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II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Political Law defined. Macariola v. Asuncion. That branch of public law which
deals with the organization, and operations of the governmental organs of the
State and defines the relations of the State with the inhabitants of its territory.

III.

Constitution defined. That body of rules and maxims in accordance with which
the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised.
Essential parts of a good written Constitution: a) Constitution of Liberty. The
series of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of
the citizens and imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means
of securing the enjoyment of those rights. b) Constitution of Government. The
series of provisions outlining the organization of the government, enumerating
its powers, laying down certain rule srelative to its administration, and defining
the electorate, e.g., Arts. VI, VII
, VIII and IX. c) Constitution of Sovereignty. The provisions pointing out the
mode or
procedure in accordance with which formal changes in the fundamental law
may
be brought about, e.g., Art. XVII.

Limitation: No amendment in this manner shall be authorized within five years

following the ratification of this Constitution nor more often than once every five
years thereafter.
Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution
or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose.
There are three systems of initiative, namely: initiative on the Constitution which
refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution; initiative on
statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.

In case of doubt, the provisions should be considered self-executing;

mandatory rather than directory; and prospective rather than retroactive.

Indirect Initiative is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition

sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action.

Self-executing provisions. A provision which lays down a general principle is

usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in it self and
becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or
that which supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.

The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative

upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition of the people.
Thus, two essential elements must be present: (1) The people must author and
sign the entire proposal; no agent or representative can sign in their behalf. (2)
As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in the petition.
The rationale for these requisites is that the signature requirement would be
meaningless if the person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is
that he is signing, and more importantly, a loose interpretation of the
subscription requirement would pose a significant potential for fraud.

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v. GSIS. If a

law or norm of the Constitution, that law or contract, whether promulgated by
the legislative or the executive branch of the Government or entered into by
private persons for private purposes, is null and void, and without any force and
effect. Since the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law of the land, it
is deemed written in every statute and every contract.

Constitutional Convention, which may be called into

existence either by a 2/3 vote of all the members of
Congress, or (if such vote is not obtained) by a majority
vote of all the members of Congress with the question of
whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the
people in a plebiscite [Sec. 3, Art. XVII].
People, through the power of initiative [Sec. 2, Art. XVI/].
Requisite: A petition of at least 12% of the total number of
registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
therein.

Peoples initiative applies only to an amendment, not a revision, of the

Constitution.
Peoples inititiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution,
inasmuch as the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments, as shown
by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Amendment vs. Revision. LAMBINO V. COMELEC. Distinctions between

revision and amendment, as follows:
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
Constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks and balances. There is also revision if the change alters the
substantial entirety of the Constitution.
On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces,
deletes, without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the Constitution; while amendment generally affects only
the specific provision being amended.

The proposed amendment shall become part of the Constitution when ratified
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than 60 nor later
than 90 days after the approval of the proposal by Congress or the
Constitutional Convention, or after the certification by the Commission on
Elections of the sufficiency of the petition for initiative under Sec. 2, Art. XVII.
Doctrine of proper submission. There can no longer be a question on whether
the time given to the people to determine the merits and demerits of the
proposed amendment is adequate.

In determining whether the Lambino proposal involves an amendment or a

revision, the Court considered the two-part test.(Quantitative and Qualitative
Test)
First, the quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in
its provisions as to change directly the substance entirety of the Constitution
by the deletion or alteration of numerous provisions. The court examines only
the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
Second, the qualitative test, which inquires into the qualitative effects of the
proposed change in the Constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change
will accomplish such far-reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision.

The plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular elections.

SANIDAD VS COMELEC. Judicial Review of Amendments. The question is
now regarded as subjected to judicial review, because invariably, the issue will
boil down to whether or not the constitution provisions on amendment had been
followed.
Judicial Review. ANGARA v. ELECTORAL COMMISSION. The power of the
courts to test the validity of executive and legislative acts in light of their
conformity with the Constitution. This is not an assertion of superiority by the
courts over the other departments, but merely an expression of the supremacy
of the Constitution. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. The power is inherent in the Judicial Department, by
virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers.

The Lambino proposal constituted a revision, not simply an amendment, of the

Constitution, because it involved a change in the form of government, from
presidential to parliamentary, and a shift from the present bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.

BONDOC V. PINEDA. That duty is part of the judicial power vested in the courts
by an express grant under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution which states:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of Government.

Steps in the amendatory process:

a) Proposal [Secs. 1-3, Art. XVII]. The adoption of the suggested
change in the Constitution. A proposed amendment may come from:
I.
Congress, by a vote of % of all its members.
Majority of authorities opine that this is to be understood as 3/4 of the Senate
and 3/4 of the House of Representatives.

YNOT v IAC. SC said that the lower courts should not shy away from the task of
deciding constitutional questions when properly raised before them. However,
in CIR vs CTA, it was held that the fact that the constitutional question was
properly raised by a party is not alone sufficient for the respondent court to pass
upon the issue of constitutionality; every court should approach a constitutional
question with grave care and considerable caution.

OCCENA V. COMELEC. Choice of method of proposal. Whether made directly

by
Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full discretion of
the legislature.

Functions of Judicial Review. SALONGA V. PANO

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a) Checking
b) Legitimating
c) Symbolic

Political Questions. Political questions are, ordinarily, outside the pale of judicial
review. TANADA V. CUENCO. The term 'political questionconnotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely a question of policy. It refers to those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
NB: The scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by the 2nd
paragraph, Sec. 1, Art. VIII, particularly the portion which vests in the judiciary
the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.

Requisites of Judicial Review.

o

Actual case or controversy. GUINGONA V. COURT OF APPEALS. It is a

conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims which can be
resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. The controversy must
be definite and concrete, bearing up on the legal relations of parties who are
pitted against each other due to their ad verse legal interests.
o
o

PACU V. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION. A request for an advisory

opinion is not an actual case or controversy. But an action for declaratory
relief is proper for judicial determination.
PROVINCE OF BATANGAS V. ROMULO. The issues raised in the case
must not be moot and academic, or because of subsequent
developments, have become moot and academic. A moot and academic
case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value.
DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO. However, the moot and academic
principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the
courts from resolving a case. It was held that courts will still decide cases
otherwise moot and academic if: (a) there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; (b) there is an exceptional character of the situation and
paramount public interest is involved; (c) the constitutional issues raised
require formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar
and the public; and (d) the case is capable of repetition yet evasive of
review.
BELGICA vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY. On the Constitutionality of the
Pork Barrel System. The questions are ripe for adjudication since the
challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization are
currently and operational, hence, there exists an immediate or threatened
injury to petitioners as a result on the unconstitutional use of these public
funds.
MONTESCLAROS vs COMELEC. SC held that a proposed bill is not
subject of judicial review, because it creates no rights and imposes no
duties enforceable by the courts. Any hypothetical issue posed which had
not yet ripened into actual case or controversy is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.

The constitutional question must be raised be the proper party. A proper

party is one who has sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining an injury
as a result of the act complained of. To be a proper party, one must have
legal standing, or locus standi.
o Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a
given question In private suits, standing is governed by the real parties in
interest rule, as contained in Sec. 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit.
o SALONGA V. WARNER BARNES. To establish legal standing, he has to
make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and
securing relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
o CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE & BUILDERS ASSOCIATION VS ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION. It was held that legal standing calls for
more than just generalized grievance.
o PEOPLE V. VERA. To determine legal standing, the Court adopted the
direct injury test, which states that a person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result.
o IBP V. ZAMOR. It was clarified that the term interest means a material
interest, an interest in issue affected by the challenged official act, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere
incidental interest.

DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO. The Supreme Court summarized its

earlier rulings and declared that petitioners may be accorded standing to
sue provided that the following requirements are met: (1) The case
involves constitutional issues: (2) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of
illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional (the prevailing doctrine is that taxpayers may question
contracts entered into by the national government or by governmentowned or -controlled corporations allegedly in contravention of law [Abaya
v. Ebdane]; (3) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in
the validity of the election law in question: (4) For concerned citizens,
there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early: and (5) For legislators, there must
be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives
as legislators.
IMBONG vs OCHOA. The RH Law drastically affects the constitutional
rights to life and health, freedom of religion and of expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these, and the fact that the issues
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the
petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate
court adjucdication.
PEOPLE V. VERA. Supreme Court declared that the Government of the
Philippines is a proper party to question the validity of its own laws,
because more than any one, it should be concerned with the
constitutionality of its acts.
OPOSA V. FACTORAN, Jr. SC ruled that not only do ordinary citizens
have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights;
they can do so in representation of their own and future generations. The
Court said : We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generations file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.
CHR-Employees Association vs CHR. Protests due to the upgrading and
collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level
positions in the Commission, resulting in the demoralization of rank-andfile employees. This, according to the Supreme Court, meets the injury
test.
CUTARAN vs DENR. Courts will not touch an issue involving the validity
of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or
performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person
contesting its legality.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE
PHILIPPINES VS COMELEC. They do not have any interest as registered
voters, because the case does not involve the right of suffrage. Neither do
they have an interest as taxpayers because the case does not include the
exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. However, they still
have the locus standi over the case because it would suffer losses from
the implementation of Sec 92 of BP 881 since it would be required to give
free airtime to the COMELEC.
TATAD V. GARCIA. It was held that the prevailing doctrine in taxpayer
suits is to allow taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the
national government or GOCCs allegedly in contravention of law (citing
the Kilosbayan ruling). Accordingly, in Information Technology Foundation
v. Comelec, reiterated the principle that taxpayers are allowed to sue
when there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds, or if public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or when petitioners
seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
Facial Challenge. The established rule is that a party can question the
validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. The
exception is the so-called facial challenge. But the only time a facial
challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom
of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a
party to challenge the validity of a statute even though, as applied to him,
it is not unconstitutional, but it might be if applied to others not before the
Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the
statute on its face, rather than as applied, is permitted in the interest of
preventing a chilling effect on freedom of expression.
Facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine, to
be used sparingly and only as a last resort, thus, is generally disfavored. A
facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully since the challenger must establish that
there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here,
petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this situation exists.
Void-for-Vagueness. Related to overbreadth, this doctrine holds that a
law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. The Court has
stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable
degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld, not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude.
ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them, much less do we have to
define every word we use.

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Contiguous zone;

