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EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]
CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.
Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY
REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING
MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133 of the Civil
Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of
Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision
of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the
opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se
engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno, [according to] the
Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem
spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband
and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such
irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the
other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be
just that such donations should subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt
should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family
law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should
likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER
SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased
to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship
between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28. 1962. She
is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to
decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the
deceased Felix Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes, was void.
Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a
time before defendant was married to the donor, sustained the latters stand. Hence this
appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the
opportunity of ruling on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v.

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Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that
year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion
reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses falls within the
prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the
acceptance of this Court. The decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiffs
complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in question, she specifically
raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila
Cervantes was null and void under the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that
defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was
made in 1956 and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that
when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of facts
which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective
counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the
property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter
vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on
February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the
donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the
common law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-done and the now
deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That
the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff
claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the
deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the
land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned
out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the Civil Code is void if made
between the spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix
Matabuena in favor of the defendant on February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix
Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became
spouses only when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy considerations of the most
exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition
should apply to a common-law relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision,
Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code 8 speaks
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice
J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his
descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose
el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI,
LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects
(Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit
of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty
years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the
law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by
Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should
subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long
as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand
that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any
other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would be to indict the framers of the
Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot
be distinguished. Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if such
irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with
benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible to such a reproach. If there is
ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the

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spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic
purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may
be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by
an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que
informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus
disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the disputed
property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the
defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his
widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and
the plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint
with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff
and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is
remanded to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above
opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar,JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.
Endnotes:

1. Art 133 of the Civil Code provides: "Every donation between the spouses during the
marriage shall be void. This prohibition does not apply when the donation takes effect after
the death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to moderate gifts which the
spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing."cralaw virtua1aw
library
2. 50 O.G. 3679 (1954).
3. Ibid., p. 3686.
4. Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 17-19.
5. Ibid, pp. 19-20.
6. Ibid, p. 21.
7. 50 O.G. 3679.
8. Art. 1334 of the former Civil Code was similarly worded: "All donations between the
spouses made during the marriage shall be void."cralaw virtua1aw library
9. Buenaventura v. Bautista, 50 O.G. 3679, 3686 (1954).
10. The excerpt from Yellow Taxi and Pasay Trans. Workers Union v. Manila Yellow Taxicab
Co., 80 Phil. 833, 838 (1948) reads in full: "Esta interpretacin de la ley es insostenible. El
espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin
de sus dispociones. No deben atenerse a la letra de la ley cuando la interpretacin literal
se separa de la intencin de la legislatura especialmente cuando lleva a conclusiones
incompatibles con objeto manifesto de la ley. Cuando hay conflicto entre la interpretacin
literal y la interpretacin fundada en el proposito de la ley, la ltima debe prevalecer." Cf.
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil, 1051 (1957); Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, L-25326-27, May 29, 1970, 33
SCRA 105; Casela v. Court of Appeals, L-26754, Oct. 16, 1970, 35 SCRA 279.
11. According to Art. 1001 of the Civil Code: "Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the

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inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children the other half. (953, 837a)."

G.R. No. 23703, Gercio v. Sun Life Assurance of Canada et al., 48 Phil. 53
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
September 28, 1925
G.R. No. 23703
HILARIO GERCIO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, ET AL., defendants.
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE OF CANADA, appellant.
Fisher, DeWitt, Perkins and Brady and Jesus Trinidad for appellant.
Vicente Romualdez, Feria and La O and P. J. Sevilla for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The question of first impression in the law of life insurance to be here decided is whether the
insured the husband has the power to change the beneficiary the former wife and
to name instead his actual wife, where the insured and the beneficiary have been divorced
and where the policy of insurance does not expressly reserve to the insured the right to
change the beneficiary. Although the authorities have been exhausted, no legal situation
exactly like the one before us has been encountered.
Hilario Gercio, the insured, is the plaintiff. The Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, the insurer,
and Andrea Zialcita, the beneficiary, are the defendants. The complaint is in the nature of
mandamus. Its purpose is to compel the defendant Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada to

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change the beneficiary in the policy issued by the defendant company on the life of the
plaintiff Hilario Gercio, with one Andrea Zialcita as beneficiary.
A default judgment was taken in the lower court against the defendant Andrea Zialcita. The
other defendant, the Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, first demurred to the complaint and
when the demurrer was overruled, filed an answer in the nature of a general denial. The
case was then submitted for decision on an agreed statement of facts. The judgment of the
trial court was in favor of the plaintiff without costs, and ordered the defendant company to
eliminate from the insurance policy the name of Andrea Zialcita as beneficiary and to
substitute therefor such name as the plaintiff might furnish to the defendant for that
purpose.
The Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada has appealed and has assigned three errors alleged to
have been committed by the lower court. The appellee has countered with a motion which
asks the court to dismiss the appeal of the defendant Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, with
costs.
As the motion presented by the appellee and the first two errors assigned by the appellant
are preliminary in nature, we will pass upon the first. Appellee argues that the "substantial
defendant" was Andrea Zialcita, and that since she was adjudged in default, the Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Canada has no interest in the appeal. It will be noticed, however, that the
complaint prays for affirmative relief against the insurance company. It will be noticed
further that it is stipulated that the insurance company has persistently refused to change
the beneficiary as desired by the plaintiff. As the rights of Andrea Zialcita in the policy are
rights which are enforceable by her only against the insurance company, the defendant
insurance company will only be fully protected if the question at issue is conclusively
determined. Accordingly, we have decided not to accede to the motion of the appellee and
not to order the dismissal of the appeal of the appellant.
This brings us to the main issue. Before, however, discussing its legal aspects, it is advisable
to have before us the essential facts. As they are stipulated, this part of the decision can
easily be accomplished.
On January 29, 1910, the Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada issued insurance policy No.
161481 on the life of Hilario Gercio. The policy was what is known as a twenty-year
endowment policy. By its terms, the insurance company agreed to insure the life of Hilario
Gercio for the sum of P/2,000, to be paid him on February 1, 1930, or if the insured should
die before said date, then to his wife, Mrs. Andrea Zialcita, should she survive him; otherwise
to the executors, administrators, or assigns of the insured. The policy also contained a
schedule of reserves, amounts in cash, paid-up policies, and renewed insurance,
guaranteed. The policy did not include any provision reserving to the insured the right to
change the beneficiary.
On the date the policy was issued, Andrea Zialcita was the lawful wife of Hilario Gercio.
Towards the end of the year 1919, she was convicted of the crime of adultery. On September
4, 1920, a decree of divorce was issued in civil case no. 17955, which had the effect of
completely dissolving the bonds of matrimony contracted by Hilario Gercio and Andrea
Zialcita.
On March 4, 1922, Hilario Gercio formally notified the Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada that
he had revoked his donation in favor of Andrea Zialcita, and that he had designated in her
stead his present wife, Adela Garcia de Gercio, as the beneficiary of the policy. Gercio
requested the insurance company to eliminate Andrea Zialcita as beneficiary. This, the
insurance company has refused and still refuses to do.
With all of these introductory matters disposed of and with the legal question to the
forefront, it becomes our first duty to determine what law should be applied to the facts. In
this connection, it should be remembered that the insurance policy was taken out in 1910,
that the Insurance Act. No. 2427, became effective in 1914, and that the effort to change
the beneficiary was made in 1922. Should the provisions of the Code of Commerce and the
Civil Code in force in 1910, or the provisions of the Insurance Act now in force, or the general
principles of law, guide the court in its decision?

