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AGRARIAN

Felizardo vs. Fernandez 137509


Endaya vs. CA 88113
Milestone Realty vs. CA 135999
Villaviza vs. Panganiban L19760
RUPA vs. CA GR 80129
Basbas vs. Entena

G.R. No. 137509

August 15, 2001

PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, RONEMAR FELIZARDO, PERFECTO ADALID and


VENERANDA ADALID,petitioners,
vs.
SIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ, respondent.
QUISUMBING,J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No.
46748, which affirmed the judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB), upholding the ruling of its Regional Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. X (07)
818.
The petition stems from a complaint 1 for illegal ejectment, reinstatement, and damages
filed by respondent Siegfredo Fernandez against petitioners Ronemar and Pevet Adalid
Felizardo (Felizardos) and Perfecto and Veneranda Adalid (Adalids), owners of a twohectare agricultural land situated in Barangay Garang, Tangub City, Province of Misamis
Occidental, of which 1.5 hectares tenanted by respondent's father used for planting
coconut and corn since the early 1930's.

alleged that by virtue of successional tenancy rights, he is the lawful tenant of the land. He
pointed out that he substituted his father and assumed cultivation of the land for 15 long
years without objection from the landowners. Therefore, he became a bona fide tenant and
could not be ejected because he is the lawful tenant.
Siegfredo also claimed that there is no other qualified successor to his father's leasehold
right because all his eight elder siblings were no longer members of Policarpo's immediate
farm household. Asuncion, in particular, was already of advanced age and could not be
expected to work on the land personally. She lived elsewhere in Tangub City and has never
helped their father in the farm nor been a farmworker in her entire life. 3
On the other hand, the Felizardos and Adalids denied Siegfredo's tenancy status and
insisted that after Policarpo's death, they had the right to choose who among the
Fernandez siblings would succeed Policarpo in the latter's agricultural leasehold rights.
They asserted that the right to choose the agricultural lessor belonged to the landowner in
accordance with Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform
Code.4 They stressed that they have already appointed Asuncion to continue Policarpo's
agricultural lease on September 22, 1995. A leasehold contract was also entered into on
October 24, 1995 between Asuncion and the landowners, copy of which was already
furnished to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) in Tangub City. 5

In 1981, when Policarpo was already 74 years old, the task of working on the tenanted land
fell on his son, respondent Siegfredo, who was the only member of the household then
living with Policarpo. For close to 15 years and even while his father was still alive,
Siegfredo cultivated the land, harvested the coconuts, and sold the copra to buyers in
Tangub City. During those years, the "pesadas" were placed in Siegfredo's name and the
latter observed the same 1/3-2/3 sharing arrangement of the copra produce with the
landowners, as his father previously did.

On March 26, 1996, the Regional Adjudicator ruled in favor of Siegfredo and disposed of
the case thus:

After Policarpo passed away on August 31, 1995, the Felizardos and Adalids children of
the landowners and acting as attorneys-in-fact of the Adalids who were then already
residing in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A sought to eject Siegfredo from the land he was
tilling. The Felizardos refused to recognize Siegfredo as the lawful successor to Policarpo's
tenancy rights and instead, appointed Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, Siegfredo's 65-year
old elder sister, as tenant.

2. Ordering the cancellation of the existing leasehold contract between defendants


and one Asuncion Espinosa, and in lieu thereof, the execution of a leasehold
contract as between herein complainant and defendants;

Subsequently, in October 1995, the Felizardos and Adalids brought criminal charges
against Siegfredo for usurpation and qualified theft before the regular courts. While these
cases were pending, the landowners harvested the coconuts on November 6, 1995, sold
the same and excluded Siegfredo in the sharing arrangement of 1/3-2/3 scheme. 2
Siegfredo then filed this present case before the Regional Adjudication Board (Region 10)
of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) against the Adalids and Felizardos. Siegfredo

WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:


1. Ordering the immediate reinstatement of complainant as the Bonafide tenantlessee to the subject landholding;

3. Ordering the respondents to account for and pay to the complainant his share or
the amount in excess of his rentals after deducting the expenses in the harvest of
November, 1995 and February 1996 based on the "pesadas" from the copra buyer;
4. Ordering respondents to pay the amount of P10,000 as in (sic) Attorney's Fees
and the amount of P5,000 as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.6

The Regional Adjudicator held that the landowner's right to choose a lessor under Section 9
of R.A. No. 3844 is circumscribed by the requirements that the prospective lessor must be
able to cultivate the land personally and be a member of the original tenant's immediate
farm household. Based on these factors, the Adjudicator declared that Asuncion does not
qualify to take over Policarpo's leasehold right. Moreover, the Adjudicator noted that the
landowners did not object to Siegfredo's tillage of the land and they accepted their share in
the harvest proceeds from Siegfredo for 15 years. According to the Adjudicator, they
impliedly consented to the new tenancy relationship under Section 7 of Republic Act No.
11997 or the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as amended.
On appeal to the DARAB, where the case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 4983, the
Board affirmed the findings of the Regional Adjudicator. 8 The Court of Appeals, to which the
case was subsequently elevated, agreed with the DARAB. 9
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioners submit the following questions of law for our resolution:
1. Whether or not under the law the right to choose to succeed the tenancy right of
a tenant belongs to the landowner or not (sic).
2. Whether or not respondent Siegfredo Fernandez during the lifetime of his father
can already be considered as a tenant as allegedly he was already the one doing
the duties of his father until his death in 1995. 10
The issue to be determined in this case is whether Siegfredo has acquired the status of
agricultural tenant which would preclude petitioners from exercising their right to choose
Asuncion as Policarpo's successor after the latter's death.
Petitioners mainly contend that their right to choose a tenant successor under Section 9 of
RA No. 3844 is subsisting, despite the fact that Siegfredo took over his father's landholding
as early as 1981. They maintain that they did not object to Siegfredo's personal cultivation
of the land for 15 years because they believed that during that period, Siegfredo was
merely aiding Policarpo as member of the latter's immediate farm household. They argue
that could not be construed as having impliedly consented to a leasehold relation with
Siegfredo under Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199, since Policarpo was then still alive and was not
declared to be permanently incapacitated.
Respondent, on the other hand, insists that he is the sole qualified successor to Policarpo's
leasehold, being the only immediate member of the farm household who personally
cultivated the land during the latter's lifetime. According to respondent, the landowner
concededly has the right to choose a tenant successor under Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844,
but only if there were two or more qualified prospective lessors from among the original

