sv2014 SI03

STRATEGIC
VISION
Special Issue
October, 2014
for Taiwan Security

w
ISSN 2227-3646
Vietnams Foreign Policy

Oil-Rig Crisis Forces Rethink of China Ties
Huong Le Thu
Warmer Hanoi-Washington Relations
Lu Wen-hao
Asia-Pacific Flashpoints
Yavor Kostadinov
Chinas Maritime
Territorial Goals
A First Step Toward

Regional Dominance?
Masafumi Iida
Taiwans Submarine
Acquisition Prospects
Jens Kastner
Offshore Control Strategy
And Taiwans SLOCs
Micha Pawinski
Sea Lines of Communication
STRATEGIC
VISION
Special Issue
for Taiwan Security
October, 2014
Contents
Flashpoints in the Asia-Pacific........................................................4

Yavor Kostadinov
China estabishing regional dominance........................................10

Masafumi Iida
Taiwans prospects for submarine aquisition............................... 20

Jens Kastner
Hanoi re-evaluates relations with Beijing..................................... 25

Huong Le Thu
Obstacles to warmer Vietnam-US ties..........................................30

Lu Wen-hao
Offshore control and Taiwans SLOCs..........................................36

Micha Pawiski
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Editor
Fu-Kuo Liu
Executive Editor
Dean Karalekas
Editorial Board
Tiehlin Yen
Raviprasad Narayanan
Richard Hu
James Yuan
Laurence Lin
Aaron Jensen
STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Special
Edition Number 3, October, 2014,
published under the auspices of the
Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.
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From The Editor
e are very pleased to bring you this, our third

special issue, highlighting the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the Asia-Pacific region and
the issues that impact the security thereof. As the regions littoral continues to become embroiled in territorial claims and
counterclaims, it is a timely subject of immense importance
to Asia-Pacific and cross-strait security, and we are proud to
offer a diversity of analysis on the topic from experts throughout the region and the world.
We begin with Yavor Kostadinov, a scholar at Taiwans
Tamkang University, who looks at maritime issues of strategic importance to Taipei, particularly the issue of SLOCs and
how they can quickly become flashpoints for potential conflict.
Masafumi Iida, a senior research fellow at Japans National
Institute for Defense Studies, offers an insightful analysis of
Chinas maritime territorial ambitions and how they may
portend Beijings first step in establishing political dominance
over the countries in the region.
Taipei-based journalist Jens Kastner examines the ROC
militarys longstanding search to acquire submarine assets
and how this would benefit the security of Taiwans SLOCs.
Dr. Huong Le Thu, who is a visiting fellow at the Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, looks at how the
recent oil-rig incident in the South China Sea has soured
Sino-Vietnam relations and how the Vietnamese government
is re-evaluating its relationship with its powerful neighbor.
Continuing on the theme of Sino-Vietnam ties, Colonel Lu
Wen-hao, deputy director of the Research and Development
Office of the ROC National Defense University, looks at how
Chinas actions have precipitated a budding rapprochement
between Hanoi and Washington, although he identifies obstacles to warming ties.
Micha Pawiski of the Graduate Institute of International
Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University, provides an examination of the US militarys concept of offshore
control, and what are its prospects for success in countering
Chinas Anti-Access/Area-Denial efforts, particularly as regards Taiwans vital SLOCs.
We truly hope you enjoy this supplemental issue of Strategic
Vision, and that you benefit from our coverage of the issues
surrounding the security implications regarding the regions
sea lines of communication.
Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu
Editor
Strategic Vision
Flashpoints
in the Asia-Pacific
Sea Lines of Communication
Maritime Issues of Strategic Importance for Taiwan
by Yavor Kostadinov
ontrol of vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) is essential for international

trade and growth of the regional and world
economy. As such, SLOCs play a major role in the
development of a nations strategy and policy. In particular, the higher the dependence on international
seaborne trade, the higher the priority of SLOCs for
economic and military security, as in the case of nations such as Japan and the Republic of China (ROC).
As Napoleon once said, The policy of a state lies in its
geography. In executing maritime policy, the ROC
has continuously avoided flexing its military muscle
in maritime disputes, preferring to use its coast guard
instead. This can be attributed to the emphasis that
photo: Colby Neal
4 Strategic Vision Sea Lines of Communication
the administration of ROC President Ma Ying-jeou

places on peaceful resolution of maritime disputes
and conflicts. However, this soft-power approach
could have devastating implications if it were to be
misinterpreted as timidity. As former US President
Dwight Eisenhower once remarked, history does
not long entrust the care of freedom to the weak or
the timid. With this warning in mind, ROC leaders
may need to rethink their strategy.
Our planet is made up of 70 percent water, and while
we live and stay on the land for most of our lives,
maritime transport is the backbone of international
trade and the global economy. Around 80 percent

of global trade by volume, and over 70 percent of
global trade by value, is shipped by sea. These figures are even higher in the case of most developing
countries. Hence, the nation that controls the SLOCs
has the power to collect crucial strategic information,
to intercept supplies in the event of a crisis, and to
predict the rise and fall of the economic and military
development of other states.
Major source of conflict

There are many strategically important chokepoints
and potential flashpoints in the worlds littoral, five
of which are located in the Asia-Pacific region. In
the South China Sea (SCS), there are the straits of
Malacca and Lombok, and the Spratly Islands, and the
East China Sea (ECS) is home to the Taiwan Strait and
the area around the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands. In the
past, continental territorial disputes were typically the
main drivers of conflict. Recently however, maritime
disputes have increasingly become the major source
of potential conflict. In the words of Robert Kaplan,
the seas of the Western Pacific are the future of conflict. Moreover, the regional security environment
was described by ROC Deputy Minister of National
Defense Andrew Yang with two words: uncertain

and escalating.
The fact that half of the worlds trade, and one third
of its oil transit through the Strait of Malacca alone
underlies the strategic geopolitical importance of the
seas in the region. Furthermore, Taiwans geographic location has great strategic value; being situated
between the SCS and ECS. It is also located, both
geopolitically and ideologically, between authoritarian China and the democratic West. Moreover, the
location and distance of friends and enemies across
SLOCs could be crucial for survival should a crisis arise. Hence, the strategic regional environment
and the interplay between major regional powers
and US involvement in the region certainly impact
ROC strategy.
For the military, SLOCs are maritime instruments
of power, and maritime geography becomes the playing field on which naval forces must be deployed. For
politicians, SLOCs influence the state of relations be-
Lightning flashes as the aircraft carrier USS Abraham

Lincoln (CVN 72) transits the Strait of Malacca.
Autumn 2014 Special Issue 5
image: MrDevlar
tween countries which are located along these routes,

while economists see them as the shortest and most
economical distance between two destinations. There
are several threats and opportunities for the ROC
to consider as it develops its strategy and policy for
SLOC security.
Different interpretations
First and most important, as emphasized by the
United States and other major powers, is the unimpeded passage of global commerce over the SLOCs in
the region. However, different interpretations among
nations of the principle of freedom of navigation
could lead to a major conflict. For example, there are
many overlapping claims in the SCS over the Spratly
Islands, and over Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)
as defined by the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, the US has not
ratified the convention, and the ROC is not a member
of the United Nations and therefore under no legal

compunction to observe UNCLOS (although, as a
responsible and democratic nation, the ROC voluntarily abides by this and other international laws).
Additionally, the Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) that the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) set
up in November 2013 covering almost the entire East
China Seaincluding sections that overlap with the
EEZs of Japan, Taiwan, and South Koreahas further
added to rising tensions in the region.
Second, the insecurity which arises from higher dependence on SLOCs prompts rapidly developing nations such as the PRC to boost their surveillance and
military presence. By using economic, political, and
diplomatic pressure combined with military intimidation, the PRC has strengthened its strategic position in the region in step with its growing capabilities.
While there is much debate over the PRCs intentions,
it seems obvious that the PRCs intentions are deliberately lacking transparency in order to prevent other
regional actors from predicting its future moves.

