40.

Casimiro v Tandog gr 146137 june 8,

2005
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Haydee Casimiro was appointed
Municipal Assessor. On 04 September 1996,
Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a
report based on an investigation he conducted into
alleged irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimero.
The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax
Declarations No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano
and the issuance of a new one in the name of petitioners
brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380
and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and
the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioners brotherin-law Marcelo Molina.
Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog
issued several
Memorandum Orders placing the
petitioner under preventive suspension and to answer to
the charge of irregularities in her office. Petitioner denied
the alleged irregularities claiming that the cancellation of
the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses
Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as
municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax
declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina
by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Antipas San
Sebastian in Molinas favor.
Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a factfinding committee to investigate the matter. After a series
of hearings, the committee submitted its report
recommending petitioners separation from service,
stating that it is clearly shown that petitioner is guilty of
malperformance of duty and gross dishonest to the
prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon.
ISSUE: WON petitioner was afforded procedural and
substantive due process when she was terminated from
her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose,
Romblon?
HELD: YES
In administrative proceedings, procedural due
process has been recognized to include the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution
of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or
with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively
a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;
and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by
substantial evidence submitted for consideration during
the hearing or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected.
In the case at bar, what appears in the record is
that a hearing was conducted, which petitioner attended
and where she answered questions propounded by the
members of the fact-finding committee. Records further
show that the petitioner was accorded every opportunity

to present her side. She filed her answer to the formal

charge against her. After a careful evaluation of evidence
adduced, the committee rendered a decision, which was
affirmed by the CSC and the Court of Appeals, upon a
move to review the same by the petitioner. Indeed, she
has even brought the matter to this Court for final
adjudication.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners argument
that the affidavit is hearsay because the complainants
were never presented for cross examination. In
administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure
and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due
process cannot be fully equated to due process in its
strict judicial sense.
The Court finds far little basis to petitioners
protestations that she was deprived of due process of law
and that the investigation conducted was far from
impartial and fair.
Well-entrenched is the rule that substantial proof,
and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond
reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis for the imposition of
any disciplinary action upon an employee. The standard
of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer
has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct and his participation
therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence
demanded by his position.
In the case at bar, there is substantial evidence to
prove petitioners dismissal.
Two alleged irregularities provided the dismissal
from service of herein petitioner:
1.ThecancellationofcomplainantTeodulo
Matillanostaxdeclarationandtheissuanceofa
newoneinfavorofpetitionersbrotherUlysses
Cawaling;and
2.Thecancellationofthetaxdeclarationinthename
ofcomplainantNoraidaSanSebastianCesars
parentinfavorofpetitionersbrotherinlaw,
MarceloMolina.
IN ALL, we affirm the finding of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner is guilty of acts of dishonesty. Her
acts of cancelling the tax declarations of Antipas San
Sebastian and Teodulo Matillano in favor of her close
relatives without complying with the requirements set
under the law constitute grave acts of dishonesty.
41. Lozano v Delo Santos274 scra 452
PUNO, J.:
FACTS: petitioner Reynaldo M. Lozano filed a civil case
for damages against respondent Antonio Anda before the
MCTC .Petitioner alleged that he was the president of the
Kapatirang
Mabalacat-Angeles
Jeepney
Drivers'
Association, Inc. (KAMAJDA) while respondent Anda was
the president of the Samahang Angeles-Mabalacat
Jeepney Operators' and Drivers' Association, Inc.
(SAMAJODA); upon the request of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mabalacat, Pampanga, petitioner and private
respondent agreed to consolidate their respective

associations and form the Unified Mabalacat-Angeles

Jeepney Operators' and Drivers' Association, Inc.
(UMAJODA); petitioner and private respondent also
agreed to elect one set of officers who shall be given the
sole authority to collect the daily dues from the members
of the consolidated association; elections were held and
both petitioner and private respondent ran for president;
petitioner won; private respondent protested and, alleging
fraud, refused to recognize the results of the election;
private respondent also refused to abide by their
agreement and continued collecting the dues from the
members of his association despite several demands to
desist. Petitioner was thus constrained to file the
complaint to restrain private respondent from collecting
the dues and to order him to pay damages in the amount
of P25,000.00 and attorney's fees of P500.00.
Private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that jurisdiction was
lodged with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). MCTC denied it.
Private respondent filed a petition for certiorari
before the RTC and it found the dispute to be
intracorporate, hence, subject to the jurisdiction of the
SEC.
ISSUE: WON SEC has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: The grant of jurisdiction to the SEC must be
viewed in the light of its nature and function under the
law. This jurisdiction is determined by a concurrence of
two elements: (1) the status or relationship of the parties;
and (2) the nature of the question that is the subject of
their controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy
must arise out of intracorporate or partnership relations
between and among stockholders, members, or
associates; between any or all of them and the
corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members or associates, respectively; and
between such corporation, partnership or association and
the State in so far as it concerns their individual
franchises. The second element requires that the dispute
among the parties be intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation, partnership or association
or deal with the internal affairs of the corporation,
partnership or association. After all, the principal function
of the SEC is the supervision and control of corporations,
partnerships and associations with the end in view that
investments in these entities may be encouraged and
protected, and their activities pursued for the promotion of
economic development.
There is no intracorporate nor partnership relation
between petitioner and private respondent. The
controversy between them arose out of their plan to
consolidate their respective jeepney drivers' and
operators' associations into a single common association.
The KAMAJDA and SAMAJODA to which petitioner

and private respondent belong are duly registered with

the SEC, but these associations are two separate
entities. The dispute between petitioner and private
respondent is not within the KAMAJDA nor the
SAMAJODA. It is between members of separate and
distinct associations. Petitioner and private respondent
have no intracorporate relation much less do they have
an intracorporate dispute. The SEC therefore has no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel advanced
by private respondent cannot override jurisdictional
requirements. Jurisdiction is fixed by law and is not
subject to the agreement of the parties.
42. Globe Telecom v National
Telecommunications Comm gr 143946 july
26, 2004
TINGA, J.:
FACTS: Smart filed a Complaint with public respondent
NTC, praying that NTC order the immediate
interconnection of Smart's and Globe's GSM networks,
particularly their respective SMS or texting services. The
Complaint arose from the inability of the two leading
CMTS providers to effect interconnection. Smart alleged
that Globe, with evident bad faith and malice, refused to
grant Smart's request for the interconnection of SMS.
NTC issued a Show Cause Order, informing Globe of the
Complaint, specifically the allegations therein that,
"among othersdespite formal request made by Smart to
Globe for the interconnection of their respective SMS or
text messaging services, Globe, with evident bad faith,
malice and to the prejudice of Smart and Globe and the
public in general, refused to grant Smart's request for the
interconnection of their respective SMS or text messaging
services, in violation of the mandate of Republic Act
7925, Executive Order No. 39, and their respective
implementing rules and regulations."
Globe filed its Answer with Motion to Dismiss, interposing
grounds that the Complaint was premature, Smart's
failure to comply with the conditions precedent required in
Section 6 of NTC Memorandum Circular 9-7-93. Smart
responded that it had already submitted the voluminous
documents asked by Globe in connection with other
interconnection agreements between the two carriers,
and that with those voluminous documents the
interconnection of the SMS systems could be expedited
by merely amending the parties' existing CMTS-to-CMTS
interconnection agreements.
NTC issued the Order now subject of the present
petition. In the Order, after noting that both Smart and
Globe were "equally blameworthy" for their lack of
cooperation in the submission of the documentation
required for interconnection and for having "unduly
maneuvered the situation into the present impasse," NTC
held that since SMS falls squarely within the definition of
"value-added service" or "enhanced-service" given in
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 8-9-95 (MC No. 8-995) the implementation of SMS interconnection is

mandatory pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) No. 59.

