Nelson Dulay vs.

Abitiz
ARTICLE 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding
article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor
practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement.
The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances
or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and
refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

In any case, the Court agrees with petitioner's contention that the CBA is the law or contract between the parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA
entered into by and between respondent GCI and AMOSUP, the union to which petitioner belongs, provides as follows:
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, in the first place, really intended to bring to conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or
conflict in the interpretation or application of the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a procedure
for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that procedure should be strictly observed.
It may not be amiss to point out that the abovequoted provisions of the UKI are in consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present Omnibus
Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which
states that "[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with Articles
261 and 262 of the Labor Code." The Court notes that the said Omnibus Rules and Regulations were promulgated by the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and that these departments were mandated to consult with the
Senate Committee on Labor and Employment and the House of Representatives Committee on Overseas Workers Affairs
Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures. In cases of claims and disputes arising from this employment, the parties covered by a
collective bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If the parties are not covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the parties may at their option submit
the claim or dispute to either the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), pursuant to Republic
Act (RA) 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If there is no provision as to the voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the parties, the same shall
be appointed from the accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the Department of Labor and
Employment.
The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) shall exercise original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide disciplinary
action on cases, which are administrative in character, involving or arising out of violations of recruitment laws, rules and regulations involving
employers, principals, contracting partners and Filipino seafarers
It is clear from the above that the interpretation of the DOLE, in consultation with their counterparts in the respective committees of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, as well as the DFA and the POEA is that with respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers
wherein the parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of a
voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement that parties may opt to submit the
dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration. It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the
law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. 8 Such rules and regulations partake of the
nature of a statute and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself.9 In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent
reason to depart from this rule.

UNIVERSITY of IMMACULATE, CONCEPCION, INC., petitioner,

vs.
The HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR

When the Secretary of Labor ordered the UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the termination of the individual respondents, the Secretary
did not exceed her jurisdiction, nor did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It must be pointed out that one of the substantive evils which
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor dispute to the further detriment of the national interest. In her
Order dated March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor rightly held:

It is well to remind both parties herein that the main reason or rationale for the exercise of the Secretary of Labor and Employments power
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as amended, is the maintenance and upholding of the status quo while the dispute is being
adjudicated. Hence, the directive to the parties to refrain from performing acts that will exacerbate the situation is intended to ensure that the
dispute does not get out of hand, thereby negating the direct intervention of this office.l^vvphi1.net

The Universitys act of suspending and terminating union members and the Unions act of filing another Notice of Strike after this Office has
assumed jurisdiction are certainly in conflict with the status quo ante. By any standards[,] these acts will not in any way help in the early
resolution of the labor dispute. It is clear that the actions of both parties merely served to complicate and aggravate the already strained labormanagement relations.17

Indeed, it is clear that the act of the UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual respondents from their employment became the impetus for the
UNION to declare a second notice of strike. It is not a question anymore of whether or not the terminated employees, the individual
respondents herein, are part of the bargaining unit. Any act committed during the pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise to further
contentious issues or increase the tensions between the parties should be considered an act of exacerbation and should not be allowed

REYES vs. TRAJANO

The same legal proposition is set out in the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended, as
might be expected Section 1, Rule II (Registration of Unions), Book V (Labor Relations) of the Omnibus
Rules provides as follows; 4
Sec. 1. Who may join unions; exception. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural
enterprises, including employees of government corporations established under the Corporation Code as
well as employees of religious, medical or educational institutions, whether operating for profit or not, except
managerial employees, shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor
organizations for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant, intermittent and without any definite
employers people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor organizations for
their mutual aid and protection.
The right of self-organization includes the right to organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine which
of two or more unions in an establishment to join, and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for
purposes of collective bargaining through representatives of their own choosing, or for their mutual aid and
protection, i.e., the protection, promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests
Logically, the right NOT to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to disaffiliate or resign from a labor
organization, is subsumed in the right to join, affiliate with, or assist any union, and to maintain membership
therein. The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain from
exercising said right. It is self-evident that just as no one should be denied the exercise of a right granted by
law, so also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The fact that a person has
opted to acquire membership in a labor union does not preclude his subsequently opting to renounce such
membership
The right to refuse to join or be represented by any labor organization is recognized not only by law but also
in the rules drawn up for implementation thereof. The original Rules on Certification promulgated by the
defunct Court of Industrial Relations required that the ballots to be used at a certification election to
determine which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an alternative choice of the employee
voting, to the effect that he desires not to which of two or more competing labor unions would represent the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit should contain, aside from the names of each union, an
alternative choice of the employee voting, to the effect that he desires not to be represented by any union
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or not to be represented by a labor organization, and in
the affirmative case, by which particular labor organization. If the results of the election should disclose that
the majority of the workers do not wish to be represented by any union, then their wishes must be respected,
and no union may properly be certified as the exclusive representative of the workers in the bargaining unit
in dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. The
minority employees who wish to have a union represent them in collective bargaining can do nothing
but wait for another suitable occasion to petition for a certification election and hope that the results will be
different. They may not and should not be permitted, however, to impose their will on the majority who do
not desire to have a union certified as the exclusive workers' benefit in the bargaining unit upon the plea
that they, the minority workers, are being denied the right of self-organization and collective bargaining. As
repeatedly stated, the right of self-organization embraces not only the right to form, join or assist labor
organizations, but the concomitant, converse right NOT to form, join or assist any labor union.
The respondents' argument that the petitioners are disqualified to vote because they "are not constituted into
a duly organized labor union" "but members of the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious grounds,
from joining or forming any labor organization" and "hence, not one of the unions which vied for
certification as sole and exclusive bargaining representative," is specious. Neither law, administrative rule
nor jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a
certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote
to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization or not
In a certification election all rank-and-file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit are entitled to vote.
This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the "labor organization
designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall be the
exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining." Collective

bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified
union binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank-and-file employees, probationary or
permanent, have a substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no
distinction as to their employment for certification election. The law refers to "all" the employees in the
bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining unit".
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be denied the right to vote because they "did not
participate in previous certification elections in the company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not
allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations," persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or
precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past
certification elections. In denying the petitioners' right to vote upon these egregiously fallacious grounds, the
public respondents exercised their discretion whimsically, capriciously and oppressively and gravely abused
the same.
KAPATIRAN VS. CALLEJA
The right of members of the IGLESIA NI KRISTO sect not to join a labor union for being contrary to their
religious beliefs, does not bar the members of that sect from forming their own union. The public respondent
correctly observed that the "recognition of the tenets of the sect ... should not infringe on the basic right of
self-organization granted by the constitution to workers, regardless of religious affiliation.

