ARNE NAESS, VAL

PLUMWOOD, AND DEEP

ECOLOGICAL SUBJECTIVITY
A CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEEP
ECOLOGY-ECOFEMINISM DEBATE
CHRISTIAN DIEHM

Karen Warrens recent essay, Ecofeminist Philosophy and Deep Ecology, begins by noting that the philosophical positions found under the
heading deep ecology are anything but monolithic. This point, which
has been overlooked by deep ecologists as often as by others, is crucial for
those who are interested in the deep ecology-ecofeminism debate, for
just as one must specify which of the ecofeminisms are in question, so too
one must be clear about which of the deep ecologies is being debated, if
one is to make ones way through the complex relationships between them.
In the course of her article, Warren recounts with approval Val Plumwoods
Nature, Self and Gender: Feminism, Environmental Philosophy, and the
Critique of Rationalism, an essay which locates, discusses, and critiques
three versions of the self that various deep ecologists offer. In light of
Plumwoods comments, Warren argues that the work of Arne Naess differs significantly from other deep ecologists such that Naess deep ecology position is or could be compatible with ecofeminism (Warren 1999,
255).

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In this essay, I propose to continue the analysis offered by Warren by

examining how Naess might respond individually to the objections
Plumwood voices. This will be done by looking closely at Naesss articulation of what he refers to as the ultimate premises of his view, premises
that are not necessarily aspects of deep ecology per se, but of his own
ecophilosophy, Ecosophy T.1 I will argue that even though Naess may
not be subject to Plumwoods most immediate criticisms, her work exposes the problematic tendency of his philosophy of identification to stress
sameness in relations with others. I will conclude by suggesting a critical
revision of the notion of identification that would allow one to retain key
features of Naesss viewmost notably his gestaltist understanding of the
self or subject and his emphasis on Self-realization as an ultimate
normwhile responding to the problems that Plumwoods work exposes.
THE SELF AS TRANSPERSONAL
One of the three senses of self specified by Plumwood is the transpersonal self. Her discussion of the transpersonal self focuses on the work
of Warwick Fox who, in his Toward a Transpersonal Ecology, describes
three varieties of identification: personal, ontological, and cosmological.2 Fox favors the latter two because they are less local than personal
identification, and this is due to the fact that they are not rooted in the
immediate reality in which one moves, but rather within broader, more
encompassing views, and thus are said to be impartial (Fox 1995, 256).
As such, it is claimed that these trans-personal forms of identification escape the problem that accompanies personal identification, which is that,
qua personal, it is necessarily biased in favor of those with whom one has
personal contact, and thus seems to have far more to do with the cause of
possessiveness, greed, exploitation, war, and ecological destruction than
with the solution to these seemingly intractable problems (262). But this
is not meant to imply an outright rejection of personal identification, and
Fox cites as proof of this Naesss approval of the felt nearness of others
as a principle for resolving conflicts. Foxs point is to show that transpersonal identification proceeds from a sense of the cosmos . . . and works
inward to each particular individuals sense of commonality with other
entities (258), but that within this framework personal identification remains important as an inescapable aspect of living and . . . plays a fundamental role in human development (2667).
Plumwoods critique of this view is that the privileging of the trans-

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personal over the personal repeats a patriarchal gesture of the exclusion of

