COQUILLA vs COMELEC

FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras,

Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when
he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining
the US Navy.
In1998, he came to the Philippines and took out a residence
certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States.
Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171
which was approved. Thus, on November 10, 2000, he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of
Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy
stating that he had been a resident of Oras,Eastern Samar for 2
years.
Oras incumbent mayor, Neil Alvarez, who was running
for reelection sought to cancel Coquillas certificate of
candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year
residency in Oras was a material representation as he only
resided therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.
Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections
commenced and Coquillo was proclaimed the winner.
On July 19, 2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and
ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE: Was COMELECs order of cancellation of the certificate
of candidacy Teodulo M. Coquilla proper?
HELD: YES
COMELEC properly ordered the cancellation of CoquillaS COC.
COMELEC still had jurisdiction over his case although he was
already proclaimed because RA 6646 provides that the
proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for
the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which
have been begun before the elections, should continue even
after such elections and proclamation of the winners.
In this case, the COC was correctly cancelled because Coquilla
did not posses the legal qualification of at least 1 year
residency.
The term "residence" is to be understood as the "domicile" or
legal residence.
He has lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S.
citizen and he has not re-established his claimed domicile in
Oras by mere filing of taxes or by obtaining a voters
registration as it only requires six-month residency.
The material falsification he committed merits the cancellation
of his COC.
Dela Torre vs COMELEC [258 SCRA 485]
(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification of Local Elective
Officials, Moral Turpitude)
Facts: Section 40 (a) of Republic Act 7160 (Local Government
Code of 1991) provides that a prior conviction of a crime
becomes a ground for disqualification from running for any
elective local position i.e. when the conviction is for an
offense involving moral turpitude.
Citing above as ground, the COMELEC in a resolution, declared
petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor of
Cavinti, Laguna. COMELEC held that petitioner was found guilty
by the MTC for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense
whose nature involves moral turpitude.

Petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government

Code does not apply to his case inasmuch as the probation
granted him by the MTC which suspended the execution of the
judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing
therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
However, he admits all the elements of the crime of fencing.
Issue: WON the petitioner applicant is disqualified for the
coming elections due to a crime involving moral turpitude.
Held: Yes. Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals.
From the definition of fencing in Sec. 2 of PD 1612, an element
of the crime of fencing may be gleaned that the accused
knows or should have known that the said article, item, object
or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft.
Moral turpitude is deducible from this. Actual knowledge by the
fence of the fact that property received as stolen displays the
same degree of malicious deprivation of ones rightful property
as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very
nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. And although the
participation of each felon in the unlawful taking differs in point
in time and in degree, both the fence and the actual
perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded ones peaceful
dominion for gain thus deliberately reneging the process
private duties they owe their fellowmen in a manner
contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty and good morals.
Note: In determining whether a criminal act involves moral
turpitude, the Court is guided by one of the general principle
that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude while crimes
mala prohibita do not. However, SC admitted that it cannot
always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by merely classifying as crime as mala in se or as
mala prohibita. Whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude
is ultimately a question of fact and frequently depends on all
the circumstance
Mercado v. Manzano Case Digest [G.R. No. 135083. May
26, 1999]
FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were
both candidates for Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the
highest number of votes. However, his proclamation was
suspended due to the pending petition for disqualification filed
by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he was not a citizen of
the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen.
The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as
candidate for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc,
the disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent
was held to have renounced his US citizenship when he attained
the age of majority and registered himself as a voter in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of
Makati City on August 31, 1998. Thus the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold
public elective office in the philippines.

RULING: The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in

R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d) and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood
as referring to dual allegiance. Dual citizenship is different from
dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual
allegiance on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual's volition. Article IV Sec. 5
of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to
the termination of their status, for candidates with dual
citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence
of conflicting laws of different states.

