1 of 24

G.R. No. L-24740 July 30, 1979

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO C. JUAN and ANA TANSECO JUAN, defendants-appellants.
Celestino C. Juan &, Associates for appellants.
Solicitor General's Office for the appellee.
FACTS:
Appeal by defendants-appellants from the decision dated September 28, 1964 of
the Court of First Instance of La Union in Civil Case No. 1835 for the
expropriation of 338.7480 hectares of land owned by spouses Celestino C. Juan
and Ana Tanseco as the site for the La Union Regional Agricultural School,
directing the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines tot.hqw
... pay the legal owners Celestino C. Juan and Ana Tanseco the amount of
P190,000.00 which is the just and reasonable compensation that the Court rules
in this case in favor of the defendants; and it appearing that on May 7, 1963,
P100,000.00 had already been paid, it is therefore ordered that upon this
decision becoming final the balance of P90,000.00 plus interest of 6% from May
4, 1963 shall be paid to defendants Celestino C. Juan and Ana Tanseco," aside
from the costs of the suit.
Before the institution of the expropriation proceedings Victor Luis, who was
appointed principal of the proposed school, recommended the property of
defendants as the school site. Thereafter, together with Mrs. Avelina L. Osias, he
negotiated with the defendants for the purchase of their property (pp. 85-87,
ROA, Vol. 1, rec.). On January 25, 1963, he wrote a letter to defendant Celestino
Juan, thus
Purchase price: 170k. Dp of 90k and remaining within a year,
On May 4, 1963, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines took possession and
occupied the lots under expropriation (p. 86, ROA, Vol. I, rec.) and deposited on
May 7, 1963 the amount of P100,000.00 which the appellants withdrew that
same day.
On May 7, 1963, defendants filed two simultaneous pleadings: motion for
reconsideration of the provisional value on the ground that the value fixed by the
court is still inadequate; and a motion to dismiss which likewise embodied
defendants' answer to the complaint for expropriation (pp. 46-66, ROA, Vol. I,
rec.).
In an order dated June 13, 1963, the court denied the motion to dismiss of
defendants for lack of merit (p. 66, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
In order dated January 8, 1964, the trial court directed the condemnation of the
property,t.hqw

it appearing that the plaintiff has already deposited the amount of P100,000.00
the provisional value of the property sought to be condemned, which amount has
already been withdrawn by the defendants and the property accordingly turned
over to the Republic of the Philippines for the use of the La Union Agricultural
School, ..."
On June 29, 1964, Atty. Eufemio Molina, commissioner for plaintiff, filed his
report dated June 25, 1964 (pp. 69-78, ROA, Vol. I, rec.) recommendingt.
hqw
... that the value of the land of defendants to be taken as the site of the La Union
Agricultural School at Sapilang, Bacnotan, La Union, be fixed at P135,000.00.
which amount is the meeting point between the government's offer of
P100,000.00 and the defendants' price of P170,000.00.
ISSUE:
Under their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the propriety of the
expropriation and the manner in which it was conducted were in dispute
throughout the proceedings in the trial court and that they never waived their
objections thereto; that the conditions precedent as provided for by Executive
Order No. 132, series of 1937, as amended, were not complied with, for no
proper and valid negotiation to purchase the lots or to have it donated to the
Government was undertaken by the State before the institution of the
expropriation case in court; and that the resolution of the Appraisal Committee
which was the basis of the amount alleged in the complaint as the fair market
value of the lots to be expropriated was null and void, having been adopted
contrary to legal requirements (pp. 24-46, Appellants' Brief: p. 11. Vol. II. rec.).
RULING:
To begin with, it must be emphasized that plaintiff-appellee in this instant case is
the Republic of the Philippines which is exercising its right of eminent domain
inherent in it as a body sovereign. In the exercise of his sovereign right the state
is not subject to any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution
which are: first, the taking must be for a public use; secondly, the payment
of just compensation must be made; and thirdly, due process must be
observed in the taking. Beyond these conditions, the exercise by the State of
its right of eminent domain is subject to no restraint.
Section 64(h) of the Revised Administrative Code confers upon the Chief
Executive the power to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to
exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines
and to direct the Solicitor General to cause the filing of the appropriate
condemnation proceedings in court. By this grant, the executive authorities may
then decide whether the power will be invoked and to what extent (see pp.

2 of 24

87-89, Political Law of the Philippines, Ta;ada and Carreon, 1962 ed., citing
Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550).
Appellants in making their first assignment of error are under the wrong
impression that the provisions of Executive Order No. 132 are conditions
precedent to the valid exercise of the State of its right of eminent domain.
Moreover, there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of
Executive Order No. 132; because negotiations for the purchase of the parcels
were conducted between Victor Luis, the principal of the proposed agricultural
school, and Mrs. Avelina L. Osias on one hand, and the defendants-appellants
on the other, which did not result in a voluntary sale by the defendants-appellants
for lack of agreement on the just compensation for the parcels.
There can be no debate that due process was observed in the instant case.
Likewise, education is public use or public purpose. Republic Act No. 2692
expressly authorizes the establishment of the La Union Regional Agricultural
School within the Province of La Union and the acquisition of a suitable site
therefor. The inadvertent omission of the term Regional in the complaint for
expropriation could not nullify the expropriation of the lands of defendantsappellants. Such error in the complaint does not amend the law and can easily
be corrected without affecting the validity of the proceedings.
II
The valuation of the lots must be fair and just, not only to the owner but also to
the taxpayers who are to pay for it. Appellants are entitled to receive only the
value of what they have been deprived of, and no more; because to award them
less, would be unjust to them, and to award them more, would be unjust to the
public (27 Am. Jur., 2nd s 266, footnote 17 pp. 52- 53).
and after considering some factors, like the fact that the lots are titled, said
commissioner finally recommended "the amount of P1,407,856.00, the same to
bear interest at the legal rate from the date of possession by the plaintiff to the
date the amount is actually Mr. Luis Victor, principal of the La Union Regional
Agricultural School, testified that there were around 30 fruit-bearing mango trees,
once coconut fruit-bearing trees and banana plants
It is argued that appellants judicial admission of P300,000.00 as the provisional
value of their lots, should not bind them, because said admission refers only to
the provisional value of the said lots and not as an admission of the actual - fair
and just - value of the lots. The provisional value fixed by the Court pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is the provisional value that does not
bind the land-owners. But when the landowner himself fixes the provisional
value, he should abide thereby in obedience to the rule that admissions in
pleadings bind the party making them.

Section 2 of Rule 67, New Rules of Court reads:t.hqw

Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with the National or Provincial Treasurer
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have
the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real or personal property
involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial Treasurer its value, as
provisionality and promptly ascertained and fixed by the Court having jurisdiction
of the proceedings, to be held by such treasurer subject to the orders and final
disposition o)f the court
Rule 69, Section 3 of the Old Rules of Court under which the present case was
filed contained a similar provision. (See also Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus. 40
Phil. 550-556 [1919] and Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes (31 Phil. 118-142
[1915]).
For emphasis, We repeat that the price of P300,000.00 was the provisional value
fixed not by the trial court, but by the defendants-appellants as owners in their
motion for reconsideration filed on April 24, 1963. The provisional value fixed by
the trial court in its order of April 15, 1963, was only P90,793.70, the
reconsideration of which the owners sought from the trial court. In its order of
April 26, 1963, the trial court fixed the provisional value of P100,000.00. The trial
court, in its challenged decision of September 28, 1964, finally fixed the value at
P190,000.00, which is still more than double the alleged capital investment of
P90,000.00 allegedly paid by the owners for the purchase of the property,
levelling and expenses for survey and titling of the property from 1957 to 1959. In
his own letter of January 28, 1963, where he fixed his selling price at
P170,000.00 net to him (plus P20,000.00 bank mortgage on the property),
defendant-appellant Celestino, Juan stated that the best offer he had for the
property was only P200,000.00.
While it may be true that the value provisionally fixed by the trial court "... does
not necessarily represent the true and correct value of the land ..." it is equally
true that the said amount provisionally fixed may yet turn out to be the true and
correct value of the lots approximating the "just compensation" requirement of
the Constitution. In fact, the same may also turn out to be more than the true and
correct value of the property condemned by the government (see 27 AM JUR
2nd 111, footnote 16).
Furthermore, it can be justifiably inferred that when appellants themselves
proposed on April 24, 1963 the amount of P300,000.00 as the provisional value
of their lots, they were referring actually to the highest value their lots could
command at that time, notwithstanding their very speculative and extravagant
claim in the same pleading (where they made the P300,000.00 proposal) that the
"fair market value of (the) property should at least be fifty centavos . . per square
meter or P5,000.00 per hectare.
It must be pointed out that the most reliable pieces of evidence in the records
relative to the just compensation to be paid herein appellants are those