a corrupting and self-interested particularity in favor of an impersonal
and abstract universality (Plumwood 1991, 15). And, ultimately, such a position cannot allow for the deep and highly particularistic attachment to
place that is found at the root of much conservationist activity (1516).
Such a criticism would seem to indict Naess as well as Fox, since Fox
argues that Naess also places greater emphasis upon trans-personal
identification.3 But what this reading of Naess implicitly assumes is a sort
of secondary status of the personal, that the personal can find its place
within the strictures of a more general set of relations which, on Foxs
view, have greater normative force and which serve as a corrective to potentially disastrous particular attachments. However, when Naess himself
discusses the issue of felt nearness, he paints a picture of identification
not, as Fox does, of a universalized identification that can spiral inward
to account for particularity, but rather of a concrete set of identifications
that spirals outward to embrace increasingly distant others. He says
that through the process of identification higher level unity is experienced: from identifying with ones nearest, higher level unities are created
through circles of friends, local communities, tribes, compatriots, races,
humanity, life, and, ultimately . . . unity with the supreme whole. . . .4
Here we see that although there is clearly a movement towards the universal, the process described is one in which our personal contacts form the
basis of our ability to connect with those more remote. Moreover, within
this process the emotive force of the personal retains its normative power:
nearness is prescriptive for the ecological self because such a self is engaged in a process of self-realization which is always, necessarily, rooted in
the particularities of that self; it is a process in which the self remains
bound by special responsibilities, obligations and insights (Naess 1993,
34). Thus the personal is neither transcended nor inscribed within a universal that renders it harmless. Rather it is the case that personal attachments are the very fabric of the universal, which is to say that one cannot
put forth ethical rules of conduct without taking our limited capacities,
and . . . personal feelings, seriously (Naess 1995b, 224).
That being said, we can understand that while Fox seems to find the
principle of felt nearness to be acceptable on the basis of a prior transpersonal identification, for Naess, nearness functions as a priority principle because self-realization is a process that follows the vectors of the
emotional charges of the particular, and this undermines the attempt to

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classify his position as trans-personal in Foxs sense. Hence Naesss articulation of self-realization, while shunning neither the universality achieved
through more general forms of identification, nor the norms that this entails, is at the same time in no way a rejection of the personal and the
particular.
THE EXPANDED SELF
Another account of the self offered by deep ecologists that Plumwood
analyzes is the expanded self. She suggests that because deep ecology
has failed to question the structures of rational egoism, it ends up promoting a model of the self that takes for granted egoism as its starting
point (Plumwood 1991, 15). Once this assumption is made, deep ecologists can see no other way to promote responsible behavior than to expand
the self to include others. In this way, self-realization becomes an extension of egoism, a way to allow for a wider set of concerns while continuing to allow the self to operate on the fuel of self-interest.5 That is,
although the ecological self acts in favor of a collective and not a narrow
set of interests, the motivation for such acts still lies in ones concern for
oneself, and thus, far from being a critique of egoism, deep ecology actually relies upon and reinforces it.
Due to the complexity of this issue, we must take a circuitous route
towards an answer from Naess, beginning with an analysis of his reliance
upon gestalt principles to formulate an ontology. Gestalt ontology involves
a relational, total-field image (Naess 1973, 95) in which subjects are
not conceived of as things in themselves, but instead are understood in
the way that objects of perception are understood in gestalt psychology;
they are constituted by their relations to larger wholes which shape and
define the individuals within them, as a figure is perceived in relation to a
ground, or a text is illuminated by its context (Naess 1995a, 243). Naess
gives the example of three dots arranged on a piece of paper in such a way
that, when seen, the experience is not of three separate points but of a
triangle (1995a, 241). Any single one of the dots is not originally a dot;
it is an integral part of a whole, a term defined by its relations to the other
dots. And so, literally, the dot is its relationships, for if the field changes,
then what it means to be the dot will change. The same is said to hold true
for human beings: to be a human is not to exist in oneself, but to be a
product of relations that are constitutive of ones very self. Thus the self is,
in Naesss ontology, always already relational.6