Rodriguez vs COMELEC 259 SCRA 236

Facts: In 1992, petitioner Rodriguez and respondent Marquez
ran for Governor of Quezon Province. Rodriguez won. Marquez
challenged Rodriguez victory via a Quo Warranto on the ground
that there is a charge pending against him at the Los Angeles
Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft,
etc. Thus, he is a fugitive from justice.
COMELEC dismissed the case. Upon certiorari to the Supreme
Court, it was held that: Fugitive from justice includes not
only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but
also those who after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.
The case was remanded to the COMELEC to determine WON
Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice.
In 1995, Rodriguez and Marquez again ran for Governor.
Marquez filed a Petition for Disqualification against Rodriquez on
the same ground that he is a fugitive from justice. COMELEC
then consolidated both cases and found Rodriguez guilty based
on the authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest at LA Court
and of the felony complaint.

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same

time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are
also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens.
It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and
of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.

Rodriguez won again, and despite a Motion to suspend his

proclamation, the Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
him.

When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes

an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or
government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law
is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such
renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive
prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No
foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and
application.

Issue: Is Rodriguez a fugitive from justice as defined by the

Court in the MARQUEZ Decision?

The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of

respondent sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a
dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he
is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and
allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to
the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent
his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill
his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust,
there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his
Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate
proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained
the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground
that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for
the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a
Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his
foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting
renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Upon motion of Marquez, the COMELEC nullified

proclamation. Rodriguez filed a petition for certiorari.

the

Held: No. A fugitive from justice is defined as not only

those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This
indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that
makes a person leave a particular jurisdiction, and there can
only be intent to evade prosecution or punishment when the
fleeing person knows of an already instituted indictment, or of a
promulgated judgment of conviction. Intent to evade on the
part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that
there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight. This cannot be applied
in the case of Rodriguez. Rodriguez arrived in the Philippines on
June 25, 1985, five months before the filing of the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court on November 12, 1985 and
of the issuance of the arrest warrant by that same foreign court.
It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about
such felony complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the
US, as there was in fact no complaint and arrest warrant
much less conviction to speak of yet at such time.
Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition,
Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial
post.
Gamboa vs Aguirre and Araneta (members of SP)
Facts: In the 1995 elections, Rafael Coscolluela, petitioner
Romeo J. Gamboa, Jr. and respondents Marcelo Aguirre, Jr., and
Juan Y. Araneta were elected Negros Occidental Governor, ViceGovernor and SP members, respectively. Sometime in August of
1995, the governor designated petitioner as Acting Governor for
the duration of the formers official trip abroad until his return.
When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan held its regular session,
respondents questioned the authority of petitioner to preside
therein in view of his designation as Acting Governor and asked
him to vacate the Chair. The latter, however, refused to do so.
In another session, 7 members of the SP voted to allow
petitioner to continue presiding while 4 others voted against
with 1 abstention. Respondents filed before the lower court a
petition for declaratory relief and prohibition. In the meantime,
the Governor re-assumed his office.
Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner
as temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the
sessions of the SP during the period that he is the Acting

Governor. Petitioner filed a petition for review raising the issue

earlier mentioned. Although this case is dismissible for having
become moot and academic considering the expiration in 1998
of the terms of office of the local officials involved herein, the
Court nonetheless proceeds to resolve this common controversy
but novel issue under the existing laws on local government.

Governors (Vice-Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP

is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section
49(b), (i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding
officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members
present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer.

Issue: WON Gamboa, while serving as the Acting Governor,

temporarily relinquished the powers, functions, duties and
responsibilities of the Vice-Governor, including the power to
preside over the sessions of the SP