tenants' descendants. Besides, according to respondent, petitioners did not question his
assumption of Policarpo's leasehold obligations for many years. Consequently, he
concludes that they could not now belatedly deny his status as tenant of the land.
As found by the appellate court and the proper agencies below, the evidence on record
strongly suggests that respondent became Policarpo's tenant successor by implied consent
of petitioners. On this point, we are in agreement.
Petitioners assert that for 15 years, they thought that respondent was merely helping
Policarpo in the latter's personal cultivation of the land. In our view, however, the period of
15 years is too long a time to hold on to such a thought which appears to be only an
unverified assumption. The undisputed fact, as found by the DARAB, is that respondent
worked on the land since 1981 because his father could no longer do so. Respondent did
not merely aid his father in the latter's farm work, but completely took over that work since
Policarpo was already very old and incapable to continue farming. Section 5 (p) 11 of R.A.
No. 1199 defines "incapacity" as any cause or circumstance which prevents the tenant
from fulfilling his contractual obligations. Respondent fubsp;
xxx
(p) Incapacity means any cause or circumstance which prevents the tenant from fulfilling
his contractual obligations and those imposed by this Act.

The antecedent facts are as follows:


The Spouses Natividad Trinidad and Cesar San Diego owned a piece of agricultural land
consisting of 20,200 square meters situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas, devoted
to rice and corn. As far back as 1934, private respondent Fideli has been cultivating this
land as a tenant of the Spouses respondent Fideli has been cultivating this land as a tenant
of the Spouses San Diego under a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing agreement. This fact,
petitioners do not dispute.
On May 2, 1974, a lease contract was executed between the Spouses San Diego and one
Regino Cassanova for a period of four years from May 1974 up to May 1978. 3 The lease
contract obliged Cassanova to pay P400.00 per hectare per annum and gave him the
authority to oversee the planting of crops on the land. 4 Private respondent signed this
lease contract as one of two witnesses. 5
The lease contract was subsequently renewed to last until May 1980 but the rental was
raised to P600.00. Again, private respondent signed the contract as witness. 6
During the entire duration of the lease contract between the Spouses San Diego and
Cassanova, private respondent continuously cultivated the land, sharing equally with
Cassanova the net produce of the harvests.

G.R. No. 88113 October 23, 1992


SPOUSES TITUS L. ENDAYA and GLENDA TRINIDAD; SPOUSES RICO L. ENDAYA and
NANETTE AQUINO; and SPOUSES JOSEPHINE L. ENDAYA and LEANDRO
BANTUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEDRO FIDELI, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-.G.R. No. 15724 dated April 26, 1989 1 reversing the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Tanauan, Batangas (Branch 6) in Civil Case No. T-430 2 and holding that private
respondent is an agricultural lessee in the land of petitioner whose security of tenure must
be respected by the latter.

On January 6, 1980, the Spouses San Diego sold the land to petitioners for the sum of
P26,000.00. The sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Batangas and a Transfer
Certificate of Title was duly issued on January 7, 1981. 7 Private respondent continued to
farm the land although petitioners claim that private respondent was told immediately
after the sale to vacate the land. 8 In any case, it is undisputed that private respondent
deposited with the Luzon Development Bank an amount of about P8,000.00 as partial
payment of the landowner's share in the harvest for the years 1980 until 1985. 9
Due to petitioners persistent demand for private respondent to vacate the land, private
respondent filed in April 1985 a complaint 10 with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas praying that he be declared the agricultural tenant of petitioners.
After trial, the trial court decided in favor of petitioners by holding that private respondent
is not an agricultural lessee of the land now owned by petitioners. The dispositive portion
of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiff's complaint to be declared a
tenant of the landholding consisting of 20,200 square meters, located at San Pioquinto,
Malvar, Batangas, and owned by the defendants; ordering Pedro Fideli to vacate the
landholding deliver possession thereof to the defendants; and ordering the amount of
P8,000.00 deposited under Account No. 2940029826 Civil Case No. T-430 to be withdrawn
and delivered to the defendants, No. pronouncement as to costs.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision and declared private
respondent to be the agricultural lessee of the subject landholding. Hence, this petition
wherein private respondent's status as an agricultural lessee and his security of tenure as
such are being disputed by petitioners.
Petitioners impugn the Court of Appeals' declaration that private respondent is an
agricultural lessee of the subject landholding contending that when the original
landowners, the Spouses San Diego, entered into a lease contract with Regino Cassanova,
the agricultural leasehold relationship between the Spouses San Diego and private
respondent, the existence of which petitioners do not dispute, was thereby terminated.
Petitioners argue that a landowner cannot have a civil law lease contract with one person
and at the same time have an agricultural leasehold agreement with another over the
same land. It is further argued that because private respondent consented to the lease
contract between the Spouses San Diego and Cassanova, signing as he did the lease
agreement and the renewal contract as witness thereof, private respondent has waived his
rights as an agricultural lessee.
These contentions are without merit.
R.A. No. 3844 (1963), as amended By R.A. No. 6839 (1971), which is the relevant law
governing the events at hand, abolished share tenancy throughout the Philippines from
1971 and established the agricultural leasehold system by operation of law. 11 Section 7 of
the said law gave agricultural lessees security of tenure by providing the following: "The
agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee
the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is
extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his
landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes
herein provided." 12The fact that the landowner entered into a civil lease contract over the
subject landholding and gave the lessee the authority to oversee the farming of the land,
as was done in this case, is not among the causes provided by law for the extinguishment
of the agricultural leasehold relation. 13 On the contrary, Section 10 of the law provides:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.
The agricultural leasehold relation under this code shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or
transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee
thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor.
Hence, transactions involving the agricultural land over which an agricultural leasehold
subsists resulting in change of ownership, e.g., sale, or transfer of legal possession, such
as lease, will not terminate the right of the agricultural lessee who is given protection by
the law by making such rights enforceable against the transferee or the landowner's
successor in interest. 14

