Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Hodges
G.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No. 12, Official Gazette 5374
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to sell a lot with an area of
278 square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms and conditions. The agreement called for a down
payment of P 800.00 and monthly installments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P 2,085 is
paid in full. In case of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly payment within 60 days after it fell due,
the contract may be considered as rescinded or annulled.
Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installment.
Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera.
The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied upon all rights,
interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale, Laderas house was sold to Avelino
A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased the house from Magno.
Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgment was rendered in favor of
Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39, Rules of Court regarding judicial sales of real
property. On appeal, Hodges contends that the house, being built on a lot owned by another, should be
regarded as movable or personal property.
ISSUE: Whether or not Laderas house is an immovable property.
HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the
following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any
distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession
regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said
accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.
merely incidentalsacquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its
service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on,
without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair
or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another.
considered as personal properties. Clearly then, petitioners were estopped from denying the characterization
of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subject of the writ of
seizure. Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
FACTS: On January 18, 1993, NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel engine
power barges moored at Balayan Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract staes that NPC shall be responsible
for the payment of all taxes other levies imposed government to which POLAR may be or become subject to
in respect of the Power Barges. Subsequently, Polar Energy, Inc. assigned its rights under the agreement to
FELS Energy Inc.
On August 7, 1995, FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from Provincial
Assessor of Batangas City. The assessed tax amounted to P56,184,088.40 per annum. FELS referred the
matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the agreement to pay all real estate taxes. NPC sought
reconsideration of the Provincial Assessors decision to assess real property taxes on the power barges,
alleging that barges are non-taxable items. In its answer, the Provincial Assessor averred that the barges
were real property for purposes of taxation under Section 199(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160.
ISSUE: Whether power barges, which are floating and movable, are personal properties and therefore, not
subject to real property tax.
HELD: NO. The power barges are real property and are thus subject to real property tax. Tax assessments by
tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of proving
otherwise. Besides, factual findings of administrative bodies, which have acquired expertise in their field, are
generally binding and conclusive upon the Court.
HELD: No. Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others,
anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom
without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit this description. It could
be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously,
the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or
dismantling of other fasteners.
Laurel v. Garcia
G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797
Gutierrez, J.
FACTS: In view of the Reparations Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, four properties located in
Japan were given to the Philippines. One of these properties is the Roppongi property. The said property was
formerly the location of the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy until it was transferred to Nampeidai on July
22, 1976. The Roppongi property has remained abandoned from the time of the transfer due to lack of funds
to develop the said property. Consequently, Administrative orders were issued by the President authorizing
the study of the condition of the properties of the Philippines in Japan. Subsequently, Executive Order 296
was issued by President Aquino allowing non-Filipinos to buy or lease some of the properties of the Philippines
located in Japan, including Roppongi.
Petitioners now contend that the Roppongi property cannot be alienated as it is classified as public dominion
and not of private ownership because it is a property intended for public service under paragraph 2, article
420 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondents aver that it has already become part of the patrimonial
property of the State which can be alienated because it has not been used for public service for over 13 years.
They further contend that EO 296 converted the subject property to patrimonial property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property still forms part of the public dominion hence cannot be
disposed nor alienated.
HELD: Yes. The respondents failed to convincingly show that the property has already become patrimonial.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not
automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Under Art. 422 of the Civil Code, there must be a definite and
a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being public. Abandonment must be a
certain and a positive act based on correct legal premises. The mere transfer of the embassy to Nampeidai is
not a relinquishment of the propertys original purpose.
The Administrative orders authorizing the study of the conditions of government properties in Japan were
merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
Likewise, EO 296 did not declare that the properties lost their public character; it merely made them available
to foreigners in case of sale, lease or other disposition. Thus, since there is no law authorizing its conveyance,
the Roppongi property still remains part of the inalienable properties of the State.
Rabuco v. Villegas
G.R. No. L-24916, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 658
Teehankee, J.
FACTS: The issue in this case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 whereby the Congress
converted the lots in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate that are reserved as communal
property into disposable or alienable lands of the State. Such lands are to be placed under the administration
and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square
meters per lot for sale on instalment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and expressly
prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under Section 2 of the Act. Respondent contends
that the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for it constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law
and without just compensation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3120 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes. The lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and
are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial
property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due
process and without just compensation. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property
calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power, which will not be interfered with by the courts.
The Acts in question were intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the
government program of land for the landless and that they were not intended to expropriate the property
involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for
disposition by the National Government. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power
of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the
Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property.
Macasiano v. Diokno
G.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 464
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: The Municipality of Paranque passed an ordinance that authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G.
Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque Metro Manila and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. Thereafter, the municipal council of Paranaque issued a resolution
authorizing Paranaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into a contract with any service cooperative for the
establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. By virtue of
this, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement
whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the
obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paranaque. Consequently, market
stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets.
Petitioner Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, then ordered the destruction
and confiscation of the stalls along the abovementioned streets. Hence, respondents filed with the trial court a
joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the
petitioner filed his opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the
validity of the ordinance in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution which authorizes the lease and use of public streets or
thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.
HELD: No. The aforementioned streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered
public properties of respondent municipality. Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that properties of public
dominion devoted for public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man
and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Properties of the local
government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress. Hence, LGUs have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties
unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
limitation on Morato's right to enjoy and possess the land for herself. Encumbrance, as defined, is an
impairment on the use or transfer of property, or a claim or lien on the property where there is a burden on
the title. Thus, Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent on these points. Moreover, the property
became a foreshore land because it turned into a portion of land which was covered most of the time with
water, whether it was low or high tide. Foreshore is defined as land between high and low waters which is dry
depending on the reflux or ebb of the tides. In accordance with this land reclassification, the land can no
longer be subject to a pending patent application and must be returned to the State.
JVA through negotiation without public bidding. A Legal Task Force was created to look into the issue. The
said task force upheld the legality of the JVA.
In 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a petition to compel PEA to disclose all facts on its negotiations
with AMARI, invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern. He
assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of the constitutional prohibiting
in the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Despite the ongoing court petitions, PEA and AMARI signed an Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended
JVA) in 1999, and such was approved by President Estrada. The Amended JVA seeks to convey to AMARI the
ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands.
ISSUE: Whether AMARI has the capacity to acquire the lands held by PEA.
HELD: No. Under the 1987 Constitution, private corporations such as AMARI cannot acquire alienable land of
the public domain. Reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, which are covered by certificates of title
in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell
these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing
laws. Thus, the Amended Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA was null and void.
In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands, and the JVA was approved by President Ramos. However, PEA and AMARI entered into the
"The only issue in an action for forcible entry is the physical or material possession of real property, that is,
possession de facto and not possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is that irrespective of
the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned
out by strong hand, violence or terror." A judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive
only on the question of possession and not on the ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affects
the ownership of the land or building.
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion
reivindicatoria under Art. 434 of the Civil Code, and should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is
an accion interdictal. Accion interdictal, which is the summary action for forcible entry (detentacion) where the
defendant's possession of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for unlawful detainer
(desahuico) where the defendant's possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the expiration of
his right to possess, both of which must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land,
in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer, in the proper
municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court; accion publiciana which is a plenary action for recovery of the
right to possess and which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when the dispossession has
lasted for more than one year; and, accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the recovery
of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a
parcel of land and seeks recovery of its full possession. It is different from accion interdictal or accion
publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without claim of title.
In Civil Case No. 926 Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the disputed area without
asserting title thereto. It should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 2203-0 where she expressly alleged
ownership.
Javier v. Veridiano II
G.R. No. L-48050, October 10, 1994, 237 SCRA 565
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS: Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for lot 1641. She later instituted a complaint for forcible
entry against Babol, alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a portion of said land. The case for forcibly
entry was however dismissed as it was found by the court that the occupied portion was outside Lot 1641.
The same was dismissed on appeal. Javier was eventually granted a Miscellaneous Sales Patent and issued an
OCT for lot 1641. Babol, however had sold the property he was occupying, including a portion of 200 square
meters to Rosete. Javier demanded the surrender of the same area from Rosete who repeatedly refused to
comply. After 4 years, Javier instituted a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession with
damages against Babol and Rosete. Rosete moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. The
CFI sustained the argument of Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Javier contends that res judicata
cannot apply in the instant case since there is no identity of parties and causes of action between her
complaint for forcible entry, which had long become final and executory, and her subsequent petition for
quieting of title. Javier maintains that there is no identity of causes of action since the first case was for
forcible entry, which is merely concerned with the possession of the property, whereas the subsequent case
was for quieting of title, which looks into the ownership of the disputed land.
ISSUE: Whether or not there are really different causes of action between the forcible entry case and the
later quieting of title case.
HELD: Yes. For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action the following requisites must concur:
(1) There must be a final judgment or order; (2) The court rendering the judgment must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (3) The former judgment is a judgment on the merits; and, (4) There is between the
first and second actions identity of (4a) parties, (4b) of subject matter and (4c) of causes of action.
Javier's argument that there is no identity of parties between the two actions is without merit. We have
repeatedly ruled that for res judicata to apply, what is required is not absolute but only substantial identity of
parties. But, there is merit in Javier's argument that there is no identity of causes of action.
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration; however, on June 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land.
HELD: In this case, the issue of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the unlawful
detainer case, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court as to possession on the ground that
the decision has become final and executory. This means that the petitioners may be evicted. In the accion
reinvindicatoria, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ownership of petitioners over the subject land. Hence, the
court declared petitioners as the lawful owners of the land. In the present case, the stay of execution is
warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof.
To execute the judgment by ejecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave
injustice. Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership to the
spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. Placing petitioners in possession of the land in question is the
necessary and logical consequence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners is possession. It
follows that as owners of the subject property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. "An owner
who cannot exercise the seven (7) "juses" or attributes of ownership-the right to possess, to use and enjoy,
to abuse or consume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits is a
crippled owner.
the motion for execution are resolved. The motion to suspend hearing on the issue of the rentals was denied
and the trial court authorized the substitution of the de Vera spouses by the Abalos spouses. Roman Soriano's
motion for reconsideration was denied on March 16, 1985. Roman filed petition for certiorari and prohibition in
the Court of Appeals but the latter denied the petition, pending the denial of this petition, Roman Soriano
died. Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs of Roman Soriano brought this case in
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a winning party (ABALOS) in a land registration case can effectively eject the
possessor (SORIANO) thereof, whose security of tenure rights is still pending determination before the
DARAB.
HELD: No. The Court held that a judgment in a land registration case cannot effectively used to oust the
possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending determination before the DARAB.
There is no dispute that Abalos spouses' title over the land under litigation has been confirmed with finality.
However, the declaration pertains only to ownership and does not automatically include possession, especially
soin the instant case where there is a third party occupying the said parcel of land, allegedly in the concept of
an agricultural tenant. Agricultural lessees are entitled to security of tenure and they have the right to work on
their respective landholdings once the leasehold relationship is established. Security of tenure is a legal
concession to agricultural lessees which they value as life itself ad deprivation of their landholdings is
tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. The exercise of the right of ownership, then,
yields to the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. The Supreme Court decided to refrain from ruling
whether petitioners may be dispossessed of the subject property while petitioner's status as tenant has not
yet been declared by the DARAB.
petitioner Jose Garcia occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated
by his parents. An owners act of allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent
and indefeasible right of possession in the latters favor. Consequently, it is of no moment that petitioner was
in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses. It was not a hindrance to a valid
transfer of ownership. All said, the Magpayo spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the
property to PBCom.
communicated to the offeror. Until that moment, there is no real meeting of the minds, no concurrence of
offer and acceptance, hence, no contract.
However, the same is not true of the contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992. As argued by RODIL, these
contracts are not proscribed by law; neither is there a law prohibiting the execution of a contract with
provisions that are retroactive. Where there is nothing in a contract that is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order, the validity of the contract must be sustained.
The Court of Appeals invalidated the contracts because they were supposedly executed in violation of a
temporary restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court. The appellate court however failed to note that
the order restrains the REPUBLIC from awarding the lease contract only as regards respondent ASSOCIATION
but not petitioner RODIL. While a temporary restraining order was indeed issued against RODIL, it was issued
only on 25 May 1992 or after the assailed contracts were entered into. As correctly stated by petitioner, one
cannot enjoin an act already fait accompli.
Private respondents argue that the "renewal contract" cannot "renew" a void contract. However, they could
cite no legal basis for this assertion. It would seem that respondents consider the renewal contract to be a
novation of the earlier lease contract of 23 September 1987. However, novation is never presumed. Also, the
title of a contract does not determine its nature. On the contrary, it is the specific provisions of the contract
which dictate its nature. Furthermore, where a contract is susceptible of two (2) interpretations, one that
would make it valid and another that would make it invalid, the latter interpretation is to be adopted. The
assailed agreement of 18 May 1992, "Renewal of Contract of Lease," merely states that the term of the
contract would be for ten (10) years starting 1 September 1987. This is hardly conclusive of the existence of
an intention by the parties to novate the contract of 23 September 1987. Nor can it be argued that there is an
implied novation for the requisite incompatibility between the original contract and the subsequent one is not
present. Based on this factual milieu, the presumption of validity of contract cannot be said to have been
overturned.
Respondent ASSOCIATION claims that the Decision of the Office of the President declaring null and void the
lease contracts of 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992 should be counted in its favor. We do not agree. The
contention does not hold water. It is well-settled that a court's judgment in a case shall not adversely affect
persons who were not parties thereto.
Isaguirre v. De Lara
G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 803
Gonzaga Reyes, J.
FACTS: Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales Application over a
parcel of land with an area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his death, Alejandro de Lara was succeeded by his
wife-respondent Felicitas de Lara as claimant. On this lot stands a two-story residential-commercial apartment
declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondents sons, Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara. When
Felicitas encountered financial difficulties, she approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre. On February 10,
1960, a document denominated as Deed of Sale and Special Cession of Rights and Interests was executed
by Felicitas and Isaguirre, whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of the subject lot, together
with the two-story commercial and residential structure standing thereon. Sometime in May 1969, Apolonio
and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of ownership and possession of the twostory building. However, petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property and was issued an OCT.
Due to overlapping of title, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title. Judgment was rendered in favor of
the respondents. When respondent filed a motion for execution, petitioner opposed, and alleged that he had a
right of retention over the property until payment of the value of the improvements he had introduced on the
property.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements
he made on the property.
HELD: No. The petitioner is a possessor in bad faith. Based on the factual findings from this case, it is evident
that petitioner knew from the very beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondents
property as mere security for the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim
reimbursement only for necessary expenses; however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful
expenses which he may have incurred.
action against Guevarra for forcible entry with prayer that Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot 105A. The Justice of the Peace of Court of Nasugbu decided in favor of Roxas y Cia and on June 6, 1959, a
trouble between Cabalag and Caisip occurred regarding the cutting of sugarcane.
A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven out by Caisip. Due to
Cabalags tenacious attitude, Caisip sought the help of the Chief of Police of Nasugbu. The Deputy Sheriff,
however, informed Caisip that his request to eject Cabalag cannot be acted upon without a proper court
order. Nevertheless, the Chief of Police assigned Sergeant Ignacio Rojales and Corporal Frederico Villadelrey
to Haciendo Palico. On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding a portion of Lot 105-A which was a
ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to do so. So, Caisip went to Sgt.
Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey and brought them to Cabalag. Rojales told Cabalag to stop weeding but she
insisted on her right to stay in the said lot. While in squatting position, Cabalag was grabbed by Rojales who
twisted her right arm and wrested the trowel she was holding. Villadelrey held her left hand and together
Rojales forcibly dragged her towards a banana plantation while Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn gun.