The NTC also declared that both Smart and Globe have
been providing SMS without authority from it, in violation
of Section 420 (f) of MC No. 8-9-95 which requires PTEs
intending to provide value-added services (VAS) to
secure prior approval from NTC through an administrative
process. Yet, in view of what it noted as the "peculiar
circumstances" of the case, NTC refrained from issuing a
Show Cause Order with a Cease and Desist Order, and
instead directed the parties to secure the requisite
authority to provide SMS within thirty (30) days, subject to
the payment of fine in the amount of two hundred pesos
(P200.00) "from the date of violation and for every day
during which such violation continues.
ISSUE: WON NTC may classify SMS as VAS?
HELD: The NTC Order is not supported by substantial
evidence. Neither does it sufficiently explain the reasons
for the decision rendered.
Our earlier discussion pertained to the lack of clear legal
basis for classifying SMS as VAS, owing to the failure of
the NTC to adopt clear rules and regulations to that
effect. Muddled as the legal milieu governing SMS
already is, NTC's attempt to apply its confusing standards
in the case of Globe and Smart is even more
disconcerting. The very rationale adopted by the NTC in
its Order holding that SMS is VAS is short and shoddy.
Astoundingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the rationale
bereft of intelligent inquiry, much less comment. Stated in
full, the relevant portion of the NTC Order reads:
xxx Getting down [to] the nitty-gritty, Globe's SMS
involves the transmission of data over its CMTS which is
Globe's basic service. SMS is not ordinarily provided by a
CMTS operator like Globe, and since SMS enhances
Globe's CMTS, SMS fits in to a nicety [sic] with the
definition of "value-added-service" or "enhanced-service"
under NTC Memorandum Circular -9-95 (Rule 001, Item).
The Court usually accords great respect to the technical
findings of administrative agencies in the fields of their
expertise, even if they are infelicitously worded. However,
the above-quoted "finding" is nothing more than bare
assertions, unsupported by substantial evidence. The
Order reveals that no deep inquiry was made as to the
nature of SMS or what its provisioning entails. In fact, the
Court is unable to find how exactly does SMS "fits into a
nicety" with NTC M.C. No. 8-9-95, which defines
"enhanced services" as analogous to "format, media
conversion, encryption, enhanced security features,
computer processing, and the like." The NTC merely
notes that SMS involves the "transmission of data over
[the] CMTS," a phraseology that evinces no causal
relation to the definition in M.C. No. 8-9-95. Neither did
the NTC endeavor to explain why the "transmission of
data" necessarily classifies SMS as a VAS.
In fact, if "the transmission of data over [the] CMTS" is to
be reckoned as the determinative characteristic of SMS, it
would seem that this is already sufficiently covered by
Globe and Smart's respective legislative franchises.
Smart is authorized under its legislative franchise to
establish
and
operate
integrated
telecommunications/computer/ electronic services for

public domestic and international communications, while

Globe is empowered to establish and operate domestic
telecommunications, and stations for transmission and
reception of messages by means of electricity,
electromagnetic waves or any kind of energy, force,
variations or impulses, whether conveyed by wires,
radiated through space or transmitted through other
media and for the handling of any and all types of
telecommunications services.
The question of the proper legal classification of VAS is
uniquely technical, tied as at is to the scientific and
technological application of the service or feature. Owing
to the dearth of substantive technical findings and data
from the NTC on which a judicial review may reasonably
be premised, it is not opportunely proper for the Court to
make its own technical evaluation of VAS, especially in
relation to SMS. Judicial fact-finding of the de novo kind
is generally abhorred and the shift of decisional
responsibility to the judiciary is not favored as against the
substantiated and specialized determination of
administrative agencies. With greater reason should this
be the standard for the exercise of judicial review when
the administrative agency concerned has not in the first
place come out with a technical finding based on
evidence, as in this case.
While stability in the law, particularly in the business
field, is desirable, there is no demand that the NTC
slavishly follow precedent. However, we think it
essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual
honesty, that if an administrative agency decides
inconsistently with previous action, that it explain
thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if
need be, why the previous standards should no
longer apply or should be overturned. Such
explanation is warranted in order to sufficiently
establish a decision as having rational basis. Any
inconsistent decision lacking thorough, ratiocination
in support may be struck down as being arbitrary.
And any decision with absolutely nothing to support
it is a nullity.
43. Villaflor v CA 280 SCRA 297
Facts:On16January1940,CiriloPiencenaves,inaDeedof
AbsoluteSale,soldtoVicenteVillafor,aparcelofagricultural
land(plantedtoAbaca)containinganareaof50hectares,more
orless.ThedeedstatesthatthelandwassoldtoVillafloron22
June1937,butnoformaldocumentwasthenexecuted,and
sincethenuntilthepresenttime,Villaflorhasbeenin
possessionandoccupationofthesame.Beforethesaleofsaid
property,Piencenavesinheritedsaidpropertyformhisparents
andwasinadversepossessionofsuchwithoutinterruptionfor
morethan50years.Onthesameday,ClaudioOtero,inaDeed
ofAbsoluteSalesoldtoVillafloraparcelofagriculturalland
(plantedtocorn),containinganareaof24hectares,moreor
less;HermogenesPatete,inaDeedofAbsoluteSalesoldto
Villaflor,aparcelofagriculturalland(plantedtoabacaand
corn),containinganareaof20hectares,moreorless.Both
deedstatethesamedetailsorcircumstancesasthatof
Piencenaves.On15February1940,FerminBocobo,inaDeed
ofAbsoluteSalesoldtoVillaflor,aparcelofagriculturalland