PANAM WORLD AIRWAYS INC. VS. PANAM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION

The greater offense is to the labor movement itself, more specifically to the right of self-organization. There
is both a constitutional and statutory recognition that laborers have the right to form unions to take care of
their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their freedom organizations would be rendered nugatory if they
could not choose their own leaders to speak on their behalf and to bargain for them.
FEU-DR. NICANOR REYES MEDICAL FOUNDATION, INC vs. TRAJANO
At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification election on February 13, 1986, Article 244 of the
Labor Code was already amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, to wit:

Art. 244. Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial, industrial and
charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the right to selforganizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant intermittent and itinerant
workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may form labor
organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their interests and for their mutual aid and protection.
(underscoring supplied).

Under the aforequoted provision, there is no doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit medical institutions (as
herein petitioner) are now permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective
bargaining. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by law for calling a certification
election (p. 15, Rollo), it was incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election to ascertain
the bargaining representative of petitioner's employees (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel,
134 SCRA 152).

As held in Quimpo v. Dela Victoria, 46 SCRA 139, in order that the pendency of another action between the same
parties for the same cause may be availed of as a ground to dismiss a case, there must be, between the action
under consideration and the other action: (1) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in
both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3)
the Identity on the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other
action wig, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.1avvphi1

In the instant case, any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme
Court (G. R. No. L-49771) wig not constitute res judicata in the petition for certification election under consideration,
for while in the former, private respondent questioned the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code before its
amendment, in the latter, private respondent invokes the same article as already amended.

Toyota Motor Phil. Corp vs. Toyota Phil Corp.

At the time private respondent filed its petition for certification election on February 13, 1986, Article 244 of the
Labor Code was already amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 70, to wit:
Art. 244. Coverage and employees' right to self-organization. All persons employed in commercial,
industrial and charitable, medical or educational institutions whether operating for profit or not, shall have the
right to self-organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining. Ambulant intermittent
and itinerant workers, self-employed people, rural workers and those without any definite employers may
form labor organizations for the purpose of enhancing and defending their interests and for their mutual aid
and protection. (underscoring supplied).
Under the aforequoted provision, there is no doubt that rank and file employees of non-profit medical institutions (as
herein petitioner) are now permitted to form, organize or join labor unions of their choice for purposes of collective
bargaining. Since private respondent had complied with the requisites provided by law for calling a certification
election (p. 15, Rollo), it was incumbent upon respondent Director to conduct such certification election to ascertain
the bargaining representative of petitioner's employees (Samahang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. vs. Noriel,
134 SCRA 152).
As held in Quimpo v. Dela Victoria, 46 SCRA 139, in order that the pendency of another action between the same
parties for the same cause may be availed of as a ground to dismiss a case, there must be, between the action
under consideration and the other action: (1) Identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in
both actions; (2) Identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3)
the Identity on the two preceding particulars should be such that any judgment which may be rendered on the other
action wig, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
1avvphi1

In the instant case, any judgment which may be rendered in the petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme
Court (G. R. No. L-49771) wig not constitute res judicata in the petition for certification election under consideration,
for while in the former, private respondent questioned the constitutionality of Article 244 of the Labor Code before its
amendment, in the latter, private respondent invokes the same article as already amended
TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS INTERNATIONAL GOLF CLUB INC. VS TAGAYTAY HIGHLANDS EMPLOYEES UNION
Clearly, based on this provision [Article 245], a labor organization composed of both rank-and-file and supervisory employees is no
labor organization at all. It cannot, for any guise or purpose, be a legitimate labor organization. Not being one, an organization which
carries a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees cannot posses any of the rights of a legitimate labor organization,
including the right to file a petition for certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining. It becomes necessary,
therefore, anterior to the granting of an order allowing a certification election, to inquire into the composition of any labor
organization whenever the status of the labor organization is challenged on the basis of Article 245 of the Labor.

The inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation, unless
such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances
enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article 239 of above-quoted Article 239 of the Labor
Code.
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of subject employees x x x The mere fact that an employee is
designated manager does not necessarily make him one. Otherwise, there would be an absurd situation where one can be given the
title just to be deprived of the right to be a member of a union. In the case of National Steel Corporation vs. Laguesma (G. R. No.
103743, January 29, 1996), it was stressed that:
What is essential is the nature of the employees function and not the nomenclature or title given to the job which
determines whether the employee has rank-and-file or managerial status or whether he is a supervisory employee.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. VS. SEC OF LABOR

While therefore under the old rules, security guards were barred from joining a labor organization of the rank and
file, under RA 6715, they may now freely join a labor organization of the rank and file or that of the supervisory
union, depending on their rank. By accommodating supervisory employees, the Secretary of Labor must likewise
apply the provisions of RA 6715 to security guards by favorably allowing them free access to a labor organization,
whether rank and file or supervisory, in recognition of their constitutional right to self-organization.

A.D GOTHONG

Managerial employee is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely
routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not
falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of
this Book.
Under Rule I, Section 2 (c), Book III of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code, to be a
member of managerial staff, the following elements must concur or co-exist, to wit: (1) that his
primary duty consists of the performance of work directly related to management policies; (2) that
he customarily and regularly exercises discretion and independent judgment in the performance of
his functions; (3) that he regularly and directly assists in the management of the establishment; and
(4) that he does not devote more than twenty percent of his time to work other than those described
above.
The test of supervisory or managerial status depends on whether a person possess authority
to act in the interest of his employer in the matter specified in Article 212 (k) of the Labor Code and
Section 1 (m) of its Implementing Rules and whether such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. Thus, where such
recommendatory powers as in the case at bar, are subject to evaluation, review and final action by
the department heads and other higher executives of the company, the same, although present, are
not exercise of independent judgment as required by law.

PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAGUESMA

First. In United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma, 30 we had occasion to elucidate on the term
"managerial employees." Managerial employees are ranked as Top Managers, Middle Managers and First Line
Managers. Top and Middle Managers have the authority to devise, implement and control strategic and operational
policies while the task of First-Line Managers is simply to ensure that such policies are carried out by the rank-andfile employees of an organization. Under this distinction, "managerial employees" therefore fall in two (2) categories,
namely, the "managers" per se composed of Top and Middle Managers, and the "supervisors" composed of FirstLine Managers. 31 Thus, the mere fact that an employee is designated "manager" does notipso facto make him one.
Designation should be reconciled with the actual job description of the employee, 32 for it is the job description that
determines the nature of employment
PICOP's contention that the subject section heads and unit managers exercise the authority to hire and fire 35 is
ambiguous and quite misleading for the reason that any authority they exercise is not supreme but merely advisory
in character. Theirs is not a final determination of the company policies inasmuch as any action taken by them on
matters relative to hiring, promotion, transfer, suspension and termination of employees is still subject to
confirmation and approval by their respective superior. 36 Thus, where such power, which is in effect
recommendatory in character, is subject to evaluation, review and final action by the department heads and other
higher executives of the company, the same, although present, is not effective and not an exercise of independent
judgment as required by law.