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On the supposition, first, that the Code of Commerce is applicable, yet there can be found in
it no provision either permitting or prohibiting the insured to change the beneficiary.
On the supposition, next, that the Civil Code regulates insurance contracts, it would be most
difficult, if indeed it is practicable, to test a life insurance policy by its provisions. Should the
insurance contract, whereby the husband names the wife as the beneficiary, be
denominated a donation inter vivos, a donation causa mortis, a contract in favor of a third
person, or an aleatory contract? The subject is further complicated by the fact that if an
insurance contract should be considered a donation, a husband may then never insure his
life in favor of his wife and vice versa, inasmuch as article 1334 prohibits all donations
between spouses during marriage. It would seem, therefore, that this court was right when
in the case of Del Val vs. Del Val ([1915]), 29 Phil., 534), it declined to consider the proceeds
of the insurance policy as a donation or gift, saying "the contract of life insurance is a special
contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which
deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and
specifically to life-insurance contracts or to the destination of life-insurance proceeds. . . ."
Some satisfaction is gathered from the perplexities of the Louisiana Supreme Court, a civil
law jurisdiction, where the jurists have disagreed as to the classification of the insurance
contract, but have agreed in their conclusions as will hereafter see. (Re Succession of Leone
Desforges [1914], 52 L.R.A. [N.S.], 689; Lambert vs Penn Mutual Life Insurance Company of
Philadelphia and L'Hote & Co. [1898], 50 La. Ann., 1027.)
On the further supposition that the Insurance Act applies, it will be found that in this Law,
there is likewise no provision either permitting or prohibiting the insured to change the
beneficiary.
We must perforce conclude that whether the case be considered as of 1910, or 1914, or
1922, and whether the case be considered in the light of the Code of Commerce, the Civil
Code, or the Insurance Act, the deficiencies in the law will have to be supplemented by the
general principles prevailing on the subject. To that end, we have gathered the rules which
follow from the best considered American authorities. In adopting these rules, we do so with
the purpose of having the Philippine Law of Insurance conform as nearly as possible to the
modern Law of Insurance as found in the United States proper.
The wife has an insurable interest in the life of her husband. The beneficiary has an absolute
vested interest in the policy from the date of its issuance and delivery. So when a policy of
life insurance is taken out by the husband in which the wife is named as beneficiary, she has
a subsisting interest in the policy. And this applies to a policy to which there are attached the
incidents of a loan value, cash surrender value, an automatic extension by premiums paid,
and to an endowment policy, as well as to an ordinary life insurance policy. If the husband
wishes to retain to himself the control and ownership of the policy he may so provide in the
policy. But if the policy contains no provision authorizing a change of beneficiary without the
beneficiary's consent, the insured cannot make such change. Accordingly, it is held that a
life insurance policy of a husband made payable to the wife as beneficiary, is the separate
property of the beneficiary and beyond the control of the husband.
As to the effect produced by the divorce, the Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, merely
provides in section 9 that the decree of divorce shall dissolve the community property as
soon as such decree becomes final. Unlike the statutes of a few jurisdictions, there is no
provision in the Philippine Law permitting the beneficiary in a policy for the benefit of the
wife of the husband to be changed after a divorce. It must follow, therefore, in the absence
of a statute to the contrary, that if a policy is taken out upon a husband's life the wife is
named as beneficiary therein, a subsequent divorce does not destroy her rights under the
policy.
These are some of the pertinent principles of the Law of Insurance. To reinforce them, we
would, even at the expense of clogging the decision with unnecessary citation of authority,
bring to notice certain decisions which seem to us to have controlling influence.
To begin with, it is said that our Insurance Act is mostly taken from the statute of California.
It should prove of interest, therefore, to know the stand taken by the Supreme Court of that
State. A California decision oft cited in the Cyclopedias is Yore vs. Booth ([1895]), 110 Cal.,
238; 52 Am. St. Rep., 81), in which we find the following:

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. . . It seems to be the settled doctrine, with but slight dissent in the courts of this country,
that a person who procures a policy upon his own life, payable to a designated beneficiary,
although he pays the premiums himself, and keeps the policy in his exclusive possession,
has no power to change the beneficiary, unless the policy itself, or the charter of the
insurance company, so provides. In policy, although he has parted with nothing, and is
simply the object of another's bounty, has acquired a vested and irrevocable interest in the
policy, which he may keep alive for his own benefit by paying the premiums or assessments
if the person who effected the insurance fails or refuses to do so.
As carrying great weight, there should also be taken into account two decisions coming from
the Supreme Court of the United States. The first of these decisions, in point of time, is
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company vs Schaefer ([1877]), 94 U.S., 457). There, Mr.
Justice Bradley, delivering the opinion of the court, in part said:
This was an action on a policy of the court, in part said: July 25, 1868, on the joint lives of
George F. and Francisca Schaefer, then husband and wife, payable to the survivor on the
death of either. In January, 1870, they were divorced, and alimony was decreed and paid to
the wife, and there was never any issue of the marriage. They both subsequently married
again, after which, in February, 1871, George F. Schaefer died. This action was brought by
Francisca, the survivor.
xxx

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xxx

The other point, relating to the alleged cessation of insurable interest by reason of the
divorce of the parties, is entitled to more serious consideration, although we have very little
difficulty in disposing of it.
It will be proper, in the first place, to ascertain what is an insurable interest. It is generally
agreed that mere wager policies, that is, policies in which the insured party has no interest
in its loss or destruction, are void, as against public policy. . . . But precisely what interest is
necessary, in order to take a policy out of the category of mere wager, has been the subject
of much discussion. In marine and fire insurance the difficulty is not so great, because there
insurance is considered as strictly an indemnity. But in life insurance the loss can seldom be
measured by pecuniary values. Still, an interest of some sort in the insured life must exist. A
man cannot take out insurance on the life of a total stranger, nor on that of one who is not
so connected with him as to make the continuance of the life a matter of some real interest
to him.
It is well settled that a man has an insurable interest in his own life and in that of his wife
and children; a woman in the life of her husband; and the creditor in the life of his debtor.
Indeed it may be said generally that any reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit or
advantage from the continued life of another creates an insurable interest in such life. And
there is no doubt that a man may effect an insurance on his own life for the benefit of a
relative or fried; or two or more persons, on their joint lives, for the benefit of the survivor or
survivors. The old tontines were based substantially on this principle, and their validity has
never been called in question.
xxx

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The policy in question might, in our opinion, be sustained as a joint insurance, without
reference to any other interest, or to the question whether the cessation of interest avoids a
policy good at its inception. We do not hesitate to say, however, that a policy taken out in
good faith and valid at its inception, is not avoided by the cessation of the insurable interest,
unless such be the necessary effect of the provisions of the policy itself. . . .
. . . .In our judgment of life policy, originally valid, does not cease to be so by the cessation
of the assured party's interest in the life insured.
Another controlling decision of the United States Supreme Court is that of the Central
National Bank of Washington City vs. Hume ([1888], 128 U.S., 134). Therein, Mr. Chief Justice
Fuller, as the organ of the court, announced the following doctrines:

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We think it cannot be doubted that in the instance of contracts of insurance with a wife or
children, or both, upon their insurable interest in the life of the husband or father, the latter,
while they are living, can exercise no power of disposition over the same without their
consent, nor has he any interest therein of which he can avail himself; nor upon his death
have his personal representatives or his creditors any interest in the proceeds of such
contracts, which belong to the beneficiaries to whom they are payable.
It is indeed the general rule that a policy, and the money to become due under it, belong,
the moment it is issued, to the person or persons named in it as the beneficiary or
beneficiaries, and that there is no power in the person procuring the insurance, by any act of
his, by deed or by will, to transfer to any other person the interest of the person named.
A jurisdiction which found itself in somewhat the same situation as the Philippines, because
of having to reconcile the civil law with the more modern principles of insurance, is
Louisiana. In a case coming before the Federal Courts, In re Dreuil & Co. ([1915]), 221 Fed.,
796), the facts were that an endowment insurance policy provided for payment of the
amount thereof at the expiration of twenty years to the insured, or his executors,
administrators, or assigns, with the proviso that, if the insured die within such period,
payment was to be made to his wife if she survive him. It was held that the wife has a
vested interest in the policy, of which she cannot be deprived without her consent. Foster,
District Judge, announced:
In so far as the law of Louisiana is concerned, it may also be considered settled that where a
policy is of the semitontine variety, as in this case, the beneficiary has a vested right in the
policy, of which she cannot be deprived without her consent. (Lambert vs Penn Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann., 1027; 24 South., 16.) (See in same connection a leading decision of the
Louisiana Supreme Court, Re Succession of Leonce Desforges, [1914], 52 L.R.A. [N.S.], 689.)
Some question has arisen as to the power of the insured to destroy the vested interest of the
beneficiary in the policy. That point is well covered in the case of Entwistle vs. Travelers
Insurance Company ([1902], 202 Pa. St., 141). To quote:
. . . The interest of the wife was wholly contingent upon her surviving her husband, and she
could convey no greater interest in the policy than she herself had. The interest of the
children of the insured, which was created for them by the contract when the policy was
issued; vested in them at the same time that the interest of the wife became vested in her.
Both interests were contingent. If the wife die before the insured, she will take nothing under
the policy. If the insured should die before the wife, then the children take nothing under the
policy. We see no reason to discriminate between the wife and the children. They are all
payees, under the policy, and together constitute the assured.
The contingency which will determine whether the wife, or the children as a class will take
the proceeds, has not as yet happened; all the beneficiaries are living, and nothing has
occurred by which the rights of the parties are in any way changed. The provision that the
policy may be converted into cash at the option of the holder does not change the relative
rights of the parties. We agree entirely with the suggestion that "holder" or "holders", as
used in this connection, means those who in law are the owners of the policy, and are
entitled to the rights and benefits which may accrue under it; in other words, all the
beneficiaries; in the present case, not only the wife, by the children of the insured. If for any
reason, prudence required the conversion of the policy into cash, a guardian would have no
special difficulty in reasonable protecting the interest of his wards. But however that may be,
it is manifest that the option can only be exercised by those having the full legal interest in
the policy, or by their assignee. Neither the husband, nor the wife, nor both together had
power to destroy the vested interest of the children in the policy.
The case most nearly on all fours with the one at bar is that of Wallace vs Mutual Benefit Life
Insurance Co. ([1906], 97 Minn., 27; 3 L.R.A. [N.S.], 478). The opinion there delivered also
invokes added interest when it is noted that it was written by Mr. Justice Elliott, the author of
a text on insurance, later a member of this court. In the Minnesota case cited, one Wallace
effected a "twenty-year endowment" policy of insurance on his life, payable in the event of
his death within twenty years to Emma G. Wallace, his wife, but, if he lived, to himself at the
end of twenty years. If Wallace died before the death of his wife, within the twenty years, the
policy was payable to the personal representatives of the insured. During the pendency of
divorce proceedings, the parties signed a contract by which Wallace agreed that, if a divorce