Illustrative of the legal principles outlined above is Catorce v. Court of Appeals 15 where the
person holding a mortgage over the farm land subject of an agricultural leasehold took
possession thereof pursuant to the mortgage and ousted the agricultural lessee. Upon
complaint for reinstatement filed by the agricultural lessee, the then Court of Agrarian
Relations ordered the mortgagee to deliver possession over the land to the agricultural
lessee but his decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. In reversing the Court of
Appeals' judgment and reinstating the Agrarian Court's decision, the Court, through Justice
Melencio-Herrera, noted, among other considerations, that "tenants are guaranteed
security of tenure, meaning, the continued enjoyment and possession of their landholding
except when their dispossession had been authorized by virtue of a final and executory
judgment, which is not so in the case at bar." 16 Implicit in the decision is the recognition
that the transfer of possession to the mortgage did not terminate the agricultural leasehold
nor prejudice the security of tenure of the agricultural lessee.
Closer, to although not identical with the factual setting of the case at bar is Novesteras
v. Court of Appeals. 17Petitioner in said case was a share tenant of the respondent over two
parcels of land. Respondent entered into a contract of civil lease with Rosenda Porculas for
a term of three years. Porculas did not farm the land himself but left it to petitioner to till
the land. After the expiration of the lease between respondent and Porculas, petitioner
entered into an agreement denominated as a contract of civil lease with respondent. On
expiration of this lease contract, respondent denied petitioner possession over the land.
Resolving the rights and obligations of the parties, the Court, through Justice Paras, held
that the petitioner therein became an agricultural tenant of respondent by virtue of R.A.
No. 3844 (1963), as amended by R.A. No 6839 (1971). The lease contract between the
respondent and Porculas did not terminate the agricultural leasehold relationship between
petitioner and respondent. If at all, the said lease agreement, coupled by the fact that
Porculas allowed petitioner to continue cultivating in his capacity as tenant of the subject
landholding, served to strengthen petitioner's security of tenure as an agricultural tenant
of the farmland in question. Accordingly, the subsequent contract between petitioner and
respondent denominated as a contract of civil lease was held by the Court to be in fact an
agricultural leasehold agreement.
Again, in Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. (COCOMA) v. Court of
Appeals, 18 it was held that the agricultural leasehold is preserved, notwithstanding the
transfer of the legal possession of the subject landholding, with the transferee, COCOMA in
that case, being accountable to the agricultural lessees for their rights. The Court, through
Justice Padilla, summarized the rule as follows:
There is also no question that, in this case, there was a transfer of the legal possession of
the land from one landholder to another (Fule to petitioner COCOMA). In connection
therewith, Republic Act 3844, Sec. 10 states:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of Period, etc.
The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere
expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or

transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells,
alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, purchaser or transferee
thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the
agricultural lessor.
Further, in several cases, this Court sustained the preservation of the landholder-tenant
relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession:
. . . in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship
between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order to insure the wellbeing of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly dispossessed by the transferee or
purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in question is to maintain the
tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection
against unjustified dismissal from their holdings. (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil. 675);
It is our considered judgment, since the return by the lessee of the leased property to the
lessor upon the expiration of the contract involves also a transfer of legal possession, and
taking into account the manifest intent of the lawmaking body in amending the law, i.e., to
provide the tenant with security of tenure in all cases of transfer of legal possession, that
the instant case falls within and is governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act
1199, as amended by Republic Act 2263. (Joya v. Pareja, 106 Phil, 645).
. . . that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce obligation
incurred by the former landholder such obligation . . . falls upon the assignee or transferee
of the land pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since respondent are in turn free to
proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it is not iniquitous to hold them
responsible to the tenant for said obligations. Moreover, it is the purpose of Republic Act
1199, particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right of the tenant to receive his lawful
share of the produce to receive this lawful share of the produce of the land is unhampered
by the transfer of said land from one landholder to another. (Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120
Phil.
1154.). 19
In the instant case, private respondent has been cultivating the subject farm landholding
with a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing arrangement with the Spouses San Diego, petitioners'
predecessors-in-interest. The passage of R.A. 6839 in 1971, amending R.A. 3844 (1963),
secured to private respondent all the rights pertaining to an agricultural lessee. The
execution of a lease agreement between the Spouses San Diego and Regino Cassanova in
1974 did not terminate private respondent's status as an agricultural lessee. The fact that
private respondent knew of, and consented to, the said lease contract by signing as
witness to the agreement may not be construed as a waiver of his rights as an agricultural
lessee. On the contrary, it was his right to know about the lease contract since, as a result
of the agreement, he had to deal with a new person instead of with the owners directly as
he used to. No provision may be found in the lease contract and the renewal contract even
intimating that private respondent has waived his rights as an agricultural lessee.