PEPSI-COLA PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC vs. SEC OF LABOR

In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification
of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, thus ". . . if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union
in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company dominated with the presence of
managerial employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its representatives, and to see to it that its
interest are well protected. The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees themselves are union
members. Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided. It is the same reason that impelled this
Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the
disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential employees could unionize in
order to bargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by their own motives rather than the
interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose of collective bargaining
would mean the extension of the law to persons or individuals who are supposed to act "in the interest of" the
employers. It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which
they are duty bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. vs.FerrerCalleja reiterated in Philips Industrial Development, Inc., NLRC, that "confidential employees such as accounting
personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the source of
undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining agreement.

TUNAY NA PAGKAKAISA NG MANGGAGAWA SA ASIA BREWERY vs. ASIA BREWERY INC.

Confidential employees are defined as those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who
formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two (2) criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that is, the
confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the
prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of employees who, in the
normal course of their duties, become aware of management policies relating to labor relations is a principal
objective sought to be accomplished by the "confidential employee rule." 26 There is no showing in this case that the
secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted or acted in a confidential capacity to managerial employees and obtained
confidential information relating to labor relations policies. And even assuming that they had exposure to internal
business operations of the company, respondent claimed, this is not per se ground for their exclusion in the
bargaining unit of the daily-paid rank-and-file employees. 27
Not being confidential employees, the secretaries/clerks and checkers are not disqualified from membership in the
Union of respondents rank-and-file employees. Petitioner argues that respondents act of unilaterally stopping the
deduction of union dues from these employees constitutes unfair labor practice as it "restrained" the workers
exercise of their right to self-organization, as provided in Article 248 (a) of the Labor Code.
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (SCBEU-NUBE) vs. SCB

The disqualification of managerial and confidential employees from joining a bargaining unit for rank and file
employees is already well-entrenched in jurisprudence. While Article 245 of the Labor Code limits the ineligibility to
join, form and assist any labor organization to managerial employees, jurisprudence has extended this prohibition to
confidential employees or those who by reason of their positions or nature of work are required to assist or act in a
fiduciary manner to managerial employees and hence, are likewise privy to sensitive and highly confidential
records.15
In this case, the question that needs to be answered is whether the Bank's Chief Cashiers and Assistant Cashiers,
personnel of the Telex Department and HR staff are confidential employees, such that they should be excluded.

As regards the qualification of bank cashiers as confidential employees, National Association of Trade Unions
(NATU) Republic Planters Bank Supervisors Chapter v. Torres 16 declared that they are confidential employees
having control, custody and/or access to confidential matters, e.g., the branch's cash position, statements of
financial condition, vault combination, cash codes for telegraphic transfers, demand drafts and other negotiable
instruments, pursuant to Sec. 1166.4 of the Central Bank Manual regarding joint custody, and therefore, disqualified
from joining or assisting a union; or joining, assisting or forming any other labor organization. 17
Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja18 meanwhile stated that "confidential employees such as accounting
personnel, radio and telegraph operators who, having access to confidential information, may become the source
of undue advantage. Said employee(s) may act as spy or spies of either party to a collective bargaining
agreement."19
Finally, in Philips Industrial Development, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,20 the Court
designatedpersonnel staff, in which human resources staff may be qualified, as confidential employees because by
the very nature of their functions, they assist and act in a confidential capacity to, or have access to confidential
matters of, persons who exercise managerial functions in the field of labor relations

CENECO vs. DOLE

As discussed by the Solicitor General, Article I, Section 9 of the Articles of Incorporation and By- Laws of CENECO
provides that "any member may withdraw from membership upon compliance with such uniform terms and
conditions as the Board may prescribe." The same section provides that upon withdrawal, the member is merely
required to surrender his membership certificate and he is to be refunded his membership fee less any obligation
that he has with the cooperative. There appears to be no other condition or requirement imposed upon a
withdrawing member. Hence, there is no just cause for petitioner's denial of the withdrawal from membership of its
employees who are also members of the union. 7
The alleged board resolutions relied upon by petitioner in denying the withdrawal of the members concerned were
never presented nor their contents disclosed either before the med-arbiter or the Secretary of Labor if only to prove
the ratiocination for said denial. Furthermore, CENECO never averred non-compliance with the terms and
conditions for withdrawal, if any. It appears that the Articles of Incorporation of CENECO do not provide any ground
for withdrawal from membership which accordingly gives rise to the presumption that the same may be done at any
time and for whatever reason. In addition, membership in the cooperative is on a voluntary basis. Hence, withdrawal
therefrom cannot be restricted unnecessarily. The right to join an organization necessarily includes the equivalent
right not to join the same.
The right of the employees to self-organization is a compelling reason why their withdrawal from the cooperative
must be allowed. As pointed out by CURE, the resignation of the member- employees is an expression of their
preference for union membership over that of membership in the cooperative. The avowed policy of the State to
afford fall protection to labor and to promote the primacy of free collective bargaining mandates that the employees'
right to form and join unions for purposes of collective bargaining be accorded the highest consideration.
Membership in an electric cooperative which merely vests in the member a right to vote during the annual meeting
becomes too trivial and insubstantial vis-a-vis the primordial and more important constitutional right of an employee
to join a union of his choice. Besides, the 390 employees of CENECO, some of whom have never been members of
the cooperative, represent a very small percentage of the cooperative's total membership of 44,000. It is
inconceivable how the withdrawal of a negligible number of members could adversely affect the business concerns
and operations of CENECO.
We rule, however, that the direct certification ordered by respondent Secretary is not proper. By virtue of Executive
Order No. 111, which became effective on March 4, 1987, the direct certification originally allowed under Article 257
of the Labor Code has apparently been discontinued as a method of selecting the exclusive bargaining agent of the
workers. This amendment affirms the superiority of the certification election over the direct certification which is no
longer available now under the change in said provision. 8
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC IMMIGRATION COMMISSION vs. CALLEJA

There are basically three propositions underlying the grant of international immunities to international organizations.
These principles, contained in the ILO Memorandum are stated thus: 1) international institutions should have a

status which protects them against control or interference by any one government in the performance of functions
for the effective discharge of which they are responsible to democratically constituted international bodies in which
all the nations concerned are represented; 2) no country should derive any national financial advantage by levying
fiscal charges on common international funds; and 3) the international organization should, as a collectivity of States
members, be accorded the facilities for the conduct of its official business customarily extended to each other by its
individual member States. 12 The theory behind all three propositions is said to be essentially institutional in character. "It
is not concerned with the status, dignity or privileges of individuals, but with the elements of functional independence
necessary to free international institutions from national control and to enable them to discharge their responsibilities
impartially on behalf of all their members. 13 The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded
performance of their functions by the agencies concerned.

SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY vs. DRILON

The Court finds that since private respondents are not employees of the Company, they are not entitled to the
constitutional right to join or form a labor organization for purposes of collective bargaining. Accordingly, there is no
constitutional and legal basis for their "union" to be granted their petition for direct certification. This Court made this
pronouncement in La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, supra:
. . . The question of whether employer-employee relationship exists is a primordial consideration
before extending labor benefits under the workmen's compensation, social security, medicare,
termination pay and labor relations law. It is important in the determination of who shall be included
in a proposed bargaining unit because, it is the sine qua non, the fundamental and essential
condition that a bargaining unit be composed of employees. Failure to establish this juridical
relationship between the union members and the employer affects the legality of the union itself. It
means the ineligibility of the union members to present a petition for certification election as well as
to vote therein
MACTAN WORKERS UNION vs. ABOITIZ
The terms and conditions of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. Those who are
entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the
aggrieved party has the right to go to court for redress. 6 Nor does it suffice as a defense that the claim is made on
behalf of non-members of intervenor Associated Labor Union, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the benefits of a
collective bargaining agreement extend to the laborers and employees in the collective bargaining unit, including those
who do not belong to the chosen bargaining labor organization.
Nevertheless, it is not to be forgotten that what is entitled to constitutional protection is labor, or more specifically
the working men and women, not labor organizations. The latter are merely the instrumentalities through which their
welfare may be promoted and fostered. That is the raison d'etre of labor unions. The utmost care should be taken
then, lest in displaying an unyielding, intransigent attitude on behalf of their members, injustice be committed
against opposing labor organizations. In the final analysis, they alone are not the sole victims, but the labor
movement itself, which may well be the recipient of a crippling blow. Moreover, while it is equally understandable
that their counsel would take advantage of every legal doctrine deemed applicable or conjure up any defense that
could serve their cause, still, as officers of the court, there should be an awareness that resort to such a technique
does result in clogged dockets, without the least justification especially so if there be insistence on flimsy and
insubstantial contentions just to give some semblance of plausibility to their pleadings. Certainly, technical virtuosity,
or what passes for it, is no substitute for an earnest and sincere desire to assure that there be justice according to
law. That is a creed to which all members of the legal profession, labor lawyers not excluded, should do their best to
live by.

GUIJARNO VS. CIR

The authoritative doctrine that a closed-shop provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not to be given a
retroactive effect so as to preclude its being applied to employees already in the service, is traceable, as set forth in

the opening paragraph of this opinion, to the leading case of Confederated Sons of Labor v. Anakan Lumber
Co. 18 decided in April of 1960. In discussing the particular stipulation in the contract, it was made clear in the opinion of
the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "In order that an employer may be deemed bound, under a collective
bargaining agreement, to dismiss employees for non-union membership, the stipulation to this effect must be so clear and
unequivocal as to leave no room for doubt thereon. An undertaking of this nature is so harsh that it must be strictly
construed, and doubts must be resolved against the existence of "closed shop"." 19 Less than a year later, to be more
precise, on January 28, 1961, in Freeman Shirt Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 20 this Court,
speaking through Justice Gutierrez David, went further. Thus: "The closed-shop agreement authorized under sec. 4,
subsec. a(4) of the Industrial Peace Act above quoted should however, apply to persons to be hired or to employees who
are not yet members of any labor organization. It is inapplicable to those already in the service who are members of
another union. To hold otherwise, i. e., that the employees in a company who are members of a minority union may be
compelled to disaffiliate from their union and join the majority or contracting union, would render nugatory the right of all
employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing, a right guaranteed by
the Industrial Peace Act (sec. 3, Rep. Act No. 875) as well as by the Constitution (Art. III, sec. 1[6])." 21 Thereafter,
in Kapisanan Ng Mga Mangagagawa Ng Alak v. Hamilton Distillery Company, 22 this Court, again speaking through the
former, minced no words in characterizing a stipulation that would allow a dismissal of those already employed as "null
and void." 23 In 1967, this time already elevated to his position as head of the Court, Chief Justice Concepcion in Salunga
v. Court of Industrial Relations 24did stress that while "generally, a state may not compel ordinary voluntary associations to
admit thereto any given individual, because membership therein may be accorded or withheld as a matter of privilege, the
rule is qualified in respect of labor unions holding a monopoly in the supply of labor, either in a given locality, or as regards
a particular employer with which it has a closed-shop agreement. ... ." 25 He continued: "Consequently, it is well settled that
such unions are not entitled toarbitrarily exclude qualified applicants for membership, and a closed-shop provision would
not justify the employer in discharging, or a union in insisting upon the discharge of, an employee whom the union thus
refuses to admit to membership, without any reasonable ground therefor. Needless to say, if said unions may be
compelled to admit newmembers, who have the requisite qualifications, with more reason may the law and the courts
exercise the coercive power when the employee involved is a long standing union member, who, owing to provocations of
union officers, was impelled to tender his resignation, which he forthwith withdrew or revoked. Surely, he may, at least,
invoke the rights of those who seek admission for the first time, and can not arbitrarily be denied re-admission." 26

ELECTROMAT MANUFACTURING and RECORDING CORPORATION VS. LAGUNZAD

D.O. 40-03 represents an expression of the governments implementing policy on trade unionism. It builds upon the
old rules by further simplifying the requirements for the establishment of locals or chapters. As in D.O. 9, we see
nothing contrary to the law or the Constitution in the adoption by the Secretary of Labor and Employment of D.O.
40-03 as this department order is consistent with the intent of the government to encourage the affiliation of a local
union with a federation or national union to enhance the locals bargaining power. If changes were made at all, these
were those made to recognize the distinctions made in the law itself between federations and their local chapters,
and independent unions; local chapters seemingly have lesser requirements because they and their members are
deemed to be direct members of the federation to which they are affiliated, which federations are the ones subject to
the strict registration requirements of the law.
1avvphi1

In any case, the local union in the present case has more than satisfied the requirements the petitioner complains
about; specifically, the union has submitted: (1) copies of the ratified CBL; (2) the minutes of the CBLs adoption and
ratification; (3) the minutes of the organizational meetings; (4) the names and addresses of the union officers; (5) the
list of union members; (6) the list of rank-and-file employees in the company; (7) a certification of non-existence of a
CBA in the company; (8) the resolution of affiliation with WASTO and the latters acceptance; and (9) their Charter
Certificate. These submissions were properly verified as required by the rules. In sum, the petitioner has no factual
basis for questioning the unions registration, as even the requirements for registration as an independent local have
been substantially complied with.
MARIWASA SIAM
A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. For this reason, retractions are looked upon with
disfavor and do not automatically exclude the original statement or declaration based solely on the recantation. It is
imperative that a determination be first made as to which between the original and the new statements should be
given weight or accorded belief, applying the general rules on evidence. In this case, inasmuch as they remain bare
allegations, the purported recantations should not be upheld. 13
Nevertheless, even assuming the veracity of the affidavits of recantation, the legitimacy of respondent as a labor
organization must be affirmed. While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation
from the union, the fact remains that at the time of the unions application for registration, the affiants were members
of respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a labor

union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the application for union
registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum membership requirement all
throughout its existence.

