Ritchelle Libon

G.R. No. 177148

June 30, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.RAUL NUEZ y REVILLEZA,Appellant
FACTS:
In a search and seizure conducted based on reports of drug possession, the appellants room was
surveyed in his presence while his family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in
the living room. 31 packets of shabu,lighters, improvised burners, tooters, and aluminium foil with
shabu residue and a ladys wallet containing P4,610 inside appellants dresser were found. The
group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill,jigsaw, electric tester,
and assorted carpentry tools on suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu.
Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized6 and a Certification of
Orderly Search7 which appellant signed.
The RTC convicted appellant guilty, beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Republic Act 6425, as
amended.Appellant elevated the case to this Court on appeal, but the case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals where the Court ofAppeals rendered its decision affirming appellants conviction.

ISSUE:
WON there was an irregularity in the seizure of personal property conducted.
RULING:
SEC. 3. (Rule 126 of the Rules of Court) Personal property to be seized. A search warrant may
be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offence
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the
authorities. In the case at bar, Search Warrant No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only.
Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the
ladys wallet,cash, grinder, camera, component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester,
saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word paraphernalia as they bear no
relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers

exercised their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellants residence
they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or "means of committing the offense." This is, in our
view, absolutely impermissible.
The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly
described in the warrant is to limit the things to be taken to those, and only those particularly
described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what
articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding
party to undertake a fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were not specified in the search warrant
should be restored to appellant
G.R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007
Rowland Kim Santos, petitioner,
vs PRYCE Gas Inc., respondents

Facts:
This is a petition for review on the decision of Court of Appeals to reversed the twin orders of RTC
Iloilo City quashing the warrant it issued and ordering the return of LPG cylinders seized from
petitioner.
Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and distributing industrial gases and
LPG products. In 2002, Pryce noticed the decline of return of LPG cylinders for refilling. Pryce
employees suspected that LPG cylinders had been removed from market circulation and refilled by
their competitors, one of whom is Sun Gas and Santos as the manager.
Figueroa, Pryce's sales manger for Panay sought the assistance of CIDG to recoverLPG cylinders
allegedly in posession of Sun Gas. Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) conducted
surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then later requested the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP)
to conduct a routine fire inspection at Sun Gas. CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and were
able to take photographs of LPG cylinders (PO@ Demandara).
Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the premises with the allegation that
Pryce LPG cylinders were tampered and replaced with Sun Gas marking, averred also that Sun
Gas is distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of Pryce. RTC issued the search
warrant with the authority to seize the following items:

1. Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in different kilograms.

2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS INC., trademark and embossed
Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.

3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS cylinders. The authorities have
seize a number of Pryce LPG tanks.
Santos then filed for motion to quash the search warrant on the grounds of lack of probable cause
as well as deception and fraud in obtaining evidence in support of the application, violating article
3, section 2 of constitution and Rule 126 of rules of court.
On the same day, CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the office of City Prosecutor of Iloilo
against Santos, charging him with violation of RA No. 632.
After hearing, RTC granted the motion to quash , stating that the probable cause as found by it at
the time of the application for search warrant fell short of the requisite probable cause necessary to
sustain the validity of the search warrant.
Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the release of the seized items. It
also filed a motion for reconsideration of the 16 July 2002 Order but was denied in an Order dated
9 August 2002.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari,
arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing the search warrant.
The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the search warrant despite a prior finding of
probable cause and the failure of petitioner to prove that he bought the seized items from
respondent. It also challenged petitioners personality to file the motion to quash.
On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, which set aside the two
orders of the trial court. The appellate court also ordered the return of the seized items to
respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in an order dated 16 July 2004.
Issues:
(1) whether or not petitioner has authority to seek the quashal of the search warrant;
(2) who has proper custody of the seized items; and
(3) whether or not respondent correctly availed of the special civil action for certiorari to assail the
quashal of the search warrant.
Ruling:
1. The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the trial courts quashal of the search
warrant solely on the ground that petitioner, being a mere manager of Sun Gas, Inc., failed to show
his authority to act on behalf of the corporation and, therefore, had no legal personality to question
the validity of the search warrant. Thus, it concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining and subsequently granting petitioners motion to quash.

Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights
have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties.
2. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had raised the standard of
probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for trial. In so doing, the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has
been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.
3. The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to respondent.
Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly mandates the delivery of the
seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in custodia legis in anticipation
of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery of the items seized to the court which
issued the warrant together with a true and accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is
mandatory in order to preclude the substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who
issued the search warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the
issuance of a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the
court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the foregoing
constitutes contempt of court.
The seized items should remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search warrant
pending the institution of criminal action against petitioner.