Cabalag shouted, Ina ko po! Ina ko po! and was heard by some neighbors. Zoilo Rivera, head of the tenant
organization to which Cabalag was affiliated, went with them on their way to the municipal building. Upon
arrival, Cabalag was turned over by Rojales and Villadelrey to the policemen on duty, who interrogated her.
But upon representations made by Rivera, she was released and allowed to go home. Cabagan then filed a
complaint charging Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey of the crime of grave coercion.
The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them guilty as charged. On appeal, The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip and others, in the exercise of his right granted by Article
429, is reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or
usurpation of his property.
HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by Article 429. This is totally inapplicable to the
case, for, having been given 20 days from June 6th within which to vacate the lot, Cabalag did not, on June
17th and within said period, invades or usurps the said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof,
even though the hacienda owner may have become its co-possessor by reason of the prior order of the
Justice of Peace Court of Nasugbu. Caisip and others did not repel or prevent an actual or threatened physical
invasion or usurpation. They expelled Cabalag from a property which she and her husband were in
possession, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay in said
property up to June 26th, and had expressed the view that he could not oust them without a judicial order. It
is clear, therefore, that Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey, by means of violence, and without legal authority, had
prevented the complainant from doing something not prohibited by law (weeding and being in Lot 105-A),
and compelled her to do something against her will (stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), whether it be
right or wrong, thereby taking the law into their hands, in violation of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code.
trespass justified the appellant to drive them away, even by means of bolo because they refused to listen to
his appeal which is reasonable. The appellant need not rush to the court to seek redress before reasonably
resisting the invasion of his property. The situation required immediate action and Art. 429 gave him the self
executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance. The provision in Art 429 of the New Civil Code confirms
the right of the appellant, an owner and lawful possessor, to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or
usurpation, actual, threatened or physical of his property. The principle of self-defense and the protective
measures related thereto, covers not only his life, but also his liberty and property.
The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force, not only to prevent a threatened
unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is a sort of self-defense. It is lawful to repel force by force. He who
merely uses force to defend his possession does not possess by force. The use of such necessary force to
protect propriety or possessory rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under the Penal Code.
FACTS: An application for registration of a parcel of land was filed on February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa
on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province,
was divided into 9 lots. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his
children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. In support of the application, both
Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed
to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation. Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in
1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, who recalled the earlier
possession of the land by Alberto's father. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim
covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who
located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase,
Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner. Atok
alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims
located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of
the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by
Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots. The Bureau of
Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered
by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by
reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession
and ownership of the land sought to be registered. The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which
reversed the trial court and affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims. Both Benguet and Atok
appealed to the Supreme Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The Republic filed its own petition
for review and reiterated its argument that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies had
any valid claim to the land because it was not alienable and registerable.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benguet and Atok have a better right over the property in question.
HELD: Yes. It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in force
removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the land, against
even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a
patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the
same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the "vicissitudes of
ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private respondents aver, by
acquisitive prescription. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between
the owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. Under the aforesaid ruling, the land
is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title.
However, the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half
mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely
agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land
ceased to be so and became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As
long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and
become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those
who were unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine. If a person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals
are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of their respective mining claims
which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public
domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was
not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor
could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral
purposes. The decision is set aside and that of the trial court is reinstated.
10
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has acquired title over the disputed land.
Custodio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116100, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 483
Regalado, J.
FACTS: Pacifico Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment. Said property may be described to
be surrounded by other immovables owned by petitioner Spouses Custodio, Spouses Santos and Rosalina
Morato. From the main street P. Burgos, there are two possible passageways to Mabasas property. One of
the tenants of the apartment vacated because an adobe fence was constructed thereby making the first
passageway narrower in width. Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence for security
reasons. Morato also constructed her fence and even extended it in such a way that the entire passageway
was enclosed. It was then that the remaining tenants of the apartment left. Thereafter, Mabasa filed a case
for the grant of an easement of right of way against petitioners. The RTC granted the easement of right of
way sought by private respondent. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC and furthermore,
ordering petitioners to pay private respondent a sum of money for damages.
HELD: An action for reconveyance of a property is the sole remedy of a landowner whose property has been
wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after one year from the date of the decree so long as
the property has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The action does not seek to reopen the
registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration but only purports to show that the person who
secured the registration of the property in controversy is not the real owner thereof. Fraud is a ground for
reconveyance. For an action for reconveyance based on fraud to prosper, it is essential for the party seeking
reconveyance to prove by clear and convincing evidence his title to the property and the fact of fraud.
Reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in
another's name. In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion.
Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual
possession since January 1947. Title to alienable public lands can be established through open, continuous,
and exclusive possession for at least 30 years. Not being the owner, petitioner cannot maintain the present
suit. Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the titles legally issued by the
State.
Abejaron v. Nabasa
G.R. No. 84831, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 47
Puno, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Abejaron avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a 118-square
meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos City. Petitioner Abejaron and his
family occupied the 118-square meter land. At that time, the land had not yet been surveyed. They fenced
the area and built thereon a family home with nipa roofing and a small store. Petitioner later improved their
abode to become a two-storey house. This house, which stands to this day, occupies a portion of Lot 1, Block
5 and a portion of the adjoining Lot 2 of the same Psu. Lot 2 belongs to petitioners' daughter, Conchita. The
small store was eventually destroyed and in its stead, petitioner Abejaron another store. He later planted five
coconut trees on the property. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character, petitioner declared
only his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes. The last two declarations state that
petitioners' house stands on Lots 1 and 2, Block 5. Petitioner stated that respondent Nabasa resided on the
remaining 57-square meter portion of Lot 1. Nabasa built his house about 4 meters away from petitioner
Abejaron's house. Employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area. Abejaron did not apply for title of the
land on the belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property. Without his knowledge
and consent, Nabasa applied for and caused the titling in his name the entire Lot 1, including petitioner
Abejaron's 118-square meter portion. Nabasa was issued an Original Certificate of Title pursuant to a Free
Patent covering Lot 1. As the title included petitioner Abejarons portion of the lot, he filed a protest with the
Bureau of Lands against Nabasa's title and application. The protest was dismissed for failure of the petitioner
to attend the hearings. Petitioner Abejaron then filed an action for reconveyance with damages against
respondent Nabasa before the RTC. The RTC The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of petitioner in its
reconveyance case declaring the possession and occupancy of Abejaron over 118 square meters of lot in good
faith and thereby declaring the inclusion of said portion in the OCT issued in the name of Nabasa erroneous.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC stating that the only basis for reconveyance is actual
fraud which in this case was failed to be substantiated by Abejaron. Without proof of irregularity neither in the
issuance of title nor in the proceedings incident thereto nor a claim that fraud intervened in the issuance of
the title, the title would become indefeasible. The petitioner hence resorts to the Supreme Court.
11
Ignacio v. Hilario
G.R. No. L-175, August 30, 1946, 76 Phil. 605
Moran, C. J.
FACTS: This case concerns the ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential. The
lower court rendered judgment holding plaintiffs as the legal owners of the whole property but conceding to
defendants the ownership of the houses and granaries built by them on the residential portion with the rights
of a possessor in good faith, in accordance with article 361 of the Civil Code.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they chose neither to pay
defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential lot, said defendants should be ordered to
remove the structure at their own expense and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants
objected to this motion which, after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad. Hence, this petition by
defendants praying for (a) a restraint and annulment of the order of execution issued by Judge Natividad; (b)
an order to compel plaintiffs to pay them the sum of P2,000 for the buildings, or sell to them the residential
lot for P45; or (c), a rehearing of the case for a determination of the rights of the parties upon failure of
extra-judicial settlement.
ART. 361. The owner of land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the
right to appropriate as his own the work, sowing or planting, after the payment of the indemnity stated in
articles 453 and 454, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent.
ART. 453. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may
retain the thing until such expenses are made good to him.
Useful expenses shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the expenses or paying
the increase in value which the thing may have acquired in consequence thereof.
The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the
possession of the land until he is paid the value of his building, under article 453. The owner of the land, upon
the other hand, has the option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner
of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the
land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to
another motion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.
The Court holds, therefore, that the order of Judge Natividad compelling defendants-petitioners to remove
their buildings from the land belonging to plaintiffs-respondents only because the latter chose neither to pay
for such buildings not to sell the land, is null and void, for it amends substantially the judgment sought to be
executed and is, furthermore, offensive to articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code.
12
FACTS: After appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals held, among other things, that Filipinas Colleges,
Inc. are declared to have acquired the rights of the spouses Timbang in the questioned lots, they are ordered
to pay the spouses Timbang in the amount of P15,807.90 plus such other amount which said spouses might
have paid or had to pay. On the other hand, Maria Gervacio Blas was also declared to be a builder in good
faith of the school building constructed in the lot in question and was entitled to be paid the amount of
P19,000.00 for the same. Also, in case that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to deposit the value of the land,
which after liquidation was fixed at P32,859.34, within the 90-day period set by the Court, Filipinas Colleges
would lose all its rights to the land and the spouses Timbang would then become the owners thereof. If that
is the case, the Timbangs are ordered to make known to the court their option under Article 448 of the Civil
Code whether they would appropriate the building in question, in which even they would have to pay Filipinas
Colleges, Inc. the sum of P19,000.00, or would compel the latter to acquire the land and pay the price
thereof. Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to pay the sum of P32,859.34 so the spouses Timbang made known to
the court their decision that they had chosen not to appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges,
Inc., for the payment of the sum of P32,859,34 which was granted by the Court. As a consequence of which,
a writ of execution was issued. Meanwhile, Blas filed a motion for execution of her judgment representing the
unpaid portion of the price of the house sold to Filipinas which was granted. Levy was made on the house in
virtue of the writs of execution. Then, the Sheriff of Manila sold the building in public auction in favor of the
spouses Timbang, as the highest bidders. Several motion were the subsequently filed before the lower court
wherein the court held that: a) the Sheriff's certificate of sale covering a school building sold at public auction
was null and void unless within 15 days from notice of said order spouses Timbang shall pay to Blas the sum
of P5,750.00 that the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriff's sale; b) that Filipinas is owner
of 245.00/32,859.34 undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a on which the building sold in the auction sale is
situated; and c) that the undivided interest of the Filipinas in the lot should be sold to satisfy the unpaid
portion of the judgment in favor of Blas and against Filipinas in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of
P5,750.00. The spouses Timbang contends that because the builder in good faith has failed to pay the price of
the land after the owners thereof exercised their option under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the builder lost his
right of retention provided in Article 546 and that by operation of Article 445, the spouses Timbang as owners
of the land automatically became the owners ipso facto of the school building.
FACTS: Petitioner Manotok Realty filed a complaint against Nilo Madlangawa for recovery of possession with
damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said court rendered judgment declaring Madlangawa as a
builder-possessor in good faith; ordering the company to recognize the right of Madlangawa to remain in Lot
345, Block 1, of the Clara Tambunting Subdivision until after he shall have been reimbursed by the company
the sum of P7,500.00, without pronouncement as to costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Timbang automatically become the owners of the building upon failure
of Filipinas to pay the value of the land.
HELD: No. Based on Article 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, the owner of the land has the right to choose
between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof or compelling the builder
in good faith to pay for his land. Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of the land is
considerably more than that of the building. In addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value of his
improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by
the ow-----ner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these two articles, 448 and 546, which would
justify the conclusion of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when
such is demanded by the land-owner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the improvement under
Article 445. The case of Bataclan vs Bernardo cannot be applied in this case in the sense that although it is
true it was declared therein that in the event of the failure of the builder to pay the land after the owner
thereof has chosen this alternative, the builder's right of retention provided in Article 546 is lost, nevertheless
there was nothing said that as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights over his own
building. Also, in the present case, the Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee Blas is entitled to
the payment of the unpaid balance of the purchase price of the school building. Blas is actually a lien on the
school building are concerned. The order of the lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as successful
bidders, to pay in cash the amount of their bid in the sum of P5,750.00 is therefore correct.
Not satisfied with the trial courts decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals and upon affirming the
trial courts decision, it elevated the case to the Supreme Court. On July 13, 1977, the Supreme Court issued a
resolution denying Manotoks petition for lack of merit. Petitioner then filed with the trial court (Judge Jose H.
Tecson), a motion for the approval of the companys exercise of option and for satisfaction of judgment.
However, Judge Tecson denied the motion for approval. Hence, this petition is filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Tecson can deny petitioners (landowner) motion to avail of its
option.
HELD: No. There is, therefore, no basis for the respondent judge to deny the petitioners motion to avail of
its option to appropriate the improvements made on its property. Neither can the judge deny the issuance of
a writ of execution because the private respondent was adjudged a builder in good faith or on the ground of
peculiar circumstances which supervened after the institution of this case, like, for instance, the introduction
of certain major repairs of and other substantial improvements because the option given by law belongs to
the owner of the land. Under Article 448 of the Civil Code, the right to appropriate the works or improvements
or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the proper price of the land belongs to the owner of the land.
The only right given to the builder in good faith is the right of reimbursement of necessary expenses for the
preservation of the land; the builder cannot compel the landowner to sell such land to the former.
Bernardo v. Bataclan
G.R. No. L-44606, November 28, 1938, 66 Phil. 598
Laurel, J.
FACTS: Bernardo bought a parcel of land from Samonte which was located in Cavite. In order that he may
take possession and occupy the said land, he filed a case in the CFI for such purpose and the court rendered
a favorable decision for Bernardo. However, when he was supposedly set in occupying the said land, he found
Bataclan. He was within the premises because he was authorized by the previous owners to clear the land
and make the necessary improvements he deems fit, further claiming that such authorization was granted to
him ever since 1922. Since Bataclan was not a party in the first case, Bernardo filed against him a separate
case. Bernardo was declared owner but the defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith for whom the
work done and improvements made by him should be reimbursed. An appeal to the decision of the court was
filed by both Bernardo and Bataclan. The decision was modified by lowering the price of the land from P300 to
P200 per hectare. Bernardo was given 30 days to exercise his option, whether to sell the land to Bataclan or
to buy the improvements from him. Bernardo chose the option which would require Bataclan to pay him the
value of the land at the rate of P200 per hectare. However, Bataclan informed the court that he will not be
able to pay for the price of the land. The court then gave Bataclan 30 days to pay the price of the property
and after the lapse of the period, the land shall be sold in a public auction. After 30 days, the land was sold to
Teodoro at a public auction, after failure of Bataclan to pay within the period the purchase price.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bataclan has the right of retention over the parcel of land in question.
HELD: No. Bataclan no longer has lost the right of retention. The option of the owner was already exercised
where he decided that he will just allow the defendant to purchase the land such that Bataclan was to comply
with the option if he wants to retain the land. From the moment that he told the courts of his inability to pay
for the price of the land, he already lost his right to retain the land.
13
attempted to transfer registration of the property in its name before it conveyed the same to Durano III.
Since petitioners knew fully well the defect in their titles, they were correctly held by the Court of Appeals to
be builders in bad faith.
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or
sown without right of indemnity.
Art. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand
the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their
former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed; or he may compel the builder or
planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
Art. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder,
planter or sower.
Based on these provisions, the owner of the land has three alternative rights: (1) to appropriate what has
been built without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor, or (2) to demand that the builder remove what he
had built, or (3) to compel the builder to pay the value of the land. In any case, the landowner is entitled to
damages under Article 451.
The Court sustains the return of the properties to respondents and the payment of indemnity as being in
accord with the reliefs under the Civil Code.