Militating against petitioners' theory that the agricultural leasehold was terminated or
waived upon the execution of the lease agreement between the San Diegos and
Cassanova is the fact the latter desisted from personally cultivating the land but left it to
private respondent to undertake the farming, the produce of the land being shared
between Cassanova and private respondent, while the former paid P400.00 and later
P600.00 per hectare per annum to the San Diegos, as agreed upon in the lease contract.
Petitioners, however, insist that private respondent can no longer be considered the
agricultural lessee of their farm land because after they purchased the land from the
Spouses San Diego in 1980, private respondent did not secure their permission to cultivate
the land as agricultural lessee.
It is true that the Court has ruled that agricultural tenancy is not created where the
consent the true and lawful owners is absent. 20 But this doctrine contemplates a situation
where an untenanted farm land is cultivated without the landowner's knowledge or against
her will or although permission to work on the farm was given, there was no intention to
constitute the worker as the agricultural lessee of the farm land. 21 The rule finds no
application in the case at bar where the petitioners are successors-in-interest to a tenanted
land over which an agricultural leasehold has long been established. The consent given by
the original owners to constitute private respondent as the agricultural lessee of the
subject landholding binds private respondents whom as successors-in-interest of the
Spouses San Diego, step into the latter's shows, acquiring not only their rights but also
their obligations. 22
Contradicting their position that no agricultural leasehold exists over the land they
acquired from the Spouses San Diego, petitioners also pray for the termination of the
tenancy of private respondent allegedly due to: (a) non-payment of the agricultural lease
rental; and (b) animosity between the landowners and the agricultural lessee. The Court,
however, observes that nowhere in the petitioners' Answer to private respondent's
Complaint or in the other pleadings filed before the trial court did petitioners allege
grounds for the termination of the agricultural leasehold. Well-settled is the rule that issues
not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 23
In fine, the Court, after a painstaking examination of the entire records of the case and
taking into account the applicable law, as well as the relevant jurisprudence, rules that
private respondent is the agricultural lessee over the land owned by petitioners. As such,
private respondent's security of tenure must be respected by petitioners.
The Court, however, notes from the records of the case that private respondent has
unilaterally decided to pay only 25% of the net harvests to petitioners. 24 Since the
agreement of private respondent with the Spouses San Diego, the original owners, was for
a fifty-fifty (50-50) sharing of the net produce of the land, the same sharing agreement
should be maintained between petitioners and private respondents, without prejudice to a
renegotiation of the terms of the leasehold agreement.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court
of Appeals AFFIRMED. Private respondent is hereby ordered to pay the back rentals from
1980 until 1992 plus interest at the legal rate. An accounting of the production of the
subject landholding is to be made by private respondent to the Regional Trial Court of
Tanauan, Batangas which shall determine the amount due to petitioners based on the rate
ordered above.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 135999

April 19, 2002

MILESTONE REALTY and CO., INC. and WILLIAM L. PEREZ, petitioners,


vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA RAZON PEA and RAYMUNDO
EUGENIO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioners Milestone Realty & Co., Inc. ("Milestone" for brevity) and William Perez seek the
reversal of the decision1 dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP NO.
39987. Said decision affirmed that of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB),2 which had declared respondent Delia Razon Pea as the bona fide tenant
of a lot in Bulacan, and voided the sale of said lot thereby reversing the decision of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD).3
The facts as culled from the records are as follows:
Spouses Alfonso Olympia and Carolina Zacarias and Spouses Claro Zacarias and Cristina
Lorenzo were the co-owners of an agricultural land identified as Lot 616 of the Malinta
Estate. Said lot has an area of 23,703 square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 26019, located at Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Bulacan, now Valenzuela City.
Eventually, Carolina became the owner of the property by virtue of a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement executed on October 17, 1976 by the heirs of Alfonso Olympia, one of whom is
Francisco Olympia, on their respective shares after Alfonso's death and by an Affidavit of
Settlement executed on June 24, 1992 by the spouses Claro and Cristina Zacarias on their
shares in the property.
Meanwhile, Anacleto Pea who was a tenant of the property and a holder of a Certificate of
Agricultural Leasehold issued on February 23, 1982, had a house constructed on the lot. He
had several children on the first marriage, among whom are Emilio Pea and Celia Segovia,