Nala v Barroso
[G.R. No. 153087. August 7, 2003]
Facts:

 On June 25, 2001, PO3 Alcoser applied for a search warrant against petitioner Nala, who was
referred to in the application as Rumolo Nala alias Long of Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,

Bukidnon for illegal possession of firearms. On the same day, said search warrant was granted.

At around 6:30 in the morning of July 4, 2001, Alcoser and other police officers searched
petitioners house and allegedly seized various firearms, ammunitions and explosives.

Petitioner questioned the validity of the search warrant and filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash but
was denied by the judge.
Lower court found that probable cause was duly established from the deposition and examination
of witness Ruel Nalagon and the testimony of PO3 Alcoser who personally conducted a
surveillance to confirm the information given by Nalagon. The fact that the items seized were not
exactly the items listed in the warrant does not invalidate the same because the items seized
bear a direct relation to the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
Respondent judge also found that petitioner was sufficiently identified in the warrant although his
first name was erroneously stated therein as Romulo and not Bernard, considering that the
warrant was couched in terms that would make it enforceable against the person and residence
of petitioner and no other.

Issues:
(1) Was petitioner sufficiently described in the search and seizure warrant? YES.
(2) Was there probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant against petitioner?
NO.
(3) Whether or not the firearms and explosive allegedly found in petitioners residence are
admissible in evidence against him even though said firearms were not listed in the search and
seizure warrant. Immaterial due to a void search warrant.
Held:
1. The failure to correctly state in the search and seizure warrant the first name of petitioner,
which is Bernard and not Romulo or Rumolo, does not invalidate the warrant because the
additional description alias Lolong Nala who is said to be residing at Purok 4, Poblacion, Kitaotao,
Bukidnon sufficiently enabled the police officers to locate and identify the petitioner. What is
prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party, and not one which, as in the instant case,
contains a descriptio personae that will enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty.

2. Nowhere in the affidavit and testimony of witness Ruel Nalagon nor in PO3 Macrino L. Alcosers
application for the issuance of a search warrant was it mentioned that petitioner had no license to
possess a firearm. While Alcoser testified before the respondent judge that the firearms in the
possession of petitioner are not licensed, this does not qualify as personal knowledge but only
personal belief because neither he nor Nalagon verified, much more secured, a certification from
the appropriate government agency that petitioner was not licensed to possess a firearm. This
could have been the best evidence obtainable to prove that petitioner had no license to possess
firearms and ammunitions, but the police officers failed to present the same. Hence, the search
and seizure warrant issued on the basis of the evidence presented is void.
3. The settled rule is that where entry into the premises to be searched was gained by virtue of a
void search warrant, prohibited articles seized in the course of the search are inadmissible against
the accused. Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case,
it was not because: 1) there was no valid search warrant; and 2) absent such a warrant, the right
thereto was not validly waived by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the
petitioners premises had no right to be there and therefore had no right either to seize the pistol
and bullets.
The plain view doctrine finds no application here not only because the police officers had no
justification to search the house of petitioner (their search warrant being void for lack of probable
cause), but also because said officers failed to discharge the burden of proving that subject
articles were inadvertently found in petitioners house

Ratio:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such presence is
determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may
produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; (4) the
applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant
specifically describes the person and place to be searched and the things to be seized.

The probable cause for a valid search warrant has been defined as such facts and

circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched. This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainantor the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In determining its existence, the examining magistrate must make a probing and exhaustive, not
merely routine or pro forma examination of the applicant and the witnesses.

The elements of illegal possession of firearms are (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and
(2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the license or permit to
possess thesame.

 Plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from
which he can viewa particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
(c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

Yao Vs People
GR 168306
June 19, 2007
FACTS
Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION (MASAGANA), an
entry engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG products, while private respondents
Petron and pilipinas Shell are two of the largest bulk suppliers and producers of LPG in the
Philippines. Their LPG products are sold under the marks GASUL and SHELLANE respectively.
They are authorized to allow refillers and and distributors to refill, use sell and distribute their
respective LPG containers and products. NBI agent Oblanaca filed applications for search warrant
against petitioners and other occupants of masagana compound on the ground that petitioners are
actually producing selling offering for sale and or distributing LPG products using steel cylinders
owned by, and bearing the trade names , trade marks and devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell,
Without authority and in violation of the rights of said entities. presiding judge of RTC Cavite found
probable cause, hence, commanded the immediate search and seizure of the items. Petitioners
filled with the RTC a Motion to quash Search Warrants alleging that the items are being used in the
conduct of the lawful business of respondents and the same are not being used in refilling
shellane and GAsul LPGs. RTC denied the said petitioners Motion, and was affirmed by CA.
Hence, This Petition

ISSUE
Wether Petitioners are liable for trademark infringement
HELD
YES , Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting trademark infringement.
As can be gleaned in the section 155.1 mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered
trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is
likely to cause confusion, mistakes or deception among the buyers/ consumers can b e considered
as trademark infringement.