EEZ; and

High seas.
It also gives the coastal state jurisdiction over foreign
vessels depending in where the vessel is located.
O ARIGO V SWIFT. SC ruled that a foreign warships unauthorized entry into
The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one
opportunity. MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO. It was held that the earliest
situation in which Article 30 and 31 of UNCLOS may apply (A.30 nonopportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before
compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State &
a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, If not raised in the
A.31 responsibility of the flag State for damages caused by a warship or
pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the
other government ship operated for non-commercial purpose), even if the
trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
flag State if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS. Nono ESTARIJA V. RANADA. Where the petitioner, who had been ordered
membership of the US does not mean that the latter will disregard the rights
dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman for dishonesty and grave
of the PH as a coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea.
misconduct, raised the issue of constitutionality of the provision in RA
O Right of Innocent Passage. The archipelagic State enjoys sovereign
6770 (Ombudsman Act) for the first time before the Court of Appeals, the
rights over all waters enclosed by the baselines, described as
Supreme Court said that petitioner raised the issue at the earliest
archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth and distance from the
opportunity. He could not raise it in his motion for reconsideration before
coast. However, in order to preserve international navigation, especially
the Ombudsman, because the Office of the Ombudsman is without
through waters that were formerly high seas, all States enjoy the right
jurisdiction to entertain questions of the constitutionality of a law.
of innocent passage through archipelagic waters. The archipelagic
o However, in criminal cases, the question can be raised at any time at the
State may, however, suspend temporarily, without discrimination, such
discretion of the court; in civil cases, the question can be raised at any
right in specified areas, when deemed essential for the protection of
stage of the proceedings if necessary for the determination of the case
national security, PROVIDED that such suspension shall take effect
itself; and in every case, except when there is estoppel, it can be raised at
only AFTER DUE PUBLICATION. (Articles 52 and 53 of UNCLOS)
any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.
O Contiguous Zone. 12 nautical miles. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
200 nautical miles. The coastal state shall have sovereign rights over
The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the
all economic resources of the sea, sea bed, and subsoil in these areas.
case itself. Lis Mota literally means the cause of the suit or action. It is
However, in the EEZ, other State enjoy freedom of navigation and
rooted in the principle of separation of powers and is merely an offshoot of
overflight, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and other
the presumption of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our
internationally recognized lawful uses of the sea in relation to these
coequal branches of the government.
freedoms.
O MAGALLONA V ERMITA. RA 9522 (is constitutional) is statutory tool to
Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality. Two views: a) Orthodox view: An
demarcate the countrys maritime zone and continental shelf. Also,
unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the Constitutions
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative, as If it had not been
delineation of internal waters, because under current norms of
passed at all. b) Modern view: Courts simply refuse to recognize the law and
international law, the right of innocent passage is recognized over
determine the rights of the parties as if the statute had no existence.
archipelagic waters or internal waters however they may be
denominated.
Operative Fact Doctrine. As a general rule, the nullification of an Government.
unconstitutional law or act carries with it the illegality of its effects. However, in
o U.S. V. DORR. Defined. The agency or instrumentality through which the
cases where the nullification of its effects will result inequity and injustice, the
will of the
operative fact doctrine may apply, and the effects of the unconstitutional act will
o State is formulated, expressed and realized.(See also, Sec 2 (1),
have to be recognized.
Adminisgtrative Code of 1987)
o Functions. Traditionally, the functions of government have been classified
Partial Unconstitutionality. Requisites: a) The Legislature must be willing to
into constituent, which are mandatory for the Government to perform
retain the valid portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability
because they constitute the very bonds of society, such as the
clause in the law; and b) The valid portion can stand independently as law.
maintenance of peace and order, regulation of property and property
rights, the administration of justice, etc; and ministrant, those intended to
promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people, and which are
merely optional for Government to perform.
ARTICLE I NATIONAL TERRITORY
o
In FONTANILLA V. MALIAMAN, the SC said that the functions of
government are classified into governmental or constituent and
CIR V. CAMPOS RUEDA. Definition of a State. A community of persons, more
proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty
or less numerous, permanently occupying a definite portion of territory,
and therefore compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of
independent of external control, and possessing a government to which a great
proprietary functions and thus considered as optional.
body of inhabitants render habitual obedience.
o Doctrine of Parens Patriae. CABANAS V. PILAPIL. Literally mean parent
of the people. As such, the Government may act as guardian of the rights
Elements of a State.
of people who may be disadvantaged or suffering from some disability or
misfortune.
People. Adequate number for self-sufficiency and defense; of both sexes for
o
Classification: De jure vs. De facto.
perpetuity
o Kinds of de facto government: That which takes possession or control of,
Territory.
or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal
o Territorial Sea. (Article 3, UNCLOS) That portion of the open sea adjacent
government and maintains itself against the will of the latter; that which is
to the shore of a State over which that State exercises jurisdiction. Every
established by the inhabitants of a territory who rise in insurrection against
State has the right to established the breadth of its territorial sea to a limit
the parent state; and that which is established by the invading forces of an
not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from the baseline.
enemy who occupy a territory in the course of war. The last is
o Straight baseline method: Imaginary straight lines are drawn joining the
denominated a de facto government of paramount force.
outermost points of outermost islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area
o Presidential vs. parliamentary government. The principal distinction is that
the ratio of which should not be more than 9:1 (water to land); provided that
in a presidential government, there is separation of executive and
the drawing of baselines shall not depart, to any appreciable extent, from
legislative powers (the first is lodged in the President, while the second is
the general configuration of the archipelago. The waters within the
vested in Congress); while in a parliamentary government, there is fusion
baselines shall be considered internal waters; while the breadth of the
of both executive and legislative powers in Parliament, although the actual
territorial sea shall then be measured from the baselines. (Article 48,
exercise of the executive powers is vested in a Prime Minister who is
UNCLOS)
chosen by, and accountable to, Parliament.
o MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO VS SCOTT SWIFT. The International law of
o Unitary vs. federal government. A unitary government is a single,
the sea is generally defined as body of treaty rules and customary norms
centralized government, exercising powers over both the internal and
governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the
external affairs of the State; while a federal government consists of
exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of PIL
autonomous state (local) government units merged into a single State,
regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans. [On
with the national government exercising a limited degree of power over
right of Coastal State] The freedom to use the worlds maritime waters is
the domestic affairs but generally full direction of the external affairs of the
one of the oldest customary principles of international law. The UNCLOS
State.
gives the coastal state sovereign rights in varying degrees over different
zones of the sea which are:
Internal waters;
Sovereignty

Territorial sea;
o

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK VS. ANTITERRORISM COUNCIL. The doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing on their faces
statues in free speech cases. They cannot be made to do service when
what is involved in a criminal statute.

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Sovereignty. The supreme and uncontrollable power inherent in a State

by which that State is governed.

Kinds. (1)Legal, which is the power to issue final commands; or Political,

which is the sum total of all the influences which lie behind the law.
(2)Internal, or the supreme power over everything within its territory; or
External, also known as independence, which is freedom from external
control.

LAUREL V. MISA.
comprehensiveness,
imprescriptibility.

Characteristics:
absoluteness,

permanence,
indivisibility,

exclusiveness,
inalienability,

Test to determine if suit is against the State. REPUBLIC vs FELICIANO.. On the

assumption that a decision is rendered against the public officer or agency
impleaded, will enforcement thereof require an affirmative act from the State,
such as the appropriation of the needed amount to satisfy judgment. If so, then
it is a suit againt the State.
O TAN VS DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY. SC said that the State immunity from
suit may be invoked as long as the suit really affects the property, rights or
interests of the State and not merely those of the officers nominally made
party defendants.

Effects of change in sovereignty: Political laws are abrogated.

MACARIOLA V. ASUNCION; municipal laws remain in force. VILAS V.
CITY OF MANILA.
o Effects of belligerent occupation: No change in sovereignty. PERALTA V.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS. However, political laws, except the law on
treason, are suspended [Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856]; municipal laws
remain in force unless repealed by the belligerent occupant. At the end of
the belligerent occupation, when the occupant is ousted from the territory,
the political laws which had been suspended during the occupation shall
automatically become effective again, under the doctrine of jus
postliminium.
o Dominium v. Imperium: Dominium refers to the capacity to own or acquire
property, including lands held by the State in its proprietary capacity; while
Imperium is the authority possessed by the State embraced in the concept
of sovereignty.
Jurisdiction.
O

Territorial: power of the State over persons and things within its territory.
Exempt are: (WHO vs AQUINO)
a)
Foreign states, heads of state, diplomatic representatives, and
consuls to a certain degree;
b) Foreign state property, including embassies, consulates, and public
vessels engaged in noncommercial activities;
c) Acts of state;
d) Foreign merchant vessels exercising the rights of innocent passage
or involuntary entry, such as arrival under stress;
e) Foreign armies passing through or stationed in its territory with its
permission; and
f) Such other persons or property, including organizations like the
United Nations, over which it may, by agreement, waive jurisdiction.

Personal: power of the State over its nationals, which may be exercised by
the State even if the individual is outside the territory of the State.

Extraterritorial: power exercised by the State beyond its territory in the

following cases:
(a) Assertion of its personal jurisdiction over its nationals abroad; or the
exercise of its rights to punish certain offenses committed outside its
territory against its national interests even if the offenders are
nonresident aliens;
(b) By virtue of its relations with other states or territories, as when it
establishes a colonial protectorate, or a condominium, or administers
a trust territory, or occupies enemy territory in the course of war;
(c) When the local state waives its jurisdiction over persons and things
within its territory, as when a foreign army stationed therein remains
under the jurisdiction of the sending state;
(d) By the principle of exterritoriality, as illustrated by the immunities of
the head of state in a foreign country;
(e) Through enjoyment of easements or servitudes, such as the
easement of innocent passage or arrival under stress;
(f) The exercise of jurisdiction by the state in the high seas over its
vessels; over pirates; in the exercise of the right to visit and search;
and under the doctrine of hot pursuit;
(g) The exercise of limited jurisdiction over the contiguous zone and the
patrimonial sea, to prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary regulations.

it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending

State. The cloak of protection is removed the moment the foreign agent is
sued in his individual capacity, as when he is sought to be made liable for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in
bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
ARIGO v SWIFT. In a suit filed against the US naval officials to hold them
liable for damage caused to Tubbataha reefs by USS Guardian, a US
warship, the petitioners argued that there is a waiver of immunity from suit
found in the VFA. The SC rejected this contention, stating that the waiver of
State Immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as the present petition.

Suit against Government agencies.

Incorporated. An incorporated agency possesses a juridical personality
independent of the State. If its charter provides that the agency can sue and be
sued, then the suit will lie, including tort.
o MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO, LA UNION vs JUDGE FIRME.
Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and, therefore, should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. However, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their respective charters provide
that they can sue and be sued.
o ATO vs SPS. RAMOS. ATO is an agency of government not performing a
purely governmental or sovereign function, but instead involved in the
management and maintenance of Loakan Airport, an activity that is not the
exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity, Thus, cannot
invoke State immunity from suit.
Unincorporated. An incorporated agency has no juridical personality
independent of the Government. To determine its suability, one has to inquire
into principal functions of the agency.
o If governmental, NO SUIT w/o consent. FAROLAN VS CTA. Bureau of
Customs, being unincorporated agency without a separate juridical
personality, enjoys immunity from suit. It is invested with an inherent
power of sovereignty, namely power of taxation; it performs governmental
functions. Department of Agriculture could be sued on the contract for
security services entered into by it (subject to prior filing of the claim with
the COA)m despite it being an unincorporated agency performing
primarily governmental functions.
o
If proprietary. SUIT WILL LIE because when the State engages in
principally proprietary functions, then it descends to the level of a private
individual, and may therefore, be vulnerable to suit. (Civil Aeronautics
Administration vs CA)
Suit against Public Officers. (DOH vs Philippine Pharmawealth)The doctrine of
State immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the State for
acts performed by them in the discharge of their duties within the scope of their
authority.
SANDERS V. VERIDIANO. Supreme Court spoke of a number of wellrecognized exceptions when a public officer may be sued without the prior
consent of the State, viz:
a) to compel him to do an act required by law;
b) to restrain him from enforcing an act claimed to be unconstitutional;
c) to compel the payment of damages from an already appropriated
assurance fund or to refund tax over-payments from a fund already
available for the purpose;
d) to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by himself
without the State having to do a positive act to assist him; and
e) where the government it self has violated its own laws, because the
doctrine of state immunity cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice.

STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. Sec 3, Art. XVI.

SHAUF V. COURT OF APPEALS. The unauthorized acts of government

officials are not acts of state; thus, the public officer may be sued and held
personally liable in damages for such acts, Where a public officer has
committed an ultra vires act, or where there is a showing of bad faith, malice or
gross negligence, the officer can be held personally accountable, even if such
acts are claimed to have been performed in connection with official duties.

Basis. REPUBLIC V. VILLASOR. There can be no legal right against the

authority which makes the law on which the right depends. However, it may be
sued if it gives consent, whether express or implied. The doctrine is also known
as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.
Immunity is enjoyed by other States, consonant with the public international law
principle of par in parem non habet imperium. The Head of State, who is
deemed the personification of the State, is inviolable, and thus, enjoys immunity
from suit.
o The States diplomatic agents, including consuls to a certain extent, are
also exempt from the jurisdiction of local courts and administrative tribunals.
A foreign agent can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as

Where the public official is sued in his personal capacity, the doctrine of state
immunity will not apply, even if the acts complained of were committed while the
public official was occupying a public position.
Need for Consent.

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REPUBLIC V. FELICIANO. In order that suit may lie against the state, there
must be consent, either express or implied. Where no consent is shown, state
immunity from suit may be invoked as a defense by the courts sua sponte at
any stage of the proceedings, because waiver of immunity, being in derogation
of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly and must be construed in strictissimi
juris. Accordingly, the complaint (or counterclaim) against the State must allege
the existence of such consent (and where the same is found), otherwise, the
complaint may be dismissed.