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was granted to Mrs. Wallace, the court might award her certain specified property as
alimony, and Mrs. Wallace agreed to relinquish all claim to any property arising out of the
relation of husband and wife. The divorce was granted. An action was brought by Wallace to
compel Mrs. Wallace to relinquish her interest in the insurance policy. Mr. Justice Elliott said:
As soon as the policy was issued Mrs. Wallace acquired a vested interest therein, of which
she could not be deprived without her consent, except under the terms of the contract with
the insurance company. No right to change the beneficiary was reserved. Her interest in the
policy was her individual property, subject to be divested only by her death, the lapse of
time, or by the failure of the insured to pay the premiums. She could keep the policy alive by
paying the premiums, if the insured did not do so. It was contingent upon these events, but
it was free from the control of her husband. He had no interest in her property in this policy,
contingent or otherwise. Her interest was free from any claim on the part of the insured or
his creditors. He could deprive her of her interest absolutely in but one way, by living more
than twenty years. We are unable to see how the plaintiff's interest in the policy was primary
or superior to that of the husband. Both interests were contingent, but they were entirely
separate and distinct, the one from the other. The wife's interest was not affected by the
decree of court which dissolved the marriage contract between the parties. It remains her
separate property, after the divorce as before. . .
. . . . The fact that she was his wife at the time the policy was issued may have been, and
undoubtedly was, the reason why she was named as beneficiary in the event of his death.
But her property interest in the policy after it was issued did not in any reasonable sense
arise out of the marriage relation.
Somewhat the same question came before the Supreme Court of Kansas in the leading case
of Filley vs. Illinois Life Insurance Company ([1914]), 91 Kansas, 220; L.R.A. [1915 D], 130). It
was held, following consideration extending to two motions for rehearing, as follows:
The benefit accruing from a policy of life insurance upon the life of a married man, payable
upon his death to his wife, naming her, is payable to the surviving beneficiary named,
although she may have years thereafter secured a divorce from her husband, and he was
thereafter again married to one who sustained the relation of wife to him at the time of his
death.
The rights of a beneficiary in an ordinary life insurance policy become vested upon the
issuance of the policy, and can thereafter, during the life of the beneficiary, be defeated only
as provided by the terms of the policy.
If space permitted, the following corroborative authority could also be taken into account:
Joyce, The Law of Insurance, second edition, vol. 2, pp. 1649 et seq.; 37 Corpus Juris, pp. 394
et seq.; 14 R.C.L., pp. 1376 et seq.; Green vs. Green ([1912], 147 Ky., 608; 39 L.R.A. [N.S.],
370); Washington Life Insurance Co. vs. Berwald ([1903], 97 Tex., 111); Begley vs. Miller
([1907]), 137 Ill., App., 278); Blum vs. New York L. Ins. Co. ([1906], 197 Mo., 513; 8 L.R.A.
[N.S.], 923; Union Central Life Ins. Co. vs. Buxer ([1900], 62 Ohio St., 385; 49 L.R.A., 737);
Griffith vs. New York Life Ins. Co. ([1894], 101 Cal., 627; 40 Am. St. Rep., 96); Preston vs.
Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. of Hartford ([1902]); 95 Md., 101); Snyder vs. Supreme Ruler of
Fraternal Mystic Circle ([1909], 122 Tenn. 248; 45 L.R.A. [N.S.], 209); Lloyd vs. Royal Union
Mut. L. Ins. Co. ([1917], 245 Fed., 162); Phoenix Mut. L. Ins. Co. vs. Dunham ([1878], 46
Conn., 79; 33 Am. Rep., 14); McKee vs. Phoenix Ins. Co. ([1859], 28 Mo., 383; 75 Am. Rep.,
129); Supreme Council American Legion of Honor vs. Smith and Smith ([1889], 45 N.J. Eq.,
466); Overhiser vs. Overhiser ([1900], 63 Ohio St., 77; 81 Am. St. Rep., 612; 50 L.R.A., 552);
Condon vs. New York Life Insurance Co. ([1918], 183 Iowa, 658); with which compare Foster
vs. Gile ([1880], 50 Wis., 603) and Hatch vs. Hatch ([1904], 35 Tex. Civ. App., 373).
On the admitted facts and the authorities supporting the nearly universally accepted
principles of insurance, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that the question at issue
must be answered in the negative.
The judgment appealed from will be reversed and the complaint ordered dismissed as to the
appellant, without special pronouncement as to the costs in either instance. So ordered.

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Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Avancea, C.J., concurs in the result.
Romualdez, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
JOHNSON, J., concurring in the result.
I agree with the majority of the court, that the judgment of the lower court should be
revoked, but for a different reason. In my judgment, the question presented by the plaintiff is
purely an academic one. The purpose of the petition is to have declared the rights of certain
persons in an insurance policy which is not yet due and payable. It may never become due
and payable. The premiums may not be paid, thereby rendering the contract of insurance of
non effect, and many other things may occur, before the policy becomes due, which would
render it non effective. The plaintiff and the other parties who are claiming an interest in
said policy should wait until there is something due them under the same. For the courts to
declare now who are the persons entitled to receive the amounts due, if they ever become
due and payable, is impossible, for the reason that nothing may ever become payable under
the contract of insurance, and for many reasons such persons may never have a right to
receive anything when the policy does become due and payable. In my judgment, the action
is premature and should have been dismissed.

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Jovellanos v. CA et. al., G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100728 June 18, 1992


WILHELMINA JOVELLANOS, MERCY JOVELLANOS-MARTINEZ and JOSE HERMILO
JOVELLANOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and ANNETTE H. JOVELLANOS, for and in her behalf, and
in representation of her two minor daughters as natural guardian, ANA MARIA and
MA. JENNETTE, both surnamed JOVELLANOS, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision 1
promulgated by respondent court on June 26, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 27556 affirming with
some modifications the earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85,
which, inter alia, awarded one-half (1/2) of the property subject of Civil Case No. Q-52058
therein to private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos and one-sixth (1/6) each of the other half
of said property to the three private respondents. all as pro indiviso owners of their aforesaid
respective portions.
As found by respondent court, 2 on September 2, 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philippine
American Life Insurance Company (Philamlife) entered into a contract denominated as a
lease and conditional sale agreement over Lot 8, Block 3 of the latter's Quezon City
Community Development Project, including a bungalow thereon, located at and known as
No. 55 South Maya Drive, Philamlife Homes, Quezon City. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was
married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor
Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel married private respondent Annette
H. Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her herein co-respondents.
On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and, at the behest
of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. On January 8,
1975, with the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a
deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his

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rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. On September 8, 1985, Daniel
Jovellanos died and his death spawned the present controversy, resulting in the filing by
private respondents of Civil Case No. Q-52058 in the court below.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated
property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting, by
virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated January 8, 1975 executed by Philamlife in favor of
her husband, Daniel Jovellanos. who was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 212286 of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the
second marriage. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the property, specifically the
lot and the bungalow erected thereon, as well as the beneficial and equitable title thereto,
were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease
and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
On December 28, 1989, the court a quo rendered judgment

with the following dispositions:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows


1. Ordering the liquidation of the partnership of the second marriage and
directing the reimbursement of the amount advanced by the partnership of
the first marriage as well (as) by the late Daniel Jovellanos and the defendants
spouses Gil and Mercia * J. Martinez in the acquisition of the lot and bungalow
described in the Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement (Exhs. D and 1);
2. After such liquidation and reimbursement, declaring the plaintiff Annette
Jovellanos as pro-indiviso owner of 1/2 of the property described in TCT No.
212268 (sic) and the bungalow erected therein;
3. Declaring the plaintiff Annette Jovellanos, as well as the minors Anna Marie
and Ma. Jeannette (sic) both surnamed Jovellanos and the herein defendants,
as owners pro indiviso of 1/6 each of the other half of said property;
4. Declaring the defendants spouses Gil and Mercia Martinez as exclusive
owners of the two-storey house erected on the property at the back of the
said bungalow, with all the rights vested in them as builders in good faith
under Article 448 of the New Civil Code;
5. Ordering the parties to make a partition among themselves by proper
instruments of conveyances, subject to the confirmation of this Court, and if
they are unable to agree upon the partition, ordering that the partition should
be made by not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners who shall make the partition in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule
69 of the Revised Rules of Court;
6. Ordering the defendant(s) to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.