3 of 24

hereinbefore enumerated, namely, appellants' own evaluation in 1963, the

acquisition cost the tax assessment. This is so because the Committee failed to
arrive at an acceptable valuation, not to mention the fact that the individual
reports of the commissioners of the Appraisal Committee did not undergo the
indispensable requirement of hearing before the trial court. It must be herein
stressed that almost all the evidence enumerated earlier are in the nature of
admissions by the owner, which kind of evidence under existing jurisprudence
occupies a preferred position in the realm of proof of just compensation and
valuation in eminent domain.
Even the purchase price of P50,000.00 paid in 1956 or 1957 by appellants for
the lots sought to be condemned in 1963 is generally held admissible as
evidence of the lots' fair market value, unless such purchase is too remote in
point of time from the condemnation proceedings or more special consideration
induced the sale at less than the true market value (29-A C.J.S. 1203-04).
Similarly, the assessed valuation of land made by tax assessors when required
by the law, and the owner's own valuation may be considered together with other
proofs in the determination of the just value of the lots condemned (29-A C.J.S.
1201-1202).
As aforestated, appellants paid realty taxes on the property on the basis of an
assessed valuation of only P42,120.00, with improvements worth only
P1,712.00. On January 28, 1963, appellants' offer was P190,000.00, then
P300,000.00 on April 24, 1963, as provisional value, after extravagantly claiming
that the property is worth the fantabulous price of at least P5,000.00 per hectare
or a total of P1,693,040.00. Not even the irrigated rice lands along the national
highway in Nueva Ecija, the home province of appellants, could command that
price to P5,000.00 per hectare in 1963. And the lands in the case at bar are in La
Union, hilly, and away from the national highway without direct access to any
feeder road.
In our jurisdiction, the statement of the value of his property by the owner in the
tax declaration shall, since 1940 under C.A. No. 530, constitute prima facie
evidence of the real value of the property in expropriation proceedings by the
Government and its instrumentalities.
The presence of the houses of twenty-three (23) tenants in a 4-hectare area at
the time the government took possession of the lots herein involved, is not
sufficient proof of that portion's potentialitv for conversion into a residential
subdivision, much less of the whole parcel of about 338 hectares. There was no
evidence that the houses of the tenants were there constructed because of its
residential nature. In all likelihood, the tenants were forced by necessity to
construct their Rouses therein to be close to their respective tobacco farms. The
fact that under the leasehold system of land tenure, a tenant is allotted a portion
for his dwelling does not render the entire landholding no longer agricultural and
thereby convert the same into a residential land.

WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY MODIFIED

AND THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS
HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS CELESTINO
C. JUAN AND ANA TANSECO THE SUM OF TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P200,000.00) PESOS, WITH INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE OF SIX
PERCENT (6%) PER ANNUM FROM MAY 1, 1963. NO COSTS.
Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.1wph1.t

UNCHUAN vs. LOZADA

(G.R. No. 172671,April 16, 2009)
FACTS:
Sisters Anita Lozada Slaughter and Peregrina Lozada Saribay were the
registered co-owners of 2 lots in Cebu City.
The sisters, who were based in the United States, sold the lots to their
nephew Antonio J.P. Lozada under a Deed of Sale. Armed with a Special
Power of Attorney from Anita, Peregrina went to the house of their brother,
Dr. Antonio Lozada (Dr. Lozada), Dr. Lozada agreed to advance the
purchase price of US$367,000 or P10,000,000 for Antonio, his nephew. The
Deed of Sale was later notarized and authenticated at the Philippine
Consuls Office and new TCTs were issued in the name of Antonio Lozada.
Pending registration of the deed, petitioner Marissa R. Unchuan caused the
annotation of an adverse claim on the lots. Marissa claimed that Anita
donated an undivided share in the lots to her under an unregistered Deed
of DonationAntonio and Anita brought a case against Marissa for quieting
of title with application for preliminary injunction and restraining order.
Marissa filed an action to declare the Deed of Sale void and to cancel the
new TCTs.
At the trial, respondents presented a notarized and duly authenticated
sworn statement, and a videotape where Anita denied having donated land
in favor of Marissa. In a Decision dated June 9, 1997, RTC disposed of the
consolidated cases, ruling among others that:
1. Plaintiff Antonio J.P. Lozada is declared the absolute owner of the
properties in question;
2. Defendant Marissa R. Unchuan is ordered to pay Antonio J.P. Lozada and
Anita Lozada damages.
On motion for reconsideration by petitioner, the RTC issued an Order dated
April 5, 1999. Said order declared the Deed of Sale void, ordered the
cancellation of the new TCTs in Antonios name, and directed Antonio to
pay Marissa damages, P100,000 attorneys fees and P50,000 for expenses
of litigation.

4 of 24

Respondents moved for reconsideration. On July 6, 2000, Presiding Judge,

the RTC reinstated the Decision dated June 9, 1997, but with the
modification that the award of damages, and attorneys were disallowed.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 23, 2006 the
appellate court affirmed with modification the July 6, 2000 Order of the
RTC.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the deed of donation executed in favor of the
petitioner is void.
2.
Whether or not videotaped statement is hearsay.
RULING:
1.
NO. When the law requires that a contract be in some form in order that it
may be valid or enforceable, or that a contract be proved in a certain way,
that requirement is absolute and indispensable. Pertinent to this, the Rules
require a party producing a document as genuine which has been altered
and appears to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to
the question in dispute, to account for the alteration. He may show that the
alteration was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with
the consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or
language of the instrument. If he fails to do that, the document shall, as in
this case, not be admissible in evidence.
2.
NO. Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in
part, on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to be produced. There are three reasons for
excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence
of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of oath. It is a hornbook doctrine
that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its maker did not take
the witness stand. Verily, the sworn statement of Anita was of this kind
because she did not appear in court to affirm her averments therein. Yet, a
more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they
do not cover admissions of a party; the videotaped statement of Anita
appears to belong to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130 provides that "the
act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are
admissible even if they are hearsay. Indeed, there is a vital distinction
between admissions against interest and declaration against interest.
Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by
one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.
Declaration against interest are those made by a person who is neither a
party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence and
constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when

the declarant is unavailable as a witness. Thus, a mans acts, conduct, and

declaration, wherever made, if voluntary, are admissible against him, for
the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth, and
it is his fault if they do not. However, as a further qualification, object
evidence, such as the videotape in this case, must be authenticated by a
special testimony showing that it was a faithful reproduction. Lacking this,
we are constrained to exclude as evidence the videotaped statement of
Anita. Even so, this does not detract from our conclusion concerning
petitioners failure to prove, by preponderant evidence, any right to the
lands subject of this case.
G. R. No. 153699 August 22, 2005 CIRSE FRANCISCO "CHOY" TORRALBA,
Petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
1.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 promulgated on

22 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 24818 which
affirmed, with modification, the trial courts2 decision finding petitioner
Cirse Francisco "Choy" Torralba guilty of the crime of libel in Criminal
Case No. 9107
"THESE HONTANOSAS, AGAPITO HONTANOSAS AND CASTOR
HONTANOSAS, ARE COLLABORATORS DURING THE WAR. IN
OTHER WORDS, THEY ARE TRAITORS TO THE LAND OF THEIR
BIRTH." X X X. "THE FATHER OF MANOLING HONTANOSAS HAD
TREACHEROUS BLOOD," and other words of similar import, thereby
maliciously exposing the family of the late Judge Agapito Hontanosas
including Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas,3 one of the legitimate children of
[the] late CFI Judge Agapito Y. Hontanosas to public hatred, dishonor,
discredit, contempt and ridicule causing the latter to suffer social
humiliation, embarrassment, wounded feelings and mental anguish, to
the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Manuel L. Hontanosas in the
amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
n its order dated 25 May 1998,7 the motion for consolidation filed by
petitioner Torralba was granted by the RTC, Branch 1, Tagbilaran City.

During the trial on the merits of the consolidated cases, the prosecution
presented as witnesses Segundo Lim, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas, and
Gabriel Sarmiento.
Lim testified that he was one of the incorporators of the Tagbilaran Maritime
Services, Inc. (TMSI) and was at that time the assigned manager of the port in
Tagbilaran City. According to him, sometime during the Marcos administration,

5 of 24

petitioner Torralba sought TMSIs sponsorship of his radio program. This request
was approved by private complainant Atty. Hontanosas who was then the
president of TMSI. During the existence of said sponsorship agreement, the
management of TMSI noticed that petitioner Torralba was persistently attacking
former Bureau of Internal Revenue Deputy Director Tomas Toledo and his
brother Boy Toledo who was a customs collector. Fearing that the Toledos would
think that TMSI was behind the incessant criticisms hurled at them, the
management of TMSI decided to cease sponsoring petitioner Torralbas radio
show. In effect, the TMSI sponsored "Tug-Ani ang Lungsod" for only a month at
the cost of P500.00.
Soon thereafter, petitioner Torralba took on the management of TMSI. Lim
testified that petitioner Torralba accused TMSI of not observing the minimum
wage law and that said corporation was charging higher handling rates than what
it was supposed to collect.
On 17 December 1993, private complainant Atty. Hontanosas went on-air in
petitioner Torralbas radio program to explain the side of TMSI. The day after said
incident, however, petitioner Torralba resumed his assault on TMSI and its
management. It was petitioner Torralbas relentless badgering of TMSI which
allegedly prompted Lim to tape record petitioner Torralbas radio broadcasts.
Three of the tape recordings were introduced in evidence by the prosecution, to
wit:
Exhibit B - tape recording of 19 January 19948
Exhibit C - tape recording of 25 January 19949
Exhibit D - tape recording of 11 April 199410

2. It is generally held that sound recording is not inadmissible because of

its form where a proper foundation has been laid to guarantee the
genuineness of the recording. In our jurisdiction, it is a rudimentary rule
of evidence that before a tape recording is admissible in evidence and
given probative value, the following requisites must first be established,
to wit:
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony;
(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent;
(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the recording; (4)
a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made; (5)
a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording;
(6) identification of the speakers; and
(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without
any kind of inducement.
3.