who also had their houses constructed on the property. On February 4, 1986, Anacleto, who
was already 78 years old and a widower, married Delia Razon, then only 29 years old. On
February 17, 1990, Anacleto died intestate and was survived by Delia and his children in
his first marriage, including Emilio.
Emilio and Delia, the latter with the help of respondent Raymundo Eugenio, her son-in-law,
continued tilling and cultivating the property. On January 22, 1992, Emilio signed a
handwritten declaration that he was the tenant in the land and he was returning the
landholding to Carolina Zacarias in consideration of the sum of P1,500,000 as "disturbance
compensation". He initially opted for a 1,000 square meter homelot but later changed his
mind. After receipt of the money, he executed a "Katibayang Paglilipat ng Pag-mamay-ari".
In the meantime, petitioner William Perez, Joseph Lim, Willy Lim, Winston Lim, Edgar Lim,
and Jaime Lim established Milestone as incorporators, in order to acquire and develop the
aforesaid property and the adjacent parcel, Lot No. 617 of the Malinta Estate.
On July 30, 1992, Carolina Zacarias executed a deed of sale transfering the Lot No. 616 to
petitioner Milestone for P7,110,000. TCT No. 26019 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. 25433 was issued in the name of Milestone. On the same date, the adjoining Lot No.
617 covered by TCT No. V-25431 was issued under the name of petitioner William Perez
who subsequently sold the same to Milestone on the basis of which TCT No. V-26481 was
issued to it. Thus, Milestone became the owner of the adjoining lots, Lot Nos. 616 and 617
of the Malinta Estate with a total area of three (3) hectares. Development of the property
then commenced.
On October 13, 1992, private respondents Delia Razon Pea and Raymundo Eugenio filed a
complaint against Emilio Pea, Carolina Zacarias and her brother Francisco Olympia, and
William Perez with the PARAD, which was amended on January 6, 1993 to implead
Milestone as respondent, praying inter alia to declare as null and void the sale by Carolina
to Perez and by the latter to Milestone, and to recognize and respect the tenancy of private
respondents Delia and Raymundo.1wphi1.nt

4. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
In the decision, the PARAD ruled that the order of preference cited in Section 9 of Republic
Act 3844 is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause. 6 It also took note that
Emilio's two siblings have openly recognized Emilio as the legitimate successor to
Anacleto's tenancy rights.7
Delia Razon Pea and Raymundo Eugenio appealed from the PARAD's decision to the
DARAB. On September 5, 1995, the DARAB reversed the decision of PARAD, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 28, 1993 is REVERSED.
Judgment is issued:
1. Declaring Delia Razon Pea the bona-fide tenant over the landholding in question;
2. Declaring the series of purchase and sale of the landholding in question as illegal,
hence, null and void;
3. Directing the Register of Deeds to cancel TCT No. V-26485 and all subsequent titles
obtained thereafter over the landholding named under William L. Perez and Milestone
Realty and Co., Inc.;
4. Allowing Delia Razon Pea to exercise her right of redemption over the land within the
prescribed period granted by law;
5. Enjoining all Respondents-Appellees to desist from further disturbing Delia Razon Pea in
the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land;

In her answer, Carolina Zacarias declared that she chose Emilio Pea as her tenantbeneficiary on the said property within 30 days after the death of Anacleto, conformably
with Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844. 4 On July 28, 1993, the PARAD rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint as follows:5

6. Directing the DAR-DOJ Task Force on Illegal Conversion to file appropriate charges before
the Special Agrarian Court as regards the criminal aspect of this case.

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered:

In reversing the PARAD's decision, the DARAB noted that Carolina's affidavit did not show
any categorical admission that she made her choice within the one (1) month period
except to state that "when Anacleto died, the right of the deceased was inherited by Emilio
Pea" which could only mean that she recognized Emilio Pea by force of circumstance
under a nebulous time frame.9

1. Dismissing the instant complaint;


2. Dissolving the writ of Preliminary Injunction issued on May 24, 1993;
3. Directing the Cashier of the DAR Regional Office at Pasig, Metro Manila to release to the
Petitioners or their duly authorized representative, the cash bond posted in the amount of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos [P15,000.00].

SO ORDERED.8

In a petition for review to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the DARAB's decision,
thus:

We are convinced, beyond cavil, in the present recourse, that the Petitioners Carolina
Olympia and Francisco Olympia failed to choose, within the statutory period therefor, any
tenant in substitution of Anacleto Pea, the erstwhile deceased tenant on the landholding,
and that, without prior or simultaneous notice to Private Respondent Delia Pea, the
Petitioners made their choice of Petitioner Emilio Pea as substitute tenant only in January,
1992, after they had agreed to sell the property to the Petitioner Milestone Realty & Co.,
Inc.
IN SUM, then, We find no reversible error committed by the DARAB under its oppunged
Decision.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is hereby
dismissed. The appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against the Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.10
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CA's decision. Said
motion was denied on October 12, 1998.
Hence, this petition assigning the following errors allegedly committed by respondent
Court of Appeals:11
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND
APPLICATION OF SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT 3844 BY HOLDING THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DELIA RAZON PEA HAS SUCCEEDED TO HER DECEASED HUSBAND'S
LEASEHOLD RIGHT BY OPERATION OF LAW.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE SALE BY THE
LANDOWNER TO PETITIONER WILLIAM L. PEREZ, AND BY THE LATTER TO PETITIONER
MILESTONE REALTY & CO., INC. AS NULL AND VOID, AND IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION
OF THEIR RESPECTIVE TITLES.12
These two assigned errors tendered issues articulated in petitioners' memorandum as
follows:
1. Whether or not Emilio Pea was validly chosen by Carolina Zacarias as the new tenant
over the landholding under dispute within one (1) month from the death of his father
Anacleto, as prescribed by Section 9 of R.A. 3844, as amended;

