Persons and Family Relations Reviewer

CIVIL LAW REVIEW SYLLABUS
ATTY. Steve Y. Dicdican

1st semester SY 2016-2017
EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
ARTICLE 2
Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect 1 year after
publication
Reason would tell that a law which prohibits, prescribes, limits and defines the right of a
person must have a date of effectivity and must be made known to the people
[publication], otherwise it becomes oppressive and whimsical.
Thus, in Lara v. del Rosario: The Civil Code of the Philippines took effect on Aug.
30, 1950. This date is exactly one year after the Official Gazette publishing the Code
was released for circulation, the said release having been made on Aug. 30, 1949.
Corollary to the mandate that laws must have an effectivity date, Article 2 of the Civil
Code provides Effectivity of laws: Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation, unless otherwise provided (as amended by E.O. 200).
Effectivity date is not only sufficient for the binding application of the law.
It is the publication of the law which makes it binding and operative.
In Tanada v. Tuvera the phrase unles otherwise provided.. refers the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication, which cannot in any event be omitted;
publication is indispensable.
Omission of publication would offend DUE PROCESS insofar as it would deny the public
the knowledge of the Laws that are supposed to govern them; Section 6 of the
Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern" is instructive.
UMALI v. ESTANISLAO G.R. No. 104037 May 29, 1992

Article 2, Civil Code; Construction of the phrase unless otherwise provided
RA 7167 was signed and approved by President on DECEMBER 19, 1991 and
was published on JANUARY 14, 1992 in Malaya, a newspaper of general
circulation. It did not contain specifically a date of effectivity but only
provided in Sec. 3. This act shall take effect upon its approval.
The court ruled that inasmuch as RA 7167 has no specific date for its
effectivity and neither can it become effective upon its approval
notwithstanding its express statement, following Art. 2 of the Civil Code and
the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, RA 7167 took effect 15 days after Jan. 14,
1992 which is Jan. 30, 1992
Additional issue: The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167
cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income received
during 1992 because it would in effect postpone the availability of the
increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993. Since this decision is
promulgated after 15 April 1992, the individual taxpayers entitled to the
increased exemptions on compensation income earned during calendar
year 1991 who may have filed their income tax returns on or before 15 April
Ludica Oja | University of Cebu
1992 (later extended to 24 April 1992) without the benefit of such increased
exemptions, are entitled to the corresponding tax refunds and/or credits, and
respondents are ordered to effect such refunds and/or credits.
The term "laws" should refer to ALL LAWS and not only to those of general application;
Presidential Decrees and Executive Orders, Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to ENFORCE or IMPLEMENT EXISTING LAW
including even those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him
from certain prohibitions or requirements.
The circulars issued by the MONETARY BOARD must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "FILL IN THE DETAILS" of the Central Bank Act.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Neither is publication required of the so- called Letters of Instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
The charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion
of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
PUBLICATION MUST BE IN FULL or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws.
Note: before publication, you cannot apply the law whether penal or civil. Why? How
can you be bound if you dont know the law.
Bar 1990: Effectivity of Laws- After a devastating storm causing widespread destruction
in four Central Luzon provinces, the executive and legislative branches of the
government agreed to enact a special law appropriating P1 billion for purposes of relief
and rehabilitation for the provinces. In view of the urgent nature of the legislative
enactment, it is provided in its effectivity clause that it shall take effect upon approval
and after completion of publication in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. The law was passed by the Congress on July 1, 1990. Signed
into law by the President on July 3, 1990, and published in such newspaper of general
circulation on July 7, 1990 and in the Official Gazette on July 10, 1990.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the publication of said legislative enactment, is there sufficient observance or
compliance with the requirements for a valid publication?
Explain your answer.
Yes, there is sufficient compliance. The law itself prescribes the requisites of publication
for its effectivity, and all requisites have been complied with. (Article 2, Civil Code)
When did the law take effect? Explain your answer.
The law takes effect upon compliance with all the conditions for effectivity, and the last
condition was complied with on July 10, 1990. Hence, the" law became effective on
that date.
Can the executive branch start release and disbursing funds appropriated by the said
law the day following its approval? Explain your answer.
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No. It was not yet effective when it was approved by Congress on July 1, 1990 and
approved by the President on July 3, 1990. The other requisites for its effectivity were not
yet complete at the time.
No. It was not yet effective when it was approved by Congress on July 1, 1990 and
approved by the President on July 3, 1990. The other requisites for its effectivity were not
yet complete at the time.
PUBLICATION AND IGNORANCE OF THE LAW
ARTICLE 3
Provides that- ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith- if you
want to be classic then in latin- ignorantia legis neminem non excusat.
Why the rule? This is a necessary rule for all civilized society. Otherwise it would be
impossible to enforce the law. This is reasonable since it is very hard to determine
whether or not a person really does not know the law, and without this rule there would
be anarchy. To remedy the situation, the law sacrifices occasional harshness to prevent
universal anarchy!
Moreover, per Article 7, paragraph 1- the violation of a law is not justified even if:
a. No one follows the law, e.g. nonpayment of taxes;
b. There is a custom to the contrary.
Ergo, these arguments do not hold water...I do not know that there was a law punishing
swindling...I did not follow the law, since everybody is not following the law... I did not
follow the law since my act is Valid according to our customs.
Note: Article 3 applies only to ignorance of Philippine law. It does not apply to foreign
law. In Private International Law and Evidence- foreign laws must be alleged and
proven even if it is applicable. Otherwise, the courts will presume the foreign law to be
the same as Philippine.
Thus, Processual presumption arises if the foreign law is not properly alleged and proved;
the presumption is that it is the same as our law.
Laws covered by Article 3: All domestic laws, mandatory or prohibitive, not to permissive
or suppletory laws, and whether substantive or remedial.
Mitigation of the Effects of Article 3
Ignorance of fact eliminates criminal intent as long as there is no negligence; Ignorance
of law is not an excuse for complying with the law.
Purpose: on grounds of expediency, policy, and necessity, to prevent evasion of the
law.
BAR 1996: Ignorance of the Law vs. Mistake of Fact- Is there any difference in their legal
effect between ignorance of the law and ignorance or mistake of fact?
Suggested answer: Yes, there is a difference. While ignorance of the law is not an
excuse for not complying with it, ignorance of fact eliminates criminal intent as long as
there is no negligence. In addition, mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may
be the basis of good faith (Art. 526 NCC). Mistake of fact may, furthermore, vitiate
consent in a contract and make it voidable (Art. 1390 NCC).
Alternative answer: Yes. Ignorance of the law differs in legal effect from Ignorance or
mistake of fact. The former does not excuse a party from the legal consequences of his
conduct while the latter does constitute an excuse and is a legal defense.
PRINCIPLES IN LAW-MAKING
ARTICLE 4
General rule: Laws shall have no retroactive effect.
Exceptions:
1. If the statute itself provide for retroactivity
Exception to the exception:
a. Ex post facto laws.
b. Laws which impair the obligations and contracts.
2. Remedial, as there is no vested right in procedural laws.
3. If the statute is penal in nature; provided it is favorable to the accused;
provided further that the accused is not a habitual delinquent
4. Laws that are emergency and authorized by the police power of the state
5. Curative laws
6. If a substantive right be declared for the first time, unless vested rights are
impaired.
7. Interpretative laws
Vested Right: A right or interest in property that has become fixed and established that it
is no longer open to controversy.
ARTICLE 5
General rule: Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall
be void.
Exceptions: When the law itself authorizes their validity, such as1. When the law makes the act merely voidable.
2. When the law makes the act valid but subjects the wrongdoer to criminal
responsibility.
3. When the law makes the act itself void but recognizes legal effects flowing
therefrom.
4. When the law itself makes certain acts valid although generally void.
Mandatory Law- one which prescribes some element as a requirement [i.e. wills must be
written; forms of donations].
Prohibitory Laws- one which forbids something.
ARTICLE 6
If a person was given a right, he can waive such right. However, there can only be a
waiver of right and not waiver of obligations. For example, a creditor can waive the
loan but the debtor cannot waive his obligation.
There is no form required for a waiver since a waiver is optional. You can waive by mere
inaction, refusing to collect a debt for example is a form of waiver.
However, for a waiver to be valid, these elements must be present:
1. Existence of a right
2. Knowledge of the existence of the right
3. An intention to relinquish the right
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4.
The waiver must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or
good customs, or prejudicial to others with a right recognized by law.
General rule: Rights can be waived.
and Labor laws. Thus, the waiver is invalid and not binding. The Child Labor Law is a
mandatory and prohibitory law and the rights of the child cannot be waived as it is
contrary to law and public policy.
Exception: When the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
ARTICLE 7
It is a principle that congress cannot enact irrepealable laws. Thus, Article 7 is a sound
provision since time moves forward and obsolescence of a law sets in when it no longer
address the needs of society.
Rights which cannot be waived:

natural rights
alleged rights (future rights)
those which renunciation would infringe public policy
those which renunciation is prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized
by law
Waiver: intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a known right or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right.
Only subsequent law can repeal prior laws and not vice versa, either through:
1. A repealing clause [express repeal]
2. Incompatibility of the subsequent and prior laws [implied repeal].
Supremacy of the Constitution/Hierarchy of laws:
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
Right: the power or privilege given to one person and as a rule demandable of another.
Relative to repeal is the enactment of General Law and special law.
PP. V. HON. JUDGE DONATO G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991
Rodolfo is estopped from invoking his right to bail, having expressly waived it
in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody of his person"
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, although waiver in derogation
of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if
it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals
and the public interest may be waived.
The court ruled that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights
which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and
whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
BAR 2004- B. DON, an American businessman, secured parental consent for the
employment of five minors to play certain roles in two movies he was producing at
home in Makati. They worked at odd hours of the day and night, but always
accompanied by parents or other adults. The producer paid the children talent fees at
rates better than adult wages. But a social worker, DEB, reported to OSWD that these
children often missed going to school. They sometimes drank wine, aside from being
exposed to drugs. In some scenes, they were filmed naked or in revealing costumes. In
his defense, DON contended all these were part of artistic freedom and cultural
creativity. None of the parents complained, said DON. He also said they signed a
contract containing a waiver of their right to file any complaint in any office or tribunal
concerning the working conditions of their children acting in the movies. Is the waiver
valid and binding? Why or why not? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The waiver is not valid. Although the contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
they may not do so if such are contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy (Article 1306, Civil Code). The parents' waiver to file a complaint
concerning the working children acting in the movies is in violation of the Family Code
As a rule, if the general law was enacted prior to the special law, the latter is considered
the exception to the general law.
However, if the general law was enacted after the special law, the latter remains unless:
1. There is an express declaration to the contrary.
b. There is a clear, necessary and irreconcilable conflict.
c. The subsequent general law covers the whole subject and is clearly intended
to replace the special law on the matter.
In the case that the general law treats a particular matter in specific, while the special
law treats such matter in general, the former will prevail.
Moreover, repeal is not the only mode where a law ceases since there are laws which,
without any repeal, cease to have effect because they lapse by their own terms. A law
may expressly provide that it shall be effective only for a fixed period.
Effects of Repeal: The law first repealed shall not be revived unless so expressly provided.
But if the prior law was repealed, not expressly but by implication, the repeal of the
repealing law will revive the prior law, unless the language of the last law provides
otherwise.
Implied repeals: not favored. Requisites: the laws cover the same subject matter and
the latter is repugnant to the earlier.
INTERPRETATION OF A LAW
ARTICLE 8
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.
Note, however, that only Supreme Court decisions establish jurisprudence; decisions of
other judicial or quasi-judicial bodies are merely persuasive.
Stare decisis: Adherence to judicial precedents; it requires courts to follow the rule
established in a decision; it is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further
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argument, and when another case involving the same point at issue arises, it should be
decided in the same manner.
This principle, however, does not mean blind adherence. The duty of the Court is to
abandon any doctrine found to be in violation of the law in force.
This provision taken from common law. Under the Civil Law tradition, the court merely
applies the law. However, since the Philippine legal system is a combination of civil law
and common law, courts apply statutes as well as resort to the doctrine of precedent.
PEOPLE vs. RAFAEL LICERA G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975
Licera was apprehended for assault upon an agent of a person in authority
and illegal possession of firearm on December 2, 1965. CFI acquitted him of
the first offense but sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment for the
later. The higher court later overturned the decision relying on the
Macarandang rule instead of Mapas.
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of
his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite
license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule the Courts
interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formed part
of
our
jurisprudence
and,
hence,
of
this
jurisdiction's
legal
system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly,
where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should
operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by
the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith
thereof
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this
jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws,
constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation
placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed
law purports to carry into effect.
ALBINO CO V. CA G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

Co was charged with a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 that was filed by the salvage company against him and was was
later convicted. As basis for its verdict of conviction, TC relied on Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) i.e., that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P.
Blg. 22.
Co argued that at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1,
1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que
v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing"
check as guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable
offense, an official pronouncement made in a Circular of the Ministry of
Justice. That Circular (No. 4), dated December 15, 1981.
The court ruled that the ruling on Que v. People should not be applied
retroactively but prospectively. The principle of prospectivity of statutes,
original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. The prospectivity
principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars.
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions
which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what
the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil
Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"
Therefore the Que ruling should not be given retrospective effect to the
prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the
official opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within
the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
ARTICLE 9
Duty of the court to decide: no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of laws.
ARTICLE 10
Statutory construction: In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.
What if the law is silent? The court should render a decision based on justice as stated in
Article 10.
ARTICLE 11
Since laws are enacted for the purpose of preserving the harmonious relationship of
people, it follows that customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy
shall not be countenanced.
What if customs are not contrary to law? The custom would be countenanced.
However, this does not mean that the custom would have obligatory force. Ergo, a
custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence [Article 12].
Custom: a rule of human conduct established by repeated acts, and uniformly
observed or practiced as a rule of society.
Requisites:
1. Proven as a fact, according to the rules of evidence (Art.12); there is no
judicial notice of custom.
2. It must not be contrary to law, public order or public policy. Otherwise, it shall
not be countenanced (Art. 11).
3. There must be a number of repeated acts.
4. The repeated acts must have been uniformly performed.
5. There must be a juridical intention to make a rule of social conduct.
Although the law does not specify the cases when custom is relevant in litigation. But in
case custom is relevant, it should be proven.
Commentators say that custom is important in cases involving negligence. For example,
if a kalesa in Manila is by custom supposed to have rattan baskets to prevent people
from slipping, if a person slips because there is no rattan basket, then he can sue for
negligence.
ARTICLE 13
Since the law looks forward it is but proper to divide time into segments. This is crucial in
enforcing ones rights since the law provides for the extinguishment of an obligation.
Thus, Article 13 has been superseded by Executive Order No. 292 [Revised Administrative
Code].
Page 4
Section 31- Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve calendar months;
month of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be
computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; day, to a day
of twenty-four hours; and nigh from sunset to sunrise.
Under E.O. 292- a year is equivalent to 12 calendar months and not 365 days. Leap year
is not considered.
Computation of periods: the first day shall be excluded, and last day included, unless
the latter is a Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event, the time shall run until the end of
the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal holiday.
When the act and the period are CONTRACTUAL, the act must be done on the last day,
even if the latter is a Sunday or a legal holiday.
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION VS TECSON August 1969

NMC filed a civil suit against Tecson whose defense its prescription of the
action. LC dismissed the suit pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an
action upon a judgment must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues, the issue thus confined to the date on which ten
years from December 21, 1955 had expired.
The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
"When the laws speak of years ... it shall be understood that years are of three
hundred sixty-five days each" according to Art. 13 of our Civil Code. 1960 and
1964 being leap years, the month of February in both had 29 days, so that ten
(10) years of 365 days each, or an aggregate of 3,650 days, from December
21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965.
The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion
to the policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done
through legislative process and not by judicial decree.
QUIZON V. BALTAZAR G.R. Nos. L-23779-80 April 29, 1977

The RPC provides that an action for serious oral defamation prescribes in six
months. The months should be computed by the regular 30 days, not the
calendar months. Hence, where the crime was committed on November 11,
1963, and the action was filed exactly 180 days later, said action was filed on
time.
SCOPE OF APPLICATION
ARTICLE 14
It is a principle of law that a law applies only to the territorial jurisdiction of the authority
who had enacted it, save for some [territoriality], and applies also to all its people save
for some who are immune from the application of such law [generality].
Thus, penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international
law and to treaty stipulations [Article 14].
Principle of Territoriality: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
enforceable throughout the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty stipulation.
General rule: Criminal laws apply only in Philippine territory.
Exception: extraterritoriality principle- criminal laws applies to the following even if they
are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines against those who:
Commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship.
Forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or
obligations and securities issued by the government of the Philippine Islands;
Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of
the obligations and securities mentioned in the preceding number.
While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the
exercise of their functions; or
Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of
nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this code.- ex: piracy.
Principle of Generality: Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principles of
public international law and to treaty stipulation.
General rule: criminal laws apply to everyone in the territory [citizens and aliens].
Exceptions: in these instances, all the Philippine government can do is expel themTreaty stipulations which exempt some persons within the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts.
Heads of states, ambassadors and members of the diplomatic envoy.
Note: the immunity of a consul is limited, hence if the is not immunity from penal laws of
the receiving state in the treaty, then they are subject to the penal laws of our country.
ARTICLE 15
Under Article 15 the Philippines follows the nationality theory. Thus laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Also, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever maybe the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found (Art. 16, par.2).
The national law of the decedent regardless of the location of the property shall govern.
Thus, the national law of the decedent determines who will succeed.
BELLIS VS BELLIS, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a
domicile thereof at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a
conflict of law rule providing that the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae)
calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
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situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to the conflict of law
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position
is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties
shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his
national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view
of those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern.
Under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly,
since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of
successional rights has to be determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law
on legitimates can not be applied to the testate of Amos Bellis.
Mobilia sequuntur personam: Movable property follows the national law of the owner.
This rule has been modified by the present article.
ARTICLE 17
Lex loci celebrations: principle which applies the law of the place where the contract
was executed as far as the formalities and solemnities (extrinsic validity) are concerned.
The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
Exterritoriality: When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or
consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
In Miciano vs. Brimo, the SC said that the will of a foreigner containing the condition that
the law of the Philippines should govern regarding the distribution of the properties is
invalid.
Note: prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
In Aznar vs. Garcia, what was involved was the renvoi doctrine. In this case, the
decedent was a citizen of California who resided in the Philippines. The problem was
that under Philippine law, the national law of the decedent shall govern. On the other
hand, under California law, the law of the state where the decedent has his domicile
shall govern. The SC accepted the referral by California law and applied Philippine law
[single renvoi].
ARTICLE 829- Revocation of Wills adheres to domiciliary theory.

A revocation done outside the Philippines, by a person who does not have his domicile
in this country, is valid when it is done according to the law of the place where the will
was made, or according to the law of the place in which the testator had his domicile
at the time; and if the revocation takes place in this country, when it is in accordance
with the provisions of this Code.
Status: the sum total of a persons rights, duties, and capacities.

Characteristics of status:
a. It is inalienable.
b. It is imprescriptible.
c. It cannot be the object of compromise.
d. The action to claim it cannot be renounced.
e. The rights arising from it cannot be exercised by creditors.
ARTICLE 1039- Capacity to succeed

Capacity to inherit depends not on the national law of the heir, but on the national law
of the decedent.
Nationality/personal theory: the status and capacity of an individual are generally

governed by the law of his nationality.
Domiciliary Theory- the personal laws of a person are determined by his domicile.
Problem: what if the decedent is a Filipino domiciled in a foreign country which follows
the domiciliary theory? According to Professor Balane, one way to resolve the situation is
this- Philippine Law should govern with respect to properties in the Philippines while the
law of the domicile should govern with respect to properties located in the state of
domicile.
ARTICLE 16
Lex rei sitae: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.
In contracts where the real property is given as security, the principal contract shall be
governed by the proper law of the contract, but the accessory contract shall be
governed by this article.
Lex loci voluntatis/intentionis: proper law of the contract
ARTICLE 1753- The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall
govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.
ARTICLE 26 FC All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall
also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37, and 38. (71a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (A) (As Amended by E.O. No. 227, dated July 17, 1987
ARTICLE 80 FC- In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the
property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the
place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
Where both spouses are aliens;
With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated
in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is located;
With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines
but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws require
different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
Page 6
HUMAN RELATIONS
ARTICLE 19
Abuse of right: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Elements of abuse of right:
1. Legal right.
2. Exercise of such right in bad faith.
3. Intent to prejudice others.
Pre-contractual abuse: an offeror who, in abuse of right, withdraws his offer without a
valid reason, after the offeree in good faith has incurred expenses preparatory to
entering into the contract, is liable for damages.
For the cause of action to arise, the complaining party must suffer prejudice such as
pecuniary loss.
ARTICLE 20
Civil liability for delict: Every person who, contrary to law, willfully [dolo] or negligently
[culpa] causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Civil liability for quasi-delict: Also, whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, but no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is obliged to pay for the damage done [Art. 2176].
ARTICLE 21
Contra bonus mores: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.
Misconduct: implies a wrongful intention and not merely error in judgment.
Relative to this provision is the Breach of promise to marryAs a general rule: Not an actionable wrong
However by way of Exception breach of promise to marry becomes an actionable
wrong if:
1. When there has been sexual intercourse:
a. The aggrieved party may ask the other to RECOGNIZE THE CHILD,
should there be one, and PROVIDE SUPPORT to said child.
b. Sue for MORAL DAMAGES, if there be criminal or moral seduction, but
not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust; if the cause be the
promise to marry, and the effect be the carnal knowledge, there is
criminal or moral seduction.
c. Sue for ACTUAL DAMAGES, should there be any, such as the
expenses for the wedding preparations.
2. When there was no sexual intercourse:
a. Sue for MORAL DAMAGES in case there has been a deliberate desire
to inflict loss or injury or there has been an evident abuse of right.
b. Sue for ACTUAL DAMAGES, should there be any, such as the
expenses for the wedding preparations.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS 176 SCRA 778
Petitioners invoked the right of damnun absque injuria or the damage or loss
which does not constitute a violation of legal right or amount to a legal
wrong is unavailing in this case.
The Court finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must
now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail;
his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be
trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a
letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to
dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private
respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent.
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 of the Civil Code.
PNB vs CA et al G.R. No. L-27155 May 18, 1978