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It is from within this ontology that we can catch sight of what Naess
means by self-realization through identification. He writes that [t]hrough
the wider Self every living being is intimately connected, and from this intimacy follows the capacity of identification. . . . (1995d, 233, emphasis
added). If one believes that the wider self is attained as a result of identification, then it is impossible to make sense of the claim that the capacity of
identification stems from the wider, capital S, self. We can begin to understand this thought only when we recognize that, ontologically speaking, the self is always connected intimately to others. The self is already a
Selfa claim that is in keeping with gestalt ontology. But, of course,
many of these relations exist only as potentialities of the self, paths which
are always accessible, but which must be actualized by the individual.
Identification thus appears as the means by which such potencies may be
actualized. That is, identification does not add on a series of external
relations to an isolated self, rather identification realizes, brings to life and
fulfillment, the internal relations already constitutive of the self.7
This helps us to see, as Jim Cheney wrote in his 1991 review of Ecology, Community and Lifestyle, that Naesss understanding of identification
doesnt seem to call up the notion of Self-realization as the expansion of
the atomistic self so as to include the other (Cheney 1991, 270). The self
neither relates to others as in market economies, where the isolated ego
ventures into the public realm of external, commodified relations (a view
which Naess himself criticizes under the heading of the supermarket
view of reality8), nor does the self sacrifice itself in order to connect with
others.9 Since the self is already relational, self-realization is not about
losing oneself in a collective but about finding oneself and others through
positive forms of relation. As Naess puts it, a widening and deepening of
the self implies a widening and deepening of the web of relational entities (Naess 1999, 273).
Placing self-realization in the context of gestalt ontology is also important when addressing the question of egoism because, in its rejection of
atomism, Naesss ontology is an attempt to undercut egoismand altruismby denying the very ego that would ground them. For a self that is
constituted by its relations to others, the flourishing of self and other cannot be radically isolated. To identify with an other and realize ones own
potential is at the same time to promote the other, since ones own potential is relational and is bound to that of others. And, for that same
reason, to promote the others flourishing is to promote oneself. The mo-

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tives that fuel self-realization are, then, always mixed, since self and other
are essentially intertwined. This is not a way of smuggling egoism into
ecological subjectivity based on the assumption that one will work for
others only if such action ultimately benefits oneself. It stands as an attempt to recognize the reality that interests intermingle, a reality which
stems from the gestalt ontological principle of essential relationality.
Of course, this is not to say that acting for a narrow set of interests is
impossible, or that one cannot act for oneself in ways that are highly
destructive of others. Naess frequently discusses the idea that in the West
self-realization is the term most often used for the competitive development of a persons talents and the pursuit of an individuals specific interests. . . .(1993, 31), and he claims that this stresses the ultimate and
extensive incompatibility of the interests of different individuals (1989,
85). Through this process of alienation, an ego is constructed in opposition to the world. One is still related to others, to be sure, but here relations are agonistic, or indifferent; in Cheneys words, the alienated self
maintains defining relations in which the self is denied in its relations to
others . . . (1991, 270). All action, moreover, takes on the appearance of
being either egoistic and exclusively for oneself, or altruistic and exclusively for an other. From this point identification, as an affirmation of
relationality, provides a way of overcoming this artificial sense of mutual
exclusivity between self and other, transcending the sharp egoism-altruism divide into which many people have been indoctrinated.10
These reflections allow us, finally, to attend to a certain group of statements Naess makes that are very likely to arouse in his readers the suspicion of an assumed egoism. A typical example of claims of this kind is
found when he writes that through broader identification, [people] may
come to see their own interest served by environmental protection . . .
(1995d, 229). This remark, and others like it, could easily be taken as a
direct appeal to self-interest, but are perhaps better read as an appeal to
gestaltism against the alienated selfs falsely construed atomism. For although it is clear that Naess is highly critical of acting egoistically in a
narrow sense, such a criticism does not imply that one must therefore adopt
the posture of sheer altruism, or self-sacrifice, in its stead. That is, if one
can, through identification, affirm instead of deny the relationships constitutive of the self, then one will learn that actions for the environment, or
any other, do not exclude the flourishing of the self, that such actions can
in fact be highly consonant with it. Hence comments of this sort are not so

