A.C. No.

378

March 30, 1962

JOSE G. MEJIA and EMILIA N. ABRERA, complainants, vs. FRANCISCO S. REYES, respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a disbarment proceedings against attorney Francisco S. Reyes for malpractice.
On 27 September 1947, Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank attorney and notary public
for the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit H), as follows:
Atty. Francisco S. Reyes
Baguio City, Mt. Province
(Thru: The Manager, Phil. National Bank
Baguio Branch) .
Sir:
Please be advised that you are hereby appointed as Bank Attorney and Notary Public of our Baguio Branch,
effective September 19, 1947, and as such you are to perform the following: .
1) To ratify documents covering bank transactions;
2) To represent the Bank in cases filed in the local courts when, in the opinion of the Government Corporation
Counsel, there is a necessity for an attorney for the purpose; and
3) To give legal advise on ordinary routinary matters to our Branch Manager thereat and sign collection letters
when so requested by the latter.
It is understood that you shall receive no regular compensation from the Bank but that you will be allowed to
collect fees authorized by the Notarial Law when ratifying documents and 5% of the amount of judgment in cases
where your appearance for the Bank is requested, if and when actually collected, which fees, however, may be
changed as circumstances may warrant. Furthermore, it is also understood that under this appoinment,you are
not entitled to any other form of compensation or privileges accorded to regularly appointed employees of this
Bank.
Yours very truly, .
(Sgd.) V. CARMONA
President
I AGREE:
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. REYES
In June 1955 while still holding such position his professional services were engaged by Jose G. Mejia and Emilia
N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the Philippine National Bank and the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the Development Bank of the Philippines) as successor-in-interest of the
defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio
City recorded on their certificate of title No. 2499 (civil No. 532). On 28 June 1955 a complaint, signed by

Attorney Francisco S. Reyes for the law firm of Reyes and Cabato, was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Baguio against the two banks, praying that the sum in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 paid on 27 October
1944 by Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank and received by the
Philippines National Bank, Baguio Branch, to pay the balance of real estate mortgage loan, be credited by the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation as successor-in-interest of the defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank and
that the mortgage annotated on transfer certificate of title No. 2499 be cancelled (Exhibit A). After trial, on 4
August 1956 the Court rendered judgment declaring valid the payment in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 on 27
October 1944 but crediting only the sum of P67.34, Philippine currency, the equivalent value of P2,693.53 under
the Ballantyne Schedule (Exhibit 8). On 31 August 1956 the Reyes and Cabato law firm filed a motion for
reconsideration (Exhibit 9) and the Philippine National Bank on 5 September 1956 (Exhibit 10), to which on 15
September 1956 the former filed a written objection (Exhibit 11). On 15 September 1956 the Court denied both
motion for reconsideration (Exhibit 12). No appeal was taken by either party.
In this administrative proceedings, the complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera allege that they had
desired to take an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio but did not, upon
the respondent's advice; that thereafter for the first time they learned that the respondent was counsel and notary
public of the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that his representing them against the Philippine
National Bank, in whose Baguio Branch he was bank attorney and notary public, without revealing to them such
connection with the Bank, constitutes malpractice; and pray this Court to disbar him.
In his answer filed on 2 March 1959 respondent Francisco S. Reyes avers that after a conference among the
complainants, attorney Federico L. Cabato and himself, they agreed not to appeal the judgment rendered by the
Court and, instead, to take advantage of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1286 that condoned interests
accruing on debts to the Government provided that the principal was paid on or before 31 December 1956; that
all the time he was handling their case the complainants knew his professional connection with the Baguio
Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that he worked hard with attorney Cabato on their case, for which he was
paid by them a meager sum of P90 as attorney fees; that he is not guilty of malpractice, because he was not a
retainer lawyer of the Philippine National Bank but represented it only in collection cases where he was paid 5%
of any amount collected; that the malpractice charge is just to harrass, embarrass and force him to pay the
complainants' debt to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; and praysthat the complaint be dismissed..
On 4 March 1959 the Court referred the administrative case to the City Attorney of Baguio for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting the investigation during which the parties presented their evidence, on 23
March 1960, Sixto A. Domondo, City Attorney of Baguio, rendered a report finding the respondent guilty of
malpractice and recommending reprimand..1wph1.t
Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case (Cantorne vs. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23 and In
re: De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258). The respondent's act of appearing and acting as counsel for the complainantsJose
G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him bank
attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice. However, it does not appear satisfactorily proventhat during
the pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the respondents connection with the bank as attorney
and notary public. On the other hand, it appears that notwithstanding the letter dated 21 July 1955 written by Mr.
L.D. Herrera, manager of the BaguioBranch, quoting a part of a previous letter sent to him (Herrera) by attorney
Ramon B. de los Reyes, chief legal counsel of the Philippine National Bank, stating that