While it is true that PNB had the ultimate authority of approving or
disapproving the proposed lease since the quota was mortgaged in the
Bank. The Bank cannot escape its responsibility of observing, for the
protection of the interest of the private respondents (Mrs. Tapnio), that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which circumstances demand in
approving or disapproving the lease. The law makes it imperative that every
person must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
The petitioner failed to do this. Certainly it knew that the agricultural year was
about to expire, and that by disapproval of the lease, private respondents
would be unable to utilize the sugar quota allocation.
ARTICLE 22
Unjust enrichment: Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Requisites of accion in rem verso [action for restitution of the thing]:
1. One party must be enriched.
b. The other party suffered loss.
c. There must be a causal relation between the parties.
d. The enrichment must not be justifiable; otherwise, there can be no recovery.
e. There must be no other way to recover such as those based on contract,
quasi-contract or quasi- delict.
f.
The indemnity cannot exceed the loss or enrichment, whichever is less.
In an accion in rem verso, mistake of payment need not be alleged because there is a
positive act, either by way of dolo or culpa, done by the offender party to the prejudice
of the offended party. Rather, alleged only the wrongful acts.
While in solutio indebite, mistake of payment must be alleged since there is no positive
act done to induce the complaining party to pay by mistake.
Page 7
The incapacity of the defendant to enter into contracts does not bar the accion in rem
verso, so long as he has been unjustly enriched.
The indemnity does not include unrealized profits because defendants enrichment is
the limit of his liability.
Elements of alienation of affection between spouses:

a. Wrongful conduct of the defendant.
b. Loss of affection or consortium.
c. Causal connection between such conduct and loss.
ARTICLE 23
Basis: nemo cum alterius detrimento locupletori potest. - No person can enrich himself at
the expense of another.
Note: A stranger would be liable irrespective of his good motives, if he interferes with
family relations, whereas a parent or close relative would not be liable unless there is
malice proven by the plaintiff. A distant relative could escape liability if he proves good
faith and honest motives.
Duty to indemnify even without fault: Even when an act or event causing damage to
anothers property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter
shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event, he was benefited.
The right to privacy is limited whenever the circumstances show a reasonable interest on
the part of the public in the conduct or affairs of persons who have become public
characters.
Illustration: A fire ensued in the village of A, B, C. The house of B and C are behind the
house of A. To prevent the fire from spreading the firemen need to destroy the house of
A. What is the liability of B and C?
They are liable to pay for the construction of the house of A because they benefited
from its destruction. If the house of A was not demolished by the firemen, the fire would
have gotten their respective houses.
Also, the right to privacy is limited by the privilege similar to that of fair comment in the
law of defamation.
ARTICLE 24
Protection of the underdog: In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of
the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence,
ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age of other handicap, the courts must
be vigilant for his protection.
Parens patriae: literally means father or parent of his country; it is the sovereign power of
the state in safeguarding the rights of person under disability; it is the obligation to
minimize the risk to those who, because of their disability, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves, in case where the law is to be applied strictly.
ARTICLE 25
Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute
public want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of
any government or private charitable institution.
Note: damages cannot be demanded as an alternative relief.
ARTICLE 26
This is based on the alienation of affections.
Rights protected: Every person shall respect the personal dignity, personality, privacy,
peace of mind, personal security, family relations, and social intercourse.
Remedies in case of violation: damages; prevention; other relief.
Prohibited acts:
1. Prying into the privacy of anothers residence.
2. Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another.
3. Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends.
4. Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
5. Other similar acts.
MANUEL LAGUNZAD vs. MARIA SOTO VDA. DE GONZALES AND THE COURT OF
APPEALS GR NO. L-32066 August 6, 1979
Being a public figure ipso facto does not automatically destroy in t oto a
person's right to privacy. The right to invade as person's privacy to
disseminate public information does not extend to a fictional or novelized
representation of a person, no matter how public a figure he or she may be.
In the case at bar, while it is true that petitioner exerted efforts to present a
true-to-life story of Moises Padilla, petitioner admits that he included a little
romance in the film because without it, it would be a drab story of torture
and brutality.
Lagunzad cannot dispense with the need for prior consent and authority
from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's life
and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v.
Curtis" a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person
to protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to
protect their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the
character and memory of the deceased."
Lagunzad claims that as a citizen and as a newspaperman, he had the right
to express his thoughts in film on the public life of Moises Padilla without
prior restraint. The right of freedom of expression, indeed, occupies a
preferred position in the "hierarchy of civil liberties." It is not, however, without
limitations. One criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and
of the press is the "balancing-of-interests test." The principle requires a court to
take conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests
observable in a given situation or type of situation." In the case at bar, the
interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by respondent and the
right of -freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. Taking into account the
interplay of those interests, and considering the obligations assumed in the
Licensing Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such
agreement will have to be upheld particularly because the limits of freedom
of expression are reached when expression touches upon matters of
essentially private concern.
GAUDENCIO T. MENDOZA vs. MAXIMO M. ALCALA G.R. No. L-14305 August 29,
1961
Page 8
The defendant could still be prosecuted for the collection of the amount
stated in the said receipt after he had been acquitted by the Court on a
charge of estafa based on the same receipt.
The declaration in the decision in Criminal Case No. 3219 to the effect that
"any obligation which the defendant may have incurred in favor of
Gaudencio T. Mendoza is purely civil in character, and not criminal," amounts
to a reservation of the civil action in favor of the offended party. Under Art. 29
of NCC when the accused was acquitted on the ground that the
prosecution has not proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action
based on the same transaction may prosper. Under the Rules of Court, the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of civil unless
there is a declaration that fact from which civil is based did not exist.
Although no reservation was made, the declaration in the criminal case that
the obligation is purely civil amounts to a reservation of the civil action in
favor of the offended party. Furthermore, since estafa involves fraud, an
independent civil action may prosper under Art. 33 of the Civil Code.
ARTICLE 27
Note that for article 27 to apply, the act complained of and which cause damages to
the complainant must be a ministerial duty and not a discretionary duty.
Ministerial duty- refers to duties which an authority must do without exercising his
discretion.
Example- is the enforcement of an ordinance- A mayor must enforce an ordinance
even if he thinks that it is unconstitutional, because it is his ministerial duty to enforce
ordinances, otherwise he can be compelled by mandamus.
In contrast to a discretionary duty, wherein the person in authority is exercising his
wisdom and intelligence. You compel an authority to perform a discretionary duty, since
he is given the right to do it or not base on his discretion.
Non-feasance: Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or
employee refuse or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Requisites:
1. The defendant is a public official charged with the performance of official
duties.
2. There is a violation of an official duty in favor of an individual.
3. There is willfulness or negligence in the violation of such official duty.
4. There is injury to the individual.
Excuses for non-performance: impossibility of performance; contributory negligence of
the plaintiff; ministerial officer with no discretion where the law places on him the
imperative duty of obeying the order of a superior.
Good faith or absence of malice is not a defense for non-performance.
ARTICLE 28
Prohibited competition: Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or high- handed method shall give rise to right of action by the
person who thereby suffers damages.
Characteristics: it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and it must involve
acts which are characterized as contrary to good conscience or unlawful.
Cutthroat competition: when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the
sake of profit to himself, but regardless of loss, and for the sole purpose of driving his
competitor out of business so that later on, he can take advantage of the effects of his
malevolent purpose.
ARTICLE 29
Civil action not barred by acquittal: When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted.
Reason: difference in the proceedings and the quantum of evidence needed.
Criminal case- the quantum of evidence is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Civil case- the quantum of evidence is only preponderance of evidence. This means
that whoever had proven his claim as supported by evidence, thus the scale of justice
tilted towards him is entitled of his prayer.
Filing of bond: Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond, to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
Duty of the court: if in a criminal case, the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
due to that ground.
Civil action barred by acquittal: whenever the accused has been found to be not the
author of an act, or that that supposed act attributed to the accused did not exist, this
findings, resulting in an acquittal, would bar a civil action for damages against the
accuse.
Also, a separate civil action may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense even if no criminal proceeding is instituted [Art. 30].
Furthermore, a civil action may also be brought even if no independent civil action and
criminal action have been instituted [Art. 35].
MENDOZA VS. ALCALA 2 SCRA 1032

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground. A judgment of acquittal does not constitute a
bar to a subsequent civil action involving the same subject matter, even in
regard to a civil action brought against the defendant by the State, nor is it
evidence of his innocence in such action, and is not admissible in evidence
to prove that he was not guilty of the crime with which he was charged.
The declaration in the decision in Criminal Case No. 3219 to the effect that
"any obligation which the defendant may have incurred in favor of
Gaudencio T. Mendoza is purely civil in character, and not criminal," amounts
to a reservation of the civil action in favor of the offended party and the
Page 9
offense charge in the said criminal case being estafa which is fraud the
present action falls under the exception to the general rule and it can be
filed independently of the criminal action.
MENDOZA vs ARRIETA G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979

Where in a multiple highway accident involving a truck which hit a jeep
which then hit a Mercedes Benz coming from the opposite direction, two
criminal actions for reckless imprudence was filed against the drivers of the
truck and jeep, and the driver of the truck was found guilty and the driver of
the jeep acquitted, a civil action for damages against the owner of the truck
would prosper as there is no res judicata, the parties and causes of action
being different. Furthermore, under Art. 31 of the Civil Code, When the civil
action is based on an obligation not arising from crime, the civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings regardless of result of the
latter.
Citing Garcia v. Florido, "As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent
act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or
create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own foundation and individuality. Some
legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil
action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal
proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the latter.
Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 (requiring reservation of civil
actions) with reference to Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code, is contrary
to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were drafted and
are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is
now Section 1 of Rule 111. The proviso, which is procedural, may also be
regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33
and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso."
However, a civil action for damages against the owner-driver of the jeep
would not prosper because civil liability arising from crime co-exists with
criminal liability in criminal cases. Hence, the offended party had the option
to prosecute on civil liability arising from crime or from quasi-delict. His active
participation in the criminal case implies that he opted to recover the civil
liability arising from crime. Hence, since the acquittal in the criminal case,
which was not based on reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages can
no longer be instituted.
REPUBLIC v. BELLO G.R. No. L-34906 January 27, 1983

Even if an accused in a criminal case is acquitted of the crime of
malversation because of the failure of the prosecution to prove criminal
intent and failure to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
government may still file a civil action to recover the government funds
disbursed by him without prior authority.
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case
refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code. In other words, the civil liability which is ALSO
EXTINGUISHED upon acquittal of the accused is the civil liability ARISING
FROM THE ACT as a crime.
A separate civil case may be filed BUT there is NO STATEMENT THAT SUCH
SEPARATE FILING IS THE ONLY AND EXCLUSIVE PERMISSIBLE MODE OF
RECOVERING DAMAGES. There appear to be no sound reasons to require a
separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in
the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings
where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the
accused. The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused
the destruction of the complainant's market stall and had its contents carted
away. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was
acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on
the part of all concerned.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a
judgment of acquittal and a judgment awarding damages in the same
criminal action. THE TWO CAN STAND SIDE BY SIDE.
MAXIMO vs. GEROCHI, JR. G.R. Nos. L-47994-97 September 24, 1986.
Panghilason was acquitted from estafa where in the LC grounded the
dismissal on the prosecution's failure to establish her guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and that if accused had any obligation, it is simply civil in
nature that could be properly ventilated within the context of civil law.
Maximo then filed an MR to to compel Judge Gerochi, Jr. to include in his
judgment of acquittal the civil liability which the private respondent Conchita
Panghilason admitted in court. MR denied which the SC set aside.
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be
established or more evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case
has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court
where the criminal action was decided for further hearings on the civil
aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a
separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the
delays suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it would
be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a separate
civil action to be filed.
Judge Geroci stated in his denial of the motion for reconsideration that the
action for civil liability must be filed in a "civil court is erroneous, since the
private respondent never denied her debts or obligations to the petitioner, he
could have made the same civil judgment on the criminal case.
ARTICLE 30
[Civil action even if there is no criminal action instituted]
PADILLA V. CA G.R. No. L-39999, May 31, 1984
Mayor Padilla et al was acquitted from criminal charge of Grave Coercion
against Antonio Vergara however such acquittal did not extinguish the civil
liability.
The judgment of acquittal EXTINGUISHES the liability of the accused for
damages ONLY WHEN IT INCLUDES A DECLARATION that the facts from which
the civil might arise DID NOT EXIST.
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal
offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil
case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
ARTICLE 31
Page 10
Independent civil action: When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter.
Instances when the law grants independent civil action:
1. Art. 32 (breach of constitutional and other rights)
2. Art. 33 (in their generic sense: defamation; fraud; physical injuries)
3. Art. 34 (refusal or failure of a city/municipal police to give protection)
4. Art. 2177 (culpa-aquiliana)
5.
ARTICLE 32 (breach of constitutional rights)
See codal provision for enumerationIt is not necessary that the defendant should have
actedwith malice/bad faith to be liable.
Limited liability: The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge.
Exception: Unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other
penal laws [see Art. 204 207 of the Revised Penal Code].
ARTICLE 33
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
ARTICLE 34
Primary liability: When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to
render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such police
officer shall be primarily liable for damages.
Subsidiary liability: The city or municipal government shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefore.
The defense of exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, as provided under Art. 2180, cannot be used as this is available only to
private employers.
RULE 111, SEC.3 Rules on Crim Procedure
When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided for in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the
criminal action.
SAPIERA V. CA G.R. No. 128927 September 14, 1999

Based on the above findings of the trial court, the exoneration of petitioner of
the charges of estafa was based on the failure of the prosecution to present
sufficient evidence showing conspiracy between her and the other accused
Arturo de Guzman (issuer of the check) in defrauding private respondent.
However, by her own testimony, petitioner admitted having signed the four
(4) checks in question on the reverse side.
We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that despite the conflicting
versions of the parties, it is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by de
Guzman were signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to
how she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an

indorser thereof.
The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil
liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from
a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might
arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held
civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The
accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks
signed by her in favor of the complainant.
ESCUETA VS FANDIALAN
Under Art. 33 of the Civil Code, even without a reservation, an injured person
can prosecute his civil action for damages from the physical injuries
separately and independently of the criminal action and would require only
a preponderance of evidence to support his action. Such separate and
independent civil action under the cited codal article proceeds to trial and
final judgment irrespective of the result of the criminal action. (Rule 111, Sec.
2, Rules of Court).
[NOTE: Under said Rule, a reservation is REQUIRED. Why a contradictory rule
was cited as authority will perhaps remain an unceasing source of wonder.]
MANDEJA VS CARO
DR. EVA A. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for
the death of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy. Widow reserved her
right to file a separate civil action for damages. While the criminal case still
pending, widow sued the accused for damages of the same court. The
judge granted the MTD stating that Rule111, the instant civil action may be
instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action,
in correct.
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute
it separately and after the criminal action has been commenced no civil
action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted.
The present articles create an exception to this rule when the offense is
defamation, fraud, or physical injuries. In these cases, a civil action may be
filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no
reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such
reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the
civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has
been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result
of the civil action."
MANIAGO VS CA
Petitioner owns shuttle buses which one figured in a vehicular accident with a
passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Boado. As result of the
accident, victims filed criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property and multiple physical injuries and a month after filed a
civil case for damages.
Page 11
proceed.
Court ruled,the reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action
shall be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be
reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
Without reservation it will be deemed to have been instituted with the
criminal case.
A civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as general rule, impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising
from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is
waived;(2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has
been instituted prior to the criminal action.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORP VS PEOPLE

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who has
been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot
be held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action
based on quasi delict against it.
In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action
for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal
action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, when private respondents, as complainants in the
criminal action, reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they
waived other available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission
of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in holding the
accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer of the accused subsidiarily
liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in the criminal action as the
offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action against the employer
based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil action ex delicto.
The Court, however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order to
promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding" or exempted "a
particular case from the operation of the rules." Hence, this case should be
remanded to the trial court so that it may render decision in the civil case
awarding damages as may be warranted by the evidence.
ARTICLE 36
Prejudicial question: One which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may
be instituted or may proceed, because a decision therein is vital to the judgment in the
criminal case.
Elements:
1. The previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action.
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
MERCED VS DIEZ
A married man, Abundio Merced, was forced by Elizabeth Ceasar to
contract marriage with her. He then sued for the annulment of the second
marriage on the ground of force and intimidation, but Elizabeth countered
with a criminal charge of bigamy. In his answer in the bigamy case, he filed a
motion to suspend the criminal proceedings until after the termination of the
annulment case on the theory that the annulment was a prejudicial
question.
HELD: The annulment is really a prejudicial question, because if he was really
forced, there was no consent to the second marriage, and he cannot
therefore be guilty of bigamy. In order that a person may be held guilty of
bigamy, the second marriage must have had all the essential elements of a
valid marriage, were it not for the existence of the first marriage. The
contention that the second marriage being bigamous and void, does not
have to be declared such, as held in People v. Mendoza, 50 O.G. No. 10, p.
4767, cannot be sustained because precisely the issue here is whether or not
such marriage was really bigamous.
NOTE: The doctrine in Merced v. Diez, was reiterated in Zapanta v. Montesa,
et al., L-14534, Feb. 28, 1962, where the Supreme Court ruled that the
defendant in a case for bigamy claims that his second marriage is not valid
on the ground that his consent thereto was obtained by means of duress,
force, and intimidation, the suit for annulment of the second marriage must
first be decided before the criminal action for bigamy can proceed
LANDICHO VS RELOVA
In order that a case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
question to a case of bigamy as against an accused, it must be shown that
the petitioners consent to such marriage was procured by means of duress,
force, and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage was
involuntary and cannot be made the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy.
ARTICLE 43
Article 43 contemplates a situation where two people who are called to succeed each
other died.
The rule- if there is a doubt, as between 2 or more persons who are called to succeed
each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the
other, shall prove the same. [Presumption] in the absence of proof, it is presumed that
they died at the same time, [Effect of presumption] there shall be no transmission of
rights from one to the other.
Relative to Article 43 is Rule 131 of the Rules of CourtSection 3. Disputable Presumptions- the following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
jj. That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in the same
calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not shown who died first, and
there are not particular circumstances from which it can be inferred, the survivorship is
Page 12
determined from the probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes,
according to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to have
survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have survived.
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is deemed to have
survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the male is
deemed to have survived; if the sex be same, the older.
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those ages, the
latter is deemed to have survived.
Nobody has 0% capacity to act. Infants are close to 0% but still have capacity to act.
For example, even fetus has the right to succeed and also have the right to the integrity
of body. Aliens cannot own colleges or broadcast media but can own other things such
as cars or stocks.
ARTICLE 38
Restrictions on capacity to act: Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being deafmute, prodigality, and civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do
not exempt the incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise
from his acts or from
property relations, such as easements.
In short- The Rules of Court shall apply where:

1. The issue does not involve succession but something else [i.e. insurance,
suspensive conditions]; and
2. The persons perish in the same calamity.
A minor cannot enter into contracts, but he may be estopped from

disavowing his contract if he has misled the other party as to his age.
Generally, a deaf-mute can make a valid will so long as its contents can be
made known to him. But when the deaf-mute does not know how to read and
write, he cannot give consent to contracts.
Civil interdiction is an accessory penalty; it shall deprive the offender of the
rights of parental authority, or guardianship, either as to the person or property
of any ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property, and the
right to dispose of such property by any act inter vivos.
Article 43 shall apply where:

1. The case involves succession; and
2. The persons do not perish in the same calamity.
What if succession is involved and the persons perish in the same calamity? Most
commentators say Article 43 will prevail.
Note: If the conditions in the Rules of Court or Article 43 do not concur, do not apply
either.
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
I.
CIVIL PERSONALITY
Civil personality: the aptitude of being the subject, active or passive, of rights and
obligations.
A.
B.
RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT
1. MINORITY (RA 6809)

Minority those that havent attend the age of majority or 18yo
i. Civil Acts
Art. 797 NCC Persons of either sex under eighteen years of age cannot make a will.
Art. 1498 , par 2 FC With regard to movable property, its delivery may also be made by
the delivery of the keys of the place or depository where it is stored or kept
Art. 14 Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.
Elements
ARTICLE 37 - Capacity
Juridical capacity
The fitness to be the subject of legal relations.
There are no degrees of juridical capacity. Juridical capacity is the same in
every person. No one has more juridical capacity than others.
It is inherent in natural persons. On the other hand, it arises in artificial persons
when such artificial persons are created.
Capacity to actThe power to do acts with legal effect; it can be acquired and may be lost. It
can be restricted, modified, and limited.
Nobody has 100% capacity to act. The law imposes restrictions on capacity to act. As
long as one has contractual capacity [a.ka. full civil capacity] one is near 100%
capacity to act.
Capacidad plena civil or full civil capacity is not really 100% but close to it. With
contractual capacity, one is generally able to perform contracts and dispose property.
ii. Delicts and Quasi delicts

Art.101 par 3, RPC Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor
under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property
exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.
Art. 2182 if the minor or insane person causing damage has no parents or guardian,
the minor or insane person shall be answerable with his own property in an action
against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed
2. Insanes and Imbecile

Art. 1327 The following cannot give consent to a contract:
(1) Unemancipated minors;
(2) Insane or demented persons, and deaf-mutes who do not know how to write.
Art. 1328 Contracts entered into during a lucid interval are valid. Contracts agreed to
in a state of drunkenness or during a hypnotic spell are voidable.
Art. 1399 When the defect of the contract consists in the incapacity of one of the
parties, the incapacitated person is not obliged to make any restitution except insofar
as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him.
Page 13
3. Deaf-mute
A deaf-mute may either be sane or insane. If sane, prescription may run against him. He
may make a will (Art. 807); but cannot be a competent witness to a notarial will. (Art.
820).
Art. 1327 same above
4. Prodigal
Rule 92, Sec. 2 ROC It has been held that the acts of prodigality must show a mor- bid
state of mind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent
as is likely to expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the compulsory heirs of
their legitime. (Martinez vs. Martinez, 1 Phil. 182). Prodigals are subject to guardianship.
(Rule 93, Sec. 2, Rules of Court)
A spendthrift is a person who, by excessive drinking, gambling, idleness, or debauchery
of any kind shall so spend, waste or lessen his estate as to expose himself or his family to
want or suffering, or expose the town to charge or expense for the support of himself
and his family.
5. Civil interdiction accessory penalty