NHA v HEIRS of QUIVELONDO. it was held that if the funds belong to a public
corporation or a government-owned or controlled corporation which is clothed
with a personality of its own, then the funds are not exempt from garnishment.
Suability not equated with outright liability. Liability will have to be determined by
the Court on the basis of the evidence and the applicable law.

Express consent. Express consent can be given only by an act of the

legislative body.
o General Law. An example of a general law granting consent is
CA327, as amended by PD 1445, which requires that all money
claims against the government must first be filed with the
Commission on Audit before suit is instituted in court. In
MINISTERIO V. CITY OF CEBU, the Supreme Court said that suit
may lie because the doctrine of State immunity cannot be used to
perpetrate an injustice.
o Special Law. REPUBLIC V. PURISIMA.This form of consent must be
embodied in a statute and cannot be given by a mere counsel.

The inherent powers of the State are: (a) Police Power; (b) Power of
Eminent Domain; and (c) Power of Taxation.
Police Power. Definition. It is the power of promoting public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.
(Scope/Characteristics)Police power is the most pervasive, the least limitable,
and the most demanding of the three powers. The justification is found in the
Latin maxims: salus populi est suprema lex, and sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas.
ICHONG V. HERNANDEZ. Police power cannot be bargained away through the
medium of a treaty or a contract.

Implied consent.

LUTZ V. ARANETA. The taxing power may be used as an implement of police

power.

When the State commences litigation, it becomes vulnerable to a counterclaim,

FROILAN V. PAN ORIENTAL SHIPPING. Intervention by the State would
constitute commencement of litigation, except when the State intervenes not for
the purpose of asking for any affirmative relief, but only for the purpose of
resisting the claim precisely because of immunity from suit.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM. Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the police
objective

When the State enters into a business contract. U.S. V. RUIZ. Where the
Supreme Court distinguished between contracts entered into by the State in
jure imperii (sovereign acts) and in jure gestionis (commercial or proprietary
acts). Where the contract is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, there is no waiver
of immunity, and no implied consent may be derived therefrom. In U. S. v. Ruiz,
it was held that the contract for the repair of wharves was a contract in jus
imperii, because the wharves were to be used in national defense, a
governmental function. In JUSMAG Phil. v. NLRC, the engagement of the
services of private respondent was held to be performance of a governmental
function by JUSMAG, on behalf of the United States. Accordingly, JUSMAG
may not be sued under such a contract. In Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, it
was held that contracts entered into by a sovereign state in connection with the
establishment of a diplomatic mission, including contracts for the upkeep or
maintenance of air conditioning units, generator sets, electrical facilities, water
heaters and water motor pumps of the embassy and the Ambassadors
residence, are contracts in jure imperii. The fact that the contract contains a
provision that any legal action arising out of the agreement shall be settled
according to the laws of the Philippines and by a specified court of the
Philippines does not necessarily mean a waiver of the states sovereign
immunity from suit.

ORTIGAS & CO. V. CA. A law enacted in the exercise of police power to
regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive
effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or contracts. Police power
legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already
in existence. Non impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to
yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of the police power.
PRC V. DE GUZMAN. It is true that the Court has upheld the constitutional right
of every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. But like all
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. This
regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the
public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance.
CHAVEZ V. ROMULO. The right to bear arms is merely a statutory privilege.
The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither
does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside one s residence
may be revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be
considered as absolute as to be beyond the reach of the police power.

In U.S. v. Guinto, the contract bidded out for barbershop facilities in the Clark
Field US Air Force Base was deemed commercial. Similarly, in a companion
case, U.S. v. Rodrigo, a contract for restaurant services within the Camp John
Hay Air Station was likewise held commercial in character.

CARLOS SUPERDRUG CORPORATION V. DSWD. When conditions so

demand, as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the
primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by the due
process clause, must yield to the general welfare.

NB: However, that in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that even if, in
exercising the power of eminent domain, the State exercises a power jus
imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary right of jus gestionis, where
property has been taken without just compensation being paid, the defense of
immunity from suit cannot be set up in an action for payment by the owner.

Who may exercise the power. The power is inherently vested in the
Legislature. However, Congress may validly delegate this power to the
President, to administrative bodies and to lawmaking bodies of local
government units. Local government units exercise the power under the
general welfare clause.
Limitations (Tests for Valid Exercise):
a) Lawful subject: The interests of the public in general as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the power.
This means that the activity or property sought to be regulated
affects the general welfare; if it does, then the enjoyment of the
rights flowing therefrom may have to yield to the interests of the
greater number. TAXICAB OPERATORS V. BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION.
b) Lawful Means: The means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on
individuals. YNOT V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT.

In Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, shares in Negros Occidental Golf and

Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) owned and registered in the name of private
respondent Benedicto were sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal
agents. In a suit for payment of dues of the sequestered shares, PCGG raised,
among others, the defense of immunity from suit. The Supreme Court held that
by entering into a Compromise Agreement with Benedicto, the Republic
stripped itself of its immunity and placed itself in the same level as its adversary.
When the State enters into a contract through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional
legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accruse and rights
and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express
consent, precisely because by entering into a contract, the sovereign descends
to the level of the citizen.

The proper exercise of the police power requires compliance with

the following requisites: (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
intereference by the State; and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. An ordinance aimed at relieving
traffic congestion meets the first standard; but declaring bus
terminals as nuisances per se and ordering their closure or
relocation contravenes the second standard LUCENA GRAND
CENTRAL TERMINAL V. JAC LINER.

Scope of Consent. Consent to be sued does not include consent to the

execution of judgment against it.
Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of the court
ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties
may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment, unless such
disbursement is covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by law.
But funds belonging to government corporations (whose charters provide that
they can sue and be sued) that are deposited with a bank are not exempt from
garnishment.

Additional Limitations [When exercised by delegate]:

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entry must be for more than a momentary period; entry

must be under warrant or color of authority;

property must be devoted to public use or otherwise

informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and

utilization of the property must be in such a way as to

oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of
the property.
Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered
by a landowner and approved by Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council for CARP coverage through the stock distribution scheme.

a) Express grant by law.

b) Within territorial limits
c) Must not be contrary to law. [Activity prohibited by law cannot, in
the guise of regulation, be allowed; an activity allowed by law may
be regulated, but not prohibited.] DE LA CRUZ V. PARAS.
Power of Eminent Domain. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right
of the state to condemn private property to public use upon payment of just
compensation. When a property interest is appropriated and applied to some
public purpose, there is need to pay just compensation.

Where there is taking in the constitutional sense, the property owner

need not file a claim for just compensation with the Commission on
Audit; he may go directly to court to demand payment. AMIGABLE
V. CUENCA.

Sec. 9, Art. Ill of the Constitution, in mandating that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation, merely imposes a limit on
the governments exercise of this power and provides a measure of protection
to the individuals right to property. An ejectment suit should not ordinarily
prevail over the States power of eminent domain. REPUBLIC V. TAGLE

d)

Jurisdiction over a complaint for eminent domain is with the Regional Trial
Court. While the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in
monetary terms, for the court is duty bound to determine the amount of just
compensation to be paid for the property, it is merely incidental to the
expropriation suit.
In expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to
dismiss the complaint, precisely because the landowner may have already
suffered damages at the start of the taking. The plaintiffs right in expropriation
cases to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to court approval and
to certain conditions. NPC V. POBRE.

Whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare

satisfies the requirement if public use.
e)

Plaintiffs right to dismiss complaint. In expropriation cases, there is no such

thing as the plaintiffs matter of right to dismiss the complaint, precisely because
the landowner may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking.
The plaintiffs right inn expropriation cases to dismiss the complaint has been
subject to court approval and to certain conditions. NPC VS POBRE.

Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain; they can
exercise the power only when expressly authorized by the Legislature. Sec. 19
of the Local Government Code confers such power to local governments, but
the power is not absolute; it is subject to statutory requirements. MASIKIP V.
CITY OF PASIG.

Just compensation mean not only the correct amount to be paid to

the owner of the land but also payment within a reasonable time
from its taking.

Requisites for exercise:

a) Necessity. When the power is exercised by the Legislature, the
question of necessity is generally a political question. (MUN. OF
MEYCAUAYAN, BULACAN V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT) but when exercised by a delegate, the determination of
whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable
question.

The fair market value of the expropriated property is determined by

its character and its price at the time of actual taking. These are 3
important concepts. It is a settled rule that the nature and character if
the land at the time of the taking is the principal criterion for
determining how much just compensation should be given to the
landowner. Judicial prerogative. The ascertainment of what
constitutes just compensation for property taken in eminent domain
cases is a judicial prerogative, and PD 76, which fixes payment on
the basis of the assessment by the assessor or the declared
valuation by the owner, is unconstitutional [EPZA v. Dulay]. PD 1533
and PD 42, insofar as they sanction executive determination of just
compensation in eminent domain cases, are unconstitutional.

The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly

addressed to the Regional Trial Court in the course of the
expropriation proceedings. If the property owner objects to the
necessity of the takeover, he should say so in his Answer to the
Complaint. The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether
there is a genuine necessity for it.

c)

Just compensation. Concept. The full and fair equivalent of the

property taken; it is the fair market value of the property. It is settled
that the market value of the property is that sum of money which a
person, desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but
not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and
received therefore. The measure is not the takers gain, but the
owners loss.
No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential
damages. Consequential damages are awarded if, as a result of the
expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers from
impairment or decrease in value.
No consequential damages should be awarded if the entire property,
and not merely a portion, is being expropriated.

Who may exercise the power. Congress and, by delegation, the President,
administrative bodies, local government units, and even private enterprises
performing public services.

b)

Public Use. Concept. As a requirement for eminent domain, public

use is the general concept of meeting public need or public
exigency. It is not confined to actual use by the public in its
traditional sense. The idea that public use is strictly limited to clear
cases of use by the public has been abandoned. The term public
use has now been held to be synonymous with public interest,
public benefit, public welfare, and public convenience REYES V.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY.

In Republic (DAR) v. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 758, it was held

that under R.A. 6657 (CARL), the decision of the provincial
adjudicator need not be appealed to the DARAB before resort may
be made to the RTC. The RTC, as special agrarian court, is given
original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases,
namely: (1) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners; and (2) the prosecution of all criminal offenses und er
R.A. 6657.

Private Property. Private property already devoted to public use

cannot be expropriated by a delegate of legislature acting under a
general grant of author ity. CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE
COMMUNITY. All private property capable of ownership may be
expropriated, except money and choses in action. Even services
may be subject to eminent domain REPUBLIC V. PLDT.
Taking in the constitutional sense. Exercise of the power of eminent
domain does not always result in the taking or appropriation of title to
the expropriated property; it may only result in the imposition of a
burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of
title or possession.

It is a settled rule that the determination of just compensation is a

judicial prerogative. The DAR land valuation is only preliminary and
is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner or
any other interested party.
Reckoning point of market value of the property. Compensation is
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint for eminent
domain, but where the filing of the complaint occurs after the actual
taking of the property and the owner would be given undue
incremental advantages arising from the use to which the
government devotes the property expropriated, just compensation is
determined as of the date of the taking. It was further declared that
the value of the property must be determined either as of the date of
the taking or the filing of the
complaint, whichever comes first.

The owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of

the land if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely
deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposing of
conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal
of the property.
In REPUBLIC V. CASTELVI, the Supreme Court enumerated the
following requisites for valid taking:

the expropriator must enter a private property;

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determined and the process be concluded under RA 6657. The fair
market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of the taking, or the time when the
landowner is deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such
as, when title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries.

Form of compensation. Compensation is to be paid in money and no

other. But in Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, it was held that in agrarian reform, payment is
allowed to be made partly in bonds, because under the CARP, we
do not deal with the traditional exercise of the power of eminent
domain; we deal with a revolutionary kind of expropriation.

Power of Taxation. Definition; nature and scope of power. Who may exercise.
Primarily, the legislature; also: local legislative bodies ; and to a limited extent,
the President when granted delegated tariff powers.