(plantedwithabaca),containinganareaof18hectares,moreor
less.On8November1946,VillaflorleasedtoNasipitLumber
Co.,Inc.aparcelofland,containinganareaof2hectares,
togetherwithalltheimprovementsexistingthereon,fora
periodof5years(from1June1946)atarentalofP200.00per
annumtocovertheannualrentalofhouseandbuildingsitesfor
33housesorbuildings.Theleaseagreementallowedthelessee
tosubleasethepremisestoanyperson,firmorcorporation;and
tobuildandconstructadditionalhouseswiththeconditionthe
lesseeshallpaytothelessortheamountof50centavosper
monthforeveryhouseandbuilding;providedthatsaid
constructionsandimprovementsbecomethepropertyofthe
lessorattheendoftheleasewithoutobligationonthepartof
thelatterforexpensesincurredintheconstructionofthesame.
On7July1948,inanAgreementtoSellVillaflorconveyed
toNasipitLumber,2parcelsofland.Parcel1containsanarea
of112,000hectaresmoreorless,dividedintolots5412,5413,
5488,5490,5491,5492,5850,5849,5860,5855,5851,5854,
5855,5859,5858,5857,5853,and5852;andcontainingabaca,
fruittrees,coconutsandthirtyhousesofmixedmaterials
belongingtotheNasipitLumberCompany.Parcel2contains
anareaof48,000moreorless,dividedintolots5411,5410,
5409,and5399,andcontaining100coconuttrees,productive,
and300cacaotrees.Fromsaidday,thepartiesagreedthat
NasipitLumbershallcontinuetooccupythepropertynot
anymoreinconceptoflesseebutasprospectiveowners.On2
December1948,VillaflorfiledSalesApplicationV807with
theBureauofLands,Manila,topurchaseundertheprovisions
ofChapterV,XIorIXofCA141(ThePublicLandsAct),as
amended,thetractofpubliclands.Paragraph6ofthe
Application,states:Iunderstandthatthisapplicationconveys
norighttooccupythelandpriortoitsapproval,andI
recognizethatthelandcoveredbythesameisofpublicdomain
andanyandallrightsImayhavewithrespecttheretobyvirtue
ofcontinuousoccupationandcultivationarehereby
relinquishedtotheGovernment.On7December1948,
VillaflorandNasipitLumberexecutedanAgreement,
confirmingtheAgreementtoSellof7July1948,butwith
referencetotheSalesApplicationfiledwiththeBureauof
Land.On31December1949,theReportbythepublicland
inspector(DistrictLandOffice,BureauofLands,inButuan)
containedanendorsementofthesaidofficerrecommending
rejectionoftheSalesApplicationofVillaflorforhavingleased
thepropertytoanotherevenbeforehehadacquired
transmissiblerightsthereto.InaletterofVillaflordated23
January1950,addressedtotheBureauofLands,heinformed
theBureauDirectorthathewasalreadyoccupyingtheproperty
whentheBureausAgusanRiverValleySubdivisionProject
wasinaugurated,thatthepropertywasformerlyclaimedas
privateproperty,andthattherefore,thepropertywas
segregatedorexcludedfromdispositionbecauseoftheclaim
ofprivateownership.Likewise,inaletterofNasipitLumber
dated22February1950addressedtotheDirectorofLands,the
corporationinformedtheBureauthatitrecognizedVillafloras
therealowner,claimantandoccupantoftheland;thatsince
June1946,Villaflorleased2hectaresinsidethelandtothe
company;thatithasnootherinterestontheland;andthatthe
SalesApplicationofVillaflorshouldbegivenfavorable
consideration.On24July1950,thescheduleddateofauction

ofthepropertycoveredbytheSalesApplication,Nasipit
LumberofferedthehighestbidofP41.00perhectare,butsince
anapplicantunderCA141,isallowedtoequalthebidofthe
highestbidder,Villaflortenderedanequalbid,depositedthe
equivalentof10%ofthebidpriceandthenpaidtheassessment
infull.On16August1950,Villaflorexecutedadocument,
denominatedasaDeedofRelinquishmentofRights,infavor
onNasipitLumber,inconsiderationoftheamountofP5,000
thatwastobereimbursedtotheformerrepresentingpartofthe
purchasepriceoftheland,thevalueoftheimprovements
Villaflorintroducedthereon,andtheexpensesincurredinthe
publicationoftheNoticeofSale;inlightofhisdifficultyto
developthesameasVillaflorhasmovedtoManila.Pursuant
thereto,on16August1950,NasipitLumberfiledaSales
Applicationoverthe2parcelsofland,coveringanareaof140
hectares,moreorless.ThisapplicationwasalsonumberedV
807.On17August1950theDirectorofLandsissuedan
OrderofAwardinfavorofNasipitLumber;andits
applicationwasenteredintherecordasSalesEntryV407.On
27November1973,VillaforwrotealettertoNasipitLumber,
remindingthelatteroftheirverbalagreementin1955;butthe
newsetofcorporateofficersrefusedtorecognizeVillaflors
claim.Inaformalprotestdated31January1974which
VillaflorfiledwiththeBureauofLands,heprotestedtheSales
ApplicationofNasipitLumber,claimingthatthecompanyhas
notpaidhimP5,000.00asprovidedintheDeedof
RelinquishmentofRightsdated16August1950.On8August
1977,theDirectorofLandsfoundthatthepaymentofthe
amountofP5,000.00intheDeedandtheconsiderationinthe
AgreementtoSellweredulyproven,andorderedthedismissal
ofVillaflorsprotest.On6July1978,Villaflorfileda
complaintinthetrialcourtforDeclarationofNullityof
Contract(DeedofRelinquishmentofRights),Recoveryof
Possession(oftwoparcelsoflandsubjectofthecontract),and
Damagesataboutthesametimethatheappealedthedecision
oftheMinisterofNaturalResourcestotheOfficeofthe
President.On28January1983,hedied.Thetrialcourtordered
hiswidow,LourdesD.Villaflor,tobesubstitutedaspetitioner.
Aftertrialinduecourse,thethenCFIAgusandelNorteand
ButuanCity,BranchIII,dismissedthecomplaintonthe
groundsthat:(1)petitioneradmittedthedueexecutionand
genuinenessofthecontractandwasestoppedfromprovingits
nullity,(2)theverballeaseagreementswereunenforceable
underArticle1403(2)(e)oftheCivilCode,and(3)hiscauses
ofactionwerebarredbyextinctiveprescriptionand/orlaches.
Itruledthattherewasprescriptionand/orlachesbecausethe
allegedverballeaseendedin1966,buttheactionwasfiled
onlyon6January1978.The6yearperiodwithinwhichtofile
anactiononanoralcontractperArticle1145(1)oftheCivil
Codeexpiredin1972.NasipitLumberwasdeclaredthelawful
ownerandactualphysicalpossessorofthe2parcelsofland
(containingatotalareaof160hectares).TheAgreementsto
SellRealRightsandtheDeedofRelinquishmentofRights
overthe2parcelswerelikewisedeclaredbindingbetweenthe
parties,theirsuccessorsandassigns;withdoublecostsagainst
Villaflor.TheheirsofpetitionerappealedtotheCourtof
Appealswhich,however,renderedjudgmentagainstthemvia
theassailedDecisiondated27September1990finding
petitionersprayers(1)forthedeclarationofnullityofthe

