Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
No. 13-1215
MARIE M. MCCRAY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT
Administration,
OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Maryland
Transit
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore.
Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge.
(1:11-cv-03732-ELH)
Argued:
Decided:
Marie
McCray
worked
for
the
Maryland
Transit
McCray brought
immunity
grounds
could be conducted.
discriminatory
activity.
before
any
meaningful
discovery
conduct
that
occurred
before
any
legislative
I.
Marie
McCray
began
working
for
the
Maryland
Transit
For
three
decades,
she
worked
without
incident
and
In June of
near
her
desk.
She
was
taken
to
the
hospital
in
an
Michael
claims.
she
Deets,
Deets
provided
whose
behavior
confronted
written
McCray
documentation
is
It is this
the
core
ceaselessly,
from
her
of
even
doctors
examination.
This
independent
doctor
confirmed
what
transferred
significant
to
work.
consultant,
Other
and
employees
McCray
in
her
was
left
unit
were
overwhelmed
with
work,
but
when
McCray
requested
more
filed
Employment
claim
Opportunity
with
the
Commission
United
States
(EEOC),
Equal
alleging
She
alleged
discriminatory
animus
that
her
due
position
to
her
was
race,
cut
because
of
gender,
age,
and
disability.
Before any meaningful discovery was conducted, the MTA and
MDOT
filed
motion
to
dismiss.
The
agencies
argued
that
At this
motion
claims.
for
summary
The
court
judgment
found
and
that
then
because
dismissed
her
McCrays
position
was
Further, any
immunity
issue.
Because
[McCrays]
proposed
J.A. 110.
As such, the
II.
The
McCrays
MDOT
age
and
and
MTA
argue
that
disability
argument is correct.
sovereign
discrimination
immunity
claims.
425,
429
(1997).
This
state agencies.
bars
Edelman
absent
abrogation
of
sovereign
of
Ala.
v.
Garrett,
531
U.S.
36364
(2001).
Sovereign immunity has not been abrogated for ADEA claims and
ADA Title I claims.
Thus, absent
We disagree.
limits
immunity.
to
how
long
state
may
wait
before
There
claiming
the
state
to
then
claim
sovereign
immunity.
Ku
v.
As stressed by
late for the MDOT and MTA to raise their sovereign immunity
defense, even though it is raised before us for the first time.
Thus, we affirm the district courts rulings on McCrays ADEA
and
ADA
claims,
albeit
based
on
sovereign
immunity,
not
legislative immunity.
III.
For McCrays remaining Title VII claim, the key question is
whether the district court erred in dismissing McCrays action
before
judgment
she
should
discovery.
(1986).
could
conduct
only
be
discovery.
granted
In
after
general,
adequate
summary
time
for
For this
judgment
declaration
that,
motion,
for
she
specified
may
file
reasons,
an
affidavit
[the
party]
P.
56(d).
In
response,
the
district
court
or
cannot
Fed. R.
may
defer
review
discretion.
district
courts
Id.
56(d)
ruling
for
abuse
of
granted where the nonmoving party has not had the opportunity
to discover information that is essential to his opposition.
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
n.5 (1986)).
should
be
liberally
granted
in
order
to
protect
non-moving
Greater Balt.
721
F.3d
264,
281
(4th
Cir.
2013)
(quoting
Raby
v.
the
legislative
immunity
consideration,
McCrays
to
make
an
argument
that
she
was
fired
because
of
discriminatory reasons.
Again,
for
termination
discrimination claims.
go
to
the
crux
of
McCrays
race
are
affidavit
absent
or
here.
declaration
Non-movants
before
they
must
can
generally
succeed
on
file
a
an
56(d)
McCray
filed
such
declaration
and
J.A. 9395.
In this
identified
the
Similarly, non-
movants do not qualify for Rule 56(d) protection where they had
the opportunity to discover evidence but chose not to.
Harrods,
in
discovery).
part
because
it
was
not
dilatory
in
pursuing
J.A. 110.
legislative
immunity
684
F.3d
462,
finding
is
legal
determination
(4th
Cir.
2012).
Legislative
import
overstate.