In the commission of certain offenses, accessory penalties are imposed by law, like
perpetual or temporary disqualification to hold office, suspension from public office,
curtailment of the right to vote or be voted for and the right to exercise a profession or
calling, or even civil interdiction.
Art. 34, RPC Civil interdiction deprives the offender during the time of his sentence of
the rights of parental authority and guardianship, either as to person or property of any
ward, of marital authority, of the right to manage his property and the right to dispose of
such property by any act or conveyance inter vivos.
Art 135 (1) and Art 142 (3), FC Ground for separation of properties during marriage.
6. Insolvency
(FRIA) If one has been declared insolvent, he cannot just dispose of his properties
existing at the time of the commencement of the proceedings for insolvency. No
payments of property or credit can be made to him.
Art. 1830 cause of dissolution.
Art. 1919 agency is extinguished
Art. 2238 So long as the conjugal partnership or absolute community subsists, its
property shall not be among the assets to be taken possession of by the assignee for the
payment of the insolvent debtor's obligations, except insofar as the latter have
redounded to the benefit of the family. If it is the husband who is insolvent, the
administration of the conjugal partnership or absolute community may, by order of the
court, be transferred to the wife or to a third person other than the assignee.
7. Alienage
Aliens cannot acquire land in the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution provides that save in
cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. (Sec. 7, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution). The rule cited above is not however
absolute as the Constitution further provides that notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 7 of this Article, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship may be a transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law.
(Sec. 8, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution).
The limitation provided by law is that if such former natural-born citizen acquires land in
Metro Manila, he can do so but not exceeding 5,000 square meters. If outside, the limit is
three (3) hectares. It can be acquired for all purposes.
Aliens cannot practice their professions in the Philippines, as the 1987 Constitution says
that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens,
save in cases pro vided by law. (Sec. 14, Art. XII). They cannot also operate public
utilities. (Art. XII, Sec. 11). In the case of Cheesman vs. CA, it was said that if a foreigner
marries a Filipino and out of conjugal funds, a private land is acquired by them, the
same cannot form part of their community of property because the foreigner is
disqualified from acquiring lands in the Philippines. Note that this may be harsh, but that
is the law. Dura lex sed lex.
II.
A.
KINDS OF PERSONS
Natural Persons
1. Commencement of Personality
Art. 37 Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Art. 40 Determinant: birth determines personality.
Presumptive personality: The conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in Art. 41.
The personality, therefore, has 2 characteristics: it is essentially limited [since it has a
beginning and end] and it is provisional or conditional [a person must be born inorder to
have a personality].
Actual personality: personality begins at birth.
The conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to
it- an example of a case where upon birth occurs personality retroacts to the moment
of conception is in case of succession since it is favorable to the child. On the other
hand, if the purpose is for paying taxes, personality does not retroact since it is
unfavorable to the child.
Art. 742 Is the fetus subject of donation? Is the fetus entitled to the donation?
Yes, the fetus can be the subject of donation since the law provides that the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it. Donation is
favorable to the child hence he is considered born for that purpose. Donations made to
conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those who would legally
represent them if they are already born.
However, the child is not entitled to the donation since his intra-uterine life is less than 7
months and he did not survive at least 24 hours from the moment of birth. The child was
never born and did not have personality. Thus, there was no donee in this case, since for
one to be a donee, one must have a legal personality, one must be born, but the child
was never born.
Art. 1025 (2) A child already conceived at the time of the death of the decedent is
capable of succeeding provided it be born later under the conditions prescribed in
article
Page 14
GELUZ VS. CA [JULY 20, 1961]

Facts: Nestor Lazos wife obtained an abortion from petitioner Geluz for 3
times. Lazo hinged his claim for damages against petitioner on the third
abortion. The RTC and CA upheld the claim of Lazo, basing their decision on
initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code, which provides thatArt. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasidelict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have
been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by
the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's
inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand
support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.
Issue: whether or not Lazo can recover damages against Geluz.
Held: No, the court ruled that an action for pecuniary damages on account
of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to
see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action
could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished
by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from
on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from
capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil
Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality
by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive:
"provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article".
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
Moreover, this is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any
damages at all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon
them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the
deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents cannot
expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary
damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the
case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found
any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly
found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it,
that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities
are that he was likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious
repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible
practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not
seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against
the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining
from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50, 000.00
damages and P3, 000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.
2.
Extinguishment of personality
a.
Contracts
Art. 42 Extinction of civil personality: Civil personality is extinguished by death.

Death: The cessation of life. The ceasing to exist
Effect of death upon civil personality is determined by: law, contract or will.
The estate of a deceased is a person that may continue the personality of the
deceased for the purpose of settling debts.
The fact of death is important because it affects civil personality and legal relations. The
main effect of death is readily seen in succession. Death is also relevant to labor law
and insurance.
Art. 777 The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent.
Art. 776 The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of
the decedent.
Art. 1919 (3) Agency is extinguished: By the death, civil interdiction, insanity or
insolvency of the principal or of the agent;
Art. 603 Usufruct is extinguished: By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary
intention clearly appears;
Art. 1311 Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law. The heir is not liable
beyond the value of the property he received from the decedent.
b.
Criminal Liability
Art. 89 (1), RPC How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment.
RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

The contention of petitioner that the death of the accused-employee wipes
out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's
subsidiary liability is without merit. The death of the accused during the
pendency of his appeal or before the judgment of conviction (rendered
against him by the lower court) became final and executory extinguished his
criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the imprisonment imposed
and his pecuniary liability for fines, but not his civil liability should the liability
or obligation arise (not from a crime, for here, no crime was committed, the
accused not having been convicted by final judgment, and therefore still
Page 15
regarded as innocent) but from a quasi-delict (See Arts. 2176 and 2177, Civil
Code), as in this case. The liability of the employer here would not be
subsidiary but solidary with his driver (unless said employer can prove there
was no negligence on his part at all, that is, if he can prove due diligence in
the selection and supervision of his driver).
B. Juridical Persons
ARTICLE 45- Kinds of juridical persons:
1.
2.
People v. Bayotas GR 102007, Sep. 2, 1994

Where civil liability survives, an action for recovery may be pursued but only
by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action
may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.
A private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of
the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privatization of right by prescription.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, the death of appellant
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act
complained of, i.e., rape.
Mansion Biscuit Corp., et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 94713
The civil liability for non-payment of the nutria-wafer biscuits delivered by
Mansion Biscuit to Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced
against the private respondents because the said civil liability was not the
personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuit Corp. Rather, it was the
contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corp., of which Ty Teck Suan was
president, to Mansion Biscuit Corp.
It is quite obvious therefore that Ty Teck Suan did not purchase the biscuits for
himself but for the Corporation. The issue of the civil liability of Edward Ty
Brothers Corp. to Mansion Biscuit Corp. arising from the contract of purchase
and sale between them could not have been and was not litigated and
resolved in the criminal case inasmuch as they were not parties thereto. A
separate civil action must be instituted by Mansion Biscuit Corp. against
Edward Ty Bros. Corp. to enforce the contract between them.
Even if the liability were tortious, the same must be addressed still against
Edward Ty Bros. Corp. for the established facts show that the postdated
checks were issued by the accused not in payment of his personal
obligations but of the corporations. Moreover, the fraud allegedly
committed by the accused was merely incidental to the contractual
obligation, not an independent act which could serve as a source of
obligation.
The law speaks of a civil action arising from the act or omission complained
of. It does not refer to a civil action which is based on other sources of
obligations like contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts.
The State and its political subdivisions; governed by the laws creating or
recognizing them [Art. 45].
Juridical persons for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality
begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; governed by
the laws creating or recognizing them [Art. 45];
In case of dissolution, their property and other assets shall be disposed of in
pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been specified
on this point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes
for the benefit of the LGUs which during the existence of the institution derived
the principal benefits from the same [Art. 47].
3.
Juridical persons for private interest or purpose; their personality begins from
the moment a certificate of incorporation is granted and issued by the SEC;
Regulated by laws of general application on the subject [Art. 45].
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by
the provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. [Art. 45];
In case of dissolution, see the Corporation Code.
ARTICLE 46
Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations
of their organizations.
Juridical persons may acquire properties. They may enter into contracts. Without such
capacity, they cannot fulfill or attain their aims. They may sue or be sued but they
cannot be prosecuted criminally. The officers may however, be prosecuted criminally.
III MARRIAGE! FAMILY CODE
1.
DEFINATION Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union

between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and
an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits
provided by this Code.
Aspects of marriage:
1. As a CONTRACT, marriage differs from other contracts:
Generally in contracts, the parties are free to enter into contractual stipulations.
However, in a marriage the parties are generally not free to enter into contractual
stipulations. All the consequences of marriage are determined by law. The only area in
which the parties may stipulate is with regard to property relations as long as these
stipulations are not contrary to law. In fact, the parties are not limited to the 3 major
regimes of property relations in the Family Code.
2. As a STATUS:
Page 16
Marriage is no longer just a contract but an inviolable social institution, which is

the foundation of the family, and shall be protected by the State.
Being an institution of public order or policy, its nature, consequences, and
incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation except in
marriage settlements where the parties may fix their property relations to a
certain extent.
It carries with it implications in 2 fields: the realm of personal rights and
obligations of the spouses, and the realm of property relations.
REQUISITES
1. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES:
a.
Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a

female.
Legal capacity includes:
I.
Age any male or female of the age of 18 years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38, may contract marriage.
II.
Gender must be a male and a female.
III.
No legal impediment: incestuous marriages (Art. 37); void marriages by reason of
public policy (Art. 38).
When either or both of the contracting parties are CITIZENS OF A FOREIGN COUNTRY, it
shall be necessary for them before a marriage license can be obtained, to submit a
CERTIFICATE OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO CONTRACT MARRIAGE, issued by their respective
diplomatic or consular officials.
STATELESS PERSONS OR REFUGEES FROM OTHER COUNTRIES shall, in lieu of the certificate
of legal capacity herein required, submit an AFFIDAVIT SHOWING SUCH CAPACITY TO
CONTRACT.
The legal capacity of a foreigner to marry, as determined by the law of the country of
which he is a citizen, is recognized by our laws. This is in accordance with the nationality
theory under Art. 15 of the Civil Code.
Under Art. 35(1): a marriage contracted by any party below 18 years of age even with
the consent of parents or guardians shall be void ab initio.
b.
Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.
Freely given: the consent is real and not vitiated or rendered defective by any of the
vices of consent.
Hence, the marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by
fraud, (Art. 45, par. 3), or if the consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence (Art. 45, par. 4).
2.
FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE

a.
Authority of the solemnizing officer - In the Philippines marriage can

be solemnized by:
I.
Members of the judiciary.
II.
Any priest or minister of any church or religious.
III.
Any ship captain or airplane.
IV.
Any military commander of a unit.
V.
VI.
Any consul-general, consul, or vice-consul.

Incumbent Mayor of a city/municipality (see sec. 444 and
445 of the Local Government Code).
Hence, the marriage shall be void if it shall be solemnized by any person not legally
authorized to perform marriages, UNLESS such marriages were contracted with either or
both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority
to do so.
NAVARRO v. JUDGE DOMAGTOY A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

Judge Domagtoy has no authority to solemnize the marriage of Sumaylo and
Del Rosario since the same was done outside his jurisdiction. His reliance on
the exceptions of Art. 8 is incorrect, neither of the contracting parties were at
the point of death nor in a remote place. Also, the written request presented
addressed to respondent judge was made by one party only (needs both),
Gemma Del Rosario.
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage
outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
The marriage between Tagadan and Borga is BIGAMOUS and VOID, there
being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Pearanda (his first wife).
Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse
was already dead (missing for 7years according to the affidavit), a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a is still a mandatory requirement.
Note: If the marriage is void then you dont need to do anything, its as if I
didnt happen. However for the purpose of remarriage there is a need to
formally get a declaration of nullity.
Consul-general as a solemnizing officer: Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad

may be solemnized by a consul-general, consul or vice-consul of the Philippines. The
issuance of the marriage license and the duties of the local civil registrar and of the
solemnizing officer with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by the
consular official.
b.
Marriage License
Where to apply? A marriage license shall be issued by the LCRegistrar of the city or
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
Enforceability of the license: The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines for a
period of 120 days from the date of issue, and shall be deemed automatically
cancelled at the expiration of said period if the contracting parties have not made use
of it.
A marriage solemnized without a license shall be void ab initio.
PEOPLE V DAVID 13 CA REP 495

No marriage license but only a receipt however the marriage is still valid.
Page 17
The absence of a piece of paper just makes it harder to prove your right but
still you can prove it in other evidentiary ways.
Marriages Exempt From Marriage License [Extraordinary Marriage]:

1. Art. 27: marriage in articulo mortis; remains valid even if the ailing party
subsequently survives.
2. Art. 28: marriage in remote places (no means of transportation to
personally appear to the LCR).
3. Art. 31: marriage in articulo mortis between passengers or crew while the
ship is at sea or the plane is at flight, and during stopovers at ports of call.
4. Art. 32: marriages in articulo mortis between persons within the zone of
military operation, whether members of the armed forces or civilians.
5. Art. 33: Marriages among Muslims or among members of the ethnic
cultural communities provided that they are solemnized in accordance
with their customs, rites or practices.
6. Ratification of marital cohabitation: Art. 34: marriage of a man and a
woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least 5 years,
during which, the parties have no legal impediment to marry each other.
7. Marriages solemnized outside the Philippines where no marriage license is
required by the country where it is solemnized.
DE LORIA VS FELIX G.R. No. L-9005

June 20, 1958
The marriage between Matea and Felix is one of articulo mortis. The failure to
sign the marriage certificate or contract does not nullify the marriage. First,
Under the Marriage law, failure to sign the marriage contract is not one of the
causes to annul a marriage. Second, signing of the marriage contract or
certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing
the act. No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it
an essential requisite not the formal requirement of evidentiary value,
which we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by which it
may be established is quite another.
The fact that the parish priest failed to send a copy of the marriage cert to
local registrar does not invalidate such marriage since it does not appear
that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were not present,
the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of the
requisites. In line with the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of
men and women who have lived publicly in a state of concubinage, we
must hold this marriage to be valid.
c.
A Marriage Ceremony which takes place with the appearance of

the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
in the presence of not less than 2 witnesses.
Form No prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally
before the solemnizing officer and DECLARE in the presence of not less than 2 witnesses
of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife. This declaration shall be
contained in the marriage certificate which shall be signed and attested to.
In case of a marriage in articulo mortis, when the party at the point of death is unable to
sign the marriage certificate, it shall be sufficient for one of the witnesses to the marriage
to write the name of said party, which fact shall be attested by the solemnizing officer.
Since it is neither an essential nor a formal requisite, an unsigned or unattested marriage
certificate does not invalidate the marriage.
Where the marriage should be solemnized? The marriage shall be solemnized publicly,
and not elsewhere:
1. In the chambers of the judge
2. In open court
3. In the church, chapel or temple
4. In the office of the consul-general, consul or vice consul, and not elsewhere
5. Except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote
places
6. Where both of the parties request in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them.
7. All marriages solemnized OUTSIDE the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized and valid there as
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those void foreign marriages.
Marriage by proxy:
a. If performed here in the Philippines, the marriage is void because physical presence
of both parties is required.
b. If performed abroad, whether between Filipinos or foreigners or mixed, and valid
there as such, the marriage should be considered valid in the Philippines as mentioned
under Art. 26.
ROSALIA MARTINEZ VS ANGEL TAN GR NO. L-4904 FEB. 5,1909
Marriage between Martinez and Tan was valid. Evidence strongly
preponderates in favor of the decision of the lower court to the effect that
the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.
A marriage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the
peace, signed by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the
presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties
before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as
husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being
corroborated in this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that
she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her,
which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in
marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so
states before the justice of the peace who authorized the same.
Effects:
Absence: The absence of essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
Article 35(2) good faith on both or either of the parties of the solemnizing officers
authority to solemnize marriage.
Defect: A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Art. 45.
Page 18
Irregularity: An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
or administratively liable.
Illustration:
A marriage solemnized by a judge outside his territorial jurisdiction is valid but opens the
judge to sanctions.
A marriage contracted by a party who is 18 21 years old without parental consent is
voidable.
WHAT SHALL A PERSON DO INORDER TO CONTRACT A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE?
There are two optionsFirst option: kill your spouse in a clandestine manner, since death terminates
marital tie. =)
Second option- avail the remedies provided by law.
1. File a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, pursuant to Article
41. Article 41- A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before
the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had
been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case
of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil
Code, an absence of only 2 years shall be sufficient.
2.
Contracted by any party below 18 years of age even with the consent of
parents or guardians;
3. Solemnized without License, except those marriages that are exempt from
the license requirement;
4. Solemnized by any person not Authorized to perform marriages unless such
marriages were contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith
that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
5. Contracted through Mistake of one of the contracting party as to the identity
of the other;
6. Bigamous or polygamous marriages;
7. Subsequent marriages that are void under Art. 53 FC; no liquidation of property
from previous marriage.
8. Marriages contracted by any party, who at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, was Psychologically incapacitated;
9. Incentuous Marriages (Art. 37, FC)
10. Marriages declared void because they are contrary to Public policy (Art. 38,
FC).
11. Subsequent reappearance of the missing spouse (Art. 42, FC)
12. One entering into a subsequent marriage without a final judgment declaring
absolute nullity of a previous marriage (Art. 40, FC) fav ni sir
SANTOS VS CA
The failure of the wife to return home, or at the very least to communicate,
for more than five years does not void the marriage on grounds of
psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less
than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute summary
proceedings as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
Judicial declaration of nullity of marriage before remarriage: the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the bases solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
2.
Register the decision declaring the nullity of marriage in the civil

registry per Article 52 & 53. Art. 52: the judgment of annulment of
absolute nullity of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens
presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry
and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect third
persons.
Article 53- either of the former spouses may marry again after
complying with the requirements of the immediately preceding Article
[52]; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be null and void.
1.
VOID MARRIAGES
A LAaMB PIPS18
1. Absence of any of the essential or formal requisites of marriage;
Psychological incapacity: the condition of a person who does not have the mind, will,
and heart for the performance of essential marital/parental obligations as provided
below
1.
2.
3.
Art. 68: the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 220: parental authority over the person of their unemancipated children.
Art. 225: parental authority over the property of their unemancipated children.
GOMEZ V. LIPANA G.R. No. L-23214 June 30, 1970

Lipana who contracted a 2nd marriage while the first is still subsisting, that the
second marriage was void ab initio and that the husband was the one who
gave cause for its nullity, applied the provision of the Old Civil Code (written
in Spanish) declared his interest in the disputed property forfeited in favor of
the estate of the deceased second wife.
Page 19
There is no suggestion here that the defendant's 1930 marriage to Maria

Loreto Ancino had been annulled or dissolved when he married Isidra Gomez
in 1935, and there is no proof that he did so under the conditions envisioned
in sub-section (b). The burden is on the party invoking the exception to prove
that he comes under it; and the defendant has not discharged that burden at
all, no evidence whatsoever having been adduced by him at the trial.
Indeed, he contracted the second marriage less than seven years after the
first, and he has not shown that his first wife was then generally considered
dead or was believed by him to be so.
REPUBLIC VS CA, MOLINA G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997

There is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of Reynaldo Molina is an incapacity
(spending more time with friends, as a from parents and hiding finances). It appears to be more of a
difficulty if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable
of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. The evidence adduced by
respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other.
The court further laid down the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36
of the Family Code:
1.
The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belong to the plaintiff, and any
doubt must be resolved in favor of the existence of the marriage and against its nullity.
2.
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
I.
Medically or clinically identified
II.
Alleged in the complaint
III.
Sufficiently proven by experts
IV.
Clearly explained in the decision
3.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage although the manifestation need not be perceivable at such time.
4.
The incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable,
although the incurability may be relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
5.
The incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations and not to
those unrelated to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
6.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
7.
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Arts. 68 71 and Arts. 220 225 of the Family Code, with regard to parents and children. Such non-compliance must
also be state in the petition, proven by evidence, and included in the text of the decision.
8.
Interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church, while not controlling, should be
given great respect by our courts.
9.
The trial court must order the fiscal and the Solicitor general to appear as counsel for the
State. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor general issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition to the petition. The Solicitor General and the fiscal shall submit such
certification to the court within 15 days from the date the case is submitted for resolution.
nota bene: Psychological incapacity concept was used by Church to annul marriages.
The Congress meant to adopt Divorce yet Phil as a Christian country adopted Void
under Psych Incapacity instead.
According to sir, homosexuality can be considered as psychologically incapacity. The
question is, is homosexuality an illness? Its not, its a condition; therefore it falls under
psych incapacity.
CHI MING TSOI vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 119190; January 16, 1997
The refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with
each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. The SC finding the gravity of the failed relationship
in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows
and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
General characteristics of psychological incapacity:

a. Gravity: if the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage
and family, shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of
life and work.
b. Antecedence: if the roots of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject
before the marriage although its overt manifestations appear only after the wedding.
c. Incurability: if treatments required exceed the ordinary means of the subject, or
involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject.
LENI O. CHOA vs HON. BELDIA AND ALFONSO C. CHOA May 17, 1999
The respondent judge did not act with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the promulgation of judgment in the criminal case for
concubinage due to a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question comes to
play generally where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending
and there exist in the former (civil action), an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed. Because the
issue in the civil action if resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt of the accused in the criminal case.
In this case, the prejudicial question is the issue raised in the civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity under
Art. 36 of the Family Code. Under this article, a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
VOID even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
The nullity of marriage between the petitioner and the private respondent
brings about two things:
One,
there
is
no
marriage
at
all.
Two, there is no ground to convict Alfonso Choa of concubinage because
one element of the crime is not attendant, that is the man must be married
at the time of commission.
Domingo v. CA G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993

There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent
celebrated while the former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz
Page 20
was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is from the beginning Petitioner

himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.
a. Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment of the other

party of a crime involving moral turpitude.
b. Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she
was pregnant by a man other than her husband.
c. Concealment of a STD, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage.
d. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, existing at the time of the marriage.
The Family Code settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said
projected marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. In fact, the requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who
marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Simply, petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary
however such petition can also be filed for other purposes not only for
remarriage (ex: liquidatin, partition, separation of property etc)
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune, or

chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the
annulment of marriage.
4.
Party & prescription: aggrieved spouse, within 5 years from the cessation of the
violence of intimidation.
GR: Children born out of a void marriage are illigitimate, regardless of absence of a prior
declaration.
XPN: Those conceived or born of marriages declared void under:
1. Art.36 (Psychological incapacity), or
2. Art. 52 in relation to Art. 53
There is violence when in order to wrest consent, serious or irresistible force is

employed.
There is intimidation when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a
reasonable and well-grounded fear of imminent and grave evil upon his
person or property, or upon the person or property of his spouse, descendants
or ascendants, to give his consent.
There is undue influence when a person takes improper advantage of his
power over the will of another, depriving the latter of a reasonable freedom
of choice.
Reverential fear: fear of causing distress, disappointment, or anger on the part
of one whom a person has been conditioned to revere, respect, or obey out
of a special debt of gratitude.
2. VOIDABLE MARRIAGE
Note: Basta viodable marriages it has something to do with the consent of the
contracting parties, either there was a vitiated consent or no consent at all.
I.
Grounds for the annulment of marriage: (Art. 45)