14
within thirty (30) days from finality of the decision their option to either buy the portion of respondents Go's
improvement on their Lot No. 24, or sell to said respondents the portion of their land on which the
improvement stands. If petitioners elect to sell the land or buy the improvement, the purchase price must be
at the prevailing market price at the time of payment. If buying the improvement will render respondents Go's
house useless, then petitioners should sell the encroached portion of their land to respondents Go. If
petitioners choose to sell the land but respondents Go are unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must
vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from the time petitioners made their choice up to the time
they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the
improvement, then respondents Go may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the
terms, the lease. Should they fail to agree on said terms, the court of origin is directed to fix the terms of the
lease.
not been paid. Consequently, the Company instituted a civil case to recover the unpaid balance and the court
sustained their claim. The defendant sheriff levied th six buildings. The Pacific Farms, Inc. filed a suit against
the Company and the sheriff asserting ownership over the levied buildings which it had acquired from the
Insular Farms by virtue of absolute sale executed on March 21, 1958. Pacific prays that the judicial sale of the
six buildings be declared null and void. The trial court rendered judgment annulling the levy and the certificate
of sale. However, it denied the plaintiff's claim for actual and exemplary damages on the ground that it was
not "prepared to find there was gross negligence or bad faith on the part of any defendants".
ISSUE: Whether or not the application by analogy of the rules of accession would suffice for a just
adjudication.
HELD: Article 447 of the Civil Code contemplates a principal and an accessory; the land being considered the
principal, and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good faith whether personally or through another - makes constructions or works thereon, using materials belonging to
somebody else, becomes the owner of the said materials with the obligation however of paying for their
value. On the other hand, the owner of the materials is entitled to remove them, provided no substantial
injury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right to reimbursement for the value of his materials,
Applying article 447 by analogy, the Court consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and
construction materials that went into their construction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the
six buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the values of the said materials; the appellant which
apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and, even if it were minded to do so, cannot remove them
without necessarily damaging the buildings has the corresponding right to recover the value of the unpaid
lumber and construction materials.
15
indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed. This is so because the
right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or
possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not having been so paid, he
was entitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
Edith Robillo purchased from Pleasantville Development Corporation Lot 9. Sometime in 1975, she sold the
said parcel of land, Lot 9, to Eldred Jardinico which at that time is vacant. Upon paying completely to Robillo,
Jardinico secured from the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City on December 19, 1978 Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 106367 in his name. It was only that time that he discovered that Wilson Kee take possession of that
lot and that the same have introduced improvements to the same lot. Jardinico confronted Kee and tried to
reach for an amicable settlement, but failed.
On January 30, 1981, Jardinico, through his lawyer, demanded that Kee vacate Lot 9 and remove all the
improvements introduced by the latter. Kee refused which made Jardinico filed with the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Branch 3, Bacolod City a complaint for ejectment with damages against Kee. Kee, in turn filed a
third-party complaint against Pleasantville Development Corporation and CTTEI.
FACTS: Technogas purchased a parcel of land from Pariz Industries, Inc. In the same year, Eduardo Uy
purchased the land adjacent to it. The following year, Uy bought another lot adjoining the lot of Technogas.
Portions of the buildings and wall bought by Technogas together with the land from Pariz Industries are
occupying a portion of Uys adjoining land. The knowledge of some encroachment was only made known to
both parties after their parties of their respective parcels of land.
The MTCC held that the erroneous delivery was attributable to CTTEI and the Kee has no rights to Lot 9
because of the rescission made by CTTEI of their contract due to Kees failure to pay the installment. MTCC
also held that Kee must pay reasonable rental for the use of Lot 9 and furthermore he cannot claim
reimbursement for the improvements introduced by him. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court held that
Pleasantville and CTTEI were not negligent and that Kee was in bad faith.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines is a possessor in bad faith.
2.) Whether or not petitioner Technogas Philippines has stepped into the shoes of the seller.
Kee appealed directly to the Supreme Court which referred the matter to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate
Court overturned the ruling of the RTC and held the Kee was a builder in good faith and the erroneous
delivery was attributable to the negligence of CTTEI. Hence the instant petition filed by Pleasantville.
HELD: 1.) No. Unless one is versed in the science of surveying, no one can determine the precise extent or
location of his property by merely examining his paper title. There is no question in that when Technogas
purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures were already in existence.
Furthermore, it is not clear as to who actually built these structures but it can be assumed that the
predecessor-in-interest of Technogas, Pariz Industries, did so. An article 527 of the New Civil Code presumes
good faith. Since no proof exists to show that the builder built the encroaching structures in bad faith, the
structures should be presumed to have been built in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the
builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. Furthermore,
possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in case and from the moment facts exist
which show that the possessor is not aware that he possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully. The good
faith ceases from the moment the defects in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by suit for recovery of the property of the true owner.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not, Wilson Kee is a builder in good faith.
2.) Whether or not petitioner is liable for the acts of its agent CTTEI.
2.) Yes. Has been shown, contrary as to the good faith of Technogas has not been overthrown. Similarly,
upon delivery of the property to Pariz Industries, as seller, to Technogas, as buyer, the latter acquired
ownership of the property. Consequently, Technogas is deemed to have stepped into the shoes of the seller
with regard to all the rights of ownership of the property over the immovable sold, including the right to
compel Uy to exercise either of the two options under Article 448 of the New Civil Code. Thus, the
landowners exercise of his option can only take place after the builder shall have to know the intrusion in
short, when both parties shall have become aware of it. Only then will the occasion for exercising the option
arise, for it is only then that both parties will have been aware that a problem exists with regard to their
property rights.
HELD: 1.) Petitioner fails to persuade the Court to abandon the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals that Kee was a builder in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is
building on is his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed, petitioner
has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee. At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee
believed that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was
not Lot 8. Thus, Kee is in good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kee's bad faith, petitioner points to Kee's violation of paragraphs 22 and 26 of the Contract of
Sale on Installment. It has no merit. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a
builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the improvements on Lot 9. These
alleged violations may give rise to petitioner's cause of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual
breach), but may not be the basis to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
2.) Yes. The rule is that the principal is responsible for the acts of the agent done within the scope of his
authority, and should bear the damage caused to third persons. On the other hand, the agent who exceeds
his authority is personally liable for the damage. But CTTEI was acting within its authority as the sole real
estate representative of petitioner when it made the delivery to Kee, only that in so acting, it was negligent. It
is this negligence that is the basis of petitioner's liability, as principal of CTTEI, per Articles 1909 and 1910 of
the Civil Code. For such negligence, the petitioner should be held liable for damages. The rights of Kee and
Jardinico vis-a-vis each other, as builder in good faith and owner in good faith, respectively, are regulated by
law (i.e., Arts. 448, 546 and 548 of the Civil Code). It was error for the Court of Appeals to make a "slight
modification" in the application of such law [by holding petitioner and CTTEI solidarily liable], on the ground
of "equity".
16
lease which expired in November 1985; (2) whether the lessees were builders in good faith and entitled to
reimbursement of the value of the house and improvements; and (3) the value of the house.
On the first issue, the court held that since the petitioners' mother was no longer the owner of the lot in
question at the time the lease contract was executed in 1978, in view of its acquisition by Maria Lee as early
as 1972, there was no lease to speak of, much less, a renewal thereof. And even if the lease legally existed,
its implied renewal was not for the period stipulated in the original contract, but only on a month-to-month
basis pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code. The refusal of the petitioners' mother to accept the rentals
starting January 1986 was then a clear indication of her desire to terminate the monthly lease. As regard the
petitioners' alleged failed promise to sell to the private respondents the lot occupied by the house, the court
held that such should be litigated in a proper case before the proper forum, not an ejectment case where the
only issue was physical possession of the property.
The court resolved the second issue in the negative, holding that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, which
allow possessors in good faith to recover the value of improvements and retain the premises until reimbursed,
did not apply to lessees like the private respondents, because the latter knew that their occupation of the
premises would continue only during the life of the lease. Besides, the rights of the private respondents were
specifically governed by Article 1678, which allow reimbursement of up to one-half of the value of the useful
improvements, or removal of the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.
On the third issue, the court deemed as conclusive the private respondents' allegation that the value of the
house and improvements was P180,000.00, there being no controverting evidence presented.
Among these occupying lands covered by Solana Cadastre were Pablo Binayug and Maria Melad. Through the
years, the Cagayan River eroded lands of the Tuguegarao Cadastre on its eastern bank among which was
Agustins Lot 8457, depositing the alluvium as accretion on the land possessed by Binayug on the western
bank. However, 1968, after a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course, returned to its 1919 bed and in
the process, cut across the lands of Maria Melad, Timoteo Melad, and the spouses Pablo Binayug and
Geronima Ubina whose lands were transferred on the eastern, or Tuguegarao, side of the river. To cultivate
those lots they had to cross the river. In April 1969, while the Melads, Binayug, Urbina and their tenants were
planting corn on their lots located on the easter side of Cagayan River, Agustin, the heirs of Baldomero
Langcay, Juan Langcay, and Arturo Balisi, accompanied by the mayor and some policemen of Tuguegarao,
claimed the same lands as their own and drove away the Melads, Binayug and Urbina from the premises.
ISSUE: Whether or not ownership of accretion is lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the river.
HELD: No. The ownership of the accretion to the lands was not lost upon sudden and abrupt change of the
course of the river (Cagayan River in 1968 or 1969 when it reverted to its old 1919 bed), and separated or
transferred said accretions to the other side (eastern bank) of the river. Articles 459 and 463 of the New Civil
Code apply to this situation. Article 459 provides that whenever the current of a river, creek or torrent
segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfer it to another estate, the owner of
the land to which the segregated portion belonged retains the ownership of it, provided that he removes the
same within two years. Article 463 provides that, whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches,
leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains his ownership. He also retains it
if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.
On appeal by the private respondents, the RTC of Dagupan City reversed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 448 or Article 1678 of the Civil Code should apply in the instant case.
HELD: In this case, both parties admit that the land in question was originally owned by the petitioners'
mother. The land was allegedly acquired later by one Maria Lee by virtue of an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage. Lee, however, never sought a writ of possession in order that she gain possession of the property
in question. The petitioners' mother therefore remained in possession of the lot. It has been said that while
the right to let property is an incident of title and possession, a person may be lessor and occupy the position
of a landlord to the tenant although he is not the owner of the premises let. There is no need to apply by
analogy the provisions of Article 448 on indemnity as was done in Pecson vs. Court of Appeals, because the
situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the application of that provision, is not present in this
case. Suffice it to say, "a state of forced co-ownership" would not be created between the petitioners and the
private respondents. For, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the right of the private respondents as
lessees is governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement to the extent of one-half of
the value of the useful improvements.
It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of the Civil Code arises only if the
lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since the petitioners refused to exercise that option the private
respondents cannot compel them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither
can they retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is to
remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
17
Viajar had Lot 7340 relocated and found out that the property was in the possession of Ricardo Y. Ladrido.
Consequently, she demanded its return but Ladrido refused. The piece of real property which used to be Lot
7340 of the Cadastral Survey of Pototan was located in barangay Guibuanogan, Pototan, Iloilo; that at the
time of the cadastral survey in 1926, Lot 7511 and Lot 7340 were separated by the Suague River; that Lot
7340 has been in the possession of Ladrido; that the area of 14,036 sq.ms., which was formerly the river bed
of the Suague River per cadastral survey of 1926, has also been in the possession of Ladrido; and that the
Viajars have never been in actual physical possession of Lot 7340. On 15 February 1974, Angelica and Celso
Viajar instituted a civil action for recovery of possession and damages against Ricardo Y. Ladrido. The trial
court rendered its decision in favor of Ladrido, dismissing the complaint of Angelica and Celso Viajar with
costs against them, declaring the Ladridos are entitled to the possession thereof. Not satisfied with the
decision, the Viajars appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
court. The Viajars filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the respondents are entitled to the land on the ground of accretion.
HELD: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides that to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The
presumption is that the change in the course of the river was gradual and caused by accretion and erosion. In
the present case, the lower court correctly found that the evidence introduced by the Viajars to show that the
change in the course of the Suague River was sudden or that it occurred through avulsion is not clear and
convincing. The Ladridos have sufficiently established that for many years after 1926 a gradual accretion on
the eastern side of Lot 7511 took place by action of the current of the Suague River so that in 1979 an alluvial
deposit of 29,912 sq.ms. more or less, had been added to Lot 7511. The established facts indicate that the
eastern boundary of Lot 7511 was the Suague River based on the cadastral plan. For a period of more than
40 years (before 1940 to 1980) the Suague River overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the
defendant gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river. The consequent
increase in the area of Lot 7511 due to alluvion or accretion was possessed by the defendants whose tenants
plowed and planted the same with corn and tobacco. The quondam river bed had been filled by accretion
through the years. The land is already plain and there is no indication on the ground of any abandoned river
bed. Under the law, accretion which the banks or rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the current
of the waters becomes the property of the owners of the lands adjoining the banks. Therefore, the accretion
to Lot 7511 which consists of Lots A and B belong to the Ladridos.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners can claim ownership of the subject land by virtue of Art 457 of the Civil
Code.
HELD: No, accretion as a mode of acquiring property under Art 457 of the NCC requires the concurrence of
the requisites mentioned in the Article. These are called rules on alluvion, which if present in a case, give to
the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects
of the current of waters. The word current indicates the participation of the body of water in the flow of
waters due to high and low tide. Petitioners, however, admit that the accretion was formed by the dumping of
boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of the Balacanas creek and the Cagayan River. The
Bureau of lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of sawdust.
Petitioners submission not having met the first and second requirements of the rules of alluvion, they cannot
claim the rights of a riparian owner. The subject being public land is under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
lands, respondent Palad is authorized to exercise executive control over any form of concession, disposition
and management of the lands of public dominion.
18
The conclusion formed by the trial court on the basis of the aforegoing observation is that the disputed land is
part of the foreshore of Manila Bay and therefore, part of the public domain. Thus, the disputed property is an
accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the disputed property is,
under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of the public domain.
a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners) of the Island which is truly abstract,
because until physical division is effected such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined (3
Manresa, Codigo Civil, 3rd Ed., page 486, cited in Lopez vs. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De la Cruz vs. Cruz, 32
SCRA 307 [1970]; Felices vs. Colegado, 35 SCRA 173 [1970],; Dultra vs. CFl 70 SCRA 465 [1976]; Gatchalian
vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977].)
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island was to be
partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of
the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as yet been done. The second and
fourth paragraphs of the agreement speaks of a survey yet to be conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan
and description yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a son of the surveyor named Amadeo who is referred to in
the contract dated April 18, 1908 as the surveyor to whom the task of surveying Cagbalite Island pursuant to
said agreement was entrusted, however, testified that said contracts were never implemented because
nobody defrayed the expenses for surveying the same.
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn
in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and
titles issued to each of them accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of
actual partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Maganon vs. Montejo,
146 SCRA 282 [1986]).
Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by some of the petitioners
herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was
purchased by the original co-owners as a common property and it has not been proven that the Island had
been partitioned among them or among their heirs. While there is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of
his share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other co-owners (Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75
SCRA 234 [1977]).
2.) On the second issue, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero
vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners,
absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners. An action for
partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497, provides that the assignees of
the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now
Article 494 provides that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a
provision which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches
(Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership
is properly repudiated by the co- owner.
Pardell v. Bartolome
G.R. No. L-4656, November 18, 1912, 23 Phil. 450
Torres, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and defendant Matilde Ortiz are the duly recognized natural daughters of the
spouses Miguel and Calixta who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Prior to the death of their mother, she executed a
will whereby Matilde and Vicenta became the heirs of all her property. Subsequently, defendants, without
judicial authorization or extrajudicial agreement took over the administration and enjoyment of the properties
as well as collection of the rents, fruits and products thereof. Moreover, Matilde and her husband occupied the
upper storey of the house and the room of the lower floor as an office. With this, Vicenta demanded that she
be given rental payments by Matilde in occupying the house since she is a co-owner of the property not
occupying the same and as such is entitled to its enjoyment and/or fruits.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta can collect rentals from Matilde who occupies and enjoy the property alone as
a co-owner.