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much directed to egoism as they are directed to mutuality against the entire egoism-altruism dichotomy and the incompatibilist thinking that accompanies it.11
INDISTINGUISHABLE SELVES
A third type of self that Plumwood locates is the indistinguishable
self, and it is in examining this sense of self that we will come to see what
I take to be a decisive fissure between Naess and some ecofeminist philosophies. Plumwoods claim is that some deep ecologists, in response to traditional Western dualist metaphysics which posit a radical separation of the
human from the natural, have developed a variant of identification that
dissolves all sense of difference between the two, a self which rejects boundaries between self and nature (Plumwood 1991, 12). John Seed is cited as
a proponent of this indistinguishability thesis, and his claim that I am
part of the rainforest protecting myself is used to show how, for Seed,
distinctions between the terms self and rainforest appear to lose all
meaning.12 Plumwood calls attention not only to deep ecologys failure to
critique the sources of the sense of radical discontinuity from nature, but
also to the fact that the merger of self and other does not guarantee responsible action. As she puts it, [w]hat John Seed seems to have in mind
is that once one has realized that one is indistinguishable from the rainforest,
its needs would become ones own. But there is nothing to guarantee this
one could equally well take ones own needs for its.13
This highlights two things for us. The first is that there is a certain
violence in the claim that there are no boundaries between self and other.
Without a recognition of difference, there is the danger of repeating a colonizing gesture which is a root problem and not a solution for environmentalism. The second point to observe is that what is particularly problematic
here is that indistinguishability at the ontological level is taken to imply an
indistinguishability of interests.
Naess is, as Karen Warren notes, quite sensitive to questions of identity and difference, and constantly cautions against forms of holism which
deny difference (Warren 1999, 265). When discussing the idea that deep
ecologists views are compatible with many types of holism, he also says
that such views are incompatible with the kind of holism which obliterates individuality (Naess 1999, 272). However, that he himself avoids
such holism is by no means given, and Plumwood contends that gestalt
ontology pushes the dissolution of individual differences too far.14 But it is

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important to recognize that Naesss use of gestalt principles to emphasize

the relational, non-atomistic character of the self has more to do with the
position he is criticizing than with a full exposition of the implications of
gestalt thinking.15 We can, I believe, find in gestalt ontology arguments in
favor of the distinguishability of individuals.
Although this point cannot be fully developed here, we should note
that Naess, in a brief essay responding to both Ariel Salleh and Karen
Warren, declares that his thought places a strong emphasis on individuals, and goes so far as to say that he is in favor of letting point one of the
eight points [of the deep ecology platform] refer only to individuals (Naess
1999, 272). This statement is undoubtedly somewhat astounding to those
accustomed to hearing Naess promote the total-field view. However,
Naess has always held that his version of holism is able to recognize individuals, claiming in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle that [i]dentification
with living beings individually . . . is the first field of research within
Ecosophy T (1989, 181). In what is perhaps one of his most telling comments on the issue, he writes that at any level of self-realization individuals
remain separate. They do not dissolve like individual drops in the ocean.
Our care continues ultimately to concern the individuals, not any collectivity. But the individual is not, and will not be isolatable, whatever exists
has a gestalt character (1989, 195). Here we see that on the gestaltist
view individuals are indeed discernible, perhaps pre-eminently so, but that
at the same time we must recognize the relational or gestalt character of
these individuals, such that our concern for individuals must take note of
the networks of relations that allow them to flourish. Thus Naesss oftcited claim that any discussion of individuality is superficial should not
be taken as proclaiming the ontological meaninglessness of the term, but
rather the tendency of individualistic thinking to overlook the importance
of relationships in any full account of individuality.16
This reading of gestaltism can bring Naess quite close to some
ecofeminists and their notion of a relational self which is not denied its
status as an individual. Warren is unambiguous on this point, claiming
that Naess is clear in his desire not to abrogate individuality and that he
is able to avoid the identity or indistinguishability thesis specified by
Plumwood (Warren 1999, 265). However, even though Naess may be able
to describe the maintenance of difference on the ontological level, the problem remains that identification is prescribed as the means to realize ones
relational potential, and this term is actually defined in conjunction with