We note that the complaint is signed by our Bank Attorney and Notary Public, Atty. Francisco S. Reyes, in behalf
of the Law Office of Reyes and Cabato. Needless to say, it is unethical for Atty. Reyes, who is presently the
attorney of the Bank, to represent the plaintiffs here whose interest are diametrically opposed to those of the
Bank. As this is certainly embarrassing both for Atty. Reyes and for the Bank, it is requested that you please take
this matter with Atty. Reyes with the end in view of advising him to desist from representing the plaintiffs in this
case, otherwise, we will be compelled, much to our regret, to recommend severance of his official connection with
this Bank,.
which shows that the Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel for the
complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and notary public; that in the civil
case the respondent did not appear as counsel for the Bank which was represented by attorneys Ramon B. de
los Reyes and Nemesio P. Libunao; that no appeal was taken from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Baguio, because the complainants had chosen to pay the principal of their loan on or before 31
December 1956 in order that the interests thereon be condoned as provided for in Republic Act No. 1286
(Exhibits 13 to 17); and that the respondent was deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants
and collected a very small attorney's fees of P90, the malpractice committed by the respondent is not so serious.
He is just admonished and warned not to repeat it

from the Sheriff, the amount of P22,930.64, which he (Tuason) applied in the following manner: (1) P10,000.00
for his alleged attorney's fees; (2) P1,648.00 to supposed expenses of litigation, which he claimed to have
advanced in the prosecution of the case; and (3) the balance of P11,282.64, to plaintiff Fausto E. Chincuanco, his
uncle.
Petitioner claims that respondent Tuason deprived him of his lawful share in the judgment which was P25,511.62;
that respondent was not entitled to P10,000.00 as attorney's fees because even the lower court awarded him
only P3,500.00; that the foregoing acts were done, without the prior knowledge and consent of petitioner.
Upon finding that the respondent withdrew the P22,930.64 from the Office of the Provincial Sheriff, complainant
Sta. Maria repaired to the office of Atty. Tuason and demanded the amount to be turned over to him, or to the
Sheriff for proper disposition by the Court; that upon failure of respondent to comply with any of the two things,
contempt proceedings were instituted against respondent Tuason. In view, however, of the claim of Tuason that
he gave the money to Guanzon and Chincuanco, petitioner filed with the CFI of Pampanga, Civil Case No. 1704,
against said Tuason, Guanzon and Chincuanco, for collection of his rightful share in the judgment in Civil Case
No. 894.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY EDUARDO M. TUASON.
EMILIO C. STA. MARIA, petitioner.

Respondent, in his Answer, admitted having received the amounts in question from the Sheriff of Pampanga, and
disbursed the same in the manner stated by petitioner, but he denied that he obtained and disbursed the
amounts, without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner; the truth of the matter being that he was given full
authority by petitioner's partners (Guanzon and Chincuanco) to receive P10,000.00 for his services; that the two
were the ones who engaged his services in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 894, for their own behalf and in
behalf of petitioner himself; that he delivered the balance of the amount, to Chincuanco, who was the one who
had actually retained his services and who took charge of liquidating the accounts with his partners.

PAREDES, J.:

The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General who made the following findings and
recommendations:

Sometime in June, 1955, respondent Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason represented petitioner Emilio C. Sta. Maria. and
his two partners Andres Guanzon and Fausto E. Chincuanco in prosecuting Civil Case No. 894, CFI of
Pampanga, entitled "Fausto E. Chincuanco, et al. v. Enriqueta M. de Hidalgo, et al", a collection case involving a
promissory note of P50,000.00. Defendant Enriqueta M. de Hidalgo was declared in default, and the Court
rendered judgment on October 8, 1955, ordering the defendant de Hidalgo to pay:

The foregoing evidence presented by the parties involves two issues, namely; (1) Whether the respondent was in
connivance with Fausto Chincuanco and Andres Guanzon in delivering to them the full amount of P22,930.64
and thereby deprived the petitioner from getting his rightful share in the liquidation of assets of the partnership
and (2) whether the respondent was guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct in withholding the amount of
P10,000 as his attorney's fees and also the amount of P1,648 as alleged expenses in the litigation.

(a) Plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 with interests thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from June
18, 1955, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the same shall have been fully paid, plus the sum of
P3,500.00 as plaintiffs' attorney's fees;

The complainant in this case contends that the respondent committed malpractice in delivering the proceeds of
the judgment money to Fausto Chincuanco, his uncle, and Andres Guanzon, his close business associate (p. 17,
tsn, July 10, 1961; p. 6, rec.).