1.
The marriage may be annulled for the reason that the party in whose behalf it
is sought to have the marriage annulled was 18 years of age or over but
below 21, and the marriage was solemnized without the consent of the
parents, guardian or person having substitute parental authority over the
party, in that order, unless after attaining the age of 21, such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband and wife.
Party to file annulment: Parent/ guardian- before the party age 18-21 reach
the age of 21; Spouse [18-21 y.o.]- Within 5 years after reaching the age of 21.
2.
That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to
reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.
Party & prescription: Sane spouse/relatives of the insane spouse- annulment of
marriage may be filed anytime during the lifetime of the insane spouse; Insane
spouse- during lucid interval.
3.
That the consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation, or undue
influence, unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party
thereafter freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife.
5.
That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage

with the other and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable.
Requisites for physical incapacity:
a. That the incapacity exists at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
b. That such incapacity continues to the time when the case for annulment is
being tried.
c. That it appears to be incurable.
d. It must be unknown to the other contracting party.
Party & prescription: aggrieved spouse, within 5 years from the celebration of
the marriage.
That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife.
Party & prescription: aggrieved spouse, within five years after the discovery of
the fraud.
Fraud constitutes:
Page 21
The physical incapacity referred to by law as a ground for annulment of

marriage is impotence, or that physical condition of the husband or the wife in
which sexual intercourse with a normal person of the opposite sex is impossible.
Impotence is the lack of power to copulate, the absence of the functional
capacity for the sexual act, and not merely sterility: a pathological condition
which negatives reproduction.
Absolute impotency: lack of power to copulate with anyone.
Relative impotency: physical incapability of one party to consummate the
marriage with the other.
Only the potent spouse can file the action for annulment; if both spouses are
impotent, the marriage cannot be annulled because
neither spouse is aggrieved by the other.
Doctrine of triennial cohabitation: if the wife remains a virgin after living
together with her husband for 3 years, the presumption is that the husband is
impotent, and he will have to overcome this presumption.
6.
That either party was afflicted with a STD found to be serious and appears to
be incurable.
Party & prescription: within 5 years from the date of celebration of the
marriage.
Art. 45 (6)
One party is afflicted with a STD
found to be serious and
appears to be incurable
The disease is present at the
time of the marriage
Concealment is immaterial; the
disease may be known to the
other party
Art. 46 (3)
One party is afflicted with a STD
regardless of its nature
The disease is present at the
time of the marriage
There is concealment
Nevertheless, Article 45 provides for the extinguishment of the action for annulment of
marriage through ratification by cohabitation.
DUTIES OF THE PROSECUTOR: In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. No judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
Rationale: The reason for the duty is because marriage is not just a contract between
the parties but a social institution, in the preservation of which, the State is interested.
Aquino v. Delizo, L-15853, July 27, 1960

It must be borne in mind that if a husband knew at the time the marriage was
celebrated that the woman was pregnant because of him; the marriage
cannot be annulled on the ground of fraud. A pregnancy however, of about
four months is not readily apparent, particularly if the woman is naturally
plump or fat. Such concealment amounted to fraud. In this case, it was
uniformly ruled that one cannot seek annulment of marriage on the ground
of concealment of pregnancy where the woman at the time of the marriage
was in an advanced state of family way.
ANAYA VS. PALAROAN G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
Non-disclosure of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman is

not one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for
annulment (Art. 85, Civil Code; Art. 45, Family Code); and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article (Art. 86, Civil Code; Art. 46,
Family Code), providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
chastity shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman
may detest such non-disclosure of premarital lewdness or feel having been
thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the
law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for
upon marriage she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself
alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the Court's duty is to
give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
II.
Action for Annulment period is already narrated above
TOLENTINO V. VILLANUEVA G.R. No. L-23264, 56 SCRA 1, March 15, 1974

Tolentino MAY NOT COMPEL Judge Agrava to receive his evidence and
expect him to decide on the basis thereof in light of the non-appearance of
wife Helen in an action for annulment.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines EXPRESSLY PROHIBIT the
rendition of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal separation
BASED ON A STIPULATION OF FACTS OR BY CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT .
Instead, the same provisions direct that in case of non-appearance of
defendant, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether
or not collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent fabrication of evidence for
the plaintiff.
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950 Civil Code of the
Philippines, direct that actions for the annulment of marriage or divorce shall
not be decided UNLESS the material facts alleged in the complaint are
proved.
The prohibition expressed in the aforesaid laws and rules is predicated on the
fact that the institutions of marriage and of the family are sacred and
therefore are as much the concern of the State as of the spouses; because
the State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and
preservation of these social institutions against desecration by collusion
between the parties or by fabricated evidence.
This stresses the fact that marriage is more than a mere contract between the
parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law
enjoins the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the State IN
ORDER TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY AND SANCTITY OF THE MARITAL BONDS.
GR rule in children born of voidable marriages they are legitimate.
GR rule in property relations, they have absolute community.
GR: A marriage cannot be annulled by means of a summary judgment.
GLORIA G. JOCSON vs. RICARDO R. ROBLES February 10, 1968

The Court of Domestic Relations correctly denied the motion for summary
judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and 1011 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, that expressly prohibit the rendition of a decree of
annulment of a marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of
judgment. The affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the Civil Code.
Page 22
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES

Parameters
Nature
Susceptibility of
convalidation
Void marriages
Inexistent from time of
performance
Cannot be validated
on property
No community property;
only co-ownership
Effect on children
Children are illegitimate

under Art. 165 (subject to
exceptions)
a. may be attacked
directly or collaterally. But
for the purpose of
remarriage, there must be
a judicial declaration of
nullity.
b. can still be impugned
even after death of
parties.
How marriage may be

impugned
III.
Voidable marriages
Valid until annulled by a
competent court
Can be convalidated
either by free
cohabitation or presription
Absolute community exists
unless other system is
agreed upon in marriage
settlement
Children are legitimate if
conceived before decree
of annulment (see Art. 54)
a. cannot be collaterally
attacked. Only directly
(there must be a decree
of annulment)
b. can no longer be
impugned after death of
one of the parties.
Effects of Annulment
The regime of property of the subsequent marriage shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the property regime shall be forfeited in favor of the
common children or, if there be none, the children of the guilty spouse by a
previous marriage, or in default of children, the innocent spouse.
Donations by reason marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are
revoked by operation of law.
Art. 44: if both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said
marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and
testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law.
The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who
acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such
designation be stipulated as irrevocable.
The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate
succession.
Children conceived or born before the judgment of annulment or absolute
nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 (psychological incapacity) has become
final and executory, shall be considered legitimate. Children conceived or
born of the subsequent marriage under Art. 53 (recording of the judgment)
shall likewise be legitimate.
Recording: The partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses shall be
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registry of property; otherwise, the same
shall not affect 3rd persons.
Notice to creditors: - All creditors of the spouses as well as of the property regime shall
be notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
Conjugal dwelling: in the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Art. 102 and 129 (see
codal provision for the procedure for the liquidation of absolute community/conjugal
partnership assets and liabilities).
Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the
conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse
with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the
age of 7 years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the Court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the Court shall decide, taking in to
consideration the best interests of said children.
3.
CONFLICTS OF LAW- ARTICLE 26
Outside marriages: Marriages solemnized in a foreign country in accordance with the

laws of that foreign country shall be valid in the Philippines.
Exceptions: - Philippine law applies
a. Either or both parties did not have the legal capacity to get married.
b. The marriage is immoral being bigamous or polygamous.
c. Consent of one party is lacking because of mistake as to the identity of the other.
d. One of the parties is psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage.
e. Incestuous marriage.
f. Void marriages by reason of public policy.
g. Subsequent marriages which are considered void due to lack of recording under Art.
53.
Exception to the exception: Those marriages celebrated abroad wherein Philippines law
applies and gives an exception. E.g. those marriages where marriage license is not
needed such as those marriages celebrated in articulo mortis. [this covers Art 27, 28 &
31]
The final judgment of annulment/nullity of marriage shall provide for the liquidation,
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes.
Page 23
marriage. Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the

husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. To maintain, as private respondent does,
that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq.
of the Civil Code cannot be just. The Respondent should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.
Capacity to remarry [EO 227]: where a marriage between a Filipino citizen

and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
However, it be noted that it is the Filipino spouse that should avail of this
privilege in the Philippines and not the alien spouse.
Inapplicability of EO 227:
a. A divorce obtained by a Filipino abroad from his or her Filipino
spouse, which divorce is void because divorce is not allowed in
this country, and a Filipino is governed by his national law
wherever he goes.
This is in consonance with Article 17 of the Civil Code- prohibitive
laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good
customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon
in a foreign country.
b. A divorce obtained by a former Filipino who had been
naturalized in another country, after his naturalization, as it might
open the door to rich Filipinos obtaining naturalization abroad for
no other reason than to be able to divorce their Filipino spouses.
NOTE: Not all marriages entered into by the contracting parties are valid under the law.
Some marriages for some reason are considered invalid since their reasons are against
reason itself. Its invalidity maybe hinged on relationship [you cannot marry your sister],
public policy and public morals [you cannot marry your adopted daughter] and lacks
the requirements provided by law for validity of a marriage.
VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO

The divorce obtained in Nevada by Alice and Upton is valid. The Nevada
District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the
case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his
address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on
the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. There can be no question
as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in
any State of the Union.
The divorce decree is also valid in the Philippines. It is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
Note: It must be the foreigner that initiates the divorce proceedings in another country. If
the former spouse of the Filipino is allowed to remarry by reason of divorce, by reason of
equity, the Filipino spouse must also be allowed to remarry.
How to register the divorce here in the Philippines? Special Proceeding for
Cancellation/Correction of entries in the civil registry specifically praying for recognition
of the divorce decree.
4.
MUSLIM CODE
Art. 13, PD1083 Application.

(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to marriage and divorce wherein both parties
are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized
in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the Philippines.
(2) In case of marriage between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, solemnized not in
accordance with Muslim law or this Code, the Civil Code of the Philippines shall apply.
Art. 29, PD1083 By divorcee.
(1) No woman shall contract a subsequent marriage unless she has observed an 'idda of
three monthly courses counted from the date of divorce. However, if she is pregnant at
the time of the divorce, she may remarry only after delivery
5.
PENAL SANCTIONS
walay act 3613 (Marriage Law) mogawas sa net.. huhu.. no time to lib
IV.
LEGAL SEPARATION
Legal separation is otherwise known as a mensa et thoro [translated as- separation from
bed and board]. It is valid under Philippine law since the marital tie between the
husband and wife is not severed. Their separation only is in terms of bed and board.
The primordial purpose of legal separation is separation in bed and board and not to be
used for the purpose of separation of property being a mere incidental effect thereof.
In contrast to Avinculum Matrimonii which literally means severance of marital tie. This is
otherwise known as absolute divorce. This is not valid since it is contrary to Philippine
public policy and law.
Primordial consideration - Cooling-off period: an action for legal separation shall in no
case be tried before 6 months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition.
Page 24
No legal separation may be decreed unless the court has taken steps toward the
reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that reconciliation
is highly improbable.
TENCHAVEZ vs ESCAO G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965

A foreign divorce between Filipino citizens, sought and decreed after the
effectivity of the present Civil Code of the Philippines (Rep. Act 386, which
took effect in 1950), is not entitled to recognition as valid in the Philippines. A
marriage contracted with another party by a Filipino divorcee after his/her
divorce is also not entitled to validity in the Philippines.
The Supreme Court explained that the marriage between Tenchavez and
Vicenta was valid and remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine
law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that Vicenta sought
and obtained from the American court. The Court noted that at the time the
divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, like Tenchavez, was still a Filipino
citizen. Hence, both parties are subject to Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time.
Notably, the remarriage of divorced wife (in this case, Vicenta) and her cohabitation with a person (her American partner) other than her lawful
husband (in this case, Tenchavez) entitle Tenchavez to a decree of legal
separation conformably to Philippine law, and that desertion and securing of
an invalid divorce decree by Vicenta entitles Tenchavez to recover
damages.
A.
GROUNDS FOR LEGAL SEPARATION: Art 55-56
1. Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct.

First ground- the key words are repeated and grossly. Hence the physical
violence must be repeated and gross.
2. Physical violence or moral pressure.
Second ground- there must be undue pressure since some pressure is expected in
every marriage. It must go beyond what is permissible.
3.
4.
Attempt or connivance to corrupt or induce to engage in prostitution.

Final judgment of imprisonment of more than 6 years: even if subsequently
judicially pardoned.
5. Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism.

Fifth ground- the drug addiction can occur after marriage. Article 55 does not talk
of concealment of drug addiction unlike Article 46 (4).
6.
7.
Lesbianism or homosexuality.
Subsequent bigamous marriage.
8. Sexual infidelity or perversion.

Eight ground- under the Family Code, both men and women need only commit
one act of sexual infidelity to fall under 55 (8). In Gandionco vs. Penaranda, the SC
said that a criminal conviction of concubinage is not necessary, only
preponderance of evidence. In fact, a civil action for legal separation based on
concubinage may proceed ahead of or simultaneously with a criminal action.
9. Attempt against the life: no need for criminal conviction.

Ninth ground- there is no need for conviction.
10. Abandonment without justifiable cause for more than 1 year.
Tenth ground- Requisites of abandonment: A spouse is deemed to have
abandoned the other when he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without any
intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of
3 months or has failed within the same period to give any information as to his or
her whereabouts shall be prima facie evidence presumed to have no intention of
returning to the conjugal dwelling.
B.
LIMITATIONS OF THE ACTION
Prescriptive period: an action for legal separation shall be filed within 5 years from the
time of the occurrence of the cause.
People vs Sesano G.R. No. L-37720 March 27, 1933

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including
both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
Apart from the fact that the husband in this case was assuming a mere pose
when he signed the complaint as the "offended" spouse, we have come to
the conclusion that the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the
inference that he consented to the adulterous relations exi sting between the
accused and therefore he is not authorized by law to institute this criminal
proceeding. We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that
the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of his wife is
explained by his absence from the Philippine Islands during which period it
was impossible for him to take any action against the accused. There is no
merit in the argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.
Note-abandonment must be complete separation
BUGAYONG VS GINEZ GR L-10033 December 28, 1956

Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for
legal separation.
The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact
that she went with him and consented to be brought to the house of his
cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife
all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that
a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a
condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost
ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity amounting to
adultery. It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme
courts of the different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual
intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the offense is ordinarily
sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. In
the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal
provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the
inevitable conclusion is that there is condonation.
Note-The act of sex here meant that there was already forgiveness.
Page 25
-To operate as condonation, there must be knowledge of the facts then you
forgive.
Differentiate connivance (you create the cause) and collusion (this
happens during the proceedings - )
MATUBIS VS PRAXEDES
An action for legal separation cannot be filed except within one year from
and after the date on which the plaintiff became cognizant of the cause
and within five years from after the date when cause occurred. The
complaint was filed outside the periods provided for by the above Article. By
the very admission of plaintiff, she came to know the ground (concubinage)
for the legal separation in January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on
April 24, 1956. It is to be noted that appellant did not even press this matter in
her brief.
The very wording of the agreement gives no room for interpretation other
than that given by the trial judge. Condonation and consent on the part of
plaintiff are necessarily the import of the agreement. The condonation and
consent here are not only implied but expressed. Article 100 Civil Code,
specifically provides that legal separation may be claimed only by the
innocent spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to
the adultery or concubinage. Having condoned and/or consented in writing,
the plaintiff is now undeserving of the court's sympathy.
Note-The written agreement made by the spouse is void against public
policy. However it can be used as a defense in a legal separation,
concubinage and adultery.
CONTRERAS VS MACARAIG
The requirement of the law that a complaint for legal separation be filed
within one year after the date plaintiff become cognizant of the cause is not
of prescriptive nature, but is of the essence of the cause of action. It is
consonant with the philosophy that marriage is an inviolable social institution
so that the law provides strict requirements before it will allow a disruption of
its status. The only question to be resolved is whether the period of one year
provided for in Article 102 of the Civil Code should be counted, as far as the
instant case is concerned from September 1962 or from December 1963.
After a careful review of the record, We are persuaded that, in the eyes of
the law, the only time when appellant really became cognizant of the
infidelity of her husband was in the early part of December 1963 when plaintiff
pleaded the defendant to give up Lily Ann Alcala.
From all the foregoing We conclude that it was only on the occasion
mentioned in the preceding paragraph when her husband admitted to her
that he was living with and would no longer leave Lily Ann to return to his
legitimate family that appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to
decide whether to sue or not to sue for legal separation, and it was only then
that the legal period of one year must be deemed to have commenced. The
one year prescriptive period is thus followed in this case.
Note-The wife had personal knowledge when the husband confessed. Homosexuality is a ground for legal separation if it existed after marriage. It
can be ground for voidable marriage if such homosexuality was concealed
under fraud.
C.
HEARING
Art. 58. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition. (103)
Art. 59. No legal separation may be decreed unless the Court has taken steps toward
the reconciliation of the spouses and is fully satisfied, despite such efforts, that
reconciliation is highly improbable. (n)
Art. 60. No decree of legal separation shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or a
confession of judgment.
In any case, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
FFECTS OF FILING A PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION
1. Spouses can live separately from each other;
2. The administration of the common properties [ACP, CPG, etc.] shall be given
by the court to either of the spouses or to a 3rd person as is best for the
interests of the community.
3.
In the absence of a written agreement of the spouses, the court shall provide
for the support between the spouses and the custody and support of the
common children, taking into account the welfare of the children and their
choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain.
4.
When the consent of 1 spouse to any transaction of the other is required by
law, judicial authorization shall be necessary, unless such spouse voluntarily
gives such consent.
RAMOS-SAMOSA VS VAMENTA
Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for
preliminary injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period
The court should remain passive and let the parties alone in the meanwhile in
order for them to cool off. It is precluded from hearing the suit. The
management of the spouses properties need not be left unresolved even
during this cooling off period. An administrator may be appointed for the
management of the property of the conjugal partnership.
NOTE-incidental matters can be resolved while the case is still on its cooling
off period, like property management.
ARANETA VS CONCEPCION
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous
marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known
that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from
contracting another marriage.
And respondent Judge cannot deny
knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed
and sworn to before him.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when
he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the
law excuses no one has special application to judges, who, under Rule 1.01
Page 26
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of

competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges
be conversant with the law and basic legal principles. And when the law
transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.
-Spouses can reconcile even after the decree of separation has been given.
MACADANGDANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 108 SCRA 314

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect
on the legal separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the
separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to
a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property,
have not yet been commenced nor terminated.
3. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES

Art. 61. After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouses shall be entitled to
live separately from each other.
The court, in the absence of a written agreement between the spouses, shall designate
either of them or a third person to administer the absolute community or conjugal
partnership property. The administrator appointed by the court shall have the same
powers and duties as those of a guardian under the Rules of Court. (104a)
Art. 62. During the pendency of the action for legal separation, the provisions of Article
49 shall likewise apply to the support of the spouses and the custody and support of the
common children. (105a)
REYES V INES-LUCIANO
Support can be administered during the pendency of an action. provided
that adultery is established by competent evidence. Mere allegations will not
bar her right to receive support pendente lite. Support can be administered
during the pendency of such cases. In determining the amount, it is not
necessary to go into the merits of the case. It is enough that the facts be
established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record. [The SC on July, 1978 ordered the alimony to be P1000/month from
the period of June to February 1979, after the trial, it was reverted to
P4000/month based on the accepted findings of the trial court that the
husband could afford it because of his affluence and because it wasnt
excessive.
DEFENSES AGAINST LEGAL SEPARATION: these grounds bars the institution of a petition for
legal separation1. Condonation: express or implied, as in sexual intercourse after knowledge of ground.
2. Consent
3. Connivance
4. Mutual guilt
5. Collusion
6. Prescription
7. Death of either party during the pendency of the case [Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio].
8. Reconciliation of the spouses during the pendency of the case [Article 66 (1)].
The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on
the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution
conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate
succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties
have been allocated to the deceased spouse.
Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final
decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code
provides the effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects
ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment
decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each
spouse in the conjugal assets.
D.
I.
1.
2.
3.
4.
LAPUZ SY V. EUFEMIO, 43 SCRA 177 (1972)

The lawyer wanted to proceed with legal separation despite of the death of
one of the parties. The SC denied it since the primary purpose of legal
separation is bed and board separation while the effect on the property is
merely incidental.
EFFECTS OF A DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION:

The spouses are entitled to live separately, but the marriage bonds shall not be
severed.
The property regime shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending party
shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the property
regime, and shall be forfeited in accordance with Art. 43 (2): this is included in
effects of reappearance under Art. 42.
The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse.
Art. 213: in case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be
exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over 7
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under 7 years of age
shall be separated form the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise.
The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent
spouse by intestate succession. Provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made in the will of the innocent spouse shall be revoked by operation of law.
If, however, the offended spouse executes another will in favor of the
offending spouse after the decree of legal separation, the will shall be valid,
since the primordial consideration is the intention of the testator.
EFFECT OF DEATH OF A SPOUSE
Note that the effect of filing a Petition for Legal separation is different from
the effects of a Decree of Legal Separation. -The death of the spouse
terminates the action for LG. This is a personal action
DECREE OF LEGAL SEAPARATION
The conviction of the wife of adultery does not disqualify her to inherit from the
offended husband, if there is no decree of legal separation between them.
Accordingly, the guilty spouse shall not be disqualified from inheriting unless
the innocent spouse files a case for legal separation.
5.
Art. 64: the innocent spouse may revoke the donation propter nuptias
[donations made before the celebration of the marriage] made by him or her
in favor of the offending spouse, as well as the designation of the guilty party
Page 27
as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated

as irrevocable.
The revocation shall be recorded in the registry of property. Alienations, liens
and encumbrances registered in good faith before the recording of the
revocation shall be respected. The revocation of the insurance policy shall
take effect upon written notification to the insured.
The action to revoke donation must be brought within 5 years from the time
the decree of legal separation has become final.
6.
7.
II.
Cessation of the obligation of mutual support [Article 198].

The wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before legal
separation.
RECONCILIATION
Reconciliation: if the spouses should reconcile, the corresponding joint manifestation

under oath duly signed by them shall be filed with the Court in the same proceeding for
legal separation.
Note that is not the reconciliation which produces the effects in Article 66 [enumerated
below]. Rather it is the filing of the joint manifestation of reconciliation.
EFFECTS OF RECONCILIATION:
1. The legal separation proceedings, if still pending, shall thereby be terminated
in whatever stage.
2. The final decree of legal separation shall be set aside, but the separation of
property and any forfeiture of the share of the guilty spouse already effected
shall subsist, unless the spouses agree to revive their former property regime.
The agreement to revive the former property regime shall be executed under
oath and shall specify:
a. The properties to be contributed anew to the restored regime.
b. Those to be retained as separated properties of each spouse.
c. The names of all their known creditors, addresses and corresponding
credits.
The agreement of revival and the motion for its approval shall be filed with the Court in
the same proceeding for legal separation, with copies of both furnished to the creditors
named therein. After due hearing, the Court shall take measures to protect the interest
of creditors and such order shall be recorded in the proper registry of property.
Notice to creditors: The recording of the order in the registries of property shall not
prejudice any creditor not listed or not notified, unless the debtor-spouse has sufficient
separate property to satisfy the creditors claim.
In other words, the revival of the old property regime between the parties is without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired by creditors prior to such revival. In effect, a
legal lien is created in favor of unsecured creditors. Thusa. Contractual lienholders retain their liens.
b.
Creditors without liens are given a legal lien.
c. In case of insufficiency of property to settle the debts, the future shares of
debtor-spouse in the property regime will answer his personal obligations.
Who has the legal personality to file a Petition for Legal Separation? Aggrieved wife or
husband only, since this is purely personal question.
Why not the guilty spouse? Because of the clean hands doctrine- you must go to court
with clean hands and an offender of the law cannot profit from his wrong doings.
V.
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Personal obligations between the spouses: the husband and wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.
I. The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain
cases:
a. If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her life.
b. If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making
common life impossible.
c. If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her
mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels.
d. Where the husband continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different
women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration.
e. Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money, and at the same
time insulting his wife and laying hands on her.
f. If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp.
g. When the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home.
h. If the husband is immoderate or barbaric in his demands for sexual intercourse.
If the wife abandons the conjugal home without justifiable cause, can the husband
compel her to come home under the pain of contempt of court?
No, because cohabitation is a purely personal obligation, and to compel the wife
to comply with such obligation would be a violation of her personal liberty which is
guaranteed by the Constitution.
However, the husband has the following remedies:
a. To withhold support from the wife.
b. To recover moral damages from the wife.
c. To ask the Court to counsel his wife.
d. To ask the Court to admonish his wife to return, but she cannot be held in
contempt in case of non-performance; also, no mandamus or injunction will lie.
e. To ask the court for other relief.
II. Live together: the duty to live together includes cohabitation or consortium and
sexual intercourse.
III. Mutual love, respect and fidelity: these duties are personal to the spouses and go into
their intimate relations, so that they must be performed voluntarily by them. Accordingly,
some consequences of the duties are the following:
a. The unfaithful spouse may be charged criminally with adultery or concubinage.
b. Sexual infidelity and perversion are also grounds for legal separation, and so is
repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against a spouse by the
other, which shows lack of love and respect for the former.
c. Both spouses now administer the family property, and they also have joint parental
authority over their minor children, both over their persons and property.
Page 28
d. If one spouse commits acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor, or injury to the
other, the aggrieved spouse may apply to the Court for relief.
IV. Mutual help and support: The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the
family and the management of the household. The expenses for such support and other
conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence
thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or
absence of said income fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
properties.
Includes support pendente lite.
V. To fix family domicile: the husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of
disagreement, the Court shall decide.
Separate domicile: the court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the
latter should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons from the
exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with
the solidarity of the family.
a. If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her life.
b. If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making
common life impossible.
c. If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her
mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels.
d. Where the husband continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different
women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration.
e. Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money, and at the same
time insulting his wife and laying hands on her.
If the wife refuses unjustifiably to live with her husband, the court will
admonish but not order her to return; and even if an order is made,
contempt proceeding against the wife will not prosper. The only remedy here
for the husband is to refuse to grant support.
Note-Art 73 Amended by 10572 The condition on the benefits received by the family
Art. 73. Either spouse may exercise any legitimate profession, occupation, business or
activity without the consent of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious,
and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
(1) The objection is proper, and
(2) Benefit has accrued to the family prior to the objection or thereafter. If the
benefit accrued prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the community property. If the benefit accrued thereafter,
such obligation shall be enforced against the separate property of the spouse
who has not obtained consent.
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of creditors who acted in
good faith.
SEC. 2. Article 111 of the Family Code, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
Art. 111. Either spouse may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or
her exclusive property.
Benefit prior to objection
Original law
Amended Law
w/knowledge
Conjugal P
Conjugal P
w/out K
Separate property
Conjugal
f. If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp.
ATILANO VS CHUA CHING BENG
g. When the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home.
FACTS: The husband fixed the family residence in the home of his parents. The
wife objected and refused to live with him. The wife claimed that
misunderstanding with her parents- in-law resulted in quarrels and bickerings.
As a consequence, the wife filed an action for support against the husband.
HELD: The action would not prosper because misunderstanding with the inlaws was not a sufficient moral or legal obstacle to her living with the
husband against whom the action for support is directed. The wife cannot
claim for support since the abandonment is without just cause
h. If the husband is immoderate or barbaric in his demands for sexual intercourse.

Relief against breach of duties: when one of the spouses neglects his or her duties to the
conjugal union or commit acts which tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the
other or to the family, the aggrieved party may apply to the Court for relief.
The injury contemplated is not economic or financial injury but physical, moral,
emotional or psychological injury.
ARROYO VS VASQUEZ
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of
the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render
conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action
may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than
to compel the spouses to live together. No sufficient cause was present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the
separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto
separation of the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be
seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the
fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.
VI.
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES

A.
In General
This is one important part of marriage. This is to protect the spouses.

Governing law on property relations: the property relations between husband and wife
shall be governed in the following order:
a. By marriage settlements executed before the marriage.
b. By the provisions of this Code.
c. By the local custom.
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In case the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership shall govern their property relations during their marriage, the provisions of
the Civil Code on CPG shall be of supplementary application.
However, in the absence of a contrary stipulation in the marriage settlements, the
property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the
place of the celebration of the marriage and their residence. In these instances the
aforementioned rule shall not apply:
1. Where both spouses are aliens.
2. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not
situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is
located.
3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the Philippines
but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws required
different formalities for their extrinsic validity.
Thus, in the absence of marriage settlement or the property regime is void, ACP
[absolute community property] is the regime of property relations of the spouses.
B.
Capacity to Execute Marriage Settlement
6.
Modifications in The Marriage Settlement

General Rule: all modifications to the marriage settlement must be made before the
marriage is celebrated.
Moreover, any modification thereof shall be in writing, signed by the parties and
executed before the celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice 3 rd persons
unless they are registered in the LCR where the marriage contract is recorded as well as
in the proper registries of property.
Exceptions: in this instances the is a valid modification of marriage settlement even after
the celebration of marriage since it springs from the effect of a court order1. Legal separation- in such an instance the property regime is
dissolved.
2. Revival of the former property regime upon reconciliation, if the
spouses agree Article 66 (2)- the reconciliation referred to in the
preceding Articles shall have the following consequences
D.
Marriage settlement: ante-nuptial agreement means the contract entered into by a

man and a woman who intend or plan to get married fixing the property regime that
will govern their present and future properties during their marriage.
The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements, agree upon the regime of absolute
community property, conjugal partnership of gains, complete separation of property or
any other regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed
upon is void, the system of absolute community property shall govern.
C.
Formalities
Requisites of marriage settlement:

1. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof shall be in writing,
signed by the parties and executed before the celebration of the marriage.
They shall not prejudice 3rd persons unless they are registered in the LCR where
the marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of property.
2.
A minor who according to law may contract marriage may also execute his or
her marriage settlement, but they shall be valid only if the persons designated
in Art.14 to give consent, are made parties to the agreement.
3.
For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by a person upon whom
a sentence of civil interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any
other disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed by a
competent court to be made a party thereto.
4.
Must be made before the celebration of the marriage and even modification
also be made before the wedding, except conversion into the complete
separation of property regime, which would be allowed provided there is
judicial approval and no prejudice to creditors.
5.
Must not contain provisions contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public order, and public policy; or against the dignity of either spouse.
Must generally confine itself only to property relations.
Conflicts of Law Rule
Art. 80. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property
relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of
the celebration of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not
situated in the Philippines and executed in the country where the property is
located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in the
Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country whose laws
require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
E.
Effects of Marriage not taking place
Art. 81. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts referred to in the preceding
articles in consideration of a future marriage, including donations between the
prospective spouses made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take
place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the celebration of the marriages
shall be valid.
F.
Donation Propter Nuptias

1.
Nature
Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its
celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future
spouses.
Requisites for a Valid Donation Propter Nuptias
(a) Must be made before the celebration of the marriage.
(b) Must be made in consideration of the same.
(c) Must be made in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
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[NOTE: If one of the requisites is not complied with, it may still be valid as an ordinary
donation (provided that all other essential requisites are complied with), but not as a
donation propter nuptias.].
Estanislao Serrano v. Melchor Solomon

FACTS: A man, prior to his marriage, made a donation in a public instrument,
in favor of his future wife, with the condition that should she die before him
and there be no children, 1/2 of the properties donated shall be given to the
natural guardians of his wife. Nine months after the wedding, the wife died
without issue. The natural guardians now claim the share given to them in
the deed.
HELD: The natural guardians cannot get said share. Insofar as said share is
concerned, the alleged donation to them cannot be a valid donation
propter nuptias nor a donation inter vivos nor a donation mortis causa: not a
donation propter nuptias because said share was not given to one of the
spouses (Art. 126, Civil Code, now Art. 82, Family Code); not a donation inter
vivos, for there was no acceptance on the part of said natural guardians (Art.
749, Civil Code), and not a donation mortis causa because the deed of
donation did not have the formalities of a will aside from the fact that the
donor is still alive.
Donation propter Nuptias

Does not require express acceptance
May be made by minors
May include future property
If present property is donated and
property regime is not absolute
community, limited to 1/5
Grounds for revocation are found in Art. 86
2.
Ordinary donations
Express acceptance is necessary
Cannot be made by minors
Cannot include future property
No limit to donation of present property
provided legitimes are not impaired
Distinguished from Donation Inter Vivos

i.
Consideration and Donee
Art. 82. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are made before its
celebration, in consideration of the same, and in favor of one or both of the future
spouses.
Art. 87. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing.
The prohibition shall also apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage.
Sumbad V. Ca
After the wife died, the husband donated a parcel of land to his commonlaw wife, who subsequently sold the property. The children of the marriage
seek to declare the sale void based on the nullity of the donation. The Court
ruled that the sale was valid.
The children could have challenged the validity of the deed of donation
executed by their father in favor of a woman on the ground of their
common-law relationship. But due to their failure to present evidence of such
fact, the donation is valid.
Note: Good Faith can validate a donation / sale between common-law
spouses
Grounds for revocation are found in law

on donations
Form
Art. 83. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary donations established in
Title III of Book III of the Civil Code, insofar as they are not modified by the following
articles.
Art. 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of
property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than
one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary
succession and the formalities of wills.
Article 748 - NCC. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document
representing the right donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the
donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall
be void.
3.
Matabuena vs Cervantes
The Supreme Court, in this case, outlined the reason for the applicability of
the prohibition against donation between the husband and wife to a
common-law husband and wife. It said:
If the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort
and his descendants because of fear or undue and improper pressure and
influence upon, the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law,
then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons
living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not
to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years
bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger
that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as
already pointed out by Ulpian it would not be just that such donations should
subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should
likewise attach to concubinage.
Donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited, this is so
because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during
marriage, that would destroy the system of conjugal partnership, a basic
policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise of undue
influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of
marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law.
Page 31
The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit
of marriage.
ii.
Revocation
Art. 86. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the donor in the following
cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab initio except
donations made in the marriage settlements, which shall be governed by
Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the parents or
guardian, as required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as specified by the
provisions of the Civil Code on donations in general.
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article
shall produce the following effects:
Xxx
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the
donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said
donee are revoked by operation of law;
Art. 50. The effects provided for by paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and by
Article 44 shall also apply in the proper cases to marriages which are declared ab initio
or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common
children, and the delivery of third presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. All creditors of the spouses as well as of
the absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be notified of the proceedings
for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 766 - FC. Although the donation is revoked on account of ingratitude,
nevertheless, the alienations and mortgages effected before the notation of the
complaint for revocation in the Registry of Property shall subsist.
Later ones shall be void.
Article 760 - FC. Every donation inter vivos, made by a person having no children or
descendants, legitimate or legitimated by subsequent marriage, or illegitimate, may be
revoked or reduced as provided in the next article, by the happening of any of these
events:
(1) If the donor, after the donation, should have legitimate or legitimated or
illegitimate children, even though they be posthumous;
(2) If the child of the donor, whom the latter believed to be dead when he
made the donation, should turn out to be living;
(3) If the donor subsequently adopt a minor child.
SOLIS VS BARROSO
Donation proper nuptias here was not valid because it was made in a private
instrument.
This donation must be governed by the rules on Donation. Real Property may
be valid, it must be made in the public instrument. (Formal Validity) The only
exceptions to this rule are onerous and remuneratory donations, insofar as
they do not exceed the value of the charge imposed, which are then
governed by the rules on contracts, and those which are to take effect upon
the donors death, which are governed by the rules established for
testamentary succession.
Marriage in DPN is rather a resolutory condition which presupposes the
existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not a
condition necessary for
the birth of the obligation.
iii.
Extent of Property Donated
Art 84. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community of
property, they cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than
one-fifth of their present property. Any excess shall be considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions on testamentary
succession and the formalities of wills.
Art 750 -NCC. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the donor, or
part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for
the support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the
donation, are by law entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation,
the donation shall be reduced in petition of any person affected.
Art 751 - NCC. Donations cannot comprehend future property.
By future property is understood anything which the donor cannot dispose of at the time
of the donation.
Art 752- NCC. The provisions of article 750 notwithstanding, no person may give or
receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will.
The donation shall be inofficious in all that it may exceed this limitation.
Art 1070- NCC. Wedding gifts by parents and ascendants consisting of jewelry, clothing,
and outfit, shall not be reduced as inofficious except insofar as they may exceed onetenth of the sum which is disposable by will.
MATEO V LAGUA
In 1917, a father of two sons gave to one son two parcels of land as
donations propter nuptias on account of said sons forthcoming marriage. In
1957, the second son sued for annulment of one half of the donation on the
Page 32
allegation that the two lots donated were the only properties of the fatherdonor and consequently the donation impaired his (the second sons
legitime). While the action was pending, the father died.
This was in 1958. The donee contended that the donation should be
completely upheld on the theory:
(a) that the action had already prescribed, the donation having taken
place some 40 years ago; and
(b) that donations propter nuptias can be revoked only on the grounds
stated in Art. 132 of the Civil Code [now Art. 86 of the Family Code]
(enumerating the grounds for the revocation of such donations).
Held: Annulment or revocation or reduction on the ground of inofficiousness
can still be allowed
(a) because the action for reduction has not yet prescribed, the cause
having arisen only in 1958, the death of the donor. It is only from such death
in 1958 when we can begin to consider the matter of inofficiousness (upon
computation of the hereditary estate); and
(b) because, being in the nature of a liberality, donations propter nuptias
remain subject to reduction, if found inofficious.
Before there could be any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps should be
taken first.
The CA should follow Art. 908 to determine the legitime before reducing the
donation for being inofficious.
G.
Absolute Community
Commencement of the regime: The ACP between spouses shall commence at the
precise moment that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for
the commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void.
May the husband or wife waives his or her rights, interest, share or effects in the ACP? No
waiver during the marriage cannot be made except in case of judicial separation of
property.
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the
marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument
and shall be recorded in the LCR and registry of property.
Right of creditors of the debtor spouse in case there is a waiver: The creditors of the
spouse who made such waiver may petition the Court to rescind the waiver to the
extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.
What Constitutes ACP? GENERAL RULE: Article 93property acquired during the marriage is presumed to belong to the community; unless
it is proved that it is one of those excluded therefrom.
PROPERTIES EXCLUDED IN THE ACP: Article 92- the following shall be excluded from the
community property
a. Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and
the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by
the donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community
property;
b.
Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse. However, jewelry shall
form part of the community property.
c.
Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any,
of such property.
H.
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Concept of CPG: Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and
wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or
by chance, and, upon dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be divided equally between them,
unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.
Commencement: The CPG between spouses shall commence at the precise moment
that the marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the
commencement of the community regime at any other time shall be void.
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract of
partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or
by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
May the husband or wife waive his or her rights, interest, share or effects in the CPG? No
waiver during the marriage can be made except in case of judicial separation of
property.
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of property, or after the
marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the same shall appear in a public instrument
and shall be recorded in the LCR and registry of property.
Right of creditors of the debtor spouse in case there is a waiver: The creditors of the
spouse who made such waiver may petition the Court to rescind the waiver to the
extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their credits.
1.
Exclusive Properties of Each Spouse
Art. 109. The following shall be the exclusive property of each spouse:
(1) That which is brought to the marriage as his or her own;
(2) That which each acquires during the marriage by gratuitous title;
(3) That which is acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by exchange
with property belonging to only one of the spouses; and
(4) That which is purchased with exclusive money of the wife or of the
husband. (148a)
Art. 110. The spouses retain the ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of
their exclusive properties.
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the administration of his or her exclusive
property to the other by means of a public instrument, which shall be recorded in the
registry of property of the place the property is located.
Page 33
Art. 111. A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his
or her exclusive property, without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone in
court to litigate with regard to the same. (n)
Art. 112. The alienation of any exclusive property of a spouse administered by the other
automatically terminates the administration over such property and the proceeds of the
alienation shall be turned over to the owner-spouse. (n)
Art. 113. Property donated or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of
determinate shares, shall pertain to the donee-spouses as his or her own exclusive
property, and in the absence of designation, share and share alike, without prejudice to
the right of accretion when proper. (150a)
Art. 114. If the donations are onerous, the amount of the charges shall be borne by the
exclusive property of the donee spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the
conjugal partnership of gains. (151a)
Art. 115. Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits
shall be governed by the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in
each case.
PLATA VS YATCO
Judgment in eviction suit cannot be held against the wife being not lawful
against her as she was not made party defendant to the said suit. The
property was paraphernal in origin being that she sold the property and
bought it back seven months later. The fact that Begoso signed as comortgagor of a subsequent mortgage made by Plata of the propert does not
convert the property into conjugal. The property was paraphernal and the
creditors and purchasers knew this so the judgment bound the husband
alone and not the wifes possession of her paraphernal property which
by law she hold and administers independently, and which she may even
encumber without her husbands knowledge and consent.
If a wife is not made a party defendant in an ejectment suit brought by a
stranger against her husband over possession of a parcel of land which is her
paraphernal property, she can validly ignore the judgment against her
husband. In case of disobedience to the order of execution, she will not be
liable for contempt of court, for after all, as to her, the writ of execution was
not lawful.
b.
Property Acquired by right of redemption or exchange with exclusive property

of spouse.
ROSETE V. PROB. SHERIFF

The property is now the exclusive property of the wife by virtue of the right of
redemption as successor in interest of her husband. It has ceased to be the
property of the judgment debtor. It can no longer therefore be the subject of
execution under a judgment exclusively affective the personal liability of the
latter.
2.
Conjugal Property
Art. 116. All property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to
have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. (160a)
Art. 117. The following are conjugal partnership properties:
(1) Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the
common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one
of the spouses;
(2) Those obtained from the labor, industry, work or profession of either or both
of the spouses;
(3) The fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage
from the common property, as well as the net fruits from the exclusive property
of each spouse;
(4) The share of either spouse in the hidden treasure which the law awards to
the finder or owner of the property where the treasure is found;
(5) Those acquired through occupation such as fishing or hunting;
(6) Livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in excess of the
number of each kind brought to the marriage by either spouse; and
(7) Those which are acquired by chance, such as winnings from gambling or
betting. However, losses therefrom shall be borne exclusively by the loserspouse.
CASTILLO V. PASCO
The property was partly conjugal and partly paraphernal. Under Spanish CC,
determining ownership of properties acquired by onerous consideration
during the marriage depends on source of funds used for acquisition. a.
Separate if bought w/exclusive money. (Spanish CC Art. 1396) b. Conjugal if
bought w/common funds whether for partnership or for one spouse only.
(Spanish CC Art. 1401) Last phrase is immaterial since its been proven that
prop was sold to both spouses.
First payment: according to CA it came from Pascos private funds.
Petitioners: w/o express proof that debt of Gabriel came from Pascos private
fund, they should be presumed conjugal (Art. 1407 Spanish CC). However,
Art. 1416 provides that wife cant bind conjugal partnership w/o husbands
consent. Her private transactions are presumed to be her own. W/o proof
that Castillo authorized Pasco to use community funds to lend money to
Gabriel, presumption that she used her private funds would lie.
2nd & 3rd payments by loans guaranteed by mortgage: since they were
made to both spouses as joint borrowers, loan thus became obligations of
conjugal partnership & loan money became part of conjugal property.
Securing mortgage on wifes paraphernal prop is mere accessory oblig w/c
lenders can waive if they wish to do so w/o affecting principal debt owed by
conjugal partnership & w/c creditors can enforce against latter if they so
desire.
If money borrowed by husband upon credit of wifes prop became CP &
when reinvested in construction of house, such became CP & was liable for
husbands debt, then all the more that a loan obtained by both spouses
should be conjugal.
Court likewise ruled in Lim Queco vs. Cartagena that when wife borrows
money guaranteed w/mortgage on her paraphernal prop, money loaned &
property acquired w/such will still be her exclusive prop even if husband
consented to such. Reason is that she is not the qualified administrator of CP.
Creditor can only demand repayment from her & her properties. Palanca
Page 34
ruling applies, thus, property is partly paraphernal by virtue of first payment &
partly conjugal by virtue of 2nd & 3rd payments. It belongs to both
patrimonies 1/6 paraphernal + 5/6 CP of Castillo & Pasco. 4.If Pasco paid
mortgages with her private funds, her share is not increased. Instead,
common funds can repay the amount she has advanced.
Zulueta v. PANAM
The settlement entered into by Mrs. Zulueta with the defendant PANAM
would not bind the conjugal partnership of the parties herein. In the case at
bar the principal part in interest is the husband. Considering that the
damages in question have arisen from, inter alia, a breach of plaintiffs
contract of carriage with the defendant, for which plaintiffs paid their fare
with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal partnership. We hold that
the said damages fall under par. (1) of Art 153 the right thereto having been
acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The rights accruing from said
contract, including those resulting fro breach thereof by the defendant, are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership of Mr and mrs. Zulueta.
i.
Improvements At The Expense of Conjugal Funds or Through