Such subtlety has been a part of Chinese strategy
since ancient times, and the Chinese Communist
Party has adopted it yet again to hide its intentions
and bide its time.
Maritime theorist Alfred Thayer Mahan has argued
that, through sea power, a state can achieve greatness. This could be applied today especially for big
manufacturing export-led economies such as China
which must rely on a strong navy to protect commerce and SLOCs. For Mahan, the state of peace is
a time when designers of foreign policy look to the
direct and indirect effects of far-reaching sea power
to a future when war might erupt. The navy, during
times of peace, serves as a preventive force that may
reassure allies of support, help gain new allies, and
deter states without navies. Similarly, by clearing the
sea lines of hostile navies, and protecting the waters
with friendly ones, a good navy encourages allies to
develop commercially by providing them with safe
routes to commercial markets.
Contrary to Mahan, Julian Corbett saw maritime
strategy as suited only to limited national purposes,
and he identified some fundamental differences between land warfare and sea warfare, proposing a
balanced amphibious strategy. He advocated
relative, rather than absolute, command of
the sea. Corbett believed that the prime object of

naval warfare was to secure communication. This
was achieved by sea control, not command of the
sea. The PRCs buildup and naval modernization
can be justified by the need to secure its increased
international commerce, similar to the way that the
United States justifies its large naval force.
If the PRC were to control SLOCs, it

would be an immense temptation to
harass or inhibit passage of Taiwanregistered cargo containers.
However, weaker countries are reluctant to trust
the PRC, or its intentions. For instance, the government of Vietnam states in its foreign policy that
there is a threat coming from peaceful evolution
pursued by hostile forces. The control of the seas
by the United States has so far has resulted in prosperity for a number of countries in the region, not
the least of which is the ROC: would that be the
case if China took control of regional SLOCs? It is
no secret that one of the PRCs core interests is
isolating Taiwan with the aim of taking over the
island. If the PRC were to control SLOCs, it would
be an immense temptation to harass or inhibit
passage of Taiwan-registered cargo containers
The USS Seawolf, the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force destroyer
JS Oonami and the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis
steam in the US 7th Fleets area of responsibility. Working with its
partners, the US Navy has been the security guarantor in the Pacific
since the end of World War II.
photo: Walter Wayman

bound for Chinas trade competitors, or otherwise

link its responsibilities as SLOC security guarantor
with Beijings foreign-policy goals. Just the fear of
this eventuality gives China immense leverage over
the ROC, in addition to the significant economic
leverage that it has already achieved by integrating
Taiwans economy with its own.
Third, in a world of competitiveness and liberalization of markets, an unprecedented blockage of resources would result in serious damage to the ROC
military and Taiwans economy. The ROC depends on
a constant supply of raw materials to keep its exportled economy alive. The IMF in 2013 ranked Taiwan
among the top 20 countries in the world based on
GDP (PPP), placing it fifth in the region after China,
Japan, Russia, and South Korea.
Fourth, the regions many maritime territorial disputes could easily spill over and represent a risk to
the SLOCs and threaten the ROCs sovereignty and
development. The emerging naval buildup of the PRC

and the multinational nature of the claims could easily drag the ROC into a conflict, especially considering that Beijings expansive claims in the region are
by and large mirrored by Taipeis own. The unstable
A timely response is vital during

periods of crisis or heightened
tensions.
diplomatic relationship between the PRC and Japan
places the ROC in a difficult position. On the one
hand, if Taiwan angers Japan, it risks losing vital supplies for its economy. On the other hand, angering
the PRC would close doors for exports since the PRC
is Taiwans No. 1 export partner. The ROC needs to
carefully prioritize.
For the ROC, as well as other nations, multilateral
cooperation on traditional SLOC security may be
An MH-60S Knight Hawk passes the Arleigh Burke-class guidedmissile destroyer USS Chafee (DDG 90) while delivering supplies to
the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70).
photo: James Evans
Crewmembers on Chinas Luhu-class destroyer Qingdao (DDG 113) man the rails as she
pulls into Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii on a trust-building mission.
perceived as an intrusion into national sovereignty.

Thus, ensuring sea lane security will require comprehensive strategies encompassing differing perceptions and national interests of concerned states.
Therefore, the priority of military application for
deterrence and engagement needs to be taken into
full consideration.
Stronger presence needed

It is recommended that a stronger military presence
be initiated at chokepoints and strategic locations,
including Taiping Island, inside the Taiwan and
Malacca straits, and any areas of overlapping EEZs.
Additionally, the ROC should increase its use of soft
power tools to reinforce its position on the issue.
This, in combination with greater military visibility,
will maximize the ROCs standing on these crucial
strategic issues.
The ROCs primary strategic objectives in the SCS
and ECS, either alone or with the help of the United
photo: Cynthia Clark
States, are to maintain sovereignty and to secure vital SLOCs, thus ensuring continued security and
economic growth. How can the ROC secure Taiping
Island if it relies only on the Coast Guard? Due to
the PRCs strategy of biding its time regarding its SCS
and ECS disputes, the ROC needs to make sure that
its position will not be compromised.
Finally, a timely response is vital during periods
of crisis or heightened tensions. The government
reacted slowly in deploying the military during the
confrontation with the Philippines over the death of
a Taiwanese fisherman. This resulted in claims that
the ROC government was timid. As one of the worlds
top 20 economic and military powers, the ROC can
surely take a stronger stand in securing sea lines of
control by more skillfully utilizing its hard and soft
power resources. b
About the author
Yavor Kostadinov is a PhD student at Taiwans Tamkang University. He can be
reached for comment at yavorbg@gmail.com.
Chinas maritime territorial ambitions

the first step in establishing
regional dominance
Empire
Building
by
Masafumi
Iida
ollowing the purchase by the Japanese

government of three of the Senkaku Islands
from a private Japanese citizen in September
2012, the Chinese government has intensified its efforts to erode and discredit Japanese sovereignty and
administration over the islands, causing the greatest levels of tension between the two countries
since their normalization of diplomatic ties
in 1972. One of the tactics employed by
leaders in the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC) has been to blame
Japan for disruption of the
international order, established at the end of World
War II, through this
change of ownership.
Chinas Ambassador
to the United Nations, Li Baodong, asserted at the

UN General Assembly in September 2012 that the
purchase of the islands by the Japanese government
constituted an open denial of the outcomes of victory of the world anti-fascist war, and a grave challenge to the post-war international order.
It is not Japan that is challenging the existing international order by making trouble over the Senkaku
Islands. That is precisely what China is doing. Indeed,
Beijing has profound reasons for seeking to revise the
post-war order in East Asia, and it is taking steps to
achieve regional predominance through maritime
expansion.
In recent years, China has accelerated actions
designed to intimidate Japans valid control over the Senkaku Islands by
not only verbally criticizing
Raising an Army is a painting

depicting the 1759 Battle of Qurman
in which the Qing court extended its
empire into East Turkestan.
Japans position on the Islands but also by intensifying

pressure on Japan to make concessions by leveraging
its rapidly growing comprehensive national power, including in the maritime domain. In December
2008, two patrol vessels of China Marine Surveillance
(CMS), a paramilitary organization under the State Oceanic

Administration, intruded into Japanese territorial waters around the
Senkakus. This was the
first-ever incursion by
a Chinese-government
ship into the Islands
territorial seas.
After a Chinese fishing boat intentionally
map: VOA
collided with two Japan
Coast Guard (JCG)
vessels within the Japanese waters of the Senkakus
(prompting the arrest of the captain) in September
2010, patrol vessels of the Fishery Law Enforcement
Command (FLEC) of Chinas Ministry of Agriculture
joined the CMS vessels to intrude into the Japanese
Uotsuri Island is the largest of the five Senkaku Islands.
photo: Al Jazeera
seas around the Senkakus on the pretext

of protecting Chinese fishermen.
Since the Japanese government acquired
ownership of three of the Senkaku Islands
in September 2012, China has drastically
increased use of its maritime strength to
intimidate Japan. CMS, FLEC, and, following its creation in March 2013, the China
Coast Guard (CCG) have regularly dispatched patrol vessels to the Senkakus,
maintaining a continuous presence in the
area. In 2013, Chinese government ships
intruded into the territorial waters of the
islands more than 50 times. The Peoples
Liberation Army (PLA) also has intensified provocative actions against Japan
in the East China Sea. In October and
December of 2012, a PLA Navy (PLAN)
flotilla passed through Japanese contiguous waters of the Nansei Shoto Islands
also known as the Ryukyu Islandsand
sailed for the Senkakus.
A well-worn ensign adorns a Japanese coast guard vessel on patrol

