Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57 (2016) 9e16

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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa

Historical antecedents to the philosophy of Paul Feyerabend

Gonzalo Munvar
Lawrence Technological University, United States

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:
Available online 28 December 2015

Paul Feyerabend has been considered a very radical philosopher of science for proposing that we may
advance hypotheses contrary to well-conrmed experimental results, that observations make theoretical
assumptions, that all methodological rules have exceptions, that ordinary citizens may challenge the
judgment of experts, and that human happiness should be a key value for science. As radical as these
theses may sound, they all have historical antecedents. In defending the Copernican view, Galileo
exemplied the rst two; Mill, Aristotle and Machiavelli all argued for pluralism; Aristotle gave
commonsense reasons for why ordinary citizens may be able to judge the work of experts; and a
combination of Platos and Aristotles views can offer strong support for the connection between science
and happiness.
2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords:
Feyerabend;
Galileo;
Mill;
Aristotle;
Plato;
Machiavelli

When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

1. Introduction
Although, Paul Feyerabends ideas in philosophy of science are
considered revolutionary, he would have been the rst to recognize
that such ideas had roots in the work of other philosophers who
toiled long before the discipline received a name of its own. Some
historical antecedents of his arguments for pluralism in science are
quite obvious, since Feyerabend himself pointed to Galileo and Mill.
Others are perhaps not so obvious. Plato, Aristotle and Machiavelli, I
will argue, contribute arguments that could be brought together to
support some of the crucial views that Feyerabend made famous, or
infamous, depending on ones point of view. In this paper, I will
discuss how those thinkers had insightful things to say about one or
more of such themes as the need for pluralism (Aristotle, Machiavelli), the evaluation of science by the citizenry (Aristotle), and the
relationship between the practice of science and the happiness of
the society (Plato, Aristotle).
I will begin by discussing some of the obvious antecedents: the
important ways in which Galileo and Mill support Feyerabends
views. This discussion, I trust, will provide some bridges that will
allow me to make more plausible the case I intend to provide in the

E-mail address: gmunevar@ltu.edu.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.11.002
0039-3681/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

bulk of the paper in support of the notion that the work of Plato,
Aristotle, and Machiavelli are valuable historical antecedents to
Feyerabends philosophy. Thus I do not mean to suggest that they
directly inuenced the development of Feyerabends ideas. In some
instances, I will point out, for example, some clear underpinnings in
Aristotle and Machiavelli for Mills ideas on pluralism, ideas that did
inuence Feyerabend directly. My intent, however, goes beyond the
uncovering of telling similarities of that sort, for I would like to
present some ways in which the work of our ancestors can make
Feyerabends arguments stronger. This approach should have been
even more to Feyerabends pleasing, given his emphasis on the
worth of looking for wisdom in other cultures and other times.
Moreover, that these themes were seen as crucial long before the
birth of modern science suggests both the value of trying to place
contemporary controversies in a long historical context, as well as
the value of Feyerabends concerns for understanding human
experience.
2. Galileo
When Newton spoke of standing on the shoulders of giants
surely he had Galileo in mind, for Newton, the physicist, owed him
an immense debt of gratitude. But for Newton, the consummate
methodologist, the connection to Galileo, the consummate anti-

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G. Munvar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57 (2016) 9e16

methodologist, is at the very least ironic. In the Principia, Newton

sets down the Rules for Reasoning in Philosophy, four methodological rules by which experience passes judgment on the worth
of our ideas about the world (1989 [1687], 146-48). Had Galileo
obeyed Newtons rules, there would have been no shoulders for
Newton to stand on.
Let us concentrate on Newtons Rule III and Rule IV, the heart of
methodological inductivism. In Rule III, Newton holds that qualities
of bodies determined by experiment ought to be considered universal, therefore the good (natural) philosopher does not consider
alternative accounts of the phenomena: We are certainly not to
relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams and
vain ctions of our own devising. (146) This Newtonian view is, of
course, in sharp contrast with Feyerabends urging in Chapter 3 of
Against Method that science should not only permit the development of hypotheses inconsistent with well-conrmed theories and/
or well-conrmed experimental results, but indeed that such
development should be encouraged (1975).1
Newton would nd Feyerabends position anathema for several
reasons. The rst reason, not shared by the falsicationists who also
object to Feyerabend, was Newtons belief that hypotheses,
whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy, where a
hypothesis is whatever is not deduced from the phenomena.
(152) Although, centuries later scientists and philosophers, now
separated, would tend to nd such an approach much too stringent
and narrow, many would also tend to draw the line, against
Feyerabend, at the notion that scientists might be encouraged to
develop hypotheses inconsistent with well-conrmed experimental results. For Newton, experiments acquire the highest priority in the achievement of knowledge about the world. As he
points out,
.that the divided but contiguous particles of bodies may be
separated from one another, is matter of observation; and, in the
particles that remain undivided, our minds are able to distinguish yet lesser parts, as is mathematically demonstrated. But
whether the parts so distinguished, and yet not divided, may, by
the powers of Nature, be actually divided and separated from
one another, we cannot certainly determine. Yet, had we the
proof of but one experiment that any undivided particle, in
breaking a hard and solid body, suffered a division, we might by
virtue of this rule conclude that the undivided as well as the
divided particles may be actually divided and actually separated
to innity (147).
When will Newton allow scientists to depart from a path that
has been shown to be experimentally fruitful? In Rule IV, he tells us
that:
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions
inferred by general induction from phenomena as accurately or
very nearly true, notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses that
may be imagined, till such time as other phenomena occur, by
which they may either be made more accurate or liable to exceptions. This rule we must follow, that the argument of induction
may not be evaded by hypotheses (his emphasis, 148).
Clearly, the good philosopher is not to question what has
received strong inductive support, and surely not by entertaining
hypotheses inconsistent with well-conrmed experimental results,