Work or Industry of Spouse
Art. 120. The ownership of improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the
separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts
or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to the conjugal partnership, or to the
original owner-spouse, subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal partnership and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time
of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the
property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject
to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall be vested upon the
reimbursement, which shall be made at the time of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership.
Property Brought on Installment
Art. 118. Property bought on installments paid partly from exclusive funds of either or
both spouses and partly from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer or buyers if full
ownership was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal partnership if such
ownership was vested during the marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by
the partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed by the owner or owners
upon liquidation of the partnership.
JOVELLANOS V. CA
Husband entered into a contract of lease and conditional sale with Philamlife
over a house and lot. He was married at that time and when the wife died,
he married another woman. During the subsistence of the second marriage,
the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed a deed of
absolute sale to the husband and the latter donated to herein petitioners all
his rights, title and interest over the lot and bungalow before he died. The
second wife claimed that the land belonged to the conjugal partnership.
Held: The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the
nature of contract to sell as distinguished from contract of sale. The former
case, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full
payment of the purchase price. The property belonged to the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage. But since it pertained to the second wife,
she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners
who helped pay the amortization of the house and lot. Remember 118 of the
FCP on the property bought on installments, whre ownership vested during
the marriage, such shall belong to the conjugal partnership.
ALVAREZ V. ESPIRITU
If the husband redeems the paraphernal property of the wife with his money,
he does not own the same. Ownership belongs to the heirs of the wife and
the wife. But the estate owes the husband.
ii.
VITUG V. MONTEMAYOR
The principal issue is to be determined in this appeal is whether the thirty
parcels of land involved in this litigation are conjugal, as claimed by the
plaintiff, or paraphernal, as claimed by the defendants. If the former the relief
prayed for should be granted; if the latter the action should be dismissed.
The evidence shows that the funds used in purchasing the thirty parcels of
land in question had come from this refundable amount, it logically follows
that said properties are conjugal and should have formed part of the estate
of the late Clodualdo Vitug. The fact that said properties are now registered
in the exclusive name of Donata Montemayor does not destroy their nature
as conjugal because they are acquired during coverture and the
presumption of law created in favor of the conjugal partnership has not been
overcome by clear proof to the contrary
MARAMBA VS. LOZANO, 20 SCRA 474

The presumption that property is conjugal (Art. 160, New Civil Code) refers to
property acquired during the marriage. When there is no showing as to when
the property was acquired by a spouse, the fact that the title is in the
spouses name is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said
spouse.
The presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of the civil code refers to
property acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case, there is no
showing as to when the property in question was acquired and hence the
fact that the tile is in the wifes name alone is determinative. Furthermore,
appellant said that the property was paraphernal.
The construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of
one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal. The ownership
of the land remains the same until the value thereof is paid, and this payment
can only be demanded in the liquidation of the partnership. There is no
showing that there was already liquidation and so the property being
separate property cannot be made to answer for the liability of the other
defendant.
Page 35
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a

professional, vocational, or other activity for self-improvement;
CALTEX V. FELIAS
A lot belonging to the parents and later donated by them to their daughter
belonged to the parphernal property and the building constructed thereon
before the donation follows the rule accessory follows the principal. The
donation transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over the building
constructed on it. As such the lot and the building are not answerable for the
obligations of her husband.
DOMINADO V. DARAYUNAN
A lot belonging to the parents and later donated by them to their daughter
belonged to the parphernal property and the building constructed thereon
before the donation follows the rule accessory follows the principal. The
donation transmitted to her the rights of a landowner over the building
constructed on it. As such the lot and the building are not answerable for the
obligations of her husband.
CALIMLIM-CANULLAS V. FORTUN
Husband abandoned his family and was convicted for concubinage. In 1980
he sold the land he inherited from his deceased father during the marriage to
his concubine. The concubine initiated a complaint to quiet title and
damages against the legal wife.
Held: The alienation of the property without the consent of the legal wife was
not valid because the contract of sale was null and void for being contrary to
morals and public policy. (Art. 1409 of the NCC)
Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal partnership but the
conjugal partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the land and
so the husband is entitled for reimbursement at the time of the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership.
3.
Obligations and Charges upon Conjugal Partnership
Art. 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

(1) The support of the spouse, their common children, and the legitimate
children of either spouse; however, the support of illegitimate children shall be
governed by the provisions of this Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of
gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of
the other to the extent that the family may have benefited;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have redounded to the
benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor of their
common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose of commencing or
completing a professional or vocational course or other activity for selfimprovement; and
(9) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is found to
groundless.
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties.
Art. 123. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game of chance or in
betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by
law, shall be borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the conjugal partnership property.
i.
Contractual Obligations Assumed By Either Spouse
Art. 122. The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before
or during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal properties partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon them be charged to the
partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by either spouse before the
marriage, that of fines and indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against the partnership assets
after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding Article have been covered, if the
spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient; but
at the time of the liquidation of the partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what
has been paid for the purpose abovementioned.
LUZON SURETY V. DE GARCIA

Conjugal partnership is only liable for such debts and obligations contracted
by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, There is none in
this case. This particular codal provision in question rightfully emphasized the
responsibility of the husband as administrator. He is supposed to conserve
and, if possible, augment the funds for conjugal partnership, not dissipate
them. If out of friendship and misplaced generosity on his part the conjugal
partnership would be saddled with financial burden, then the family stands to
suffer.
(4) All taxes, liens, charges, and expenses, including major or minor repairs
upon the conjugal partnership property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the marriage
upon the separate property of either spouse;
COBB-PEREZ V. LANTIN
In the NCC, Art. 160, the party who invokes this presumption must first prove
that the property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In the
Page 36
case at bar, there is no evidence as to when the shares of stocks were

acquired, the fact that they are registered in the name of the husband alone
is an indication that the shares belong exclusively to the said spouse.
shall be liable for x x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the
marriage by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other; (3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited;
Ayala Investments and Development Corp., et al. vs. CA, et al
The loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to
purchase the house and lot which became the conjugal home of
respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged lack of
consent of respondent, under Art. 121 of the Family Code, he shall be
solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
The Supreme Court ruled that the surety undertakings of a spouse cannot
bind the conjugal properties of the husband and wife even if it has become
a part of his duties as an officer of a corporation to sign as surety in certain
undertakings of the corporation of which he is the Executive Vice-President.
The loan procured from AIDC was for the advancement and benefit of PBM
and not for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of Ching and his wife
which was named in the writ of execution. AIDC failed to prove that Ching
contracted the debt for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains . PBM
has a personality distinct and separate from the family of Ching despite the
fact that they happened to be stockholders of said corporate entity. Clearly,
the debt was a corporate debt and right of recourse to Ching as surety is
only to the extent of his corporate stockholdings.
The term benefit is the crucial point in determining whether the properties
of the husband and wife are liable for obligations contracted prior to or
during the marriage. The burden of proof that the obligation redounded to
the benefit of the family of the debtor lies in the creditor.
1.
Administration of Conjugal Partership
Based from the foregoing jurisprudential rulings of the court, if the money or
services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only
as a surety or guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be
categorized as falling within the context of obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. The contract of loan or services is clearly for the
benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. Ching only
signed as a surety for the loan contracted with AIDC in behalf of PBM.
Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession, it is
not embarking in a business. Hence, the conjugal partnership should not be
made liable for the surety agreement which was clearly for the benefit of
PBM.
General Rule: the administration and enjoyment of the ACP shall belong to both
spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement: the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed
of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
The court did not support the contention of the petitioner that a benefit for
the family may have resulted when the guarantee was in favor of Chings
employment (prolonged tenure, appreciation of shares of stocks, prestige
enhanced) since the benefits contemplated in Art. 161 of the Civil Code must
be one directly resulting from the loan. It must not be a mere by product or a
spin off of the loan itself.
Sale or encumbrance of a property included in ACP: The written consent of either

spouse is needed, and in case of the incapacity of the other spouse and the other
spouse was appointed as administrator, authority of the court is needed.
ii.
Charges Upon The Conjugal Partnership Art 122 (3)
CARLOS V. ABELARDO
Petitioner lent to the respondent but without the consent of his spouse the
amount of $25,000.00 for the purchase of a house and lot.
In fact, when he inquired from them the status of their loan, they
acknowledged it but they failed to pay despite demand, hence, a suit for
sum of money was filed. Respondent claimed that the amount was his share
in the corporations profits. The RTC decided for the plaintiff but the CA
decided for the defendant. Are the conjugal partnership properties
answerable for the obligation? Why?
Held: Yes, because the loan redounded to the benefit of their family.
The amount of $25,000.00 was in the form of a loan as shown by the fact that
they acknowledged the indebtedness from the plaintiff, and hence, the
liability of the conjugal partnership. Under the law, the conjugal partnership
Exception: If one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the

administration of the common properties. The other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration.
Note that the powers of administration of the administrator spouse do not include
disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the
other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Donation of property belonging to the ACP- Neither spouse may donate any community
property without the consent of the other.
However, either spouse may without the consent of the other, make moderate
donations from the community property for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or
family distress.
No consent of either spouse or the court needed: either spouse may dispose by will of his
or her interest in the community property.
Why the rule? The disposition takes effect only after the death of the testator spouse
since the disposition is in the form of a will.
Page 37
2.
Dissolution of CPG
The ACP terminates1) Upon the death of either spouse

2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage.
Effect of Legal Separation to the ACP: the separation in fact between husband and wife
shall not affect the regime of absolute community except that:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have the right to be supported;
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required
by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a summary proceeding;
3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate property of
both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be given judicial
authority to administer or encumber any specific separate property of the
other spouse and use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's share.
Effects of Abandonment to the ACP: If a spouse without just cause abandons the other
or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family [refers to marital, parental or
property relations], the aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole administrator of the
absolute community, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court may
impose.
When is there abandonment? A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when
he or she has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The spouse who
has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three months or has failed within the same
period to give any information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal dwelling.
EFFECT OF DISSOLUTION OF ACP OR CPG:
a. After dissolution, the provisions on complete separation of property shall apply.
b. Each spouse shall own, dispose, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own
separate estate, without the need of the consent of the other. To each spouse
shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all
fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or
her separate property.
c. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or in
case of insufficiency or default thereon, to the current market value of their
separate properties. The liability of the spouses to creditors for family expense
shall be solidary.
Recording: the petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the
same shall be recorded in the proper registry of property.
Rights of Creditors: the separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously
acquired by creditors.
3.
Liquidation
Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
2. The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance
with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
3. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be
delivered to each of them.
4. The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute
its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and wife,
unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share
provided in this Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits
shall be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution.
5. The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Article 51. 6. Unless otherwise agreed upon by
the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot
on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
When to will the liquidation of ACP done if the dissolution of the marriage is by reason of
death of one spouse? Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the community
property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving spouse shall liquidate the
community property either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death
of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is
made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with
the foregoing requirements, a mandatory regime of complete separation of property
shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
I.
Separation of Property
1. During the Marriage
Art. 134. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either be voluntary or
for sufficient cause.
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation
of property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
Page 38
(3) That loss of parental authority of the spouse of petitioner has been decreed
by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to
comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact
for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2) and (3), the presentation of the
final judgment against the guilty or absent spouse shall be enough basis for the
grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
Art. 136. The spouses may jointly file a verified petition with the court for the voluntary
dissolution of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership of gains, and for the
separation of their common properties.
All creditors of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership of gains, as well as
the personal creditors of the spouse, shall be listed in the petition and notified of the
filing thereof. The court shall take measures to protect the creditors and other persons
with pecuniary interest.
Art. 137. Once the separation of property has been decreed, the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership of gains shall be liquidated in conformity with this Code.
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of property, the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership shall pay for the support of the spouses and their
children. (192a)
Art. 138. After dissolution of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership, the
provisions on complete separation of property shall apply. (191a)
Art. 139. The petition for separation of property and the final judgment granting the
same shall be recorded in the proper local civil registries and registries of property.
(193a)
Art. 140. The separation of property shall not prejudice the rights previously acquired by
creditors. (194a)
Art. 141. The spouses may, in the same proceedings where separation of property was
decreed, file a motion in court for a decree reviving the property regime that existed
between them before the separation of property in any of the following instances:
(1) When the civil interdiction terminates;
(2) When the absentee spouse reappears;
(3) When the court, being satisfied that the spouse granted the power of
administration in the marriage settlements will not again abuse that power,
authorizes the resumption of said administration;
(4) When the spouse who has left the conjugal home without a decree of legal
separation resumes common life with the other;
(5) When parental authority is judicially restored to the spouse previously
deprived thereof;
(6) When the spouses who have separated in fact for at least one year,
reconcile and resume common life; or
(7) When after voluntary dissolution of the absolute community of property or
conjugal partnership has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of the
spouses, they agree to the revival of the former property regime. No voluntary
separation of property may thereafter be granted.
The revival of the former property regime shall be governed by Article 67. (195a)
Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive property of either spouse may be
transferred by the court to the other spouse:
(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;
(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction; or
(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is in hiding as an
accused in a criminal case.
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of incompetence, conflict of interest, or any
other just cause, the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator. (n)
GARCIA VS MANZANO
Husband Gonzalo Garcia against his wife Consolacion Manzano for the
judicial declaration of the separation of their conjugal partnership property,
hey have been living separately from each other since 1948, all attempts at
reconciliation between them having failed.
The Lower court did not err in dismissing the complaint on the ground that the
complaint does not warrant for a separation of property. Both the old and
new civil code require the separation of property shall not prevail unless
expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or
by formal decree during the existence of the marriage and in the latter case,
it may only be ordered by the court for causes specified in Art. 191 of the
NCC. Such article must be limitative, in view of the Codes restrictive policy.
The remedy of the aggrieved spouse in case of the maladministration of the
other spouse is to revoke the power granted the other and resume the
administration of the community property and to conduct the affairs of the
conjugal partnership.
PARTOSA-JO VS CA
The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, is the legal wife of Jose Jo, herein private
respondent. The latter admitted to have cohabited with 3 women and
fathered 15 children. Prima filed a complaint against the husband for judicial
separation of conjugal property in addition to an earlier action for support
which was consolidated. RTC decision was a definite disposition of the
complaint for support but none of that for the judicial separation of conjugal
property. Jose elevated the decision to CA which affirmed rulings of the trial
court. The complaint on the separation of property was dismissed for lack of
cause of action on the ground that separation by agreement was not
covered in Art. 178 of the Civil Code. Prima contested that the agreement
between her and Jose was for her to temporarily live with her parents during
the initial period of her pregnancy and for him to visit and support her. They
never agreed to be separated permanently. She even returned to him but
the latter refused to accept her.
ISSUE: WON there is abandonment on the part of Jose Jo to warrant judicial
separation of conjugal property.
HELD: SC is in the position that respondent court should have made the
necessary modification instead of dismissing the case filed.
For
abandonment to exist, there must be an absolute cessation of marital
relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation. The
fact that Jo did not accept her demonstrates that he had no intention of
Page 39
resuming their conjugal relationship. From 1968 until 1988, Jose refused to
provide financial support to Prima. Hence, the physical separation of the
parties, coupled with the refusal by the private respondent to give support to
the petitioner, sufficed to constitute abandonment as a ground for the
judicial separation of their conjugal property.
Wherefore, the petition was granted and in favor of the petitioner and that
the court ordered the conjugal property of the spouses be divided between
them, share and share alike. The division will be implemented after the
determination of all the properties pertaining to the said conjugal partnership
including those that may have been illegally registered in the name of the
persons.
LACSON V. JOSE-LACSON
Held: The grant of Court on the spouses petition to dissolve their property
during marriage does not legalize their de facto separation. The Court does
not acknowledge the separation in fact of the spouses, which is abnormal. It
merely seeks to extinguish/saturate the seething emotions of the spouses by
minding their separation. The court cannot compel them to live together but
it can make their abandonment as difficult as possible.
II. NCC: Husband chooses the family home and the Wife follows.
FC: Both Husband and Wife chooses the family home.
When can the spouses live separately from each other [without decree of LS]:
1. When one is abroad
2. For compelling reasons
3. Where there is violence, acts of immorality and infidelity
UNLESS, separation is incompatible with the solidarity of the family
2.
Regime of Separation of Property
Art. 143. Should the future spouses agree in the marriage settlements that their property
relations during marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of property; the
provisions of this Chapter shall be suppletory.
Art. 144. Separation of property may refer to present or future property or both. It may
be total or partial. In the latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall
pertain to the absolute community.
Art. 145. Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess, administer and enjoy his or her own
separate estate, without need of the consent of the other. To each spouse shall belong
all earnings from his or her profession, business or industry and all fruits, natural, industrial
or civil, due or received during the marriage from his or her separate property.
Art. 146. Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in proportion to their income, or, in
case of insufficiency or default thereof, to the current market value of their separate
properties.
The liabilities of the spouses to creditors for family expenses shall, however, be solidary
VII.
UNION WITHOUT MARRIAGE
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or
under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares
and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not
participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to
have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the
care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the
property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of
the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in
bad faith in the coownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case
of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture
shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her
shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in both
faiths.
YAPTINCHAY V. TORRES, 28 SCRA 489

Teresita C. Yaptinchay alleged that the deceased Isidro Yaptinchay had
lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife for 19
year. The deceased died without a will left an estate consisting of personal
and real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and other places
with an estimated value of about P500,000. The deceased left three
daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion
Yaptinchay, who carted away from the residences aforesaid personal
properties belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively
owned by petitioner. It was averred that in these circumstances the
appointment of a special administrator to take custody and care of the
interests of the deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator
became an urgent necessity.
ISSUE: Can petitioner claim ownership.
HELD: Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests
in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title
that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of
injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive right especially calling for
judicial protection is wanting. Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent
Page 40
or future rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right. Common-law

wife was not able to prove that they jointly bought the property in Forbes Park
so it belonged to the legal marriage.
Maxey vs CA
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales lived as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. They had 6 children. Between 1911 and 1912, Melbourne
acquired properties and after the death of Regina, he sold this properties. In
1962, their children filed a suit to recover the said parcels of land contending
that the parcels of land were sold without their consent. They contended that
the properties were common properties of their parents.
The Court ruled in favor of the children, in considerations of justice which
dictate the retroactive application of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the
case at bar which states that, when a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void from the
beginning, the separate property acquired by either or both of them through
their work or industry or their wages or salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code, on August 30, 1950, the
formation of an informal partnership between a man and wife not legally
married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties
acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation were
recognized through decisions of this Court.
With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 (now Article 147,
Family Code) codified the law established through judicial precedents, but
with the modification that the property governed by the rules on coownership may be acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the
man and wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of
them. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey
and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold.
Technically speaking, the petitioners should return onehalf of the P1,300.00
purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some
form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties.
Antonio A.S. Valdes vs. RTC

Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez got married on January 5,
1971. They begot five children. On June 22, 1992, Valdez filed an action for
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity which was granted where the court declared their marriage
void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity.
The trial court correctly applied the law in that a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the
FC. Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code as interpreted and
so applied in previous cases. If this peculiar kind of co-ownership applies
when a man and a woman, suffering no legal impediment to marry each
other, exclusively live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. The term capacitated in the provision (in
the first para graph of the law) refers to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage, i.e., any male or female of the age of eighteen years or
upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38
of the Code.
Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their
work and industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any
property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed
thereto jointly if said parties efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
of the family household (Art. 147) Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains,
the fruits of the couples separate property are not included in the coownership.
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment to marry or
when they do not live exclusively with each other (as husband and wife), only
the property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion
to their respective contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares, however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The share of any
party who is married to another shall accrue to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing under a valid
marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly married to
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already heretofore
expressed.
Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001
This case involves a policeman who married twice. The first marriage was
contracted without a marriage license. Then, he contracted another
marriage without the first having been declared void.
SC held that the marriage between Yee and Cario falls under the Article 148
of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous or
polygamous marriages, adulterous or concubinage relationships.
Yee cannot claim the benefits earned by the SPO4 as a police officer as her
marriage to the deceased is void due to bigamy. She is only entitled to the
properties acquired with the deceased through their actual joint
contribution. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her
exclusively. Hence, they are not owned in common by Yee and the
deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and Yee has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death
benefits of the deceased shall pass to his legal heirs. And, Yee, not being
the legal wife, is not one of them.
As regards to the first marriage, the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is
null and void due to absence of a valid marriage license. Nicdao can claim
the death benefits by the deceased even if she did not contribute thereto.
Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling Nicdao to
share one-half of the benefits. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the first
marriage, she can claim one-half of the disputed death benefits and the
other half to the deceased' to his legal heirs, by intestate succession.
BAR 1997- PROPERTY RELATIONS; UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, Luis is gainfully employed, Rizza is not
employed, stays at home, and takes charge of the household chores. After living
together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary earnings
during that period the amount of P200, 000.00 presently deposited in a bank. A house
Page 41
and lot worth P500, 000.00 was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple.
Of the P500.000.00 used by the common-law spouses to purchase the property,
P200.000.00 had come from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda owned by
Luis and P300,000.00 from the rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In fine, the sum of
P500.000.00 had been part of the fruits received during the period of cohabitation from
their separate property, a car worth P100.000.00 being used by the common-law
spouses, was donated Just months ago to Rizza by her parents. Luis and Rizza now
decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give them your legal
advice on the following:
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) How, under the law should the bank deposit of P200, 000.00 the house and lot valued
at P500.000.00 and the car worth P100.000.00 be allocated to them? Art. 147 of the
Family Code provides in part that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work
or industry shall be governed by the rules of coownership. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their Joint efforts, worker Industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household. Thus: 1) the wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200, 000.00 shall be
divided equally between Luis and Rizza. 2) the house and lot valued at P500.000.00
having been acquired by both of them through work or industry shall be divided
between them in proportion to their respective contribution, in consonance with the
rules on coownership. Hence, Luis gets 2\5 while Rizza gets 3\5 of P500.000.00.
3) the car worth P100,000.00 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza, the same having been
donated to her by her parents.
(b) What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been living
together all the time, ie., since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage? The property
relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been celebrated 20 years ago
(under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, under
which the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or b chance, and upon dissolution of the marriage or of the
partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained by either or both spouse shall be divided
equally between them (Art. 142. Civil Code). Thus: 1) The salary of Luis deposited in the
bank in the amount of P200.000.00 and the house and lot valued at P500, 000.00 shall be
divided equally between Luis and Rizza. 2) However, the car worth P100.000 donated to
Rizza by her parents shall be considered to her own paraphernal property, having been
acquired by lucrative title (par. 2, Art. 148, Civil Code).
a) Who will be entitled to the house and lot? (3%)- Tony and Susan are entitled to the
house and lot as coowners in equal shares. Under Article 147 of the Family
Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during their
cohabitation are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry
and shall be owned by them in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of
one of them consisted merely in his or her care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was
previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated? (2%) Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties
to the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those
properties acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or Industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. The efforts of one of the parties in maintaining the family and
household are not considered adequate contribution in the acquisition of the
properties. Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she
has no share therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice,
the house and lot is his exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal
separation from Alice, the house and lot belongs to his community or partnership with
Alice.
BAR 2000- PROPERTY RELATIONS; OBLIGATIONS; BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.As finance officer of K and Co., Victorino arranged a loan of P5 Million from PNB for the
corporation. However, he was required by the bank to sign a Continuing Surety
Agreement to secure the repayment of the loan. The corporation failed to pay the loan,
and the bank obtained a judgment against it and Victorino, jointly and severally. To
enforce the judgment, the sheriff levied on a farm owned by the conjugal partnership of
Victorino and his wife Elsa. Is the levy proper or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER: The levy is not proper there being no showing that the surety
agreement executed by the husband redounded to the benefit of the family. An
obligation contracted by the husband alone is chargeable against the conjugal
partnership only when it was contracted for the benefit of the family. When the
obligation was contracted on behalf of the family business the law presumes that such
obligation will redound to the benefit of the family. However, when the obligation was
to guarantee the debt of a third party, as in the problem, the obligation is presumed for
the benefit of the third party, not the family. Hence, for the obligation under the surety
agreement to be chargeable against the partnership it must be proven that the family
was benefited and that the benefit was a direct result of such agreement.
BAR 2000- PROPERTY RELATIONS; UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank Vice-president, and Susan, an entertainer, lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were
capacitated to many each other. Since Tony's salary was more than enough for their
needs, Susan stopped working and merely "kept house". During that period, Tony was
able to buy a lot and house in a plush subdivision. However, after five years, Tony and
Susan decided to separate.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Page 42
Modequillo vs. Breva G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