2. Whether or not Delia Razon Pea was a bona fide or de jure tenant over the landholding
in question to be accorded the alleged rights to security of tenure and of redemption under
the agrarian reform laws;
3. Whether or not Emilio Pea validly renounced or otherwise caused the extinction of his
tenancy rights over the subject property;
4. Whether or not the sales of the subject property by Carolina Zacarias to William Perez
and by the latter to Milestone were null and void, hence merited the declaration of nullity
and cancellation of the respondents' respective titles;
5. Whether or not illegal conversion was committed by Milestone.
In sum, we find the following relevant issues now for our resolution:
1. Whether or not Delia Razon Pea has a right of first priority over Emilio Pea in
succeeding to the tenancy rights of Anacleto over the subject landholding.
2. Whether or not the sales of the subject lots by Carolina Zacarias to William Perez and
then to Milestone are null and void.
At the outset, it bears stressing that there appears to be no dispute as to tenancy
relationship between Carolina Zacarias and the late Anacleto Pea. The controversy
centers on who is the rightful and legal successor to Anacleto's tenancy rights. Relevant to
the resolution of the first issue is Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as
the Code of Agrarian Reforms, which provides as follows:
SEC. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the
Parties. - In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his
landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person
who can cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within one
month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following: (a) the
surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (c) the next eldest
descendant or descendants in the order of their age: Provided, That in case the death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee occurs during the agricultural year, such
choice shall be exercised at the end of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the
event the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein provided,
the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind
his legal heirs.
Petitioners contend that Section 9 does not require any form or manner in which the choice
should be made.13They assail the Court of Appeals for heavily relying on the findings of the
DARAB that there was no convincing proof that Carolina exercised her right to choose from
among the qualified heirs a replacement for the deceased tenant, 14 when in fact a choice

was made. In support thereof, petitioners invoke Carolina's affidavit and her Answer to the
complaint in the PARAD, both dated November 16, 1992 where Carolina recognized Emilio
Pea as the successor to Anacleto's tenancy rights. Petitioners argued that Delia could not
have qualified as a successor-tenant to Anacleto due to lack of personal
cultivation.15 Further, she had not been paying rent on the land.
Responding to petitioners' contentions, respondents argue that Carolina did not choose the
successor to Anacleto's tenancy rights within one month from the death of Anacleto.
Respondents note that it was only after the lapse of two (2) years from the death of
Anacleto on February 17, 1990, that both Carolina and Emilio claimed in their respective
affidavits that Emilio inherited the rights of Anacleto as a tenant. 16 According to
respondents, such inaction to make a choice within the time frame required by law is
equivalent to waiver on Carolina's part to choose a substitute tenant. 17 Also, it appears that
Carolina made the choice in favor of Emilio Pea only by force of circumstance, i.e., when
she was in the process of negotiating the sale of the land to petitioners Perez and
Milestone.18
On this score, we agree with private respondents. As found by both the DARAB and the
Court of Appeals, Carolina had failed to exercise her right to choose a substitute for the
deceased tenant, from among those qualified, within the statutory period. 19 No cogent
reason compels us to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule,
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal by the Supreme Court, provided they are borne out by the record or based on
substantial evidence.20
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844 is clear and unequivocal in providing for the rules on
succession to tenancy rights. A close examination of the provision leaves no doubt as to its
rationale of providing for continuity in agricultural leasehold relation in case of death or
incapacity of a party. To this end, it provides that in case of death or permanent incapacity
of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the leasehold shall continue between the
agricultural lessor and the person who can cultivate the landholding personally. In the
same vein, the leasehold shall bind the legal heirs of the agricultural lessor in case of
death or permanent incapacity of the latter. It is to achieve this continuity of relationship
that the agricultural lessor is mandated by law to choose a successor-tenant within one
month from the death or incapacity of the agricultural lessee from among the following: (1)
surviving spouse; (2) eldest direct descendant by consanguinity; or (3) the next eldest
direct descendant or descendants in the order of their age. Should the lessor fail to
exercise his choice within one month from the death of the tenant, the priority shall be in
accordance with the aforementioned order. In Manuel vs. Court of Appeals,21 we ruled that:
Agricultural leasehold relationship is not extinguished by the death or incapacity of the
parties. In case the agricultural lessee dies or is incapacitated, the leasehold relation shall
continue between the agricultural lessor and any of the legal heirs of the agricultural
lessee who can cultivate the landholding personally, in the order of preference provided
under Section 9 of Republic Act 3844, as chosen by the lessor within one month from such

10

death or permanent incapacity. Since petitioner Rodolfo Manuel failed to exercise


his right of choice within the statutory period, Edwardo's widow Enriqueta, who
is first in the order of preference and who continued working on the landholding
upon her husband's death, succeeded him as agricultural lessee. Thus, Enriqueta
is subrogated to the rights of her husband and could exercise every right Eduardo had as
agricultural lessee, including the rights of pre-emption and redemption.
Applying Section 9 of Republic Act 3844, in the light of prevailing jurisprudence, it is
undeniable that respondent Delia Razon Pea, the surviving spouse of the original tenant,
Anacleto Pea, is the first in the order of preference to succeed to the tenancy rights of her
husband because the lessor, Carolina Zacarias, failed to exercise her right of choice within
the one month period from the time of Anacleto's death.
Petitioners cannot find succor in the declarations of Emilio Pea and the affidavit of
Carolina Zacarias, stating that Emilio succeeded to the tenancy rights of Anacleto. In the
first place, Carolina's affidavit and her Answer filed before the PARAD were both executed
in 1992, or almost two years after the death of Anacleto on February 17, 1990, way beyond
the one month period provided for in Section 9 of Republic Act 3844. Secondly, as found by
the DARAB, a scrutiny of Carolina's declaration will show that she never categorically
averred that she made her choice within the one (1) month period. Instead, she narrated
passively that "when Anacleto died, the right of the deceased was inherited by Emilio
Pea," prompting the DARAB to conclude it merely "connotes that she recognized Emilio
Pea by force of circumstance under a nebulous time frame." 22
Petitioners further argue that Delia cannot qualify as tenant even on the assumption that
she was the rightful successor to Anacleto's tenancy rights, because she did not personally
cultivate the land and did not pay rent. In essence, petitioners urge this Court to ascertain
and evaluate certain material facts which, however are not within the province of this
Court to consider in a petition for review. Determination of personal cultivation and rental
payments are factual issues beyond the reach of this petition. Well established is the rule
that in an appeal viacertiorari, only questions of law may be reviewed.23
On the second issue, however, we are unable to agree with the ruling of respondent Court
of Appeals and of DARAB that the sale of the land in question should be declared null and
void. There is no legal basis for such declaration. Lest it be forgotten, it is Carolina Zacarias
who is the owner of the subject land and both Emilio Pea and Delia Razon Pea only
succeeded to the tenancy rights of Anacleto.
As an owner, Carolina has the right to dispose of the property without other limitations
than those established by law. 24 This attribute of ownership is impliedly recognized in
Sections 10, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, 25where the law allows the agricultural
lessor to sell the landholding, with or without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee and
at the same time recognizes the right of preemption and redemption of the agricultural
lessee. Thus, the existence of tenancy rights of agricultural lessee cannot affect nor
derogate from the right of the agricultural lessor as owner to dispose of the property. The