near the Senkaku Islands.
Provocative actions
In January 2013, PLAN frigates directed
fire control radar at a destroyer and a helicopter of the Japan Maritime Self Defense
Force in the East China Sea. In May of the
same year, PLAN submarines conducted
submerged passages in contiguous waters
of the Ryukyu Islands at least three times.
Even in the airspace over the East China
Sea, China has steadily increased pressure on Japan,
sending a patrol aircraft in December 2012 to intrude
into Japanese airspace over the Senkaku Islands. A
year later, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) allegedly operated by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) flew
near the Senkakus. Most recently, in November 2013,
China declared a new air defense identification zone
photo: Al Jazeera
(ADIZ) over the East China Sea. The ADIZ includes

the airspace over the Senkaku Islands.
Chinas provocative behavior in the East China Sea
can be interpreted as an insight into Beijings intentions of leverage its growing sea power to alter the
existing order in favor of Chinese interests. Clearly, it
is not Japan but China that has an interest in changing
the status quo of Japanese territorial jurisdiction over

the Senkakus, which is in accordance with the postwar regional order. The National Security Strategy of
Japan, published in December 2013, pointedly notes,
China has taken actions that can be regarded as attempts to change the status quo through coercion.
This recently published strategic document clearly
shows Tokyos resolve to take measures in the coming
years to protect Japans legally and historically wellestablished sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands, and
to reject any attempts by China to change the status
quo in the region by coercive measures.
Chinas ambition to expand its territorial and economic interests by force has been much more apparent in the South China Sea than in the East China Sea.
Since the mid 1970s, the region has witnessed China
NalGeoMap
steadily expand its control over islands in the Paracel

and Spratly Island chains through intimidation and/
or use of force. In January 1974, the PLAN attacked
naval assets of South Vietnam, which at the time
Vessels belonging to the PLAN and

Chinese law enforcement agencies often show an attitude inconsistent with
regional rules and norms, including
safety and freedom of navigation.
controlled some of the Paracel Islands. Eventually the
PLAN defeated the South Vietnamese navy and established full control over the Paracels. In March 1988,
the PLAN again attacked the Vietnamese Navy in an
area near the Spratly Islands Johnson South Reef,
causing severe damage
to the Vietnamese side
and ultimately leading
to occupation of some
islands that had previously been administered
by Vietnam.
In March 1995, China
constructed
guard
posts on Mischief
Reef (claimed by the
Philippines) and coerced Manila into accepting Beijings occupation of the Reef by
sending PLAN warships
into the area. In retrospect, China is the only
nation among the six
claimants in the South
China Sea to have taken
control of islands from
rival claimants through
intimidation and force.
In 2012, China deployed its growing maritime power to wrest

the Scarborough Shoal
from the Philippines.
A Philippine patrol
aircraft spotted some
Chinese fishing boats in
the waters around the
shoal, and upon subsequent investigation by a
frigate of the Philippine
Navy it was discovered
that these vessels had
been engaged in illegal fishing operations.
When the Philippines
side tried to arrest the Chinese fishermen, CMS
vessels maneuvered into the area and prevented the
Philippine authorities from conducting law enforcement activities.
PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi
Standoff at sea
This incident sparked a
two-month standoff between Chinese patrol vessels of the CMS and FLEC
and Filipino Coast Guard
patrol vessels. Ultimately,
the Chinese side expelled
the Philippine vessels from
the area and established
Chinese control over the
Scarborough Shoal. This is
the latest manifestation of
Chinas persistent territorial ambition in the South China Sea and Beijings
apparent violation of the Declaration on the Conduct
of the Parties in the South China Sea, which stipulates
Landsat imagery of Scarborough Shoal
that the parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in

the conduct of activities including, inter alia, refraining from action of inhabiting the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, and
cays. While still serving as
vice minister, PRC Minister
of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi
signed this document in
2002 on behalf of his government, as did his counterparts from the member
states of The Association
of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN).
Vessels belonging to the
PLAN and Chinese law
enforcement agencies often show an attitude inconsistent with regional rules
photo: Wikimedia commons
and norms, including safety and freedom of navigation. In recent years, the
CMS and FLEC have intensified their activities aimed
at claiming sovereignty and maritime rights in the
South China Sea. In April 2010, for instance, a large

FLEC patrol ship sailed close to Swallow Reef, controlled by Malaysia, causing an 18-hour standoff with
a Malaysian missile boat and patrol aircraft. In May
2011, a CMS vessel obstructed navigation of the Binh
Minh 02, a PetroVietnam survey ship, off the coast of
Central Vietnam, reportedly using specialized cablecutting devices to damage the equipment being towed
by the Vietnamese survey ship. Indeed, the region is
still feeling the fallout of the PRCs placement of an
oil rig within the boundaries of Vietnams EEZ, and
the clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese vessels
that followed.
ternational waters south of Hainan Island, was harassed in a dangerous and unprofessional manner by
PLAAF aircraft as well as five Chinese ships, among
them vessels of the PLAN, CMS, and FLEC, and
two trawlers.
It is extremely difficult for China to

expand its control over these islands
through peaceful negotiation because other parties to the disputes
have no intention of giving up their
own sovereignty.
Targeting the US
In December 2013, while observing an exercise by

the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning in international
waters in the South China Sea, the USS Cowpens was
Chinas assertiveness in the South China Sea is directed not only at the Southeast Asian countries but
at the United States as well. In March 2009, the US
surveillance ship USNS Impeccable, operating in in-
forced to stop to avoid a collision with a PLANs ship

that manoeuvred dangerously in front of it. These actions on the part of Chinas military and law enforcement agencies are inconsistent with the principles of
In an apparently coordinated effort, Chinese trawlers stop directly in front of the unarmed ocean surveillance
vessel USNS Impeccable, forcing the ship to conduct an emergency all-stop to avoid collision.
photo: US Navy
freedom of navigation and raise concerns about the

safety of navigation in the South China Sea.
Why has China engaged in increasingly assertive
behavior in its surrounding waters? What does China
seek to achieve by exercising its growing might? It is
fairly clear that China aims to establish exclusive con-
ests. This firm stance in pursuing territorial integrity

is enthusiastically supported by a nationalistic portion of Chinese society, and contributes to enhancing
the CCPs political legitimacy.
Nonetheless, it is extremely difficult for China to
expand its control over these islands through peacephoto: Paul Kelly
The guided missile cruiser USS Cowpens (CG 63) pulls into port in Saipan.
trol over Taiwan, the Senkaku Islands, and the Spratly

Islands, which they perceive to be lost territories.
Just after his appointment as secretary general of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Xi Jinping pledged
to realize a great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
This Chinese dream can hardly be realized without
annexing territories in the East and South China seas.
The State Council Information Office released
September 2011 an official document on Chinese
foreign policy strategy, euphemistically titled Chinas
Peaceful Development, that defines territorial integrity and national reunification as the states core interests. At a study group session of the CCP Central
Committee Political Bureau in January 2013, Xi declared that China will never sacrifice core interests,
and that no country should presume that China will
be willing to consider trades involving its core inter-
ful negotiation because other parties to the disputes

have no intention of giving up their own sovereignty
to China. The existing international mechanisms for
resolving territorial disputes might not be helpful for
China because the legal foundation of Chinas claims
over many of these islands is far from ironclad. The
As China seeks to maximize the

effect of its coercion of rival states,
its major obstacle remains the US
military presence in the region.
Philippines has included Chinas recent actions on
Mabini Reef, where Beijing appears to be building an
airstrip, in its appeal to the UNs Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague. China rejects such international arbitration, holding firm to its nine-dash line
photo: Jonathan Chen
interpretation to justify its claim to almost the entire

South China Sea. Clearly, since Beijing is averse to a
negotiated settlement to its many disputed territorial claims, it is prone to rely on its growing maritime
power to compel rival countries to concede.
As China seeks to maximize the effect of its coercion
of rival states, its major obstacle remains
the US military presence in the region, because Washington is
committedoften by force
of treatyto the security
of many parties to the disputes.
US support
The United States supports
the security of Taiwan by
many means including the sale
of defensive weapons to Taipei, as
stipulated in the Taiwan Relations Act.
Japan is a security ally of the United States and the
US government has reaffirmed that the Senkaku
An AH-64E Apache helicopter sold to Taiwan by the United

States, as provided for in the Taiwan Relations Act.
Islands fall under the treaty obligation of America.