Respondent Court of Appeals, in its challenged decision, held that the lease and conditional
sale agreement executed by and between Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is a lease
contract and, in support of its conclusion, reproduced as its own the following findings of the
trial court:
It is therefore incumbent upon the vendee to comply with all his obligations,
i.e., the payment of the stipulated rentals and adherence to the limitations set
forth in the contract before the legal title over the property is conveyed to the
lessee-vendee. This, in effect. is a pactum reservati dominii which is common
in sales on installment plan of real estate whereby ownership is retained by

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the vendor and payment of the agreed price being a condition precedent
before full ownership could be transferred (Wells vs. Samonte, 38768-R, March
23, 1973; Perez vs. Erlanger and Galinger Inc., CA 54 OG 6088). The dominion
or full ownership of the subject property was only transferred to Daniel
Jovellanos upon full payment of the stipulated price giving rise to the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on January 8, 1975 (Exh. 2) when the
marriage between the plaintiff and Daniel Jovellanos was already in existence.
The contention of the defendants that the jus in re aliena or right in the
property of another person (Gabuya vs. Cruz, 38 SCRA 98) or beneficial use
and enjoyment of the property or the equitable title has long been vested in
the vendee-lessee Daniel Jovellanos upon execution of Exh. "1" is true, But the
instant case should be differentiated from the cited cases of Pugeda v. Trias,
et al., 4 SCRA 849; and Alvarez vs. Espiritu, G.R. L-18833, August 14, 1965,
which cannot be applied herein even by analogy. In Pugeda. the subject
property refers solely to friar lands and is governed by Act 1120 wherein the
certificate of sale is considered a conveyance of ownership subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price has not
been paid in full; in the case at bar, however, payment of the stipulated price
is a condition precedent before ownership could be transferred to the vendee.
5

With the modification that private respondents should also reimburse to petitioners their
proportionate shares on the proven hospitalization and burial expenses of the late Daniel
Jovellanos, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. applying
Article 118 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 118. Property bought on installment paid partly from exclusive funds of
either or both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or
buyers if full ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case,
any amount advanced by the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be
reimbursed by the owner or owners upon liquidation of the partnership.
Petitioners now seek this review, invoking their assignment of errors raised before the
respondent court and which may be capsulized into two contentions, namely, that (1) the
lower court erred in holding that the lot and bungalow covered by the lease and conditional
sale agreement (Exhibit 1) is conjugal property of the second marriage of the late Daniel
Jovellanos: and (2) the lower court erred in holding that the provisions of the Family Code are
applicable in resolving the rights of the parties herein. 6
It is petitioners' position that the Family Code should not be applied in determining the
successional rights of the party litigants to the estate of Daniel Jovellanos. for to do so would
be to impair their vested property rights over the property in litigation which they have
acquired long before the Family Code took effect. 7
To arrive at the applicable law, it would accordingly be best to look into the nature of the
contract entered into by the contracting parties. As appositely observed by respondent
court, the so-called lease agreement is, therefore, very much in issue. Preliminarily, we do
not lose sight of the basic rule that a contract which is not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy has the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith. 8 Its provisions are binding not only upon them
but also upon their heirs and assigns. 9
The contract entered into by the late Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife is specifically
denominated as a "Lease and Conditional Sale Agreement" over the property involved with a
lease period of twenty years at a monthly rental of P288.87, by virtue of which the former,
as lessee-vendee, had only the right of possession over the property. 10 In a lease
agreement, the lessor transfers merely the temporary use and enjoyment of the thing
leased. 11 In fact, Daniel Jovellanos bound himself therein, among other things, to use the

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property solely as a residence, take care thereof like a good father of a family, permit
inspection thereof by representatives of Philamlife in regard to the use and preservation of
the property. 12
It is specifically provided, however, that "(i)f, at the expiration of the lease period herein
agreed upon, the LESSEE-VENDEE shall have fully faithfully complied with all his obligations
herein stipulated, the LESSOR-VENDOR shall immediately sell, transfer and convey to the
LESSEE-VENDEE the property which is the subject matter of this agreement; . . . 13
The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a contract
to sell, as contrdistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a conditional
sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full payment of the
purchase price. 14 Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered,
the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is
stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati dominii, or
contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan. 15
Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. 16 the failure of which
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. 17
Hornbook lore from civilists clearly lays down the distinctions between a contract of sale in
which the title passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing sold, and a contract to sell
where, by agreement, the ownership is reserved in the seller and is not to pass until full
payment of the purchase price: In the former, non-payment of the price is a negative
resolutory condition; in the latter, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. In the
former, the vendor loses and cannot recover the ownership of the thing sold until and unless
the contract of sale is rescinded or set aside; in the latter, the title remains in the vendor if
the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of making full payment as
specified in the contract.
Accordingly, viewed either as a lease contract or a contract to sell, or as a contractual
amalgam with facets of both, what was vested by the aforestated contract in petitioners'
predecessor in interest was merely the beneficial title to the property in question. His
monthly payments were made in the concept of rentals, but with the agreement that if he
faithfully complied with all the stipulations in the contract the same would in effect be
considered as amortization payments to be applied to the predetermined price of the said
property. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said
amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2,
1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale
thereof in his favor.
The conditions of the aforesaid agreement also bear notice, considering the stipulations
therein that Daniel Jovellanos, as lessee-vendee, shall not
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Sublease said property to a third party;
(c) Engage in business or practice any profession within the property;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Make any alteration or improvement on the property without the prior
written consent of the LESSOR-VENDOR;
(g) Cut down, damage, or remove any tree or shrub, or remove or quarry any
stone, rock or earth within the property, without the prior written consent of
the LESSOR-VENDOR;

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(h) Assign to another his right, title and interest under and by virtue of this
Agreement, without the prior written consent and approval of the LESSORVENDOR. 18
The above restrictions further bolster the conclusion that Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the
full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law, 19 and, under the contract, Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not
possess or enjoy such rights of ownership.
We find no legal impediment to the application in this case of the rule of retroactivity
provided in the Family Code to the effect that
Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired nights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.
The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with Philamlife was merely
an inchoate and expectant right which would ripen into a vested right only upon his
acquisition of ownership which, as aforestated, was contingent upon his full payment of the
rentals and compliance with all his contractual obligations thereunder. A vested right as an
immediate fixed right of present and future enjoyment. It is to be distinguished from a right
that is expectant or contingent. 20 It is a right which is fixed, unalterable, absolute, complete
and unconditional to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, 21 and which is perfect in itself
and not dependent upon a contingency. 22 Thus, for a property right to be vested, there must
be a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the proprietary interest
must have attached to a thing; it must have become fixed or established and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy. 23
The trial court which was upheld by respondent court, correctly ruled that the cases cited by
petitioners are inapplicable to the case at bar since said cases involved friar lands which are
governed by a special law, Act 1120, which was specifically enacted for the purpose. In the
sale of friar lands, upon execution of the contract to sell, a certificate of sale is delivered to
the vendee and such act is considered as a conveyance of ownership, subject only to the
resolutory condition that the sale may be rescinded if the agreed price shall not be paid in
full. In the instant case, no certificate of sale was delivered and full payment of the rentals
was a condition precedent before ownership could be transferred to the vendee. 24
We have earlier underscored that the deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by
Philamlife, pursuant to the basic contract between the parties, only after full payment of the
rentals. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in
Daniel Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos,
this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
As found by the trial court, the parties stipulated during the pre-trial conference in the case
below that the rentals/installments under the lease and conditional sale agreement were
paid as follows (a) from September 2, 1955 to January 2, 1959, by conjugal funds of the first
marriage; (b) from January 3, 1959 to May 29, 1967, by capital of Daniel Jovellanos; (c) from
May 30, 1967 to 1971, by conjugal funds of the second marriage; and (d) from 1972 to
January 8, 1975, by conjugal funds of the spouses Gil and Mercy Jovellanos
Martinez. 25 Both courts, therefore, ordered that reimbursements should be made in line with
the pertinent provision of Article 118 of the Family Code that "any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners upon
liquidation of the partnership."
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error in the judgment of respondent court, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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Narvasa, C.J., Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 Serafin E. Camilon, J., ponente; Celso L. Masigno and Artemon D. Luna, JJ.,
concurring.
2 Rollo 23-24, 28.
3 Per Judge Bernardo P. Abesamis, Presiding Judge.
* She testified under this name but is named in the pleadings as Mercy JovellanosMartinez.
4 Rollo, 93-94.
5 Ibid., 30-31.
6 Ibid., 11.
7 Ibid., 13.
8 Arts. 1159 and 1306, Civil Code.
9 Art. 1311, Id.
10 Original Record, 20-24.
15 See Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (1982). 670: cf. Arts. 1475, 1478 and 1503,
Civil Code.
16 Alfonso vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 186 SCRA 400 (1990).
17 Roque vs. Lapuz, et al., 96 SCRA 741 (1980).
18 Original Record, 21.
19 II A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code, 43-45 (1987).
20 Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, etc., et al., 98 Phil. 711, 722 (1956).
21 Luque, et al. vs. Villegas, etc., et al., 30 SCRA 408, 417 (1969).
22 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 96 SCRA 342, 359
(1980).
23 Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil, 498 (1928).
24 Rollo 89.
25 Ibid., 90.