only right of the agricultural lessee or his successor in interest is the right of preemption
and/or redemption.1wphi1.nt
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Carolina became the absolute owner of the subject
landholding by virtue of Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Affidavit of Settlement
executed by the other heirs of Alfonso Olympia and Spouses Claro and Cristina Zacarias.
As the owner, it is within her right to execute a deed of sale of said landholding, without
prejudice however to the tenancy rights and the right of redemption of Delia Razon Pea.
InManuel,26 we held that the tenancy relationship is not affected or severed by the change
of ownership. The new owner is under the obligation to respect and maintain the tenant's
landholding. In turn, Delia Razon Pea, as the successor tenant, has the legal right of
redemption. This right of redemption is statutory in character. It attaches to a particular
landholding by operation of law.27
Finally, as to the question of illegal conversion of the land, suffice it to state that such
determination is not within the jurisdiction of this Court and is not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari as it requires evaluation and examination of pertinent facts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 39987 is AFFIRMED in so far as it recognizes Delia Razon Pea
as the successor of Anacleto Pea as the tenant, thereby allowing her to exercise her right
of redemption over the land within the prescribed period granted by law. However, said
decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as it declared the sale of said landholding
null and void. IN LIEU THEREOF, SAID SALE BY CAROLINA ZACARIAS IS HEREBY
DECLAREDVALID, SUBJECT TO THE TENANCY RIGHTS AND RIGHT OF REDEMPTION by the
TENANT-LESSEE, private respondent Delia Razon Pea.
No pronouncements as to costs
SO ORDERED.

11

G.R. No. L-19760

April 30, 1964

MARCELO VILLAVIZA, ET AL., petitioners,


vs.
JUDGE TOMAS PANGANIBAN, ET AL., respondents.
Alejandro C. Villaviza for petitioners.
Ipac and Fajardo for respondent Judge Tomas Panganiban.
Manuel Cordero for other respondents.

2. Agapito Neuda

3. Domingo Villaviza

3. Rafael Alamon

4. Marcelo Villaviza

4. Petronilo Aguilar

5. Cirilo Ramos

5. Eulogio Samaniego

6. Ciriaco Pizaro

6. Castor Rufino

7. Cesario Villaviza
Ben Morelos

REYES, J.B.L., J.:


Review of the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Cabanatuan City, in its Case No.
2088-NE-60, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent Quirino Capalad to pay the
petitioners as follows:
1. Jose Aguilar

P297.00

2. Agapito Neuda

264.75

3. Sixto Malarulat

264.25

4. Rafael Alamon

164.00

5. Petronilo Aguilar

335.25

6. Eulogio Samaniego

219.00

7. Castor Rufino

234.00

The following respondents are hereby ordered to vacate their respective landholdings in
favor of the petitioners, subject to the provisions of pars. 3 and 4, Sec. 22, R.A. No. 1199,
as amended, the indemnity in the aforestated paragraphs, supra, shall be paid by
respondent Quirino Capalad:

12

2. Severino Padilla

Respondents

Petitioners

1. Alejo Pramel

1. Jose Aguilar

Juan Morelos

7. Sixto Malarulat

)
)

SO ORDERED.
The lower court found that the above-named respondents (petitioners below) were tenants
since 1944 in a riceland situated in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, and owned by Domingo Fajardo.
Fajardo gave out the land for lease (civil lease) to the petitioner, Quirino Capalad, starting
with the crop year 1955-56. The said lessee, in June, 1955, plowed the land by machinery,
and installed, as his tenants his above-named in this Court, so that when the respondents
went back to their respective landholdings to prepare them for planting they found the
land already cultivated. The respondents-tenants demanded their reinstatement, but
everytime they did, which they did yearly until the present suit was filed, Quirino Capalad
promised but never fulfilled, to reinstate them for the agricultural year following said
demands.
As grounds for the petition for review, the petitioners claim grave abuse of discretion by
the Agrarian Court and a lack of substantive evidence to support its findings.
The above claim is wild and reckless and definitely without merit, since the decision itself
contains the recitals of the testimonies of the witnesses upon which the court based its
findings, and the petitioners do not question the existence and adequacy of these
testimonies. That the court believed the evidence for the respondents rather than those for
the petitioners is the tenancy court's prerogative, and, as a reviewing court, the Supreme
Court will not weigh anew the evidence; all that this Court is called upon to do, insofar as
the evidence is concerned is to find out if the conclusion of the lower court is supported by
substantive evidence; and the present case is, as hereinbefore explained.
A tenant's right to be respected in his tenure under Republic Act 1199, as amended, is an
obligation of the landholder created by law, and an action for violation thereof prescribes in