The residential house and lot of defendant was not constituted as a family
home, whether judicially or extra-judicially under the Civil Code. It became a
family home by operation of law under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988.
VIII.
FAMILY
A. As an Institution
Art. 149. The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which
public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by
law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized
or given effect. (216a, 218a)
Art. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or halfblood. (217a)
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should
appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were
in fact made, the same case must be dismissed.
This rules shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of compromise under
the Civil Code.
Note: if a sister-in-laws, brother-in-laws, or any stranger is made part of the complaint,
then there is no need to comply with the foregoing rules.
Note further: the suit contemplated by the law is a controversial or adversarial action,
and not settlement of estate.
Conflict in the family: no suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
Exception: This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
a. Civil status of persons.
b. Validity of a marriage or a legal separation.
c. Any ground for legal separation.
d. Future support.
e. Jurisdiction of courts.
f.
Future legitimes.
g. When a stranger is involved.
B.
The Family Home
Defendants contention that it should be considered as a family home from

the time it was occupied by him and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under
Article 162 of the Family Code, The provisions of this Chapter shall also
govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. It
does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said Code have a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been
constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from execution for the
payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the
Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title
V have a retroactive effect.
Defendants family home is not exempt from the execution of the money
judgment. The debt or the liability, which was the basis of the judgment that
arose, was incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976
and the money judgment, arising therefrom rendered by the appellate court
on 29 January 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution
provided in the Family Code.
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially as was required in the Civil Code.
The exemption against execution is effective from the time of the constitution
of the family home as such and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually reside therein
It must be said that the main purpose of the law on the constitution of the
family home is to place it beyond the reach of ordinary creditors and thus
encourage the building of the family home which is the seat and symbol of
family affections.
Concept: The family home is the dwelling house where the husband and wife and their
family reside, and the land on which it is situated.
Who constitute? The family home may be constituted jointly by the husband and the
wife or by an unmarried head of a family. Also, under Art. 161: a person may constitute,
or be the beneficiary of, only one family home.
When is it constituted? The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as a family residence.
Duration: From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be such.
Also, the family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a minor
Page 43
beneficiary and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds compelling
reasons therefore. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
Thus a family home cannot be extra-judicially portioned, unless after the lapse of ten
years from the death of mother or father.
Judicial partition- you should convince the court that there is reason to do the same.
Where is it constituted? The family home must be part of the properties of the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership, or of the exclusive properties of
either spouse with the latters consent. It may also be constituted by an unmarried head
of a family on his or her own property. Nevertheless, property that is the subject of a
conditional sale on installments where ownership is reserved by the vendor only to
guarantee payment of the purchase price may be constituted as a family home.
How much? The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time of its
constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in urban areas, and P200,000.00 in rural areas or
such amounts as may be fixed by law. In any event, if the value of the currency
changes, the value most favorable for the constitution of a family home shall be the
basis of evaluation.
Urban areas: include chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least
equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are deemed rural areas.
Privilege: The family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment, except
as may be provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
Exceptions: the family home may be levied upon
For non-payment of taxes.
For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home.
For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such
constitution.
For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material men, and
others who have rendered service or furnished materials for the construction of
the building.
When a creditor whose claim is not among those mentioned from a d
obtains a judgment in his favor, and he has reasonable grounds to believe that
the family home is actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed
herein, he may apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order
directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall so order if it
finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount
allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the increased actual value
exceeds the maximum allowed and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting the family
home, by the owner or owners of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries,
the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family home shall
be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the amount fixed by law,
and then to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess, if any,
shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
Who are the beneficiaries?
a. The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of family.
b.
c.
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the

relationship be legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and
who depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
A person may be the beneficiary of only one family home.
Disposition of the family home the family home may be sold, alienated, donated,
assigned or encumbered by the owner or owners thereof with the written consent of
the person constituting the same, the latters spouse, and a majority of the beneficiaries
of legal age. In case of conflict, the court shall decide.
Applicability to existing residences: the provisions of this chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable.
IX.
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Paternity- means the relationship or status of a person with respect to his or her child.
Paternity includes maternity.
Filiation- means the status of a person with respect to his or her parents.Paternity and
filiation then implies relationship.
Tayag vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 95229, June 9, 1992

An action was filed to compel recognition of an illegitimate child was
brought before the effectivity of the Family Code by the mother of a minor
child based on open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child against the administrator of the estate of her late husband
(not legal). It appeared that during the lifetime of Atty. Ocampo, they had
an amorous relationship resulting in the birth of Chad on October 5, 1980. On
September 28, 1983, Atty. Ocampo died. On April 9, 1987, the complaint was
filed seeking for the childs share in Atty. Ocampos estate. It was opposed
on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the recognition of the child has not been
established; (2) prescription.
The grounds were not proper;
1. It is well-settled, that natural child having a right to compel
acknowledgment, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the
inheritance against his co-heirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in
the proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural
father, or mother x x x. In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling
acknowledgment.
2. While it is true that under Article 175, FC, the action to establish filiation by
an illegitimate child should be brought during the lifetime of the putative
father, yet, if that right was acquired under the Civil Code (Art. 285), the child
can bring such action within four (4) years from the attainment of the age of
majority if the father of the child died when the child was a minor. Right of
action of the minor child has been vested by the filing of the complaint in
court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code therefore has not yet prescrived.
2 types of Filiation
1. Natural
a. Legitimate
i. Legitimate proper[Article164]
ii. Legitimated [Article 167-172]
iii. Those conceived through artificial insemination.
b. Illegitimate [Articles 165, 175, 176]
Page 44
2.
Adoption
a. RA 9552 [domestic Adoption Act & RA 8043 [Inter-country Adoption
Act]
LEGITIMATE CHILDREN:
1. Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
2. Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the
sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate
children of the husband and his wife, provided, that these requisites concur
a. Authorization or ratification of the insemination by both husband and
wife. [Note: authorization occurs before the insemination; ratification
happens after the insemination].
b. The authorization or ratification must be in writing.
c. The instrument must be executed and signed before the childs birth
by both the husband and wife.
d. The instrument must be recorded in the civil registry together with the
birth certificate of the child.
THREE TYPES OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN
1. Legitimate proper
2. Legitimated
3. Adopted.
What if the mother declared against the illegitimacy of the child?
Article 167- the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Despite the declaration of the mother that the child is illegitimate or that she has been
declared adulteress, the presumption of legitimacy still stands. This is so because in
many instance, the woman wouldnt know who the father of the child is if she had
multiple partners. Also, there are instances wherein a woman whose marriage turned
sour will declare in such order to hurt the pride of her husband.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN:
General Rule: Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless otherwise provided in this code.
Exceptions:
a. Children of voidable marriages
b. Children of void marriages in two instances
i) Children conceived of a marriage void under Article 36, before final judgment was
rendered annulling the marriage.
ii) Children conceived of a marriage under Article 53.
TWO TYPES OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
1. Children of parents disqualified to marry each other at conception
and marriage.
2. 2. Children of parents qualified to marry each other- only this kind
can be legitimated by subsequent marriage.
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private

handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Note: mere use of endearment is not admissible as proof of filiation; the admission must
expressly indicate filiation and paternity between the presumptive father and the child.
When to file an action to claim legitimacy? The action to claim legitimacy maybe
brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of 5 years within which to institute the action. The action already commenced by
the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
Illegitimate children: Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action to claim illegitimate filiation must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
When to file an action to claim illegitimate filiation? The action to claim illegitimate
filiation maybe brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to
the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of 5 years within which to institute the action. The action
already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or
both of the parties.
DNA Testing to Prove Filiation:
Above 99%- presumption that he is the father
Below 99%- child must produce additional evidence to prove that the putative father is
the real father.
No relation- conclusive presumption.
The weight and probative value of DNA results depends on the observance of certain
requirements known as the Vallejo Guidelines. To wit:
a. How the samples ( both evidence and reference) were collected
b. How they were handled
c. The possibility of contamination of the samples
d. The procedure followed in analyzing the samples
e. Whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting
the test The qualification of the analyst who conducted the test
Note: DNA testing cannot be used to impugn legitimacy of children conceived through
artificial insemination.
ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY
PROOFS OF FILIATION
Who has the legal personality to impugn the legitimacy of a child?

General rule: only the husband during his lifetime can impugn the legitimacy of the
child.
Legitimate children: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the

following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment.
Exception: the heirs of the husband in the following cases:

a. If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing
Page 45
his action.
If he should die after the filing of the compliant without having desisted
therefrom or
c. If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Note: children cannot impugn their status.
b.
Benitez-Badua vs. CA, et al., January 24, 1994

The spouses (now deceased) begot no child, hence, the nephews and sister
of Vicente Benitez as the only relatives filed a petition for letters of
administration. Petitioner opposed on the ground that she is the only
legitimate child of spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian.
Documentary evidences were presented. The RTC decided in favor of the
petitioner and dismissed the petition for letters of administration. The CA
reversed, applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code. The record further
shows that after Isabels death, Vicente and Dr. Nilo Chipongian executed a
Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Isabel, stating that they are the
sole heirs and that she died without descendants or ascendants. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the CAs decision, said that the petitioners
insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family
Code cannot be sustained.
The legal provisions refer to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable
to this case because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child
but an action of private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs
of their childless aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat-Lim
is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedents
child at all. Being neither legally adopted child nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal
heir of the deceased
When to impugn the legitimacy of a child?

1. 1 year from knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
husband or in a proper case, any of his heirs, should reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or recorded.
2. 2 years from knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
husband, or in a proper case, any of his heirs, do not reside in the city or
municipality where the birth took place or recorded.
3. 3 years from knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the
husband or in a proper case, any of his heirs, live abroad.
In case of substitution- the heirs of the husband must follow the foregoing prescriptive
periods.
Note: if the birth of the child has been concealed or was unknown to the husband or his
heirs, the period shall be counted from the discovery or knowledge of the birth of the
child or of the fact of the registration of the birth, whichever is earlier.
GROUNDS TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY
1. That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days, which immediately
preceded the birth of the child because of:
a. The physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife.
b. The fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a
way that sexual intercourse was not possible.
c.
2.
3.
Serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual

intercourse.
That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the
2nd paragraph of Art. 164 (on artificial insemination).
That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence.
PRESUMPTION OF FILIATION- If the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted

another marriage within 300 days after such termination of the former marriage, these
rules shall govern in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Rodriguez vs. CA, et al.

On October 15, 1986, an action for compulsory recognition and support was
filed by Alarito Agbulos against Bienvenido Rodriguez. At the trial, the plaintiff
presented his mother, Felicitas Haber, who, on direct examination, revealed
the identity of plaintiff s father. It was objected to, and the objection was
sustained. The CA reversed the order and allowed the admission of the
testimony. Rule on the validity of the CAs decision.
Held: The CAs decision is correct. The provision of the Civil Code (Arts. 276,
277, 278, 279, and 280), which prohibited the disclosure of plaintiffs father,
have been replaced by Article 172 of the Family Code, hence, undoubtedly
disclosing the intention of the legislature to uphold the Code Commissions
stand to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity of the
illegitimate children. The Family Code now allows the establishment of
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. (Art. 175, Family Code). Of interest is that of Art. 172 of the Family
Code, which adopts the rule in Art. 283 of the Civil Code that filiation may be
proven by any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
X.
ADOPTION
RA 8552 [Domestic Adoption Act]
Republic v. CA and Sps. Hughes Oct. 26, 1993

Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity
and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from
adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental
authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support
and successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be
considered inconsequential to the parties.
James Anthony as a foreigner is not permitted to adopt under any of the
exceptional cases, the niece and nephew of his Filipina wife. The wife Lenita,
also would not qualify since she may not adopt alone, Article 185 requires a
joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read
alongtogether with Article 184.
Art 185 provides: Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the
following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.
Page 46
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.

As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603 had thus
made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them
was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same
nationality.
This Court is not unmindful of the possible benefits that an adoption can bring
not so much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted
children themselves. Even then, we have to call the attention of the
appropriate agencies concerned to the urgency of addressing the issue on
inter-country adoption, a matter that evidently is likewise espoused by the
Family Code.
Definition: the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess
in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child.
Simulation of birth: the tampering of the civil registry making it appear in the birth
records that a certain child was born to a person who is not his biological mother,
causing such child to lose his true identity and status.
Who may adopt?
1. A Filipino citizen who:
a) Of legal age
b) Good moral character.
c) In possession of full civil capacity and legal rights.
d) Emotionally and psychologically capable in caring for children.
e) Has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
f) 16 years difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee (may be
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the
spouse of the adoptees parent)
g) Who is in a position to support and care for his children in keeping with the
means of the family.
2. Any alien who:
a) Possesses all the above qualifications
b) Has been certified by his diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he has the legal capacity to adopt in his country ( )
c) Has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 continuous years prior to the
filing of the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the
adoption decree is entered
d) His government allows the adoptee to enter his country as his adopted son
or daughter
e) His country has diplomatic relations with the Philippines
Waivable in the following cases:
A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
One who seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of his/her Filipino
spouse.
One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with
his/her spouse a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity
of the Filipino spouse.
3. The guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of the guardianship and
JOINT ADOPTION OF HUSBAND AND WIFE: The husband and wife shall jointly adopt (joint
parental authority shall be exercised), except in the following cases:
4. If one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter of the
other.
5. If one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter; provided
that the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto.
6. If one spouses are legally separated from each other.
WHO MAY BE ADOPTED?
a. Below 18 years of age who has been judicially or administratively declared
available for adoption. Involuntary committed child: one whose parents,
known or unknown, has been permanently and judicially deprived of parental
authority due to abandonment; substantial, continuous, or repeated neglect;
abuse; or incompetence to discharge parental responsibilities. Abandoned
child: refers to one who has no proper parental care or guardianship or whose
parent has deserted him for a period of at least 6 continuous months and has
been judicially declared as such.
b. The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse.
c. An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status
to that of legitimacy.
d. A person of legal age, if, prior to the adoption, said person has been
consistently considered and treated by the adopter as his/her own child since
minority.
e. A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded.
f.
A child whose biological or adoptive parents have died. Provided that no
proceedings shall be initiated within 6 months from the time of death of said
parents.
The petition for adoption must allege all the qualification of the adopter and attached
the consent of those persons who should give consent to the adoption
The petition for adoption continues even if the adopter dies.
Whose consent is necessary to the adoption?
a. The adoptee, if 10 years of age or over.
b. The biological parents of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child.
c. The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, 10 years of age or over, of the
adopter and adoptee, if any.
d. The illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years of age or over, of the adopter if
living with said adopter and the latters spouse, if any.
e. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
f. If the child is committed to the DSWD, then only the DSWD can give consent.
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION:
1. Parental authority all legal ties between the biological parent and the
adoptee shall be severed and the same shall then be vested on the adopter.
2.
Legitimacy the adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of

the adopter for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights
and obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them
without discrimination.
Page 47
The adopted can use the surname of the adopting parents. If the adopting
parent is single, then the adopted child will have no middle name.
3.
Example: Juan Santos, married to Juana. They have 3 children. At age 35,
Juan was adopted by Santi Cruz. What surname will Juan and his wife and
children use?
Juan- surname will be change to Cruz
Wife and Children- surname will remain as Santos, because they were not
adopted by Santi Cruz.
Remedy of wife and children- petition for change of name.
Succession the adopter and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
RESCISSION OF ADOPTION:
1. Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter despite having
undergone counseling despite having undergone counseling.
2. Attempt on the life of the adoptee.
3. Sexual assault or violence.
4. Abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations.
Who can rescind adoption? The adopted only.
What about the adopter? The adoption shall not be subject to rescission by the adopter
but they may disinherit the adoptee.
XI.
SUPPORT
Essence of support: demandable when needed, but payable only when demanded.
Object/scope of legal support support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation , in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation,
even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place
of work.
Kinds of support:
As to amount:
o
Natural (bare necessities of life)
o
Civil (in accordance with financial standing)
As to source of obligations:
o
Legal (from provision of law)
o
Voluntary (from agreement or from provision of a will)
Special kind (alimony pendente lite)
Subjects of support the following are obliged to support each other to the whole
extent set forth under Art. 194:
a. The spouses
b. Legitimate ascendants and descendants
c. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children
of the latter
d. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children
of the latter
e. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood
f. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are
likewise bound to support each other to the full extent set forth, except only when
the need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause
imputable to the claimants fault or negligence.
Demandability and performance of support the obligation to give support shall be
demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial
demand.
Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Payment shall be made within the first 5 days of each corresponding month, or when
the recipient dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in
advance.
SOURCES OF SUPPORT: For the support of the legitimate ascendants; descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate; and brothers and sisters, whether legitimately or
illegitimately related, only the separate property of the person obliged to give support
shall be answerable provided that in case the obligor has no separate property, the
absolute community or the conjugal partnership, if financially capable, shall advance
the support, which shall be deducted from the share of the spouse obliged upon the
liquidation of the absolute community or of the conjugal partnership.
Support from Others:
From stranger When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give
support, it is given by a stranger, the latter shall have the right to claim the same
from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without intention of being
reimbursed.
From a third person When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses
or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person
obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the father or
mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give
support to the child when urgently needed.
Contractual support In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in
amount beyond that required for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment
or execution.
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification
is necessary due to changes in circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation of
the parties.
Exemption from execution The right to give support as well as any money or property
obtained as such support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution.
Per the rules of court the support for 3 months is the one that is exempt from attachment
and execution.
Page 48
Amount of support The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Art. 195 and 196,
shall bee in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of
the recipient.
Joint parental authority The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the
fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Form/Option in giving support the person obliged to give support shall have the option
to fulfill the obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to receive support. The
latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are
obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority.
Ratio of support: wherever two or more persons are giving support, they shall bear the
same proportionately based on their financial ability.
Order of support Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability
shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided:
a. The spouse
b. The descendants in the nearest degree
c. The ascendants in the nearest degree
d. The brothers and sisters
Divisions in giving and receiving of support When the obligation to give support falls
upon 2 or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided between them in
proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances, the judge may order
only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, without prejudice to his right to
claim from the other obligors the share due from them.
When 2 or more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same
person legally obliged to give it, should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all
claims, the order established in the preceding article shall be followed, unless the
concurrent obliges should be the spouse and a child subject to parental authority, in
which case the child shall be preferred.
Piecemeal support Support shall be reduced or increased proportionately, according
to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
XII.
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
A.
Concept Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person
and property of their unemancipated children, parental authority and
responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of such children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being.
Nature Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred

except in the cases authorized by law.
Parental authority cannot be subject of contractual stipulation.
Exceptions - Waivable in the following cases:
a. When there is guardianship approved by the court;
b. When there is adoption approved by the court;
c. When there is emancipation by concession;
d. When there is a surrender of the child to an orphan asylum.
Continuous exercise of parental authority In case of absence or death of either

parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage
of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless
the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the
children.
Parental authority in case of separation In case of separation of the parents, parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take
into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
Filial privilege No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against
his parents and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime
against the descendant or by one parent against the other.
Under the Rules on Evidence: No person may be compelled to testify against his
parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants (Rule 130, sec.
25). Thereupon, should a conflict arise between this provision and civil code provision,
the latter prevails, since a procedural rule cannot impair substantive law.
B. SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Order of substitute: in default [death or unwilling or incapacitated] of parents or a
judicially appointed guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute parental
authority over the child in the order indicated:
1. The surviving grandparent: in case of death, absence or unsuitability of the
parents, substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking
into account the same consideration mentioned under Art. 213, shall exercise
the authority.
2. The oldest brother or sister, over 21 years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
3. The childs actual custodian, over 21 years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
Whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the property of the child
becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed.
Parental Authority & custody over illegitimate children: whether recognized or not,
parental authority is solely and exclusively vested to the mother, except there are
grounds not to grant the same, such as when the mother lives a promiscuous life.
Parental authority for Foundlings: In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or
abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be
entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of childrens homes, orphanages
and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.
C.
SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Page 49
The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged
in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
The teachers stand in loco parentis over the minor in such instances. It means that they
exercise effective control and influence over the child.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus determine if the act of the child was done within the school time or after.
If after - see if the school has effective control and influence over the child, school and
teacher is liable.
For children who are not minors [18 but 21 and below] apply Civil Code.
D. EFFECTS OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
UPON PERSON- the parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with
respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right
precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping
with their means;
2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interests
in civic affairs and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
4. To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health
at all times;
5. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise
their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad
company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health,
studies and morals;
6. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
7. To demand from them respect as may be required under the circumstances;
and
8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and
guardians.
Disciplinary measures: The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual,
entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the
place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the
child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or
appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the
petitioner and the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of
the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also
order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures
as it may deem just and proper.
The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the
child for not more than 30 days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in
childrens homes duly accredited by the proper government agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child
whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own
instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and
proper.
UPON PROPERTY: The father and mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the
property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court
appointment. In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is
a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the marked value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds
P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as
the court may determine, but not less than 10% of the value of the property or annual
income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
Appointment of guardian over the property: The courts may appoint a guardian of the
childs property, or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the child so requires.
Disposition of the property of an unemancipated child: The property of the
unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to
the latters support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the childs property shall be limited
primarily to the childs support and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the
family.
ADMINISTRATION OF THE CHILD OF THE PARENTS PROPERTY: If the parents entrust the
management or administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated child,
the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the owner. The child shall be given a
reasonably monthly allowance in an amount not less than that which the owner would
have been paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner, grants the entire
proceeds to the child. In any case, the proceeds thus given in whole or in part shall not
be charged to the childs legitime.
LIABILITIES
Those given the special parental authority shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor.
The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental
authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be
governed by the provisions on quasi- delicts.
Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for
the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law [defense of
diligentissimi pater familias].
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in
child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment
upon the child.
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Permanent: Parental authority terminates permanently:
a. Upon the death of the parents
Page 50
b.
c.
d.
Upon the death of the child