COASTAL SUBIC BAY TERMINAL, INC VS. DOLE

ALU and APSOTEU are one and the same federation having a common set of officers. Thus, the supervisory and
the rank-and-file unions were in effect affiliated with only one federation
A word of caution though, under Article 245 of the Labor Code, 28 supervisory employees are not eligible for
membership in a labor union of rank-and-file employees. The supervisory employees are allowed to form their own
union but they are not allowed to join the rank-and-file union because of potential conflicts of interest. 29 Further, to
avoid a situation where supervisors would merge with the rank-and-file or where the supervisors labor union would
represent conflicting interests, a local supervisors union should not be allowed to affiliate with the national
federation of unions of rank-and-file employees where that federation actively participates in the union activity within
the company.30 Thus, the limitation is not confined to a case of supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file union. The
prohibition extends to a supervisors local union applying for membership in a national federation the members of
which include local unions of rank-and-file employees. 31 In De La Salle University Medical Center and College of
Medicine v. Laguesma, we reiterated the rule that for the prohibition to apply, it is not enough that the supervisory
union and the rank-and-file union are affiliated with a single federation. In addition, the supervisors must have direct
authority over the rank-and-file employees.32
In the instant case, the national federations that exist as separate entities to which the rank-and-file and supervisory
unions are separately affiliated with, do have a common set of officers. In addition, APSOTEU, the supervisory
federation, actively participates in the CSBTI-SU while ALU, the rank-and-file federation, actively participates in the
CSBTI-RFU, giving occasion to possible conflicts of interest among the common officers of the federation of rankand-file and the federation of supervisory unions. For as long as they are affiliated with the APSOTEU and ALU, the
supervisory and rank-and-file unions both do not meet the criteria to attain the status of legitimate labor
organizations, and thus could not separately petition for certification elections.
1wphi1

The purpose of affiliation of the local unions into a common enterprise is to increase the collective bargaining power
in respect of the terms and conditions of labor.33 When there is commingling of officers of a rank-and-file union with a
supervisory union, the constitutional policy on labor is circumvented. Labor organizations should ensure the freedom
of employees to organize themselves for the purpose of leveling the bargaining process but also to ensure the
freedom of workingmen and to keep open the corridor of opportunity to enable them to do it for themselves.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
And under Article 235 (Action on Application)
The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days from filing.
All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of
the organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president.
MINETTE BATISTA VS. ROSARIO VILLANUEVA

Based on RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws, the charges against petitioners were not mere internal squabbles,
but violations that demand proper investigation because, if proven, would constitute grounds for their expulsion from
the union. As such, Article X, Investigation Procedures and Appeal Process of RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws,
which reads
SECTION 1. Charge against any member or officer of the Union shall be submitted to the Board of Directors (BOD)
in writing, which shall refer the same, if necessary, to the committee on Grievance and Investigation. The Committee
shall hear any charge and subsequently, forward its finding and recommendation to the BOD. The BOD has the
power to approve or nullify the recommendation of the Committee on Grievance and Investigation based on the
merit of the appeal.
was correctly applied under the circumstances.

It is well-settled that workers and employers organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions and
rules to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and activities and to formulate
their programs.38 In this case, RPNEUs Constitution and By-Laws expressly mandate that before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the internal remedies
within the organization. Petitioners were found to have violated the provisions of the unions Constitution and ByLaws when they filed petitions for impeachment against their union officers and for audit before the DOLE without
first exhausting all internal remedies available within their organization. This act is a ground for expulsion from union
membership. Thus, petitioners expulsion from the union was not a deliberate attempt to curtail or restrict their right
to organize, but was triggered by the commission of an act, expressly sanctioned by Section 2.5 of Article IX of the
unions Constitution and By-Laws.
1wphi1

JERRY E. ACEDERA VS. NLRC

Petitioners-appellants anchor their right to intervene on Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Section 1 of
which reads:
Section 1. Who may intervene.- A person who has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success
of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenors right
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
They stress that they have complied with the requisites for intervention because (1) they are the ones who stand to
gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of any judgment that may be rendered in this case, (2) no undue
delay or prejudice would result from their intervention since their Complaint-in-Intervention with Motion for
Intervention was filed while the Labor Arbiter was still hearing the case and before any decision thereon was
rendered, and (3) it was not possible for them to file a separate case as they would be guilty of forum shopping
because the only forum available for them was the Labor Arbiter.26
Petitioners-appellants, however, failed to consider, in addition to the rule on intervention, the rule on representation,
thusly:
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties.- Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of the
case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. . . 27 (Emphasis
supplied)
A labor union is one such party authorized to represent its members under Article 242(a) of the Labor Code which
provides that a union may act as the representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining. This
authority includes the power to represent its members for the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the CBA. That
APCWU acted in a representative capacity "for and in behalf of its Union members and other employees similarly
situated," the title of the case filed by it at the Labor Arbiters Office so expressly states.
While a party acting in a representative capacity, such as a union, may be permitted to intervene in a case,
ordinarily, a person whose interests are already represented will not be permitted to do the same 28 except when
there is a suggestion of fraud or collusion or that the representative will not act in good faith for the protection of all
interests represented by him.29

EDEN GLADYS ABARIA VS. NLRC

Art. 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, provides for the consequences of an illegal strike to
the participating workers:
x x x Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That
mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground

for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike.

The above provision makes a distinction between workers and union officers who participate
in an illegal strike: an ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he or she committed illegal acts during a strike. A union
officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an
illegal strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike

THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS. PIGLAS

The fact that some of respondent PIGLAS unions members were also members of the old rank and file union, the
HHE union, is not a ground for canceling the new unions registration. The right of any person to join an organization
also includes the right to leave that organization and join another one. Besides, HHE union is dead. It had ceased to
exist and its certificate of registration had already been cancelled. Thus, petitioners arguments on this point may
also be now regarded as moot and academic.
Labor laws are liberally construed in favor of labor especially if doing so would affirm its constitutionally guaranteed
right to self-organization.30 Here, the PIGLAS unions supporting documents reveal the unmistakable yearning of
petitioner companys rank and file employees to organize. This yearning should not be frustrated by inconsequential
technicalities.
At any rate, the Labor Code 28 and its implementing rules29 do not require that the number of members appearing on
the documents in question should completely dovetail. For as long as the documents and signatures are shown to
be genuine and regular and the constitution and by-laws democratically ratified, the union is deemed to have
complied with registration requirements.

THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS. NUWHRAIN-HHMSC

Jurisdiction to review the decision of the Regional Director lies with the BLR. This is clearly provided in the
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code and enunciated by the Court in Abbott. But as pointed out by the CA, the
present case involves a peculiar circumstance that was not present or covered by the ruling in Abbott. In this case,
the BLR Director inhibited himself from the case because he was a former counsel of respondent. Who, then, shall
resolve the case in his place?
In Abbott, the appeal from the Regional Directors decision was directly filed with the Office of the DOLE Secretary,
and we ruled that the latter has no appellate jurisdiction. In the instant case, the appeal was filed by petitioner with
the BLR, which, undisputedly, acquired jurisdiction over the case. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the court, it
remains with it until the full termination of the case.25
Thus, jurisdiction remained with the BLR despite the BLR Directors inhibition. When the DOLE Secretary resolved
the appeal, she merely stepped into the shoes of the BLR Director and performed a function that the latter could not
himself perform. She did so pursuant to her power of supervision and control over the BLR. 26
Expounding on the extent of the power of control, the Court, in Araneta, et al. v. Hon. M. Gatmaitan, et
al.,27pronounced that, if a certain power or authority is vested by law upon the Department Secretary, then such
power or authority may be exercised directly by the President, who exercises supervision and control over the
departments. This principle was incorporated in the Administrative Code of 1987, which defines "supervision and
control" as including the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate.28 Applying the foregoing to the present case, it is clear that the DOLE Secretary, as the person

exercising the power of supervision and control over the BLR, has the authority to directly exercise the quasi-judicial
function entrusted by law to the BLR Director.
It is true that the power of control and supervision does not give the Department Secretary unbridled authority to
take over the functions of his or her subordinate. Such authority is subject to certain guidelines which are stated in
Book IV, Chapter 8, Section 39(1)(a) of the Administrative Code of 1987.29 However, in the present case, the DOLE
Secretarys act of taking over the function of the BLR Director was warranted and necessitated by the latters
inhibition from the case and the objective to "maintain the integrity of the decision, as well as the Bureau itself." 30
ART. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION.
The following shall constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration:
xxxx
(d) Failure to submit the annual financial report to the Bureau within thirty (30) days after the closing of every fiscal
year and misrepresentation, false entries or fraud in the preparation of the financial report itself;
xxxx
(i) Failure to submit list of individual members to the Bureau once a year or whenever required by the Bureau. 35
These provisions give the Regional Director ample discretion in dealing with a petition for cancellation of a unions
registration, particularly, determining whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed by law. It is sufficient
to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of required documents as sufficient compliance with the
requirements of the law. After all, the law requires the labor organization to submit the annual financial report and list
of members in order to verify if it is still viable and financially sustainable as an organization so as to protect the
employer and employees from fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the required documents by
respondent, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.
We cannot ascribe abuse of discretion to the Regional Director and the DOLE Secretary in denying the petition for
cancellation of respondents registration. The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to the
appropriate bargaining unit should not be deprived of a bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the
union officers who were responsible for the submission of the documents to the BLR.
It is worth mentioning that the Labor Codes provisions on cancellation of union registration and on reportorial
requirements have been recently amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9481, An Act Strengthening the Workers
Constitutional Right to Self-Organization, Amending for the Purpose Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended,
Otherwise Known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, which lapsed into law on May 25, 2007 and became
effective on June 14, 2007. The amendment sought to strengthen the workers right to self-organization and
enhance the Philippines compliance with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labour
Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87,38 pertaining to the non-dissolution of workers organizations by administrative
authority.39 Thus, R.A. No. 9481 amended Article 239 to read:
ART. 239. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration.The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of
union registration:
(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the
constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who
took part in the ratification;
(b) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the
election of officers, and the list of voters;
(c) Voluntary dissolution by the members.
R.A. No. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A, which provides:
ART. 242-A. Reportorial Requirements.The following are documents required to be submitted to the Bureau by
the legitimate labor organization concerned:

(a) Its constitution and by-laws, or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members
who took part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days from adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto;
(b) Its list of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and list of voters within thirty (30) days from election;
(c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year; and
(d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the Bureau.
Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but shall
subject the erring officers or members to suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate penalty.
INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL VS. WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL DAVAO
In case of any dispute arising from the interpretation or implementation of this Agreement or any matter affecting the
relations of Labor and Management, the UNION and the COMPANY agree to exhaust all possibilities of conciliation
through the grievance machinery. The committee shall resolve all problems submitted to it within fifteen (15) days
after the problems ha[ve] been discussed by the members. If the dispute or grievance cannot be settled by the
Committee, or if the committee failed to act on the matter within the period of fifteen (15) days herein stipulated,
the UNION and the COMPANY agree to submit the issue to Voluntary Arbitration. Selection of the arbitrator shall be
made within seven (7) days from the date of notification by the aggrieved party. The Arbitrator shall be selected by
lottery from four (4) qualified individuals nominated by in equal numbers by both parties taken from the list of
Arbitrators prepared by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). If the Company and the Union
representatives within ten (10) days fail to agree on the Arbitrator, the NCMB shall name the Arbitrator. The decision
of the Arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties. However, the Arbitrator shall not have the authority to
change any provisions of the Agreement.The cost of arbitration shall be borne equally by the parties.
x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their respective
representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it shall automatically be
referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA. Consequently, only disputes
involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)55
If the individual members of the Union have no authority to file the case, does the federation to which the local union
is affiliated have the standing to do so? On this note, Coastal Subic Bay Terminal, Inc. v. Department of Labor and
Employment56 is enlightening, thus:
x x x A local union does not owe its existence to the federation with which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct
voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its members. Mere affiliation does not divest the local union
of its own personality, neither does it give the mother federation the license to act independently of the
local union. It only gives rise to a contract of agency, where the former acts in representation of the latter. Hence,
local unions are considered principals while the federation is deemed to be merely their agent. x x x 57
Even granting that petitioner Union was affiliated with NFL, still the relationship between that of the local union and
the labor federation or national union with which the former was affiliated is generally understood to be that of
agency, where the local is the principal and the federation the agency. Being merely an agent of the local union, NFL
should have presented its authority to file the Notice of Mediation. While We commend NFL's zealousness in
protecting the rights of lowly workers, We cannot, however, allow it to go beyond what it is empowered to do.

HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOLVS. PATRICIA STO.THOMAS

The "Bystander Rule" is already well entrenched in this jurisdiction. It has been consistently held in a number of
cases that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the employer itself has to file the
petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but even after such filing its role in the certification
process ceases and becomes merely a bystander.41 The employer clearly lacks the personality to dispute the
election and has no right to interfere at all therein. 42 This is so since any uncalled-for concern on the part of the
employer may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a company union. 43 Indeed, the demand of the law and
policy for an employer to take a strict, hands-off stance in certification elections is based on the rationale that the

employees bargaining representative should be chosen free from any extraneous influence of the management;
that, to be effective, the bargaining representative must owe its loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.44
Following the doctrine laid down in Kawashima and SMCC-Super, it must be stressed that petitioner cannot
collaterally attack the legitimacy of private respondent by praying for the dismissal of the petition for certification
election:
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification
election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it
cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a
mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial
employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the
proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.
a labor organization as "any union or association of employees which exists in whole or in part for the purpose of
collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment." Upon
compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau shall issue in favor of the
applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations.
Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration

In case of alleged inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer like
petitioner is to directly file a petition for cancellation of the unions certificate of registration due to misrepresentation,
false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code, as amended. 54 To
reiterate, private respondent, having been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having
acquired juridical personality which may not be attacked collaterally

On the other hand, a bargaining unit has been defined as a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of
all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interests of all the employees, consistent
with equity to the employer, indicated to be best suited to serve reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the
collective bargaining provisions of the law."55 In determining the proper collective bargaining unit and what unit would
be appropriate to be the collective bargaining agency, the Court, in the seminal case of Democratic Labor
Association v. Cebu Stevedoring Company, Inc., 56 mentioned several factors that should be considered, to wit: (1)
will of employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work
and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions; (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4)
employment status, such as temporary, seasonal and probationary employees. We stressed, however, that the test
of the grouping is community or mutuality of interest, because "the basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights.