However, LBP vs CA,the deposit of compensation must be in cash

or in Land Bank bonds, not in any other form, and certainly not in a
trust account.
The market value of the lot should be determined as of the time the
parties signed the compromise agreement and the same was
approved, because this is tantamount to EPZA impliedly agreeing to
pay the market value of the lot in 1993. EPZA vs Estate of Salud
Jimenez.

Limitations on the exercise.

a) Due process of law: tax should not be confiscatory.
b) Equal protection clause: Taxes should be uniform and equitable.
c) Public purpose.
i. Tax for special purpose [Sec. 29 (3), Art. VI]: Treated as a special
fund and paid out for such purpose only; when purpose is fulfilled,
the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.
Double Taxation. Additional taxes are laid on the same subject by the same
taxing jurisdiction during the same taxing period and for the same purpose.

If property is taken for public use before compensation is deposited

with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interest on its just value to be computed
from the time the property is taken to the time when the
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.

Despite lack of specific constitutional prohibition, double taxation will not be

allowed if the same will result in a violation of the equal protection clause.

Who else may be entitled to just compensation. Entitlement to the

payment of just compensation is not, however, limited to the owner,
but includes all those who have lawful interest in the property to be
condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in
possession under an executory contract.

Tax Exemptions. Requisite: No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress.
Where tax exemption is granted gratuitously, it may be revoked at will; but not if
granted for a valuable consideration.

Title to the property. Title does not pass until after payment, except
in agrarian reform. Thus, the owner of land subject to expropriation
may still dispose of the same before payment of just compensation.

Police Power v. Taxation. The Court made a conservative and pivotal distinction
between police power and taxation, holding that the distinction rests in the
purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of revenue is the primary
purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that revenue is incidentally raised
does not make the imposition a tax.

Right of landowner in case of non-payment of just compensation. As

a rule, non-payment of just compensation in an expropriation
proceeding does not entitle the private landowners to recover
possession of the expropriated lots, but only to demand payment of
the fair market value of the property.

License fee v. Tax. License fee is a police measure; tax is a revenue measure.
Amount collected for a license fee is limited to the cost of permit and
reasonable police regulation [except when the license fee is imposed on a nonuseful occupation. Amount of tax may be unlimited provided it is not
confiscatory. License fee is paid for the privilege of doing something, and may
be revoked when public interest so requires; Tax is imposed on persons or
property for revenue.

Where the government fails to pay just compensation within five

years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
possession of their property.
Writ of Possession. The issuance of the writ of possession becomes
ministerial upon the [i] filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient
in form and substance, and [ii] upon deposit made by the
government of the amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the
fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated per
current tax declaration. The determination of whether the taking of
the property is for a public purpose is not a condition precedent
before the court may issue a writ of possession. Once the requisites
mentioned above are established, the issuance of the writ becomes
a ministerial matter for the expropriation court.

Kinds of license fee.

a) For useful occupations or enterprises.
b) For non-useful occupations or enterprises. When a license fee is
imposed in order to discourage non-useful occupations or
enterprises, the amount imposed may be a bit exorbitant.
Supremacy of the national government over local governments in taxation.
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government
instrumentalities, the exercise of the power is construed strictly against local
governments.

Plaintiffs right to dismiss the complaint in eminent domain. In

expropriation cases, there is no such thing as the plaintiffs matterof-right to dismiss the complaint, precisely because the landowner
may have already suffered damages at the start of the taking. The
plaintiffs right to dismiss the complaint has always been subject to
Court approval and to certain conditions.
Right to repurchase or re-acquire the property. In Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the
property owners right to repurchase the property depends upon the
character of the title acquired by the expropriator, i.e., if land is
expropriated for a particular purpose with the condition that when
that purpose is ended or abandoned, the property shall revert to the
former owner, then the former owner can re-acquire the property.
Expropriation is an in rem proceeding, and after condemnation, the
paramount title is in the public under a new and independent title.
Expropriation under Sec. 18, Art. XII.
Taking of private property for agrarian reform is an exercise of
eminent domain and does not involve police power.
The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation on the use of the
land, but the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the
beneficiary.
Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still
incomplete, such as when the just compensation should be

ARTICLE VI LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Legislative power it is the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws.
Where Vested It is vested in Congress, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Initiative. It is the power of the people to propose amendments to the

Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for
that purpose.
Indirect Initiative. Is the exercise of initiative by the people through proposition
sent to Congress or local legislative body for action.
Referendum. Power of the elcctorate to approve or reject legislation through an
election called for the purpose.
o 3 systems of initiative. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a national legislation. Initiative on Constitution which
refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. Initiative on
local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
o Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative
and referendum petition. 1. No petition embracing more than one subject
shall be submitted to the electorate; and 2. Statutes involving emergency
measures, the enactment of which is specifically vested in Congress by
the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until 90 days after their
effectivity.

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The 2% threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list are qualified to have a seat in the house.
The 3-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it
actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of 3 seats, i.e., one qualifying
and 2 additional.
Proportional representation additional seats which is qualified party is entitled
to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes

Local initiative cannot be exercised more than 1 year.

Composition of House of Representative. Until a law is passed, the President

may fill by an appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors the
seat reserved for sectoral representation. These appointments shall be subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Apportionment of Legislative Districts. The question of the validity of
apportionment law is justiciable question.

Any elected party-list representative who changes his political affiliation or paty
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat; provided that if he changes his
political party or sectoral affiliation w/in 6 months before election, he shall not be
eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or org.

Each City with not less than 250K inhabitants shall be entitled to at least 1
representative; and Each province, irrespective of number of inhabitants, is
entitled to at least 1 reprensentative. Take note that the City must first attain
the 250K requirement, and thereafter, in the immediately following election,
such city shall have a district representative.
SEMA VS COMELEC. The Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power to
increase the allowable membership in the HOR and to reapportion legislative
district is vested exclusively in Congress.

LOZADA vs COMELEC. To fill a vacancy in the legislative department, but

elected member shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term.
Joint Sessions: Voting Separately.
Choosing the President
Determine Presidents disability
Confirming nomination of the Vice president
Declaring the existence of a state of war
Proposing constitutional amendments.

Registration; Manifestation to participate in the Party-list system. Any

organized group of persons may register as party, organization or coalition for
such purpose by filing with the COMELEC not later than 90 days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional, or sectoral party or
organization or a coalition if such parties or organization. Those already
registered need not register anew, but shall file with the COMELEC not later
than 90 days before the election a manifestation of its desire to participate in
the party-list system.

AVELINO vs CUENCO. The basis for determining the existence if a quorum in

the Senate shall be the total number of Senators who are in the country and
within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate.
PAREDES vs SADIGANBAYAN. The suspension contemplated in the
Constitution (Art. VI, Sec 16(3)) is different firm the suspension prescribed in
the anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The latter is not a penalty but a
preliminary preventive measure and is no imposed upon the petitioner for
misbehavior as member of Congress.

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC vs COMELEC. The plain

clear and unmistakable language if the law provides for two separate reasons,
among others, for delisting a party-list group, namely, it failed to participate in
the last 2 preceding elections, and that it failed to obtain at least 2% of the
votes cast in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it is
registered.

MABANAG vs LOPEZ VITO. An Enrolled bill is one duly ntroduced and finally
passed by both Houses, authenticated by the proper officers of each, and
approved by the President.

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST vs COMELEC. Track record is a record of past

performance often taken as an indicator of likely future performance. There is no
basis in law and established jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking
registration under the party-list system still needs to comply with the track record
requirement.
Each registered party, organization, or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC
not later than 45 days before the election a list of names, not less than 5, from
which a party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the
required number of votes. A person may be nominated in 1 list only. Only
persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The
list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has
lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No
change shall be allowed after the list shall have submitted to the COMELEC
except in cases where nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated , in which case the names of the substitute nominee
shall be placed in the list. Failure to submit the list of five nominees before the
election warrants the cancellation of the partys registration. The party-list
representatives shall constitute 20% of total number of the members of the
House of Representatives.

BONDOC vs PINEDA; TANADA vs CUENCO. The HRET was created as a

non-partisan court. It must be independent of Congress and devoid of patisan
influence and consideration. Disloyalty to the party and Breach of party
discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member. HRET members
enjoy security of tenure; their membership may not be terminated except for a
just cause such as expiration of congressional term, death, resignation from
political party, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other
valid causes.
SAMPAYAN vs DAZA. HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications (ERQ) of its members.
AQUINO vs COMELEC. However, the HRET may assume jurisdiction only after
the winning candidate (who is a party to the election controversy) shall have
been duly proclaimed, has taken his oath of office and has assumed the
functions if the office, because it is only then that he is said to be a member of
the House.
VILANDO vs HRET. But the power of HRET, no matter how complete and
exclusive, does not carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the
judgment of the naturalization of respondents father, in the pursuit of
disqualifying the representative.

In determining the allocation of seats for the party-list representative, the

following procedure shall be observed:

ANGARA vs ELECTORAL COMMISSION. The electoral Tribunal is

independent of the Houses of Congress.

The parties, orgs, and coalition shall be ranked from highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during elections; and
The parties, orgs, and coalitions receiving at least 2% of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to 1-seat each, provided, that those
garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes; provided finally, that each party,
orgs or coalition shall be entitled to more than 3 seats.

PENA vs HRET. Decision of HRET may be reviewed by the SC only upon

showing of grave abuse of discretion in a petition for certiorari filed under Rule
65 of the ROC.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS (CoA). GUINGONA vs GONZALES. The
SC held that a political party must have at least two elected senators for every
seat in the CoA.

VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY vs COMELEC. The court said that the

Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable parameters, to wit:

CoA shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of

Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote
of its members.

The 20% allocation the combined number of all party list congressmen shall
not exceed 20% of the total membership of the HOR.

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POLITICAL

IMBONG vs OCHOA. The one subject-one title rule expresses the principle
that the title of the law must not be so uncertain that the average person
reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or out on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the
act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject of scope of the
act.

HOR, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Hence, the
special provision adverted to is unconstitutional.
The programs, activities, projects under DAP remain valid under OPERATIVE
FACT DOCTRINE. As a general rule, the nullification if an unconstitutional law
carries with it the illegality if its objects. However, in cases where nullification of
the effects will result in inequity and injustice, the OPERATIVE FACT
DOCTRINE may apply.

It is important to emphasize that it is not the law, but the bill, which is required to
originate exclusively in the HOR, because the bill may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result may be rewriting of the whole. The
Constitution does not prohibit the filing in the Senate if a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House bill. Such act does not
contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the HOR as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it
receives the House Bill.

BELGICA vs OCHOA. Pork Barrel System (PBS) is defined as the collective

body of rules and practices that governs the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through
respective participations if the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government, including its members.
The Congressional Pork Barrel. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of
separation of powers and us, thus unconstitutional. It also violates the principle
of non-delegability of legislative power and thus, unconstitutional. Also, it
deprives the President of the exercise of his prerogative of item-veto, impairs
the system of checks and balances, hence, unconstitutional.

Approval of bills. The bill becomes a law in any of the following cases:
President approves the same and signs it.
When Congress overrides the Presidential Veto. If the president disapproves
the bill, he shall return the same, with his objections thereto contained in his
Veto Message, to the House of Origin. The Veto is overridden upon a vote
of 2/3s of all members of the House of Origin and the other House.
o No pocket Veto
o Partial Veto. As a rule, partial Veto is invalid. It is allowed only for
particular items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.
o Legislative Veto. A congressional Veto is a means whereby the
legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a
statute. It is a form of legislative control in the implementation of
particular extensive action.

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation encompasses

everything that concerns the administration of existing laws, as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or abolish. Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose
a limitation to the broad power of Congress in the absence of any constitutional
basis. Furthermore, Sec. 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1, being in the nature of an immunity,
is inconsistent with Art. XI, Sec. 1, of the Constitution which states that public
office is a public trust , as it goes against the grain of public accountability and
places PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of the courts, Congress and
other administrative bodies [Miguel v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, October 17,
2006]

Power of Appropriation. The spending power, called the power of the purse,
belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. While it is
the President who proposes the budget, still, the final s ay on the matter of
appropriation is lodged in Congress.

