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Law
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY
REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil
Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of
Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision
of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the
opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se
engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno, [according to] the
Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband
and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such
irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be
just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family
law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should
likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER
SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased
to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship
between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She
is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to
decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the
deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a
time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latters stand. Hence this
appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the
opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v.
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1. Art 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after
the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing."cralaw virtua1aw
library
2. 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).
3. Ibid., p. 3686.
4. Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.
5. Ibid, pp. 19-20.
6. Ibid, p. 21.
7. 50 O.G. 3679.
8. Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded: "All donations between the
spouses made during the marriage shall be void."cralaw virtua1aw library
9. Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).
10. The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers Union v. Manila Yellow Taxicab
Co., 80 Phil. 833, 838 (1948) reads in full: "Esta interpretacin de la ley es insostenible. El
espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin
de sus dispociones. No deben atenerse a la letra de la ley cuando la interpretacin literal
se separa de la intencin de la legislatura especialmente cuando lleva a conclusiones
incompatibles con objeto manifesto de la ley. Cuando hay conflicto entre la interpretacin
literal y la interpretacin fundada en el proposito de la ley, la ltima debe prevalecer." Cf.
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil, 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 105; Casela v. Court of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279.
11. According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: "Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
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G.R. No. 23703, Gercio v. Sun Life Assurance of Canada et al., 48 Phil. 53
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
September 28, 1925
G.R. No. 23703
HILARIO GERCIO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, ET AL., defendants.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, appellant.
Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins and Brady and Jesus Trinidad for appellant.
Vicente Romualdez, Feria and La O and P. J. Sevilla for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The question of first impression in the law of life insurance to be here decided is whether the
insured the husband has the power to change the beneficiary the former wife and
to name instead his actual wife, where the insured and the beneficiary have been divorced
and where the policy of insurance does not expressly reserve to the insured the right to
change the beneficiary. Although the authorities have been exhausted, no legal situation
exactly like the one before us has been encountered.
Hilario Gercio, the insured, is the plaintiff. The Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, the insurer,
and Andrea Zialcita, the beneficiary, are the defendants. The complaint is in the nature of
mandamus. Its purpose is to compel the defendant Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada to
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xxx
xxx
The other point, relating to the alleged cessation of insurable interest by reason of the
divorce of the parties, is entitled to more serious consideration, although we have very little
difficulty in disposing of it.
It will be proper, in the first place, to ascertain what is an insurable interest. It is generally
agreed that mere wager policies, that is, policies in which the insured party has no interest
in its loss or destruction, are void, as against public policy. . . . But precisely what interest is
necessary, in order to take a policy out of the category of mere wager, has been the subject
of much discussion. In marine and fire insurance the difficulty is not so great, because there
insurance is considered as strictly an indemnity. But in life insurance the loss can seldom be
measured by pecuniary values. Still, an interest of some sort in the insured life must exist. A
man cannot take out insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not
so connected with him as to make the continuance of the life a matter of some real interest
to him.
It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own life and in that of his wife
and children; a woman in the life of her husband; and the creditor in the life of his debtor.
Indeed it may be said generally that any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or
advantage from the continued life of another creates an insurable interest in such life. And
there is no doubt that a man may effect an insurance on his own life for the benefit of a
relative or fried; or two or more persons, on their joint lives, for the benefit of the survivor or
survivors. The old tontines were based substantially on this principle, and their validity has
never been called in question.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The policy in question might, in our opinion, be sustained as a joint insurance, without
reference to any other interest, or to the question whether the cessation of interest avoids a
policy good at its inception. We do not hesitate to say, however, that a policy taken out in
good faith and valid at its inception, is not avoided by the cessation of the insurable interest,
unless such be the necessary effect of the provisions of the policy itself. . . .
. . . .In our judgment of life policy, originally valid, does not cease to be so by the cessation
of the assured party's interest in the life insured.