A bargaining unit is a group of employees sought to be represented by a petitioning union. Such employees need
not be members of a union seeking the conduct of a certification election. A union certified as an exclusive
bargaining agent represents not only its members but also other employees who are not union members. As pointed
out in our assailed Decision, there were two contending unions in the U.P. case, namely, the Organization of NonAcademic Personnel of U.P. (ONAPUP) and the All U.P. Workers Union composed of both U.P. academic and nonacademic personnel. ONAPUP sought the conduct of a certification election among the rank-and-file non-academic
personnel only, while the All U.P. Workers Union intended to cover all U.P. rank-and-file employees, involving both
academic and non-academic personnel.
Indeed, the purpose of a certification election is precisely to ascertain the majority of the employees choice of an
appropriate bargaining unit to be or not to be represented by a labor organization and, if in the affirmative case, by
which one

A certification election proceeding directly involves two (2) issues namely: (a) the proper composition and
constituency of the bargaining unit; and (b) the validity of majority representation claims. It is therefore incumbent
upon the Med-Arbiter to rule on the appropriateness of the bargaining unit once its composition and constituency is
questioned.

PHILIPPINE SKYLANDERS, INC VS. NLRC

The mere act of disaffiliation did not divest PSEA of its own personality; neither did it give PAFLU the license to act
independently of the local union. Recreant to its mission, PAFLU cannot simply ignore the demands of the local
chapter and decide for its welfare. PAFLU might have forgotten that as an agent it could only act in representation of
and in accordance with the interests of the local union. The complaint then for unfair labor practice lodged by PAFLU
against PSI, PSEA and their respective officers, having been filed by a party which has no legal personality to
institute the complaint, should have been dismissed at the first instance for failure to state a cause of action.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATED vs. SMC

In National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Mainit Lumber Development Company Workers Union United
Lumber and General Workers of the Phils, 22 the Court, taking into account the "community or mutuality of interests"
test, ordered the formation of a single bargaining unit consisting of the Sawmill Division in Butuan City and the
Logging Division in Zapanta Valley, Kitcharao, Agusan [Del] Norte of the Mainit Lumber Development Company. It
held that while the existence of a bargaining history is a factor that may be reckoned with in determining the
appropriate bargaining unit, the same is not decisive or conclusive. Other factors must be considered. The test of
grouping is community or mutuality of interest. This is so because the basic test of an asserted bargaining units
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the
exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 23 Certainly, there is a mutuality of interest among the employees of the
Sawmill Division and the Logging Division. Their functions mesh with one another. One group needs the other in the
same way that the company needs them both. There may be differences as to the nature of their individual
assignments, but the distinctions are not enough to warrant the formation of a separate bargaining unit.
An appropriate bargaining unit is defined as a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less
than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest of all the employees, consistent with equity to
the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law.
It bears stressing that a certification election is the sole concern of the workers; hence, an employer lacks the
personality to dispute the same. The general rule is that an employer has no standing to question the process of
certification election, since this is the sole concern of the workers. 37 Law and policy demand that employers take a
strict, hands-off stance in certification elections. The bargaining representative of employees should be chosen free
from any extraneous influence of management. A labor bargaining representative, to be effective, must owe its
loyalty to the employees alone and to no other.38 The only exception is where the employer itself has to file the
petition pursuant to Article 25839 of the Labor Code because of a request to bargain collectively

Mechanical Department Labor Union Sa Philippine National Railways v. Court of Industrial Relations
Appellant contends that the application of the "Globe doctrine" is not warranted because the workers of the
Caloocan shops do not require different skills from the rest of the workers in the Mechanical Department of the
Railway Company. This question is primarily one of facts. The Industrial Court has found that there is a basic
difference, in that those in the Caloocan shops not only have a community of interest and working conditions but
perform major repairs of railway rolling stock, using heavy equipment and machineries found in said shops, while
the others only perform minor repairs. It is easy to understand, therefore, that the workers in the Caloocan shops
require special skill in the use of heavy equipment and machinery sufficient to set them apart from the rest of the
workers. In addition, the record shows that the collective bargaining agreements negotiated by the appellant union
have been in existence for more than two (2) years; hence, such agreements can not constitute a bar to the

determination, by proper elections, of a new bargaining representative (PLDT Employees' Union vs. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co.
As to the charge that some of the members of the appellee, "Samahan Ng Manggagawa", are actually supervisors,
it appears that the question of the status of such members is still pending final decision; hence, it would not
constitute a legal obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite. At any rate, the appellant may later question whether the
votes of those ultimately declared to be supervisors should be counted.

FULACHE VS.ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

Section 1. APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT. The parties agree that the appropriate bargaining unit shall
beregular rank-and-file employees of ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION but shall not include:
a) Personnel classified as Supervisor and Confidential employees;
b) Personnel who are on "casual" or "probationary" status as defined in Section 2 hereof;
c) Personnel who are on "contract" status or who are paid for specified units of work such as writerproducers, talent-artists, and singers.
The inclusion or exclusion of new job classifications into the bargaining unit shall be subject of discussion between
the COMPANY and the UNION. [emphasis supplied]
Under these terms, the petitioners are members of the appropriate bargaining unit because they are regular rankand-file employees and do not belong to any of the excluded categories. Specifically, nothing in the records shows
that they are supervisory or confidential employees; neither are they casual nor probationary employees. Most
importantly, the labor arbiters decision of January 17, 2002 affirmed all the way up to the CA level ruled against
ABS-CBNs submission that they are independent contractors. Thus, as regular rank-and-file employees, they fall
within CBA coverage under the CBAs express terms and are entitled to its benefits.
We see no merit in ABS-CBNs arguments that the petitioners are not entitled to CBA benefits because: (1) they did
not claim these benefits in their position paper; (2) the NLRC did not categorically rule that the petitioners were
members of the bargaining unit; and (3) there was no evidence of this membership. To further clarify what we stated
above, CBA coverage is not only a question of fact, but of law and contract. The factual issue is whether the
petitioners are regular rank-and-file employees of ABS-CBN. The tribunals below uniformly answered this question
in the affirmative. From this factual finding flows legal effects touching on the terms and conditions of the petitioners
regular employment. This was what the labor arbiter meant when he stated in his decision that "henceforth they are
entitled to the benefits and privileges attached to regular status of their employment." Significantly, ABS-CBN itself
posited before this Court that "the Court of Appeals did not gravely err nor gravely abuse its discretion when it
affirmed the resolution of the NLRC dated March 24, 2006 reinstating and adopting in toto the decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated January 17, 2002 x x x."30 This representation alone fully resolves all the objections procedural or
otherwise ABS-CBN raised on the regularization issue.
G.R. No. 169717