In one case, it was held that the testimony of the operator of the
recording device as regards its operation, his method of operating it, the
accuracy of the recordings, and the identities of the persons speaking

laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the recordings. Likewise,

a witness declaration that the sound recording represents a true
portrayal of the voices contained therein satisfies the requirement of
authentication.28 The party seeking the introduction in evidence of a
tape recording bears the burden of going forth with sufficient evidence to
show that the recording is an accurate reproduction of the conversation
recorded.
These requisites were laid down precisely to address the criticism of
susceptibility to tampering of tape recordings. Thus, it was held that the
establishment of a proper foundation for the admission of a recording
provided adequate assurance that proper safeguards were observed for
the preservation of the recording and for its protection against tampering
4.

In the case at bar, one can easily discern that the proper foundation for
the admissibility of the tape recording was not adhered to. It bears
stressing that Lim categorically admitted in the witness stand that he was
not familiar at all with the process of tape recording and that he had to
instruct his adopted daughter to record petitioner Torralbas radio
broadcasts

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS, COURT OF

APPEALS, Complainant, vs.
CIELITO M. SALUD, CLERK IV, COURT OF APPEALS, Respondent.
A.M. No. CA-05-20-P; September 9, 2005
Facts:
Respondent is charged and held liable for offenses on inefficiency and
incompetence of official duty; conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service; and directly and indirectly having financial and material interest in an
official transaction considering his undue interest in the service of the order of
release and actual release of Melchor Lagua.
Lagua was found guilty of homicide and was then detained at the Bureau of
Prisons National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa City. Laguas petition for bond was
approved in a Resolution where the appellate court directed the issuance of an
order of release in favor of Lagua. The resolution was brought to the office of
Atty. Madarang, Division Clerk of Court, for promulgation.
Respondent served the resolution and order of release of Lagua at the National
Penitentiary, where Lagua was detained for homicide.
Meanwhile, Atty. Madarang received a call from a certain Melissa Melchor, who
introduced herself as Laguas relative, asking how much more they had to give to
facilitate Laguas provisional liberty, and that they sought the help of a certain

6 of 24

Rhodora Valdez of RTC Pasig, but was told that they still had a balance. When
Atty. Madarang was able to get the mobile number of respondent, he
represented himself as Laguas relative and exchanged text messages with said
respondent for a possible pay-off for the Laguas provisional liberty. Atty.
Madarang later discovered that the respondent did not properly serve the copies
of the Resolution and Order of Release upon the accused-appellant and his
counsel. but gave them to a certain Art Baluran, allegedly Laguas relative.
Later on, Complainant called the respondent to her office. When confronted, the
respondent denied extorting or receiving money for Laguas release, or in any
other case. He, however, admitted serving the copies of resolution and order of
release intended for Lagua and his counsel to Art Baluran. Complainant then
lodged the complaint against the respondent in a Letter dated November 14,
2003.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of text messages as evidence constitutes a
violation of right to privacy of the accused?
Held:
No. The respondents claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence
against him constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text
messages have been classified as ephemeral electronic communication under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and shall be proven by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge thereof. Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is
now moot and academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel,
already admitted that he was the sender of the first three messages on Atty.
Madarangs cell phone.
This was also the ruling of the Court in the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira
Cruz-Apao. In that case, the Court, in finding the respondent therein guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the
complainant asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a
case pending before the CA. The Court had the occasion to state:
The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same
are now covered by Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
which provides:
Ephemeral electronic communication refers to telephone conversations, text
messages and other electronic forms of communication the evidence of which
is not recorded or retained.

Torres v PAGCOR

Facts: Petitioner, slot machine operator, was made the subject of an

investigation in PAGCOR. The scheme of CMR padding was discovered, which
was committed by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot
machine or adding a digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot
machine with an actual CMR of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the
amount of either P50,000.00 or P35,000.00.5 Based on the CIU's investigation of
all the CMR receipts and slot machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the
months of February and March 2007, the CIU identified the members of the
syndicate who were responsible for such CMR padding, which included herein
petitioner. Petitioner was charged with dishonesty, serious misconduct, fraud and
violation of office rules and regulations which were considered grave offenses
where the penalty imposable is dismissal. He was dismissed by the CSC, which
was affirmed by the CA on the ground that his appeal was filed out of time.
Issue: Whether petitioner failed to appeal timely.
Held: A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal
delivery. When a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be
deemed filed on the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be
attached to the records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal
delivery, the motion is deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper
office. And the movant has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to
file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal therefrom. Petitioner received a
copy of the letter/notice of dismissal on August 4, 2007; thus, the motion for
reconsideration should have been submitted either by mail or by personal
delivery on or before August 19, 2007. However, records do not show that
petitioner had filed his motion for reconsideration. In fact, the CSC found that the
non-receipt of petitioner's letter reconsideration was duly supported by
certifications issued by PAGCOR employees. Even assuming arguendo that
petitioner indeed submitted a letter reconsideration which he claims was sent
through a facsimile transmission, such letter reconsideration did not toll the
period to appeal. The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration is not
sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
The motion for reconsideration may be filed only in two ways, either by mail or
personal delivery. A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at
best, an exact copy preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original,
there is no way of determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is
genuine and authentic and was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It
may, in fact, be a sham pleading.

IBM Phil Inc v NLRC

This is a petition or certiorari to set aside the decision, 1 dated April 15, 1994, of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) finding private respondent to

7 of 24

have been illegally dismissed and ordering his reinstatement and the payment of
his wages from August 1991 until he is reinstated.
n April 1, 1975, private respondent Angel D. Israel commenced employment with
IBM as Office Products Customer Engineer. For the next sixteen (16) years, he
occupied two other positions in the company, 2 received numerous award, 3 and
represented the company in various seminars and conferences in and out of the
country. 4
On February 1, 1990, private respondent was assigned to the team supervised
by petitioner Reyes.
On June 27, 1991, petitioner Reyes handed a letter to private respondent
informing the latter that his employment in the company was to be terminated
effective July 31, 1991 on the ground of habitual tardiness and absenteeism.
Alleging that his dismissal was without just cause and due process, private
respondent filed a complaint with the Arbitration Branch of the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) on July 18, 1991.
In his position paper filed on September 6, 1991, he claimed that he was not
given the opportunity to be heard and that he was summarily dismissed from
employment based on charges which had not been duly proven. 5
Petitioners denied private respondent's claims. It was alleged that several
conferences were held by the management with private respondent because of
the latter's unsatisfactory performance in the company and he was given
sufficient warning and opportunity to "reform and improve his attitude toward
attendance,
Attached to petitioners' position paper were copies of print-outs of alleged
computer entries/messages sent by petitioner Reyes to private respondent
through IBM's internal computer system. The following is a summary of the
contents of the print-ours which mostly came from petitioner Reyes' computer:
(a) Private respondent was admonished when he would miss out on meetings
with clients and failed to attend to important accounts, such as that of Hella
Philippines; 9
(b) Petitioner Reyes conducted consultations with private respondent concerning
the latter's work habits; 10
(c) A new policy of requiring employees to be at the office at 8:30 a.m. every
morning was adopted and employers were no longer allowed to sign out of the
office by phone; 11
(d) Petitioner Reyes would type into his computer the records of the security
guard which reflect private respondent's daily tardiness and frequent absences;
12

(e) Private respondent was admonished when he failed to respond to instructions

from his superiors; 13

(f) IBM Australia, contacted by Hella Australia, once asked about the reported
lack of attention given to Hella Philippines. 14
(g) The said response was denied by Hella Australia which later made it clear
that it would be buying "anything but IBM"; 16 and
(h) While private respondent showed some improvement after consultations
where he allegedly admitted his shortcomings, petitioner Reyes reported that he
(private respondent) would eventually slide back to his old ways despite constant
counselling and repeated warnings that he would be terminated if he would not
improve his work habits.
LA- IBM not guilty of illegal dismissal but ordered to pay separation pay.
It appears, however, that prior to the release of the labor arbiter's decision at
11:21 a.m. on March 26, 1992, private respondent had filed a "Manifestation And
Motion To Admit Attached New Evidence For The Complainant" which was
received by the Arbitration Branch at 10:58 a.m. of the same day. The evidence
consisted of private respondent's Daily Time Records (DTRs) for the period June
1, 1990 to August 31, 1990 and pay slips for the period January 1990 to June
1991 showing that private respondent did not incur any unexcused absences,
that he was not late on any day within the period and that no deduction was
made from his salary on account of tardiness or absences.
Private respondent appealed to the NLRC which, on April 15, 1994, reversed the
labor arbiter's decision and found private respondent's dismissal illegal. The
NLRC ruled: (1) that the computer print-outs which petitioners presented in
evidence to prove that private respondent's office attendance was poor were
insufficient to show that the latter was guilty of habitual absences and tardiness;
and (2) that private respondent was not heard in his defense before the issuance
of the final notice of dismissal
NLRC- illegall dismissal
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK Of JURISDICTION IN
HOLDING THAT NO JUST CAUSE EXISTS NOR WAS THERE DUE PROCESS
OBSERVED IN THE DISMISSAL OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT BECAUSE
THE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS WHICH PROVE JUST CAUSE AND DUE
PROCESS ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
2. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OR EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT EVEN IF THE COMPUTER PRINTOUTS
WERE ADMISSIBLE, PETITIONER FAILED TO SATISFY DUE PROCESS.
HELD: NO MERIT