The United States signed a security treaty with the
Philippines and supports Manila as it seeks to enhance its defensive capabilities.
In recent years the United States has also made
significant efforts to strengthen defense cooperation with new partners in Southeast Asia, such
as Singapore and Vietnam. As long as
the United States maintains a military presence sufficient to meet
its security commitments and
support other countries in the
region, there is little chance
for China to make tangible
achievements from its coercive behavior against the contested countries.
However, China presently
stops short of overtly challenging
the US presence in this region because
it is incapable of doing so for the time being. China currently pursues an indirect approach
to eroding the regional foundation for supporting
the US military presence. Without credible support

and cooperation from regional allies and partners
based on their trust and confidence in US security
commitments, Washington will find it extremely difficult to maintain an effective military presence in
the Asia Pacific.
Coercive behavior
China strives to diminish the credibility of US security commitments to regional partners by engaging
in coercive behavior that is not so provocative as to
invite US intervention. For instance, China wrested
the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines, but the
United States did not take effective action to compel
China to withdraw from the shoal for the sake of its
ally. China expects that a continuation of this sort of
non-militarized pressure will induce US partners in
the region to gradually lose their confidence in the
US security guarantee, which will in turn undermine
regional support for the US military presence.
The CCP, furthermore, regards the US presence

around China as a major threat to the continuation of
its authoritarian political regime. The CCP is deeply
suspicious of the US intention to support peaceful
evolution away from communist rule. According to
analyst Edward Friedman, from the CCPs point of
view, the American promotion of human rights and
democracy is the No. 1 threat that the CCP regime
has to defeat. In order to realize the Chinese dream
and to enable the one-party state to endure, the CCP
has to make every effort to weaken US influence
in East Asia, and that means China must ascend to
dominance in the region, replacing the existing USled regional order.
Chinas maritime expansion into the East and South
China seas and the Western Pacific should be understood as the first step in the CCPs long-term strategy
to establish Chinese domination in the region. b
About the author
Masafumi Iida is a senior research fellow at Japans National Institute for Defense
Studies and can be reached for comment at masafumi@nids.go.jp.
The sun sets on Swallow Reef, of the

disputed Spratly Islands, in the South China Sea.
photo: Matthew Lee
The
Diving
Dragon
BY JENS KASTNER
Taiwans sea lines of communication
and prospects for submarine aquisition
f one were to ask a diversity of strategists if

they could agree on the one weapon system that
has what it takes to safeguard Taiwans sea lines
of communication (SLOCs), that system would surely
be submarines. A small fleet of diesel-electric submarines would be extremely useful in a number of
scenarios that the Republic of China (ROC) may be
facing in the future. Beijing appears to be fed up after decades of waiting for unification, yet it does not
want to launch an ugly, all-out war to annex Taiwan.
If it were to blockade Taiwan, ROC submarines could
facilitate what East Asia defense expert Alex Bellah
calls a Focused Lifeline between the United States

and the island, which produces less than 1 percent
of its primary energy supply, and imports virtually
all corn and soybeans needed to feed its livestock.
Moreover, if the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
would effectively continue to accept the status quo,
the subs would bring about much more firepower that
would allow the ROC to join the increasingly rude
elbowing for regional energy reserves in the regions
seas. Even if the Taiwanese opt to form a union with
Chinaone allowing them to maintain their own
armed forcesthe subs would still prove useful: They
image: Andromega Volaire
would act as a disincentive for Chinas future leaders

from drastically backpedaling on whatever concessions their predecessors may have made to Taiwan.
These leaders would know that, apart from undermining a blockade, the boats could be deployed in
the Taiwan Strait just off the key passageways out
from Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) naval bases
and commercial ports, conducting mining operations, and posing real threats to anything that sails
submarines, agreed to by the administration of US

President George W. Bush in April 2001, will never
materialize. For one thing, the United States can no
longer build diesel-electric subsit produces only
nuclear-powered onesand the European countries that have the capability would be unlikely to
risk messing up their lucrative business relationships
with China.
by, including the major surface combatants of the

PLA Navy (PLAN).
That said, where will these boats come from?
There are recurring reports that Taiwan wants to
build its own subs. Such reports have emerged since
it became clear that the sale of eight diesel-electric
Made in Taiwan
One solution that initially suggested itself was that
Taiwan build its own boats. During the tenure of
ROC President Chen Shui-bian, talk emerged of the
Diving Dragon: a project that envisioned the possiAutumn 2014 Special Issue 21
The nuclear-powered attack submarine Virginia while under construction.
bility for Taiwans China Shipbuilding Corp. (CSBC)

to built boats in Taiwan using technology transfers.
However, neither the ROC Navy nor the Ministry of
National Defense (MND) was convinced, due largely
to the high cost projections, likely schedule delays,
and problems with quality standards that could potentially result from local construction.
These doubts were compounded by the fact that
building a submarine is by no means a small engineering feat, and that CSBC has so far welded together container and bulk carriers that are basically big
steel boxes, very much unlike modern submarines,
which are highly compartmented and require sophisticated sensors and combat systems, hulls optimized
to avoid flow noise and air-independent propulsion
(AIP) systems as well as fuel cells which enable the
boats to stay underwater weeks at a time. CSBC was
warned that it would find it difficult to use someone
elses design while trying to obtain all the subsystems
from the original vendors, and Taiwan hands have
predicted that the Diving Dragon would inevitably
photo: US Navy
run into profound difficulties as soon as CSBC started

altering the original design, or having to find replacement vendors for subsystems. In other words, the
critics said, if Taipei were to start a submarine program using foreign blueprintsor even its ownto-
Japan might consider selling Taiwan

some of its mothballed submarines if
Sino-Japanese relations continue to
deteriorate.
day, it would take well over a decade and a whopping
US$15 billion before an ROC submarine fleet could
possibly take to the sea.
But now it appears as if the Diving Dragon could be
alive and kicking sooner, and for less money.
In April, President Ma Ying-jeou told the US Center
for Strategic and International Studies of a new consensus in Taiwan to build the submarines domestically. A few days later, Defense Minister Yen Ming tes-
A Hai Lung class submarine surfaces during an ROC naval exercise.
tified to the Legislatures Foreign Affairs and National

Defense Committee that the United States is willing
to help us build the submarines together. Although
such talk by ROC government officials has more or
less been consistently heard for years, without discernible progress made on the issue, the first promising sign that the Diving Dragon might indeed be
lingering just around the corner came in late May.
It was then that ROC Navy

Command Headquarters confirmed that the CSBC and the Ship
and Ocean Industries Research
and Development Center (SOIC)
have been appointed to weld a
new section of pressure hull onto
Taiwans two 70-year-old Tench/
Guppy-II class submarines. The
old boats are used in anti-submarine warfare exercises simulating
PLAN boats, but do not actually
dive, owing to the obvious danger to the crew. And as the new
welding job will not really change
photo: ROC Navy
this, given that metal fatigue will
still plague the rest of the boats,
the local media found it worthwhile to speculate that
the partial hull replacement is meant as welding practice for CSBC and SOIC. According to this school of
thought, such practicing with the Guppies in combination with the reverse-engineering of Taiwans
other two boats, the combat-capable Zwaardvis-class
boats acquired from the Netherlands in the 1980s,
will facilitate the birth of the Diving Dragon, making the possibility significantly less costly and some-
The secret base at Sanya on Hainan

Island could house up to 20 of the latest
094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic missile
submarines.
photo: Wapster
what faster than previously predicted.

In terms of its shipbuilding capacity and
experience with marine engineering, South
Korea is certainly ahead
of Taiwan, and yet it
had three brand new
boats out of service for
much of 2010 because
its engineers did not
get some minor bolts
right. The Koreans had
to swallow their pride
and eventually call in German techniciansa safety
net that will not be available to the ROC should it
encounter technical difficulties with any future sub
fleet. According to political scientist Chen ChingChang, a professor at Japans Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific
University, given these problems, Taiwan might as
well wait for the day that foreign-built boats will be
released. According to Chen, Japan might consider
selling Taiwan some of its mothballed submarines if
Sino-Japanese relations continue to deteriorate, and
if the Beijing-friendly Kuomintang loses power in
USS Nimitz (CVN 68) is moored near the ROKS Son Won-il
(SS 072) at Busan Naval Base, South Korea.
photo: Lou Rosales
Taiwans 2016 presidential elections. These Japanese

conventional subs are very quiet, AIP-equipped, relatively new, and some can launch anti-ship missiles,
making them an attractive option for Taiwan as it
faces a leadership cadre in Beijing that is growing
impatient with the slow pace of cross-strait unification armed with a quickly modernizing PLA fleet. b
About the author
Jens Kastner is a Taipei-based journalist who covers security and military topics.
He can be reached for comment at kenslastner@googlemail.com.
Royal Navy Trafalgar Class submarine HMS Triumph

is silhouetted against the Middle Eastern sun.
photo: Abbie Gadd
Oil and Water
Oil rig incident forces Hanoi to re-evaluate relationship with Beijing