1
This reference is to the rst edition of AM. Page references will be to the
enlarged third edition (1993).

unless in the normal course of doing science he stumbles upon new

phenomena that do not quite t into the knowledge he has accumulated so far and thus force him to consider the need for a change
to his approach in explaining the world (we may notice some
resemblance to Kuhns account of how normal science leads to
scientic change, 1970). Given this crowning of experiments plus
induction in science, what worse sin could a scientist commit
against reason than to elaborate hypotheses to justify a claim about
the world that experiment has demonstrated to be false? Feyerabends position is absurd.
Or it seems to be, until we pay close attention to Galileos defense of Copernicus. In The Second Day of his Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief World Systems, Galileo acknowledges that
the Aristotelians had observation and experiment on their side
when they argued that the Earth did not move. As the strongest
reason of all is adduced that of heavy bodies, which, falling down
from on high, go by a straight and vertical line to the surface of the
earth (1989 [1623], 72). If the Earth were to rotate and a rock
were to be let fall from the top of a tall tower, the tower, being
carried by the motion of the Earth, would travel many hundreds
of yards in the east in the time the rock would consume in its fall,
and the rock ought to strike the earth that distance from the base
of the tower. But the rock strikes the earth next to the tower,
which refutes the notion that the Earth rotates. This experiment
can be supplemented by many others: shooting a cannon ball
straight up (it should fall at a large distance from the cannon, but
it does not), or north or south (it should deviate from a straight
north/south direction, but it does not), or two equal cannons
shooting one west and the other east (if the Earth rotated, the
respective cannon balls should travel signicantly different distances, but they do not). Indeed, Salviati, who stands for Galileo in
the dialogue, makes such a strong case of the experimental support for the immovable Earth that Simplicio, the Aristotelian
supporter, in admiration tells him that it would appear to be an
impossible feat to contradict such palpable experiences. If these
experiments were false, Simplicio asks, What true demonstrations were ever more elegant? (73).
Nevertheless, Galileo does entertain hypotheses contrary to
such powerful experimental results (contrary to Rule III) and
without having produced any other phenomena (as Rule IV requires), i.e. no new observations or experimental results. What did
Galileo do instead? He offered a theoretical argument. He begins by
asking what may seem to be a silly question: How do we know that
the rock falls vertically? We see it, obviously, as Simplicio points out
(by means of the senses). But what if the Earth did rotate? How
would the rock move then? Galileos move here reminds us of
Feyerabends advice to imagine a dream-world in order to discover
the features of the world we think we inhabit (1993, 32). The Aristotelian Simplicio gives the answer: The rock would move with a
compound of two motions, one with which it measures the tower,
and the other with which it follows it. The real motion would thus
be a compound of a vertical and a circular motion. Of course, it is
implied, we only observe the vertical motion, since we share, with
the rock and the tower, the motion of the Earth. A few pages earlier
Galileo had pointed out that any motions that may be attributed to
the Earth must necessarily remain imperceptible to us . for as
inhabitants of the earth, we consequently participate in the same
motions (69).
It follows, then, that from seeing the motion of the stone you
could not say for sure that it described a straight and perpendicular
line, unless you rst assumed the earth to stand still (77, my italics).
But whether the Earth stands still is precisely what is in question.
The evidence adduced to show that the earth stands still assumes
that the earth stands still! Aristotle, the great logician, has
committed the fallacy of petitio principii.