8 of 24

It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC are not
bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication of cases. However,
this procedural rule should not be construed as a license to disregard certain
fundamental evidentiary rules. While the rules of evidence prevailing in the courts
of law or equity are not controlling in proceedings before the NLRC, the evidence
presented before it must at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to be
given some probative value. The Statement of Profit and Losses submitted by
Crispa, Inc. to prove its alleged losses, without the accompanying signature of a
certified public accountant or audited by an independent auditor, are nothing but
self-serving documents which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper
devoid of any probative value.
The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford
no assurance of their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of
this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of
authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.
The computer print-outs, which constitute the only evidence of petitioners, afford
no assurance of their authenticity because they are unsigned. The decisions of
this Court, while adhering to a liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some proof of
authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.
Not one of the 18 print-out copies submitted by petitioners was ever signed,
either by the sender or the receiver. There is thus no guarantee that the message
sent was the same message received. As the Solicitor General pointed out, the
messages were transmitted to and received nor by private respondent himself
but his computer. 30
Neither were the print-outs certified or authenticated by any company official who
could properly attest that these came from IBM's computer system or that the
data stored in the system were not and/or could not have been tampered with
before the same were printed out. It is noteworthy that the computer unit and
system in which the contents of the print-outs were stored were in the exclusive
possession and control of petitioners since after private respondent was served
his termination letter, he had no more access to his computer. 31
Second. Even if the computer print-outs were admissible, they would not suffice
to show that private respondent's dismissal was justified.
Petitioners' contention is that private respondent was repeatedly warned through
computer messages for coming in late or not reporting at all to the office during
the period May 1990 June 1991 but he never denied the allegavtions.
Therefore, he must be deemed to have admitted these allegations. 32 But the
burden of proving that the dismissal was for just cause is on petitioners. They
cannot simply rely on any admission by private respondent implied from his
failure to deny the alleged computer messages to him which he denied he had
ever received. On the other hand, private respondent's additional evidence,

consisting of DTRs and reporting pay slips, show that he did not incur unexcused
absences or tardiness or that he suffered deduction in pay on account of such
absences or tardiness.
Indeed, petitioners could have easily proven their allegations by presenting
private respondent's DTRs. Since these were in petitioners' possession, their
non-production thereof raises the presumption that if presented they would be
adverse to petitioners. This is precisely what the best evidence rule guards
against.
The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the
prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and
withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the
presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for fraudulent
purposes which its production would expose and defeat.
Third. Even assuming the charges of habitual tardiness and absenteeism were
true, such offenses do not warrant private respondent's dismissal. He has not
been shown to have ever committed any infraction of company rules during his
sixteen-year stint in the company. Although it is alleged that he failed to attend
important client meetings and gave false representations to a valued client to
cover his tracks, there is no record finding him guilty of such offenses. Dismissal
has always been regarded as the ultimate penalty.
Fourth. The print-outs likewise failed to show that private respondent was
allowed due process before his dismissal.
The law requires an employer to furnish the employee two written notices before
termination of his employment may be ordered. The first notice must inform him
of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, the second
of the employer's decision to dismiss the employee after he has been given the
opportunity to be heard and defend himself. 40
These requirements were not observed in this case. As noted earlier, there is no
evidence that there was an exchange of communication between petitioners and
private respondent regarding the latter's supposed substandard performance.
Private respondent has consistently denied, however, that he was ever advised
of the charges hurled against him.
Fifth. Petitioners allege that the NLRC, after concluding that the evidence
submitted by them were not properly identified or authenticated, should have
remanded the case to the arbiter for "clarificatory" hearing.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITO G.R. No. 172607 April
16, 2009

9 of 24

FACTS: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino
Umanito was found by the RTC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape.The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her
pregnancy and the birth of a child hereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that
fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Court deemed
uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB. With the advance in
genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. The DNA test
result shall be simultaneously disclosed to the parties in Court. The [NBI] is,
therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA test
results.
The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles
and all results or other information obtained from DNA testing and is hereby
ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused has
been acquitted or served his sentence.
The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken
from [AAA], [BBB], and Umanito, to determine whether or not Umanito is the
biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in all
of the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on
the above findings, there is a 99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is
the biological father of BBB. The defense admitted that if the
value of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a
disputable presumption of paternity.
ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB].
RULING: Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently
promulgated New Rules on DNA Evidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has
evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA,
Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months
after the day she said she was raped by Umanito. Disputable presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).The disputable presumption
that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and
overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did not
object to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B"
inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the same.
By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the
rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of
rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.
Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the
conclusions of the lower courts, and that no cause is presented for us to deviate
from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to deny

Umanito

s Motion to Withdraw Appeal.

The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED

SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,

vs.
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO
ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO,
ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ, Respondents.
Facts:
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of the two agricultural
lands of Lantap Property located at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya
and the Murong Property located at Brgy. Murong of the same town which were
subsequently foreclosed and sold to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) due
to their failure to pay the loans in the said bank. But a Deed of Sale was made on
Feb. 26, 1985covering "TCT No. T-62096" (corresponds to Murong property)
without description as to the location of the subject property whether it is in Brgy.
Murong or Brgy.Lantap.
TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong Property
and TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap Property in
favor of RBBI. However, both TCTsdid not specifically state its location whether it
is in Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
RBBI executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of
Marquez and DelaCruz covered by TCT No. T-62836 (corresponds to Lantap
Property) but described being located in Brgy. Murong.DAR issued Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to Marquez and Dela Cruz upon payment of the
purchase price to RBBI.
Nemi Fernandez, husband of ElenitaEspejo, was the tenant of Lantap Property
while Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz were the tenants of the Murong
Property. No evidence that Espejos took possession of Murong Property nor
demanded lease rentals from petioners, Marquez and Dela Cruz.
Espejos filed Complaint on Feb. 10, 1997 before the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya based on the Deed of Sale
indicating that TCT No. T-62096 (referring to Murong Property) was the subject of
theirbuy-back transaction.RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers
appearing on the Deed of Sale and VLTs but was reversed by Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
In appeal, the CA annulled and set aside DARABs decision because in using the
Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the Deed of Sale is the
best evidence as to its contents, particularly the description of the land which
was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is
the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the
property that the respondents repurchased. The additional description in the

10 of 24

VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to
be a mere typographical error.
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 163320 with the Supreme Court but was denied. CAs
decision becomes final and executory. A petition for review on Certiorari was filed
in the SC by Marquez and Dela Cruz.
Issues:
1.
Whether or not the said petition is proper when it raises factual issues.
2.
Whether or not the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to
determine the subject of the contracts.
3.
Whether or not Parol Evidence Rule can be applied in this case.
Ruling:
1.
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the
CAs rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible
under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of
evidence is a legal question that is within the Courts authority to review.Besides,
even if it were a factual question,we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions
to the general rule because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the
case through its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule.
2.
The appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule.
The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other
evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a
general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of
undetected tampering with the document.
There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule in this case
because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents for it is
admitted by the parties that the Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its
subject; while the petitioners VLTs referred to TCT No.T-62836 as its subject.The
real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and
correctly express the true intention of the parties.
Theres an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of
the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve
the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of the instruments.
3.
The CA refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and
rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of the
contracting partiesin which itwould appear that what it actually applied was the
Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides that when the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the
terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors
in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.It excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to
contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or
instrument.