19
HELD: No. The law grants each co-owner the right to use the property for the purpose intended provided
that the interest of the co-ownership must not be injured or prejudiced and the other co-owners must not be
prevented from using it according to their rights.
Matilde occupied the property owned in common in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended.
Records show no proof that she neither occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property
nor prevented her sister from utilizing the said property in accordance to her right as a co-owner thereof.
Matilde was excercising her right as a co-owner without being prejudicial to Vicenta who could have also
occupied her property had she wanted to.
Each co-owner of a property has the right pro-indiviso over the whole property and may use and enjoy the
same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, for the reason that
until a division is made, the respective part of each holder of a right as a co-owner cannot be determined and
every co-owner exercises joint ownership over the pro-indiviso property in addition to his use and enjoyment
of the same.
the three amigos. A subdivision plan was made and by common agreement Lot 1-C, with an area of 163
hectares, was ceded to petitioner, to wit, TCT no. T-4978.
In addition, notwithstanding the ruling in the Caram case wherein the sale of the property took place after the
partition agreement, the court therein saw no difference with respect to a conveyance which took place
before the partition agreement.
Regarding the contention of private respondent that she was not notified of the sale, the court ruled that
since the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this case because admittedly a subdivision title
has already been issued in the name of the petitioner on Lot 1-C sold to her, it becomes moot and academic.
It becomes unnecessary to decide whether private respondent complied with the requirements for the
exercise of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the New Civil Code.
20
vest ownership by prescription. It is settled that possession by the co-owner or co-heir is that of a trutee. In
order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the coownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts
amounting to an ouster of cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to
the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.
FACTS: Petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific
Performance" (docketed as Civil Case No. 5236-M) with Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Malolos
against respondents Emesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below)
claimed legal ownership of an undivided three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549, by virtue of the 27
November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her favor by Emesto Roque and Victor Roque.
When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof, obtained a
cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new title in his name as the
owner, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a
declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and their rights thereafter. The issuance of a new title
constituted a clear act of repudiation of the trust and co-ownership.
In support of this claim, petitioner also presented an undated and unnotarized "Kasulatang Pagkilala sa Bilihan
Patuluyan ng Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng Bahagui" said to
have been signed by the respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and validity of the Bilihan in favor
of petitioner. Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition
of the property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the co-ownership of the same. Respondents
Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of
ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.
FACTS: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers, and were among the seven (7) children of the
late Maximiano Aguilar. In 1969, the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Paraaque where their father
could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed that
Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written
memorandum, Virgilio and Senen agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal,
with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the SSS in exchange for
his possession and enjoyment of the house together with their father. Since Virgilio was then disqualified from
obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed of sale would be executed and the title
registered in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of their
father and his needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the
house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them. Because of the refusal of
respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed an action to compel the sale of the house and lot
so that the they could divide the proceeds between them. In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the
proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to
respondent. Petitioner also prayed for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their
father died. In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale as long
as the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale would be effected, the proceeds thereof should be
divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled to the use and enjoyment of the property.
Rendering judgment by default against defendant, for failure to appear at pre- trial, the trial court found him
and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of their written agreement.
However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his participation in the property by defendant's continued
enjoyment of the house and lot, free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of
defendants, to delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand
partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the former's share, the trial
court held that this property should be sold to a third person and the proceeds divided equally between the
parties. The CA set aside the order of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may demand partition of the property.
HELD: Yes. We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the
payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to commence only after the
trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its order. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides
that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any
time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498
of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it
be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners
but because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the
interests of the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be
allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-owners. However, being a co-
21
owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without paying any compensation to petitioner, as he
may use the property owned in common long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended
and in a manner not injurious to the interest of the other co-owners. 9 Each co-owner of property held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation
than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being that until a division is made, the
respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his coparticipants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
was foreclosed for failure to pay the mortgage debt wherein the defendant bank emerged as the highest
bidder during the auction sale. Defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Santos. A n action for
quieting of title was filed by respondent Santos. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been in possession of the
land since 1942 and it was only in 1987 that they knew about the foreclosure of the mortgage. The Court of
Appeals ruled that because of the plaintiffs inaction for more than 20 years, prescription had already set in.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot and
respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing the sale of the property by his
continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity demand that respondent and his family vacate the
property so that the sale can be effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a
rental of P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to vacate, for the
use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to petitioner. When petitioner filed an action
to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of
respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also
ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of
petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them. To this
extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
HELD: Yes. Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a fundamental
principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following
requisites must concur: (1) the co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other coowner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. In the present case, Hilario did not have
possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners from the use and the enjoyment
thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits. Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract
with the bank cannot be construed to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his
undivided interest in the land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should his
payment of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a repudiation of the
co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was tantamount to repudiation was belied by
the continued occupation and possession of the disputed property by the petitioners as owners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action has prescribed in favour of Hilario Robles.
22
2.) No. On the matter of laches, it is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity and its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and
injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering
what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore,
unavailing in this case.
3.) No. As to petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc.s claim that they are buyers in good faith,
same fails to persuade. A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has notice
of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the same property. So it is that the "honesty of
intention" which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to
put a person on inquiry. "Tam did not exert efforts to determine the previous ownership of the property in
question" and relied only on the tax declarations in the name of Paz Galvez. It must be noted that Carlos Tam
received a copy of the summons and the complaint on 22 September 1994. This notwithstanding, he sold the
property to Tycoon Properties, Inc. on 27 September 1994. Significantly, Carlos Tam is also an owner of
Tycoon Properties, Inc. to the extent of 45%. A notice of lis pendens dated 8 July 1997 filed with the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of La Union was inscribed on TCT No. T- 40390. Despite the inscription, Tycoon
Properties, Inc. mortgaged the land to Far East Bank and Trust Company for the sum of P11,172,600. All
these attendant circumstances negate petitioners claim of good faith.
property owned in common. Registration of property is not a means of acquiring ownership. It operates as a
mere notice of existing title, that is, if there is one.
2.) We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have
been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain
conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known
to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.
The instant case shows that the petitioner had not complied with these requisites. We are not convinced that
he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the private respondents in the
dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be said to have "made
known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership. Moreover, one of the private respondents, Emeteria Asejo, is
occupying a portion of the land up to the present; yet, the petitioner has not taken pains to eject her
therefrom. As a matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of that portion Emeteria is occupying only as
a counterclaim, and only after the private respondents had first sought judicial relief.
23
does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of
his father, Dominador.
Sumipat v. Banga
G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004
Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. The couple was
childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children. They are the petitioners herein. Lauro
executed a document denominated Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real Properties in
favor of the petitioners. On the document, it appears that the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates
that she gave her marital consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was already very
sick and bedridden that upon petitioner Lydias request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of
Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned
on the same day and requested Lauros unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said document. After Lauros
death, his wife, Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of the produce went to his
wife. As wifes share in the produce of the properties dwindled, she filed a complaint for declaration of
partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject document.
ISSUE: Whether or not a co-ownership was formed from the said deed.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property a donation
although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be
entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support.
Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made
in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not
manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation
is patently void. The Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein are not merely voidable but null
and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she signed the deeds without knowing what
they were. The significant circumstance meant, the Court added, that her consent was not merely marred by
vices of consent so as to make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents had been in actual possession of the land in question.
HELD: Yes. The CA gave credence to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents. As a general rule, it is
provided in the Civil Code that possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of
a right or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts or legal formalities
established for acquiring such right. Petitioners evidence, consisting of tax receipts, tax declaration and
survey plan are not conclusive and indisputable basis of ones ownership of the property in question.
Assessment alone is of little value as proof of title. Mere tax declaration does not vest ownership of the
property upon defendant.
Wong v. Carpio
G.R. No. 50264, October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 118
Bidin, J.
FACTS: William Giger sold a parcel of land through a pacto de recto sale to Manuel Mercado. Mercado only
began to harvest the coconut fruits but he never placed anyone over the land to watch it. Neither did he
reside in the land nor was there any hut constructed thereon to show possession. Thereafter, Ignacio Wong
inspected the land to see if whether there was anyone claiming the land. After finding there was none, he
bought the land from Giger. He placed workers on the land, constructed a farmhouse, and fenced the
boundaries. He couldn't register the sale due to some technicalities.
ISSUE: Whether or not the possession of the disputed land belongs to Ignacio Wong.
HELD: It should be stressed that "possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise
of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities
for acquiring such right." And that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. If, however, notwithstanding the execution of
the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing and make use of
it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected.
Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed from vendor
William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro, and accordingly, the
later sale a retro in favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the property because there is an
impediment the possession exercised by private respondent. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the
one longer in possession, if the dates of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings.
24
FACTS: The petitioners Fernanda Mendoza Cequea and Eduarda Apiado sought for the ownership and
possession of the land occupied by the respondent Honorata Bolante. Prior to 1954, the land in Binangonan,
Rizal was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, the father of respondent.
Sinforoso died in 1930. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of
the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza, the father of
the petitioners. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. During the cadastral survey, respondent Honorata is the
present occupant of the land together with Miguel Mendoza, another brother of the petitioners. The trial court
rendered the petitioners as the lawful owner and possessors of the land. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision because the genuineness and the due execution of the affidavit. It was said to be
insufficient to overcome the denial of respondent and her mother. Moreover, the probative value of
petitioners tax receipts and declarations paled in comparison with respondents proof of ownership of the
disputed parcel. The actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 gave her
a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code. The petitioners contended otherwise that she came into
possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.
Maglucot Aw v. Maglucot
G.R. No. 132518, March 28, 2000, 329 SCRA 78
Kapunan, J.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the respondent has the actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession of the land.
2.) Whether or not tax declarations and receipts are conclusive evidence of ownership or possession.
FACTS: Sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. By virtue of
this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. It was only in 1952 when
the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and
heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Significantly,
after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or through their predecessors-ininterest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan. Sometime in 1963,
Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of the subject lot. Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed
Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said
respondents built houses on their corresponding leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per
annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessor-ininterest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the
subject lot alleging they had a right over the land because such was not partitioned and they were co-owners.
Manglucot-Aw thus filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages against Manglucot.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Possession by the petitioner before 1985 was not exclusive, as the respondent also acquired it
before 1985. The records show that the petitioners father and brother, as well as the respondent and her
mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land. Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the
respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefitting from her fathers tax declaration of the subject lot
since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners father
acquired joint possession only in 1952.
2.) No. Tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere
prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence
of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership. The petitioners claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manglucot-Aw may recover possession by virtue of a valid partition.
HELD: Yes. An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable because it decides the
rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. In this case, both the order of partition and the unconfirmed
sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but
show by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree,
especially, where, by reason of their conduct, considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the
commission. Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in accordance with the
sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed
to question the binding effect thereof. Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without
being confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties. However, this rule does not apply in case
where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of
court approval is to give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by
actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this
case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not to be taken to
mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties herein are
estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding
sketch/subdivision plan.
Cequea v. Bolante
G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 216
Panganiban, J.
25
possessor may lose his possession under the circumstances provided under Article 555 of the New Civil Code,
to wit: (1) By the abandonment of the thing; (2) By an assignment made to another either by onerous or
gratuitous title; (3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or because it goes out of commerce; and (4)
By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted longer
than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. The Court held that
since the foregoing enumerations with respect to the loss of possession was not conclusively established by
the representatives of the government, and the fact that the owners of the land in question have never
intended to abandon the same, then it is just and proper to register said land in their name.
property. They seized the 120 books. Santos sued for recovery of the books after demand for their return was
rejected by EDCA.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not EDCA was unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the impostor in
payment therefor was dishonored.
2.) Whether or not EDCA had the right to cease the books that were sold to Santos.
HELD: 1.) No. EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books. Article 559 of the Civil Code provides that the
possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost
any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of the
same. If the possessor of a movable lost or of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived has acquired it
in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. A
contract of sale is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject matter and the
consideration. Ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the purchase only
if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall pass from the vendor to
the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase price has not yet
been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal
prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold
will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
2.) No. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he
could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was
a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title to the books acquired by the Santos spouses.
Therefore, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the books and Santos had rights over the books.
HELD: No. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of movable
property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has
been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor
of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public
sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor. Respondent Angelina D.
Guevara, having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was entitled to recover it from
petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was found in possession of the same. The only exception the law allows
is when there is acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot
obtain its return without reimbursing the price. The common law principle that where one of two innocent
persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by
his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed, cannot be applied in a case which is
covered by an express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a common law
principle and statutory provision, the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction. It is thus immediately apparent
that there is no merit to the contention raised in the first assigned error that her possession in good faith,
26
equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat respondent Guevara's claim. As the above cases demonstrate, even on
that assumption the owner can recover the same once she can show illegal deprivation. Respondent Court of
Appeals was so convinced from the evidence submitted that the owner of the ring in litigation is such
respondent.
Dizon v. Suntay
G.R. No. L-30817, September 29, 1972, 47 SCRA 160
Fernando, J.
FACTS: Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3 carat diamond ring. She entered into a transaction with Clarita
Sison, wherein said ring was delivered to the latter for sale on commission. Upon receiving the ring, the
receipt was delivered to Suntay. After a lapse of a considerable amount of time, the ring was not yet returned
and so Suntay demanded for its return from Sison but the latter could not comply as she had already pledged
it with Dizons pawnshop for P 2,600.00. After insistent demands, Sison delivered the pawnshop ticket to
Suntay. Suntay through her counsel, wrote to Dizon asking for the delivery of the ring pledged but, the latter
refused. She filed an action for recovery with P 500 as attorneys fees and costs. She asked for the remedy of
replevin upon filing the requisite bond pending final determination of the action. The CFI of Manila issued the
writ and Suntay was able to regain possession during the pendency of the action. The lower court rendered a
decision in favor of Suntay. On appeal, Dizon sought the reversal of the lower courts decision and invoking
estoppel. CA affirmed the lower courts decision. SC affirmed CA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the owner of the ring may recover its possession from the pawnshop owner.
HELD: Yes. Owner of a diamond ring may recover the possession of the same from a pawnshop where
another person had pledged it without authority to do so. Art. 559 of the civil code applies and the defense
that the pawnshop acquired possession of the without notice of any defect in the title of the pledgor is
unavailing. Neither the promptings of equity nor the mandates of moral right and natural justice come to his
rescue. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would manifest itself to ascertain
whether or not an individual who is offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled to do so. If no such care
be taken he should be the last to complain if thereafter the right of the true owner of such jewelry should be
recognized.
Cordero v. Cabral
G.R. No. L-36789, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 532
Abad Santos, J.
FACTS: Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo of Meycauayan, Bulacan, husband of the plaintiff Felipa Cordero and father
of the other plaintiffs surnamed Ocampo, died on May 17, 1958. The said deceased left several properties,
which were inherited by the plaintiffs including the land in question which parcel of land was originally
registered in accordance with the Land Registration Act on December 14, 1933, and was registered and/or
transferred in the name of Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo on July 31, 1934. After the death of the said Mr. Gregorio
Z. Ocampo, the plaintiffs herein took possession of the said parcel of land which is a riceland, but they found
out that the southern portion of the same with an area 4,303 square meters, more or less, upon verification,
was possessed by the defendants herein, Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos.