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the notion of interests: identification is a spontaneous, non-rational, but

not irrational, process through which the interest or interests of another
being are reacted to as our own interest or interests (Naess 1993, 29).
Here it sounds as if Naess, having rejected the thesis of ontological indistinguishability, may still be subscribing to some thesis of interest indistinguishability, or as Plumwood puts it, the position that selves may not be
fused, but interests are (1999, 208). David Rothenberg apparently attributes this position to Naess as well, writing in the introduction to Ecology, Community and Lifestyle that we must see the vital needs of
ecosystems and other species as our own needs: there is thus no conflict of
interests (Naess 1989, 11). This would mean that although self and other
are relatively distinct, there is still the sense that what is good for the self is
the same asidentical towhat is good for the other.
But I do not think that Naess believes that interests merge in this way.
He stresses that even in identification one must recognize that self and
other are different individuals (1993, 29) and that, as such, the conflicts
of interest that Rothenberg denies can indeed appear within the wider,
identified self.17 In fact, Naesss position is probably very close to that articulated by Plumwood herself when she writes that analysis in terms of
interest identity wont enable us to dispense with difference but that instead we may, starting from a plurality of interests, assume the overarching
interest of the others general well-being and react to that as bound up
with our own (1999, 2089). That is, although the others interests are
not the same as those of the self, those different interests are still regarded
as important. Hence there is not an indistinguishability of interests so much
as a mutuality of interests: the flourishing or the failure of the other, while
not being identical to that of the self, is nonetheless experienced by the self
as either enriching or as diminishing.
However, while identification does not necessarily assume an indistinguishability of interests, it of necessity relates the interests of others to
those of oneself; it discovers kinships and similarities, and sees others to be
like oneself (Naess 1989, 172). This is clearly illustrated in Naesss account of witnessing a flea jump into chemicals on a microscope slide, where
he claims that his empathic response to the fleas struggle and ultimate
death was made possible by the fact that he was able to see in the flea
something resembling himself (1995d, 227). Here we arrive at the crucial point, for even if Naess can somehow show that within experiences of
identification there is a recognition that the interests of an other are, never-

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theless, not identical to ones own, it will always be the case that identification centers upon a recognition of interests which are in significant aspects similar to ones own. There is, then, an important distinction to be
made between interests that are distinct and interests that are dissimilar.
While Naess can be understood to claim the former, the use of identification as the means to self-realization makes it difficult to articulate a meaningful notion of the latter. It is therefore true that, in Plumwoods words,
Naess vision . . . ultimately draws on sameness and identity as the basis
of respect (1999, 207). And because of this his position always runs the
risk of failing to include others whose interests are so divergent as to obstruct or ruin the process of identification, or of assuming that the same
sorts of things that are good for oneself are also the sorts of things that are
good for others, since one relates to others based primarily on an assumed
similarity of interests.
Thus Plumwoods criticism that the indistinguishability thesis has
trouble recognizing the distinctness of the needs of things in nature from
ours (1991, 13) is, in a restricted sense, valid in relation to Naess. This is
so not because he has given an account of the self as indistinguishable
from others, but because although selves do not fuse, and even interests
may not fuse, it remains that when the bonds between self and other are
fostered and enriched by a process of identification alone, the interests of
others will always be understood by reference to ones own.18 Ethics, then,
will involve an inference or movement from self to other which is not
complemented by an attentiveness to the unique demands and needs of the
other, a sensitivity to the movements from other to self. And this singularity of movement is bound to do violenceeither that of exclusion or that
of assimilation.
IDENTIFICATION AND ADDRESS
By examining the work of Plumwood and Naess, we are in a position
to understand how Naesss notion of ecological subjectivity answers questions regarding the status of the personal, the egoism of the human subject, and the place of individuals in relation to wholes and to other
individuals. Yet we are left to wonder if it is possible or even desirable to
maintain an alliance with Naess if his emphasis on identification might
involve an exclusion or violation of the very others that we sought to include in our ethics, our lives, our world. At this point I would like to suggest that what is called for is not an outright rejection of Naesss ecosophy