In Obleanicas swom affidavits he started they before conducting an investigation on the alleged
illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the certificates of trademark registrations issued by
the Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and Piulipinas Shell: that he confirmed
from Petron and Pilipinas Shell that MASAGANA is not authorized to sell, use, refill or distribute
GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinder containers; that he and alajar monitored the activities of
MASAGANA in its refilling plan station located within its compound at governors drive Barangay
Lapidario Tirece Martires, Cavite City; that using different names, they conducted twi test buys
therein where they purchased LPS cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and SHELLANE; that
the said GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders were refiled in their presence by the MASAGANA
employees; that while they were inside MASAGANA compound, he noticed stock piles of multi
branded cylinders including GASUL AND SHELLANE LPG cylinders coming in and out of the
MASAGANA compound and making deliveries to various outlets

Uy vs. BIR
G.R. No. 129651
October 20, 2000
FACTS
On September 30, 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of Unifish Packaging
Corporation (UPC) reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that UPC and Uy Chin
Hoalias Frank Uy, manager of UPC, were engaged in activities constituting violations of the
NationalInternal Revenue Code (NIRC). On October 1, 1993, the BIR requested and successfully
secured,before the RTC of Cebu, a search warrant. On the same day, a second warrant was
issued with contents almost identical to that of the first warrant but consisted of only one page.
These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Section 253. A third warrant,
however, was issued no that same day for Uys alleged violation of Section 238 in relation to
Section 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of
the PNP searched the premises of the UPC on October 2, 1993. They seized the items as listed on
the said warrant. A return of said search was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. Uy and
UPC filed a motion to quash the warrants before the RTC. Said motion was denied. A petition for
certiorari filed before the Court ofAppeals was likewise dismissed as it is not the proper remedy.

ISSUE:
Whether the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. It sustained the validity of the search warrant and
comprehensively discussed each and every defect alleged by petitioners.

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and
statutory provisions. One of which is that, the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to
be searched and persons or things to be seized. Although it noted inconsistencies in the
description of the place to be searched as indicated on said warrants, the Court ruled that the
description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officers enforcing the warrant can, with
reasonable effort,ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in
the community. It was not established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in
locating the premises of petitioner corporation, hence, inconsistency in identifying the
city where the premises to be searched is not a defect that would spell the warrants
invalidation in this case.
The warrants were also inconsistent as to who should be searchedone warrant was directed
only against Uy while the other was against Uy and UPC. The Court, however, ruled that where the
warrant was issued not for search of the persons occupying the premises, but only a search of the
premises occupied by them, the search could not be declared unlawful or in violation of the
constitutional rights of the owner or occupants of the premises, because of the
inconsistencies in stating their name. Furthermore, the Court said that where the apparent intent in
issuing another warrant was to supersede an earlier warrant, the latter should be deemed revoked
by the former.
Also the thing to be seized was not clearly defined by the judge as she used generic terms.As a
rule, the use of a generic term or a generic description in a warrant is acceptable only when amore
specific description of the things to be seized is unavailable. But where, however, by the nature of
the goods to be seized, their description must rather be general, it is not required that a technical
description be given, as this would mean no warrant could issue. As regards the terms
unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, the
SolicitorGeneral correctly argued that these documents need not be specified as it is not possible
to do so precisely because they are unregistered.
Lastly, general description of most of the documents listed in the warrants does not render the
entire warrant voidthe search warrant is severable, and those items not particularly described
may be cut off without destroying the whole warrant. Hence, insofar as the warrants authorize the
search and seizure of unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase
and sales invoices, the warrants remain valid.

People vs Court of Appeals (291 SCRA 400)

FACTS
A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which
quashedsearch warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the
itemsseized under the warrant.
>An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussainwho
had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207Area F.
Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following daySearch
Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No.1,
immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the
seizure of a number of different explosives and firearms.
ISSUE: WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private
respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular apartment had
been specifically described in the warrant.
HELD:
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of minds as to the
place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and
what was done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither
fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the
claim that the place actually searched

although not that specified in the warrant

is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence.
What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not
what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the
court issuing the warrant.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers'
own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their
application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter
alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or

things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be
searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of
the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the
Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place
to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be
left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

SUSAN ESQUILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES.