deedofrelinquishment,(2)fortheevictionofprivate
respondentfromthepropertyand(3)forthedeclarationof
petitionersheirsasownerstobewithoutbasis.Not
satisfied,petitionersheirsfiledthepetitionforreviewdated7
December1990.InaResolutiondated23June1991,theCourt
deniedthispetitionforbeinglate.Onreconsideration,the
Courtreinstatedthepetition.SCdismissedthepetition.
ISSUE: DidtheCourtofAppealserrinadoptingorrelying
onthefactualfindingsoftheBureauofLands,especiallythose
affirmedbytheMinister(nowSecretary)ofNaturalResources
andthetrialcourt?
HELD: Underlying the rulings of the trial and appellate
courts is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; i.e., courts
cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an
administrative tribunal, especially where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and
intricate matters of fact.
The rationale underlying the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction finds application in this case, since the
questions on the identity of the land in dispute and the
factual qualification of private respondent as an awardee
of a sales application require a technical determination by
the Bureau of Lands as the administrative agency with
the expertise to determine such matters. Because these
issues preclude prior judicial determination, it behooves
the courts to stand aside even when they apparently have
statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary
jurisdiction of the administrative agency.
Petitioner initiated his action with a protest before
the Bureau of Lands and followed it through in the
Ministry of Natural Resources and thereafter in the Office
of the President. Consistent with the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, the trial and the appellate courts had reason
to rely on the findings of these specialized administrative
bodies.
The rule that factual findings of an administrative
agency are accorded respect and even finality by courts
admits of exceptions. This is true also in assessing
factual findings of lower courts. It is incumbent on the
petitioner to show that the resolution of the factual issues
by the administrative agency and/or by the trial court falls
under any of the exceptions. Otherwise, this Court will not
disturb such findings.
In this instance, both the principle of primary
jurisdiction of administrative agencies and the doctrine of
finality of factual findings of the trial courts, particularly
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in this case,
militate against petitioners cause. Indeed, petitioner has
not given us sufficient reason to deviate from them.
In the exercise of his primary jurisdiction over the
issue, Director of Lands Casanova ruled that the land

was public:
xxxEven(o)ntheassumptionthatthelandsmentionedinthe
deedsoftransferarethesameasthe140hectareareaawarded
toNasipit,theirpurchasebyVillaflor(or)thelatters
occupationofthesamedidnotchangethecharacteroftheland
fromthatofpubliclandtoaprivateproperty.Theprovisionof
thelawisspecificthatpubliclandscanonlybeacquiredinthe
mannerprovidedforthereinandnototherwise(Sec.11,C.A.
No.141,asamended).TherecordsshowthatVillaflorhad
appliedforthepurchaseoflandsinquestionwiththisOffice
(SalesApplicationNo.V807)onDecember2,1948.xxx
Thereisaconditioninthesalesapplicationxxxtotheeffect
thatherecognizesthatthelandcoveredbythesameisof
publicdomainandanyandallrightshemayhavewithrespect
theretobyvirtueofcontinuousoccupationandcultivationare
relinquishedtotheGovernment(paragraph6,Sales
ApplicationNo.V807ofVicenteJ.Villaflor,p.21,carpeta)
ofwhichVillaflorisverymuchaware.Italsoappearsthat
Villaflorhadpaidforthepublicationfeesappurtenanttothe
saleoftheland.Heparticipatedinthepublicauctionwherehe
wasdeclaredthesuccessfulbidder.Hehadfullypaidthe
purchaseprive(sic)thereor(sic).Itwouldbea(sic)heightof
absurdityforVillaflortobebuyingthatwhichisownedbyhim
ifhisclaimofprivateownershipthereofistobebelieved.xxx.
This finding was affirmed by the Minister of Natural
Resources.
Clearly, this issue falls under the primary jurisdiction of
the Director of Lands because its resolution requires
survey, classification, xxx disposition and management of
the lands of the public domain. It follows that his rulings
deserve great respect. As petitioner failed to show that
this factual finding of the Director of Lands was
unsupported by substantial evidence, it assumes finality.
Thus, both the trial and the appellate courts correctly
relied on such finding. We can do no less.
44. Comm of Customs v Navarro (77 scra
264
FERNANDO, J.:
FACTS: The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector
of Customs in their exhaustive and scholarly petition for
certiorari sought to nullify and set aside order of
respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro dated January 4,
1971, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for
by private respondents Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic
Incorporated the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits,
restraining petitioners from proceeding with the auction
sale of such perishable goods. Classified as nonessential consumer commodities, they were banned by
Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as
prohibited importation or importation contrary to law and
thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner
Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of
the Tariff and Customs Code. In a detailed and specific
fashion, petitioners pointed out how violative was the
assumption of jurisdiction by respondent Judge over an
incident of a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding
which, as held in a number of decisions, was a matter
falling within the exclusive competence of the customs

authorities. The persuasive character of the petition is

thus evident, resulting in this Court issuing on February
15, 1971 a resolution requiring respondents to file an
answer and at the same time issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction as prayed for by petitioners to prevent the
challenged order of respondent Judge from being
implemented. Instead of preparing an answer, they just
submitted a manifestation stating that "after an intensive
and serious study of the merit of the case, the
respondents have decided to abandon its interest in the
case." The rationale behind such a move was ostensibly
the desire to avoid additional expenses, in view of the fact
that "the shipments, being perishable, have already
deteriorated." It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that the
real reason was that the points of law raised by
petitioners could not be refuted. Private respondents
concluded with a statement of "their intention of not filing
an answer to the instant petition and respectfully
[submitting] the case on the basis of the pleadings made
before the lower court. "
HELD: It does not require too much of an effort then to
ascertain the applicable legal principles that should
govern. The inescapable conclusion is that the petition
possesses merit. certiorari lies.
1. The question of seizure and forfeiture is for the
administrative in the first instance and then the
Commissioner of Customs. This is a field where the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction controls. Thereafter an
appeal may be taken to the Court of Tax Appeals. A court
of first instance is thus devoid of competence to act on
the matter. There is further judicial review, but only by this
Court in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction. More
specifically, in Pascual v. Commissioner of Customs, a
1959 decision, this Court affirmed a judgment of the
Court of Tax Appeals and categorically announced that
respondent Commissioner of Customs could "seize [the
importation of goods lacking the release certificates of the
Central Bank] and order their forfeiture under the
[appropriate] provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code
That such jurisdiction of the customs authorities is
exclusive was made clear in Pacis v. Averia, decided in
1966. This Court, speaking through Justice J. P.
Bengzon, realistically observed: "This original jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, when exercised in an action
for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a
forfeiture proceeding in the Bureau of Customs, tends to
encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the
Collector of Customs in seizure and forfeiture
proceedings." The court "should yield to the jurisdiction of
the Collector of Customs." Such a ruling, as pointed out
by Justice Zaldivar in Auyong Hian v. Court of Tax
Appeals, promulgated less than a year later, could be
traced to Government v. Gale, a 1913 decision, where
there was a recognition in the opinion of Justice Carson
that a Collector of Customs when sitting in forfeiture
proceedings constitutes a tribunal upon which the law
expressly confers jurisdiction to hear and determine all
questions touching the forfeiture and further disposition of

the subject matter of such proceedings.

