Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
2d 990
This pro se civil rights action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, presents
the difficult question of when a prosecutor is entitled to the defense of absolute
immunity.
I.
2
individuals, but under the color and pretense of the laws of the State of New
Jersey. . . ."
3
Mancini claimed that his ex-wife had been responsible for making false charges
against him during a six-month period between May and September 1972. Mrs.
Mancini allegedly presented these charges to Mancini's employer (the Bergen
County Prosecutor's Office) as well as the Internal Revenue Service, the New
Jersey State Police, and the United States Attorney General's Office. She
telephoned the prosecutor's office up to six times daily and "threatened . . . that
she would go to the police if I (plaintiff) was not fired."
7
Whether
(Mrs. Mancini's) charges were in fact true is irrelevant . . . the point is that
the Prosecutor had the right to proceed as he did in investigating respondent, based
upon the evidence before him. Since his actions in this regard were fully justified,
and since there is not the slightest suggestion that the Prosecutor was not acting in
good faith, there was no wrongful or illegal pressure and therefore no duress
Mancini's petition for certification to appeal the Superior Court decision was
denied by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Woodcock v. New Jersey Civil
Service Commission, 69 N.J. 77, 351 A.2d 5 (1975).2
10
It was then that plaintiff filed his civil rights complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey. After reviewing the defendants'
brief and hearing oral argument, the district court dismissed plaintiff's case on
June 26, 1979. It explained the basis of its decision: "After reading all of the
moving papers in this case and having had the benefit of oral arguments, this
Court finds that these Defendants enjoy prosecutorial immunity."3
11
Mancini filed a timely appeal. We now vacate the judgment and remand the
matter to the district court.
II.
12
13
437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133; Pflaumer v. United States Dept.
of Justice, 450 F.Supp. 1125, 1133 (E.D.Pa.1978) (the gathering of evidence
for the purpose of supporting the presentation of an indictment is part of the
prosecutor's investigative role and therefore entitled to qualified rather than
absolute immunity); D'Iorio v. County of Delaware, 447 F.Supp. 229, 235
(E.D.Pa.1978) (qualified immunity), vacated on other grounds, 592 F.2d 681
(3d Cir. 1979); Austin v. Manlin, 433 F.Supp. 648 (E.D.Pa.1977) (qualified
immunity applies to prosecutor's investigative role); Tomko v. Lees, 416
F.Supp. 1137 (W.D.Pa.1976).
14
15
Speaking for the Court, Judge Hunter evaluated this claim against "the
boundaries to (the) immunity" established by the Supreme Court. He concluded
that cases in other circuits both before and after Imbler had "distinguished
between a prosecutor's quasi-judicial functions on the one hand and his
investigative and administrative functions on the other, granting absolute
immunity to the former and relegating the latter to qualified immunity." 599
F.2d at 1213-1214 (citations omitted). Surveying the decisions of this Court on
the issue, Judge Hunter found that we have "not been squarely presented with
the problem of the scope of immunity for prosecutorial conduct which lies
outside of the advocatory function but within a prosecutor's duties as an
administrator or investigator." Id. at 1214.5
16
599 F.2d at 1215 (footnotes omitted). The Court then remanded the case to the
district court so that it could apply the above test. We believe that a similar
course should be followed here.
20
In the present situation it does not appear that the district court evaluated the
allegations in light of the functional test set forth in Forsyth. Indeed, the factual
record is sketchy. The district court was without affidavits from the defendants
in support of the motion to dismiss (styled in the alternative as a motion for
summary judgment), and the hearing which occurred on June 25, 1979 was
limited to argument by Mancini and defense counsel. Although it is often
difficult to draw lines within the "gray" area of investigatory activity prior to a
prosecution,6 as we see it, the following factors are to be considered in applying
These factors appear to point to the exercise by the defendants here of functions
in the administrative/investigative area. As was the case in Forsyth, however,
the record on appeal here does not contain a reasoned explication of the district
court's analysis and conclusion in this regard. In evaluating defendants' claim of
absolute immunity, it therefore may be helpful to turn to the arguments that
were presented to the district court and which are repeated on appeal.
27
Defense counsel that the defendants are entitled to immunity under the express
provision of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. He apparently contends that a
New Jersey state statute could immunize the defendants from a violation of
plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. The New Jersey Superior Court has
rejected an identical argument based upon the provisions of this state
regulation:
28
Defendants
claim immunity under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, which, by
express language, excuses municipalities and their officials from liability with
respect to discretionary acts.
29 act is not a bar to this suit. This cause involves federal rights. These rights
The
cannot be denied by the passage of state legislation. If the contrary were true, every
state could deprive its citizens of the very rights which enactments of the Federal
Congress are designed to protect. As then Judge Stevens points out in Hampton v.
Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. den., 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39
L.Ed.2d 471 (1974):The district court erroneously relied on the Illinois Tort
Immunity Act. Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 or 1985(3) cannot be immunized by state law. A
construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have
controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and
the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be
enforced. (citation omitted)
30
T & M Homes, Inc. v. Township of Mansfield, 162 N.J.Super. 497, 393 A.2d
613, 618 (Super.Ct. Law Div.1978).