Id.
of
It
legislative
prevents
immunity
those
who
is
were
difficult
to
defeated
in
healthier,
more
thriving
class
of
The
Id.
It
politicians
by
10
Id.
The
protections
of
legislators themselves.
55 (1998).
on
the
immunity
being
claiming immunity.
as
fulfillednot
the
title
. . .
typically
rules
that
involve
establish
alteration
at
184
(internal
omitted).
the
a
of
the
actor
Actions that
adoption
general
of
policy
beyond
legislative
prospective
631
extend
function
qualify
legislative
Washington Suburban,
quotations
Accordingly,
marks,
this
Court
citations
has
had
and
no
accept
McCrays
position
was
due
to
budget-making. 3
Finally, and most helpful to the MDOT and MTA, our case law
shows that legislative immunity extends to those individuals who
advise legislators. Kensington, 684 F.3d at 471; Baker v. Mayor
& City Council of Balt., 894 F.2d 697, (4th Cir. 1990) (applying
legislative immunity to a government department that recommended
that a position be cut pursuant to a mayors request), overruled
on other grounds by Berkley v. Common Council of the City of
Charleston, 63 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Baraka v.
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 19697 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
governors
appointees
actions
in
advising
and
counseling
proposition
that
just
as
legislator
is
immune
from
animus,
Legislative
aides
immunity
is
to
a
that
legislator
shield
that
are
also
protects
immune.
despicable
12
MTA
and
MDOT
from
lawsuit
based
on
the
counsel
they
gave
we
vacate
discriminatory
our
employees
against
decision
brought
a
local
age
that
In
took
that
the
place
case,
discrimination
government
agency,
because
complaint
before
the
today.
an
remand
actions
and
the
former
claim
municipal
with
the
Washington
EEOC
Suburban
concluded
positions
that
it
eliminated.
should
be
Id.
The
restructured,
with
restructuring
several
required
an
Id.
These
Id.
Id.
Id. at 185.
13
prior
to
and
particular,
after
the
investigatory
the
EEOC
restructuring.
can
continue
goalsdetermining
with
whether
Id.
at
its
stated
WSSC
183.
In
current
discriminated
in
in
into
hiring
how
problematic,
as
deliberations
on
the
after
WSSC
would
the
the
restructuring.
developed
inquiries
proposal,
its
into
because
budget
the
these
Id.
would
be
legislators
actions
were
in
Washington
Suburban,
McCray
alleges
discriminatory
Even
had
already
made
conclusion
discriminatory
McCray
vulnerable
and
therefore
animusstripped
her
her
14
of
supervisordriven
her
duties.
Had
by
the
legislature
would
be
simply
shielded
terminated
by
McCrays
legislative
position,
immunity.
that
action
Similarly,
if
by
legislative
immunity.
In
this
case,
however,
See Crady
v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th
Cir.
1993)
purposes
(defining
as
significantly
including
diminished
tangible
an
employment
employer
material
action
giving
for
an
ADEA
employee
responsibilities)
(cited
761
(1998)).
Put
another
way,
the
basis
of
McCrays
lawsuit is not the financial storm that rocked the state and
forced Marylands government to scale back its budget.
Rather,
her claim is that the MTA and MDOT gave her a lightning rod to
hold and sent her to the roof.
This
case
presents
more
difficult
situation
than
15
than it is here.
stage
of
the
proceedings
in
that
case
because
it
was
assume
will
the
EEOCs
projects.).
investigation
follow
the
path
WSSC
but
legislative
it
focuses
action.
on
Thus,
behavior
while
the
occurring
case
here
before
has
any
advanced
similar
because
McCrays
lawsuit
has
not
yet
implicated
This is
MDOT
and
discriminatory
MTA
helped
animus.
terminate
However,
16
her
position
because
because
McCrays
of
lawsuit
alleges
discrimination
occurring
before
any
legislative
IV.
Because summary judgment was granted before Appellant had a
chance to discover facts essential to her claim, and she alleged
discrimination
occurring
before
any
legislative
activity,
the
and
ADEA
claims
are
supported
by
sovereign
immunity.
17