By Huong Le Thu
here is a longstanding habit in Chinese

foreign policy to count and label things,
concepts such as the four goods (good
neighbors, good friends, good comrades and good
partners) and the 16 golden words (which include
long-term stability, future-oriented, and comprehensive cooperative relations), both of which have
been used to promote Sino-Vietnamese relations.
normalization of ties in 1991. Certainly, what was

heretofore considered a positive relationship has been
seriously challenged, and it behooves the Vietnamese
government to re-examine its attitude toward China,
as well as the entire foundations of its foreign policy
and defense policy strategy.
A period of political isolation that followed years of
war impacted Vietnamese political thinking. In order
Yet despite these rosy enumerations, this summers

oil rig crisissparked when Beijing placed an oil
rig ostensibly for exploratory operations squarely
within the waters of Vietnams Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ)proved to have been one of the most
destabilizing incidents in bilateral relations since the
to promote development and growth, Hanoi viewed

it as being in Vietnams best interests to maintain a
peaceful environment in the region, and so a nonalignment defense strategy was adopted, stipulating
no military alliances, no foreign bases on Vietnamese
territory, and no intervention from third countries.
A statue
Ho ChiArmy
Min outside
the offices
of
image:ofU.S.
RDECOM
CERDEC
Communist Party of Vietnam.
photo: Jason Tabarias
This strategy, coupled with a foreign policy predicated on being friends with everyone, represented
Vietnams commitment to peace. Diplomacy was supposed to be the means by which Hanoi would build
and maintain an effective security net.
International support
By and large, this tack worked. Until May 2014, Hanoi
was able to boast about its accomplishments on the
diplomatic front. Vietnam had become an active
member of regional and trans-regional fora, and its
dense network of bilateral ties expanded, including
comprehensive, strategic, and strategic-cooperative
partnerships with 15 nations, all of which provided
Hanoi with the assurance of international support.
Vietnams successful multilateral diplomacy had resulted in earning the country a good reputation as
a responsible member of the international community of nations.
These strategies and policies, however, were shown

to be insufficient, as they did not deter the China
National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) from deploying its oil rig HYSY-981 just 120 nautical miles
off Vietnams coast, seemingly without fear or concern for any repercussions for the incursion. Thus
China clearly proved that the cooperative strategic
partnershipssupposedly the strongest partnership
type based on a long-term stable relationshipthat
Hanoi had forged with Beijing and Moscow were not
the guarantees of peaceful existence that they were
supposed to have been, but were worth little more
than the paper they were printed on. Not only did
the cooperative strategic partnership fail to prevent
China from its aggressive actions toward Vietnam,
but a similar pact with Moscow failed to constrain
Russia from taking advantage of Vietnams predicament. This blatant Chinese disregard for sovereignty
is seen by the Vietnamese as Beijing attaching a low
importance to the good comradeship, good partner-
US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel meets with

Chinese Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong at the Shangri-La
Dialogue in Singapore May 31, 2014.
photo: Aaron Hostutler
ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta
ship, and the other pair in the four goods that the
two communist-controlled neighboring governments
were supposed to have valued.
Not all previous diplomatic efforts of Vietnam
turned out in vain. Consistency in promoting nonconfrontation, respect for international law and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes has
given Hanoi a credible image of a responsible member of the international community. Such an attitude
is supported by regional actors, including Japan, the
United States, Australia, and others.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) has repeatedly called for restraint in such
matters, in order to preserve regional stability. In fact,
Vietnam has been an active promoter of ASEANs
role in the region. Obviously, Hanoi would prefer it if ASEAN took a stronger stand in this case,
as Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung
urged at the 25th ASEAN Summit that took place in
Naypyidaw, Burma, just a few days after the oil rig
was deployed. However, ASEAN is caught between
wanting to be faithful to its non-interference principle and staying relevant in the region, and the body
photo: Gunawan Kartapranata
only went so far as to issue a statement expressing

strong concern, without even naming the transgressor by name.
But because ASEAN has shown in its history that it
is capable of speaking with one, strong voice in addressing extraordinary events threatening regional
peacea category to which this situation clearly belongsthere are reasons for Hanoi to remain hopeful.
For one thing, even ASEANs tepid reaction means
that this crisis is no longer a bilateral issue between
Vietnam and China: its implications will affect the
peace of the entire region. Moreover, there are now
Even ASEANs tepid reaction means

that this crisis is no longer a bilateral
issue between Vietnam and China:
its implications will affect the peace
of the entire region.
two ASEAN member states that are suffering from
the same instability caused by China. In view of the
origin of the Association, the common threat that
brought the region together, and its continued need
to stay relevant, it is in ASEANs best interests not to

in the region, is the Japan/US dispute with China.
become sidelined.
Leaders in Vietnam seem unsure how to leverRepresentatives from Japan and
age such clear diplomatic support
the United States used strong
from two of the more crucial aclanguage at the 2014 Shangri-La
tors in the region. A speech givDialogue in Singapore, condemnen by the Vietnamese Defense
ing Beijings unilateralist attitude.
Minister sent mixed signals, reJapanese Prime Minister Shinzo
questing that China remove the
Abes keynote speech and comoil rig, while at the same time emments by US Secretary of Defense
phasizing Vietnams good relaChuck Hagel elevated the bilattionship with its neighbor to the
eral dispute between Hanoi and
north. This contradictory message
Beijing to a global level. The oil
signaled to the international comrig crisis has hence created a new
munity that, internally, the leadphoto: Aaron Hostutler
Vietnams
Defense
Minister
Phung
Quang
Thanh
balance of disputes. There are two
ership in Hanoi had not reached
sets of disputes: bilaterally between
a consensus regarding how to
China and the Philippines, and between China and
respond to the crisis.
Vietnam. There is hence room for Hanoi and Manila
The question remains: What is next for Vietnamese
to have closer consultative exchanges. The other set
foreign and defense policy? At the World Economic
of disputes, given the US and Japanese engagement
Forum in Manila in late May, Prime Minister Dung
Members of the Japanese Self Defense Force

take part in exercise Dawn Blitz 2013.
photo: Jonathan Waldman
conveyed to the international media his determination to bring the

case to the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),
though this course of action was
initially slow to receive public backing from the president
and the general secretary of the
Communist Party of Vietnam.
After the visit of PRC State
Councilor Yang Jiechi to Hanoi
in June 2014the first high-level
communication since the crisis
the pursuit of international legal mechanisms were
hardly mentioned again.
At the moment, with a reciprocal visit from Vietnam
to China, both sides claim to be working on mending the relationship. Yet, worries remain over when
Beijing might send another oil rig, as well as over
the development of an artificial island that the PRC
is building in the disputed waters, preventing Hanoi
from feeling secure.
Catalyst for change

However difficult the disturbance of the status quo in
the South China Sea is, there may be opportunities for
turning crisis into a catalyst for change. Both Tokyo
and Washington are keen to have defense cooperation
talks with Hanoi. For Japan, Vietnam is an important
player in its intention to revise collective self-defense.
Given the fact that Japan has consistently been one of
the top foreign investors and the biggest donor of aid in
Vietnam, the trust between the countries is strong. The
United States, meanwhile, has recognized Vietnams
strategic importance in the region, particularly for
its rebalancing strategy. Hanoi and Washington have
been gradually tightening cooperation, as seen from
high-level visits in 2013, which resulted in the inking
of a comprehensive partnership pact.
map: Astore international
One of the reasons that Hanoi has been cautious

about implementing closer ties with Washington has
been the fear of agitating China, but given current
events, this fear must also be revised. Other sensitive issues on the domestic side of Vietnamese politics may prove to be obstacles to closer WashingtonHanoi relations, and will take longer to address.
Another possible ally comes from ASEAN: particularly the Philippines, which would no doubt welcome
Vietnam on its side at the ITLOS.
For a country that bears a colossal asymmetry
with its northern neighbor, and which unlike the
Philippines does not have any alliances with another
giant that can protect it from aggression, Vietnam
is in a situation of very limited choices. A hard-line
reaction to Chinas assertiveness would have strong
economic and political repercussions. Incautious
maneuvering may push Hanoi into the direction of
mending fences with China in a manner dictated
by Beijing. However, increased talks with the other
great power in the regionthe United Statessuggests that Vietnam is getting over its disillusionment
and putting more of its eggs in another basket. b
About the author
Dr. Huong Le Thu is a visiting fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
in Singapore. She can be reached for comment at lethu@iseas.edu.sg.
Trying to Heal
Old Wounds
As ertswhile enemies the
United States and Vietnam
strive to develop a new
friendship, Washington and
Hanoi may find the going
more difficult than
anticipated.
By Lu Wen-hao
n a sign of the growing relationship between