The controlling principle was set forth anew in Ponce
Enrile v. Vinuya, decided in 1971. Thus: "The prevailing
doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and
forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs
precludes a court of first instance from assuming
cognizance over such a matter." Reference was then
made in the opinion to previous cases. Then it continued:
"Papa v. Mago likewise deserves to be cited. The opinion
of Justice Zaldivar for the Court emphatically asserted the
doctrine anew in the following language: 'It is the settled
rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for the
purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the
moment the goods are actually in its possession or
control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had
previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the
present case, the Bureau of Customs actually seized the
goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that
date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the
goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff
and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts.
Much less then would the Court of First Instance of
Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after
the Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of
seizure and detention on January 12, 1967, And so, it
cannot be said, as respondents contend, that the
issuance of said warrant was only an attempt to divest
the respondent Judge of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case. The court presided by respondent
Judge did not acquire jurisdiction over the goods in
question when the petition for mandamus was filed before
it, and so there was no need of divesting it of jurisdiction.
Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows
that the Court of First Instance of Manila had no
jurisdiction to issue the questioned order of March 7,
1967 releasing said goods." Lopez v. Commissioner of
Customs, as well as Luna v. Pacis, both 1971 decisions,
speak to the same effect. The latest categorical
declaration of such a rule appears in the opinion of
Justice Teehankee, speaking for the Court, in Seneres v.
Frias in these words: "It is the settled law and
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction that the customs
authorities acquire exclusive jurisdiction over goods
sought to be imported into the Philippines, for the
purpose of enforcement of Philippine customs laws, from
the moment the goods are actually under their
possession and control, even if no warrant for seizure or
detention thereof has previously been issued by the port
collector of customs."
The writ of certiorari is granted and the order of
respondent Judge of January 4, 1971 nullified and set
aside. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court in
its resolution of February 15, 1971 against the
enforcement of the above order is made permanent.
Respondent Judge, or whoever is acting in his place and
in his stead, is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 14178 of
Branch II of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled
Juanito S. Flores, doing business under the name and

style of J.S.F. Enterprises and Asiatic Incorporated v. the

Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs.
Costs against private respondents.
45. Centeno v centeno 343 scra 153
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS: Respondent is the owner of two (2) parcels of
riceland, situated at Cofradia, Sta. Isabel, Malolos, Bulacan.
Thesaidparcelsoflandwerethesubjectofanearliercasefiled
by respondent against petitioners before the Department of
AgrarianReform(DAR),forcancellationofcertificatesofland
transfer(CLT).Insaidcase,itwasestablishedthatpetitioners,
through fraud andmisrepresentation,obtained CLTs in their
namesforCiprianoCentenoandforLeonidaCalonzo.
OnNovember15,1986,thethenMinister,nowSecretary,of
AgrarianReformissuedanorderdirectingtherecalland
cancellationofpetitioners'CLTs,thus:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,orderisherebyissued:
1.RecallingandcancellingCLTNo.10186coveringFarmlot
No.122containinganareaof2,862squaremetersandCLT
No.10185coveringhalfportionofHomeLotNo.111issued
toRespondentCiprianoCenteno,andCLTNo.10148(sic)
coveringtheremaininghalfportionofHomeLotNo.111
issuedtoRespondentLeonilaCalonzo,allunderPsd248725,
situatedatRCCMalolosEstate,Malolos,Bulacan;and
forfeitinginfavorofthegovernmentwhateverpaymentsthey
havemadeonaccountthereof.
2.DirectingthegenerationandissuanceofnewCertificatesof
LandTransferinfavorofhereinprotestantIgnaciaCenteno,
coveringthelandholdingsatissue.
TheaforesaidorderwasaffirmedbytheOfficeofthe
President,whichhadbecomefinalandexecutory.
Theinstantcasehasitsrootsinacomplaintfiledbyherein
respondentIgnaciaCentenowiththeDepartmentofAgrarian
ReformandAdjudicationBoard(DARAB)for"Maintenance
ofPeacefulPossessionwithPrayerforRestraining
Order/PreliminaryInjunction,EjectmentandDamages."
Respondentallegedthat,despitethedecisionoftheDAR
recognizingherownershipoverLotNos.111and122,as
affirmedbytheOfficeofthePresident,hereinpetitioners
CiprianoCenteno,LeonilaCalonzoandRamonaAdrianohave
interferedwithandpreventedrespondentfromexercisingacts
ofpossessionoverthelandholdingsearlieradjudicatedtoher
(LotNos.111and122)andkeptonharassing,molestingand
disturbingherpeacefulpossessionaswellastheenjoymentof
thefruitsthereof,tohergreatdamageandprejudice.She
prayedthatpetitionersberestrainedfromcommittingacts
tendingtodepriverespondentofherpossession,andthatthey
beorderedtovacatethepremises.
ProvincialAdjudicatorrenderedadecision,afterhearing,
favorablytorespondent,advertingtothedecisionoftheDAR,
datedNovember15,1986,whichwasheldtobedeterminative
oftherightsofthepartiesundertheprincipleofresjudicata.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE DAR
ADJUDICATION BOARD HAS JURISDICTION

OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

and WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS ARE
ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION
HELD: The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the
present case for maintenance of peaceful possession
with prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction is a
mere off-shoot of the suit for cancellation of Certificates of
Land Transfer (CLTs) filed by herein respondent against
herein petitioners before the DARAB. That previous case
culminated in a decision upholding respondent's
entitlement to an award of the subject landholdings under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. The case at
bar is for the maintenance of her peaceful possession of
the premises and to prevent the petitioners from further
harassing her and disturbing her possession and
enjoyment thereof. Hence, the appellate court was
correct in holding that the present case is an incident
flowing from the earlier decision of the administrative
agency involving the same parties and relating to the
same lands.
Having found therefore, that the instant case is
related to and is a mere off-shoot of the said previous
case for cancellation of CLTs which was decided in favor
of herein respondent, we believe and so hold that the
DAR continues to have jurisdiction over the same. As
aptly stated by the Court of Appeals, under Section 50 of
R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of
1988), the DAR is vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program. The rule is that the DARAB has jurisdiction to
try and decide any agrarian dispute or any incident
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program.
Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules of
Procedure of the DARAB provides:
Section1.Primary,OriginalandAppellateJurisdiction.The
AgrarianReformAdjudicationBoardshallhaveprimary
jurisdiction,bothoriginalandappellate,todetermineand
adjudicateallagrariandisputes,cases,controversies,and
mattersorincidentsinvolvingtheimplementationofthe
ComprehensiveAgrarianReformProgramunderRepublicAct
No.6657,ExecutiveOrderNos.229,228and129A,Republic
ActNo.3844asamendedbyRepublicActNo.6389,
PresidentialDecreeNo.27andotheragrarianlawsandtheir
implementingrulesandregulations.
Specifically,suchjurisdictionshallextendoverbutnotbe
limitedtothefollowing:
xxxxxxxxx
f)CasesinvolvingtheissuanceofCertificateofLandTransfer
(CLT),CertificateofLandownershipAward(CLOA)and
EmancipationPatent(EP)andtheadministrativecorrection
thereof;(Underliningadded)
Furthermore, petitioners are barred by estoppel
from raising the issue of jurisdiction of the DARAB. A