Upon emancipation of the child
If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed
him to be subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently
deprived by the court of such authority.
Temporary: Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also

terminates:
Upon adoption of the child
Upon appointment of a general guardian
Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose
Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental
authority
e.
Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental
authority.
SUSPENSION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising
the same of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is
automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the
offender.
Also, the court in an action filed for the purpose or in a related case may also suspend
parental authority if the parent or the person exercising the same:
a. b.
c. d.
Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty Gives the child corrupting orders,
counsel or exampleCompels the child to beg
Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted
from culpable negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the
court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures
as may be proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a
case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause
therefore has ceased and will not be repeated.
XIII.
AGE OF MAJORITY
RA 6809 Took effect on December 13, 1989, the age of majority now is eighteen (18)
years.
As to liability, it states Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty
or responsibility of parents or guardians for children or wards below twenty-one years of
age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The above-cited provision clearly suggests that even if a child is over 18 but below 21,
his father or mother or guardian may still be liable for his acts or omissions. This is an
exception to Article 236 of the Family Code which provides for the personal responsibility
of a child who has been emancipated.
XIV.
SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules provided for in this
Title shall apply as regards separation in fact between husband and wife,
abandonment by one of the other, and incidents involving parental authority. (n)
Separation in Fact:
Art. 239. When a husband and wife are separated in fact, or one has abandoned the
other and one of them seeks judicial authorization for a transaction where the consent
of the other spouse is required by law but such consent is withheld or cannot be
obtained, a verified petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying the transaction, and, if
none, shall describe in detail the said transaction and state the reason why the required
consent thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly executed by the
parties shall be submitted to and approved by the court. (n)
Art. 240. Claims for damages by either spouse, except costs of the proceedings, may be
litigated only in a separate action. (n)
Art. 241. Jurisdiction over the petition shall, upon proof of notice to the other spouse, be
exercised by the proper court authorized to hear family cases, if one exists, or in the
regional trial court or its equivalent sitting in the place where either of the spouses
resides. (n)
Art. 242. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the other spouse, whose
consent to the transaction is required, of said petition, ordering said spouse to show
cause why the petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in said notice
for the initial conference. The notice shall be accompanied by a copy of the petition
and shall be served at the last known address of the spouse concerned. (n)
Art. 243. A preliminary conference shall be conducted by the judge personally without
the parties being assisted by counsel. After the initial conference, if the court deems it
useful, the parties may be assisted by counsel at the succeeding conferences and
hearings. (n)
Art. 244. In case of non-appearance of the spouse whose consent is sought, the court
shall inquire into the reasons for his failure to appear, and shall require such
appearance, if possible. (n)
Art. 245. If, despite all efforts, the attendance of the non-consenting spouse is not
secured, the court may proceed ex parte and render judgment as the facts and
circumstances may warrant. In any case, the judge shall endeavor to protect the
interests of the non-appearing spouse. (n)
Art. 246. If the petition is not resolved at the initial conference, said petition shall be
decided in a summary hearing on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral
testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is needed, the court shall
specify the witnesses to be heard and the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing
the parties to present said witnesses. (n)
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. (n)
Art. 248. The petition for judicial authority to administer or encumber specific separate
property of the abandoning spouse and to use the fruits or proceeds thereof for the
support of the family shall also be governed by these rules.
Incidents Involving Parental Authority
Art. 249. Petitions filed under Articles 223, 225 and 235 of this Code involving parental
authority shall be verified.. (n)
Art. 250. Such petitions shall be verified and filed in the proper court of the place where
the child resides. (n)
Art. 251. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall notify the parents or, in their
absence or incapacity, the individuals, entities or institutions exercising parental
authority over the child. (n)
Art. 252. The rules in Chapter 2 hereof shall also govern summary proceedings under this
Chapter insofar as they are applicable. (n)
Page 51
XV.
FINAL PROVISIONS
Art. 253. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, and XV of Book 1 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise
known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27, 28,
29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41, and 42 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the
Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended, and all laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed.
Art. 254. If any provision of this Code is held invalid, all the other provisions not affected
thereby shall remain valid.
Art. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Art. 265. This Code shall take effect one year after the completion of its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation, as certified by the Executive Secretary, Office of the
President.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty-seven.
XVI.
CARE AND EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
Article 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children the
latter's welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from her child under
seven years of age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
LUNA V. IACGR 68374, JUNE 18, 1985

In custody cases, the execution of a final judgment of the appellate court
awarding custody to the childs biological parents (parents by nature) may
be stayed, if during the hearing on execution, the child manifested that she
would kill herself and escape if she would be given to the custody of her
biological parents.
The childs best interest can override not only procedural rules but also the
parents rights to the childs custody. When the very life and existence of the
minor child is at stake and the child is of such age as to enable her to
exercise an intelligent choice, courts can do no less than respect that choice
and uphold the childs right to live in an atmosphere conducing to her
physical, moral, and intellectual development. Here the court cancecelled
the writ of execution and allowed the child to remain living with her rich
illegitimate grandparents
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR. V. CA AND SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND OFELIA BEDIA GR

113054, MAR. 16, 199559 SCAD 672
The considerations relied upon by the Court of Appeals (e.g., the
grandparents financial ability and the love and affection showered on the
boy) are insufficient to defeat petitioners parental authority and right to
custody.
Otherwise put, private respondents demonstrated love and affection for the
boy notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. To award the father custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to prove his
love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which
a father can give.
BAR 2006- Parental Authority; Child under 7 years of age - Under Article 213 of the Family
Code, no child under 7years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
(1) Explain the rationale of this provision. (2.5%)
Suggested answer: The rationale of the 2nd paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code
is to avoid the tragedy of a mother who sees her baby torn away from her. It is said that
the maternal affection and care during the early years of the child are generally
needed by the child more than paternal care (Hontiveros v. IAC, G.R. No. 64982,
October 23, 1984; Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code,
Volume One, pp. 718-719). The general rule is that a child below 7 years old shall not be
separated from his mother due to his basic need for her loving care (Espiritu v. C.A., G.R.
No. 115640, March 15, 1995).
(2) Give at least 3 examples of "compelling reasons" which justify the taking away from
the mother's custody of her child under 7 years of age. (2.5%)
Suggested answer:
The mother is insane (Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the
Philippines, pp. 296-297);
The mother is sick with a disease that is communicable and might endanger
the health and life of the child;
The mother has been maltreating the child;
The mother is engaged in prostitution;
The mother is engaged in adulterous relationship;
The mother is a drug addict;
The mother is a habitual drunk or an alcoholic;
XVII.
FUNERALS
Article 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative
shall be in accordance with the order established for support, under article 294. In case
of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Article 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.
Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the
deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall
determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided
upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the
other members of the family.
Article 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed
without the consent of the persons mentioned in articles 294 and 305.
Article 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a
funeral shall be liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
Article 310. The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a part of
the funeral expenses, and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if
Page 52
the deceased is one of the spouses.

RA 7170 (Transplantable Organss)
XVIII.
USE OF SURNAMES
Article 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
Article 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the
surname of the father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall
employ the surname of the recognizing parent.
Article 367. Natural children by legal fiction shall principally employ the surname of the
father. Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in article 287 shall bear the surname of
the mother.
Article 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall
principally use the surname of the father.
Article 370. A married woman may use:(1) Her maiden first name and surname and
add her husband's surname, or(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname
or(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such
as "Mrs."
Article 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall
resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume
her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Article 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her
name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Article 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still
living, in accordance with article 370.
Article 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be
obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Article 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word "Junior" can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct
male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
Article 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
Article 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for
damages and other relief.
Article 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of
action to the latter.
Article 379. The employment of pen names or stage names is permitted, provided it is
done in good faith and there is no injury to third persons. Pen names and stage names
cannot be usurped.
Article 380. Except as provided in the preceding article, no person shall use different
names and surnames.
Change of name under judicial authorization is governed by Rule 103 of the Rules of
Court. Under Sec. 1 of said rule: A person desiring to change his name shall present the
petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or in the City of
Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The state has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of

name is a privilege and not a matter of right, therefore, before a person can be
authorized to change his name (given him either in his birth certificate or civil registry),
he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason, which may justify
such change. Otherwise, the request should be DENIED. (Ong Peng Oan v. Republic,
102 Phil. 468). Justifiable causes include the following:
(a) When the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult
to write or pronounce;
(b) When the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, as
when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated;
(c) When the change is necessary to avoid confusion (not a confusion caused
by petitioners own use of an unauthorized alias).
(d) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien
nationality provided there is no prejudice to the State or to any individual.
REPUBLIC VS CA
LLANETA VS AGRAVA
FACTS: Atanacia Llaneta was married to Serafin Ferrer, with whom she had a
child named Victoriano Ferrer. The husband died and four years later,
Atanacia had relations with another man, out of which, Teresita was born.
Shortly after Teresitas birth, the mother brought her and Victoriano to Manila
where all of them lived with Atanacias mother-in-law, Victoria Vda. de
Ferrer. Teresita was raised in the Ferrer household, using the surname Ferrer in
all her dealings and throughout her schooling. When she was 20 years old,
she discovered her registered name was Llaneta, not Ferrer, and that she was
an illegitimate child of Atanacia and an unknown father. Because she felt
that the continued use of Llaneta would cause confusion, she petitioned for
change of name from Teresita Llaneta to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer. The Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Manila denied the petition on the ground
that under three decisions of the Supreme Court, a change of name will be
disallowed if it would give the false impression of family relationship.
HELD: Generally, said principle disallowing the change because of the false
impression that would arise remains valid, but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or
future mischief to the family whose surname is involved or to the community
in general. In the present case, however, the Ferrer family even earnestly
supports the petition. Its members are proud to share their name with Teresita.
Even the Office of the Solicitor-General has expressed no objection.
Accordingly, the petition for change of name should be granted.
SILVA VS PERALTA
The right of the wife to use the husbands surname is exclusive in the sense
that another woman should not misrepresent herself as the wife by using the
husbands name with the prefix Mrs.
Calderon v. Republic L-18127, Apr. 5, 1967

FACTS: A mother who had a natural child by legal fiction, subsequently
married a man other than the childs father.
ISSUE: May the child successfully petition to change, his surname from the real
fathers name to that of the stepfather, who has no objection thereto?
Page 53
HELD: Yes, for an illegitimate child need not bear the stigma of illegitimacy
during his whole lifetime. After all, the stepfather was willing. Moreover, the
change of name allowed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court does not alter
ones status, rights, duties, or citizenship. It merely changes the appellation by
which a person is known, identified or distinguished from others.
ABOITIZ VS PEPITO
Petitioner's non-controversion admits but the fact that Demetrio Pepito was
lost or missing, but certainly is not an admission of the actual fact of death.
The mere failure to controvert the statement that Demetrio Pepito is believed
to be "dead" or "'deceased" because he "was lost" or was "reported missing",
does not import an admission that the man is actually dead, but that he was
just lost or missing.
No presumption existed that Demetrio Pepito was dead. The boat was not
lost. This opens up a number of possibilities. Because nothing is certain.
Nobody knows what has happened to him. He could have transferred to
another vessel or watercraft. He could even have swam to safety. Or he
could have died. Or worse, he could have taken his own life. Legal
implications such as right to compensation, succession, the legal status of
the wife are so important that courts should not so easily be carried to the
conclusion that the man is dead. The result is that death cannot be taken as
a fact.
NALDOZA VS REPUBLIC
Legitimate children (especially minors) arent allowed to adopt the birth
name of their mother as their own surname because to discard the fathers
surname removes prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or
ancestry.
Mothers desire should not be the sole consideration, nor the fact that their
father was a swindlerTo allow this change of name would cause confusion
to the minors parentage and might create the impression that the minors are
illegitimate
XIX.
The disappearance of the employee, which occurred more than four years
ago, falls under par. 3, Art. 391, Civil Code, which presumes the death of a
person or all purposes, including the division of estate among his heirs, if he
"has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four years" or thereafter. CASE was REMANDED TO
WCC to hold a hearing and to render a proper judgment.
ABSCENSE
Article 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being
unknown, and without leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the
instance of an interested party, a relative, or a friend, may appoint a person to
represent him in all that may be necessary.
This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred
by the absentee has expired. (181a)
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES VS. LUCERO

There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss
and disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing
facts, quite logically, are sufficient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the
vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this
premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391(1) of the Civil
Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said
in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from
which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in,
and the rule of preponderance of evidence controls."
Article 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made,
the judge shall take the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests of the
absentee and shall specify the powers, obligations and remuneration of his
representative, regulating them, according to the circumstances, by the rules
concerning guardians. (182)
Article 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be
preferred when there is no legal separation.
If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person
may be appointed by the court. (183a)
Lukban vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 547

The wife of an absent husband sought to have a judicial declaration that her
husband is presumed dead. The Supreme Court, in not entertaining her
petition said that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioners husband is
presumed dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law,
and if such declaration cannot be in a special proceeding, much less can
the Court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since the matter must
necessarily depend upon the fact of the death of the husband. The Court
said, that it can declare, upon proper evidence, that he is dead, but not to
decree that he is merely presumed dead.
In Reyes vs. Alejandro, L-32026, January 16, 1986, the Supreme Court laid down certain
rules on the declaration of absence of a person:
a) The petition to declare a husband an absentee and the petition to place the
management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be
combined and adjudicated in the same proceedings. The purpose of the rule
is to prevent multiplicity of suits;
b)
An absentee person needs to be judicially declared an absentee if he has

properties which have to be taken cared of or administered by a
representative appointed by the court (Article 384, Civil Code); or if the
absentee spouse is asking for separation of property; or if the absentee is the
husband, his wife asking the court that the administration of all classes of
property in the marriage be transferred to her;
c)
The sole purpose of the filing of the petition to declare the husband absent is
to establish the absence of the husband, who left no property, the petition
should be dismissed, because there is no need to declare him judicially
Page 54
absent.
The reason for the rule is that there is no need for such declaration because
there is no property to take care of or administer. Therefore, it would be an
exercise in futility to have a declaration of absence;
d)
XX.
For the purpose of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former
spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provision of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to
enable the taking of necessary precautions for the administration of the estate
of the absentee. For the celebration of the civil marriage, however, the law
only requires that the former spouse has been absent for seven consecutive
years (now four [4] years under Article 41 of the Family Code) at the time of the
second marriage; that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living; that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead
and, that the spouse present so believes the same at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
CIVIL REGISTER
Article 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall
be recorded in the civil register. (325a)
Article 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions;
(9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. (326a)
Article 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial
orders mentioned in the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court
which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this
has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or
municipality where the court is functioning. (n)
Article 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto
shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained. (n)
Article 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized alteration
made in any civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby. However, the civil
registrar may exempt himself from such liability if he proves that he has taken every
reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful alteration. (n)
Article 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial
order. (n)
Article 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws. (n)
Rule Under Presidential Decree 603 Regarding Non- Disclosure of Birth Records
Art. 7. Non-disclosure of Birth Records. The records of a persons birth shall be kept
strictly confidential and no information relating thereto shall be issued except on the
request of any of the following:
(1) The person himself, or any person authorized by him;
(2) His spouse, his parent or parents, his direct descendants, or the guardian
or institution legally in charge of him if he is a minor;
(3) The court or proper public official whenever abso lutely necessary in
administrative, judicial or other official proceedings to determine the identity of
the childs parents or other circumstances surrounding his birth; and
(4) In case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
at least two months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five hundred pesos,
or both, in the discretion of the court.
RA 10172 Clerical errors- a clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake
committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing
an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth, mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or
the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing
record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of
nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.
REPUBLIC VS MACLI-ING
Father in this case would like to correct his sons name from Esteban Sy" to "Sy
Piao" while in another birth certificate, the son's name is being corrected from
"Noe" to "Joe"
The SC forbade the entering of material corrections in the record of birth by
virtue of a judgment in a summary action
The proceedings below, although filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court,
were not summary The Petition was published by order of the lower court
once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in accordance with law The Solicitor General was served with the
copy of the Petition as well as the notices of hearings He filed his opposition
to the Petition The Local Civil Registrar of the City of Baguio was likewise duly
served a copy of the Petition. A Fiscal was always in attendance at the
hearings in representation of the Solicitor General. He participated actively in
the proceedings, particularly. in the cross examination of witnesses And,
notwithstanding that all interested persons were cited to appear to show
cause why the petit ion should not be granted, no one appeared to oppose
except the State through the Solicitor General But neither did the State
present evidence in support of its opposition". Here SC let the case slide since
there was no opposition and jurisdictional requirements was met.
REPUBLIC V. VALENCIA GR 32181, MAR. 5, 1986

Persons who must be made parties to a petition to allow substantial changes
in the Civil Registry records are: (1) the civil registrar, and (2) all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or mechanism for
the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Art. 412 of the
Civil Code. Proceedings under Rule 108 are not anymore summary once all
Page 55
its requisites are complied with. It becomes adversary. For truth is best
ascertained under an adversary system of justice. Thereupon, substantial
errors in the Civil Registry may be corrected provided that appropriate
remedy is availed of. Changes in the birth entry regarding a persons
citizenship are now allowed, as long as adversary proceedings are held.
In the Matter for the Correction of An Entry v. Abubakar, Civil Registrar, et al.
Jan. 31, 1981
FACTS: In a petition before the Court of First Instance to correct the
designation of the sex of the minor Bio Heong Wing (by changing the letter
M to F to mean female) in the record of birth of the minor, the Court
granted the same, and ordered the Local Civil Registrar to make the
correction. The Registrar refused on the ground that the correction was not
merely clerical, and that the proceeding was summary in character.
HELD: The correction, though not merely clerical can be allowed, the
proceeding being not merely summary since the Solicitor General and other
interested parties were notified and the needed publication was duly
complied with.
Note: In this case the petitioners have filed the wrong case/petition yet the
SC let it slide since all the jurisdictional requirements are present.
LEONOR VS CA
The lower court erred in granting the husbands petition for the cancellation
of the marriage certificate in the Philippines based on a divorce case against
her in Swiss Courts.
Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries In The Civil Registry) as the
basis of the private respondents contention is untenable. The Court
explained that the Rule only applies to cases concerning typographical or
other clerical errors in the marriage contract, not material or substantial ones
like the validity or nullity of a marriage. It does not apply to cases where the
status of the parties and their children shall be affected.
Further, the respondent trial judge gravely and seriously abused his discretion
in unceremoniously expanding his very limited jurisdiction under such rule to
hear evidence on such a controversial matter as nullity of a marriage under
the Civil Code and/or Family Code, a process that is proper only in ordinary
adversarial proceedings under the Rules not summary proceedings. The
Supreme Court held in favor of the petitioner contending that a void
judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all.
Property NEXT!
Page 56

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CIVIL LAW REVIEW SYLLABUS

ATTY. Steve Y. Dicdican

UMALI v. ESTANISLAO G.R. No. 104037 May 29, 1992

Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

Rights which cannot be waived:

ALBINO CO V. CA G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993

Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION VS TECSON August 1969

QUIZON V. BALTAZAR G.R. Nos. L-23779-80 April 29, 1977

BELLIS VS BELLIS, G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

ARTICLE 829- Revocation of Wills adheres to domiciliary theory.

Status: the sum total of a persons rights, duties, and capacities.

ARTICLE 1039- Capacity to succeed

Nationality/personal theory: the status and capacity of an individual are generally

Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

PNB vs CA et al G.R. No. L-27155 May 18, 1978

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Elements of alienation of affection between spouses:

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Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

MENDOZA VS. ALCALA 2 SCRA 1032

MENDOZA vs ARRIETA G.R. No. L-32599 June 29, 1979

REPUBLIC v. BELLO G.R. No. L-34906 January 27, 1983

Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

SAPIERA V. CA G.R. No. 128927 September 14, 1999

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how she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORP VS PEOPLE

In short- The Rules of Court shall apply where:

A minor cannot enter into contracts, but he may be estopped from

Article 43 shall apply where:

RESTRICTIONS ON CAPACITY TO ACT

1. MINORITY (RA 6809)

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ii. Delicts and Quasi delicts

2. Insanes and Imbecile

5. Civil interdiction accessory penalty

Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

GELUZ VS. CA [JULY 20, 1961]

Ludica Oja | University of Cebu

Art. 42 Extinction of civil personality: Civil personality is extinguished by death.

RUFO MAURICIO CONSTRUCTION v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

People v. Bayotas GR 102007, Sep. 2, 1994

DEFINATION Art. 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union

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Marriage is no longer just a contract but an inviolable social institution, which is

Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a

Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer.

FORMAL REQUISITES OF MARRIAGE

Authority of the solemnizing officer - In the Philippines marriage can

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Any consul-general, consul, or vice-consul.

NAVARRO v. JUDGE DOMAGTOY A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996

Consul-general as a solemnizing officer: Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad

PEOPLE V DAVID 13 CA REP 495

Marriages Exempt From Marriage License [Extraordinary Marriage]:

DE LORIA VS FELIX G.R. No. L-9005

A Marriage Ceremony which takes place with the appearance of

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For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the

Register the decision declaring the nullity of marriage in the civil

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