the United States and Vietnam, it was reported
on October 2 that Washington would at least
partially lift its longstanding ban on the sale of weapons to Hanoi in order to support Vietnams efforts
to increase its maritime security capabilities. Arms
sales can now include potentially lethal systems for
both air and sea assets to aid in Vietnams security
and surveillance efforts. Vietnamese Deputy Prime
Minister Pham Binh was informed of the decision
by US Secretary of State John Kerry at a meeting in
Washington.
Even discussions about lifting the ban on lethal arms
sales to Vietnam has caused consternation in Beijing,
which would interpret the move as America meddling in Chinas backyard. Leaders at Zhongnanhai
value their party-to-party relations with the ruling
party in Vietnam, and already interpret Washingtons
rapprochement with Hanoi as taking sides against
Beijing in its territorial dispute with Vietnam.
Instigating a crisis
On May 1, 2014, China made international headlines
by moving its giant indigenous oil rig into the South
China Sea. The location, just 120 nautical miles from
Vietnams shores, was well within Vietnams continental shelf and its Exclusive Economic Zone. This
move greatly escalated the tension between China
and Vietnam in disputed waters and both sides subsequently engaged in a stand-off near the Chinese
oil rig. An official from Chinas Foreign Ministry
subsequently accused Vietnam of ramming Chinese
ships, claiming that Vietnamese boats had rammed
Chinese vessels 171 times and insisting that Chinas
ships in the area were all civilian, while Vietnam
had sent armed vessels. In response, the Vietnamese
Government showed reporters video evidence of the

ramming by Chinese ships. Additionally, Vietnam
also accused China of using its navy to support the
activity of their civilian vessels. Tensions have escalated while anti-Chinese sentiment in Vietnam has
produced significant rioting that killed at least three
Chinese citizens and injured hundreds more.
The United States immediately demonstrated
its support of Vietnam by criticizing the move by
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). A US State
Department spokeswoman told reporters, Given
the recent history of tensions in the South China Sea,
Chinas decision to operate its oil rig in disputed waters is provocative and unhelpful for the maintenance
of peace and stability in the region. In contrast, the
United States showed reluctance to condemn the
Vietnam government over the destruction by antiChinese rioters of foreign-owned factories.
It is obvious that Washington is taking sides in
the territorial dispute between Beijing and Hanoi.
Likewise, US President Barack Obamas moves in
Japan and the Philippines during his Asian tour
USNS Mercy makes a Pacific
Partnership 2012 visit to Vietnam.
photo: Sara Csurilla
A Vietnamese child looks through her new glasses for the first time after being treated
by eye specialists from the US military and Vietnam Peoples Armed Forces during Operation
Pacific Angel 2013 in Dong Hoi, Quang Binh Province.
have similarly demonstrated his siding with those

countries in their respective maritime disputes with
China. The United States has demonstrated its intent
to strengthen ties with Vietnam, relying on Hanoi
to help make its pivot to Asia a reality. In this case,
Beijing seems to be making a strategic mistake by
pushing Hanoi into Washingtons arms, thereby helping to creating a potential anti-China coalition in East
Asia, which would include Japan, the Philippines, and
maybe others. Despite recent developments, however,
it may not be an easy task for the United States to recruit Vietnam as an ally against China.
Re-engaging in Asia
Since taking office, Obama has expended considerable energy and political capital in pursuit of stronger ties in Southeast Asia. After eight years that saw
Washington disengaged and distracted from the region, Obama moved quickly to increase US engagement with this important region. Since the beginning of the Obama presidency, US engagement with
Vietnam has grown particularly fastthough admittedly starting from a low baseto a level not seen
since the heady days when President Bill Clinton
visited Hanoi in 2000 and delivered the first-ever
speech by a foreign leader to be broadcast live across

Vietnam.
Vietnam and the United States exchanged a series
of high-ranking official delegations in 2012, when
then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary
of Defense Leon Panetta visited the country to meet
with top leaders. Optimism surrounding the potential
Vietnam-US strategic partnership was riding high
after Kerry, a Vietnam War veteran and key player
in the bilateral diplomatic relationship, became US
Secretary of State in February 2013. That same year,
a July meeting at the White House between Obama
and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang further
strengthened the US-Vietnam relationship. During
their meeting, the two presidents affirmed their commitment to opening a new phase of bilateral relations
based on mutual respect and issues of common interest. Sangs visit came at an important time for both
nations, reflecting a shared desire to build a forwardlooking relationship between the two countries.
Human rights issues are perhaps the biggest obstacle
to lifting the ban on lethal weapons sales and generally improving Vietnam-US ties. American officials
have consistently raised their concerns about human rights violations by the government of Vietnam.
They even publicly stated that an improvement in the
human rights situation would be a precondition to

warmer military ties. The United States has voiced
its concern over the recent harassment, arrest and
detention of bloggers, dissidents and anti-PRC demonstrators. Kerry has been called on to put pressure
on Vietnam for its human rights record.
Washington has candidly told Hanoi that it will
not sell it weapons until its human rights record improves. This stands in sharp contrast to US policy toward other countries, such as its allies in the Middle
East. Indeed, Washington only briefly suspended
arms sales to Bahrain after the Arab Spring, and resumed them despite the governments continued
crackdown on its Shiite population.
Part of the reason Vietnam is treated differently is
undoubtedly driven by Americas domestic politics.
Civil society groups in the United States, some led
by Vietnamese Americans, have long cited Hanois
human rights abuses in arguments against stronger bilateral ties. Most of the Vietnamese-American
population of approximately 1.8 million fled to the
United States after the Vietnam War, and they remain concerned with the communist governments
lack of respect for human rights and basic freedoms
in their former homeland. Most recently, anti-Vietnam groups in the United States have seized upon
Vietnam, like Japan and the

Philippines, has been dragged into
territorial disputes by China in recent
years.
Hanois recent arrests and prosecutions of dissidents
and bloggers to press the Obama administration to
refrain from upgrading the bilateral relationship.
The PRC has been Vietnams biggest trading partner
for the past decade. Bilateral trade in 2013 reached
US$65.5 billion, a year-on-year increase of 30 percent.
Some 28 percent of Vietnams total imports are from
China, while exports to China make up 10 percent of
its total exports. By comparison, Vietnams imports
and exports form only a fraction of Chinas total.
US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta visits Hanoi June 3, 2012.
photo: Erin Kirk-Cuomo
A rational Vietnam would not want to jeopardize

this important trading relationship. Moreover, the
anti-Chinese riots and the destruction and looting
of Chinese factories, as well as those of other nations
including Taiwan and South Korea, have only hurt
Vietnams international image as a good place to do
business. This would be bad for Vietnam when its
big projects desperately need foreign capital: China
is a huge source of that capital, with Chinese foreign
direct investment having increased sharply in 2013.
Vietnam, like Japan and the Philippines, has been
dragged into territorial disputes by China in recent
years. Yet Vietnams status is different from these
others due to its economic subordination to China.
Although China and Japan rely on each other for
imports and exports, it would be a catastrophe if the
second- and third-largest economies of the world
engaged in a serious trade war. Moreover, countries
such as the Philippines have insulation from pressure by the PRC because their trade relationships and
economies are more diversified, and thus they are
less economically reliant on China. Vietnam has less
President Barack Obama, right, holds a bilateral meeting with
Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang at the White House.
White House photo
leverage with China because its economic development heavily depends on Chinese capital. Hanoi will
not cavalierly jeopardize its economic development
to seek limited cooperation with the United States.
It must be remembered that Vietnam is still a socialist regime dominated by the Communist party with a
It will not be easy for the United

States to establish a relationship with
Vietnam.
strong, historical suspicion of the United States. Many
in Vietnam are suspicious about Americas goals in
their country, believing that the United States still
aims to topple the Communist regime through some
kind of color revolution. The constant criticism of
Vietnams human rights record by the United States
only makes things worse for the bilateral relationship.
Thus, so long as the Vietnamese Communist Party
remains in power, there will not be a fundamental
change in the political relationship between Vietnam
US soldiers rest on March 13, 1968, in Quang Tri, South