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Villanueva v. IAC, 192 SCRA 21


FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 74577 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 21
CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA, Petitioner, vs. THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
JESUS BERNAS and REMEDIOS Q. BERNAS, Respondents.
DECISION
NARVASA, J.:
The spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were the owners in fee simple of a parcel
of land identified as Lot 13, their ownership being evidenced by Original Certificate of Title
No. 0-3239 issued by the Register of Deeds of Capiz on June 19, 1924. After they died, their
surviving children, Modesto Aranas and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the land to themselves
under a deed of extrajudicial partition executed on May 2, 1952. The southern portion,
described as Lot 13-C, was thereby assigned to Modesto; the northern, to Federico. 1
On March 21, 1953, Modesto Aranas obtained a Torrens title in his name from the Capiz
Registry of Property, numbered T-1346. He died on April 20, 1973, at the age of 81 years. His
wife, Victoria Comorro, predeceased him dying at age 70 on July 16, 1971. They had no
children. 2
Now, it appears that Modesto was survived by two (2) illegitimate children named Dorothea
Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These two borrowed P18,000.00 from Jesus Bernas. As
security therefor they mortgaged to Bernas their father's property, Lot 13-C. In the "Loan
Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage" executed between them and Bernas on October 30,
1975, they described themselves as the absolute co-owners of Lot 13-C. A relative,
Raymundo Aranas, signed the agreement as a witness. 3
Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay their loan. As a result, Bernas caused the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage over Lot 13-C on June 29, 1977 and acquired the land at the
auction sale as the highest bidder. 4 After the foreclosure sale, Dorothea and Teodoro
executed a deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated June 21, 1978, in which they adjudicated the
same Lot 13-C unto themselves in equal shares pro-indiviso.: nad
On October 25, 1978 Bernas consolidated his ownership over Lot 13-C, the mortgagors
having failed to redeem the same within the reglementary period, and had the latter's title
(No. T-1346 in the name of Modesto Aranas) cancelled and another issued in his name, TCT
No. T-15121. 5
About a month later, or on November 24, 1978, Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo
Aranas who, as aforestated, was an instrumental witness in the deed of mortgage
executed by Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas on October 30, 1975 filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court at Roxas City against Jesus Bernas and his spouse, Remedios Bernas.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-4188, and assigned to Branch 14. In their
complaint, the plaintiffs prayed that the latter's title over Lot 13-C, TCT No. T-15121, be
cancelled and they be declared co-owners of the land. They grounded their cause of action
upon their alleged discovery on or about November 20, 1978 of two (2) wills, one executed
on February 11, 1958 by Modesto Aranas, and the other, executed on October 29, 1957 by

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his wife, Victoria Comorro. Victoria Comorro's will allegedly bequeathed to Consolacion and
Raymundo, and to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas, in equal shares pro indiviso, all of said
Victoria Comorro's "interests, rights and properties, real and personal . . . as her net share
from (the) conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto Aranas . . ." Modesto
Aranas' will, on the other hand, bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro Aranas (his illegitimate
children) all his interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria "as well as his own capital
property brought by him to (his) marriage with his said wife." 6
At the pre-trial, the parties stipulated on certain facts, including the following:
1) that the property in question was registered before the mortgage in the name of
the late Modesto Aranas, married to Victoria Comorro, (covered by) TCT No. 1346,
issued on March 21, 1953;
2) that the wills above described were probated only after the filing of the case (No.
V-4188);
3) that Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas are not children of either
Modesto Aranas or Victoria Comorro;
4) that the lot in question is not expressly mentioned in the will; and
5) that TCT No. 15121 exists, and was issued in favor of defendant spouses Jesus
Bernas and Remedios Bernas.:-cralaw
Trial ensued after which judgment was rendered adversely to the plaintiffs, Consolacion
Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas. 7 The dispositive part of the judgment reads as follows: 8
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiffs as follows:
The plaintiffs' complaint is hereby dismissed and ordering the plaintiffs, jointly
and severally, to pay the defendants the following:
1) THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,500.00) as attorney's
fees;
2) FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as actual damages;
3) TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as moral damages;
4) Declaring the defendants spouses Jesus Bernas and Remedios O.
Bernas as legal owners of Lot No. 13-C and including all the
improvements thereon;
5) Declaring the loan agreement with real estate mortgage (Exh. '2')
entered into by Dorothea Aranas Ado married to Reynaldo F. Ado
and Teodoro C. Aranas and Jesus Bernas married to Remedios O.
Bernas, over the lot in question executed on October 30, 1975
before Notary Public Roland D. Abalajon and the corresponding
Certificate of Title No. T-15121 registered in the name of Jesus
Bernas (defendants spouses) as having been executed and issued
in accordance with law, are declared legal and valid;
6) For failure to prove all other counter-claim and damages, the same
are hereby dismissed.
7) To pay costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED."
The plaintiffs appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court, where they succeeded only in
having the award of actual and moral damages deleted, the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court having been otherwise affirmed in toto.
From this judgment of the Appellate Court, 9 Consolacion Villanueva appealed to this Court.
Her co-plaintiff, Raymundo Aranas, did not.
The only question is, what right was acquired by Consolacion Villanueva over Lot 13-C and
the improvements thereon standing by virtue of Victoria Camorro's last will and testament
giving to her all of said Victoria's "interests, rights and properties, real and personal . . . as
her net share from (the) conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto
Aranas . . ." She is admittedly, not named an heiress in Modesto Aranas' will.: nad

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Certain it is that the land itself, Lot 13-C, was not "conjugal partnership property" of Victoria
Comorro and her husband, Modesto Aranas. It was the latter's exclusive, private property,
which he had inherited from his parents Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa, the original
owners of the property registered solely in his name, under TCT T-1346. Whether Modesto
succeeded to the property prior or subsequent to his marriage to Victoria Comorro the
record being unfortunately none too clear on the point is inconsequential. The property
should be regarded as his own exclusively, as a matter of law. This is what Article 148 of the
Civil Code clearly decrees: that to be considered as "the exclusive property of each spouse"
is inter alia, "that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own," or "that which each
acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title." Thus, even if it be assumed that Modesto's
acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took place during his marriage to Victoria Comorro, the
lot would nonetheless be his "exclusive property" because acquired by him, "during the
marriage, by lucrative title."
Moreover, Victoria Comorro died on July 16, 1971, about two (2) years ahead of her husband,
Modesto Aranas, exclusive owner of Lot 13-C, who passed away on April 20, 1973. Victoria
never therefore inherited any part of Lot 13-C and hence, had nothing of Lot 13-C to
bequeath by will or otherwise to Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else.
It would seem, however, that there are improvements standing on Lot 13-C, and it is to
these improvements that Consolacion Villanueva's claims are directed. The question then is,
whether or not the improvements are conjugal property, so that Victoria Comorro may be
said to have acquired a right over them by succession, as voluntary heir of Victoria Comorro.
The Civil Code says that improvements, "whether for utility or adornment, made on the
separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through
the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership," and
buildings "constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land
shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." 10 Proof, therefore, is needful of
the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds
used therefor, in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the
conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. No such proof was presented or proferred
by Consolacion Villanueva or any one else. What is certain is that the land on which the
improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto Aranas and that where, as here,
property is registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when
precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that it belongs exclusively to said
spouse. 11 It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in
character.
Yet another consideration precludes relief to Consolacion Villanueva and that is, that when
Lot 13-C was mortgaged to Jesus Bernas, the title was free of any lien, encumbrance or
adverse claim presented by or for Consolacion Villanueva or anybody else, and that when
Bernas subsequently consolidated his ownership over Lot 13-C and obtained title in his
name, the Registry of Deeds contained no record of any lien, encumbrance or adverse claim
affecting the property. Furthermore, Bernas' mode of acquisition of ownership over the
property, i.e., by a mortgage sale, appears in all respects to be regular, untainted by any
defect whatsoever. Bernas must therefore be deemed to have acquired indefeasible and
clear title to Lot 13-C which cannot be defeated or negated by claims subsequently arising
and of which he had no knowledge or means of knowing prior to their assertion and
ventilation.:-cralaw
Finally, it bears stressing that the conclusion of the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
evidence establishes that the property in question was the exclusive property of one spouse,
not conjugal, is a factual one which, absent any satisfactory showing of palpable error or
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Appellate Court in reaching it, is not reviewable
by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court subject of this appeal, being
in accord with the evidence and applicable law and jurisprudence, is AFFIRMED, with costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Endnotes

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1. Rollo, p. 41.
2. Idem.
3. Id., pp. 7-10.
4. Id., pp. 11-12.
5. Id., p. 39.
6. Id., pp. 39-40.
7. Rendered on February 29, 1984 by Hon. Enrique P. Suplico, presiding over Branch XIV
of the RTC at Roxas City.
8. Id., pp. 37-38.
9. Rendered on Feb. 12, 1986 by the Second Civil Cases Division, Camilon, J., ponente,
with Pascual, Campos and Jurado, JJ., concurring (Rollo, pp. 39 et seq.)
10. ART. 158.
11. PNB vs. CA., 153 SCRA 435 (1987).

Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank v. Miguela Dailo, G.R. No. 153802 March 11,
2005
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153802. March 11, 2005]
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner, vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59986 rendered on June
3, 2002, which affirmed with modification the October 18, 1997 Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 29, San Pablo City, Laguna in Civil Case No. SP-4748 (97).
The following factual antecedents are undisputed.
Respondent Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During
their marriage, the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco,
San Pablo City from a certain Sandra Dalida. The subject property was declared for tax
assessment purposes under Assessment of Real Property No. 94-051-2802. The Deed of
Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee
thereof to the exclusion of his wife.[3]
On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in
favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner

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Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in
San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of
P300,000.00 from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed on the same day a
Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner. The
abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo, took
place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[4]
Upon maturity, the loan remained outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings on the mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a
Certificate of Sale was issued in favor of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of
one year without the property being redeemed, petitioner, through its vice-president,
consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.[5]
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the
subject property, respondent learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Roldan
Brion to clean its premises and that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed
a boy to play with fire within the premises.
Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29,
San Pablo City, Civil Case No. SP-2222 (97) for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
property in question was the exclusive property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision on October 18, 1997. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff having proved by the preponderance of evidence the allegations
of the Complaint, the Court finds for the plaintiff and hereby orders:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. The declaration of the following documents as null and void:
(a)

The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated December 1, 1993 executed


before Notary Public Romulo Urrea and his notarial register entered as
Doc. No. 212; Page No. 44, Book No. XXI, Series of 1993.

