1

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY

INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
A. M. No. 491
October 6, 1989
FACTS: In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
held on June 3, 1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center, the newlyelected officers were set to take their oath of office on July 4,1989 before the Supreme
Court en banc. However, disturbed by the widespread reports received by some
members of the Court from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the
proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers
about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo
Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes,
and the officious intervention of certain public officials to influence the voting, all of
which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities, the
Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar,
resolved to suspend the oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the
veracity of the reports. Media reports done by Mr.Jurado, Mr. Mauricio and Mr. Locsin in
the newspapers opened the avenue for investigation on the anomalies in the IBP
Elections
ISSUE: Is the principal candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar
conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section
14 of the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political"
Integrated Bar enshrined in Section 4 of the By-Laws.
DECISION: It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987
Constitution [See. 8, Art. VIII] providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of
seven [7] members among whom is "a representative of the Integrated Bar," tasked to
participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much
interest among the lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be
inherent in that office might have caused the corruption of the IBP elections.

2. G.R. No. 116049 July 13, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 47, Puerto Princesa City, ARNE
STROM and GRACE REYES, respondents.

People v. Gacott
G.R. No. 116049 March 20, 1995
Bidin, J.
Facts:
On February 2, 1994, a complaint for violation of the Anti-Dummy Law (C.A. No. 108) was filed
by Asst. City Prosecutor Perfecto E. Pe against respondents Strom and Reyes. The accused filed a
Motion to Quash/Dismiss the criminal case contending that since the power to prosecute is vested
exclusively in the Anti-Dummy Board under Republic Act No. 1130, the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa
has no power or authority to file the same. The prosecution filed an opposition pointing out that the AntiDummy Board has already been abolished by Letter of Implementation No. 2, Series of 1972. Despite
such opposition, however, respondent judge granted the motion espousing the position that the Letter Of
Implementation relied upon by the City Fiscal is not the law contemplated in Article 7 of the New Civil
Code which can repeal another law such as R.A. 1130. Thus, respondent judge in the assailed order of
March 18, 1994 held that the City Prosecutor has no power or authority to file and prosecute the case and
ordered that the case be quashed.
Issue:
whether or not respondent judge in granting the Motion to Quash gravely abused his discretion
as to warrant the issuance of a writ of certiorari
Held:
Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the
light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the Anti-Dummy
Board could not have been expressed more clearly than in the aforequoted LOI. Even assuming that the
City Fiscal of Puerto Princesa failed to cite P.D. No. 1 in his opposition to the Motion to Quash, a mere
perusal of the text of LOI No. 2 would have immediately apprised the respondent judge of the fact that
LOI No. 2 was issued in implementation of P.D. No. 1
3.

G.R. No. 78272 August 29, 1989

DR. and MRS. MERLIN CONSING, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARIDAD SANTOS,
Consing v. Court of Appeals177 SCRA 14Ponente: Justice CortesTopic: Deliberation

Facts:Santos filed with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) a complaint for
specificperformance with damages against the Consings. The CFI ruled in favor of Santos.
Thus,The Consings interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decisionof the CFI with modification as to the computation of the amount to be deducted
from thepurchase price. Hence, from the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner-spouses
filedthis petition for review. They contend that the decision rendered by the Court of
Appealsinn this case does not comply with the requirements of Article VIII, section 13, of
the1987 Constitution.
Issue:Whether or not the Court of Appeals must comply with the certification requirement.

Held & Ratio :

The absence of certification does not invalidate a decision. It is only evidence for failure to observe the requirement.
Therecould be an administrative case on the ground of lack of certification.
Purpose of certification requirement To ensure that all court decisions are reached after
consultation with members of the court en banc or division, as the casemay be To ensure
that the decision is rendered by a court as a whole, not merely by a member of the same To
ensure that decisions are arrived only after deliberation, exchange of ideas, and concurrence
of majority vote.
4.

[G.R. No. 93867 : December 18, 1990.]

192 SCRA 358
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC, in her capacity as
ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Sixto Brillantes, Jr. vs. Haydee T. Yorac, G.R. No. 93867, December 18 1990
Brillantes vs. Yorac
G.R. 93867, 18 December 1990

FACTS:
In December 1989, a coup attempt occurred prompting the president to create a fact finding commission
which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently he has to vacate his chairmanship of the
COMELEC. Yorac was temporarily placed as his substitute. Brillantes then questioned such appointment
urging that under Art 10-C of the Constitution in no case shall any member of the COMELEC be
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity:. Brillantes claimed that the choice of the acting
chairman should not be appointed for such is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members
themselves and that the intrusion of the president violates the independence of the COMELEC as a
constitutional commission.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the designation made by the president violates the constitutional independence of the
COMELEC.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that although all constitutional commissions are essentially executive in nature,
they are not under the control of the president in the discharge of their functions. The designation made
by the president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded on the quote administrative
expediency to present the functions of the COMELEC. Aside from such justification, it found no basis on
existing rules on statutes. Yoracs designation is null and unconstitutional.