G. Munvar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57 (2016) 9e16

In a few pages, then, and without providing one single piece of

new empirical evidence, Galileo disposes of the main objection
against the very possibility that the Earth rotates, by offering an
argument much in the spirit of Feyerabends recommendations for
pluralism in Chapter 3 of Against Method. Galileo thus creates the
stage for the eventual triumph of the Copernican Revolution. By
relinquishing the evidence of experiments for the sake of a dream
of his own devising, he was able not only to discover important
features of the world we thought we inhabited, but eventually to
show that such a world was itself a dream.
Furthermore, progress, as Feyerabend taught us, often requires
the violation of method. It surely did so in the case of Galileo, for
today we surely regard as progress the connement of the Aristotelian universe to the status of a dreamdhave done so for centuries
now. The reason such violation is often required, as Feyerabend also
taught us, is that progress depends often on the overthrow of the
empirical basis and the acceptance of a new one. And that overthrow is in principle possible because in determining the empirical
basis we make theoretical assumptions. The critique of such assumptions may introduce new ones and lead to a different empirical basis. Galileo illustrates this process beautifully. Instead of the
simple motions, he introduces compound motions that result in
true parabolic motions. Those are the facts of the new, Copernican world. He opens the door to this new set of facts by
demonstrating that claims about the real motions of objects make
assumptions about theories of the Earth (whether it moves or not).
Thus Galileo strongly supports a third infamous thesis defended by
Feyerabend: the theoretical character of observation and experiment (or in the dreadful parlance of analytic philosophy, the thesis
that observational languages are theory-laden).
The preceding argumentation has concentrated on Newtons
Rules, but it also applies for the most part to the falsicationist
admonition against the attempt to preserve refuted views, as the
Copernican view clearly seemed to be, given the devastating
experimental results at the time. I will return later, particularly in
my discussion of Machiavelli, to Galileos challenge of results
established by induction, or to be more specic, to the challenge of
approaches that so far have been proven very successful.

3. Mills On Liberty
In Chapter 2, Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, of his
book On Liberty, John Stuart Mill develops the classic case for
pluralism. But the peculiar evil of silencing an opinion, he says, is
that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it (2005 [1859], 944). The reason is that, If the
opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benet,
the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by
its collision with error (944). In Galileos day, expressing opinions
contrary to the received Aristotelian view, which was sanctioned by
religion, could lead to a death sentence, as it did for Bruno. For
Galileo, it meant spending the rest of his life under house arrest.2 It
is ironic that after science won the right to its pursuit of the truth, it
would then seek to silence opinions that are not accepted in the
eld, or at least to discourage those who would wish to develop
them no matter how successful the accepted views might be. Science needs those contrary opinions, as Feyerabend argued and as
we saw in the previous section. Here, Mill anticipated him with
exceptional clarity:

The reader may wish to consult R. L. Number (2010).

11

So essential is this discipline to a real understanding of moral

and human subjects, that if opponents of all important truths do
not exist, it is indispensable to imagine them and supply them
with the strongest arguments which the most skillful devils
advocate can conjure up (954).
It thus seems fair to say that Feyerabend extended Mills epistemological arguments for political freedom to science, both in its
philosophy, as when thinking about its nature, and even in its
practice, as revealed by his historical observations in Against
Method and other works. It is also fair to say that Mill anticipated
Feyerabend in appreciating the need to create a dream world, as
Feyerabend recommended after Mill, and as Galileo actually practiced before Mill!
These Millian themes that we nd explicitly in Feyerabenddthe
value of diversity, consensus and dissent, and the relation between
epistemic pluralism and political governancedare also explicit in
Aristotle and Machiavelli, as we will see below, and are still central
debates in the philosophy of science (see, e.g., P. Kitcher (2011),
Science in a Democratic Society).
It may surprise some readers that I do not include Protagoras
amongst the philosophers to be discussed in the rest of this paper.
The reason is that I have chosen to concentrate on aspects of
Feyerabends thought that remained important to him at least since
the late 1960s. The obvious connection with Protagoras is that this
Greek philosopher was a relativist and Feyerabend is often
considered a relativist. But, he embraced relativism only for a
relatively short period of his career, beginning with Science in a Free
Society (1978). In his later years, he repudiated relativism, e.g. in his
Conquest of Abundance (1999), mistakenly in my opinion (Munevar,
2002), but repudiate it he did.3
4. Citizens and experts (Aristotle)
One of the most unusual aspects of Feyerabends philosophy is
his defense of the democratization of science, of a role for citizens in
the practice of science. But how can ordinary people criticize and
even overrule the judgment of experts who have spent their lives
acquiring their expertise? In Book III, Chapter 11 of the Politics
(2005b [c. 330 BC]), Aristotle offers an interesting argument that
supports Feyerabend. While discoursing on the notion that the
most virtuous ought to rule a society, Aristotle considers whether
the majority should ever be in authority and, setting aside Platos
preference for a philosopher-king, begins to make a case for
pluralism and democracy. For the many, he says, who are not as
individuals excellent men, nevertheless can, when they have come
together, be better than the best few people, not individually but
collectively, just as feasts to which many contribute are better than
feasts provided at one persons expense. (1281b, 387) The multitude have many parts of virtue and practical wisdom as well as
many character traits, so they are like a human being with multiple
senses and experiences that can be used also to judge better such
things as music and poetry, for it is as if the multitude brought
together what is scattered and separate into one (1281b, 387),
which may of course be of extraordinary advantage even over
exceptional men, as we will see below.
It is clear to Aristotle that at least in some cases the multitude is
not superior to the excellent few, for otherwise beasts (cattle)
would be superior to their owner. On the other hand, it is also
important to realize that to give the multitude no share and not to