G.R. No. 182010.
August 25, 2010.
FACTS:
PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas were sent to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged
notorious snatcher operating in the Pasay area known only as Ryan.
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas to the target
area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three meters away and seen
placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While PO1 Cruz was not sure what the
plastic sachet contained, he become suspicious when petitioner started acting strangely as he
began to approach her. He then introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired
about the plastic sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however,
petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1 Cruzin who then
requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the cigarette case and thereafter
arrested her. RTC found appellant guilty of illegal possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
or shabu. Before the Court of Appeals, appellant questioned as illegal her arrest without warrant to
thus render any evidence obtained on the occasion thereof inadmissible. She assails the
appellate courts application of the stop-and-frisk principle in light of PO1 Cruzins failure to
justify his suspicion that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her placing
something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To petitioner, such
legal principle could only be invoked if there were overt acts constituting unusual conduct that
would arouse the suspicion
Issue:
Whether or not the stop-and-frisk principle was properly applied by the CA.
Held:

In a stop-and-frisk, it is essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person who
manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband concealed about him. Such a
stop-and-frisk practice serves a dual purpose: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.The circumstances under which
petitioner was arrested indeed engender the belief that a search on her person was warranted: The
police officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts when PO1
Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance into her
cigarette case. Given his training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be
drawn to curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he
introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the plastic sachet all the
more pricked his curiosity.From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the
police officers constituted a valid stop-and-frisk operation. The search/seizure of the suspected
shabu initially noticed in petitioners possession - later voluntarily exhibited[24] to the police
operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on what she placed inside a cigarette
case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of
her arrest, petitioner was exhibiting suspicious behaviour and in fact attempted to flee after the
police officer had identified himself. Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such
a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of
the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of petitioner

People vs. Racho

626 SCRA 633, August 3, 2010
Facts:
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities
who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. The team members posted
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day,
a Genesis bus arrived inBaler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed
to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the
team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu.
When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which,
when opened
, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought appellant to the
police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet

yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.Appellant was charged in two separate
informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the
second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs.During the arraignment,
appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5,
Article II, R.A. 9165 but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The appellant brought the case to SC assailing for
the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellant has a ground to assail the validity of his arrest.

Held:
The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify
a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.Appellant herein was not
committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was
committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted
from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude
that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the
informant,appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and
consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated. Neither was the arresting
officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with there quest warrant. As
testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received
the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not
only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that
appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the
following day(May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.
Valeroso v. Court of Appeals
GR. no. 164815
Sept. 3, 2009

FACTS:

Judge Ignacio Salvador ordered SPO2 Antonio Disuanco to issue a warrant of arrest against
Senior Inspector Valeroso for kidnapping with ransom. The team conducted surveillance. When
the petitioner was about to aboard into a tricycle, he was arrested and fire ammunition was seized
from him. Said fire arms were found out that it was named under a different person. They accosted
Valeroso. However, the latter in his defense, contended that when the officers came to his
childrens Boarding house in Sagana Homes, he was forced to the faucet while the men ransacked
the room until one shouted that they found something. He further stated that it was not done with a
warrant. Contrary to the prosecutions testimony, he was said to be arrested near the INP Central
Police in Culiat. He was found guilty by the trial court for the crime of illegal possession of firearms.
On appeal, his sentence was lowered
Issue:
Whether or not there is a breach of Valerosos Constitutional rights.
Held: Yes. The court favors the version of the Defense. Valerosos appeal is anchored on the
Constitutional right alleged to be violated thus making the evidence against him inadmissible.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution but with certain exceptions of valid warrantless arrest. However, in this case, such
cannot be justified. For one, the warrantless search could not be justified as an incident to a lawful
arrest. Searches and seizures incident to lawful arrests are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to to search
and remove from the arrestee that may be used by him to effect escape to the danger of the officer
doing the arrest and the concealment and destruction thereof. It is also the duty of the arresting
officer to search the area under his immediate control over any weapon and also in his plain view.
In this case, it cannot be said that the area that the officers searched is in their immediate control
as the weapon was found in a locked cabinet which needed force to be revealed. Also, it is not in
plain view which could not effectively merit a valid warrantless arrest.