Another controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court is that of the Central
National Bank of Washington City vs. Hume ([1888], 128 U.S., 134). Therein, Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller, as the organ of the court, announced the following doctrines:
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REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1
promulgated by respondent court on June 26, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27556 affirming with
some modifications the earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85,
which, inter alia, awarded one-half (1/2) of the property subject of Civil Case No. Q-52058
therein to private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos and one-sixth (1/6) each of the other half
of said property to the three private respondents. all as pro indiviso owners of their aforesaid
respective portions.
As found by respondent court, 2 on September 2, 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine
American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a contract denominated as a
lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon City
Community Development Project, including a bungalow thereon, located at and known as
No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was
married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor
Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette
H. Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her herein co-respondents.
On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and, at the behest
of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. On January 8,
1975, with the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a
deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his
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Respondent Court of Appeals, in its challenged decision, held that the lease and conditional
sale agreement executed by and between Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is a lease
contract and, in support of its conclusion, reproduced as its own the following findings of the
trial court:
It is therefore incumbent upon the vendee to comply with all his obligations,
i.e., the payment of the stipulated rentals and adherence to the limitations set
forth in the contract before the legal title over the property is conveyed to the
lessee-vendee. This, in effect. is a pactum reservati dominii which is common
in sales on installment plan of real estate whereby ownership is retained by
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With the modification that private respondents should also reimburse to petitioners their
proportionate shares on the proven hospitalization and burial expenses of the late Daniel
Jovellanos, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. applying
Article 118 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of
either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or
buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case,
any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be
reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
Petitioners now seek this review, invoking their assignment of errors raised before the
respondent court and which may be capsulized into two contentions, namely, that (1) the
lower court erred in holding that the lot and bungalow covered by the lease and conditional
sale agreement (Exhibit 1) is conjugal property of the second marriage of the late Daniel
Jovellanos: and (2) the lower court erred in holding that the provisions of the Family Code are
applicable in resolving the rights of the parties herein. 6
It is petitioners' position that the Family Code should not be applied in determining the
successional rights of the party litigants to the estate of Daniel Jovellanos. for to do so would
be to impair their vested property rights over the property in litigation which they have
acquired long before the Family Code took effect. 7
To arrive at the applicable law, it would accordingly be best to look into the nature of the
contract entered into by the contracting parties. As appositely observed by respondent
court, the so-called lease agreement is, therefore, very much in issue. Preliminarily, we do
not lose sight of the basic rule that a contract which is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy has the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith. 8 Its provisions are binding not only upon them
but also upon their heirs and assigns. 9
The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is specifically
denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" over the property involved with a
lease period of twenty years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the former,
as lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession over the property. 10 In a lease
agreement, the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. 11 In fact, Daniel Jovellanos bound himself therein, among other things, to use the
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Footnotes
1 Serafin E. Camilon, J., ponente; Celso L. Masigno and Artemon D. Luna, JJ.,
concurring.
2 Rollo 23-24, 28.
3 Per Judge Bernardo P. Abesamis, Presiding Judge.
* She testified under this name but is named in the pleadings as Mercy JovellanosMartinez.
4 Rollo, 93-94.
5 Ibid., 30-31.
6 Ibid., 11.
7 Ibid., 13.
8 Arts. 1159 and 1306, Civil Code.
9 Art. 1311, Id.
10 Original Record, 20-24.
15 See Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (1982). 670: cf. Arts. 1475, 1478 and 1503,
Civil Code.
16 Alfonso vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 186 SCRA 400 (1990).
17 Roque vs. Lapuz, et al., 96 SCRA 741 (1980).
18 Original Record, 21.
19 II A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 43-45 (1987).
20 Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, etc., et al., 98 Phil. 711, 722 (1956).
21 Luque, et al. vs. Villegas, etc., et al., 30 SCRA 408, 417 (1969).
22 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 96 SCRA 342, 359
(1980).
23 Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil, 498 (1928).