3
For more on the connection with Protagoras see M. Kuschs contribution to this
volume.

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G. Munvar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57 (2016) 9e16

allow them to participate at all would be cause for alarm. The

reason, which reminds us of Platos account in Book VIII of the
Republic, is that a state in which a large number of people are
excluded from ofce and are poor must of necessity be full of enemies (1281b, 388). The question of greatest interest, then, seems
to be whether experts should be judged (inspected and chosen)
only by other experts, doctors by doctors, geometers by geometers,
and ship captains by ship captains. But the multitude may not be
too servile, Aristotle says, for the previous argument still applies,
since each may be a worse judge than those who know, but a
better or no worse one when they all come together (1282a, 388).
In some crafts, for example, those who do not possess knowledge
of the craft nevertheless have knowledge of its products. Thus,
the maker of a house is not the only one who has some knowledge
about it; the one who uses it is an even better judge.A captain, too,
judges a rudder better than a carpenter, and a guest, rather than the
cook, a feast (1282a, 388).
Of course, society uses the products of science and is affected by
it, so Aristotles sensible arguments support Feyerabends seemingly eccentric claim to the effect that in a democracy local populations not only will, but also should, use the sciences in ways
most suitable to them (1999, 251). We should notice, however, that
Feyerabend arrives at his proposal for the relationship between
scientic experts and citizens as the result from his case for democracy and pluralism. Aristotle, instead, uses his arguments from
common sense about the propriety of allowing ordinary citizens
criticize experts to develop a case for democracy and pluralism. In
the next section, I will discuss his arguments for pluralism.

5. Democracy and knowledge (Aristotle)

In Chapters 13 and 15 of Book III of the Politics, Aristotle continues to emphasize the ability of the many, when coming all
together, to do better than the few, however excellent, even in such
matters as possessing virtue. He points out, for example, that the
many are more incorruptible, for it is easier to corrupt a society in
which only a few hold authority, say, by bribing those few. In
Chapters 15 and 16, he introduces two considerations that are
important for our purposes. While pondering whether a society
should be ruled by universal rules or by men, he recognizes the
benets of written laws, and the importance that the rulers possess
universal reason, but he makes a crucial qualication: a law is the
mean; it provides guidance in the most likely circumstances, but
not in all. The law, having educated the rulers for this special
purpose [the mean] hands over the rest to be decided and managed
in accordance with the most just opinion of the rulers (1287a,
394). It allows for experience and good sense to make corrections
where those lead to improvements.
It is key to decide who the rulers should be, given that exceptions are to be expected when you get to particulars, and that a
human being will deliberate better about particulars (better than
the law could have foreseen, that is, since in creating the law we
aim for the mean) (1286a, 393). It is here that the diversity of
experience and expertise of the many will serve the society best. In
a very small society, perhaps, an individual of exceptional virtue
should be king, but as the society becomes larger, it is perhaps no
longer easy for any other constitution to arise besides democracy
(1286b, 394). But even in those cases where a monarchy makes
sense, there is a need for pluralism: monarchs provide themselves
with many eyes, ears, hands and feet, for it would be very strange,
e.g., that someone judging with just one pair of eyes could see
better than many people with many pairs (1287b, 395).
In Chapter 17, Aristotle makes it clear how strongly he feels
about the advantages that pluralism gives to democracy:

But it is surely evident from what has been said in a case where
people are similar and equal, it is neither benecial nor just for
one person to control everything. This holds whether there are
no laws except the king himself, or whether there are laws;
whether he is a good person ruling good people, or not a good
one ruling not good ones; and even whether he is their superior
in virtue (1288a, 395).
The only exception is when dealing with an individual (or
family, or small group) whose virtue is so superior as to exceed
that of all the others [as a whole] (1288a, 396), but of course in a
large society that is practically impossible.
Just as Feyerabend extended Mills views to philosophy of science, let us do likewise with Aristotles defense of pluralism. Once
we do that the resemblance to Feyerabend is most felicitous. Like
Mills epistemological arguments for pluralism, Aristotles are also
worthy antecedents of Feyerabends philosophy. But we also nd
some additional parallels of great interest. It would seem that just
as universal laws aim to the mean and are thus bound to have
exceptions, so should universal methodological rules, as Feyerabend argues in Against Method and most of his other books.
Moreover, universal laws, let alone methodological rules, are
abstractions, either because they aim for the mean, as Aristotle
pointed out, or because they ignore particulars by not taking the
many relevant natural contexts into account. That is why we may
have theories or models of the formation of a solar system, but we
expect every solar system we encounter to be different from all
others, for their formation would have included a unique combination of factors (e.g. the presence of other stars in the cosmic
neighborhood). Feyerabend understands that for several purposes
it is necessary to ignore such variety in favor of abstraction. As he
says in Conquest of Abundance, Anyone who tries to make sense of
a puzzling sequence of events. is forced to introduce ideas that are
not in the events themselves, but put them in perspective (12).
Indeed: understanding a subject means transforming it, lifting it out
of a natural habitat and inserting it into a model or a theory or a
poetic account of it (12). But he does object, as would Aristotle, to
declaring that the views that result from abstraction constitute
reality. Not only could there be different abstractions (pluralism
again), but the features irrelevant to the abstraction (the universal
laws or universal methodological rules) may be very important to
us and thus real for different reason. As Aristotle says in the
Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1, Ch. 6 (2005a [c. 332 BC]), while criticizing
Platos penchant for universal ideas:
.it is a puzzle to know what the weaver or carpenter will gain
for his own craft from knowing this Good Itself, or how anyone
will be better at medicine or generalship from having gazed on
the Idea Itself. For what the doctor appears to consider is not
even health [universally] but human health, and presumably the
health of this human being, even more since he treats one
particular patient at a time (1097a, 258-9).
Whatever the merits of the procedures of abstraction which lead
to universal laws or rules, as Feyerabend points out, the details did
not therefore cease to exist, just as people dont cease to have a nose
when being weighed (14). Aristotles emphasis on particulars,
which again enhances the need for pluralism, is very congenial to
Feyerabends approach.4