perusal of the records will show that petitioners

participated in all stages of the instant case, setting up a
counterclaim and asking for affirmative relief in their
answer. This Court has ruled that participation by certain
parties in the administrative proceedings without raising
any objection thereto, bars them from any jurisdictional
infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered against
them.
Clearly, the above allegations regarding petitioners'
actions with regard to the subject land, if true, violate
respondent's rights as adjudicated by the DARAB; hence,
these constitute causes of action which entitle the
respondent to the relief sought. WHEREFORE, in view of
the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
46. Nuesa v ca gr 132048 march 6, 2002
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: On May 25, 1972, then Secretary of Agrarian
Reform issued an Order of Award in favor of Jose Verdillo
over two (2) parcels of agricultural land, Lots 1932 and
1904 of the Buenavista Estate, San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
covering 14,496 and 19,808 square meters, respectively,
under the following conditions:
That within a period of six (6) months from receipt of a
copy, the awardee(s) shall personally cultivate xxx or
otherwise develop at least one-fourth of the area xxx or
occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential
lot and pay at least the first installment xxx; failure on
his/her part to comply with this requirement shall be
sufficient cause for cancellation of this order and for
allocation xxx in favor of any qualified xxx applicant; and
that in no case shall an agreement to sell or deed of sale,
as the case may be, issued in favor of the awardee(s)
covering the lots without a certification issued by the Land
Reform Project Team Leader of Land Settlement
Superintendent that the awardee(s) has/have developed
or devoted to some productive enterprise at least one-half
of the area thereof, or constructed his/her/their house
therein in case of residential land.
On August 26, 1993, or after twenty-one years,
private respondent filed an application with the Regional
Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform for the
purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with
the conditions set forth in the Order. Restituto Rivera,
herein petitioner, filed a letter of protest against private
respondent claiming that contrary to the manifestation of
private respondent, it is petitioner who had been in
possession of the land and had been cultivating the
same. Petitioner had filed his own application for said
parcels in opposition to that of private respondent.
DAR issued cancellation of private respondents
award. Aggrieved by the cancellation of his award, private
respondent then filed on March 20, 1994, a Petition with
the Provincial Adjudication Board, Region III, for
Annulment of said Order. Instead of filing an Answer to
the Petition, herein petitioners (as respondents below)
filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground that
the proper remedy was an appeal to the Secretary of the

Department of Agrarian Reform from the Order of the

Regional Director, under DAR Memorandum Circular No.
5-87, and not by a Petition with the DARAB Provincial
Adjudicator, hence, the aforesaid Order had become final
and executory. The petitioners manifested that they were
no longer submitting their position paper and were opting
to rely solely on their Motion to Dismiss.
The DARAB Provincial Adjudicator promulgated a
Decision denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss and
reversing the Order of the Regional Director Petitioner
Rivera filed a Motion for Reconsideration from said
Decision, but it was denied.
ISSUE: whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
denying petitioners claim that in this case, the Board
(DARAB) acted in grave abuse of discretion tantamount
to lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
HELD: The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of
the earlier Order of Award by the Secretary of Agriculture
falls under the administrative functions of the DAR. The
DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of
adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance of the case, then
overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director
and deciding the case on the merits without affording the
petitioner opportunity to present his case.
Under Section 3(d) of R.A. 6657 (CARP Law),
agrarian dispute is defined to include (d) ...any
controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers associations or representation of persons in
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In the case at bar, petitioner and private
respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this
controversy between them within the ambit of the
abovecited provision. Consequently, the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have
taken cognizance of private respondents petition in the
first place.
Note that Administrative Order No. 3, Series of
1990, governs the distribution and titling of lots in landed
estates administered by the DAR. This Order explicitly
provides that since land has a social function, there is a
concomitant social responsibility in its ownership and
should, therefore, be distributed to the actual
occupant/tillers thereof. In the investigation on December
27, 1993, conducted by the Regional Officer of DAR, it

was established that the subject lots were in the

possession and cultivation of persons other than the
awardee Verdillo. Clearly, this constituted a violation of
the terms of the Order of Award issued in favor of private
respondent as an awardee, aside from contravening the
underlying principles of agrarian reform as a social justice
measure. Given these circumstances, we find petitioner
Restituto Riveras plea to overturn the ruling of the Court
of Appeals meritorious.

the complaint stated a cause of action and that the court

had jurisdiction thereover.

While it bears emphasizing that findings of

administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters
are accorded not only respect but even finality by the
courts, care should be taken that administrative actions
are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional
boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In
this case, respondent DARAB officials and boards,
provincial and central, had overstepped their legal
boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy
between petitioner Rivera and private respondent Verdillo
as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904 of the
Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in
sustaining DARABs unjustified action taken with grave
abuse of discretion resulting in lack or excess of its
jurisdiction.

ISSUE: WON may DECS officials to seek the dismissal of

the complaints filed in court by the school teachers even
as no restraining order could lawfully issue against the
continuation of the administrative investigations?
HELD: (1) There being no dispute that the root of the
cases filed before the court a quo deals on the
performance of official functions by the DECS officials,
there cannot be a full determination on whether the
actions taken by them have been proper or improper, or
whether they have acted in good faith or bad faith,
pending a full hearing that would give all the parties a
chance to ventilate their respective claims;
(2) Public officials are not necessarily immune from
damages in their personal capacities arising from acts
done in bad faith, for if malice is indeed established,
public officials can no longer be said to have acted within
the scope of official authority so as to still find protection
under the mantle of immunity for official actions;
(3) The issuance, however, of the restraining orders by
the lower court against further proceedings of the
administrative complaints is inappropriate inasmuch as
the authority of the DECS Regional Director to issue the
return to work memorandum, to initiate the administrative
charges, as well as to constitute the investigating panel,
can hardly be disputed; and
(4) The court cases and the administrative matters being
closely interrelated, if not interlinked, it behooves the
court, in the interest of good order and conformably with
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, to suspend its action
on the cases before it pending the final outcome of the
administrative charges.
Accordingly, we here reiterate that the court a quo did not
err in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint
in Civil Case No. 9884 although it did not commit error in
issuing its restraining further proceedings on the
administrative investigation being conducted by DECS.
CA decision is affirmed.