BENGZON V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE. The inquiry was held not
to be in aid of legislation. The Supreme Court declared that the speech of
Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into possible violation of Sec. 5, RA 3019. There
appears to be no intended legislation involved. Further, the issue to be
investigated is one over which jurisdiction has been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan; the issue had thus been preempted by that Court. To allow the
Committee to investigate would only pose the possibility of conflicting
judgments, but if the Committee s judgment is reached before the
Sandiganbayan, the possibility that its influence may be made to bear on the
ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan cannot be discounted. The SBRC s
probe and inquiry into the same justiciable controversy would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much
earlier set in.

PhilConSa vs ENRIQUEZ. The power of appropriation carries with it the power

to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law.
The provision of the GAA was not self-executory; the execution of the GAA was
still subject to a program of expenditure to be approved by the President.
ARAULLO vs AQUINO III. SC declared that DAP did not violate the provision
under Art VI Sec 29 (1). DAP was merely a program of the Executive and is not
a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government
spending. As such, no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury,
otherwise, an appropriation law would have been required. Funds which were
already appropriated were merely being realigned through the DAP. However,
such realignment must be made only within their respective office. Thus, no
cross-border transfers or augmentation may be allowed. Under the DAP, this
was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were
being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.

However, the mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a

court or a quasi-judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative inquiry, otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any
intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or an administrative
investigation.

Approrpriation law, defined. A statute the primary and specific purpose of which
is to authorize the release of public funds from the Treasury.
Classification:

STANDARD CHARTERED BANK vs SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKS. SC

held that the legislative inquiry does not violate the petitoners right to privacy.

General appropriation law: passed annually, intended to provide for the

financial operations of the entire government during one fiscal period.

MORFE V. MUTUC. The Court said that there is no infringement of the

individual s right to privacy as the requirement to disclose information is for a
valid purpose; in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in
regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in
foreign securities.

Special appropriation law: designed for a specific purpose.

Implied [extra-constitutional] limitations on appropriation measures:
Appropriation must be devoted to a public purpose.

Question hour. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of
each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any
matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to
the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the

The sum authorized to be released must be determinate, or at least

determinable.
PhilConSa vs ENRIQUEZ. Member of Congress only determine the necessity
of the realignment of savings in the allotment for their operational expenses,
because they are in the best position to do so, being knowledgeable of the
savings available in some items if the operational expenses, and which items
need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President of the Speaker of the

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security of the State or the public interest so requires, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department
heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of executive privilege.
They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only
one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom
executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except
through the power of impeachment.
ARTICLE VII THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
MAKALINTAL V. COMELEC. Sec. 18.5 of R.A. 9189 (Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003), insofar as it grants sweeping authority to the Comelec to
proclaim all winning candidates, is unconstitutional as it is repugnant to Sec. 4,
Art. VII of the Constitution vesting in Congress the authority to proclaim the
winning candidate s for the positions of President and Vice-President.
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ V. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES. The creation of the
Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to have
deprived petitioner and the other members of Congress of their congressional
prerogatives, because under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and
final report of the said Committee shall be subject to the approval of the joint
session of both Houses of Congress, voting separately.
AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR. V. JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO
CANVASS THE VOTES CAST FOR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT. The
joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive
of Sec. 4, Art. VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes f or and to proclaim
the newly-elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn
sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks.
Supreme Court as Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The Supreme Court, sitting
en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the President or Vice President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.
LOPEZ v. ROXAS. The Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not a separate and
distinct entity from the SC, albeit it has functions peculiar only to the tribunal.
No re-election: and no person who has succeeded as President and has served
as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same
office at any time.
Immunity from suit. SOLIVEN V. MAKASIAR. It was held that while the
President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit.
FORBES V. CHUOCO TIACO. The Supreme Court said that the President is
immune from civil liability.
ESTRADA V. DESIERTO. After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke
immunity from suit for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he
was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties.
GLORIA V. COURT OF APPEALS. Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego
of the President, he cannot invoke the President s immunity from suit in a case
filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President
but merely those of a department Secretary.
Executive Privilege. SENATE V. ERMITA. It has been defined as the right of the
President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public . Thus, presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings, like the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other
collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are
recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a
co-equal branch of government. However, the privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information (in this case to Congress),
the necessity for withholding the information must be of such a high degree as
to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In
light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential
to limit to the President (and to the Executive Secretary, by order of the
President) the power to invoke the privilege.

POLITICAL
Powers of the President.

Executive power. MYERS V. UNITED STATES. That the specific grant of

executive powers is not inclusive but is merely a limitation upon the general
grant of executive power. However, in Lacson v. Roque, and in Mondano v.
Silvosa, the Supreme Court opted for a stricter interpretation o f executive
power, e.g., the President s power of general supervision over local
governments could be exercised by him only as may be provided by law. It
is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this is a
question addressed to the judiciary. Thus, until and unless a law is declared
unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it regardless of his
doubts on its validity. A contrary opinion would allow him to negate the will
of the legislature and to encroach upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary.
Power of Appointment. Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested
with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given
office. It i s distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means
the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in
the public service. It is also different from the commission in that the latter is
the written evidence of the appointment.
o Appointment, classified.
Permanent or temporary. Permanent appointments are those extended
to persons possessing the qualifications and the requisite eligibility
and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure. Temporary appointments are given to persons without such
eligibility, revocable at will and without the necessity of just cause or
a valid investigation; made o n the understanding that the appointing
power has not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the
temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a permanent
choice is made. A temporary appointment and a designation are not
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Such
confirmation, if given erroneously, will not make the incumbent a
permanent appointee. It was held by the Court that where a person
is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he
shall hold the office only in a temporary capacity and may be
replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, a
designation is considered only an acting or temporary appointment
which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.

Regular or ad interm. A regular appointment is one made by the

President while Congress is in session, takes effect only after
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once
approved, continues until the end of the term of the appointee. An ad
interim appointment is one made by the President while Congress is
not in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or upon the next
adjournment of Congress. In the latter case, the ad interim
appointment is deemed by-passed through inaction. The ad interim
appointment is intended to prevent interruption s in vital government
services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in
government offices. An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment It is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can n o longer be withdrawn by the President once
the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its
permanent character. An ad interim appointment can be terminated
for two causes specified in the Constitution: disapproval of the
appointment by the Commission on Appointments, or adjournment
by Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on the
appointment.
DE RAMA V. COURT OF APPEALS. Art VIII Section 15.The Supreme Court
ruled that this provision applies only to presidential appointments. There is no
law that prohibits local executive officials from making appointments during the
last days of their tenure.
The Power of Removal. As a general rule, the power of removal may be implied
from the power of appointment. However, the President cannot remove officials
appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes certain methods for
separation of such officers from public service, e.g., Chairmen and
Commissioner s of Constitutional Commissions who can be removed only by
impeachment, or judges who are subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. In the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the
President, the same may be exercised only for cause as may be provided by
law, and in accordance with the prescribed administrative procedure.

ESTRADA vs MACAPAGAL-ARROYO. The Court declared that the elements of

a valid resignation are: intent to resign; and act of relinquishment.

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Power of Control.
o The alter ego principle. . Also known as the Doctrine of qualified political
agency. DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees. Also known as the
doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this doctrine which recognizes
the establishment of a single executive, all executives and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Applying this doctrine, the
power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly
be delegated to his Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular
executive department.
o ANGANGCO V. CASTILLO. But the power of control may be exercised by
the President only over the acts, not over the actor.
o Military Powers. The ability of the President to require a military official to
secure prior consent before appearing in Congress pertains to a wholly
different and independent specie of presidential authority -the Commanderin-Chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, these
commander- in-chief powers are not encumbered by the same degree of
restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive
control.
o The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence in such places is a power directly vested in the President under
Sec 18 VII of the Constitution. It needs not any congressional authority to
exercise this power. The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time
the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore, and she
had to act in order to prevent bloodshed and hostilities in the places
mentioned.
o IBP v ZAMORA. The SC said that when the President calls out the armed
forces ti suppress lawless violence, rebellion or invasion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power soley vested in his wisdom. The Court
cannot overrule the Presidents discretion or substitute its own.
o SANLAKAS v. REYES. A mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot
diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also no basis
for the apprehensions that, because of the declaration, military and police
authorities may resort to warrantless arrests
o
A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call out the armed
forces at his own bidding. The calling-out power to call out the AFP at his
own bidding. The calling-out power contemplated under the Constitution
exclusively belongs to the President, and an exercise of the same by
another official, even if he us the local chief, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by Sec 465 of LGC.
o Pardon. An act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is
bestowed from the punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has
committed.
o Commutation. Reduction or mitigation of the penalty.
o Reprieve. Postponement of a sentence or stay of execution.
o Parole. Release from imprisonment, but without full restoration of liberty,
as parolee is still in the custody of the law although not in confinement.
o Amnesty. Act of grace, concurred in by the legislature, usually extended to
groups of persons who committed political offenses, which puts into
oblivion the offense itself.
o Conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the Chief
Executive and the convicted criminal.
o PEOPLE V. PATRIARCA. It was held that the person released under an
amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense. Par. 3, Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty and all its
effects are thus extinguished.

POLITICAL

The Supreme Court may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate
jurisdiction; appellate jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and
concurrence.
The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and
personnel.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/ justices of
inferior courts.
The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure.
The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Salaries of judges may not be reduced; the Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Fiscal Autonomy. It should not be forgotten that in invoking ones constitutional
right to information whether in the spirit of public accountability, transparency
or some other cause the need to preserve the integrity and independence of
the judiciary must be weighted. It must be invoked, and can only be upheld, if
under the circumstances it would not result in endangering, diminishing or
destroying the independence and security of the members of the judiciary in the
performance of their judicial functions, or expose them to revenge for adverse
decisions. The independence of the judiciary should be protected not because
the Court seeks to create an exception for themselves, but because there is a
need to ensure that the Court will be able to perform its role I the system of
checks and balances.

Sec. 15, Art. VII. Relate this to the constitutional prohibition against midnight
appointments which states that two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a President or acting
President shall not make appointments except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
In Re: Mateo Valenzuela, A.M. No. 98-5-01. SC. it was held that during this
period (when appointments are prohibited), the President is not required to
make appointments to the courts, nor allowed to do so. While the filling up of
vacancies in the Judiciary is in the public interest, there is no showing in this
case of any compelling reason to justify the issuance of the appointment during
the period of the ban.
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ v. JBC. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be
composed of 7 members ONLY. Thus, the inclusion of another member,
whether with one whole vote, or half of it, violates that constitutional mandate.
In JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or HOR, is
constitutionality empowered to represent the entire Congress.
En Banc/Division Cases. FORTICH V. CORONA. When the required number is
not obtained (cases in Division), such case shall be decided en banc. The
Supreme Court interpreted the provision by drawing a distinction between
cases on the one hand, and matters on the other hand, such that cases are
decided, while matters are resolved. On the basis of this distinction, only
cases are referred to the Supreme Court en banc for decision whenever the
required number of votes is not obtained. Further, no doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be
modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Power of the SC. Original Jurisdiction.
Francisco, Jr. v Toll Regulatory Board. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit
or nullify the acts of the legislative and executive officials.
It has been judicially declared that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
even if the branch, instrumentality or agency does not exercise judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial functions.

ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Appellate Jurisdiction. Ruffy v. Chief of Staff. Note that this power does not
include the power of the Supreme Court to review decisions of administrative
bodies, but is limited to final judgments and orders of the lower courts..

The Judicial Power. The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its
processes and orders to as to make them conformable with law and justice
includes the right to reverse itself, especially when, in its honest opinion, it has
committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision
will cause injustice to a party litigant. The Court is not precluded from examining
its own ruling and rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence
to res judicata would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.

The Supreme Court, alone, may initiate and promulgate the Rules of Court.
The Supreme Court, alone, may order temporary detail of judges.
The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary.

PEOPLE V. REDULOSA. Only in cases where the penalty actually imposed is

death must the trial court forward the records of the case to the Supreme Court
for automatic review of the.
GARCIA V. PEOPLE. Where the penalty imposed is merely reclusion perpetua,
the accused should appeal the decision of conviction, otherwise, the judgment
of conviction will become final and executory.