31
Furthermore, the common law of New Jersey has for many years refused to
extend absolute immunity to state prosecutors. See, e. g., Earl v. Winne, 14 N.J.
119, 101 A.2d 535 (1953) (action against Bergen county prosecutor and two of
his detectives). While the defendants' brief argues at length about the immunity
afforded in the state act, it omits any discussion of N.J.S.A. 59:3-14, an
exception to the public employee's immunity.
See Cashen v. Spann, 66 N.J. 541, 334 A.2d 8 (N.J.1975) (prosecutor enjoyed
immunity in absence of showing that he acted out of personal motive, with
malicious intent, or in excess of his jurisdiction).
35
argument, we are unable on the basis of the present record to conclude that the
defendants in fact were serving at the critical times in question in a quasijudicial capacity.
36
In a footnote at page eleven of their brief, appellees argue that they "are
certainly protected here by a qualified immunity as they have been found to
have acted in good faith. Woodcock, supra, page 5." (emphasis added) In its
unpublished opinion regarding the prosecutor's refusal to allow Mancini to
withdraw his resignation, the Superior Court wrote:
37
Whether
the charges were in fact true is irrelevant (and is still undetermined); the
point is that the Prosecutor had the right to proceed as he did in investigating
respondent, based upon the evidence before him. Since his actions in this regard
were fully justified, and since there is not the slightest suggestion that the Prosecutor
was not acting in good faith, there was no wrongful or illegal pressure and therefore
no duress stemming from his investigation or proposed removal proceedings.
(emphasis supplied)
38
Defendants urge that this ruling must be applied as a matter of res judicata.
Unfortunately, they did not introduce the record of the proceedings that took
place before the New Jersey Superior Court as part of the record in this case.
The failure to do so undermines the defendants' argument for several reasons.
First, the question of good faith is a mixed question of fact and law, and this
Court may make such a determination only after independent examination of
the record in question. Second, it appears that the discussion of good faith arose
in the New Jersey court for a different purpose and involved an inquiry distinct
from that which must be made in the context of a qualified immunity defense in
a 1983 suit. The full record may clarify the extent to which the two issues
overlap. Third, the opinion of the Superior Court is not entirely conclusive on
the good faith question, for that court also recognized that the prosecutor's
request that Mancini take a polygraph examination "may well have been
wrongful." See unpublished opinion at page six. The Superior Court made an
independent examination of the record and concluded that the Commission's
finding "that the request to take the test was a valid basis for its finding of
duress could not 'reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence
in the record.' " (citation omitted). Furthermore, the Superior Court found that
Mancini's resignation was "freely and voluntarily submitted to avoid the
threatened disciplinary proceedings and to obtain a three-month leave of
absence without pay." The allegations in this case contradict that determination.
Mancini claims that he was told by his physician that he needed the rest and
that the defendants allegedly told him he could receive it only by submitting his
resignation. While the state court record may, upon examination, provide
The only other defense theory presented to the district court was the expiration
of the statute of limitations. Mancini's complaint was filed within the six-year
period of limitations applicable to contract actions, but defendants contended
that the two-year period which controls personal injury actions should govern
the case. The record is not clear on this point, and it is also significant that the
complaint appears to allege a continuing violation: "At the direction of the
defendants, I was forced to resign my position from the Prosecutor's Office and
(I) have been black balled from obtaining a job in law enforcement despite my
prior seventeen years of unblemished record because of their unqualified
recommendations from my superiors in the Prosecutor's Office."
40
41
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be vacated and the matter
remanded for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Commission also relied upon the "pressure" put upon Mancini by the
Prosecutor's request that he submit to a polygraph test or face certain
"unfavorable consequences."
There has been filed with the Court the unpublished opinion in Woodcock,
Bergen County Prosecutor v. Mancini, Sup.Ct.N.J. (Aplt.Div. No. A-881-74,
decided 7 July 1975)
There is evidence in the transcript that both defendant prosecutors are now state
court judges. See Doc. No. 16 at page four (4), 11.21-22
In D'Iorio v. Delaware County, 592 F.2d 681 (3d Cir. 1978) this Court
recognized that local government officials may be suable in their official
capacity for money damages or other monetary equitable relief except where
the imposition of such liability would amount to the imposition of respondeat
superior liability on a local government unit not itself suable under the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services. See 592 F.2d at
note 14.
The cases reviewed by Judge Hunter included Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d
830 (3d Cir. 1976) and Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1977). In
Brawer, the Court was confronted with allegations that a federal prosecutor had
knowingly used perjured testimony. Absolute immunity was applied as the
allegations "all related to (the prosecutor's) actions in his role as an advocate,
rather than as an administrator or investigator." 535 F.2d at 834. In Helstoski,
we considered the immunity available to a federal prosecutor in a suit alleging
that he deliberately "leaked" false information about the plaintiff to damage the
plaintiff's political prospects. While finding it unnecessary to decide whether
absolute immunity protected a United States Attorney's administrative and
investigative functions, the Court held that for some conduct a prosecutor may
be entitled only to a qualified immunity: "It would appear that (the deliberate
leaking of false information), if it occurred would lie outside of the rationale for
absolute immunity set forth in Imbler." 552 F.2d at 566