Victoria P. Cabral claimed to be the owner of said portion while her co-defendants co-possessed the same as
her tenants. The plaintiffs demanded of the defendants to surrender to the former possession of the portion
of land and/or vacate it but they refused and failed to do so, and the defendant Victoria P. Cabral continued
claiming to be the owner of the same while her co-defendants continued recognizing her as the owner thereof
instead of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that because of the defendants' occupancy of the aforementioned
plaintiffs' portion of land with the area of 4,303 square meters, more or less, to the exclusion of the latter, the
said plaintiffs failed to realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per
cavan, from the harvest-time of 1958 up to the present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants must reimburse the fruits receive.
HELD: Yes. The disputed land is included in T.C.T. No. 14513 issued to Gregorio Z. Ocampo, the predecessor
of the plaintiffs. The original registration which includes the disputed land was not vitiated by error or fraud.
The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that
they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to
answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the
fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received.
27
house No. 4 on Iznart Street. Evarista Robles, one of the heirs, since before the death of her mother
Anastasia de la Rama, has been with her husband occupying the aforesaid house No. 4 on Iznart Street, at
the beginning, by permission of her mother, later on by the consent of her coheirs, and lastly by agreement
with the partnership, Lizarraga Hermanos, to whom it had been awarded, having made some improvements
on the house, the value of which is fixed at four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500), and paying to said
partnership forty pesos (P40) monthly as rent of the upper story. On March 18, 1918, Lizarraga Hermanos
notified Evarista Robles (Exhibit J) that beginning April next the rent of the upper story of the house would be
raised to sixty pesos (P60) a month, and that, if she did not agree to the new rate of rent, she might vacate
the house. Evarista Robles refused to pay such a new rate of rent and to vacate the house, and Lizarraga
Hermanos brought suit against her for ejectment. Evarista Robles sued Lizarraga Hermanos afterwards to
recover the value of the improvements.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Evarista Robles is the owner of the aforesaid improvements and has the right to demand
payment of their value.
2.) Whether or not she has any right to retain the building until the said value is paid to her.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Robles is the owner of the improvements. The expenditures incurred in these improvements
were not necessary inasmuch as without them the house would have continued to stand just as before, but
were useful, inasmuch as with them the house better serves the purpose for which it was intended, being
used as a residence, and the improvements consisting of the addition of a dining room, kitchen, closet, and
bathroom in the lower and upper stories of the house, and a stable, suitable as a coach house and dwelling, it
is beyond doubt that such improvements are useful to the building. Since the improvements are useful and
Robles possession is in good faith, applying Article 453, it is beyond question that Evarista Robles is the
owner of such improvements, and entitled to reimbursement therefor.
2.) Yes. It is a fact that the value of the improvements in question has not as yet been paid by Lizarraga
Hermanos. Wherefore, if Evarista Robles and her husband are entitled to retain the building until the value of
such improvements is paid them, Lizarraga Hermanos have not yet any right to oust them from the building,
nor, therefore, to be indemnified for any damages caused by the refusal of the plaintiffs found on their
legitimate rights. Hence, due to the non-reimbursement of the aforesaid useful expenditures, the possessor
in good faith has the right of retention until she has been fully reimbursed with the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court correctly declared the amount to be paid as "indemnizacion" in the
form of necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant.
HELD: Yes. Article 361 of the Civil Code in the original Spanish text uses the word "indemnizacion." However
one may speculate as to the true meaning of the term "indemnizacion" whether correctly translated as
"compensation" or "indemnity," the amount of the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures
mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the present case is the amount of the necessary
and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. Necessary expenses have been variously described by the
Spanish commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing; as those without which the thing
would deteriorate or be lost; as those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded.
Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation, production, upkeep, etc. Here the
plaintiffs have chosen to take the improvements introduced on the land and are disposed to pay the amount
of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by the defendant. Inasmuch as the retentionist, who is not
exactly a posessor in good faith with in the meaning of the law, seeks to be reimbursed for the necessary and
useful expenditures, it is only just that he should account to the owners of the estate for any rents, fruits, or
crops he has gathered from it.
28
SILHOUETTE as vendee with interest at 12% per annum. The balance was also secured by an irrevocable
letter of credit. A Supplemental Agreement was forged between petitioner MWSS and respondent
SILHOUETTE on August 11, 1983 to accurately identify the subject property. Subsequently, respondent
SILHOUETTE, under a deed of sale dated July 26, 1984, sold to respondent AYALA about sixty-seven (67)
hectares of the subject property at P110.00 per square meter. Of the total price of around P74 Million, P25
Million was to be paid by respondent AYALA directly to petitioner MWSS for respondent SILHOUETTE's
account and P2 Million directly to respondent SILHOUETTE. P11,600,000 was to be paid upon the issuance of
title in favor of respondent AYALA, and the remaining balance to be payable within one (1) year with 12% per
annum interest. Respondent AYALA developed the land it purchased into a prime residential area now known
as the Ayala Heights Subdivision. Almost a decade later, petitioner MWSS on March 26, 1993 filed an action
against all herein named respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking for the
declaration of nullity of the MWSS-SILHOUETTE sales agreement and all subsequent conveyances involving
the subject property, and for the recovery thereof with damages.
taking into consideration that a stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of
the corporation, for if it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious violation of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not MWSS failed to provide appropriate security measures over its own records;
Circumstances led NBI to believe that the fraudulent encashment as an inside job.
FACTS: Jose Hemedes, father of Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a
document entitled "Donation Inter Vivos with Resolutory Conditions" whereby he conveyed ownership over
the subject land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kausapin, subject to the
following resolutory conditions that upon her death or marriage, the donee shall revert the said property to
anyone of Jose Hemedes children. On September 27, 1960 a "Deed of Conveyance of Unregistered Real
Property by Reversion" was made conveying to Maxima Hemedes. She had it titled and mortgage it to R & B
Insurance with an annotation of Usufruct in favor of her stepmother, Justa Kausapin. Unable to pay the
mortgage, R & B Insurance extra-judicially foreclosed the property. However, Justa Kausapin executed
another agreement or Kasunduan on May 27, 1971 to his stepson, Enrique D. Hemedes. He obtained tax
declarations and pay realty taxes from thereon. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform Office conducted a cadastral
survey and indicated Enrique Hemedes as the owner. Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty
Const. Corp. (Dominium), a sister company of Asia Brewery. Asia Brewery started to introduce some
improvements already when R & B insurance informed them that they are the owners of the property where
these improvements are being built.
HELD: Yes. The records likewise show that MWSS failed to provide appropriate security measures over its
own records thereby laying confidential records open to unauthorized persons. MWSS's own Fact Finding
Committee, in its report submitted to their General Manager underscored this laxity of records control. It
observed that the "office of Mr. Ongtengco (Cashier VI of the Treasury Department at the NAWASA) is quite
open to any person known to him or his staff members and that the check writer is merely on top of his table.
Relying on the foregoing statement of Mr. Ongtengco, the NBI concluded in its Report dated 2 November
1970 that the fraudulent encashment of the 23 checks in question was an "inside job". Thus the NBI believe
that the fraudulent act was an inside job or one pulled with inside connivance at NAWASA. The serial numbers
of the checks in question conform with the numbers in current use of NAWASA, aside from the fact that these
fraudulent checks were found to be of the same kind and design as that of NAWASA's own checks. While
knowledge as to such facts may be obtained through the possession of a NAWASA check of current issue, an
outsider without information from the inside can not possibly pinpoint which of NAWASA's various accounts
has sufficient balance to cover all these fraudulent checks. None of these checks, it should be noted, was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
Bachrach v. Seifert and Elianoff
G.R. No. L-2659, October 12, 1950, 87 Phil. 483
Ozaeta, J.
FACTS: The deceased E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in
his last will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate. The estate of
E. M. Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co., Inc., received from
the latter 54,000 shares representing 50 per cent stock dividend on the said 108,000 shares. On June 10,
1948, Mary McDonald Bachrach, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower court to
authorize the Peoples Bank and Trust Company, as administrator of the estate of E. M. Bachrach, to transfer
to her the said 54,000 shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate
of stock, claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore
belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant. Sophie Seifert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased,
opposed said petition on the ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of
the capital and therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. While appellants admit
that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but merely represents an
addition to the invested capital.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dividend is an income and whether it should go to the usufructuary.
HELD: Yes. The usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the
property in usufruct. The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of
stock dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the
certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares may be sold
independently of the original shares, just as the offspring of a domestic animal may be sold independently of
its mother. If the dividend be in fact a profit, although declared in stock, it should be held to be income. A
dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and, consequently, should go to the usufructuary,
Under the Massachusetts rule, a stock dividend is considered part of the capital and belongs to the
remainderman; while under the Pennsylvania rule, all earnings of a corporation, when declared as dividends in
whatever form, made during the lifetime of the usufructuary, belong to the latter. The Pennsylvania rule is
more in accord with our statutory laws than the Massachusetts rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes was valid.
HELD: No. The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA. It held that Maxima failed to
comply with the requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to repudiate Justa Kausapins
allegation that she did not execute such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for the loan.
It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima was spurious and it follows that the original title she had
for the property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin
executed an affidavit to affirm the authenticity of the the kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Enrique
Hemedes whom she is dependent from for her financial support.
29
by virtue of a final judgment entered in Civil Case No. 1659 of the Court of First Instance of Manila between
the usufructuary and the owner, the former has the right to collect all the rents of said property for herself
with the obligation on her part to pay all the real estate taxes, special assessments, and insurance premiums,
and make all necessary repairs thereon, and in case default on her part the owner shall have the right to do
all those things, in which event he shall be entitled to collect all subsequent rents of the property concerned
until the amount paid by him and the expenses of collection are fully satisfied, after which the usufructuary
shall again collect the rents. There is therefore no dispute as to the title to or the respective interests of the
parties in the property in question. The naked title to the property is to admittedly in the respondent Juan
Grey, but the right to all the rents thereof, with the obligation to pay the taxes and insurance premiums and
make the necessary repairs, is, also admittedly, vested in the usufructuary, the petitioner Josefa Fabie, during
her lifetime.
Construing said judgment in the light of the ninth clause of the will of the deceased Rosario Fabie y Grey,
which was quoted in the decision and by which Josefa Fabie was made by the usufructuary during her lifetime
of the income of the property in question, we find that the said usufructuary has the right to administer the
property in question. All the acts of administration to collect the rents for herself, and to conserve the
property by making all necessary repairs and paying all the taxes, special assessments, and insurance
premiums thereon were by said judgment vested in the usufructuary
is to defeat the desire and the dying wish of the testator to reward him for his faithful and unselfish services
rendered during the time when said testator was seriously ill or bed-ridden.
Locsin v. Valenzuela
G.R. No. L-51333, May 18, 1989, 173 SCRA 454
Feliciano, J.
FACTS: Petitioners were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land known as Hacienda Villa Regalado. A
portion of this land known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 was subject to lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen
Schon. The bulk of this lot was cultivated by the lessees who customarily delivered the rentals to respondent.
In 1972, PD 27 was enacted, decreasing the Emancipation of Tenants. The tract of land owned in common
by the petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to petitioners usufructuary rights, fell within the scope
of the Operation Land Transfer. Petitioners sought the opinion of the Department of Agrarian Reform(DAR)
as to who should be entitled to receive the rental payments which continued to be made by the tenants to
respondent. The DAR District Officer rendered the opinion that the rental payments were properly considered
as amortization payments for the land and as such should pertain to the landowners and not the usufructuary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the usufructuary was extinguished by PD 27 and who, between the naked owner and
the usufructuary, should be entitled to the amounts paid by the tenants beginning October 21, 1972.
HELD: Yes. The usufruct which had therefore existed as a jus in re aliena in favour of Helen Schon was
effectively extinguished by PD 27. To hold, as private respondent apparently urges would obviously defeat the
purpose of the land reform statute. PD 27 was enacted to emancipate the tenants from bondage of the soil
by giving to the tenant-farmers ownership of the land which they were cultivating. Ownership over the lands
subjected to the Operation Land Transfer moved from the registered owner to the tenants. The Court holds
that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land reform area and subjected to the Operation Land
Transfer, the payments made on October 21, 1972 by the tenant-farmers constituted amortization payments
on the cost of the land that they were required to pay under PD 27. These payments, therefore, legally
pertain to the petitioners as part of the compensation for the dominion over the land of which they were
deprived of by operation of PD 27.
Valisno v. Adriano
G.R. No. L-37409, May 23, 1988, 161 SCRA 398
Grino Aquino, J.
FACTS: Plaintiff appellant Nicolas Valisno alleges that he is the owner of a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija
which he bought from his sister, Honorata Adriano Francisco. Said land is planted with watermelon, peanuts,
corn, tobacco and other vegetables and adjoins the land of Felipe Adriano, on the bank of the Pampanga
River. At the time of the sale of the land to Valisno, the land was irrigated by water from the Pampanga River
through a canal about 70 meters long, traversing Adrianos land. Later, Adriano levelled a portion of the
irrigation canal so that Valisno was deprived of the irrigation water and prevented from cultivating his 57
hectare land. Thus, Valisno filed a complaint for deprivation of waters rights in the Bureau of Public Works
and Communications (Bureau PWC). Bureau PWC ruled in favour of Valisno. Instead of restoring the
irrigation canal, Adriano asked for a reinvestigation of the case which was granted. In the meantime, Valisno
rebuilt the irrigation canal at his own expense due to his urgent need to irrigate his watermelon fields. Valisno
then filed a complaint for damages. However, the Secretary of Bureau PWC reversed its decision and
dismissed Valisnos complaint. It held that Eladio Adrianos water rights which had been granted in1923
ceased to be enjoyed by him in 1936 or 1937, when his irrigation canal collapsed. His non-use of the water
rights since then for a period of more than five years extinguished the grant by operation of law. Hence, the
water rights did not form part of his hereditary estate which his heirs partitioned among themselves. Likewise,
Valisno, as vendee of the land which Honorata received from her fathers estate did not acquire any water
rights with the land purchased. The trial court held that Valisno had no right to pass through the defendant's
land to draw water from the Pampanga River. It pointed out that under Section 4 of the Irrigation Law,
controversies between persons claiming a right to water from a stream are within the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Bureau-PWC and his decision on the matter is final, unless an appeal is taken to the proper court
within thirty days. The court may not pass upon the validity of the decision of the Public Works Secretary
30
collaterally. Furthermore, there was nothing in Valisnos evidence to show that the resolution was not valid. It
dismissed the complaint and counterclaim. Valisnos motion for reconsideration was denied, and he appealed
to the Court of the Appeals who certified the case to the Supreme Court.
The plaintiff claims that he has already acquired the easement of right of way over the land thru prescription
by his continuous and uninterrupted use of the narrow strip of land as passage way. However, plaintiffs
complaint was dismissed by the CFI.
ISSUE: Whether the provisions of the Irrigation Act (Act No. 2152) or those of the Civil Code should apply to
this case.
HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code shall apply. The existence of the irrigation canal on Adrianos land for
the passage of water from the Pampanga River to Honorata's land prior to and at the time of the sale of
Honorata's land to Valisno was equivalent to a title for the vendee of the land to continue using it as provided
in Article 624 of the Civil Code: The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner of both shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a
title in order that he easement may continue actively and passively, unless at the time, theownership of the
two estates is divided, the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign
aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in case of the
division of a thing owned in common on by two or more persons (Civil Code).
This provision was lifted from Article 122 of the Spanish Law of Waters which provided: Whenever a tract of
irrigated land which previously received its waters from a single point is divided through inheritance, sale or
by virtue of some other title, between two or more owners, the owners of the higher estates are under
obligation to give free passage to the water as an easement of conduit for the irrigation of the lower estates,
and without right to any compensation therefore unless otherwise stipulated in the deed of conveyance.