Constitutional Safeguards to insure the independence of the Judiciary.

The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by the
legislature.
The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.

REPUBLIC V. SANDIGANBAYAN. SC held that the appellate jurisdiction of the

Supreme Court over decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan is limited
to questions of law. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy

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concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts;

or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens

of the Philippine Islands. x x x

Writ of Amparo. The nature and time-tested role of amparo has shown that it is
an effective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of constitutional
rights. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be
protected.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were
Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children
are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly
evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus,
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.

Writ of Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is an independent remedy to

protect the right to privacy, especially the right to informational privacy. The writ
of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in
life, liberty or security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act
or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, honor and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship x x
x. So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If
Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can
also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
(Valles v. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])

Writ of Kalikasan. It is a remedy available to a natural or juridical person, entity

authorized by law, peoples organization, non-governmental organization, or
any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity, involving
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Writ of Continuing Mandamus. When any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law,
rule or regulation or right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or
enjoyment of such right, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. As a special civil action, the writ of
continuing Mandamus may be availed of to compel the performance of an act
specifically enjoined by law. It permits the court to retain jurisdiction after
judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs
mandated under the court's decision. For this purpose, the court may compel
the submission of compliance reports from the respondent government
agencies as well as avail of other means to monitor compliance with its
decision.

18.

What are the ways of acquiring citizenship? Discuss.

Held: There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by
naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds
of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at
the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.

As defined in the x x x Constitution, natural-born citizens are those citizens of

the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
his Philippine citizenship.

Decisions of the SC. DIZON V. JUDGE LOPEZ. A decision need not be a

complete recital of the evidence presented. So long as the factual and legal
basis are clearly and distinctly set forth supporting the conclusions drawn
therefrom, the decision arrived at is valid. However, it is imperative that the
decision not simply be limited to the dispositive portion but must state the
nature of the case, summarize the facts with reference to the record, and
contain a statement of applicable laws and jurisprudence and the tribunals
statement and conclusions on the case. The decision, which consisted only of
the dispositive portion (denominated a sin perjuicio judgment) was held invalid.

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former
Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. (Antonio
Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

Citizenship
19.
To be naturalized, what must an applicant prove? When and what
are the conditions before the decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes
executory?

17.
To what citizenship principle does the Philippines adhere to?
Explain, and give illustrative case.
Held: The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the
parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of
jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.

Held: To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the

qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a
Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory
only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2)
has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of government promulgated rules; or (4)
committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any
government announced policies (Section 1, R.A. 530). (Antonio Bengson III v.
HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16,

1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa
Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a year before the 1935
Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of
the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

20.
What qualifications must be possessed by an applicant for
naturalization?

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resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the
Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the
election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining the age of
majority. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.

Held: Section 2, Act 473 provides the following qualifications:

a
b
c

d
e
f

He must be not less than 21 years of age on the day of the hearing of the
petition;
He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than
ten years;
He must be of good moral character and believes in the principles underlying
the Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the
Philippines in his relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living;
He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand
pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade,
profession, or lawful occupation;
He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal
languages; and
He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of the public
schools or private schools recognized by the Bureau of Private Schools of the
Philippines where Philippine history, government and civic are taught or
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of the
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition
for naturalization as Philippine citizen.
(Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc
[Kapunan])

The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time that person reached
the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of
electing upon reaching the age of majority.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be

claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged
to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As
such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. (Re:
Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, Bar
Matter No. 914, Oct. 1, 1999, En Banc [Kapunan])

23.
How may Philippine citizenship be renounced? Is the application for
an alien certificate of registration, and the possession of foreign passport,
tantamount to acts of renunciation of Philippine citizenship?

21.
What are the disqualifications under Section 4, Act 473, in an
application for naturalization?

Held:
Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private
respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine
citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondents
application for an alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her
of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Held: Section 4, Act 473, provides the following disqualifications:

a
b
c
d
e
f

g
h

He must not be opposed to organized government or affiliated with any

association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments;
He must not be defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,
personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of their
ideas;
He must not be a polygamist or believer in the practice of polygamy;
He must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;
He must not be suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases;
He must have, during the period of his residence in the Philippines (or not less
than six months before filing his application), mingled socially with the Filipinos,
or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs,
traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
He must not be a citizen or subject of a nation with whom the Philippines is at
war, during the period of such war;
He must not be a citizen or subject of a foreign country whose laws do not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
(Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc
[Kapunan])

Xxx

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such

renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the application of
private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian
passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest in the case of Aznar v.
COMELEC (185 SCRA 703 [1990]) and in the more recent case of Mercado v.
Manzano and COMELEC (G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999).

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application
for an alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to renunciation of his
Philippine citizenship.

22.
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino
mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14)
years after he has reached the age of majority?

And, in Mercado v. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the

fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American citizen in the
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport
on April 22, 1997, only a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vicemayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.

Held: Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of
a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to
Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that
should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time
period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The
1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made upon reaching
the age of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon reaching
twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez
was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of
registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and
do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to
effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held
by this Court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien

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certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or

repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an
Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado v. Manzano, were mere acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the
same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship she was an
Australian and a Filipino, as well.

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This

means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. (Antonio Bengson
III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of

Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included as a ground
for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or
renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioners claim that respondent must go
through the process of repatriation does not hold water. (Valles v. COMELEC,
337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])

24.
same?

26.

Held: R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23, 1995, is an act
providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by marriage to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost
their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
(Gerardo Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999 [Vitug])

How may Filipino citizens who lost their citizenship reacquire the

27.
Before what agency should application for repatriation under R.A
8171 be filed?

Answer: Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may x x x reacquire
the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act No. 63
enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct
act of Congress. (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727, June 28, 1996, En
Banc [Panganiban]; Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7,
2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

25.

Who may validly avail of repatriation under R.A. No. 8171?

Held: Under Section 1 of P.D. No. 725, dated June 5, 1975, amending C.A. No.
63, an application for repatriation could be filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization chaired by the Solicitor General with the Undersecretary of
Foreign Affairs and the Director of the National Intelligence Coordinating
Agency as the other members. Although the agency was deactivated by virtue
of President Corazon C. Aquinos Memorandum of March 27, 1987, it was not,
however, abrogated. The Committee was reactivated on June 8, 1995. Hence,
the application should be filed with said Agency, not with the Regional Trial
Court. (Gerardo Angat v. Republic, G.R. No. 132244, Sept. 14, 1999 [Vitug])

Distinguish naturalization from repatriation.

Held: Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of

Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship,
naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the
other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63 (An Act Providing for the Ways in
Which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired [1936]). Under this
law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications mentioned in
Section 4 of C.A. 473.

28.
May a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship and, therefore, qualified to run for Congressman?

Held: Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This

means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his
prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will
be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those
who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces (Section 4,
C.A. No. 63); (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II
(Section 1, Republic Act No. 965 [1953]); (3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 2630 [1960]); (4)
marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 8171
[1995]); and (5) political and economic necessity (Ibid).

In respondent Cruzs case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered

service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering
service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States,
or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply

consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided.

In Angat v. Republic (314 SCRA 438 [1999]), we held:

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have
recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of

[P]arenthetically, under these statutes (referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630), the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required
to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the
civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the
Philippines.

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repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost
his Philippine citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person

simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While
dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals
volition. (Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999, En Banc
[Mendoza])

Petitioners contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen

since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. [T]he term
natural-born citizen was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:

30.
What is the main concern of Section 5, Article IV, 1987 Constitution,
on citizenship? Consequently, are persons with mere dual citizenship
disqualified to run for elective local positions under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code?

Section 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from

birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.

Held: In including Section 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the

Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No.
7160, Section 40(d) (Local Government Code) must be understood as referring
to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, x x
x, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status
as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person
must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act
to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino
citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were
naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973 (the date of effectivity
of the 1973 Constitution), of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those naturalized citizens were not
considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at birth and
had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino
mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not
considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect
their Philippine citizenship.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear

allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of
the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment. (Mercado v.
Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999 [Mendoza])

The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino

mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After
defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence:
Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a 1
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to
obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy 2
is the absence in the said enumeration of a separate category for persons who,
after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason 3
therefore is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected
as member of the House of Representatives. (Antonio Bengson III v. HRET, 32
G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En Banc [Kapunan])

29.

31.
Cite instances when a citizen of the Philippines may possess dual
citizenship considering the citizenship clause (Article IV) of the Constitution.

Held:

Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow
the principle of jus soli;
Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws
of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship.
(Mercado v. Manzano, G.R. No. 135083, 307 SCRA 630, May 26, 1999
[Mendoza])

Does res judicata apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship?

Held: Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in
judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging
the same; citing the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration
(41 SCRA 292 [1971]). He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be
threshed out anew.

Distinguish dual citizenship from dual allegiance.

Held: Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of

the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered
a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e., the

principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the issue
of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca v. Republic (51 SCRA 248
[1973]), an exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court ruled in
that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases
of citizenship, the following must be present:

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1
2
3

33

POLITICAL
It is worth mentioning that military assistance to civilian authorities in various
forms persists in Philippine jurisdiction. The Philippine experience reveals that
it is not averse to requesting the assistance of the military in the implementation
and execution of certain traditionally civil functions. x x x [S]ome of the
multifarious activities wherein military aid has been rendered, exemplifying the
activities that bring both the civilian and the military together in a relationship of
cooperation, are:

a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said

person is a party;
the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof, and
the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.
Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case
did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that
reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though 1
2
not really binding, to make the effort easier or simpler. (Valles v. COMELEC,
3
337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc [Purisima])
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Civilian Supremacy Clause
11
12
13
The President issued Letter of Instruction (LOI) ordering the deployment of 14
members of the Philippine Marines in the metropolis to conduct joint visibility 15
patrols with members of the Philippine National Police in various shopping 16
malls. Will this not violate the civilian supremacy clause under Section 3, 17
Article II of the Constitution? Does this not amount to an "insidious incursion"
of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article
XVI of the Constitution?
Held: The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the
civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the marines in this case constitutes
permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. x x x The limited
participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which
sufficiently provides the metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is
noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility
patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro
Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint
visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient
the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and
manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these
soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military
authority is supreme over civilian authority.

Elections;
Administration of the Philippine National Red Cross;
Relief and rescue operations during calamities and disasters;
Amateur sports promotion and development;
Development of the culture and the arts;
Conservation of natural resources;
Implementation of the agrarian reform program;
Enforcement of customs laws;
Composite civilian-military law enforcement activities;
Conduct of licensure examinations;
Conduct of nationwide tests for elementary and high school students;
Anti-drug enforcement activities;
Sanitary inspections;
Conduct of census work;
Administration of the Civil Aeronautics Board;
Assistance in installation of weather forecasting devices;
Peace and order policy formulation in local government units.
This unquestionably constitutes a gloss on executive power resulting from a
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of
Congress and, yet, never before questioned. What we have here is mutual
support and cooperation between the military and civilian authorities, not
derogation of civilian supremacy.

In the United States, where a long tradition of suspicion and hostility towards
the use of military force for domestic purposes has persisted and whose
Constitution, unlike ours, does not expressly provide for the power to call, the
use of military personnel by civilian law enforcement officers is allowed under
circumstances similar to those surrounding the present deployment of the
Philippine Marines. (IBP v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, Aug.
15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan])

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake
the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an insidious
incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5[4], Article XVI of the Constitution.
34

In this regard, it is not correct to say that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff
of the AFP, by his alleged involvement in civilian law enforcement, has been
virtually appointed to a civilian post in derogation of the aforecited provision.
The real authority in these operations, as stated in the LOI, is lodged with the
head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Such being the
case, it does not matter whether the AFP Chief actually participates in the Task
Force Tulungan since he does not exercise any authority or control over the
same. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of
the PNP, there can be no appointment to a civilian position to speak of. Hence,
the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the
civilian character of the PNP.

The Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology

Is the right to a balanced and healthful ecology any less important than any of
the civil and political rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights? Explain.
Held: While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under
the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights,
it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not
even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the
inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state
policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the
first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all
else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable
of sustaining life. (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 [1993][Davide])

Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than
assistance required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no
insidious incursion of the military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation
of the civilian supremacy clause in the Constitution.