March 16, 2011

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR

EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY VICTORIO-Union
President,Petitioner,
vs.
CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING CORPORATION, Respondent.
The right to file a petition for certification election is accorded to a labor organization provided that it complies with
the requirements of law for proper registration. The inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization
seeking to represent the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate
labor organization. We apply these principles to this case.
The charter certificate need not be certified under oath by the local unions secretary or treasurer and attested to by
its president.

legal personality cannot be collaterally attacked in the certification election proceedings. As we explained
in Kawashima:
Except when it is requested to bargain collectively, an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification
election; such proceeding is non-adversarial and merely investigative, for the purpose thereof is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The choice of their
representative is the exclusive concern of the employees; the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein; it
cannot interfere with, much less oppose, the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it; not even a
mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial
employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. The employer's only right in the
proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof.
JUANITO TABIGUE, ALEX BIBAT, JECHRIS DASALLA, ANTONIO TANGON, ROLANDO PEDRIGAL, DANTE
MAUL, ALFREDO IDUL, EDGAR RAMOS, RODERICK JAVIER, NOEL PONAYO, ROMEL ORAPA, REY JONE,
ALMA PATAY, JERIC BANDIGAN, DANILO JAYME, ELENITA S. BELLEZA, JOSEPHINE COTANDA, RENE DEL
MUNDO,
PONCIANO
ROBUCA,
and
MARLON
MADICLUM, Petitioners,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION (INTERCO), Respondent.

Art. 255. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate collective
bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective
bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to present
grievances to their employer.

SAMAHANG
MANGGAGAWA
SA
PERMEX
(SMP-PIILU-TUCP), petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, PERMEX PRODUCER AND EXPORTER
CORPORATION, respondents.

But it is not enough that a union has the support of the majority of the employees. It is equally important that
everyone in the bargaining unit be given the opportunity to express himself. 4
This is especially so because, in this case, the recognition given to the union came barely ten (10) months after the
employees had voted "no union" in the certification election conducted in the company. As pointed out by
respondent Secretary of Labor in his decision, there can be no determination of a bargaining representative within a
year of the proclamation of the results of the certification election. 5 Here the results, which showed that 61% of the employees voted for
"no union," were certified only on February 25, 1991 but on December 1, 1991 Permex Producer already recognized the union and entered into a CBA with it.

There is something dubious about the fact that just ten (10) months after the employees had voted that they did not
want any union to represent them, they would be expressing support for petitioner. The doubt is compounded by the
fact that in sworn affidavits some employees claimed that they had either been coerced or misled into signing a
document which turned out to be in support of petitioner as its collective bargaining agent. Although there were
retractions, we agree with the Solicitor General that retractions of statements by employees adverse to a company
(or its favored union) are oftentimes tainted with coercion and intimidation. For how could one explain the seeming
flip-flopping of position taken by the employees? The figures claimed by petitioner to have been given to it in support
cannot readily be accepted as true.
Second. Petitioner invokes the contract-bar rule. They contend that under Arts. 253, 253-A and 256 of the Labor
Code and Book V, Rule 5, 3 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, a petition for certification election or
motion for intervention may be entertained only within 60 days prior to the date of expiration of an existing collective
bargaining agreement. The purpose of the rule is to ensure stability in the relationships of the workers and the
management by preventing frequent modifications of any collective bargaining agreement earlier entered into by
them in good faith and for the stipulated original period. Excepted from the contract-bar rule are certain types of
contracts which do not foster industrial stability, such as contracts where the identity of the representative is in
doubt. Any stability derived from such contracts must be subordinated to the employees' freedom of choice because
it does not establish the kind of industrial peace contemplated by the law. 6 Such situation obtains in this case. The petitioner entered
into a CBA with Permex Producer when its status as exclusive bargaining agent of the employees had not been established yet.

G.R. No. 162355

August 14, 2009

STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and STA. LUCIA EAST COMMERCIAL CORPORATION
WORKERS ASSOCIATION (CLUP LOCAL CHAPTER), Respondents.
Legitimate Labor Organization
Article 212(g) of the Labor Code defines a labor organization as "any union or association of employees which
exists in whole or in part for the purpose of collective bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning terms and
conditions of employment." Upon compliance with all the documentary requirements, the Regional Office or Bureau
shall issue in favor of the applicant labor organization a certificate indicating that it is included in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations.6 Any applicant labor organization shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled
to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of
registration.7
Bargaining Unit
The concepts of a union and of a legitimate labor organization are different from, but related to, the concept of a
bargaining unit. We explained the concept of a bargaining unit in San Miguel Corporation v. Laguesma, 8 where we
stated that:
A bargaining unit is a "group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicated to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and
duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law."
The fundamental factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are: (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or
similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) similarity of employment status.
The inclusion in the union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for cancellation of registration, unless
such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under the circumstances enumerated in
Sections (a) to (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code. 10 Thus, CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union, having
been validly issued a certificate of registration, should be considered as having acquired juridical personality which
may not be attacked collaterally. The proper procedure for SLECC is to file a petition for cancellation of certificate of
registration11 of CLUP-SLECC and its Affiliates Workers Union and not to immediately commence voluntary
recognition proceedings with SMSLEC.

G.R. No. 181531

July 31, 2009

NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES- MANILA PAVILION
HOTEL CHAPTER, Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HOLIDAY INN MANILA
PAVILION HOTEL LABOR UNION AND ACESITE PHILIPPINES HOTEL CORPORATION, Respondents.
A run-off election refers to an election between the labor unions receiving the two (2) highest number of votes in a
certification or consent election with three (3) or more choices, where such a certified or consent election results in
none of the three (3) or more choices receiving the majority of the valid votes cast; provided that the total number of
votes for all contending unions is at least fifty percent (50%) of the number of votes cast. 8 With 346 votes cast, 337
of which are now deemed valid and HIMPHLU having only garnered 169 and petitioner having obtained 151 and the
choice "NO UNION" receiving 1 vote, then the holding of a run-off election between HIMPHLU and petitioner is in
order.
In a certification election, all rank and file employees in the appropriate bargaining unit, whether probationary or
permanent are entitled to vote. This principle is clearly stated in Art. 255 of the Labor Code which states that the
"labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit shall
be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for purposes of collective bargaining." Collective
bargaining covers all aspects of the employment relation and the resultant CBA negotiated by the certified union
binds all employees in the bargaining unit. Hence, all rank and file employees, probationary or permanent, have a
substantial interest in the selection of the bargaining representative. The Code makes no distinction as to their

employment status as basis for eligibility in supporting the petition for certification election. The law refers to "all" the
employees in the bargaining unit. All they need to be eligible to support the petition is to belong to the "bargaining
unit