47. Regional director of region 7 vs ca gr

110193 jan 27, 1994
FACTS: The private respondents, together with other
Negros Oriental public school teachers, held, starting 19
September 1990 and lasting until 21 September 1990, a
mass action, or a strike from their school classes, to
demand the release of their salaries by the Department of
Budget.
A return-to-work order was promptly issued by one of the
petitioners, Regional Director Teofilo Gomez of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS"),
with a warning that if the "striking" school teachers were
not to resume their classes within twenty-four hours,
administrative charges would be filed. Since the order
was not heeded, administrative complaints against the
teachers concerned were thereupon filed. The teachers
were each given five days from receipt of said complaints
within which to submit their respective answers and
supporting documents. An investigation panel, composed
of three DECS lawyers (the other petitioners herein),
namely, Marcelo Baclaso, Nieva Montes and Generoso
Capuyan, was constituted to look into the case.
Prior to the start of the hearings by the DECS
Investigating Team, the private respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 42,
Dumaguete City, a complaint for injunction, prohibition
and damages with prayer for preliminary injunction. On
26 March 1991, the court a quo issued the writ of
preliminary injunction.
The petitioners filed their answer, later followed by a
motion to dismiss. The trial court denied the motion to
dismiss and set the case for pre-trial hearing, holding that

The pre-trail, however, was pre-empted by the petitioners

when they filed with this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus on 25 July 1991 and so
docketed as G.R. No. 100781. 4 In a resolution, dated 5
August 1991, the Court referred the petition to the Court
of Appeals, but later denied the petition.

48. Laguna CATV network v maraan gr

139492 nov 19, 2002
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
FACTS: Private respondents filed with the Department of
Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. IV (DOLE
Region IV), separate complaints for underpayment of
wages and non-payment of other employee benefits.
Impleaded as respondent was their employer, Laguna
CATV Network, Inc. (Laguna CATV).
Private respondents filed their separate complaints
pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7730.

DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection within

the premises of Laguna CATV and found that the latter
violated the laws on payment of wages and other
benefits. Thereupon, DOLE Region IV requested Laguna
CATV to correct its violations but the latter refused,
prompting Regional Director Alex E. Maraan to set the
case for summary investigation. Thereafter, he issued an
Order dated August 19, 1998 directing Laguna CATV to
pay the concerned employees the sum of Two Hundred
Sixty-One Thousand, Nine and 19/100 (P261,009.19)
Pesos representing their unpaid claims, within 10 days
from notice, and to submit proof of payment within the
same period. Forthwith, Laguna CATV filed a motion for
reconsideration.
In view of Laguna CATVs failure to comply with the
Order directing it to pay the unpaid claims of its
employees, DOLE Regional Director Maraan issued a
writ of execution rdering Sheriff Enrico Soagmit to collect
in cash from Laguna CATV the amount specified in the
writ or, in lieu thereof, to attach its goods and chattels or
those of its owner, Dr. Bernardino Bailon. Sheriff Sagmit
subsequently levied on Dr. Bailons L300 van and
garnished his bank deposits.
Instead of appealing to the Secretary of Labor,
Laguna CATV filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review. Laguna
CATV was of the view that an appeal to the Secretary of
Labor would be an exercise in futility considering that the
said appeal will be filed with the Regional Office and it will
surely be disapproved.
The Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying
Laguna CATVs motion for extension and dismissing the
case. The Appellate Court found, among others, that it
failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
ISSUE: WON CA was correct in holding that petitioner
failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
HELD: YES
As provided under Article 128 of the Labor Code,
as amended, earlier quoted, an order issued by the duly
authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor may
be appealed to the latter. Thus, petitioner should have
first appealed to the Secretary of Labor instead of filing
with the Court of Appeals a motion for extension of time
to file a petition for review.
This Court, in a long line of cases, has consistently
held that if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the courts judicial power can be
sought. The party with an administrative remedy must
not merely initiate the prescribed administrative
procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its
appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial
intervention in order to give the administrative agency

an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and

prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court.
The underlying principle of the rule rests on the
presumption that the administrative agency, if afforded a
complete chance to pass upon the matter will decide the
same correctly. Therefore, petitioner should have
completed the administrative process by appealing the
questioned Orders to the Secretary of Labor.
Although this Court has allowed certain exceptions
to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
such as:
1) when there is a violation of due process;
2) when the issue involved is a purely legal
question;
3) when the administrative action is patently
illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned;
5) when there is irreparable injury;
6) when the respondent is a Department
Secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter;
7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable;
8) when it would amount to a nullification of a
claim;
9) when the subject matter is a private land in
land case proceedings;
10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy, adequate remedy;
11) when there are circumstances indicating
the urgency of judicial intervention;
12) when no administrative review is provided
by law;
13) where the rule of qualified political agency
applies; and
14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies has been rendered moot,
petitioner fails to show that the instant case falls
under any of the exceptions. Its contention that an
appeal to the Secretary of Labor would be futile as it
will surely be disapproved, is purely conjectural and
definitely misplaced.
Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver, estoppel,
or any of the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, the case is susceptible of
dismissal for lack of cause of action.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED.
49. Corpuz v cuaderno 4 scra 749
FACTS: While petitioner-appellant was holding the
position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the
Central Bank of the Philippines a position declared by
the President of the Philippines as "highly technical in
nature and placed in the exempt class" (Appendix "D",
Exhibit "VV"), he was charged in an administrative case,
for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty
and/or abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc.