4
Aristotle and Feyerabend were ahead of the game. For more contemporary
authors who explore these themes, apart from Kitcher, see H. Collins and R. Evans
(2007), and M. B. Brown (2009).

G. Munvar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57 (2016) 9e16

6. Democracy and knowledge (Machiavelli)

According to Aristotle in the Politics, the correct forms of government (constitutions) turn out to be those that look to the
common good, whereas those that look to the benet of the rulers
are mistaken, (1279a, 384) and eventually, in Book 4, Chapters 11
and 12, he comes to favor a democracy in which the middle class is
in the majority as the best constitution in practice. The reason democracy is the best form of government, according to Machiavelli in
his Discourses (2005a [1531]), is that [T]he vast majority have interests that coincide with the public good, and so [in a republic]
they are able to pursue it (538). The opposite occurs, he says,
when a city is under control of only one man, for usually what
serves his interests hurts the city, and what benets the city is
contrary to his interests (538). The least bad thing that can happen
to a city that loses its freedom, even if the tyrant is extremely
competent (virtuoso), is that it ceases to make progress and stops
accumulating either power or wealth (538). As with Aristotle,
pluralism is the crucial factor, as I will discuss shortly.
Before that discussion, however, I should address the puzzlement felt by some readers at a description of Machiavelli as a defender of free, pluralistic republics who loathes tyrants (princes). I
presume that those readers acquaintance with Machiavelli is
probably only through The Prince (2005b [1532]). I will thus make a
quick detour to rehabilitate Machiavelli, the sort of task that would
delight Feyerabend, who himself took great pleasure in writing a
rehabilitation of Mach (1981, 80).
At rst that rehabilitation may seem practically impossible, for
The Prince reads like a how-to manual for would-be tyrants, who are
encouraged by Machiavelli to act with extreme ruthlessness and
deviousness. In Chapter 3, for example, he states the following
general rule: People should either be caressed or crushed. If you do
them minor damage, they will get their revenge; but if you cripple
them there is nothing they can do (485). In Chapter 8, he advises
that upon taking control of a state, you should make a list of all the
crimes you have to commit and do them all at once (497). In Chapter
17, he tells us that for a ruler, it is better to be feared than to be loved,
for his subjects will decide whom they love, but he will decide whom
they fear (511). And in Chapter 18, he urges that it is essential for a
prince to know how to be a clever counterfeit and hypocrite (511).
In particular, a wise ruler cannot and should not keep his word
when doing so is to his disadvantage. He grants that this advice
would be bad if all men were good, but since men are wicked and
will not keep faith with you, you need not keep faith with them
(511). What merit could such a cynical treatise have except for
keeping philosophy students awake during class discussion?
Nevertheless, a more sympathetic reading of Machiavelli and
The Prince may be reached upon further examination of the man
and his work. Machiavelli devoted his life rst to serving the free
republic of Florence. When the republic was dissolved, he was
thrown into prison, tortured, and then made to live a life of near
poverty. During his period of poverty, he completed what he
considered his main work, Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titius
Livius, a strong historical and philosophical defense of selfgovernment and republican liberty. He was the rst thinker to
use the expression checks and balances, as far as I know, in
crediting Lycurgus of Sparta with the realization that the most
stable form of government required a constitution that combines
what were hitherto considered the three main forms of government (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy),5 not unlike the

5
In this he followed closely Polybius historical account, The Rise of the Roman
Empire (London: Penguin Books, 1979), especially pp. 310-311. I thank Prof. Philip
Vogt for pointing out this reference.