But even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case
at bar.First,respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and
petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9
specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as "between the
parties and their successors-in-interest." The parol evidence rule may not be
invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a
party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the
instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.
Second, the instant casefalls under theexceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule
because there were issues on the intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in
the written agreement; and the failure of the written agreement to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties thereto as provided in the second
paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9.
It was squarely put in issue that the written agreement failed to express the true
intent of the parties which necessitates an examination of the parties respective
parol evidence, in order to determine the true intent of the parties.
It is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to
the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to
the petitioners.
Although the CAs decision had already become final and executory as against
RBBI with the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein
in favor of petitioners is a supervening cause which renders the execution of the
CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.
The SC granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari and declared thatthe Deed
of Sale between respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT
No. T-62836, while the VLTs and CLOAs of the petitioners covered the Murong
property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is
directed to make the necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties in
accordance with this decision.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. IMELDA "IMEE" R. MARCOSMANOTOC, FERDINAND "BONGBONG" R. MARCOS, JR., GREGORIO MA.
ARANETA III, IRENE R. MARCOS-ARANETA, YEUNG CHUN FAN, YEUNG
CHUN HO, YEUNG CHUN KAM, and PANTRANCO EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION (PEA)-PTGWO; G. R. No. 171701; 2-8-12
From a summary of the facts appearing in the Petition, the need for including the
other respondents was made clear. It was therein set forth that on May 21, 1965
the Pirasos, respondents herein, relying on the controlling statute set forth at the
opening of this opinion, sought the reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
LRC Rec. No. 211 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, praying for the
issuance in their favor of title to a parcel of land designated as LRC-SWO-6132
(Lots 140 and 141, Baguio Cadastre) consisting of 290,283 square meters, more

11 of 24

or less, situated in Baguio City. On September 11, 1965, respondent Daisy

Pacnos filed an opposition. She sought in a pleading dated March 14, 1966 to be
allowed to introduce evidence to prove her alleged right to registration of a
portion of the land, consisting of an area of 28,215.52 square meters, subject of
the proceedings. This motion was granted in an order of the respondent Judge
dated May 16, 1966.
1. It is petitioners burden to prove the allegations; the operative act on how and
in what manner must be clearly shown through preponderance of evidence.
The petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of
the documents themselves. It is imperative; therefore, to submit the original
documents that could prove petitioners allegations. Thus, the photocopied
documents are in violation of best evidence rule, which mandates that the
evidence must be the original document itself. Furthermore, petitioner did not
even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the originals were not presented,
or any compelling ground why the court such documents as secondary evidence
absent the affiants testimony.
2.

3.

The presentation of the originals of the aforesaid exhibits is not validly

excepted under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Under Section 3 (d),
when the original document is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, the original thereof need not be
presented. However, all except one of the exhibits are not necessarily
public documents. The transcript of stenographic notes (TSN) of the
proceedings purportedly before the PCGG may be a public document
but what the plaintiff presented was a mere photocopy of the purported
TSN which was not a certified copy and was not even signed by the
stenographer who supposedly took down the proceedings. The Rules
provide that when the original document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office; a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof may prove its contents.

In order that secondary evidence may be admissible, there must be

proof by satisfactory evidence of (1) due execution of the original;
(2) loss, destruction or unavailability of all such originals and
(3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the search for or attempt to
produce the original.
None of the abovementioned requirements were complied by the
plaintiff. Exhibits P, Q, R, S, and T were all photocopies. P, R, and
T were affidavits of persons who did not testify before the Court. Exhibit
S is a letter, which is clearly a private document.
It is emphasized, even if originals of these affidavits were presented,
they would still be considered hearsay evidence if the affiants do not

testify and identify them.Petitioner having failed to observe the best

evidence rule rendered the offered documentary evidence futile and
worthless in alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth insofar as the
specific allegations herein were concerned. Hence, Sandiganbayan is
correct in granting the respondents respective Demurers to evidence.
(Paredes: affidavits are public documents but considered as hearsay
evidence UNLESS affiant is presented before the court)

Estrada vs Desierto
SCRA 108
April 3, 2001
Facts:
Petitioner insists he is the victim of prejudicial publicity. Among others, he assails
the Decision for adverting to newspaper accounts of the events and occurrences
to reach the conclusion that he has resigned. In our Decision, we used the
totality test to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner has resigned. We referred to
and analyzed events that were prior, contemporaneous and posterior to the oathtaking of respondent Arroyo as president. All these events are facts which are
well-established and cannot be refuted.
On January 20, 2001 contemporaneous to the oath taking of respondent Arroyo.
We used the Angara Diary to decipher the intent to resign on the part of the
petitioner. Let it be emphasized that it is not unusual for courts to distill a
persons subjective intent from the evidence before them. Everyday, courts
ascertain intent in criminal cases, in civil law cases involving last wills and
testaments, in commercial cases involving contracts and in other similar cases.
As will be discussed below, the use of the Angara Diary is not prohibited by the
hearsay rule. Petitioner may disagree with some of the inferences arrived at by
the Court from the facts narrated in the Diary but that does not make the Diary
inadmissible as evidence.
Issue:
Whether petitioner can invoke res ipso loquitur rule to resolve the issue of
prejudicial publicity?
Held:
Petitioner pleads that we apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself) to support his argument. Under the res ipsa loquitur
rule in its broad sense, the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the

12 of 24

surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of

negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of
fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. It is not a rule of substantive law
but more a procedural rule. Its mere invocation does not exempt the plaintiff with
the requirement of proof to prove negligence. It merely allows the plaintiff to
present along with the proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an inference or presumption of
negligence and to thereby place on the defendant the burden of going forward
with the proof.

4. Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC. After Tan completed
presenting evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the RTC denied.
RTC further directed MMC to present evidence.

We hold that it is inappropriate to apply the rule on res ipsa loquitur, a rule
usually applied only in tort cases, to the cases at bar. Indeed, there is no court in
the whole world that has applied the res ipsa loquitur rule to resolve the issue of
prejudicial publicity. We again stress that the issue before us is whether the
alleged pervasive publicity of the cases against the petitioner has prejudiced the
minds of the members of the panel of investigators. We reiterate the test we laid
down in People v. Teehankee, to resolve this issue, viz:

6. On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in

charge of MMCs account. De los Santos testified that he delivered the originals
of the invoices and purchase orders to MMCs accounting department. As proof,
he showed three customers acknowledgment receipts bearing the notation:
I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you
for the period and the amount stated below, together with the corresponding
original copies of the invoices, purchase order and requisition slip attached for
purpose of verification, bearing acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods.
7. The RTC ruled for Tan and ordered defendant to pay the principal amount with
interest and liquidated damages. MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion
was denied by the RTC.

The court cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to
impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast
media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair
trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting
enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out , a responsible
press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial
administration, especially in the criminal field. The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by
subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public
scrutiny and criticism.
Manila Mining Corp v Tan
Facts:
1. Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin
Marketing, was engaged in the business of selling electrical materials.
2. Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical
materials from Tan valued at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price
within 30 days from delivery, or be charged interest of 18% per annum, and in
case of suit to collect the same, to pay attorneys fees equal to 25% of the claim.
3. MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated
demands, it failed to give the remaining balance of P1,883,244, which was
covered by nine invoices.

5. MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to
2002. Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a supplier to
present the original sales invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid.
He testified that the absence of stamp marks on the invoices and purchase
orders negated receipt of said documents by MMCs representatives.

8. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision, hence the
present petition for review on certiorari.
9. Petitioner contends, among others, that respondents claim for payment was
premature inasmuch as the original invoices and purchase orders were not sent
to its accounting department. Consequently, Tans claims were not verified and
processed. MMC believes that mere delivery of the goods did not automatically
give rise to its obligation to pay, in light of Article 1545 of the Civil Code, which
provides that, where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject
to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse to proceed with
the contract or he may waive performance of the condition.
10. Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence
presented during trial, claiming that the unauthenticated photocopies of invoices
and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence Rule and that by Tans
failure to yield the original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed
evidence under Section 3(e),15 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
W/N MMC should pay for the electrical materials despite its allegation that Tan
failed to comply with certain requisites for payment
Held:
Yes. Petition denied for lack of merit. Petitioner poses a question of fact which is
beyond this Courts power to review. This Courts jurisdiction is generally limited

13 of 24

to reviewing errors of law that may have been committed by the Court of
Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully established rule that findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with those of
the trial court, are accorded not only respect but even finality, and are binding on
this Court.
In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted offers when Tan supplied
the electrical materials to MMC. Hence, petitioner cannot evade its obligation to
pay by claiming lack of consent to the perfected contracts of sale. The invoices
furnished the details of the transactions.
As regards respondents failure to present the original documents, suffice it to
say that the best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the writing are
directly in issue. Where the existence of the writing or its general purport is all
that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced in proof. MMC did not
deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention was
that Tan did not submit the original copies to facilitate payment. But we are in
agreement that photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to
prove the contract of sale between the parties.

Gaw v Chua
Facts: Spouses Chua Chin and Chan Chi were the founders of 3 business
enterprises: Hagonoy Lumber, Capitol Sawmill Corporation and Columbia Wood
Industries. The couple had 7 children, among them were Concepcion Chua, Suy
Ben Chua and Chua Sioc Huan. Chua Chin died and left his wife and children as
the only surviving heirs.
The surviving heirs executed a Deed of Partition, wherein the heirs settled their
interest in Hagonoy Lumber as follows: to Chan Chi, as her share in the
conjugal partnership; and the other half will be divided among Chan Chi and the
seven children in equal pro indiviso shares. In said document, Chan Chi and the
six children likewise agreed to voluntarily renounce and waive their shares over
Hagonoy Lumber in favor of their co-heir, Chua Sioc Huan.
Petitioner Concepcion Chua Gaw and her husband, Antonio Gaw (Spouses
Gaw), borrowed P200,000 from Suy Ben Chua to be used for the construction of
their house. Suy Ben Chua issued a check for the amount. The parties agreed
that the loan will be payable in 6 months without interest.
Chua Sioc Huan executed a Deed of Sale over all her rights and interests in
Hagonoy Lumber for P255,000 in favor of respondent Suy Ben Chua.
Spouses Gaw failed to pay the amount they borrowed within the designated
period. Suy Ben Chua filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the Spouses
Gaw.