(b) Plaintiff Andres A. Guanzon the other sum of P3,000.00 as compensation for the injury caused to him in his
credit standing; and

As to the first issue, the petitioner claims that he was unable to collect his rightful share in the liquidation of the
funds of the partnership as agreed upon by the partners (Exh. E, pp. 3-4, tsn, June 15, 1960) for which reason,
he had to file a civil case against his partners. He attributes this failure mainly to the respondent who delivered
the judgment money to Chincuanco, his partner, who disposed of the whole amount in the manner already
indicated earlier. While it is true that Fausto Chincuanco and Guanzon, the latter being the general manager from
the Sheriff (Exh. C, p. 14, rec.), there is no clear evidence presented to show that the respondent connived with
either Chincuanco or Guanzon on delivering the judgment money to them for the purpose of depriving the
complainant of his rightful share in the partnership. What the respondent did in this case was to deliver the

A.C. No. 396

July 31, 1964

(c) Plaintiff Fausto E. Chincuanco another sum of P3,000.00 as compensation for the injury caused to him in his
credit standing.
On December 9, 1955, a writ of execution was issued. Sufficient amount of money to satisfy the judgment, came
into the hands of the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga. Respondent Tuason, on September 10, 1958, obtained

judgment money to the partnership through Chincuanco and Guanzons the latter being the general manager. The
proper action for the complainant was to demand his share from Guanzon, the managing partner, or from
Chincuanco, the other partner. This he did by filing a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (see
Civil Case No. 1704, Exh. 2). In this case Atty. Eduardo Tuason, the herein respondent, was included as
defendant. A contempt proceeding was also filed by complainant, citing Atty. Tuason and the Sheriff of Pampanga
as respondents. It appears, however, that an amicable settlement was finally agreed upon by the parties in this
civil case resulting in a compromise agreement, duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
wherein the plaintiff waived all his claim against his other partners. In said compromise agreement the plaintiff
also agreed not to proceed with the contempt case he filed against Atty. Tuason and the Sheriff of Pampanga
(Exhs. 2, 3 and 5, folder of exhibits).
The issue, therefore, revolves more on the division of the partnership assets rather than on the right of the
complainant to compel the respondent to turn over to him part of the judgment money which respondent applied
as his attorney's fees and reimbursement for his expenses in connection with the litigation he handled for the
partners. Under the foregoing circumstances, the undersigned investigator is of the opinion that the respondent
Tuason has not committed any act that will constitute malpractice or gross misconduct in office.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
As to the second issue, there is no dispute that the respondent collected the amount of P10,000 as attorney's
fees for a collection suit in the amount of P50,000.00 based on a promissory note. It appears that since the
defendant was declared in default, the case was terminated after one brief hearing. The respondent also
collected P1,648 as alleged expenses incurred in connection with the litigation. No satisfactory evidence,
however, was presented to show that the respondent actually spent that amount. On the other hand, there was
the undisputed evidence which shows that the case represented by the respondent was terminated with one brief
hearing after the defendant was declared in default. There is, likewise, no dispute that said attorney's fees and
litigation expenses were deducted from the judgment money collected by the respondent from the Sheriff of
Pampanga. This act of the respondent seems to be irregular, if not suspicious, considering his close relationship
with Mr. Chincuanco. Notwithstanding the opinion of Mr. Guanzon, the amount of P10,000 for attorney's fees is,
to our mind, also unreasonable under the circumstances. It is to be noted in this connection that the respondent
himself alleged in the complaint he filed for the partnership that "the plaintiffs will incur for attorney's fees and
expenses of the litigation P6,000" (u 9, Rec.).
Moreover, the circumstances of the case show that the respondent took advantage of the fact that he was a
nephew of Fausto Chincuanco and a close associate of Andres Guanzon in collecting his lawyer's fees. Even at
the time that the respondent was already representing the partnership, the complainant inquired from Chincuanco
about the respondent's fees. In reply Chincuanco said that he (Sta. Maria) should not worry about it because the
respondent is a nephew of his. On this assurance, the complainant could be said to have assumed that the
respondent would not collect an excessive amount, much less take advantage of his relationship with one of the
partners by retaining the funds, considering that the case was one of a simple collection based on a promissory
note. The act of the respondent in collecting P10,000 for attorney's fees and alleged expenses he incurred in the
litigation, aggravated the burden of the complainant who claims that he was not given his due share in the
distribution of the assets of the partnership as his two partners were already in possession of the money. While it