The deed of sale in favor of Valisno included the "conveyance and transfer of the water rights and
improvements" appurtenant to Honorata Adriano's property. By the terms of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the
vendor Honorata Adriano Francisco sold, ceded, conveyed and transferred to Dr. Nicolas Valisno all "rights,
title, interest and participations over the parcel of land above- described, together with one Berkely Model 6
YRF Centrifugal Pump G" suction, 6" discharge 500-1500 GPM, with Serial No. 5415812 and one (1) set of
suction pipe and discharge of pipe with elbow, nipples, flanges and footvalves," and the water rights and such
other improvements appertaining to the property subject of this sale. According to Valisno, the water right
was the primary consideration for his purchase of Honorata's property, for without it the property would be
unproductive.
Water rights, such as the right to use a drainage ditch for irrigation purposes, which are appurtenant to a
parcel of land, pass with the conveyance of the land, although not specifically mentioned in the conveyance.
The purchaser's easement of necessity in a water ditch running across the grantor's land cannot be defeated
even if the water is supplied by a third person. The fact that an easement by grant may also have qualified as
an easement of necessity does detract from its permanency as property right, which survives the
determination of the necessity. As an easement of waters in favor of Valisno has been established, he is
entitled to enjoy it free from obstruction, disturbance or wrongful interference (19 CJ 984), such as Adrianos
act of levelling the irrigation canal to deprive him of the use of water from the Pampanga River.
HELD: No. The Court held than an easement of right of way may not be acquired thru prescription because
though it may be apparent, it is nevertheless discontinuous or intermittent, and therefore, under Article 622 of
the New Civil Code, can be acquired only by a virtue of a title. Furthermore, a right of way cannot be acquired
by prescription because prescription requires that the possession be continuous and uninterrupted.
Taedo v. Bernad
G.R. No. L-66520 August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 86
Padilla, J.
FACTS: Private respondent Antonio Cardenas owned Lot 7501-A and Lot 7501-B. On the said two lots, a
septic tank was constructed for the common use of the occupants of both lots. Cardenas sold Lot 7501-A to
herein petitioner Taedo and the other Lot 7501-B was also mortgaged to Taedo as a security for the
payment of loan with an agreement that Cardenas would only sell Lot 7501-B to him. However, said Lot 7501B was sold to herein respondent Spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim. Upon learning of the said sale, Taedo
offered to redeem the property from Sim but the latter refused. Instead, Sim blocked the sewage pipe
connecting the building of Eduardo Taedo built on Lot 7501-A, to the septic tank in Lot 7501-B. He also
asked Taedo to remove that portion of his building enroaching on Lot 7501-B. Taedo was then constrained
to file an action for legal redemption and damages invoking Article 1622 of the Civil Code. On the other hand,
respondent Spouses claimed they are the absolute owners of Lot 7501-B and that Eduardo Taedo has no
right to redeem the land under Art. 1622 of the Civil Code as the land sought to be redeemed is much bigger
than the land owned by Taedo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners right to continue to use the septic tank, erected on Lot 7501-B,
ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its subsequent sale to different owners who do not have the
same interest.
HELD: No. Applying Article 631 and 624 of the Civil Code, no statement abolishing or extinguishing the
easement of drainage was mentioned in the deed of sale of Lot 7501-A to Eduardo Taedo. Nor did Antonio
Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe and septic tank by the occupants of Lot 7501-A before he sold said lot
to Eduardo Tafiedo. Hence, the use of the septic tank is continued by operation of law. Accordingly, the
spouses Romeo and Pacita Sim the new owners of the servient estate (Lot 7501- B), cannot impair, in any
manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude.
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The CFI rendered a decision on March 15, 1984 finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested
right over the passageway in controversy based on its long existence and its continued use and enjoyment by
the private respondents and also by the community at large. On appeal, Appellate Court held as without basis
the trial court's finding that the private respondents had acquired a vested right over the passageway in
question by virtue of prescription. The appellate court pointed out that an easement of right of way is a
discontinuous one which, under Article 622 of the New Civil Code, may only be acquired by virtue of a title
and not by prescription. That notwithstanding, the appellate court went on to rule that ". . . in the interest of
justice and in the exercise by this Court of its equity jurisdiction, there is no reason for Us in not treating the
easement here sought by appellees Katipunan Lumber Co., Inc. and Perfecta Guangco as one that is not
dependent upon the claims of the parties but a compulsory one that is legally demandable by the owner of
the dominant estate from the owner of the servient estate."
ISSUE: Whether or not the easement may be granted to private respondent over the land of Costabella.
HELD: No. It is already well-established that an easement of right of way, as is involved here, is
discontinuous and as such can not be acquired by prescription. Insofar therefore as the appellate court
adhered to the foregoing precepts, it stood correct. Unfortunately, after making the correct pronouncement,
the respondent Appellate Court did not order the reversal of the trial court's decision and the dismissal of the
complaint after holding that no easement had been validly constituted over the petitioner's property. Instead,
the Appellate Court went on to commit a reversible error by considering the passageway in issue as a
compulsory easement which the private respondents, as owners of the "dominant" estate, may demand from
the petitioner the latter being the owner of the "servient" estate.
Based on Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, the owner of the dominant estate may validly claim a
compulsory right of way only after he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit: (1) the
(dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2)
after payment of the proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and (4) the
right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate. In the case at bar, there is absent
any showing that the private respondents had established the existence of the four requisites mandated by
law.
to the highway thereby when an estate has no access to a public road, it may demand for a right of way.
Furthermore, under Article 651 of the Civil Code, it is the needs of the dominant property which ultimately
determine the width of the right of way. In this case, since the business of the petitioner grew larger and
pushcarts became tedious to transport his nursery plants, it became necessary for him to do so with a
jeepney. And in order to efficiently make such transportation of his plants, the right of way had to be widened
to accommodate the width of the jeepney of the petitioner. The petitioner thus shall be granted the additional
land to the existing right of way.
Choco v. Santamaria
G.R. No. 6076, December 29, 1911, 21 Phil. 132
Mapa, J.
FACTS: The defendant in the building of his house, has made several openings and windows in the walls of
the house on both sides overlooking then property of the plaintiff; that at the time the defendant was building
his house, and the windows and the openings were being made, the plaintiffs protested, and later on and in
the year 1905 made written protest and demand on the defendant, and the defendant received the written
protest and referred it to his counsel, who, from the evidence, appears to have suggested an amicable and
32
adjustment of the matter, but the adjustment was not made, and this action was brought. The Trial Court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Severina and Flora Choco, and against the defendant, Isidro
Santamaria, forever prohibiting the opening of the window stated, which must be closed, and forever
prohibiting the opening of the windows and openings marked, which must be closed or made to conform to
the requirements of law with regard to dimensions and an iron grate embedded in the wall, with the costs of
the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred by not ordering in his judgment the final and perpetual closing
of the large window opened in the balcony of the back part of the appellee's house and that, though the
appellant's lot can be seen through the window, it is not contiguous to the latter's property.
HELD: To judge from the photographic views, it opens on the boundary line between the said lot and that the
appellee and is situated perpendicularly above a part of the wall that belongs to the appellants. This opinion is
corroborated by the testimony of the defendant's witness who took the said photographs, in so far as he said
that "a part of the window in question is in front of the plaintiffs' property, since between it and the plaintiffs'
property there does not intervene the distance required by law that of two meters in the first case, and 60
centimeters in the second, therefore, its opening is a manifest violation of the provisions of article 582 of the
Civil Code which reads as follows: Windows with direct views, or balconies or any similar openings projecting
over the estate of the neighbor, cannot be made if there is not a distance of, at least, 2 meters between the
wall in which they are built and said estate. Neither can side nor oblique views be opened over said property,
unless there is a distance of 60 centimeters. Because of the lack of the distance required by law, the window
in question must be closed, and consequently the judgment appealed from should be modified in this sense,
as regards this window.
Floro v. Llenado
G.R. No. 75723, June 2, 1995, 244 SCRA 713
Romeo, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Simeon Floro is the owner of Floro Park Subdivision who has its own egress and ingress to
and from the Mac Arthur Highway by means of its Road Lot 4 and the PNR level crossing. On the other hand,
Respondent Orlando Llenado, is the registered owner of Llenado Homes Subdivision, adjacent to Floro Park
Subdivision. Prior to its purchase by Llenado, the land was known as the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision, a duly
licensed and registered housing subdivision in the name of Soledad Ortega. Bounded on the South by the 5 to
6 meter-wide Palanas Creek, which separates it from the Floro Park Subdivision, and on the west by ricelands
belonging to Marcial Ipapo. the Llenado Homes does not have any existing road or passage to the Mac Arthur
Highway. However, a proposed access road traversing the idle riceland of Marcial Ipapo has been specifically
provided in the subdivision plan of the Emmanuel Homes Subdivision which was duly approved by the defunct
Human Settlement Regulatory Commission. Meanwhile, the Llenados sought, and were granted permission by
the Floros to use Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision as passageway to and from MacArthur
Highway. However no contract of easement of right of way was ever perfected by both parties. Later, Floro
barricaded Road Lot 5 with a pile of rocks, wooden posts and adobe stones, thereby preventing its use by the
Llenados. Llenado instituted a complaint before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan against Floro for easement of
right of way. The RTC granted the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and
ordered Floro to open the road and pay damages. Thereafter, the trial court rendered another judgment
dismissing the case and lifting the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued and ordered the
plaintiff to pay defendant damages and costs. On appeal by Llenado on the CA, the judgment of the RTC was
reversed ordering Floro to open roads 4 and 5 and remove all the objects that prevent passage on road 5 and
to pay the plaintiff damages with costs and payment of indemnity for the easement of right of way.
ISSUE: Whether or not Llenado is entitled to a compulsory easement of right of way.
HELD: No. For the Llenados to be entitled to a compulsory servitude of right of way under the Civil Code, the
preconditions provided under Articles 649 and 650 thereof must be established. These preconditions are: (1)
that the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway
(Art. 649, par. 1); (2) after payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, par. 1); (3) that the isolation was not due
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate (Art. 649, last par.); and, (4) that the right of way claimed is
at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
The burden of proving the existence of the prerequisites to validly claim a compulsory right of way lies on the
owner of the dominant estate. On the past subdivision plans by Emmanuel Homes which is bought by
Llenado, there is an indication of an access road through IPAPOs property although it was not properly
paved, a dirt road will suffice. Seeing this, Llenado has failed to comply with the first requirement. If the
servitude requested by Llenado is allowed, other subdivision developers/owners would be encouraged to
hastily prepare a subdivision plan with fictitious provisions for access roads merely for registration purposes.
Furthermore, if such practice were tolerated, the very purpose for which Presidential Decree No. 957 was
enacted, that is, to protect subdivision buyers from unscrupulous subdivision owners/developers who renege
on their duties to develop their subdivisions in accordance with the duly approved subdivision plans, would be
defeated.
In order to justify the imposition of the servitude of right of way, there must be a real, not a fictitious or
artificial necessity for it. Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis
for setting up a compulsory easement. Even in the face of a necessity, if it can be satisfied without imposing
the servitude, the same should not be imposed.
The complaint for easement of right of way filed by Llenado in the lower court did not contain a prayer for the
fixing of the amount that he must pay Floro in the event that the easement of right of way is constituted.
Thus, the existence of the second requisite has likewise not been established. Private respondent Llenado
admitted that the Ipapo riceland was no longer being cultivated. Indications are that it has already been
abandoned as a ricefield. There was no reason for private respondent's failure to develop the right of way
except the inconvenience and expenses it would cost him. Hence, the third requisite has not been met. Failing
to establish the existence of the prerequisites under Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, private respondent
Llenado's bid for a compulsory easement of right of way over Road Lots 4 and 5 of the Floro Park Subdivision
must fail.
33
land adjoining the plaintiff on the same street where a sixty storey concrete building was constructed.
Plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to observe the necessary care and precautions to protect the
construction of the plaintiffs by depriving it of sufficient lateral or subjacent support, thereby causing it to sink
in some parts; its walls, ceilings, and floorings to crack in some places; and by the careless manner of
handling the cement used the roofings of the building of the plaintiff were damaged with the accumulated
debris piled thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not proper precautions had been taken by the defendants in constructing the building in
question so as to prevent causing damage to the building of the plaintiff.
HELD: No. Article 684 of the New Civil Code provides No property shall make such excavations upon his land
as to deprive any adjacent land or building sufficient lateral or subjacent support. A reading of Article 684
shows that the duty of an adjacent owner not to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or
subjacent support is an absolute one. It does not depend on the degree of care and precaution made by the
proprietor in making the excavation or building on his land. Plaintiffs house which adjoins the seven storey
concrete building constructed by the defendants had sunk by about eight inches. The sinking of the left side
of the house of the plaintiffs was due to the weakening of subjacent support and to the weight of the seven
storey concrete building constructed by the defendant, as the excavation made necessarily disturbed the
subjacent soil of the plaintiffs land. Defendants having failed to provide the plaintiffs land and house with
sufficient lateral and subjacent support are liable for damages.
34
made provisions for its observance by all whom in the future might succeed them in dominion. It is thus very
apparent that the parties and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an easement of
right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual benefit, both as dominant and servient estates.
With this, the free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement between
Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with the
corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same.
LA VISTA contends that there are other routes to LOYOLA from Mangyan Road, however, this should not be
taken into consideration since the opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish only legal or
compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant
may have also qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a property
right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
In conclusion, none of the petitioners is qualified to exercise the right of first refusal under PD No. 1517.
There was also no intention on the part of Reta to sell the property. Hence, even if the petitioners had the
right of first refusal, the situation which would allow the exercise of that right, that is, the sale or intended
sale of the land has not happened. PD No. 1517 applies where the owner of the property intends to sell it to
a third party.
Villanueva v. Velasco
G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000, 346 SCRA 99
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Bryan Villanueva is the registered owner of the parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 127862 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. He bought it from Pacific Banking
Corporation, the mortgagee of said property. When petitioner bought the parcel of land there was a small
house on its southeastern portion. It occupied one meter of the two-meter wide easement of right of way the
Gabriel spouses granted to the Espinolas, predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, in a Contract of
Easement of Right of Way. Unknown to petitioner, even before he bought the land, the Gabriels had
constructed the aforementioned small house that encroached upon the two-meter easement. Petitioner was
also unaware that private respondents, Julio Sebastian and Shirley Lorilla, had filed on May 8, 1991 for
easement. As successors-in-interest, Sebastian and Lorilla wanted to enforce the contract of easement. On
August 13, 1991, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued, ordering the Gabriels to provide the
right of way and to demolish the small house encroaching on the easement. On January 5, 1995, Judge Tirso
Velasco issued an Alias Writ of Demolition. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a Third Party Claim with Prayer to
Quash Alias Writ of Demolition. He maintains that the writ of demolition could not apply to his property since
he was not a party to the civil case.
35
Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, Metro Manila
G.R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 235
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS: Respondent Municipality of Pasig needed an access road from E.R. Santos Street, a municipal road
near the Pasig Public Market to Barangay Sto. Tomas Bukid, Pasig where 60 to 70 houses, mostly made of
light materials, were located. The road has to be at least three meters in width, as required by the Fire Code,
so that fire trucks could pass through in case of conflagration. Likewise, the residents in the area needed the
road for water and electrical outlets. The municipality then decided to acquire 51 square meters out of the
36
1,791 square meter property of Lorenzo Ching Cuanco, Victor Ching Cuanco and Ernesto Ching Cuanco Kho,
which is abutting E.R. Santos Street.
Meanwhile, the Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig approved an Ordinance authorizing the municipal mayor to
initiate expropriation proceedings to acquire the said property and appropriate the fund therefore. The
ordinance stated that the property owners were notified of the municipalitys intent to purchase the property
for public use as an access road but they rejected the offer. The municipality then filed a complaint against
the Cuancos for the expropriation of the property under Section 19 of the Republic Act No. 7160 or otherwise
known as the Local Government Code. The Cuancos then contended that they had sold the said property to
petitioner Jesus is the Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. (JILCSFI) as evidenced by a deed of sale. When
apprised about the complaint, petitioner JILCSFI filed a motion for leave to intervene as defendant-inintervention which was granted.
The petitioner JILCSFI asserted that the respondent must comply with the requirements for the establishment
of an easement of right-of-way, more specifically, the road must be constructed at the point lease prejudicial
to the servient state, and that there must be no adequate outlet to a public highway. The petitioner also
claimed that the portion of the lot sought to be expropriated is located at the middle protion of the petitioners
entire parcel of land, thereby splitting the lot into two halves, and making it impossible for the petitioner to
put up its school building and worship center.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner JILCSFIs contentions are tenable.
HELD: No. The subject property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road. The respondent is not
mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right-of-way under the New Civil Code.
Case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may
determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly
injurious. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public
character. Governmentmay not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
The respondent has demonstrated the necessity for constructing a road from E.R. Santos Street to Sto. Tomas
Bukid. The witnesses, who were residents of Sto. Tomas Bukid, testified that although there were other ways
through which one can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area
except through the newly constructed Damayan Street. This is more than sufficient to establish that there is a
genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area. After all, absolute necessity is not required, only
reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. Nonetheless, the respondent failed to show the necessity for
constructing the road particularly in the petitioners property and not elsewhere. We note that the wheras
clause of the ordinance states that the 51-square meter lot is the shortest and most suitable access road to
connect Sto. Tomas Bukid to E.R. Santos Street. The respondents complaint also alleged that the said portion
of the petitioners lot has been surveyed as the best possible ingress and egress. However, the respondent
failed to adduce a preponderance of evidence.
Acap v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118114, December 7, 1995, 251 SCRA 30
Padilla, J.
FACTS: The title to Lot 1130 of the Cadastral Survey of Hinigaran, Negros Occidental was evidenced by OCT
R-12179. The lot has an area of 13,720 sq. m. The title was issued and is registered in the name of spouses
Santiago Vasquez and Lorenza Oruma. After both spouses died, their only son Felixberto inherited the lot. In
1975, Felixberto executed a duly notarized document entitled Declaration of Heirship and Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Cosme Pido. Since 1960, Teodoro Acap had been the tenant of a portion of the said land,
covering an area of 9,500 sq. m. When ownership was transferred in 1975 by Felixberto to Cosme Pido, Acap
continued to be the registered tenant thereof and religiously paid his leasehold rentals to Pido and thereafter,
upon Pidos death, to his widow Laurenciana. The controversy began when Pido died interstate and on 27
November 1981, his surviving heirs executed a notarized document denominated as Declaration of Heirship
and Waiver of Rights of Lot 1130 Hinigaran Cadastre, wherein they declared to have adjudicated upon
themselves the parcel of land in equal share, and that they waive, quitclaim all right, interests and
participation over the parcel of land in favor of Edy de los Reyes. The document was signed by all of Pidos
heirs. Edy de los Reyes did not sign said document. It will be noted that at the time of Cosme Pidos death,
title to the property continued to be registered in the name of the Vasquez spouses. Upon obtaining the
Declaration of Heirship with Waiver of Rights in his favor, de los Reyes filed the same with the Registry of
Deeds as part of a notice of an adverse claim against the original certificate of title. Thereafter, delos Reyes
sought for Acap to personally inform him that he had become the new owner of the land and that the lease
rentals thereon should be paid to him. Delos Reyes alleged that he and Acap entered into an oral lease
agreement wherein Acap agreed to pay 10 cavans of palay per annum as lease rental. In 1982, Acap allegedly
complied with said obligation. In 1983, however, Acap refused to pay any further lease rentals on the land,
prompting delos Reyes to seek the assistance of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) in Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental. The MAR invited Acap, who sent his wife, to a conference scheduled on 13 October 1983.
The wife stated that the she and her husband did not recognize delos Reyess claim of ownership over the
land. On 28 April 1988, after the lapse of four (4) years, delos Reyes filed a complaint for recovery of
possession and damages against Acap, alleging that as his leasehold tenant, Acap refused and failed to pay
the agreed annual rental of 10 cavans of palay despite repeated demands. On 20 August 1991.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject declaration of heirship and waiver of rights is a recognized mode of
acquiring ownership by private respondent over the lot in question.
HELD: An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over a thing arising from a juridical act,
however justified, is not per se sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be
completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real rights are acquired only
pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of
acquisition or transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are generally classified into two (2)
classes, namely, the original mode (i.e., through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual
creation) and the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a result of certain
contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or mutuum).
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature and effect of the Declaration of
Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same. In a
Contract of Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing, and the other party to pay a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand,
a declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument when filed with the Registry of
Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as
they see fit. It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary rights. The
first presumes the existence of a contract or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically
speaking, a mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional relinquishment of a
known right with knowledge of its existence and intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are
co-heirs in the succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of Cosme Pido, cannot
conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the sole basis of the waiver document which neither
recites the elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring ownership.
De Luna v. Abrigo
G.R. No. L-57455, January 18, 1990, 181 SCRA 150
Medialdea, J.
FACTS: Prudencio de Luna donated a portion of a lot of the Cadastral Survey of Lucena to the Luzonian
University Foundation. The donation was embodied in a Deed of Donation Intervivos and made subject to
certain terms and conditions and provided for the automatic reversion to the donor of the donated property in
case of violation or non-compliance. The foundation failed to comply with the conditions of the donation. De
Luna "revived" the said donation in favor of the foundation, in a document entitled "Revival of Donation
Intervivos" subject to terms and conditions which among others, required it to construct a chapel, a nursery
and a kindergarten school in the donated property within five (5) years from execution. The automatic
reversion to the donor of the donated area in case of violation of the conditions was also provided. The
foundation, through its president, accepted the donation. A "Deed of Segregation" was later executed by De
Luna and the foundation whereby the area donated was adjudicated to the foundation. The heirs of de Luna
later filed a complaint with the trial court alleging that the terms and conditions of the donation were not
complied with by the foundation. Thus, it prayed for the cancellation of the donation and the reversion of the
37
donated land to the heirs. The foundation invoked, among others, the defense of prescription of action. The
court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that under Article 764 of the New Civil Code, actions to revoke a
donation on the ground of non-compliance with any of the conditions of the donation shall prescribe in four
years (4) counted from such non-compliance. In the instant case, the four-year period for filing the complaint
for revocation commenced on April 9, 1976 and expired on April 9, 1980. Since the complaint was brought on
September 23, 1980 or more than five (5) months beyond the prescriptive period, it was already barred by
prescription.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint is one for judicial decree of revocation of the donation in question as
contemplated in Article 764 of the New Civil Code and which prescribes in four (4) years and not an action to
enforce a written contract which prescribes in ten (10) years.
HELD: The donation subject of this case is one with an onerous cause. It was made subject to the burden
requiring the donee to construct a chapel, a nursery and a kindergarten school in the donated property within
five years from execution of the deed of donation. It is true that under Article 764, actions for the revocation
of a donation must be brought within for (4) years from the non-compliance of the conditions of the donation.
However, the said article does not apply to onerous donations in view of the specific provision of Article 733
providing that onerous donations are governed by the rules on contracts. Therefore, the rules on contracts
and the general rules on prescription and not the rules on donations are applicable in the case at bar.
Furthermore, while the judicial action for the rescission of a contract is generally not necessary where the
contract provides that it may be automatically revoked and cancelled for violation of any of its terms and
conditions, however, where one of the parties contests or denies the rescission, judicial intervention is
necessary not for purposes of obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded
by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial intervention, but in order to determine
whether or not the rescission was proper. Judicial action will be necessary as without it, the extrajudicial
resolution will remain contestable and subject to judicial invalidation, unless attack thereon should become
barred by acquiescence, estoppel or prescription.
In the instant case, trial court was therefore not correct in holding that the complaint is barred by prescription
under Article 764 because Article 764 does not apply to onerous donations. As provided in the donation
executed on April 9, 1971, compliance with the terms and conditions of the contract of donation, shall be
made within five (5) years from its execution. The complaint which was filed on September 23, 1980 was then
well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period to enforce a written contract pursuant to Article 1144 par. 1,
counted from April 9, 1976.
donation and the statements contained therein and not the title that should be considered in ascertaining the
intent of the donor. In the case, the donor used the term donation Mortis Causa but from the stipulations of
the deed, it can be clearly inferred that he was actually executing a donation Inter Vivos to Ursula.
The transfer of ownership over the properties donated to Ursula was immediate and independent of the death
of Dr. Pascual since it was a donation Inter Vivos. The provision as regards the reservation of properties for
the donor's subsistence in relation to the other provisions of the deed of donation confirms the intention of
the donor to give the naked ownership of the properties to Ursula immediately after the execution of the deed
of donation. Hence, he could not have donated the property again in 1969 in favor of Parungao since the lot
was already transferred to Ursula at that time.
Reyes v. Mosqueda
G.R. No. L-45262, July 23, 1990
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
HELD: In the present case, it is scarcely disputable that Lopez would not have conveyed the property in
question had he known that appellant would refuse to cohabit with him. The cohabitation was an implied
condition to the donation, and being unlawful, necessarily tainted the donation itself.
FACTS: On May 15, 1969, Dr. Emilio Pascual executed a Deed of Donation of real property located at 11091111 R. Papa St. Tondo, Manila in favor of Ofelia Parungao, a minor, with her mother, Rosario Duncil,
accepting the gift and donation for and in her behalf. However, Ursula Pascual alleged that Dr. Pascual during
his lifetime on November 2, 1966 executed a Donation mortis causa in her favor covering the said property.
Parungao, upon reaching the age of majority was able to register the Deed of Donation with the Register of
Deeds in Manila and was issued a TCT.
The rule that parties to an illegal contract, if equally guilty, will not be aided by the law but will both be left
where it finds them, has been interpreted by this Court as barring the party from pleading the illegality of the
bargain either as a cause of action or as a defense. Memo auditor propriam turpitudinem allegans.
On September 23, 1976, Ursula executed a deed of absolute sale over the Tondo property in favor of
Benjamin, Oscar, Jose, and Emmanuel Reyes. Benjamin filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity of the
TCT of Parungao and/or reconveyance of the deed of title. The CFI of Manila declared the TCT in the name of
Parungao null and void and ordered the Register of Deeds to cancel the title. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the 1966 donation to Ursula was inter vivos, which meant that the property was already transferred
to Ursula at that time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Ursula was Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa.
HELD: It was a Donation Inter Vivos. The title given by the donor in the deed of donation is not a
determinative factor which makes the donation inter vivos or mortis causa. It is the body of the document of
The appellant seeks recovery of the disputed land on the strength of a donation regular on its face. To defeat
its effect, the appellees must plead and prove that the same is illegal. But such plea on the part of the Lopez
heirs is not receivable, since Lopez, himself, if living, would be barred from setting up that plea; and his heirs,
as his privies and successors in interest, can have no better rights than Lopez himself.
Appellees, as successors of the late donor, being thus precluded from pleading the defense of immorality or
illegal causa of the donation, the total or partial ineffectiveness of the same must be decided by different legal
principles. In this regard, the Court of Appeals correctly held that Lopez could not donate the entirety of the
property in litigation, to the prejudice of his wife Maria Ngo, because said property was conjugal in character
and the right of the husband to donate community property is strictly limited by law
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void. Salud claimed that no compensation was paid by Claudio and that the transaction was deliberately
concealed from her by her brother and the defendants.
FACTS: Herein private respondent Restituta Tacalinar Guangco de Pombuena received the questioned lot
from her mother Basilides Tacalinar either as a purported donation or by way of purchase with P50 as the
alleged consideration thereof. The donation or sale was consummated while Restituta was already married to
her husband Juan Pombuena. Juan then filed for himself and his supposed co-owner Resitituta an application
for a Torrens Title over the land which was later on granted pronouncing him (married to Resitiuta) as the
owner of the land.
A contract of lease over the lot was entered into between petitioner, Pershing Tan Queto and Restituta with
the consent of her husband for a period of 10 years. The lease of contract having expired, Restituta filed for
unlawful detainer against Tan Queto. The unlawful detainer case was won by the spouses in the Municipal
Court but on appeal in the CFI the entire case was dismissed because of a barter agreement whereby Tan
Queto became the owner of the disputed lot and the spouses became the owners of a parcel of land with the
house thereon previously owned before the barter by Tan Queto. After the barter agreement, Tan Queto
constructed on the disputed land a concrete building without any objection from Restituta. Afterwards
Restituta sued both Juan and Tan Queto for reconveyance of the title over the registered but disputed lot, for
annulment of the barter, and for recovery of the land with damages.
The respondent courts decision which later on was affirmed by the Supreme court led to the reformation of
the Contract of Sale of the disputed lot from Basilides to Restituta from a sale to a conveyance of the share of
Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her parents. Hence, this petition for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the conveyance of the share of Restituta in the future hereditary estate of her
parents was valid hence a paraphernal property.
HELD: No. The court ruled that the land is conjugal, not paraphernal. The oral donation of the lot cannot be a
valid donation intervivos because it was not executed in a public instrument (Art. 749, Civil Code), nor as a
valid donation mortis causa for the formalities of a will were not complied with. The allegation that the
transfer was a conveyance to RESTITUTA of her hereditary share in the estate of her mother (or parents)
cannot be sustained for the contractual transmission of future inheritance is generally prohibited.
The fact is ownership was acquired by both JUAN and RESTITUTA by tradition (delivery) as a consequence of
the contract of sale (See Art. 712, Civil Code) with P50.00 (then a considerable amount) as the cause or
consideration of the transaction. The lot is therefore conjugal, having been acquired by the spouses thru
onerous title (the money used being presumably conjugal there being no proof that RESTITUTA had
paraphernal funds of her own).
HELD: Yes. Felipe and Juana had declared themselves the heirs of Perfecta and the owners of the property in
question. As such, they were free to give the land to whomever they pleased and for whatever reason they
saw fit. Hence, if they choose to respect Perfectas wishes and carry out her intentions by donating the land to
Salud, there was no legal impediment to their doing so. There is no question that Felipe and Juana could have
simply disregarded their sisters sentiments and decided not to donate the property to Salud. The fact that
they did no do this speaks well of their integrity and their loyalty to their deceased sister. The extra-judicial
settlement also reflects their own affection for Salud which constituted the valid consideration for their own
act of liberality.
39
certificate of title which appeared to be valid on its fade and sans any annotation or notice of private
respondents' adverse claim. Contrary therefore to the conclusion of respondent Court, petitioners are
purchasers in good faith and for value as they bought the disputed property without notice that some other
person has a right or interest in such property, and paid a full price for the same at the time of the purchase
or before they had notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the property. And having
established beyond doubt that Helen Doria fraudulently secured her title over the disputed property which she
subsequently sold to petitioners, Helen Doria should instead be adjudged liable to private respondents, and
not to petitioners as declared by the trial court and respondent Court of Appeals, for the resulting damages to
the true owner and original plaintiff, Pedro Calapine.
Petition granted.
Quilala v. Alcantara
G.R. No. 132681, December 3, 2001, 371 SCRA 311
Ynares Santiago, J.
FACTS: On February 20, 1981, Catalina Quilala executed a "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" in favor of
Violeta Quilala over a parcel of land. The "Donation of Real Property Inter Vivos" consists of two pages. The
first page contains the deed of donation itself, and is signed on the bottom portion by Catalina Quilala as
donor, Violeta Quilala as donee, and two instrumental witnesses. The second page contains the
Acknowledgment, which states merely that Catalina Quilala personally appeared before the notary public and
acknowledged that the donation was her free and voluntary act and deed. There appear on the left-hand
margin of the second page the signatures of Catalina Quilala and one of the witnesses, and on the right-hand
margin the signatures of Violeta Quilala and the other witness The deed of donation was registered with the
Register of Deeds and, in due course, TCT No. 17214 was cancelled and TCT No. 143015 was issued in the
name of Violeta Quilala.
On November 7, 1983, Catalina Quilala died. Violeta Quilala likewise died on May 22, 1984. Petitioner Ricky
Quilala alleges that he is the surviving son of Violeta Quilala. Meanwhile, respondents Gliceria Alcantara,
Leonora Alcantara, Ines Reyes and Juan Reyes, claiming to be Catalina's only surviving relatives within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity, executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate, dividing and
adjudicating unto themselves the above-described property.
On September 13, 1984, respondents instituted against petitioner and Guillermo T. San Pedro, the Registrar
of Deeds of Manila, an action for the declaration of nullity of the donation inter vivos. The trial court found
that the deed of donation, although signed by both Catalina and Violeta, was acknowledged before a notary
public only by the donor, Catalina. Consequently, there was no acceptance by Violeta of the donation in a
public instrument, thus rendering the donation null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision affirming with modification the decision of the trial court by dismissing the complaint for lack of cause
of action without prejudice to the filing of probate proceedings of Catalina's alleged last will and testament.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of donation is void for lack of acceptance on the part of the donee Violeta
Quilala.
HELD: No. As stated above, the second page of the deed of donation, on which the Acknowledgment
appears, was signed by the donor and one witness on the left-hand margin, and by the donee and the other
witness on the right hand margin. Surely, the requirement that the contracting parties and their witnesses
should sign on the left-hand margin of the instrument is not absolute. The intendment of the law merely is to
ensure that each and every page of the instrument is authenticated by the parties. The requirement is
designed to avoid the falsification of the contract after the same has already been duly executed by the
parties. Hence, a contracting party affixes his signature on each page of the instrument to certify that he is
agreeing to everything that is written thereon at the time of signing.
Simply put, the specification of the location of the signature is merely directory. The fact that one of the
parties signs on the wrong side of the page does not invalidate the document. The purpose of authenticating
the page is served, and the requirement in the above-quoted provision is deemed substantially complied with.
In the same vein, the lack of an acknowledgment by the donee before the notary public does not also render
the donation null and void. The instrument should be treated in its entirety. It cannot be considered a private
40
document in part and a public document in another part. The fact that it was acknowledged before a notary
public converts the deed of donation in its entirety a public instrument. The fact that the donee was not
mentioned by the notary public in the acknowledgment is of no moment. To be sure, it is the conveyance that
should be acknowledged as a free and voluntary act. In any event, the donee signed on the second page,
which contains the Acknowledgment only. Her acceptance, which is explicitly set forth on the first page of the
notarized deed of donation, was made in a public instrument.
HELD: We resolve these issues in the negative. Art. 1381 of the Civil Code enumerates the contracts which
are rescissible, and among them are "those contracts undertaken in fraud of creditors when the latter cannot
in any other manner collect the claims due them."
The action to rescind contracts in fraud of creditors is known as accion pauliana. For this action to prosper,
the following requisites must be present: (1) the plaintiff asking for rescission has a credit prior to the
alienation, although demandable later; (2) the debtor has made a subsequent contract conveying a
patrimonial benefit to a third person; (3) the creditor has no other legal remedy to satisfy his claim; (4) the
act being impugned is fraudulent; (5) the third person who received the property conveyed, if it is by onerous
title, has been an accomplice in the fraud. The general rule is that rescission requires the existence of
creditors at the time of the alleged fraudulent alienation, and this must be proved as one of the bases of the
judicial pronouncement setting aside the contract. Without any prior existing debt, there can neither be injury
nor fraud. While it is necessary that the credit of the plaintiff in the accion pauliana must exist prior to the
fraudulent alienation, the date of the judgment enforcing it is immaterial. Even if the judgment be subsequent
to the alienation, it is merely declaratory, with retroactive effect to the date when the credit was constituted.
In the instant case, the alleged debt of LIM in favor of petitioner was incurred in August 1990, while the deed
of donation was purportedly executed on 10 August 1989. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner became a
creditor of LIM prior to the celebration of the contract of donation, still her action for rescission would not fare
well because the third requisite was not met. Under Article 1381 of the Civil Code, contracts entered into in
fraud of creditors may be rescinded only when the creditors cannot in any manner collect the claims due
them. It is, therefore, "essential that the party asking for rescission prove that he has exhausted all other
legal means to obtain satisfaction of his claim. 20 Petitioner neither alleged nor proved that she did so. On this
score, her action for the rescission of the questioned deed is not maintainable even if the fraud charged
actually did exist."
Enrique Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty Const. Corp.(Dominium), a sister company of Asia
Brewery. Asia Brewery started to introduce some improvements already when R & B insurance informed
them that they are the owners of the property where these improvements are being built.
ISSUE: Whether or not the kasunduan executed by Justa Kausapin in favor of Enrique D. Hemedes valid.
FACTS: Celestino Arbizo died in 1956 leaving behind a parcel of land having an area of 66,530 square meters.
His heirs plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo extrajudicially settled the
partition of the land with Directo getting 11,426 square meters, Noceda got 13,294 square meters, and Arbizo
got 41,810 square meters. Plaintiff Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda,
who is her nephew being the son of her deceased sister However another extrajudicial settlement-partition
was executed. Three fifths of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda
got only one-fifth each.
HELD: The court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of the CA. It held that Maxima failed to
comply with the requirements of Art. 1332 of the civil code and also failed to repudiate Justa Kausapins
allegation that she did not execute such a deed and she never allowed to use the land as security for the loan.
It was found that the deed of conveyance to Maxima was spurious and it follows that the original title she had
for the property was also null and void so as the mortgage to R & B Insurance. On the other hand, Kausapin
executed an affidavit to affirm the authenticity of the kasundudan in favor of his stepson, Enrique Hemedes
whom she is dependent from for her financial support.
Siguan v. Lim
G.R. No. 134685, November 19, 1999, 318 SCRA 725
Davide, Jr., C.J.
FACTS: On 2 July 1991, a Deed of Donation conveying parcels of land and purportedly executed by LIM on
10 August 1989 in favor of her children, Linde, Ingrid and Neil was registered with the Office of the Register
of Deeds of Cebu City. On 23 June 1993, petitioner filed an accion pauliana against LIM and her children to
rescind the questioned Deed of Donation and to declare as null and void the new transfer certificates of title
issued for the lots covered by the questioned Deed. Petitioner claimed therein that sometime in July 1991,
LIM, through a Deed of Donation, fraudulently transferred all her real property to her children in bad faith and
in fraud of creditors, including her; that LIM conspired and confederated with her children in antedating the
questioned Deed of Donation, to petitioner's and other creditors' prejudice; and that LIM, at the time of the
fraudulent conveyance, left no sufficient properties to pay her obligations. The RTC ruled in favor of Siguan
and rescinded the Contract, but was reversed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Donation executed by respondent may be rescinded for being in fraud of
her alleged creditor.
Sometime in 1981, Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by Directo. Directo fenced the
portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon
three huts. But in 1985, Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by Directo, occupied the three huts (3)
and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate
her land, but the latter refused. Hence, Directo filed a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership
and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Noceda constitute ingratitude to warrant revocation of the donation.
HELD: Yes. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to him by private
respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C which belongs to private
respondent Directo, thus petitioner's act of occupying the portion pertaining to private respondent Directo
without the latter's knowledge and consent is an act of usurpation which is an offense against the property of
the donor and considered as an act of ingratitude of a donee against the donor. The law does not require
conviction of the donee; it is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.
The action to revoke by reason of ingratitude prescribes within one (1) year to be counted from the time (a)
the donor had knowledge of the fact; (b) provided that it was possible for him to bring the action. It is
incumbent upon petitioner to show proof of the concurrence of these two conditions in order that the one (1)
year period for bringing the action be considered to have already prescribed. No competent proof was
adduced by petitioner to prove his allegation.
41
The donation of the first parcel made by the Aquino spouses to petitioners Jose and Anastacia Velasquez who
were then 19 and 10 years old respectively was accepted through their father Cesario Velasquez, and the
acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of donation and made part of it, and was signed
by the donor and the acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery and acceptance of the deed, and the
donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation inter vivos may be revoked only for the reasons
provided in Articles 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.
The donation propter nuptias in favor of Cesario Velasquez and Camila de Guzman over the third and sixth
parcels including a portion of the second parcel became the properties of the spouses Velasquez since 1919.
The deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the other
causes mentioned in Article 86 of the Family Code. The alleged reason for the repudiation of the deed, i.e.,
that the Aquino spouses did not intend to give away all their properties since Anatalia had several children to
support is not one of the grounds for revocation of donation either inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the
donation might be inofficious.
The Escritura compraventa over another portion of the second parcel and the Deed of conveyance dated July
14, 1939 in favor of Cesario and Camila Velasquez over the remaining portion of the second parcel is also
valid. In fact in the deed of sale, the Aquino spouses ratified and confirmed the rights and interests of Cesario
Velasquez and Camila de Guzman including the previous deeds of conveyance over the second parcel in the
complaint and such deed of sale became the basis for the issuance of TCT in the names of Cesario Velasquez
and Camila de Guzman. The best proof of the ownership of the land is the certificate of title and it requires
more than a bare allegation to defeat the face value of TCT which enjoys a legal presumption of regularity of
issuance. Notably, during the lifetime of Cesario Velasquez, he entered into contracts of mortgage and lease
over the property as annotated at the back of the certificate of title which clearly established that he exercised
full ownership and control over the property.
Petitioners were able to establish that these four parcels of land were validly conveyed to them by the Aquino
spouses, hence, they no longer formed part of the conjugal properties of the spouses at the time of their
deaths. As regards the fourth and fifth parcels, petitioners alleged that these were also conveyed to third
persons and they do not claim any right thereto.
In view of the foregoing, the action of partition cannot be maintained. The properties sought to be partitioned
by private respondents have already been delivered to petitioners and therefore no longer part of the
hereditary estate which could be partitioned. No co-ownership exists between private respondents and
petitioners.
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the charges which the done must satisfy. Corollarily, Article 709 of the same Code explicitly states that the
titles of ownership, or other rights over immovable property, which are not duly inscribed or annotated in the
Registry of Property shall not prejudice third persons. From the foregoing provisions, it may be inferred that
as between the parties to a donation of immovable property, all that is required is for said donation to be
contained in a public document. Registration is not necessary for it to be contained in a public document. It is
not necessary for it to be considered valid and effective. However, in order to bind third persons, the donation
must be registered in the Registry of Property. In the case at bar, the donation executed by Ignacio Gonzales
in favor of his grand children, although in writing and duly notarized, has not been registered in accordance
with law. For this reason, it shall not be binding upon private respondents who did not participate in said deed
nor had no actual knowledge thereof.
Victor died. Ricardo Villalon, Victors sole heir, died four years later. While Victor was alive, he gave no
indication of any interest to contest the donation of his deceased father.
43
with the Regional Trial Court against the Spouses Danlag and Gestopa, for quieting of title over the parcels of
land and alleged that the land was donated to her by Diego Danlag and that she accepted the donation
openly and publicly exercised rights of ownership over the donated properties, and transferred the tax
declarations to her name. She also alleged that the donation inter vivos was coupled with conditions and,
according to Mercedes, since its perfection, she had complied with all of them; that she had not been guilty of
any act of ingratitude; and that Diego Danlag had no legal basis to revoke the donation and then in selling the
two parcels of land to the Gestopa spouses.
In their opposition, the spouses Gestopa and the Danlag averred that the deed of donation was null and void
because it was obtained by Mercedes through machinations and undue influence. Even assuming it was validly
executed, the intention was for the donation to take effect upon the death of the donor and that the donation
was void for it left the donor, Diego Danlag, without any property at all.
HELD: No. A perusal of the deed reveals that it is actually a gratuitous disposition of property a donation
although Lauro Sumipat imposed upon the petitioners the condition that he and his wife, Placida, shall be
entitled to one-half (1/2) of all the fruits or produce of the parcels of land for their subsistence and support.
Where the deed of donation fails to show the acceptance, or where the formal notice of the acceptance, made
in a separate instrument, is either not given to the donor or else not noted in the deed of donation and in the
separate acceptance, the donation is null and void. In this case, the donees acceptance of the donation is not
manifested either in the deed itself or in a separate document. Hence, the deed as an instrument of donation
is patently void. The Court declared that the deeds of sale questioned therein are not merely voidable but null
and void ab initio as the supposed seller declared under oath that she signed the deeds without knowing what
they were. The significant circumstance meant, the Court added, that her consent was not merely marred by
vices of consent so as to make the contracts voidable, but that she had not given her consent at all.
ISSUE: Whether the donation is a donation inter vivos or a donation mortis causa.
HELD: The Court Rules that it was a donation inter vivos. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision
that the reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he transferred to Mercedes the ownership
over the donated properties; that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right referred to
that of merely giving consent; that the donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos properties already
donated mortis causa; that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations pertaining to the donated
properties implied that the donation was inter vivos; and that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six
parcels of land donated to her.
In ascertaining the intention of the donor, all of the deed's provisions must be read together. The granting
clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of love and affection for the donee. This is a mark of a
donation inter vivos. Second, the reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor intended to transfer
the naked ownership over the properties. Third, the donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance
in accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor intended to part with the six parcels of
land. Lastly, the donee accepted the donation.
An acceptance clause is a mark that the donation is inter vivos. Acceptance is a requirement for donations
inter vivos. Donations mortis causa, being in the form of a will, are not required to be accepted by the donees
during the donors' lifetime. The right to dispose of the properties belonged to the donee. The donor's right to
give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary interests. The limitation on the right to sell
during the donors' lifetime implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already
effective during the donors' lifetime. Hence, the moment that it was accepted by Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil,
ownership of the properties was transferred.
Sumipat v. Banga
G.R. No. 155810, August 13, 2004
Tinga, J.
FACTS: The spouses Placida Tabo-tabo and Lauro Sumipat acquired three parcels of land. The couple was
childless. Lauro Sumipat, however, sired five illegitimate children. They are the petitioners herein. Lauro
executed a document denominated Deed of Absolute Transfer and/or Quit-Claim over Real Properties in
favor of the petitioners. On the document, it appears that the signature of his wife, Placida which indicates
that she gave her marital consent. Moreover, it was alleged that Lauro executed it when he was already very
sick and bedridden that upon petitioner Lydias request, their neighbor Benjamin Rivera lifted the body of
Lauro whereupon Lydia guided his hand in affixing his signature on the document. Lydia left but later returned
on the same day and requested Lauros unlettered wife, Placida to sign on the said document. After Lauros
death, his wife, Placida and petitioners jointly administered the properties, 50% of the produce went to his
wife. As wifes share in the produce of the properties dwindled, she filed a complaint for declaration of
partition disclaiming any partition in the execution of the subject document.
ISSUE: Whether or not the questioned deed by its terms or under the surrounding circumstances has validly
transferred title to the disputed properties to the petitioners.
44