In their Answer, the Spouses Gaw contend that Concepcion asked Suy Ben
Chua for an accounting and payment of her share in the profits of the 3 business
enterprises but Suy Ben Chua persuaded Concepcion to temporarily forego her
demand as it would offend their mother who still wanted to remain in control of
the family businesses. To insure that she will defer her demand, Suy Ben Chua
allegedly gave her P200,000.00 as her share in the profits of Hagonoy Lumber
During trial, Spouses Gaw called Suy Ben Chua to testify as an adverse witness
under Rule 132, Section 10. On cross-examination, Suy Ben Chua explained
that he ceased to be a stockholder of Capitol Sawmill when he sold his shares of
stock to the other stockholders. He further testified that Chua Sioc Huan acquired
Hagonoy Lumber by virtue of a Deed of Partition, executed by the heirs of Chua
Chin. He, in turn, became the owner of Hagonoy Lumber when he bought the
same from Chua Sioc Huan through a Deed of Sale.
On re-direct examination, Suy Ben Chua stated that he sold his shares of stock
in Capitol Sawmill for P254,000.00, which payment he received in cash. He also
paid the purchase price of P255,000.00 for Hagonoy Lumber in cash.
RTC ruled in favor of Suy Ben Chua and ordered Concepcion Gaw (her husband
Antonio had passed away) to pay P200,000. RTC held that the P200,000.00 was
a loan advanced by the Suy Ben Chua from his own funds and not
remunerations for services rendered to Hagonoy Lumber nor Concepcions
advance share in the profits of their parents businesses.
Concepcion appealed to the CA alleging that the TC erred in considering
evidence for Concepcion, Suy Ben Chuas testimony when he was called to
testify as an adverse party.
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. CA found Concepcions argument that the
RTC should not have included respondents Suy Ben Chua as part of petitioner
Concepcions evidence as baseless.
Issue: Whether or not Concepcion was unduly prejudiced when RTC treated Suy
Ben Chuas testimony as adverse witness during cross-examination by his own
counsel as part of Concepcions evidence.
Held: NO. The delineation of a piece of evidence as part of the evidence of one
party or the other is only significant in determining whether the party on whose
shoulders lies the burden of proof was able to meet the quantum of evidence
needed to discharge the burden. In civil cases, the rule is that the plaintiff must
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendants evidence. Preponderance of evidence is determined by considering
all the facts and circumstances of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless
of who actually presented it.

14 of 24
That the witness is the adverse party does not necessarily mean that the calling
party will not be bound by the formers testimony. The fact remains that it was at
his instance that his adversary was put on the witness stand. Under a rule
permitting the impeachment of an adverse witness, although the calling party
does not vouch for the witness veracity, he is nonetheless bound by his
testimony if it is not contradicted or remains unrebutted.
A party who calls his adversary as a witness is, therefore, not bound by the
latters testimony only in the sense that he may contradict him by introducing
other evidence to prove a state of facts contrary to what the witness testifies on.
A rule that provides that the party calling an adverse witness shall not be bound
by his testimony does not mean that such testimony may not be given its proper
weight, but merely that the calling party shall not be precluded from rebutting his
testimony or from impeaching him.
This, Concepcion failed to do as in her own testimony, she failed to discredit the
Suy Ben Chuas testimony on how Hagonoy Lumber became his sole property.
In arriving at a decision, the entirety of the evidence presented will be
considered, regardless of the party who offered them in evidence. The testimony
of an adverse witness is evidence in the case and should be given its proper
weight, and such evidence becomes weightier if the other party fails to impeach
the witness or contradict his testimony.

Aznar v Citibank
EMMANUEL B. AZNAR, Petitioner, vs.
CITIBANK, N.A., (Philippines), Respondent.
G.R. No. 164273; March 28, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is a holder of a credit card and claims that when he presented his
credit card in some establishments in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, the
same was not honored. And when he tried to use the same in Ingtan Tour and
Travel Agency (Ingtan Agency) in Indonesia to purchase plane tickets to Bali, it
was again dishonored for the reason that his card was blacklisted by the
respondent bank.
To prove that respondent blacklisted his credit card, Petitioner presented a
computer print-out, denominated as ON-LINE AUTHORIZATIONS FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, issued to him by Ingtan Agency with the
signature of one Victrina Elnado Nubi which shows that his card in question was
DECL OVERLIMIT or declared over the limit.
The Regional Trial Court rendered its decision dismissing petitioners complaint
for lack of merit. It held that as between the computer print-out presented by

petitioner and the Warning Cancellation Bulletins presented by respondent, the

latter had more weight as their due execution and authenticity was duly
established by respondent.
Upon motion for reconsideration, the decision was reversed. Judge De la
Pea ruled that the computer print-out was printed out by Nubi in the ordinary or
regular course of business in the modern credit card industry and Nubi was not
able to testify as she was in a foreign country and cannot be reached by
subpoena. The same took judicial notice of the practice of automated teller
machines (ATMs) and credit card facilities which readily print out bank account
status, therefore the print-out can be received as prima facie evidence of the
dishonor of petitioners credit card.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the computer print-out is an electronic
document which must be authenticated pursuant to Section 2, Rule 5 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence or under Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court by anyone who saw the document executed or written; Petitioner, however,
failed to prove its authenticity, thus it must be excluded.
Issues:
i.
Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report is an electronic
document?
ii.
Whether or not the On Line Authorization Report constitutes
electronic evidence?
Held:
The petition was denied by the Supreme Court for lack of merit.
Petitioner puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN
ACCOUNT ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to petitioner by
Ingtan Agency, to prove that his credit card was dishonored for being blacklisted.
On said print-out appears the words DECL OVERLIMIT.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently
established by petitioner.
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section
20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
Petitioner, who testified on the authenticity did not actually see the document
executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer printout.
Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on
August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by petitioner in this case, the
authentication of the computer print-out would still be found wanting.
Petitioner claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the
other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. G to the satisfaction
of the judge. The Court is not convinced. Petitioners testimony that the person

15 of 24

from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he
thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient
to show said print-outs integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge
Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. G does not show on its face that it
was issued by Ingtan Agency as petitioner merely mentioned in passing how he
was able to secure the print-out from the agency. Petitioner also failed to show
the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because
while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by petitioner, its business
address was not reflected in the print-out.
Indeed, petitioner failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the
print-out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as
true.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION INCLUDING

PROSECUTION'S EXPERT WITNESSES EVER DECLARED/TESTIFIED THAT
PETITIONER DR. CABUGAO HAD THE DUTY TO PERFORM IMMEDIATE
OPERATION ON RODOLFO PALMA, JR., AND THEY FAILED TO STATE/
SHOW THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF DEATH OF JR WAS ACUTE
APPENDICITIS;
HELD

In a nutshell, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or
not petitioners' conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide, arising from analleged medical malpractice, is supported by the
evidence on record.

Cabugao v People

AS TO DR. YNZON'S LIABILITY:

Petitioner charged of reckless impuridence resulting to homiide

That on or about June 17, 2000in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, DR.
ANTONIO P.CABUGAO and DR. CLENIO YNZON, being then the attending
physicians of one RODOLFO PALMA, JR., a minor 10 years old, confederating
and acting jointly with one another, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail through negligence, carelessness and imprudence to perform
immediate operation upon their patient, RODOLFO PALMA, JR. of acute
appendicitis, when they, the said physicians, should have been done so
considering that examinations conducted upon their patient Rodolfo Palma, Jr.
seriously manifest todo so, causing by such negligence, carelessness, and
imprudence the victim, RODOLFO PALMA JR., to die due to:
"CARDIORESPIRATORY ARREST, METABOLIC ENCEPHALOPATHY,
SEPTICEMIA (ACUTE APPENDICITIS), CEREBRAL ANEURYSM RUPTURED
(?)"
As per Certificate of Death issued by accused Dr. Antonio P. Cabugao, to the
damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased RODOLFO PALMA,
JR. and other consequential damages relative thereto.
No post-mortem examination was conducted on JR. On February 1, 2001, an
Information was filed against accused for reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide. At their arraignment, both accused, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the charge.
RTC and CA found them guilty

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice,

an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precautionon the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.13
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do
an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it
bewithout malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence;
and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.14
With respect to Dr. Ynzon, all the requisites of the offense have been clearly
established by the evidence on record. The court a quoand the appellate court
were one in concluding that Dr. Ynzon failed to observe the required standard of
care expected from doctors.
In the instant case, it was sufficiently established that to prevent certain death, it
was necessary to perform surgery on JR immediately. Even the prosecutions
own expert witness, Dr. Antonio Mateo
Worth noting is that the assigned errors are actually factual in nature, which as a
general rule, findings of factof the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding
and conclusiveupon this Court, and we will not normally disturb such factual
findings unless the findings of the court are palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record or unless the judgment itself is based on misapprehension of
facts. Inthe instant case, we find the need to make certain exception.
Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two things the
fact of the crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the
accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the
crime. Based on the above disquisitions, however, the prosecution failed to prove