35

16

The Province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa enacted ordinances
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penalties for violations thereof, in order to stop the illegal practice of cyanide
fishing which destroys the corals and other marine resources. Several
fishermen apprehended for violating the ordinances in question challenged
their constitutionality contending that the ordinances violated their preferential
right as subsistence and marginal fishermen to the use of our communal
marine resources guaranteed by the Constitution, under Section 7, Article XIII.
Will you sustain the challenge?

seek to pursue (Licup, et al. v. University of San Carlos [USC], et al., supra.),
since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the obligation of the
school to educate a student would imply a corresponding obligation on the part
of the student to study and obey the rules and regulations of the school (Capitol
Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., supra.). When a student
commits a serious breach of discipline or failed to maintain the required
academic standard, he forfeits his contractual right. In this connection, this
Court recognizes the expertise of educational institutions in the various fields of
learning. Thus, they are afforded ample discretion to formulate reasonable
rules and regulations in the admission of students (Yap Chin Fah, et al. v. Court
of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 90063, December 12, 1989), including setting of
academic standards. Within the parameters thereof, they are competent to
determine who are entitled to admission and re-admission. (University of San
Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 761, 774-775, March 7, 1994
[Nocon])

Held: The preferential right of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use

of marine resources is not absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine,
marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their exploration, development and
utilization x x x shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Moreover, their mandated protection, development and conservation x x x imply
certain restrictions on whatever right of enjoyment there may be in favor of
anyone. What must be borne in mind is the State policy enshrined in the
Constitution regarding the duty of the State to protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature (Section 16, Article II). The ordinances in question are
meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that
their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also
for the generations to come. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology
carries with it a correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
(Tano v. Gov. Salvador P. Socrates, G.R. No. 110249, Aug. 21, 1997)

2. Section 5[2], Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all

institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic
freedom includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims
and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or
interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint (Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA 245, 256-257 [1985]). The essential
freedoms subsumed in the term academic freedom encompasses the freedom
to determine for itself on academic grounds:

Who may teach,

What may be taught,
How it shall be taught, and
Who may be admitted to study. (Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal,
Inc., 227 SCRA 591, 595 [1993]; Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong, 222
SCRA 643, 660 [1993]; Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277, 285 [1975]. The above formulation was
made by Justice Felix Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263)

Academic Freedom

36.
How should the States power to regulate educational institutions be
exercised?
Held: Section 4[1], Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the
States power to regulate educational institutions:

The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., how it shall be taught. A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy.

The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions
in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and
regulation of all educational institutions.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution

requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly
educational program and the creation of an educational environment conducive
to learning. Such rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection
of the students, faculty, and property (Angeles v. Sison, 112 SCRA 26, 37
[1982]).

As may be gleaned from the above provision, such power to regulate

is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution
allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the
deprivation of their rights. (Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 348 SCRA 265, 288, Dec. 15, 2000, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

37.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student

discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By
instilling discipline, the school teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to
discipline the student likewise finds basis in the freedom what to teach.

Discuss the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.

Held: 1. Equally mandated by Article XIV, Section 5[2] of the 1987

Constitution is that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of
higher learning. Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined
as the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives,
and how best to attain them - free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a
wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Said
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a
grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent
(Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, et al., supra; Tangonan v. Pano,
et al., supra.)

Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop
discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty.

[All educational institutions] shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster

love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national
heroes in the historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties
of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character
and personal discipline, encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden
scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency
(Section 3[2], Article XIV, Constitution).

While it is true that an institution of learning has a contractual

obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the course they

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In Angeles v. Sison, we also said that discipline was a means for the school to
carry out its responsibility to help its students grow and develop into mature,
responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community. (Supra, at 37)

Capulong, supra.) (Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc., 227
SCRA 595-597, Nov. 8, 1993, En Banc [Vitug])

40.
Between the COAs findings and conclusions and that of private
auditors, which should prevail?

Finally, nowhere in the above formulation is the right to discipline

more evident than in who may be admitted to study. If a school has the
freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to
determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser
sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation privileges.

Held: Moreover, as the constitutionally-mandated auditor of all government

agencies, the COAs findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of
private auditors, at least insofar as government agencies and officials are
concerned. The superiority or preponderance of the COA audit over private
audit can be gleaned from the records of the Constitutional Commission x x x.
The findings and conclusions of the private auditor may guide private investors
or creditors who require such private audit. Government agencies and officials,
however, remain bound by the findings and conclusions of the COA, whether
the matter falls under the first or second paragraph of Section 2, unless of
course such findings and conclusions are modified or reversed by the courts.

Thus, in Ateneo de Manila v. Capulong (222 SCRA 643 [1993]), the

Court upheld the expulsion of students found guilty of hazing by petitioner
therein, holding that:

The power of the COA to examine and audit government agencies, while nonexclusive, cannot be taken away from the COA. Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution mandates that:

No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the immediate reinstatement of

respondent students who have been investigated and found guilty by the
Disciplinary Board to have violated petitioner universitys disciplinary rules and
standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the
school. This we would be most loathe to do.

Sec. 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiary in any guise whatsoever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
The mere fact that private auditors may audit government agencies does not
divest the COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since even with a private
audit the COA will still conduct its usual examination and audit, and its findings
and conclusions will still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public funds or assets
escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit. (Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Commission on Audit, 373 SCRA 356, January 16, 2002, En
Banc [Carpio])

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner universitys academic

freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and the present 1987
Constitution (Id., at 659-660).
(Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 348 SCRA 265, Dec.
15, 2000, 1st Div. [Kapunan])

41.
Is the constitutional power of the COA to examine and audit
government banks and agencies exclusive? Does it preclude a concurrent
audit by a private external auditor?

38.
May a university validly revoke a degree or honor it has conferred to
a student after the graduation of the latter after finding that such degree or
honor was obtained through fraud?

Held: The resolution of the primordial issue of whether or not the COA has the
sole and exclusive power to examine and audit government banks involves an
interpretation of Section 2, Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. This Section
provides as follows:

Held: In Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology

(68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the SC pointed out that academic freedom of institutions
of higher learning is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which
is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of
students. If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who
cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the
honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Sec. 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty
to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts
of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned and held in trust by,
or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters, x x x.
(2) The Commission shall have the exclusive authority, subject to the
limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefore, and promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant,
or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.
(Emphasis supplied)

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained

through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or
distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not
terminate upon the graduation of a student, for it is precisely the graduation
of such a student that is in question. (UP Board of Regents v. Hon. Court of
Appeals and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine, G.R. No. 134625, Aug.
31, 1999, 2nd Div. [Mendoza])

The COA vigorously asserts that under the first paragraph of Section 2, the
COA enjoys the sole and exclusive power to examine and audit all government
agencies, including the DBP. The COA contends this is similar to its sole and
exclusive authority, under the same paragraph of the same section, to define
the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, including rules
on the disallowance of unnecessary expenditures of government agencies. The
bare language of Section 2, however, shows that the COAs power under the
first paragraph is not declared exclusive, while its authority under the second
paragraph is expressly declared exclusive. There is a significant reason for
this marked difference in language.

39.
What are the essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic
freedom?
Held: In Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong (G.R. No. 99327, 27 May
1993), this Court cited with approval the formulation made by Justice Felix
Frankfurter of the essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic
freedom encompassing not only the freedom to determine x x x on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught (and) how it shall be taught, but
likewise who may be admitted to study. We have thus sanctioned its
invocation by a school in rejecting students who are academically delinquent
(Tangonan v. Pano, 137 SCRA 245 [1985]), or a laywoman seeking admission
to a seminary (Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, 68 SCRA 277 [1975]), or
students violating School Rules on Discipline. (Ateneo de Manila University v.

During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner

Serafin Guingona proposed the addition of the word exclusive in the first
paragraph of Section 2, thereby granting the COA the sole and exclusive power
to examine and audit all government agencies. However, the Constitutional
Commission rejected the addition of the word exclusive in the first paragraph
of Section 2 and Guingona was forced to withdraw his proposal. X x x.
Xxx
In sharp contrast, the Constitutional Commission placed the word exclusive to
qualify the authority of the COA under the second paragraph of the same

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Section 2. This word exclusive did not appear in the counterpart provisions of
Section 2 in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions. There is no dispute that the
COAs authority under the second paragraph of Section 2 is exclusive as the
language of the Constitution admits of no other meaning. Thus, the COA has
the exclusive authority to decide on disallowances of unnecessary government
expenditures. Other government agencies and their officials, as well as private
auditors engaged by them, cannot in any way intrude into this exclusive
function of the COA.

Economic Policy
42.
Does the Constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent
national economy rule out foreign competition?

The qualifying word exclusive in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be

applied to the first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A
qualifying word is intended to refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately
associated, and not to a phrase distantly located in another paragraph or subsection (Felipe v. De la Cruz, 99 Phil. 940 [1956]; Tirona v. Cudiamat, 14 SCRA
264 [1965]). Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be read the way it
appears, without the word exclusive, signifying that non-COA auditors can
also examine and audit government agencies. Besides, the framers of the
Constitution intentionally omitted the word exclusive in the first paragraph of
Section 2 precisely to allow concurrent audit by private external auditors.

Held: The constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national

economy does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods
and services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in
the international community.

The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is
that the COAs power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other
hand, the COAs authority to define the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing
rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary expenditures is exclusive.

Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on equality and reciprocity, the
fundamental law encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic
and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of
robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign markets.
(Tanada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18 [1997])

Xxx
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the clear
intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable conclusion the COA does
not have the exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies. The
framers of the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow independent
private audit of certain government agencies in addition to the COA audit, as
when there is a private investment in a government-controlled corporation, or
when a government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as in the case
at bar when the government borrows money from abroad.

43.
Is PHILSECO (Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation), as
a shipyard, a public utility and, hence, could be operated only by a corporation
at least 60% of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens in accordance with
Article XII, Section 10 of the Constitution?

In these instances the government enters the marketplace and

competes with the rest of the world in attracting investments or loans. To
succeed, the government must abide with the reasonable business practices of
the marketplace. Otherwise no investor or creditor will do business with the
government, frustrating government efforts to attract investments or secure
loans that may be critical to stimulate moribund industries or resuscitate a badly
shattered national economy as in the case at bar. By design the Constitution is
flexible enough to meet these exigencies. Any attempt to nullify this flexibility in
the instances mentioned, or in similar instances, will be ultra vires, in the
absence of a statute limiting or removing such flexibility.

Held: Petitioner asserts that a shipyard is a public utility pursuant to

Section 13 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 146. Respondents, on the other
hand, contend that shipyards are no longer public utilities by express provision
of Presidential Decree No. 666, which provided incentives to the shipbuilding
and ship repair industry.
Indeed, P.D. No. 666 dated March 5, 1975 explicitly stated that a
shipyard was not a public utility. x x x

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal eloquently the intent

of Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution. As this Court has ruled repeatedly,
the intent of the law is the controlling factor in the interpretation of the law
(People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542 [1978]; others omitted). If a law needs
interpretation, the most dominant influence is the intent of the law (De Jesus v.
City of Manila, 29 Phil. 73 [1914]). The intent of the law is that which is
expressed in the words of the law, which should be discovered within its four
corners aided, if necessary, by its legislative history (Manila Lodge No. 761 v.
Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162 [1976]). In the case of Section 2, Article IX-D of
the Constitution, the intent of the framers of the Constitution is evident from the
bare language of Section 2 itself. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission confirm expressly and even elucidate further this intent beyond
any doubt whatsoever.