preferred against him by employees of the Bank,

resulting in his suspension by the Monetary Board of the
Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to
investigate him. The Committee finds that there is no
basis upon which to recommend disciplinary action
against
respondent,
and
therefore
respectfully
recommends that he be immediately reinstated.
Unable to agree with the committee report, the Monetary
Board considered "the respondent, R. Marino Corpus,
resigned as of the date of his suspension." The Monetary
Board then approved of the appointment of herein
respondent Mario Marcos to the position involved in place
of petitioner R. Marino Corpus.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and
quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages, against the herein respondents. The
respondents filed their answer and motions to dismiss,
against which an opposition was filed by petitioner. After
several hearings, another order was issued granting the
motions to dismiss the amended petition, on the ground
that petitioner did not exhaust all administrative remedies
available to him in law.
ISSUE: WON petitioner is required to exhaust all
administrative remedies available to him?
HELD: True, the appellant did not elevate his case for
review either by the President or the Civil Service
Commission. However, it is our opinion that a report to
these administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case.
(1) There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in
a case like the one at bar. The fact that the President
had, in two instances cited in the orders appealed from,
acted on appeals from decisions of the Monetary Board
of the Central Bank, should not be regarded as
precedents, but at most may be viewed as acts of
condescension on the part of the Chief Executive.
(2) While there are provisions in the Civil Service Law
regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil Service
and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the
petitioner is not bound to observe them, considering his
status and the Charter of the Central Bank
On the other hand, the doctrine does not apply where, by
the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an
administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only,
warranting the conclusion that the legislature intended to
allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative
remedy has not been exhausted (42 Am. Jur. 583).
While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be
first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so;
and as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar
the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that
he who claims the right to hold a public office allegedly
usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in
the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the

reglementary period.
Upon the foregoing, we have to disagree with the legal
opinion of the trial judge and hold that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable and
does not bar the present proceedings.
50. Madrigal v lecaroz 91 scra 20
FACTS: Public respondents abolished petitioner-appellat
Joventino Madrigal's position as a permanent
construction capataz in the office of the Provincial
Engineer from the annual Roads Bridges Fund Budget for
fiscal year 1971-1972. The abolition was allegedly due to
the poor financial condition of the province and it
appearing that his position was not essential.
Madrigal appealed to the Civil Service Commission and it
declared the removal of Madrigal from the service illegal.
Public respondent moved for a reconsideration of said
resolution, which was denied. Madrigal sent a letter to
the Provincial Board requesting implementation of the
resolution of the Commission and consequently,
reinstatement to his former position.
The Provincial Board denied Madrigal's request for
reinstatement because his former position no longer
exists.
Madrigal filed a petition before the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Marinduque against public
respondents Governor Aristeo M. Lecaroz, Vice-Governor
Celso Zoleta, Jr., Provincial Board Members Domingo
Riego and Marcial Principe, Provincial Engineer Enrique
M. Isidro, Abraham I. Taduran and the Province of
Marinduque for mandamus and damages seeking, inter
alia, (1) restoration of his abolished position in the Roads
and Bridges Fund Budget of the Province; (2)
reinstatement to such position; and (3) payment of his
back salaries plus damages
The trial court issued an order dismissing the petition on
the ground that Madrigal's cause of action was barred by
laches.
Madrigal alleges that the one (1) year period prescribed
in an action for quo warranto is not applicable in an action
for mandamus because Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
does not provide for such prescriptive period. The
declaration by the trial court that the pendency of
administrative remedies does not operate to suspend the
period of one (1) year within which to file the petition for
mandamus, should be confined to actions for quo
warranto only. On the contrary, he contends that
exhaustion of administrative remedies is a condition sine
qua non before one can petition for mandamus.
Public respondents aver that it has become an
established part of our jurisprudence, being a public
policy repeatedly cited by the courts in myriad of
mandamus cases, that actions for reinstatement should
be brought within one year from the date of dismissal,
otherwise, they will be barred by laches. The pendency of

an administrative remedy before the Commission does

not stop the running of the one (1) year period within
which a mandamus case for reinstatement should be
filed.
ISSUE: WON one (1) year period prescribed in an action
for quo warranto is not applicable in an action for
mandamus?
HELD: The unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is
to the effect that a petition for quo warranto and
mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed
within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted
from his position.
And this one (1) year period is not interrupted by the
prosecution of any administrative remedy (Torres v.
Quintos, 88 Phil. 436). Actually, the recourse by Madrigal
to the Commission was unwarranted. It is fundamental
that in a case where pure questions of law are raised, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot
apply because issues of law cannot be resolved with
finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the
administrative officer of orders involving questions of law
would be an exercise in futility since administrative
officers cannot decide such issues with finality.
51. cabada v alunan 260 scra 838
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: A complaint against the petitioners for Grave
Misconduct, Arbitrary Detention, and Dishonesty was filed
with the Office of the Commission on Human Rights in
Tacloban City by private respondent Mario Valdez. The
complaint was referred to the Philippine National Police
Eighth Regional Command (PNP-RECOM 8) which, after
conducting its own investigation, filed an administrative
charge of Grave Misconduct against the petitioners and
instituted summary dismissal proceedings.
The Regional Director of PNP-RECOM 8 handed
down a decision finding the petitioners guilty of grave
misconduct and ordering their dismissal from the police
service. Pursuant to this decision, Special Order, was
issued ordering, among other things, the dismissal of the
petitioners from the service.
The petitioners claimed that they were not formally
furnished with a copy of the decision and that they were
able to secure a copy thereof thru their own effort and
initiative only on 13 June 1994. However, they received a
copy of Special Order No. 174.
Petitioners Cabada and De Guzman then filed with
the Honorable Secretary of the DILG and Chairman of the
NAPOLCOM their Appeal and Petition for Review.
NAPOLCOM, through Commissioner Alexis
Canonizado, denied due course to the petitioners appeal
and petition for review for lack of jurisdiction it appearing

x x x that both the Decision and the Resolution of the

Regional Appellate Board had long become final and
executory and there being no showing that the RAB failed
to decide respondents appeal within the reglementary
period of sixty (60) days.
The Office of the Solicitor General seeks to dismiss this
petition on the ground of prematurity because the
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies; they
should have instead appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) pursuant to Section 47, Chapter 6,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 (E.O. No. 292), which vests upon the CSC appellate
jurisdiction over disciplinary cases of government
personnel where the penalty imposed is, inter alia,
dismissal from office.
ISSUE: WON dismissal on the ground of prematurity
because the petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies is proper?
HELD: The plea of the Office of the Solicitor General that
the instant action is premature for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is thus untenable. We would
have sustained it if the Secretary of the DILG was the one
who denied due course to or dismissed the appeal of
petitioner Cabada and the petition for review of petitioner
De Guzman. By then, pursuant to Section 91 of the DILG
Act of 1990; Section 47, Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Title I,
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987; and Sections
31 and 32 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
Executive Order No. 292, the appeal would have to be
filed with the CSC. And futile would be the petitioners
claim in their Reply to the Comment of the OSG that their
case falls within the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

dalites and co v sucaldito 186 scra 704

NFA v CA 253 scra 470
gravador v mamingo 20 scra 742
Almine v ca 177 scra 796
UP board of regents vs razul 200 scra 685
arrow transport corp v board of t 63 scra 193

30. cojuangco v pcgg 190 scra 226

31. Santiago jr. v bautista 32 scra 188
32. smart comm v ntc gr no 151908 august 23,
2003
33. guerzon v ca 164 scra 182
34. antipolo realty v nha 135 scra 399
35. bantolino v coca-cola bottlers gr 153660 june
10, 2003
36. first lepanto ceramics v ca 237 scra 519
37. villa lazaro v 189 scra 34
38. paterok v bureau of customs 193 scra 132
39. lumigued v exevea gr no 117565 nov 18 1997