16 of 24

these two things. The Court is not convinced with moral certainty that Dr.
Cabugao isguilty of reckless imprudence as the elements thereof were not
proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.
Both the trial court and the appellate court bewail the failure to perform
appendectomy on JR, or the failure to determine the source of infection which
caused the deterioration of JR's condition. However, a review of the records fail
to show that Dr. Cabugao is in any position to perform the required
appendectomy.
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the fact that Dr.
Cabugao is not a surgeon,but a general practitioner specializing in family
medicine;27 thus, even if he wanted to, he cannot do an operation, much less an
appendectomy on JR. It is precisely for this reason why he referred JR to Dr.
Ynzon after he suspected appendicitis.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. ANTONIO P. CABUGAO is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide.
Due to the death of accused Dr. Clenio Ynzon prior to the disposition of this
case, his criminal liability is extinguished; however, his civil liability subsists. A
separate civil action may be filed either against the executor/administrator, or the
estateof Dr. Ynzon, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same
are based.
CITIBANK v Teodoro
Citibank N.A. Mastercard v. Efren Teodoro
Efren Teodoro owns a Citibank credit card and was billed by the company
P191,693.25, inclusive of interest and service charges. After several demands,
Citibank filed a Complaint for collection before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and was transferred to
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati. During trial, Citibank presented several
sales invoices or charge slips, which added up only P24,388.36. The slips were
mere photocopies but due to the fact that the copies appear to bear the
signatures of Teodoro, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his
purchases with the use of the credit card. The MTC ruled in favor of Citibank,
ordering Teodoro to pay the amount of P24,388.36. The RTC affirmed the MTC
decision while the CA reversed, stating that the photocopies of the sales invoices
or charge slips were insufficient to prove any liability on Teodoros part, that while
Citibank was able to prove the existence of the original sales invoices, it failed to
prove the due execution or to account for their loss or unavailability. The

Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA and stated that the original copies
of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation.
Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are
inadmissible because Citibank, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the
exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as
well as the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility
of the photocopies in the absence of the originals, Teodoros obligation
was not established.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to
adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales
invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due
execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the
reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution,
loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be
changed if necessary.
In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was
established by the
photocopies and the testimony of Hernando, the assistant manager who
testified to the
existence and due execution of the invoices. Citibank, however, failed to
prove that the
originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable
diligence and
good faith in searching for them. Indeed, the loss of the originals and
reasonable diligence
in the search for them were conditions that were not met, because the
sales invoices

17 of 24

might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had

requested the

lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence

can be given of

MR of ESHRI denied.
ESHRI appealed to CA.
CA: affirmed the RTC in toto.
Petition to SC by ESHRI.
Edsa Shangri-la argued that BF Corp ought to have laid the basis for the
presentation of the photocopies as secondary evidence before the court
admitted the evidence.
BF claims that it had complied with the laying-the basis requirement. BF
explained that it could not present the original of the documents since
they were in the possession of ESHRI which refused to hand them over
to BF despite requests.

any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other
originals.

ISSUE:

originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently followed

up the request.
Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of
them have been

EDSA SHANGRILA
FACTS: (chronological order)
Edsa Shangila Hotels and Resorts Inc. (ESHRI) contracted with BF Corp. to build
the Edsa Shangri-La Hotel on May 1, 1991.
their construction contract was denominated as Agreement for the
Execution of Builders Work for the EDSA Shangrila Hotel Project.
In the contract, the manner of payment agreed upon was that BF shall
submit a monthly progress billing to ESHRI which would then re-measure
the work accomplished and prepare a Progress Payment Certificate for
that months progress billing.
Since the start of the construction up to June 30, 1992, BF submitted a total of
19 monthly progress reports.
as per records ESHRI paid a total of 85m plus for the progress billings of
1 to 13.
For progress billings 14 to 19, BF claimed that no re-measure was done
by ESHRI and no payments were made.
BF filed a case with the RTC a complaint for collection of sum of money after
several futile attempts to collect from ESHRI.
As part of BFs claims, it submitted photocopies of Progress Billings Nos.
14 to 19.
ESHRI on the other hand alleged over payments for billings 1 to 13 and
also alleged that BF performed inferior work.
RTC: ruled in favor of BF.
24.7m as unpaid construction work; 5.8m as retention sum; legal interest;
3m in moral, exemplary and attorneys fees.
(no reason provided as to why RTC ruled in favor of BF)

Whether or not BF has complied with the laying the basis requirement for the
admission of the photocopies as secondary evidence?
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:
The only actual rule that the term best evidence denotes is the rule requiring
that the original of a writing must, as a general proposition, be produced[17] and
secondary evidence of its contents is not admissible except where the original
cannot be had. Rule 130, Section 3 of the Rules of Court enunciates the best
evidence rule:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a)

When the original has been lost or destroyed, or

cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the
part of the offeror;

(b) When the original is in the custody or under the

control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice; (Emphasis added.)
Complementing the above provision is Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads:
SEC. 6. When original document is in adverse partys
custody or control. If the document is in the custody or under

18 of 24

control of the adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to

produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its
existence, he fails to produce the document, secondary
evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.

Secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument or document refers to

evidence other than the original instrument or document itself. A party may
present secondary evidence of the contents of a writing not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also when it is in the custody or under the control
of the adverse party. In either instance, however, certain explanations must be
given before a party can resort to secondary evidence.
Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1)
the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a
request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded
sufficient time to produce them; and
(4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce
them.
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception
under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130.
3.1 In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and
reception of the photocopies of the original document as secondary
evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original
documents execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the
original documents unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.

GARCIA vda de chua v CA

begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.
On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a
petition for the guardianship and administration over the persons and properties
of the two minors.
Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving
spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper
venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedents death, Davao City
was his residence, hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper
forum. In support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following documents:
(1) photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in
the name of Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of
Davao City; (3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City
indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax
Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent

was stated as married; and, (5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was
married and his residence was Davao City.
Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving
spouse of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender to the estate of the latter
since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.
The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having
proven his status as a wife of the decedent.
Further, the court found that the actual residence of the deceased was Cotabato
City, and even assuming that there was concurrent venue among the Regional
Trial Courts where the decedent had resided, the R.T.C. of Cotabato had already
taken cognizance of the settlement of the decedent's estate to the exclusion of
all others. The pertinent portions of the order read:
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on August 19, 1992, counsel for movant
Antonietta G. Chua presented Exhibits in support of her allegation that she was
the lawful wife of the decedent and that the latter resides in Davao City at the
time of his death. Exh. "1" was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage contract
between the movant and the petitioner. This cannot be admitted in evidence on
the ground of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the best
evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy which the movant cannot
produce. Further, the counsels for petitioner in opposition presented the
following: a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no such
marriage contract was ever registered with them; a letter from Judge Augusto
Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has
not solemnized such alleged marriage. Exhibit "2" through "18" consist among
others of Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua
married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; Residence
Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he was
married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991
filed in Davao City where the status of the decedent was stated as married;
passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and his residence was
Davao City. Petitioner through counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of
Exhibits "2" through "18" if the purpose is to establish the truth of the alleged
marriage between the decedent and Antonietta Garcia. The best evidence they
said is the marriage contract. They do not object to the admission of said exhibit
if the purpose is to show that Davao City was the business residence of the
decedent.
Petitioner through counsels, presented Exhibit "A" through "K" to support her
allegation that the decedent was a resident of Cotabato City; that he died a
bachelor; that he begot two illegitimate children with the petitioner as mother.
Among these exhibits are Income Tax Returns filed in Cotabato City from 1968
through 1979 indicating therein that he was single; birth certificates of the alleged

19 of 24

two illegitimate children of the decedent; Resident Certificates of the decedent

issued in Cotabato City; Registration Certificate of Vehicle of the decedent
showing that his residence is Cotabato City.
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to establish the truth of her
allegation that she was the lawful wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a
valid marriage contract which the movant failed to produce. Transfer Certificates
of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot
prove marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a certification
from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not
registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage
that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she has no
personality to file the subject motion to dismiss.
The Order was appealed to the CA, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.
ISSUE(S): Was petitioner able to prove her marriage to Roberto L. Chua?
HELD: NO
RATIO: No. The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage
contract which petitioner failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded
the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a
violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of
evidence. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and
other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the private
respondent has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned
that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged
to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged
marriage.
People v Tijing
FACTS:
1. Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989 at the clinic of midwife and
registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila, is the youngest among
the six children of the petitioners. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the
laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of
Tondo, Manila.
2. According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch
her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some
marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-

month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let
Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry.
3. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were
gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelitas house but did not find them
there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and
told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three
days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then
complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed
unmoved by her pleas for assistance. Notwithstanding their serious efforts to
look for their missing son, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.
4. Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the
death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and
whose remains were lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time
in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for
the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to
her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named
John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy
despite her demand to do so.
5. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial
court in order to recover their son.
6. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses, namely,
Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that
she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her
clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records.
The second witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas
Lopez, could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was
sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part
against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of
his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him
that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were
not blessed with children.
7. For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She
asserts that at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989,
at the clinic of midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She said the
birth of John Thomas was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas
Lopez, with the local civil registrar of Manila on August 4, 1989.
8. RTC: Concluded that since Angelita and her common-law husband could not
have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an impossibility. It also
held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity. It ruled that
Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who
is the natural child of petitioners.