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but a careful supplementation of it, one that takes seriously feminist insights on the way towards a more responsive, more responsible deep ecology in which identification is regarded as a mode of response, rooted in
responsibility.
Identification, in the context provided by Naess, is without doubt an
indispensable part of the flourishing of the self. The essential relationality
of the self, together with its physical and evolutionary heritage, make nonsense of the idea of radical separation and discontinuity from others,
whether they be human or other-than-human. But relationality is not captured or exhausted in processes that stress similarity alone. Relationships
cannot flourish without the recognition that others are relatively distinct
beings with potentially dissimilar interests, for in the absence of this others
are lost or annihilated. At this point, however, identification falters. And
so we must ask if there might not be something else at work in the relation
between self and other, something which initiates both the search for community as well as the realization that such community is always tenuous,
subject to revision, and perpetually incomplete, such that identification
does not constitute the only, or the last, word spoken.
What is needed, I think, is an understanding of difference as something which addresses us, something which calls upon us, asks us questions, and asks for us to respond in certain ways. Encountering others
would thus be seen to involve a solicitation of the self, and to require
sensitivity to difference. Here, identification would be understood as a response, just one mode of an ongoing dialogue in which we attempt to find
ways to articulate ourselves properly to others, a way of recognizing and
assuming responsibility, of being responsive. Viewing difference in this way
would mean, moreover, that we would always be questioned further by
differences that interrogate the adequacy of our responses, that we would
always be called to listen for ways to re-position ourselves in relationships.
And how we respond, and how we listen, would be the deepest expressions of who we are.
Self-realization, then, the making real of the self as relational being,
would have to be seen as a function of our dialogue with the differences of
the world. Or, in terms closer to Naess, we could perhaps describe selfrealization as an ever-renewing process of open-ended identifications and
their revisions, the movements from self to other that are possible only as
responses to the movements from other to self.

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NOTES
1. Deep ecologists, in Naesss view, are those who are in general agreement on
the eight-point platform of the deep ecology movement. This platform has, as
Naess (1986) consistently stresses, multiple roots, meaning that any number
of philosophical or religious views could support deep ecological policies and
practices. When discussing the idiosyncrasies of the perspectives of deep ecologists, as we are proposing to do, it should be kept in mind that their differences
lie less in matters of general policy (i.e., the deep ecology platform) than in the
philosophical frameworks which lead to their acceptance of such policies.
2. These types of identification are explained in detail in chapter eight of Fox
(1985), Transpersonal Ecology and the Varieties of Identification.
3. Fox claims that this is a fact that can be discerned not only from [Naesss]
writings but also from the nature of the sources that inspired his central concept of Self-realization (1995, 259). But it is not entirely clear that Naess can
be so easily associated with Fox, or that Naesss affinity for and frequent references to certain intellectual predecessorsspecifically, Gandhi and Spinoza
can allow us to classify his view of the self as cosmologically identified in Foxs
sense. Naess himself, in a comment directed to J. Baird Callicott, cautions us to
see his thought as having certain distinctions from Gandhi (Naess 1995c).
4. Naess 1993, 30. Plumwood, in a comment directed to Aldo Leopold, notes that
this progression from close to distant could be viewed as a process of shedding
the personal in favor of the abstract (1991, 294). This thought is echoed by
Michael Zimmerman, who cites a passage similar to this and indicates that this
progression could be viewed as a process of abstraction and disconnection
(1994, 288). Marti Kheel also feels that such a process may reflect the familiar masculine urge to transcend the concrete world of particularity in preference for something more enduring and abstract (1990, 136). However, as I
am arguing in this section of the paper, I think that Naesss view of this process
does not reveal a privileging of the abstract and universal over the particular
and concrete.
5. Plumwood 1991, 14. Marti Kheel raises this same objection in relation to Aldo
Leopold specifically and deep ecologists generally (1993, 25055).
6. See also Naess 1989, 7879, 164.
7. Hence identification is described as acting out ones own nature or essence
(Naess 1993, 30), it involves bringing to actuality that which is ontologically
given as potentiality. This point also allows us to see where, perhaps, Fox misreads Naess. For although the self is always relational, it is also the case that it
is only through particular identifications that that self actualizes its relational
potential. Thus, although the self is, for Naess, always greater than itself, it is
not, thereby, always cosmologically identified. To attain such a level of selfrealization, the self must enact all of the personal identifications that become