However, Section 1 of P.D. No. 666 was expressly repealed by

Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 391, the Investment Incentive Policy Act of
1983. Subsequently, Executive Order No. 226, the Omnibus Investments Code
of 1987, was issued and Section 85 thereof expressly repealed B.P. Blg. 391.
The express repeal of B.P. Blg. 391 by E.O. No. 226 did not revive
Section 1 of P.D. No. 666, declassifying the shipbuilding and ship repair industry
as a public utility, as said executive order did not provide otherwise. When a
law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed
shall not be thereby revived unless expressly so provided (Administrative Code
of 1987, Book I, Chapter 5, Section 21). Consequently, when the APT [Asset
Privatization Trust] drafted the ASBR [Asset Specific Bidding Rules] sometime
in 1993, P.D. No. 666 no longer existed in our statute books. While it is true
that the repeal of a statute does not operate to impair rights that have become
vested or accrued while the statute was in force, there are no vested rights of
the parties that should be protected in the case at bar. The reason is simple:
said decree was already inexistent when the ASBR was issued.

There is another constitutional barrier to the COAs insistence of

exclusive power to examine and audit all government agencies. The COAs
claim clashes directly with the Central Banks constitutional power of
supervision over banks under Section 20, Article XII of the Constitution. X x x

A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by

law, the following provision of the Article XII of the Constitution applies:

Historically, the Central Bank has been conducting periodic and

special examination and audit of banks to determine the soundness of their
operations and the safety of the deposits of the public. Undeniably, the Central
Banks power of supervision includes the power to examine and audit banks,
as the banking laws have always recognized this power of the Central Bank.
Hence, the COAs power to examine and audit government banks must be
reconciled with the Central Banks power to supervise the same banks. The
inevitable conclusion is that the COA and the Central Bank have concurrent
jurisdiction, under the Constitution, to examine and audit government banks.

Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at
least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall
such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a
longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be
granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The
State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general
public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital,
and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association
shall be citizens of the Philippines.

However, despite the Central Banks concurrent jurisdiction over

government banks, the COAs audit still prevails over that of the Central Bank
since the COA is the constitutionally mandated auditor of government banks.
And in matters falling under the second paragraph of Section 2, Article IX-D of
the Constitution, the COAs jurisdiction is exclusive. Thus, the Central Bank is
devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of government banks since
this function belongs exclusively to the COA. (Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Commission on Audit, 373 SCRA 356, January 16, 2002, En
Banc [Carpio])

The progenitor of this constitutional provision, Article XIV, Section 5

of the 1973 Constitution, required the same proportion of 60%-40%

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capitalization. The JVA [Joint Venture Agreement] between NIDC [National

Investment and Development Corporation] and Kawasaki [Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Ltd. of Kobe, Japan] entered into on January 27, 1977 manifests the
intention of the parties to abide by the constitutional mandate on capitalization
of public utilities. x x x

provided in the Civil Code. x x x. In contrast, the indigenous peoples concept

of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By
virtue of the communal character of ownership, the property held in common
cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed because it was meant to benefit the
whole indigenous community and not merely the individual member.

A joint venture is an association of persons or companies jointly undertaking

some commercial enterprise with all of them generally contributing assets and
sharing risks. x x x. Considered more of a partnership (Aurbach v. Sanitary
Wares Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 75875, 180 SCRA 130, 147
[1989]), a joint venture is governed by the laws on contracts and on partnership.
The joint venture created between NIDC and Kawasaki falls within the purview
of an association pursuant to Section 5 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
and Section 11 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. Consequently, a joint
venture that would engage in the business of operating a public utility, such as a
shipyard, must observe the proportion of 60%-40% Filipino-foreign
capitalization. (JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA
143, Nov. 20, 2000, 1st Div. [Ynares-Santiago])

That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural

resources to the indigenous peoples is also clear from the deliberations of the
bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of
indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains x x x.

Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the

indigenous peoples over the natural resources. In fact, Section 7[a] merely
recognizes the right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally
and actually occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting
and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains. Neither does Section 7[b], which enumerates certain rights of the
indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within their ancestral
domains, contain any recognition of ownership vis--vis the natural resources.

The Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples

What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous peoples

rights and welfare in relation to the natural resources found within their
ancestral domains, including the preservation of the ecological balance therein
and the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be unduly displaced
when the State-approved activities involving the natural resources located
therein are undertaken. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128, 284-293,
Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc [Per Curiam])

44.
Does R.A. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act infringe upon the States ownership over the natural resources
within the ancestral domains?
Held: Petitioners posit that IPRA deprives the State of its ownership over
mineral lands of the public domain and other natural resources, as well as the
States full control and supervision over the exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources. Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor
General assail Sections 3[a], 5, and 7 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution which states, in part, that [a]ll lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. (Section 2, Article XII, Constitution) They
would have the Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3[a] of IPRA because
the inclusion of natural resources in the definition of ancestral domains
purportedly results in the abdication of State ownership over these resources.

45.
Has the concept of native title to natural resources, like native title to
land, been recognized in the Philippines?
Held: The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native
title to land, has not been recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et
al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza (40 Phil. 1017 [1909], 215 US 16, 54 L
Ed 72) in support of their thesis that native title to natural resources has been
upheld in this jurisdiction. They insist that it is possible for rights over natural
resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held
prior to the 1935 Constitution. However, a judicious examination of Reavies
reveals that, contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did
not recognize native title to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right
of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine
Bill of 1902.

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Section 3[a] merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes
the extent, limit and composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the
standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is to be
considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section
3[a] serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the
ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over
the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and
not declarative of a right or title.

While x x x native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of

land by virtue of time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was
acknowledged and recognized as far back during the Spanish colonization of
the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural
resources. The unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by
the State and is the underlying reason for its consistent assertion of ownership
and control over said natural resources from the Spanish regime up to the
present. Natural resources, especially minerals, were considered by Spain as
an abundant source of revenue to finance its battle in wars against other
nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever
these may be found, whether in public or private lands, recognized the
separability of title over lands and that over minerals which may be found
therein (Noblejas, Philippine Law on Natural Resources 1961 Revised Ed., p.
6).

The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is,

to our mind, important to ensure that no unnecessary encroachment on private
properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation
process. The mere fact that Section 3[a] defines ancestral domains to include
the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of
such natural resources as private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly,
Section 5 in relation to Section 3[a] cannot be construed as a source of
ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply
because it recognizes ancestral domains as their private but community
property.

On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a

source of wealth for its nationals. As the owner of natural resources over the
Philippines after the latters cession from Spain, the United States saw it fit to
allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in

The phrase private but community property is merely descriptive of

the indigenous peoples concept of ownership as distinguished from that

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public lands, and to grant patents to private mineral lands. x x x. Although the
United States made a distinction between minerals found in public lands and
those found in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases sourced
from the State. The framers of the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to
maintain the States ownership over natural resources to insure their
conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the
country through economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby the
Philippines would become a source of international conflicts, thereby posing
danger to its internal security and independence.

Section 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions.
It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and policies.
(Article XIV of the Constitution, entitled Education, Science, Technology, Arts,
Culture, and Sports)

Section 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the
President on policies affecting indigenous cultural communities, the majority of
the members of which shall come from such communities. (Article XVI of the
Constitution, entitled General Provisions)

The declaration of State ownership and control over minerals and

other natural resources in the 1935 Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions. (Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, 347 SCRA 128, 284-293,
Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc [Per Curiam])

(Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of

Environment and Natural Resources, et al., G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000,
En Banc)

47.

Discuss the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (R.A. No. 8371).

46.
Enumerate the Constitutional provisions recognizing and protecting
the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples.
Held: Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled "An Act to Recognize, Protect and
Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples,
Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing
Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." It is simply known as "The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997"
or the IPRA.

Held: The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution
of our less fortunate brothers, fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize
the ideals of people empowerment and social justice, and to reach out
particularly to the marginalized sectors of society, including the indigenous
peoples. They incorporated in the fundamental law several provisions
recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples, to
wit:

The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or

indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It
grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains
and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law
which traces its origin to native title.

Section 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
peoples within the framework of national unity and development. (Article II of
the Constitution, entitled State Principles and Policies)

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Section 5. The State, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social,
and cultural well-being.

Within their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, the ICCs/IPs are given the
right to self-governance and empowerment (Sections 13 to 20), social justice
and human rights (Sections 21 to 28), the right to preserve and protect their
culture, traditions, institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to
develop their own sciences and technologies (Sections 29 to 37). (Separate
Opinion, Puno, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, et al., G.R. No.
135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc)

The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains. (Article XII of the Constitution, entitled National Economy
and Patrimony)

48.

Section 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good.

Define "indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities."

Held: 1. Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international
law, IPRA now employs the politically-correct conjunctive term "indigenous
peoples/indigenous cultural communities" as follows:

To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and
disposition of property and its increments. (Article XIII of the Constitution,
entitled Social Justice and Human Rights)

Section 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act, the following terms
shall mean:

Section 6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or

stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and
utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under
lease or concession, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers,
and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands. (Ibid.)

Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities. - refer to a group of

people or homogenous societies identified by self-ascription and ascription by
others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since
time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing
common bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural
traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of
colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically

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differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. Indigenous peoples shall likewise

include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent
from the populations which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures,
or the establishment of present State boundaries, who retain some or all of their
own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their
ancestral domains x x x.
(Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources, et al., G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000,
En Banc)

Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as
ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands
are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs
under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include
but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swidden farms and tree lots (Section 3[b], IPRA). (Separate Opinion, Puno,
J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6,
2000, En Banc)

50.
How may ICCs/IPs acquire rights to their ancestral domains and
ancestral lands?
2. The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The
term "ICCs" is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of "IPs" is the
contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention 169 (Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989) and the United Nations (UN) Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Guide to R.A. 8371,
published by the Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains in cooperation
with the ILO and Bilance-Asia Department, p. 4 [1999] - hereinafter referred to
as Guide to R.A. 8371).

Held: The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands
may be acquired in two modes: (1) by native title over both ancestral lands and
domains; or (2) by torrens title under the Public Land Act and the Land
Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only. (Separate Opinion,
Puno, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 135385,
Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc)

51.
What is the concept of "native title"? What is a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)?

Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of

people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized
community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of
people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under
claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of
language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by
their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, nonindigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the
Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited
the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have
been displaced from their traditional territories or who may have resettled
outside their ancestral domains. (Separate Opinion, Puno, J., in Isagani Cruz
v. Secretary of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc)

49.
Define "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands."
constitute part of the land of the public domain?

Held: Native title refers to ICCs/IPs preconquest rights to lands and domains
held under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These
lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are indisputably
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The
rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains (which also include ancestral
lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and respected (Section 11,
IPRA). Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be
embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which shall
recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated.

Like a torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native

title. Native title, however, is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically
declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have
been public land. Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore,
indisputably presumed to have never been public lands and are private.

Do they

Held: Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of
indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of the public domain.

The concept of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Carino
v. Insular Government (41 Phil. 935 [1909], 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 594).
Carino firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective
of any royal grant from the State. (Separate Opinion, Puno, J., in Isagani
Cruz v. Secretary of DENR, et al., G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc)

The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral

domains and ancestral lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral
domains. These are defined in Section 3(a) and (b) of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act x x x.

Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of
ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until
the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations.
Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural
resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential,
agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not,
hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be
exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access
to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators (Section 3[a], IPRA).

53.
Distinguish ownership of land under native title and ownership by
acquisitive prescription against the State.

Held: Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been
held by its possessor and his predecessor-in-interest in the concept of an
owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the State, that is,
Spain or its successor-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine
Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as the land has
been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast,
ownership of land by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a
conversion of the character of the property from alienable public land to private
land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person.

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(Separate Opinion, Kapunan, J., in Isagani Cruz v. Secretary of DENR,

G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000, En Banc)

Held: Section 15, Article XI, 1987 Constitution provides that [T]he right of the
State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees,
from them or from their nominees as transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, laches, or estoppel. From the proceedings of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, however, it was clear that this provision applies only to
civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases. Thus,
the prosecution of offenses arising from, relating or incident to, or involving illgotten wealth contemplated in Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution may be
barred by prescription. (Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans, et al. v. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, et al., G.R. No. 130140,
Oct. 25, 1999, En Banc [Davide, C.J.])

The Right of the State to Recover Properties Unlawfully Acquired by

Public Officials or Employees

54.
Does the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired
by public officials or employees which may not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel under Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution apply to
criminal cases for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth?

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