Aguinaldo vs Santos 212 SCRA 768

Held: YES
Ratio Decidendi:
What the LGC provides:
The LGC provides that the Vice-Governor shall be the presiding
officer of the SP. In addition to such function, he becomes the
Governor and assumes the higher office for the unexpired term
of his predecessor, in case of permanent vacancy therein.
When the vacancy, however, is merely temporary, the ViceGovernor shall automatically exercise the powers (subject to
certain limitations) and perform the duties and functions of the
Governor. But, no such contingency is provided in case of
temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-Governor.
Vice-Governor as Acting Governor:
When the Vice-Governor exercises the powers and duties of
the Governor, he does not assume the latter office. He only
acts as the Governor but does not become the Governor.
His assumption of the powers, duties and functions of the
provincial Chief Executive does not create a permanent vacuum
or vacancy in his position as the Vice-Governor. Necessarily, he
does not relinquish nor abandon his position and title as ViceGovernor by merely becoming an Acting Governor or by merely
exercising the powers and duties of the higher office.
A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting Governor is
actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for purposes of
exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he is deemed
as a non-member of the SP for the time being. By tradition, the
offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-Governor are
essentially executive in nature, whereas plain members of the
provincial board perform functions partaking of a legislative
character. This is because the authority vested by law in the
provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of some
legislative powers of Congress. This is clear from the law, when
it provides that local legislative power shall be vested in the
SP, which is the legislative body of the province, and
enumerates therein its membership consisting of the:
1) Vice Governor as presiding officer
2) regular elective SP members
3) 3 elective sectoral representatives
4) ex-officio members namely:
a) president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng
mga barangay
b) president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan
c) president of the provincial federation of sanggunian
members of municipalities and component cities
Not being included in the enumeration, the Governor is deemed
excluded and thus, local executive power in the province is
vested alone in the Governor. Consequently, the union of
legislative-executive powers in the office of the local chief
executive under the former Code has been disbanded.
Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue
to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since
the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a fulltime occupant to discharge them.
Conclusion:
To repeat, the creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of
the Governor creates a corresponding temporary vacancy in the
office of the Vice-Governor whenever the latter acts as
Governor by virtue of such temporary vacancy. This event
constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding
officer (Vice Governor) to preside during the SP sessions, which
thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Article 49(b) of
the Local Government Code concerning the election of a
temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting

Facts: Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province

of Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup dtat was crushed,
DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to Governor
Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he should not be
suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic.
A sworn complaint was also filed by Mayors of several
municipalities in Cagayan against Aguinaldo for acts committed
during the coup. Aguinaldo denied being privy to the planning
of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he
admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel
soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days from
notice, pending the outcome of the formal investigation. Later,
the Secretary rendered a decision finding petition guilty as
charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor
Vargas was installed as Governor. Aguinaldo appealed.
Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with
the SC, assailing the decision of respondent Secretary of Local
Government. Petitioner argued that: (1) that the power of
respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local government
official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that since respondent
Secretary no longer has power to suspend or remove petitioner,
the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as
Governor; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty committed by
petitioner should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
and not be a mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an
act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
While the case was pending before the SC, Aguinaldo filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan.
Three petitions for disqualification were filed against him on the
ground that he had been removed from office.
The Comelec granted the petition. Later, this was reversed on
the ground that the decision of the Secretary has not yet
attained finality and is still pending review with the Court. As
Aguinaldo won by a landslide margin in the elections, the
resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as
Governor of Cagayan.
Issues:
1. WON petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of
Cagayan has rendered the administration case moot and
academic
2. WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local
government officials as alter ego of the President
3. WON proof beyond reasonable doubt is required before
petitioner could be removed from office.
Held:
1. Yes. Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of
Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending moot
and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes,
petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the
candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is that a
public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office
operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct
to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The
foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases
pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed
during the failed coup.

2. Yes. The power of the Secretary to remove local government

officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory
grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is
provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution
which vest in the President the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power of
general supervision over local governments. It is a
constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head are
presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly
rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337 was
repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as both
the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature the
power and authority to enact a local government code, which
provides for the manner of removal of local government
officials. Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., this
court had the occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in
force despite the effectivity of the present Constitution, until
such time as the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 is
approved. The power of the DILG secretary to remove local
elective government officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of BP
337.
3. No. Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally, but
administratively where the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence.