UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-4436

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RICHARD
L.
FULTON,
a/k/a
Brandon
Washington, a/k/a Kevin, a/k/a Kev,

B.
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Harrisonburg.
James H. Michael, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (CR-01-75)

Submitted: January 15, 2004

Decided:

January 27, 2004

Before WIDENER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Roland M.L. Santos, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellant. John L.

Brownlee, United States Attorney, William F. Gould, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).

PER CURIAM:
Richard Leroy Fulton appeals his convictions and sentence
entered after his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of a
firearm by a felon.

On appeal, Fulton contends that (1) the

district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty

plea; (2) the district court improperly failed to rule upon his pro
se motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) his
criminal history was improperly calculated.

Because each of the

claims raised by Fulton is without merit, we affirm.

Fultons motion to withdraw his plea alleged that his
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy was improper because the court failed
to inform him of the nature of the charges against him and failed
to require him to describe his participation in the conspiracy. We
review the district courts denial of the motion to withdraw the
plea for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d

1300, 1305 (4th Cir. 1996). Contrary to Fultons arguments, at his

Rule 11 hearing, he was informed of the elements of each of the
charges against him and of the evidence that the Government would
produce at trial, and he stated that he understood and agreed.
Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in denying Fultons motion.
Next, Fulton alleges that the district court failed to
rule on his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on
ineffective assistance. Specifically, he claimed that his attorney

- 2 -

assured him that he would not receive a role enhancement. However,

since Fulton described his pro se motion as an addendum to his
counsels motion, the district courts denial of the motion to
withdraw covered both the counseled and pro se portions.

In any

event, because Fulton testified at his Rule 11 hearing that he was

fully satisfied with his attorney and that there were no promises
or assurances made regarding his sentence, there was no abuse of
discretion in denying Fultons pro se motion.
Finally,

Fulton

contends

that

his

criminal

history

calculation improperly included one point for a conviction that was

part of the same transaction as the federal charges to which Fulton
pled guilty.

Because this claim is raised for the first time on

appeal, we review only for plain error.

128 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir. 1997).

United States v. Ravitch,

Reviewing for plain error, we

will uphold a defendants sentence if, on remand, the district

court would reinstate the same sentence.

Id.

Because Fultons

criminal history category would not change even if one point were
removed from the calculation, there was no plain error.
Accordingly, we affirm Fultons convictions and sentence.
We

dispense

with

oral

argument,

because

the

facts

and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

- 3 -