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available to it and which make the higher-level identifications possible. Perhaps this idea could be more simply expressed by saying that, for Naess, the
relational character of the self as an ontological principle does not imply that
the self has realized its full relational potential. Such a realization necessarily
involves aspects that are unique to individuals and as such necessarily incorporates the personal.
8. See Naess 1995a, 244.
9. These thoughts address issues raised in Cheneys Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology (1987, see especially section II). Given the comments in his 1991 review
of Naess, it seems clear that Cheney himself would also claim that Naesss view
is able to avoid some of the problems articulated in this essay.
10. This thought is frequently expressed by Naess (see, for example, 1993, 31;
1995d, 235; 1989, 175). One might object that Naesss discussions of alienation implicitly assume that identification is a means of getting an isolated self
into relations with others. It is therefore important to re-emphasize the point
that, even when describing identification as a way of overcoming alienation,
Naess is still not positing an atomistic self. The alienated self is not an atom, it
is a self that relates to others in alienated ways. Thus, while we may want to
criticize identification as a mode of relation prescribed in order to overcome
alienation (as I do in the latter portions of this paper), we should not see in
Naesss description of identification an implicit assumption of atomism.
11. Although I believe that Naess has avoided some of the pitfalls of egoism, I
believe that it is also true that, on this issue, a gender analysis is necessary
insofar as the process of alienation is not simply a Western one, but it is also
gendered.
12. See Plumwood 1991, 12, which is drawing on Seeds Beyond Anthropocentrism (1988).
13. Plumwood 1991, 13. Freya Matthews highlights this problem quite clearly in
her Ecofeminism and Deep Ecology (1994).
14. Plumwood 1991, 12. Kheel poses this question as well (1990, 133).
15. Freya Matthews makes a similar point regarding some deep ecologists use of
the relational, total-field view. She says that I think that the problem with
this [interconnection] thesis . . . is not that its interpretation within deep ecology is in any way logically flawed, but that it is partial. Deep ecologists have, in
the main, given the idea of interconnectedness a holistic reading. . . . It is arguable however that this reading . . . captures only one side of its meaning
(1994, 239). Matthews goes on to argue that the systems-theoretic approach
provides a basis for the affirmation of individuality at the same time as interconnection.
16. Freya Matthews argues for a sense of individuality as genuine, though relative which seems to me to be close to what Naess has in mind (Matthews
1994, 240). Naesss comment regarding the superficiality of the term individual is found in The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Move-

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ments (1973, 95). The portion of this essay in which this comment is found is
cited by both Matthews (1994, 236) and Plumwood (1991, 12).
17. See Naess 1993, 29 and 1989, 174.
18. I think that this also shows us how Cheneys argument is, in a restricted sense,
valid in relation to Naess. For although Cheneys criticism of identification as a
move towards fusion from an implied or assumed atomistic starting point is,
by his own admission, not applicable to Naess, his problem with this fusion
experience is that it incorporates the other into the self, which is a typically
masculine response to isolation and separation (1987, 124). On this point I
would say that although Naesss ontology breaks significantly with Western
patriarchal models and the atomistic thinking that accompanies them, he still
remains tied to a more patriarchal mode of thinking about the basis of relationships and how they flourish. Hence, although Naess has rejected the notion that the self is an atom that must fuse with others, he still imports a certain
residue of this notionand the problems it involvesinto his thinking about
constitutive relationality.

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