(b)

The Certificate of Sale executed by Notary Public Reynaldo Alcantara on


April 20, 1995.

(c)

The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant

(c)

The Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership executed by the defendant


over the residential lot located at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City,
covered by ARP No. 95-091-1236 entered as Doc. No. 406; Page No. 83,
Book No. III, Series of 1996 of Notary Public Octavio M. Zayas.

(d)

The assessment of real property No. 95-051-1236.

2. The defendant is ordered to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the
plaintiff.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P40,000.00 representing the value of
the car which was burned.
ON BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION

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1. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as attorneys fees;
2. The defendant to pay plaintiff P25,000.00 as moral damages;
3. The defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay the cost of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon elevation of the case to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the trial
courts finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the subject property acquired during the
marriage of spouses Dailo belongs to their conjugal partnership.[7] The appellate court
declared as void the mortgage on the subject property because it was constituted without
the knowledge and consent of respondent, in accordance with Article 124 of the Family
Code. Thus, it upheld the trial courts order to reconvey the subject property to respondent.
[8] With respect to the damage to respondents car, the appellate court found petitioner to
be liable therefor because it is responsible for the consequences of the acts or omissions of
the person it hired to accomplish the assigned task.[9] All told, the appellate court affirmed
the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for damages and attorneys fees for lack of
basis.[10]
Hence, this petition, raising the following issues for this Courts consideration:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. ON
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS UNDIVIDED SHARE.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE
LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO
THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.[11]
First, petitioner takes issue with the legal provision applicable to the factual milieu of this
case. It contends that Article 124 of the Family Code should be construed in relation to
Article 493 of the Civil Code, which states:
ART. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coownership.
Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part:
ART. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall
belong to both spouses jointly. . . .
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . .
Petitioner argues that although Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of the
other spouse to the mortgage of conjugal properties, the framers of the law could not have
intended to curtail the right of a spouse from exercising full ownership over the portion of
the conjugal property pertaining to him under the concept of co-ownership.[12] Thus,
petitioner would have this Court uphold the validity of the mortgage to the extent of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr.s share in the conjugal partnership.

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In Guiang v. Court of Appeals,[13] it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires
the consent of both the husband and wife.[14] In applying Article 124 of the Family Code,
this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and
void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who
contracted the sale. The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the instant case. As
shall be discussed next, there is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an
exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.
Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence
of a marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between respondent and her late husband.[15] With the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains
in the Family Code was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established
before its effectivity unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws.[16]
The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the
late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of
gains is a special type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund
the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired
by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance.[17] Unlike the absolute
community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner,[18]
the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that
is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of
gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.[19] Thus, the property relations of
respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under
the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.
The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent
of his wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who
makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule on co-ownership
under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should
not distinguish.[20] Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in declaring
the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents
consent.
Second, petitioner imposes the liability for the payment of the principal obligation obtained
by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. on the conjugal partnership to the extent that it redounded to
the benefit of the family.[21]
Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable for: . . . (3)
Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the
extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . For the subject property to be held
liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of some
advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat
and frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[22]
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such.[23] Ei incumbit probatio qui
dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove).[24] Petitioners
sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. to finance the
construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit of his family, without
adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Other than petitioners bare
allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the

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loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the
principal obligation.
In addition, a perusal of the records of the case reveals that during the trial, petitioner
vigorously asserted that the subject property was the exclusive property of the late
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. Nowhere in the answer filed with the trial court was it alleged that the
proceeds of the loan redounded to the benefit of the family. Even on appeal, petitioner never
claimed that the family benefited from the proceeds of the loan. When a party adopts a
certain theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal,
for to permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the other party but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process.[25] A party may change his
legal theory on appeal only when the factual bases thereof would not require presentation of
any further evidence by the adverse party in order to enable it to properly meet the issue
raised in the new theory.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by J. Juan Q. Enriquez and concurred in by JJ. Eugenio S. Labitoria, Chairman, and
Teodoro P. Regino; Rollo, p. 34.
[2] Penned by Judge Bienvenido Reyes.
[3] Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 3, 2002, p. 3; Rollo, p. 36,
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] As quoted in the Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 34-35.
[7] Decision of the Court of Appeals, p. 5; Rollo, p. 38.
[8] Id. at 6; Rollo, p. 39.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Id. at 7; Rollo, p. 40.
[11] Rollo, p. 24.
[12] Rollo, p. 26.
[13] 353 Phil. 578 (1998).
[14] Id. at 374.
[15] Article 119, The New Civil Code.
[16] Article 105, Family Code.
[17] Article 106, Family Code.

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[18] Article 90, Family Code.
[19] Article 108, Family Code.
[20] Recaa, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123850, January 5, 2001, 349 SCRA 24, 33 .
[21] Rollo, p. 27.
[22] Ayala Investment & Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 942, 952 (1998),
citing Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia, 30 SCRA 111 (1969).
[23] Id. at 954, 286 SCRA 272, 283 ( 1998).
[24] Castilex Industrial Corporation v. Vasquez, Jr., 378 Phi. 1009 (1999).
[25] Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 949 (1997).
[26] Heirs of Enrique Zambales v. Court of Appeals, 205 Phil. 789 (1983).

Lucilda Dael v. IAC et. al., G.R. 68873 March 31, 1989
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

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SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68873 March 31, 1989
LUCILDA DAEL, EVERGISTO DAEL, DOMINGO DAEL, JR., CONRADO DAEL, FEDERICO
DURANA, JR., FREDISVINDA DURANA, FLEURDELIZADA DURANA, FABIAN DURANA
and FE PATRICIO DURANA, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CARMENCITA CABUTIHAN, NONILON
CABUTIHAN, ROMULO CABUTIHAN, LERMO CABUTIHAN, and BIENVENIDO
CABUTIHAN, respondents.
Ismael T. Porles for petitioners.
Primo L. Marquez for respondents.
Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz collaborating counsel for respondents.
Roman R. Ulendioro for respondent Administratrix Carmencita Cabutihan.

REGALADO, J.:
The reversal of the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated on
February 29, 1984 in AC-G.R. CV No. 69711, 1 which affirmed in toto the decision, dated
December 3, 1980, of the quondam Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, in Special
Proceeding No. 4374 thereof, 2 as well as the former's resolution of September 14, 1984
denying the motion for reconsideration of the oppositors-appellants therein, are the twin
objectives of the present appeal by certiorari.
The assailed decision of the court a quo sets out the revelant background facts and the
dramatis personae in this controversy, thus:
It is not disputed that Victorina Durana died intestate on August 1, 1977 in
Manila; she was the wife of the deceased Cesario Cabutihan who died earlier
on June 9, 1972; Cesario Cabutihan was first married to Bienvenida Durana in
February, 1942; the latter died on May 2, 1957; it was less than a year
thereafter or particularly on April 6, 1958 that Cesario Cabutihan married
Victorina Durana, sister of his first wife, Bienvenida Durana.
The first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan produced the following legitimate
children: Nonilon Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido all surnamed
Cabutihan and who are the intervenors in this case although Carmencita
Cabutihan instituted the case as petitioner; the second marriage of Cesario
Cabutihan with Victorina Durana did not produce any issue; however, the
latter's heirs are the children of her two sisters and a brother namely:
Bienvenida Durana, Soledad Durana and Federico Durana Sr.; the latter is the
father of the oppositors, Federico, Jr., Flordelizada (sic), Fredizvinda, Fabian
and Fe Patricio, all surnamed Durana; while Soledad Durana is the mother of
the other oppsitors, Evaristo, Domingo Jr., Lucilda and Conrado, all surnamed
Dael; the other heirs of Vitorina Durana are the petitioner herself and the
intervenors who are all the children of Bienvenida Durana.
It is claimed by all the oppositors that they are entitled to 213 portion of the
estate of Victorina Durana considering that their predecessors-in-interest are
the brother and sister of Victorina Durana; while the remaining 1/3 portion
should devolve to the petitioner and the intervenors who represent their
mother Bienvenida Durana and the other sister of Victorina Durana.