is true that the partners of the complainant apparently acceded to the respondent's acts, it cannot be denied that
the latter acted with indiscretion, induced by his close relationship with Chincuanco to the prejudice of the
complainant. In effect, respondent's act constituted a retention of the funds of his client, an act of professional
indiscretion bordering on misbehaviour.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
It may be stated, however, that the respondent may have felt justified in his acts, since they were done with
apparent acquiescence of his clients, Fausto Chincuanco and Andres Guanzon. Moreover, an amicable
settlement of all the suits filed by the herein complainant resulted in a compromise agreement, whereby the
complainant waived any and all claims against his partners and the respondent arising from the transactions
which are the subject matter of the controversy, as well as from the incidents thereof (Exh. 2, folder of exhibits).
While it may be said that this compromise agreement may not affect the misconduct of the respondent as a
member of the bar, at least, it cannot be denied that the complainant has, in effect, condoned respondent's acts.
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which he
would otherwise deserve, the respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with the warning that a
more severe penalty be imposed for a repetition of same or similar acts.
The report of the Solicitor General was duly set for hearing, by this Court. Respondent excepted from the
recommendation which called for the imposition of a reprimand. Respondent points out that the findings of the
Solicitor General did not warrant his recommendation, since he found that respondent "has not committed any act
that will constitute malpractice or gross misconduct in office." Respondent also claims that the filing of different
proceedings against him was simply intended to harass and embarrass him, because of petitioner's
dissatisfaction over the disposition by his partners, of the award in Civil Case No. 894.
After an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, We find that the findings and
conclusions of the Solicitor General are supported by the evidence of record. The fact that the respondent has
placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his clients constitutes a breach of a lawyer's oath,
to say the least. Call it professional indiscretion or any other name, but the cold fact remains that the act, as
found by the Solicitor General, is not conducive to a healthy growth of the legal profession. The respondent is
hereby admonished that a repetition of similar acts will merit more drastic action.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.

G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V.
HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO S. SANSAET, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioners motion for the discharge of
respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying
the motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition.[1]
The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and
Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del
Sur. Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the
same province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as
counsel for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse.
The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot
No. 3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant
to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in
the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action [2] for the cancellation of respondent Paredes patent and
certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned
subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment[3] nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent
Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent
Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.[4]
Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang
Bayan and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury [5] was filed against
respondent Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.[6] On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was,
however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter
alia of prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated.[7] In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was
likewise represented by respondent Sansaet as counsel.
Nonetheless, respondent* Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on
the charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands
officials to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes counsel of record therein.
On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution[8] recommending the criminal prosecution of respondent
Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because
of its legal significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:

x x x respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the same evidence x
x x but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon recommendation of the Department
of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of arraignment and therecommendation of the Department of
Justice are hereto attached for ready reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for
respondent herein x x x.[9] (Italics supplied.)
A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan [10] charging respondent Paredes with a violation
of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later
granted in respondent courts resolution of August 1, 1991 [11] and the case was dismissed on the ground of
prescription.
On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against
respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein
for falsification of public documents.[12] He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein corespondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,
dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on
the perjury charge.[13] These falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes motion for reconsideration
of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the
same would constitute double jeopardy.
In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever
received by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a
certification of Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ario that said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage
since action thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice.[14]
Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the
submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications,
[15]
respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial
court after he had been arraigned therein.
For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation
were prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade
responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and
inducement of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government
witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their
agreement.
Withal, in a resolution[16] dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges
against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state
witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:
x x x Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent
to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for the accused in those
criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to

present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged
communication between the lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution[17] and, ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he
decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents against each of the herein
respondents. Thus, three criminal cases,[18] each of which named one of the three private respondents here as
the accused therein, were filed in the graft court.However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second
Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of respondent
Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that,
except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the
confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.
Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client
privilege adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in their opposition to
the prosecutions motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on this ratiocination:
From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship existed
between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the information. In
view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must have been disclosed
by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity. Therefore, the
testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is privileged.[19]
Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied,[20] the controversy was elevated to this Court by
the prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent
Sandiganbayan.
The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1) whether or not
the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client
privilege; and (2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps
criminis.

1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent court, and this may reasonably
be expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was
called to witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a
communication, if not more, than verbal statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of
such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to any communication,
without distinction or qualification.[22]
In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode by
which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney.The privilege is not confined to
verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information
communicated by the client to the attorney by other means.[23]
Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing relations as counsel
and client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all
passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion
is the undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to
the motion for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. [24]Also, the
acts and words of the parties during the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily
confidential since Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same
except under conditions of secrecy and confidence.
2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which
the latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past
crimes already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that
the announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is
bound to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past
crime, and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada
that have already been committed and consummated.