Vietnam in front of Viet Cong propaganda that conveys much
the same message as todays politicians.
photo: tommy japan
and the United States. The Vietnam Communist Party

might lose face in confrontations with China, but it
could jeopardize its very existence if it gets too close
to the United States.
Obstacles remain
Vietnam and the United States have progressed from
being wartime enemies to having a relationship characterized by warming ties. However, it is too early to
proclaim that they will build a strategic partnership.
There will always be obstacles in the US-Vietnam
relationship. It will not be easy for the United States
to establish a relationship with Vietnam like the one
it has with Japan or the Philippines. Human rights
and Vietnams one-party dictatorship are still strongly criticized in the US congress. Suspicion remains
among the Vietnamese leadership of the notion that
Washington seeks to orchestrate a peaceful evolution away from one-party rule by the Vietnamese
Communist Party.
Meanwhile, China still holds the position of
Vietnams most important trading partner. Hanoi
will not damage this in order to develop a strong
partnership with America. This is a good explanation

for why President Sang characterized the relationship
as a comprehensive partnership instead of a strategic partnership during his meeting with Obama.
Unlike Japan and the Philippines, which are overwhelmingly pro-American and have entered into
mutual defense treaties, Vietnam distrusts both the
United States and China due to the scars of war with
both nations. Though the Chinese oil rig incursion
raised the ire of Vietnamese citizens, this was an
emotional reaction, and from a purely economic perspective, it would be foolish for Hanoi to drift too far
out of Beijings orbit. Indeed, the true purpose of the
US rebalancing policy is to seek win-win situations
on issues of economic development. If the dispute
between China and Vietnam continues to escalate,
Hanoi may find that the United States has only limited practical aid to offer Hanoi. Vietnam, which has
little trust in superpowers, is not likely to align itself
with the United States and risk additional volatility. b
About the author
Colonel Lu Wen-hao is deputy director of the Research and Development Office
of the ROC National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at
luwenhao73@gmail.com.
Drawing Lines
Offshore Control and Taiwans Sea
Lines of Communication
By Micha Pawiski
At first glance, the proposed strategy of Offshore Control to counter Chinese Anti-Access/AreaDenial looks like an attractive option for political and military decision makers. It would not precipitate an offensive war, and it would seem to present a soft military response via a distant blockade
of the sea lines of communication essential to China, and hence it offers the achievement of political aims without the burden of high costs connected with the more offensive Air-Sea Battle plan.
There remain many challenges, however, that undermine the potential effectiveness and chances of
success with implementation of Offshore Control. What is more, it does not offer attractive future
prospects for Taiwan, as it would leave the island inside the inner ring of a distant blockade, and in
the hands of Peoples Republic of China.
hroughout history, the ability to influence the passage of trade has been the goal
of those nations that have built large navies. Control of sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
meant the free and unconstrained flow of ones goods
and the ability to hinder those of rivals. The great
powers of the pastranging from the Persians and
the Romans to the Dutch and Britishrecognized
the importance of the sea, and hence decided to shift
from land to sea power.
Contemporary China is no different, and its turn
toward the sea is now very much a reality, confirmed
by the stunning increase in global shipping market,

dependency on SLOCs and modernization of Peoples
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). Therefore, the assumptions underlining American Offshore Control
(OC), a proposed counterstrategy for Chinese AntiAccess/Area-Denial (A2/AD), seems to correspond
to the geostrategic nature of the Asia-Pacific region.
However, its effectiveness and feasibility, especially given the concerns of Taipei, remain to be seen.
According to T. X. Hammes, a senior research fellow
at the Center for Strategic Research, OC is an alternative to Air-Sea Battle that aims to provide a strategy
photo: Walter Wayman

An aviation ordnanceman attaches a satchel charge to a mine.
alternative routes, the United States

and allied forces would also have to
supervise such passages as the Strait of
Hormuz, Tsugaru Strait, and Makassar
Strait. A distant maritime blockade
might be a very attractive option to
civilian policy makers and military
planners preparing for conflict with
the Peoples Republic of China (PRC).
If successful, such a course might
achieve political objectives with very
low levels of violence. In addition, currently, the PLAN has limited means
of countering such a distant blockade. Nonetheless, if an outer blockade
could effectively cut off commerce to
China via large ships and tankers, it is
likely that a delivery through smaller, more difficult-to-control vessels
would commence. In response blockading states would be forced to consider an inner blockade ring.
photo: Andrew Mckaskle
for conflict termination with China on terms acceptable to the United States and its allies. It establishes
a set of concentric rings that denies China the use of
the sea inside the first island chain, defends the sea
and air space of the first island chain, and dominates
the air and maritime space outside the island chain.
In other words, OC establishes an inner and outer ring blockade aimed at disrupting oil flow and
economic sea commerce to China. The outer ring
blockade, or distant blockade, would focus on the
main choke points through which SLOCs are passing.
This includes three vital straits, namely, the straits of
Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok. What is more, due to
Dangerous escalation
A close blockade would mean placing surface warships in close proximity to Chinas coastline, at important trading ports like Hong Kong or Dalian.
Such a step could prove dangerously escalatory,
prompting the PRC to respond even more aggressively than it would in the case of a distant blockade.
One of the most successful examples of a naval
blockade was the US
maritime warfare
against Japan
during World
photo: Herv Cozanet

image: DoD
War II. Japan was defeated primarily because of the

destruction of its merchant fleet through submarines
and naval mines, gradually shutting off the oil and
raw materials necessary to expand and sustain its
industry and war machine. What the case of Japan
and other historical blockades show us is that the
success of any economic blockade depends on factors that vary with the domestic resources and the
geographic location of the nation against which it is
directed, as well as the military might at the disposal
of the initiating nation.
Three factors must be considered, the first of which
is that the economy of the blockaded power must be
vulnerable. It is hard to imagine that any kind of blockade
would work against the
United States, mainly due to its geography. On the
other hand,
Chinas economy is dependent upon seaborne trade,

and the PRC has never in its history had to contend
with the effects of such a blockade.
Second, the blockading nation must have sufficient military power to take control of sea and land
routes that connect the enemy with other nations.
The Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) will soon have,
if it does not possess it yet, sufficient capabilities to
execute an air and naval blockade of Taiwan.
The third factor involves the blockading powers
ability to secure the cooperation of neutral powers
that might be able to supply the blockaded country
from oversees. The United States will not be able to
blockade China without support from allies such
as Japan or Australia. Washington will have to do a
much better job securing support from third countries than it has in the case of the economic sanctions
imposed against Russia and Syria, for example. In
both cases, sanctions have had a minimal effect in
starving those economies and forcing the respective
governments to comply with international norms.
In addition to securing cooperation, there are other

challenges threatening the effectiveness of an OC
strategy against China. For one thing, Beijing has
taken major steps toward preparing to survive and
oppose a maritime blockade as long as possible, such
as by stockpiling petroleum reserves. Moreover, cargoes can be sold between the ports of embarkation
and destination; some oil cargoes are resold on the
spot market for as high as 30 times the original value
while still in tankers out at sea. Thus, oil destined
for South Korea, for example, could conceivably be
purchased by China after having passed inspection.
Using the OC approach, an allied blockade of China
and a Chinese blockade of Taiwan would be radically
different operations, both in terms of scope and difficulty. For one thing, China would have to focus solely
on the traffic to Taiwans portsa close-in operation
that would benefit from the concentration of Chinas
many naval and paramilitary vesselswhereas the
United States would have to supervise and control farflung passages including the aforementioned straits
of Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok. To execute such
an enormous operation the US Navy would have to

rationally allocate its limited resources between the
blockade and other ongoing operations.
According to estimates by analysts Gabriel Collins
and William Murray, at least 10 surface warships and
Taiwan is the vital unsinkable aircraft