20 of 24

9. CA: Reversed the decision rendered by the trial court. It expressed its doubts
on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In its view, the evidence adduced by
Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was the mother of the minor.

brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas
admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son.
Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan Lopez, had no
children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had lived with
private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.

ISSUE: WoN the evidence are sufficient to establish that that Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, Jr.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas
Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4,
1989, four months after the alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the
attending physician or midwife in attendance at birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the
parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the local
civil registrar within thirty days after the birth. Significantly, the birth certificate of
the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on
October 31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private
respondent had admitted she is a common-law wife. This false entry puts to
doubt the other data in said birth certificate.

HELD:
RATIO:
1. In this case, the minors identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the
writ sought. Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr.,
claimed by Bienvenida to be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas
Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be her offspring. We must first determine who
between Bienvenida and Angelita is the minors biological mother. Evidence
must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be
distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. Petitioners
must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf the application for the
writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If there is
doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is
made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said
minor.
2. True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative
value of all evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis
of its impugned decision, resolution or order. But since the conclusions of the
Court of Appeals contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the
evidence on the record to determine which findings should be preferred as more
conformable to the evidentiary facts.
3. A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented
by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her
missing son, Edgardo Tijing, Jr.
First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From
her very lips, she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she
underwent ligation at the Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with
Tomas Lopez without the benefit of marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that
ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she offered no evidence she gave birth
to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten years. The midwife who
allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No clinical records, log
book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.
Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is
no longer capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes,
eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged
parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. Needless to
stress, the trial courts conclusion should be given high respect, it having had the
opportunity to observe the physical appearances of the minor and petitioner
concerned.
Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenidas
giving birth to Edgardo Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent,
she presented clinical records consisting of a log book, discharge order and the
signatures of petitioners.
All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed
the son of petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of
said child.
4. A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods
unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the
fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother
and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and
child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually,
as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the

21 of 24

admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the Yes.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
DECISION of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional
Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs against the private respondent.

People v Tandoy
FACTS:
Mario Tandoy was accused feloniously sold eight (8) pieces of dried marijuana
flowering tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana flowering tops and crushed
dried marijuana flowering tops, which are prohibited drug, for and in
consideration of P20.00.
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:
The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A"
which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust
money.
The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:

ISSUE(S): Whether such document was actually executed, or exists, and

therefore the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is
admissible.
HELD: Yes
RATIO:
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution
solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents,
other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not
indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of the
marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the police
officers.
So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had been
submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would
not constitute a fatal omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accusedappellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt.

One of them was the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare,
gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and
there two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked
ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).

He must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit
the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.

The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy.

The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the
subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document
was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or
surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial
evidence is admissible.

The accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the
admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00
bill.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:
This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00
bill marked money which, according to the appellant, is excluded under
the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.
Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an
ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence except in
the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the
subject of inquiry.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the accused-appellant.:
NPC v Codilla

22 of 24

FACTS:
M/V Dibena Win, a vessel owned by private respondent Bangpai Shipping, Co.,
allegedly bumped and damaged petitioners Power Barge 209 which was then
moored at the Cebu International Port.
Petitioner filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against private
respondent Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on
petitioners power barges. The petitioner filed an amended complaint impleading
Wallem Shipping Inc as ship agent as additional defendant. Both defendants filed
a motion to dismissed but were denied.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer
of evidence before the lower court consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with
the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private respondents filed their
respective objections to petitioners formal offer of evidence.
RTC: Public respondent judge issued the assailed order denying the admission
and excluding from the records petitioners Exhibits "A", "C", "D", "E", "H" and its
sub-markings, "I", "J" and its sub-markings, "K", "L", "M" and its sub-markings,
"N" and its sub-markings, "O", "P" and its sub-markings, "Q" and its submarkings, "R" and "S" and its sub-markings. (photocopies of manually signed
letters, cost estimates, standard marine protest, subpoena, incident reports)
Reasoning: The record shows that the plaintiff has been given
every opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or
photocopies of the documents it offered. It never produced the
originals. The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the
photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are
equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of the
Electronic Evidence (Comment to Defendant Wallem Philippines
Objections and Motion to Strike). But as rightly pointed out in
defendant Wallems Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox
copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in
Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence.
CA: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 with before the CA
maintaining that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admissions of its
exhibits and its sub-marking. CA dismissed the petition.
Reasoning: (1) it appears that the pieces of petitioners
documentary evidence which were denied admission by the
respondent judge were not properly identified by any competent
witness, the witness presented did not have personal knowledge
of and participation in the preparation and making of the pieces
of documentary evidence denied admission by respondent
judge; (2) Then another ground for denying admission of
petitioners Exhibits A, C, D, E, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R,
and S by the respondent judge is that said pieces of
documentary evidence were merely photocopies of purported
documents or papers. Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that, when

the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no

evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents
themselves, except in certain cases specifically so enumerated
therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the nonpresentation or non-production of its original documentary
pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners contention: The photocopies offered as formal evidence before the
trial court are the functional equivalent of their original based on its inimitable
interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. Petitioner insists that the
photocopies it presented as documentary evidence actually constitute electronic
evidence based on its own premise that an "electronic document" as defined
under Section 1(h), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence is not limited to
information that is received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically.
Rather, petitioner maintains that an "electronic document" can also refer to other
modes of written expression that is produced electronically, such as photocopies,
as included in the sections catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output, readable
by sight or other means".
ISSUES: (1) WON photocopies are electronic documents as contemplated in
Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence. NO.
Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to
electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered
as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.
(2) WON respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the admissions of its exhibits and its submarking. NO. Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines is
very explicit in providing that, when the subject of inquiry are the contents of
documents, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents
themselves, except in certain cases specifically so enumerated therein, and the
petitioner has not shown that the non-presentation or non-production of its
original documentary pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions.
1) An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of
information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an
obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable
by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or
electronic document.

23 of 24

The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.
This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the
information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented
in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic
document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information
is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, proceFssed, retrieved or produced
electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner
will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the
persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced
electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed
manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded,
transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of
petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic
process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the
Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous,
interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are
not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may
not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the
law.
(2) The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the
best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent
pieces of evidence. Before the onset of liberal rules of discovery, and modern
technique of electronic copying, the best evidence rule was designed to guard
against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and
the withholding of the originals. But the modern justification for the rule has
expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a
central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the
world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of
the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the
concerns addressed by the best evidence rule.

(b) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the
evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public
officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of
which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole."
When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.
The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof:
(a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the
proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine
practices of destruction of documents;
(b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a
reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and
(c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has
been made for the document in the proper place or places.

Moreover, as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies
as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in
accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the abovequoted rule.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a quo denying admissibility
of the photocopies offered by petitioner as documentary evidence.

"SECTION 2. Original writing must be produced; exceptions. There can be no

evidence of a writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the
original writing itself, except in the following cases:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00848, dated 9
November 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;

Magdayao v People

24 of 24

FACTS: (chronological order)

An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22
XXX did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw, issue and
deliver to one RICKY OLVIS, in payment of his obligation to the latter, PNB
Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of SIX HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00), XXX
the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for the prosecution to adduce
its evidence, the petitioner and his counsel were absent.
The prosecution presented the private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who testified on
direct examination that on September 30, 1991, the petitioner drew and issued a
check in the amount of P600,000.00.
the drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason "Drawn Against Insufficient
Funds" stamped on the dorsal portion of the check. Olvis testified that when
informed that his check was dishonored, the petitioner pleaded for time to pay
the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis then filed a criminal
complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on September 4,
1992, docketed as I.S. No. 92-368.
The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by
retrieving the dishonored check and replacing the same with two other checks:
one for P400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00 payable to Olvis. Taking pity
on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the original copy of the check to
the petitioner, but the latter again failed to make good on his promise and failed
to pay the P600,000.00.
The prosecution moved that such direct examination of Olvis be continued on
another date, and that the petitioner be ordered to appear before the court so
that he could be identified as the drawer of the subject check. The trial court
granted the motion and set the continuation of the trial on June 13, 1997. In the
meantime, the prosecution marked a photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 as
Exhibit "A," and the dorsal portion thereof as Exhibit "A-1."
After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he and his counsel
failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial
The prosecution offered in evidence the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967,
which the court admitted The trial court, thereafter, issued an Order declaring the
case submitted for decision. The petitioner filed a

motion for a reconsideration of the Order, which the trial court denied on January
26, 1996.
The petitioner then filed an Omnibus Supplemental Motion and to Allow Him to
Adduce Evidence alleging, inter alia, that:
h) Despite the absence of the original, with only a xerox copy of the PNB Check
worth P600,000.00, and further stressing that the same was paid, the prosecutor
insisted, against the vigorous objection of accused, in filing the case in Court
In its Opposition to the said motion, the prosecution averred that it dispensed
with the presentation of the