WASSMER v.

VELEZ
Facts: The petitioner, Beatriz P. Wassmer, and respondent, Francisco X.
Velez, were lovers who decided to get married on September 4, 1954.
Prior to set date of marriage, they were able to secure a marriage license.
Likewise, actual preparations on the part of petitioner were made which
includes the distribution of invitations to relatives, friends and
acquaintances, purchase of bride-to-bes dress and apparels and their
matrimonial bed as well as the flower girls and maid of honors dress, and
gifts were given to the petitioner on her bridal shower. However, two days
prior set date of marriage, respondent left a note to petitioner saying that
the wedding will have to be postponed as the formers mother was against
it. The next day or a day before the wedding, September 3, 1954, the
respondent wired petitioner saying that nothing changed and rest
assured returning very soon, but he never returned and was never heard
of again. Thus, petitioner sued him for damages. The respondent filed no
answer to said complaint and was thus declared in default. On April 29,
1955, a judgment ordering herein private respondent to pay P2,000 as
actual damages, P25,000 as moral and exemplary damages and P2,500
for attorneys fees was rendered.
Issue: WON, the judgment is contrary to law.
Ruling. NO, the judgment is not contrary to law because breach of
promise to marry is not an actionable cause. However, Article 21 of the
New Civil Code provides that, any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In the present case, petitioner suffered actual, moral and exemplary
damages attributed to the planned wedding which did not materialize
because of respondents wanton, reckless, and oppressive acts.
The Court affirmed the lower courts decision with modification as to
the award of moral and exemplary damages reduced to P15,000,
considering the particular circumstances of this case.
NINAL v. BADAYOG
Facts: The petitioner, Engrace Ninal, who serves as the guardian of four
Ninal minors, the children of Pepito Ninal and Teodulfa Bellones, petitioned
for the declaration of nullity of marriage of Pepito Ninal to respondent
Norma Badayog which was contracted without any marriage license on
December 11, 1986, or after 20 months after the death of Teodulfa
Bellones. The petition was predicated on the assumption that the validity
or invalidity of the second marriage would affect the petitioners
successional rights. Respondent, however, contended that the petitioner
has no cause of action to file for the declaration of nullity of marriage after

the death of their father under Article 47 of the Family Code. The lower
court dismissed the petition on the grounds mentioned under Article 47 of
the Family Code, hence, this petition for review on grounded on pure
question of law.
Issue:
(1) WON, the petitioner has the cause of action to file for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of their deceased father to respondent;
(2) WON, the respondents marriage to Pepito Ninal was void ab
initio;
(3) WON, the petitioner is estopped to assail the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death.
Ruling: (1) YES, the petitioner has the cause of action to file for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of their deceased father to respondent
because the Family Code is rather silent as to who may file for declaration
of nullity of marriage. However, to have a proper determination of the
cause of action, the assailed marriage should be distinguished whether it
is voidable or void. If the marriage is voidable then Article 47 of the Family
Code governs it, and it likewise enumerated the time and persons who
could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. On the other hand, if
the marriage is void, as if there was no marriage at all to begin with, and it
being material to the determination of successional rights of the petitioner
in this case at bar, it is open for collateral attack and need not a separate
proceeding directly assailing the nullity of same marriage.
(2) YES, the respondents marriage to Pepito Ninal was void ab initio
because their case was not the one contemplated by Article 76a of the Old
Civil Code (now Article 34 NCC) which dispenses the requirement of a
marriage license to those who cohabited or lived together as husband and
wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry
each other. It must be recalled that they contracted their marriage without
any license 20 months after the death of Pepitos first wife, thus, the
alleged five year cohabitation was not met. Granting that they lived five
years before said marriage, the same was against good morals, good
customs, or even public policy as Pepitos first wife was still living then, or
exactly 30 months before her death. Thus, there is a legal impediment to
respondents marriage to Pepito.
(3) NO, the petitioner is not estopped to assail the validity of the
second marriage after it was dissolved due to their fathers death because
the Family Code is rather silent as to who may file for declaration of nullity
of marriage, and since the marriage sought to be annulled was void from
the beginning, it does not fall under the enumerations in Article 47 of the
Family Code. Petitioner may directly or collaterally assail the validity of the
second marriage of their father even after the latters death.
The Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the lower
courts ruling and the case is ordered reinstated.