PEOPLE v. VINECARIO
G.R. No. 141137
January 20, 2004
FACTS
Acting upon an information that a jeepney at Atok, Benguet was loaded with Benguet pine lumber,
the Police officers of PNP Tublay Station swiftly established a checkpoint in Acop, Tublay, Benguet.
At around 4:00 p.m. of the same day, the PNP operatives spotted the jeepney heading toward La
Trinidad. They flagged it down but it did not stop. Hence, they chased the vehicle up to Shilan,
La Trinidad where it finally halted. The driver and his companions admitted they have no permit to
transport the lumber. The police immediately arrested and investigated petitioners, Marso Insiong
Dumpit, Armando Palasi, and Ben Arinos. Only petitioners were charged with violation of
Section 68 of the Revised Forestry Code Petitioners, through counsel, filed a "Motion to
Suppress Evidence of the Prosecution" on the ground that the pieces of Benguet pine lumber
were illegally seized. But it was denied, so as their motion for reconsideration. On Appeal, the CA
dismissed the petition and held that the search conducted without warrant by the police officers is
valid; and that the confiscated pieces of lumber are admissible in evidence against the accused.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision. However, it was denied, hence this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the officers are valid.
Held: Yes.Hence, as a general rule, a search and seizure must be carried through with judicial
warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure constitutes derogation of a constitutional right.
The above rule, however, is not devoid of exceptions. In People v. Sarap, the exceptions where
search and seizure may be conducted without warrant, are:
(1) search incident to a lawful arrest;
(2) search of a moving motor vehicle;
(3) search in violation of
customs laws;
(4) seizure of the evidence in plain view;
(5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
searches and seizures;
(6) stop and frisk; and
(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

The only requirement in these exceptions is the presence of probable cause. Probable cause is the
existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place to be searched. In People v. Aruta, it was ruled that in warrantless
searches, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast rule or
fixed formula in determining probable cause for its determination varies according to the facts of
each case. Here, the search involved a moving vehicle, an instance where a warrantless search
and seizure may be conducted by peace officers. There is also probable cause on the part of the
officers for the warrantless arrest because when they flagged the jeepney down, it did not stop,
forcing the police to chase it until it reached Shilan, La Trinidad . A search of the vehicle disclosed
several pieces of Benguet pine lumber. Petitioners could not produce the required DENR permit to
cut and transport the same. In People v. Vinecarao, the Court ruled that where a vehicle sped away
after noticing a checkpoint and even after having been flagged down by police officers, in an
apparent attempt to dissuade the police from proceeding with their inspection, there exists
probable cause to justify a reasonable belief on the part of the law enforcers that the persons on
board said vehicle were officers of the law or that the vehicle contained objects which were
instruments of some offense.

Judge Felimon Abelita III vs P/Supt German Doria & SPO3 Cesar Ramirez
GR No. 170627
August 14, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner (Judge Abelita) filed a complaint for damages under Art. 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code
against Respondents (Doria and Ramirez). Petitioner alleged that he and his wife was on their
home when the respondents accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers,requested them to
proceed to the PNP headquarters. Petitioner alleged that he would proceed to to the PNP HQ after
he had brought his wife home. Petitoner alleged that when she parked his car in front of their
house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him and took his car keys, bared into the vehicle and conducted as
search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun and a
unlicensed .45 caliber pistol allegedly found inside the vehicle.
However, the respondent has a different version of the case. Doria alleged that they received a
telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed
by Ramirez to investigate the incident. Ramirez reported that a certain William Sia is wounded
while Petitioner and his wife just left the place of the incident. Doria looked for the petitioner and
when he found him, he informed him about the incident, he requested Petitioner to go with him in
the PNP HQ but the petitioner suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence, they
caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police offices saw a gun in
the form seat and a shotgun at the back. They confiscated the firearms and charged Petitioner for
illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder and an administrative case.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and seizure was valid.
Whether or not the Respondents are liable for damages.
Whether the findings in the administrative case against petitioner is conclusive in this case.
Ruling:
Yes, the seizure was valid under plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer
who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented
as evidence. The requisites of plain view are:
the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in
a position from which he can view a particular area;
the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and
it is immediately apparent to the police officers that the firearm may be an evidence of a crime.
Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.
No, the court did not agree that petitioner was framed-up and that the respondents were presumed
to be performing their duties in accordance with law. They should not be held liable for damages.
While the present case and the administrative case are based on the same essential facts and
circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata will not apply. The requisites of res judicata are:
the former judgment must be final;
it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulation submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of the parties, of subject matter, and
cause of action; this requisite is satisfied f the two actions are substantially between the same
parties.
A administrative case deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred by the
respondent for the commission of the acts complained of. This case deals with the civil liability for
damages of the police officers. There is no identity of causes of action in the cases. While identity
of causes of action is not required in the application of res judicata in the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment, it is required that there must always be identity of parties in the first
and second cases. There is no identity of parties since the administrative case was filed by
Bejamin Sia Lao against petitioner and Benjamin is not a party to this case.