5.
G.R. No. 116041 March 31, 1995
NESCITO C. HILARIO, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and CHARITO L. PLANAS, respondents.

FACTS:
- Petitioner was appointed City Attorney by then Mayor of QC Brigido R. Simon, Jr. (OIC of the
Office of the Mayor of QC.
- A new mayor, Ismael Mathay, Jr., was subsequently elected. Mathay sent a letter to Hilario
informing him that the he is deemed resigned pursuant to Sec. 481, Art II of the LGC of 1991
which provided that the position of City Legal Officer is co-terminous with the appointing
authority.
- Vice Mayor of QC Charito Planas later filed a complaint with the CSC against Hilario and a
certain Pecson praying that they be found administratively liable for usurpation, grave
misconduct, being notoriously undesirable, gross insubordination, and conduct grossly
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

- CSC issued Resolution No. 93-4067 holding in abeyance any disciplinary action against
Hilario. CSC also declared in the said resolution that Hilario should no longer be allowed to
continue holding the position of Legal Officer (City Attorney) of QC.
- MR by Hilario was subsequently denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 94-3336.
- Hilario filed a petition with the SC to annul the above mentioned resolutions of the CSC.
ISSUES/REASONING:
1) WON the position of City Legal Officer a confidential one? YES.
Hilarios arguments:
a) Hilario argued that when he was appointed City Attorney, the applicable law was BP
337, and therefore his position should not be considered confidential.
b) He argues that while the position was considered confidential under RA 5185, BP 337
impliedly repealed the confidential nature of the position when it expanded the duties
of the City Attorney.
SC disagreed. The provisions of BP 337 reveal no intention by the legislature to remove the
confidential nature of the position of city legal officer. It merely specifies the various
qualifications, powers and duties of a city legal officer which were not enumerated in RA
5185.
In previous cases it has been held that the City Legal Officer is a confidential position. In
Grino v. CSC, both the City Legal Officer and its counterpart, the Provincial Attorney, both
involve rendering trusted service.
6. : Francisco Abella Jr v. civil service commission
Abella Jr. vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 1525744 Nov. 17, 2004
Ponente: Panganiban\
Facts: Petitioner, a lawyer, retired from the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), as
Department Manager of the Legal Services Department. He held a civil service eligibility for
the position of Department Manager, having completed the training program for Executive
Leadership and Management in 1982 under the Civil Service Academy, pursuant to CSC
Resolution No. 850, which was then the required eligibility for said position.two years after
retirement, petitioner was hired by the SBMA on a contractual basis. He was issued by SBMA
a permanent employment as Department Manager III, Labor and Employment Center.
However, when said appointment was submitted to CSC Regional Office No. III, it was
disapproved on the ground that petitioners eligibility was not appropriate. Petitioner was
advised by SBMA of the disapproval of his appointment. In view thereof, petitioner was
issued a temporary appointment. The CSC affirmed the disapproval of his permanent
appointment. The CA shunned the issue of constitutionality of the Memo Circular. It ruled
that petitioner has no standing as only the appointing officer may request reconsideration of
the action taken by the CSC. Also, petitioner was not the real party in interest as his
appointment was dependent on the CSCs approval.
Issue: won the petitioner has legal standing.

Ratio: A permanent appointment in the career service is issued to a person who has met the
requirements of the position to which the appointment is made in accordance with the
provisions of law, the rules and the standards promulgated pursuant thereto. It implies the
civil service eligibility of the appointee. The law requires the appointment to be submitted to
the CSC which will ascertain, in the main, whether the proposed appointee is qualified to
hold the position and whether the rules pertinent to the process of appointment were
observed.
The appointing officer and the CSC acting together, though not concurrently but
consecutively, make an appointment complete In acting on the appointment, the CSC
determines whether the appointee possesses the appropriate civil service eligibility or the
required qualifications. If the appointee does, the appointment must be approved; if not, it
should be disapproved. According to the CA, only the appointing authority had the right to
challenge the CSCs disapproval. It relied on Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum
Circular 40, s. 1998, which provides: Section 2. Request for Reconsideration of, or appeal
from, the disapproval of an appointment may be made by the appointing authority and
submitted to the Commission within fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of the
disapproved appointment.

7. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T. BAYLON, RAMON

MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO
AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH
98, QUEZON CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 85279
July 28, 1989
Facts:
On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of
SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees
from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to
return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the
defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

Issue:
Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Held:
The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the meaning of these

provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right
to the formation of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities,
and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art.
IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos.
69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting
strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal

8.

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO,

FACTS:
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same
position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an honest misrepresentation, wrote
seven months under residency, which she sought to rectify by adding the words
"since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on
March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the
fact that she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be
eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court
are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months
residency in the district.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary

residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the
First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May
7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is
hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Posted by hyper_jetsetter at 5:42:00 PM
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