24 Rollo 89.
25 Ibid., 90.
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Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Miguela Dailo, G.R. No. 153802 March 11,
2005
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005]
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June
3, 2002, which affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During
their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco,
San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax
assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee
thereof to the exclusion of his wife.[3]
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
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(b)
(c)
(c)
(d)
2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing the value of
the car which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION
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[1] Penned by J. Juan Q. Enriquez and concurred in by JJ. Eugenio S. Labitoria, Chairman, and
Teodoro P. Regino; Rollo, p. 34.
[2] Penned by Judge Bienvenido Reyes.
[3] Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 3, 2002, p. 3; Rollo, p. 36,
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] As quoted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[7] Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 5; Rollo, p. 38.
[8] Id. at 6; Rollo, p. 39.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Id. at 7; Rollo, p. 40.
[11] Rollo, p. 24.
[12] Rollo, p. 26.
[13] 353 Phil. 578 (1998).
[14] Id. at 374.
[15] Article 119, The New Civil Code.
[16] Article 105, Family Code.
[17] Article 106, Family Code.
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Lucilda Dael v. IAC et. al., G.R. 68873 March 31, 1989
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
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REGALADO, J.:
The reversal of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated on
February 29, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69711, 1 which affirmed in toto the decision, dated
December 3, 1980, of the quondam Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, in Special
Proceeding No. 4374 thereof, 2 as well as the former's resolution of September 14, 1984
denying the motion for reconsideration of the oppositors-appellants therein, are the twin
objectives of the present appeal by certiorari.
The assailed decision of the court a quo sets out the revelant background facts and the
dramatis personae in this controversy, thus:
It is not disputed that Victorina Durana died intestate on August 1, 1977 in
Manila; she was the wife of the deceased Cesario Cabutihan who died earlier
on June 9, 1972; Cesario Cabutihan was first married to Bienvenida Durana in
February, 1942; the latter died on May 2, 1957; it was less than a year
thereafter or particularly on April 6, 1958 that Cesario Cabutihan married
Victorina Durana, sister of his first wife, Bienvenida Durana.
The first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan produced the following legitimate
children: Nonilon Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido all surnamed
Cabutihan and who are the intervenors in this case although Carmencita
Cabutihan instituted the case as petitioner; the second marriage of Cesario
Cabutihan with Victorina Durana did not produce any issue; however, the
latter's heirs are the children of her two sisters and a brother namely:
Bienvenida Durana, Soledad Durana and Federico Durana Sr.; the latter is the
father of the oppositors, Federico, Jr., Flordelizada (sic), Fredizvinda, Fabian
and Fe Patricio, all surnamed Durana; while Soledad Durana is the mother of
the other oppsitors, Evaristo, Domingo Jr., Lucilda and Conrado, all surnamed
Dael; the other heirs of Vitorina Durana are the petitioner herself and the
intervenors who are all the children of Bienvenida Durana.
It is claimed by all the oppositors that they are entitled to 213 portion of the
estate of Victorina Durana considering that their predecessors-in-interest are
the brother and sister of Victorina Durana; while the remaining 1/3 portion
should devolve to the petitioner and the intervenors who represent their
mother Bienvenida Durana and the other sister of Victorina Durana.
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Footnotes
1 Fourth Civil Cases Division; Sison, P. V., J., ponente, Bidin, A.A., Veloso, M.R.
and Jurado, D.P., JJ., concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Benigno M. Puno.
3 Record of Appeal, 192-194; Rollo, 98.
4 Exh. 1-Dael, Original Records, Vol. 11, 536.
5 Exh. 3-Dael, id., id., 539.
6 Record on Appeal, 1-4.
7 Ibid., 8-10,
8 Ibid., 24-26.
9 Ibid., 38-39.
10 Ibid., 185-191.
11 Ibid., 65-67.
12 Ibid., 88-97.
13 Ibid., 99-106.
14 Ibid., 239-240.
15 Ibid., 250,107-117.
16 Ibid., 194, 229, 251-256.
17 Ibid., 260-263.
18 Rollo, 76.
19 Record on Appeal, 268.
20 Ibid., 269-270.
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