13

system of separation of powers found in todays democracies

(533). But in 1513, he interrupted work on his magnum opus to
write The Prince as a letter to Lorenzo de Medici, the enemy of his
beloved free republic and surely the sort of person that Machiavelli had most reason to hate. Machiavelli was clearly attempting
to atter Lorenzo de Medici into lifting him from poverty by giving
him a job. It did not work, but the book, as well as the Discourses,
was published a few years after his death. Now, why would a
defender of freedom and, as we will see soon, of pluralism write
such a cynical book? The suspicion arises that The Prince was
written tongue in cheek, sarcastic tongue in cheek, for an audience that drew Machiavellis contempt. Moreover, Machiavellis
plan was apparently to gain the condence of actual and potential
princes, of tyrants, that is, and then introduce, under the cover of
his tough, no-nonsense advice, the notion that in order to stay in
power the ruler needed to treat his subjects well. Indeed, early in
The Prince Machiavelli sneaks in, as sensible advice, the notion
that princes should stay away from free republics (such as Florence). Acquiring by conquest a republic used to living in freedom
presents serious problems. Unless the new ruler demolishes it, he
should expect to be knocked down by it, for Whenever it rebels, it
will nd strength in the language of liberty and will seek to restore
its ancient constitution. Neither the passage of time nor good
treatment will make its citizens forget its previous liberty (489).
On the other hand, states used to being ruled by a monarch are
used to being obedient, and slower to take arms, for they do not
know how to rule themselves (489). Given the abundance of nonfree societies, which would be so much easier to rule, it does not
seem wise at all to conquer free republics, which will exhibit
more vitality, more hatred, more desire for revenge (490). The
memory of their former freedom, Machiavelli says, will give them
no rest, no peace (490). I suspect these passages give some
insight as to what Machiavelli must have felt when he was writing
The Prince for his enemy, Lorenzo de Medici.
If taking over his own society, though, the new ruler must seek
the support of the populace whether the people or the elite were
instrumental in bringing him to power (498), for otherwise he has
nothing to fall back in times of adversity (499). A wise ruler will
seek to ensure that his citizens always, no matter what the circumstances, have an interest in preserving both him and his authority (499). Furthermore, a ruler who wishes to protect himself
should keep in mind that the best fortress one can have is not
being hated by ones own subjects (519). As a nal example,
consider Machiavellis advice on how to acquire a good reputation
not only with other rulers but with his own population. How can a
ruler ensure the latter? Among other things:
He should encourage his citizens by making it possible for them
to pursue their occupations peacefully, whether they are businessmen, farmers, or are engaged in any other activity, making
sure they do not hesitate to improve what they own for fear it
may be conscated from them, and they are not discouraged
from investing in business for fear of losing their prots in taxes;
instead he should ensure that those who improve and invest are
rewarded, as should be anyone whose actions will benet his
city or his government (521).
This interpretation of The Prince and its subtext may seem rather
iconoclastic, but that should have pleased Feyerabend, who was
himself an iconoclast who often favored iconoclastic interpretations and offered quite a few of his own. In any event, my
interpretation has the virtue of being consistent with Machiavellis
life and main work, as well as with the text of The Prince itself.
Let us move on to Machiavellis argument for pluralism in his
Discourses. In several places (and even in Chapter 25 of The Prince),

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G. Munvar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57 (2016) 9e16

Machiavelli points out that whether men have good or bad fortune
depends on whether they adjust their style of behavior to suit the
times (546). He illustrates this point with a wonderful historical
example. When Hannibal invaded Italy he defeated the Roman
armies twice, killing most of the best Roman soldiers. Fabius, the
new Roman general, a very cautious man, avoided engaging Hannibal, giving himself time to rebuild the demoralized Roman army,
and eventually avoiding a complete Roman defeat. With the war at
a standstill, Scipio proposed a surprise invasion of Hannibals African base. Fabius was adamantly opposed. He had been very successful by being cautious and such a daring plan was unacceptable
to him. As Machiavelli explains, There are two reasons why we are
unable to change when we need to: In the rst place, we cannot
help being what nature has made us. In the second, if one style of
behavior has worked well for us in the past, we cannot be
persuaded we would be better off acting differently (547). To us
this course of action seems at rst as rational as it was for Newton
to propose his Rule #4: You continue to do what has worked well in
the past until such a time as failure forces you to consider other
directions. In the meantime, you miss opportunities and good fortune that other approaches might have brought us. If Fabius had
been King of Rome he might have well lost the war, for he would
not have known to change his style of behavior as the times
changed, Machiavelli tells us in the Discourses (546). But he was
born in a republic, where numerous citizens, all with different
temperaments, had a say (546). Rome decided to try Scipios idea
and won the war. The moral of the story for Machiavelli is that . a
republic should survive longer and should more frequently have
fortune on its side than a monarchy, for a republic can adapt itself
more easily to changing circumstances because it can call on citizens of differing characters (546).
A more general lesson is that pluralism makes it more likely that
we will make progress in whatever human enterprise we are
engaged, including science, as Feyerabend has argued.
Machiavelli and Feyerabend coincide on several other matters
that were important to them. One is the question, as Feyerabend
puts it in Conquest of Abundance, of whether liberty is more
effectively protected by elites or by the people (p. 12), the answer
to which, according to Machiavelli, is that liberty is in the interest of
the people but not of the elites, and thus it is not all surprising that
in classical times peoples hunted down tyrants with such bitterness
and were so enamored of political freedom, and that the very idea
of liberty was held in such respect among them (539). Another is
that just as Feyerabend looked to the history of science to shed light
on the philosophy of science, Machiavelli looked to history to shed
light on political philosophy. To call attention to the importance of
history is one of the main aims of this article as well.6

7. Plato and Aristotle on happiness and knowledge

According to Feyerabend in his famous (or infamous) article
Consolations for the Specialist (1970), from Kuhn we have
learneddagainst falsicationismdthat a view should not be
abandoned merely because some of its predictions fail. A view
should be given time to develop, to bear out its original promise.
Thus commitment to a view is crucial to science (Feyerabend
calls this the principle of tenacity). Where Kuhn goes too far is in
his insistence that the entire discipline be dedicated to only one

6
J. M. Najemy (2010): [the importance of] Machiavellis meditation on the role
of the past in understanding the human condition. Two centuries of humanisms
attempts to recover antiquity had profoundly instilled the idea that proper
apprehension of the world and affective action in it, both theoretical wisdom and
practical knowledge, began with the study of ancient history and literature (p. 9).

view. It is more fruitful for science, Feyerabend says, to have

several competing groups working on those ideas that they nd
particularly promising (the principle of proliferation, i.e.
pluralism). The principle of proliferation, and within its action,
the principle of tenacity, leads to greater human happiness.
Those two principles also create the conditions for fruitful
change and improvement. Thus both humanity and science are
the better for their presence.
This point is important to Feyerabend because he believes that
science, as a human activity, must be justied ultimately by the
difference it makes to human lives, including the lives of those who
practice science. As he says the most important question about
science is to what extent the happiness of individual human beings, and to what extent their freedom, has been increased? (209).
It seems to him that the happiness and the full development of a
human being is now, as ever, the highest possible value by which
we should probe the sciences of today (210). This value, he adds,
does not exclude the values which ow from institutionalized
forms of life (truth, valour, self-negation, etc.) (210). On the contrary, It rather encourages them but only to the extent to which
they can contribute to the advance of some individual (210). What
is excluded, he says, is the use of those institutionalized values for
the condemnation, or perhaps even the elimination, of those who
prefer to arrange their lives in a different way (210). And, Feyerabend emphasizes, What is excluded is the attempt to educate
children in a manner that makes them lose their manifold talents so
that they become restricted to a narrow domain of thought, action,
emotion (210).
Clearly, this view of life and science is much in agreement with
Mills pluralistic and hedonistic philosophy, but let me offer a
different and interesting grounding for it by combining some
important aspects of the thought of Plato and Aristotle.
In Book III of Platos Republic (2005 [c. 385 BC]), Socrates mentions what is now called the Myth of the Metals (415 a-c, 128129). According to the Myth, the god mixed different metals into
different people as he was forming them: gold into those who
should be rulers, silver into future soldiers, and iron and bronze
into farmers and other craftsmen. Although, children tend to
resemble their parents, some gold children will be born of iron
parents and vice versa. The most important command from the god
to the rulers of a city is to watch carefully the mixture of metals in
the souls of their offspring and to honor each mixture in a manner
appropriate to its nature. By metals Plato means talents. Different
people are born with different talents, and the societys most
important obligation is to make sure that every child has an opportunity to explore and develop his talents. A concomitant obligation for a just society is to ensure that every job is assigned to the
person most qualied. To the extent that a society falls short of
these standards, it will be not only inefcient but unjust.
Indeed, in most societies, historically and today, a childs chances depend on the status of his parents, which leads to a great waste
of human potential and much unhappiness and conict. Children of
poor parents do not even have a chance to a decent education in
many countries today, let alone a real shot at becoming rulers of
their society. Women in quite a few countries risk their lives if they
wish to have any education at all, and in some others they are not
allowed to drive a car or to hold a great variety of jobs. Even in
presumably enlightened countries like the U.S. it was not that long
ago that graduate programs in science were closed to women. In
Book 5, Plato is adamant that women should be given equality of
opportunity. Girls who are born with the talent to be rulers or
doctors or scientists should be given the opportunity and the education to reach their potential, if they wish to.
To the objection that men and women obviously have different
natures and, therefore, should not be assigned the same jobs, Plato