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There is, therefore, no dispute concerning the relationship of the petitioner,
oppositors and the intervenors to the decedent Victorina Durana; there is
neither any question concerning the right of all the parties in this case to
inherit from the deceased Victorina Durana; 3
Likewise established is the fact that during the second marriage of Cesario and Victorina,
they were engaged in a copra business and a public transportation business, with Victorina
managing the former. After the demise of Cesario, Victorina and the private respondents
entered into a extra-judicial settlement of his estate on December 30, 1973. Part of the
properties adjudicated to Victorina include the copra business abovementioned, as well as
some of the vehicles used in the transportation business. 4 Subsequently, however, the
vehicles were transferred to the private respondents by virtue of a "deed of sale" dated July
24, 1978. 5
This case was commenced in the aforementioned Court of First Instance of Quezon by
Carmencita Cabutihan, one of the private respondents herein, who filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Victorina Durana, wherein she also prayed for her
appointment as administratrix. 6 Petitioners herein filed an opposition, asking that the
letters of administration be issued instead to herein petitioner Lucilda Dael. 7 The other
private respondents, on their motion, intervened in the case. 8
On December 22, 1977, Honesto Cabutihan, Democrito Cabutihan and David Cabutihan filed
their claim against the estate for the payment of the harvest of their property which had
been entrusted to Victorina Durana for purposes of her copra business but which obligation
she failed to pay due to her untimely death. 9 Said claim, in the amount of P70,350.82, was
approved by the probate court on December 2, 1980. 10
Meanwhile, the court below appointed Amado Zoleta as special administrator of the estate
of the late Victorina Durana on May 24, 1978. 11 Said special administrator, upon order of
the probate court, submitted an inventory of the properties of the estate on August 30,
1978, consisting of twenty (20) parcels of land valued at P69,340.00, cash in bank
amounting to P140,079.41, cattle and livestock valued at P7,200.00, furniture valued at
P5,120.00, fixtures in the amount of P1,300.00, equipment worth P11,863.00, and other
miscellaneous items valued at P3,038.00. The total value of the properties included in this
inventory is P237,940.41. 12
On January 16, 1979, a "Supplementary Inventory" was filed by the special administrator
covering other real properties of the estate of Victorina, consisting of the undivided shares in
the inheritance of Cesario Cabutihan from his parents, Bartolome Cabutihan and Natividad
Daelo. The total value of the properties listed in the supplementary inventory is P4,700.82.
13 It may be mentioned that the properties that were adjudicated to Victorina in the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Cesario were included in the inventory submitted by
the special administrator. 14
Private respondents moved for the disapproval of said inventories claiming that the
properties listed therein were either acquired during the first marriage of Cesario Cabutihan
or were merely the products or fruits of the properties of said first union or otherwise
acquired through the funds thereof. 15
In due course, the trial court rendered a decision holding that Victorina Durana had no
paraphernal properties brought or contributed to her marriage with Cesario Cabutihan; that
the copra business was formed in 1949 during the first marriage; that Victorina used the
same facilities, credit and capital in managing the business; and that the main source of
income not only of Cesario Cabutihan and also of Victorina during their respective lifetimes
was the copra business. 16
On such factual findings, the lower court came up with the following conclusions:

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Not having any personal property which she brought to her marriage with
Cesario Cabutihan and the copra business not being her own or of her
conjugal partnership with her husband, the conclusion is inescapable; that all
the properties listed in the inventories in her name or jointly with Cesario
Cabutihan do not belong to her exclusively; these properties in Exhibits 'ASPA' and 'B-SPA' are either the assets of Bienvenida Durana as her
paraphernal property or as the conjugal partnership assets of spouses Cesario
Cabutihan (sic) or the latter's capital inasmuch as the properties in the name
of Victorina a Durana or those jointly with her husband were acquired or
purchased out of the fruits or produce of the properties of Bienvenida Durana
and/or Cesario Cabutihan or out of the income of the copra business of the
first marriage which was merely managed and administered by Victorina
Durana after the owners' deaths.
xxx xxx xxx
To determine, therefore, the extent of the estate of Victorina Durana from the
list of properties, real and personal, enumerated in the Inventories (Exhibits
'A-SPA' and B-SPA') which erroneously include even the Estate of the First
Marriage, the conjugal estate of Cesario Cabutihan and Bienvenida Durana
must be settled or liquidated first; one-half of the conjugal estate shall be
inherited by Cesario Cabutihan and his five (5) children, namely: Nonilon
Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido, all surnamed CABUTIHAN, share
and share alike; the inheritance of Cesario Cabutihan in the Estate of
Bienvenida Durana in addition to the other one (1/2) half which is his share in
the conjugal partnership with his wife Bienvenida shall constitute Cesario's
estate which shall be inherited by his heirs, namely: Victorina Durana, his
second wife, and his legitimate children by his first wife, namely: Nonilon
Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido, all surnamed CABUTIHAN, share
and share alike.
xxx xxx xxx
Hence, the extent of the Estate of Victorina Durana shall consist only of her
share in the inheritance of the Estate of Cesario Cabutihan.
Unless any of the properties listed in Exhibits 'A-SPA' and B-SPA' exclusively
belong to Bienvenida Durana, all of said properties shall be presumed to be
the conjugal (sic) and/or the fruits and income of said partnership or of the
copra business of said partnership; therefore, the properties in said
inventories shall be computed, divided and partitioned as follows: five (5/12)
twelve over the one (1/2) half thereof to be adjudicated to Nonilon
Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido, all surnamed CABUTIHAN as their
shares in the inheritance of their mother; the one (1/6) sixth portion out of the
one (1/2) half of said properties shall pertain to Cesario Cabutihan as his share
in the inheritance of his first wife; this share and the remaining one (1/2) half
of the properties in the Inventories which comprise his estate shall be
inherited by his second wife Victorina Durana with (whom he had no child) and
his five children by his first marriage, Nonilon Carmencita, Romulo, Lermo and
Bienvenido, all surnamed CABUTIHAN, at the proportion of one (1/6) sixth
each of the said properties over the seven (7/12) twelfth thereof; therefore,
one (1/6) sixth out of the said seven (7/12) twelfth of the said properties
(Estate of Cesario) shall be the extent of the Estate of Victorina Durana which
she inherited from her husband; this (1/6 of 7/12) portion shall be inherited by
Durana's heirs; one (1/3) third thereof to be adjudicated to petitioner and the
Intervenors and the remaining two (2/3) thirds thereof to the oppositors. 17
The probate court thereby disapproved both inventories and annulled the extrajudicial
settlement and deed of sale (Exhibit 1 Dael and Exhibit 3-Dael) mentioned earlier. The latter

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two were annulled for being simulated or fictitious and for involving conjugal properties of
the first marriage, including properties of Bienvenida, to which Victorina is not an heir. 18
As a consequence, petitioners appealed to the former Intermediate Appellate Court on
December 8, 1980. 19 On the same day, respondent Carmencita Cabutihan filed a "motion
for authority to withdraw funds" from the estate, in the amount of P90,000.00 to be
partitioned among the heirs in accordance with the proportion provided for in the aforesaid
decision of the probate court. 20 On December 11, 1980, this motion was granted, 21
despite opposition thereto. 22
Thereafter, on December 12, 1980, petitioners herein filed a motion asking the lower court
to order the return of the amount of P70,350.82 allegedly paid to the claimants Democrito
Honesto and David Cabutihan, submitting as proof a receipt allegedly signed on December
30, 1980 by Democrito Cabutihan in behalf of all said claimants and assisted by their
counsel, Euclides A. Abcede.
On February 9, 1984, respondent court promulgated its decision which, as already stated,
affirmed the decision of the lower court, hence this petition assigning four errors which we
will resolve seriatim.
1. Petitioners submit that both the respondent and lower courts erred in concluding that the
copra business, as well as the properties listed in the inventories as acquired during the
second marriage, are assets of the conjugal partnership of the first marriage between
Cesario and Bienvenida. They argued that to so hold would, in effect, maintain the theory
that the marital community of proprietary interest continued to exist even after the CesarioBienvenida conjugal partnership had been dissolved by the death of Bienvenida.
It may be conceded that the factual findings of the trial court were based on substantial
documentary and testimonial evidence and are entitled to the corresponding weight and
respect.
Such established facts notwithstanding, We are not as equally disposed to yield assent to
the conclusions drawn by both the court a quo and the respondent court which Would so
simplistically adjudicate and consider the properties involved as belonging in their entirety
to the first marriage.
When Bienvenida Durana died on May 2, 1957, the first conjugal partnership was
automatically dissolved. 23 That conjugal partnership was then converted into an implied
ordinary co-ownership. 24 It was also at this point in time that the inheritance was
transmitted to the heirs of Bienvenida. 25 Thus, her heirs, Cesario, Nonilon Carmencita
Romulo, Lermo and Bienvenido, acquired respective and definite rights over one-half (1/2) of
the conjugal partnership property which pertained to Bienvinida. Consequently, whatever
fruits or income may thereafter be derived from the properties, including the copra business,
would no longer be conjugal but would belong in part to the heirs in proportion to their
respective shares. The fruits and income of the other half of the property of the conjugal
partnership would exclusively belong to Cesario.
The marriage of Cesario and Victorina on April 6, 1952 also produced the corresponding
legal consequences. From that moment on, the fruits or income of the separate properties of
the spouses would be conjugal, including those acquired through their industry. 26 Hence,
the fruits and income of Cesario's share in the inheritance from Bienvenida and of his
conjugal share in the property of the first conjugal partnership would form part of the
conjugal partnership properties of the second marriage. The fruits and income derived or
acquired through these last-mentioned properties would likewise be conjugal in nature.
It would have been ideal had there been a liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties
of the first marriage between Cesario and Bienvenida. Unfortunately, We cannot determine
from the records the amount of such properties at the time of Bienvenida's demise. There is
a dearth of proof on this matter. What appears evident, however, is that, considering the