As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which existed
between herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case
and other confidential matters must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent
Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be
presented as a witness against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latters consent.[21]

The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now,
insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily
committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered
is the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the
client seeks his lawyers advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the
protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the
attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to
a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the
lawyers advice.

The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts
thereof and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer
understanding of that evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.

Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who
committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privilegedcommunications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of
judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the

clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.[25] (Emphases supplied.)

was affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each of the
three respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification.

3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and
Honrada, either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of
falsifying, the documents which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal
charges now pending in respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus
made by Paredes to Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet
been committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the
attorney-client privilege.

This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this case by the following
discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:

4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he,
Paredes and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a
communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. [26] In fact,
it has also been pointed out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will
not be permitted under the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a
criminal purpose is a conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the
attorney under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.[27]
It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the socalled mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later
committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
II
On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet
qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the
State. Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not
pass upon this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our resolution
in the petition at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring preludial
clarification.
1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether or not respondent
Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that issue as prayed for by
petitioner. Where the determinative facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a
position to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious
administration thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court.[28]
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand charged in three separate
informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the
filing of criminal charges for falsification of public documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution

Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaets discharge as state witness, he can, nevertheless,
be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three cases were consolidated for
joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the
Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the same
incident or series of incidents, or involving common questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and
purposes, Sansaet stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he
was charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and joint trial has the
effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially considering that they are charged
for the same offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for the same offense and tried together are called joint
defendants.
As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having been a consolidation of
the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and became a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a single
action.[29]
Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation (w)hen two or more persons are charged with
the commission of a certain offense was too broad and indefinite; hence the word joint was added to indicate the
identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same
manner in point of commission and time. The word joint means common to two or more, as involving the united
activity of two or more, or done or produced by two or more working together, or shared by or affecting two or
more.[30] Had it been intended that all the accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the
Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in
the present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After all, the purpose of the
Rule can be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.
2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule is that since in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all members of the
conspiracy. Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he does not appear to be the most guilty.
[31]
not that he must be the least guilty[32] as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be
whether an accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state
witness.
To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al.[33] we find this obiter:
It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the others to rob
Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of the stabbings, it was a
mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the perpetrators of the offense, including him, were bound
in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.

However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al.,[34] two conspirators charged with five others in three separate
informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their
confederates. Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., [35] one of the co-conspirators was
discharged from the information charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that
he was not the most guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to
open the account with the bank and which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his coaccused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In other
words, the Court took into account the gravity or nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged
compared to those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is imposable
on all of them.
Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicitly articulated found expression in People vs. Ocimar,
et al.,[36] which we quote in extenso:
Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a coaccused to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and
utilized as a state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most
guilty. Appellant asserts that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the
others.
We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of
four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of
those who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but
even the life of Capt. Caeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the
prosecution. Second, without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution to prove
the elements of the crime. Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its
material points as indicated by the trial court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the
most guilty. As the evidence reveals, he was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior knowledge
of the plot to stage a highway robbery. But even assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does
not appear to be the most guilty. What the law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused
who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by most guilty we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of
participation in the commission of the offense and not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all
the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if
We take into account his degree of participation in the perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that
he has at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
xxx
Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an accused to be
utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the commission of the crime,
which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other accused. Since Bermudez was not
individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it
cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the
government is clearly warranted. (Italics ours.)

The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is based on
the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical action although of varying
acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical school of thought, it is the
identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants the
imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all.
Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the discharge
of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need for giving immunity
to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid admission of an
accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those reasons, the Rules
provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience distilled into a judgmental
policy.
III
The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of respondent
Sansaet as a state witness are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charged in
the criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable task of
establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their
innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is
absolute necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said
respondent has indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the
substance of his projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications.
His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable witnesses, identified in the
basic petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ario, Municipal Circuit
Trial Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor
Claudio A. Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his lettercomplaint; Alberto Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in the
resolution asking their Provincial Governor to file the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and
Francisco Macalit, who obtained the certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ario.
On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time been convicted
of any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this
respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed
to testify as a state witness.
This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may propose but it
is for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and make the
corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been exercised,
and the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the
sole issue of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.

This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the retirement of two
members of its Second Division [37]and the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and
Comment [38] dated June 14, 1995, as required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman
and new members thereof [39]declared:

assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that
We are amenable to setting aside the questioned Resolutions and to grant the prosecutions motion to discharge
accused Generoso Sansaet as state witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of
the proper Resolution to that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.

4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the Petition
for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso T. Atienza and
concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impugned resolutions and
ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by
respondent Sandiganbayan.

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the Second Division in
the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments submitted by the Solicitor-General and re-

SO ORDERED