G. Munvar / Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 57 (2016) 9e16

replies that the differences and similarities that matter are those
pertinent to the pursuit in question; otherwise we would have to
ask ourselves whether the natures of bald and long-haired men are
the same or opposite. And once we agree that they are opposite, it is
open to us to forbid the long-haired ones to be shoemakers, if that
is what the bald ones are to be, or vice versa (454c, 151) That would
be ridiculous, of course. But is it not the case, then, that whereas a
male and a female whose souls are suited for medicine have the
same nature.a male doctor and a carpenter have different
ones? (454d, 151) Plato then demands to know from the opponents of equality for women what is the precise craft or pursuit,
relevant to the organization of the city, for which a womans nature
and a mans are not the same but different (455a, 151). For it seems
that, for most if not all pursuits, they differ in this respect alone,
that the female bears the offspring while the male mounts the female (454e). Surely, this cannot be a difference pertinent enough
to deny women equality of opportunity!
Of course, if you are going to employ males and females for the
same tasks, you must give them the same opportunity for education. And education, as it turns out, is the proper method by which
to determine what talents (metals) children have. Like Feyerabend,
Plato was against compulsory education, as he makes clear in Book
VII: Because a free person should learn nothing slavishly. For while
compulsory physical labors do not harm the body, no compulsory
instruction remains in the soul (536e). Plato proposes instead, an
approach that would also be agreeable to Feyerabend: use play
instead. That way you will also be able to see better what each of
them is naturally suited for (537a, 200). This will not be a quick
decision either. The young citizens will have plenty of opportunity
to self-select into their future professions, for the play-based education will last most of their youth. The more formal and specialized forms of education will not begin until they are twenty. Small
details aside, Platos point is that the society (we may now read
science) will be better served by allowing individuals to follow
their inclinations as they freely develop. This was pretty much
Feyerabends point as well.
We might also conclude that this is the sort of arrangement that
would increase the happiness of the individuals involved, since
they would lead more fullling lives. Plato seems to demur on this
point, though. What he is interested in is the happiness of the entire
community, not the happiness of any one part of it, he says in Book
IV (419 aed, 130). His worry is that in his ideal society the rulers will
be philosopher-kings (or philosopher-queens) but only love and
gratitude to their society will make them sacrice the exciting life
of the mind to go back into the cave, so to speak, to rule the society.
Individual happiness, however, is Aristotles concern. Let us see
how he can complement Platos account. To begin with, of course,
Aristotle has very different ideas on who shall rule, as we have seen.
Moreover, Aristotle thinks that it makes no sense not to strive for
the happiness of all sections of the community. But let us concentrate on the relationship he nds between an individuals development of his talents and happiness.
To begin with, he points out in Chapter 7 of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, the good of man is an end in itself, complete and
self-sufcient, and only happiness can be such an end (1097b,
259). We do many things with the ultimate goal of being happy,
but it makes little sense even to ask why we want to be happy.
Happiness, however, he argues in Book X, cannot consist merely in
pleasure, unlike what many hedonists, although perhaps not Mill,
would claim, for no one would choose to live with a childs [level
of] thought for his whole life, taking as much pleasure as possible
in what pleases children (1174 a, 351). Pleasure still plays a key
role in happiness, but the pleasure that truly matters is that which
completes the activities to which we ought to devote our lives. It is
the pleasure that comes from fulllment: . the best activity is

15

[that] of the subject in the best condition in relation to the best

object of [his] capacity. This activity will also be the most
pleasant. (1174b, 1175a-b, 351-54) Platos ideal scheme from the
Myth of the Metals would then produce the conditions under
which individual citizens will have the best chances to ourish,
and thus of being happy (as long as what Aristotle calls the externals are there to a reasonable degree: good health, love,
family, friends, etc., 1179a, 357).
Furthermore, and in accordance with Feyerabends insight, the
proper pleasure of the activity is the one that helps us improve (and
then leads to even greater pleasure, and thus greater happiness).
Therefore, when we devote ourselves freely (Plato and Feyerabend)
to those activities for which we have the most talent, we get more
out of life, that is, we are more likely to achieve happiness.
Aristotle unfortunately concludes that the greatest happiness
comes from study (1177a, 355), but this conclusion is inconsistent
with his own examples. He goes too far. Or should we advise Messi
to abandon football to devote himself to studying? And should
Segovia have given up the guitar for philosophy with the intent of
thus becoming happier?7
To sum up, if a society allows its citizens to freely determine and
develop their true talents, as required by Platos Myth of the Metals,
then Aristotle explains why the majority of its citizens will be
happy: they will achieve their potential, and the proper pleasure of
their activities will satisfy them more than anything else (as long as
the external circumstances are normal). It seems to me that this
provides a plausible and strong foundation for Feyerabends argument to the effect that scientists should have the freedom to
develop those ideas that fascinate them the most. Scientists will be
happier by doing so, will lead more fullling lives, and will make
greater contributions to science.
8. Conclusion
I would not be surprised that other philosophers from the past
may also serve as antecedents of Feyerabends philosophy. I certainly
did not pretend to provide an exhaustive list of relevant philosophers, or even an exhaustive account of the ways in which Galileo,
Mill, Machiavelli, Plato and Aristotle either anticipated Feyerabend or
provided good reasons to strengthen Feyerabends views. I would
hope that this brief sketch will serve to entice those with different
preferences to provide analogous accounts of their own.
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7
Feyerabends anti-intellectualism, or rather his taking exception to the
contempt intellectuals often express towards ordinary people (the vulgar), would
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