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continuity in the operation of the two businesses during the marital coverture between
Cesario and Victorina which spanned a period of fourteen (14) years, and the fact that after
Cesario's death Victorina still actively engaged in the same business until her own death five
(5) years later, the properties enumerated in the aforesaid inventories submitted to the
probate court could not all have been properties of the first marriage.
Inevitably, the problem is how to apportion the properties involved between the two
conjugal partnerships. On this score, guidance should be sought from the provisions of the
Civil Code to the effect that whenever the liquidation of the partnership of two or more
marriages contracted by the same person should be carried out at the same time and there
is no evidence to show the capital or the conjugal property belonging to each of the
partnerships to be liquidated, the total mass of the partnership property shall be divided
between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration of each and to the property
belonging to the respective spouses. 27
The first marriage existed for approximately fifteen (15) years (1942 to 1957), while the
second marriage lasted for about fourteen (14) years (1958 to 1972). Applying the
aforestated rule, the first conjugal partnership will be prorated a share of fifteen twentyninths (15/29) of the properties included in the inventory submitted on August 30, 1978,
while the second conjugal partnership will get fourteen twenty-ninths (14/29) thereof. Not to
be included, however, are the real properties listed in the supplementary inventory filed on
January 16, 1979, because they definitely belong to the estate of Cesario as the latter's
inheritance from his parents, Bartolome Cabutihan and Natividad Daelo.
One-half (1/2) of the properties that pertain to the first conjugal partnership belong to
Cesario as his conjugal share therein, while the other half shall be considered as inherited by
him and his five children as the heirs of Bienvenida.
The properties pertaining to the second partnership shall also be equally divided, one-half
(1/2) to belong to Cesario and the other to Victorina as their respective shares in their
conjugal partnership properties. The share of Cesario should then be divided among his
heirs, namely, Victorina and his five (5) children.
To recapitulate, the estate of Victorina for distribution to her heirs shall consist of her onehalf (1/2) share in the conjugal properties of the aforesaid second marriage and her onesixth (1/6) share in the estate of Cesario as an heir.
2. Petitioners also question the approval of the claims of Democrito Honesto and David
Cabutihan. Petitioners' effete opposition is anchored on their allegation that said claim "was
approved primarily on the basis of the testimony of claimant Democrito Cabutihan" which,
according to them, is inadmissible under the Dead Man's Statute or the survivorship
disqualification rule. 28 While petitioners' arguments may have a juris tantum plausibility if
considered alone, We see no reason to dwell on this issue. It would be pointless since, as
correctly observed by the trial court, "even assuming the applicability of the dead man's rule
concerning the testimony of Democrito Cabutihan, the testimony of Urbano Prado and Tirso
Linosa are more than sufficient to establish the claim and to bolster the documentary
evidence in support thereof as indicated on Exhibits 'B', 'B-1', to 'B-82-claim', 'C' and 'C-1'
inclusive." 29
3. Also challenged by petitioners is the order of the court below, dated December 11, 1980,
allowing the withdrawal of funds for distribution to the heirs as advance inheritance. Said
order is, however, within the contemplation and authority of Rule 109, Section 2 whereof
provides that "(n)otwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in proceedings to settle
the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may
deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the
controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these rules'. Said Rule 90, on the other hand, provides in
part that "(n)o distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees or any of them, give a

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bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs."
It is true that "partial distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of
the testate or intestate proceedings should as much as possible be discouraged by the
courts and, unless in extreme cases, such form of advances of inheritance should not be
countenanced. The reason for this strict rule is obvious courts should guard with utmost zeal
and jealousy the estate of the decedent to the end that the creditors thereof be adequately
protected and all the rightful heirs assured of their shares in the inheritance." 30
Nevertheless, after duly considering the foregoing rules, We sustain the validity of the
questioned order. The respondent court correctly held than "(i)f oppositors would stand to
share more in the inheritance than what was fixed for them in the appealed judgment, We
believe the estate has sufficient assets to ensure an equitable distribution of the inheritance
in accordance with law and final judgment in the proceedings." 31 Also, it does not appear
that there are unpaid obligations, as contemplated in Rule 90, for which provisions should
have been made or a bond required. It is clear that the provisions of the Rules of Court, as
well as the jurisprudence thereon, were followed in this particular incident.
4. With respect to the propriety of the alleged payment of the claims of the Cabutihan
brothers before the decision is this case became final and executory, We are not in a position
to rule on such issue because this Court is not a trier of facts. Such issue requires the prior
resolution of basic factual questions, that is, whether or not such payment had actually been
made to the claimants and the circumstances under which the same was effected.
The probate court had not yet ruled on petitioners' "Motion to Order the Return of the
Amount Paid for Claim", when the instant petition was filed. Based on the records of this
appeal, the last action taken in the lower court was its order that the private respondents
comment on said motion, but no response thereto or any subsequent development on this
matter is reflected or reported. If the petitioners have sufficient basis to complain on this
matter, the same should consequently be pursued and threshed out in the court below.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent court, which affirmed and adopted in toto the
decision of the court a quo, is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. So much of the judgments of both lower courts as declare that all the properties listed in
the two inventories, marked as Exhibits "A-SPA"and "B-SPA" in Special Proceeding No. 4374
of the court of origin, are conjugal partnership assets of the deceased spouses Cesario
Cabutihan and Bienvenida Durana are hereby SET ASIDE;
2. The properties therein enumerated shall be divided in the following manner: (a) Seventwelfths (7/12) of fifteen twenty-ninths (15/29), and one-half (1/2) of fourteen twenty-ninths
(14/29), of the properties listed in the inventory dated August 30, 1978, as well as all the
properties listed in the supplementary inventory dated January 16, 1979, shall constitute the
estate of Cesario Cabutihan. This estate shall be divided equally among his six (6) heirs,
namely, his second wife, Victorina, and his five (5) children, Nonilon Carmencita, Romulo,
Lermo and Bienvenido, all surnamed Cabutihan; and (b) The remaining five-twelfths (5/12) of
fifteen twenty-ninths (15/29) of the properties in said inventory of August 30, 1978 shall
belong to the said five (5) children, share and share alike, as their respective participations
in their mother's inheritance;
3. The estate of Victorina Durana, which shall be the subject of settlement and distribution in
said Special Proceeding No. 4374, shall consist of one-half (1/2) of the other portion
constituting fourteen twenty-ninths (14/29) of the properties in the inventory of August 30,
1978, which represents her share in the conjugal properties of the second marriage, and
one-sixth (1/6) of the estate of Cesario Cabutihan as fixed herein, and said properties shall
be divided among her heirs enumerated and in the proportion allotted by the probate court
as qouted at the outset of this decision;

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4. The other pronouncements in the dispositive portion of the appealed judgment of the
court below and adopted by the respondent court, insofar as the are not inconsistent with
the foregoing dispositions; the order of the said lower court, dated December 2, 1980,
approving the claims of Honesto, Democrito and David Cabutihan; and its order of December
11, 1980 allowing the withdrawal of funds for distribution among the heirs are AFFIRMED;
and
5. All other incidents not otherwise disposed of herein shall be pursued by the parties in and
shall be resolved by the court a quo in accordance with the terms of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Fourth Civil Cases Division; Sison, P. V., J., ponente, Bidin, A.A., Veloso, M.R.
and Jurado, D.P., JJ., concurring.
2 Penned by Judge Benigno M. Puno.
3 Record of Appeal, 192-194; Rollo, 98.
4 Exh. 1-Dael, Original Records, Vol. 11, 536.
5 Exh. 3-Dael, id., id., 539.
6 Record on Appeal, 1-4.
7 Ibid., 8-10,
8 Ibid., 24-26.
9 Ibid., 38-39.
10 Ibid., 185-191.
11 Ibid., 65-67.
12 Ibid., 88-97.
13 Ibid., 99-106.
14 Ibid., 239-240.
15 Ibid., 250,107-117.
16 Ibid., 194, 229, 251-256.
17 Ibid., 260-263.
18 Rollo, 76.
19 Record on Appeal, 268.
20 Ibid., 269-270.

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21 Ibid., 273-276.
22 Ibid., 271.
23 Art. 175(i), Civil Code; Ofias vs. Javillo, et al., 59 Phil. 733 (1934); Nable
Jose, et al. vs. Nable Jose, et al., 41 Phil. 713 (1916).
24 Taningco, et al. vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna 5 SCRA 381 (1962); Prades
et al. vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230 (1926); Borja vs. Addison, et al., 44 Phil. 895
(1922).
25 Art. 777, Civil Code.
26 Arts. 142, 153, ibid.
27 Art. 189, ibid.
28 Sec. 19(a), Rule 130, Rules of Court.
29 Record on Appeal, 190-191.
30 Gatmaitan vs. Medina, 109 Phil. 108, 111 (1960).
31 Rollo, 86,

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For September 29, 2014 Submission:


7. Bucoy v. Paulino 23 SCRA 248
8. Valdes v. RTC Branch 102, Quezon City, 260 SCRA 221
9. Abing v. Waeyan, G.R. No. 146294, July 31, 2006
10. Juaniza v. Jose, 89 SCRA 306
11. San Luis v. San Luis G.R. Nos. 133743: 134029 (2007)
12. Buenaventura v. Buenaventura, March 3, 2005

34 EJERCITO-BECK, A. E. /CL-1

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