carrier of East Asia; a democratic country with a population of 23 million, a
vibrant economy, and in Chinas eyes, a
gateway to the Pacific Ocean.
two replenishment vessels would be required to establish an effective distant blockade at the Strait of
Malacca. This number would increase proportionally for the Lombok Strait and Sunda Strait, not to
mention other possible routes which would require
additional surface ships.
Lessons of history
Again, one can look to historical examples for insight
into the projected effectiveness of such an operation.
During so-called Tanker War of 1987-1988 between
Iraq and Iran, the US interest was to ensure that only
non-belligerent ships moving oil to the West were given safe passage. The relatively small size of the Persian
Gulf, especially in the Straits of Hormuz, made the
situation ripe for the use of mines, forcing the tankers to head convoys by acting as crude minesweepers in order to protect the smaller US warships that
trailed behind. During the eight-year war, 543 ships
were attacked, 200 merchant sailors were killed, and
53 American lives were lost. Over 80 ships were sunk,
resulting in over US$2 billion in direct losses to cargo
and hulls. The total cost to the world economy was
projected by some to exceed US$200 billion. Despite
these high costs, the Tanker War was a limited conflict
which did not pit great powers against each other. In a
blockade against the PRC,

the cost in lives and economic losses would likely
be much greater.
Taiwan is the vital unsinkable aircraft carrier
of East Asia; a democratic country with a population of 23 million, a vibrant economy, and in
Chinas eyes, a gateway to
the Pacific Ocean. What
OC proposes is opportunity and invitation, rather
than constraint and deterrence of Chinas yen to annex Taiwan.
In the near future, the
PLA will be able to impose effective sea control
over the first island chain,
denying access to US and
allied forces. The Chinese
economy could survive
long enough to coerce
Taiwan into capitulation,
while US forces would
A CH-53E helicopter tows a MK-105 magnetic-influence minesweeping sled.
photo: Jenna Blais
struggle with the enormous challenges of a disbuildup. In fact, there is no single universal strategy
tant blockade. Therefore, American planners may
which can address all the potential challenges in the
ultimately find OC an unattractive strategy in a conAsia-Pacific Region. There are too many scenarios,
flict involving Taiwan.
too many complexities, and too many countries inIn contrast, Air-Sea Battle might be better suited to
volved to produce a one-size-fits-all strategy to counsuch a scenario. Detractors point out that this stratter PRC A2/AD initiatives.
egy would result in little more than a Pyrrhic victoNevertheless, given geopolitical realities, and
ry after a struggle between two great powers, while
Beijings national objectives, a potential naval and
those who support Air-Sea Battle see it (according
air blockade of Taiwan is still a future possibility.
to a publication of the US Center for Strategic and
Therefore, Taiwan should take necessary steps to deal
Budgetary Assessments) as the best way to offset
the PLAs unprovoked and unwarranted military
with this threat and take necessary steps to facilitate

the execution of OC.
In particular, Taipei should prepare to take actions

inside an inner-ring blockade. Taiwans economic
vulnerability, particularly in energy security, limits
its options. Taiwan mandates that the oil industry
and government maintain strategic reserves totaling
no less than 30 days of reserves. However, whether
the law is respected and the stockpiles maintained
remains unclear. For instance, in March 2008 the
media reported that the oil stocks had fallen to only
20 days. It is worth noting that the minimum safe
threshold for OECD countries is deemed to be 90
days of supply. Establishing a strategic oil reserve
threshold of 90 days or longer should be the immediate aim of the administration of President Ma
Ying-jeouthis would exceed Chinas current reserve
supply of 46 days and allow the Republic of China
(ROC) to hold out for a longer period of time in the
event of hostilities.
The PLA is not a flawless machine; it has many potential weaknesses that can be exploited by weaker
opponents. One significant shortcoming is a lack
of practical battlefield experience since the SinoVietnam War of 1979. More relevant to Taiwan is the
PLAs lack of proficiency in conducting air and naval

blockades. Rather than matching China ship for ship
and plane for plane, Taiwan should field asymmetrical systems and strategies which can imperil Chinas
ability to operate in the Taiwan Strait.
One such measure to help Taiwan facilitate an inner
Taiwans decision makers should

underline the importance of the island by pointing out that unification
would lead to a stronger and more
assertive China.
ring blockade would be to beef up the countrys minelaying, minesweeping, and mine-hunting capabilities.
Mines are particularly effective weapons as they are
simple, cheap (an important factor due to Taiwans
defense budget constraints), reliable, and persistent.
A quick glance at naval history shows that mines
have often taken a significant toll against advanced
and more powerful naval forces. Moreover, modern
mines are difficult to find and remove, and can be
easily deployed by ships, submarines, and aircraft.
US servicemen lift an unmanned underwater vehicle out of the water.
photo: Gary Keen
A cargo container operated by the China Ocean Shipping (Group) Co.
photo: Bert Knot
Submarines are another potent option against the

PLA, and they could conduct a wide variety of defensive operations during a Chinese blockade. They can
also lay mines near PRC ports, as envisioned in OC.
[A more detailed examination of Taiwans submarine
options is provided in the article on page 20. Ed.]
Potential allies
Finally, the last factor which could help counter a
PRC blockade are Taiwans allies. Japan especially
has proved to be a potential security ally to Taiwan,
offering to include the island in its theater missile
defense program, and discussing the possibility of
enacting a Japanese Taiwan Relations Act. The ROC
government should pursue closer, security-related
ties with Japan now, not just to secure aid in the event
of a future Chinese attack, but as a more immediate
means to improve Taipeis bargaining power in dealings with Beijing. The PRC respects strength, and the
ROC would gain far more concessions from China
in terms of securing international diplomatic space
and equitable trade relations if it had a stronger hand
in cross-strait talks.
Due to its geographic location and close proximity
to Taiwan, Japan would be able to facilitate imple-
mentation of inner ring blockade operations. What

is more, Taiwans decision makers should underline
the importance of the island by pointing out that
unification would lead to a stronger and more assertive China; a China without the burden of Taiwan as
a separate entity.
As a result, the PRC would be able to focus its
political objectives on other territorial ambitions.
This prospect alone should help Taiwan find allies
as it seeks to secure its continued existence under a
Chinese blockade. b
About the author
Micha Pawiski is a PhD student at the Graduate Institute of International
Affairs and Strategic Studies at Tamkang University. He can be reached for
comment at m_pawinski@op.pl.
photo: Richard Doolin

A Mineman at work aboard mine counter-measures ship USS Defender.
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STRATEGIC

for Taiwan Security

Vietnams Foreign Policy

A First Step Toward

Sea Lines of Communication

for Taiwan Security

China estabishing regional dominance........................................10

Taiwans prospects for submarine aquisition............................... 20

Hanoi re-evaluates relations with Beijing..................................... 25

Obstacles to warmer Vietnam-US ties..........................................30

Offshore control and Taiwans SLOCs..........................................36

From The Editor

e are very pleased to bring you this, our third

ontrol of vital sea lines of communication (SLOC) is essential for international

photo: Colby Neal

4 Strategic Vision Sea Lines of Communication

the administration of ROC President Ma Ying-jeou

trade and the global economy. Around 80 percent

Major source of conflict

Defense Andrew Yang with two words: uncertain

Lightning flashes as the aircraft carrier USS Abraham

Autumn 2014 Special Issue 5

tween countries which are located along these routes,

of the United Nations and therefore under no legal

regional actors from predicting its future moves.

the sea. Corbett believed that the prime object of

If the PRC were to control SLOCs, it

photo: Walter Wayman

bound for Chinas trade competitors, or otherwise

development. The emerging naval buildup of the PRC

A timely response is vital during

8 Strategic Vision Sea Lines of Communication

photo: James Evans

perceived as an intrusion into national sovereignty.

Stronger presence needed

photo: Cynthia Clark

Autumn 2014 Special Issue 9

Chinas maritime territorial ambitions

10 Strategic Vision Sea Lines of Communication

ollowing the purchase by the Japanese

to the United Nations, Li Baodong, asserted at the

Raising an Army is a painting

Autumn 2014 Special Issue 11

Japans position on the Islands but also by intensifying

(CMS), a paramilitary organization under the State Oceanic

Uotsuri Island is the largest of the five Senkaku Islands.

seas around the Senkakus on the pretext

A well-worn ensign adorns a Japanese coast guard vessel on patrol

(ADIZ) over the East China Sea. The ADIZ includes

the status quo of Japanese territorial jurisdiction over

14 Strategic Vision Sea Lines of Communication

steadily expand its control over islands in the Paracel

Vessels belonging to the PLAN and

In 2012, China deployed its growing maritime power to wrest

Landsat imagery of Scarborough Shoal

that the parties undertake to exercise self-restraint in

South China Sea. In April 2010, for instance, a large

It is extremely difficult for China to

In December 2013, while observing an exercise by

forced to stop to avoid a collision with a PLANs ship

16 Strategic Vision Sea Lines of Communication

freedom of navigation and raise concerns about the

ests. This firm stance in pursuing territorial integrity