ten years under No. 2 of Article 1144 of the Civil Code. The respondents were ousted from
their landholdings in June, 1955, they filed the present action on 31 March 1960; therefore,
the period of limitation had not expired.
The tenancy court found that the ejected tenants-respondents have engaged in gainful
occupations since their illegal ejectment and had delayed the filing of the case, and for
these reasons the court made an award for damages against Quirino Capalad equivalent to
only two harvests based on the landholder's share for the crop year 19541955. 1wph1.t
The premises for the award are erroneous. Under section 27(1) of Republic Act 1199, as
amended, a tenant's earnings may not be deducted from the damages because the said
section positively provides that the tenant's freedom to earn elsewhere is to be added ("in
addition") to his right to damages in case of illegal ejectment (Lustre, et al. vs. CAR, et al.,
L-19654, March 21, 1964). Nor can it be said that the respondents-tenants are guilty of
laches for having unnecessarily delayed to Capalad's promises to reinstate them.
The amount of the award to each respondent should not, however, be disturbed because
the respondents' non-appeal from the decision indicates their satisfaction therewith and a
waiver of any amounts other than those indicated in the decision (David V. de la Cruz, et
al., L-11656, 18 April 1958; Dy, et al. vs. Kuizon, L-16654, 30 Nov. 1961).
FOR THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioners.

13

G.R. No. 80129

January 25, 2000

GERARDO RUPA, SR., petitioner,


vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MAGIN SALIPOT, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated June 5, 1987, affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch
46, of the Complaint for Redemption with Damages filed by herein petitioner Gerardo
Rupa, Sr. (RUPA) against herein private petitioner respondent Magin Salipot (SALIPOT).
The antecedents as found by the CA are as follows:
1) On March 26, 1981, herein petitioner Gerardo Rupa filed an action for redemption with
damages against Magin Salipot before the then Court of Agrarian Relations, Tenth Regional
District, Branch IV, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, claiming that he was the agricultural share tenant
for more than 20 years of a parcel of coconut land 2 formerly owned by Vicente Lim and
Patrocinia Yu Lim; that since he assumed tenancy over the questioned property, he was the
one watching, talking care of and cleaning the coconut plantation; he also gathers
coconuts every three months and processes them into copra which he shares with the Lim
spouses under a 50-50% sharing basis; that aside from being a share tenant, he is also the
overseer of four parcels of coconut land situated in the sitios of Minuswang and Comunal,
Armenia, Uson, Masbate also owned by the Lim spouses; that the Lim spouses, however,
sold the property to herein respondent Magin Salipot without any prior written or verbal
notice to the petitioner in the sum of P5,000.00 sometime in January 1981 (Annex A, Deed
of Absolute Sale, Petition); that on February 16, 1981, petitioner came to know about the
sale of the property to the respondent when he was informed in writing by the former
landowner, and wanting to buy the property for himself, petitioner sought the assistance of
the local office of Agrarian Reform at Masbate, Masbate, but no agreement was reached;
that the petitioner manifesting his willingness to redeem the questioned property in the
same amount of P5,000.00 bought by respondent, deposited the amount with the trial
court (Annex "B", Petition). Petitioner, thus, prayed for judgment authorizing his right of
redemption over the property including his shares of the harvest, damages and expenses
arising herein.
2) On April 14, 1981, respondent Magin Salipot filed his answer denying petitioner's
allegation of tenancy over the questioned property and claimed that petitioner was hired
every now and then to oversee the copra-making of the laborers of spouses Lim, with
remuneration based on the weight of copra produced. In his affirmative and special
defenses, respondent claimed that he bought the registered parcel of land from the

14

spouses Lim who in turn bought the same from the original registered owner Diego Prieto,
who was issued OCT-1853, and since both deeds of sale, one executed by Diego Prieto in
favor of the Lim spouses and the second, by the Lim spouses to herein respondent, have
not yet been registered or legally conveyed to respondent, the action for redemption filed
by the petitioner against respondent is pre-mature; that petitioner had never been a
tenant of spouses Lim over the land in question; that the right of redemption had already
been lost by laches or non-use, because more than 180 days had lapsed since petitioner
had actual knowledge of the sale in favor of respondent.
xxx

xxx

x x x3

After hearing, the Regional Trial Court of Masbate (which had taken over the Court of
Agrarian Relations pursuant to BP 129) rendered a decision dated July 17, 1985, dismissing
the complaint on the ground that RUPA was not a tenant of the subject property, thus, not
entitled to exercise the right of redemption over the same. RUPA was also held liable in
attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and P3,000.00 as litigation expenses. RUPA
filed a notice of appeal. The CA required the parties to file their memoranda within a nonextendible period of 15 days from notice thereof, after which the case shall be considered
submitted for decision with or without memoranda. 4SALIPOT manifested that he was
adopting the memorandum filed with the court a quo, while no memorandum was received
from RUPA.5 The decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA in its judgment
promulgated on June 5, 1987, holding as follows:
. . ., this Court finds, as the court a quo also held, that there is no clear and convincing
evidence to show that plaintiff was a share tenant of spouses Lim. The admission made by
plaintiff Gerardo Rupa in Criminal Case No. 532-U, entitled People of the Philippines
vs. Mariano Luzong, filed six months after this instant case was instituted, negates his
claim of tenancy. Plaintiff RUPA, during the proceedings in the Criminal Case, admitted that
he was the overseer and the administrator of five (5) parcels of land, one of which is this
land in question, owned by the Lim spouses in Armenia, Uson, Masbate. This was aptly
discussed by the lower court in its decision as follows:
After an impartial scrutiny and evaluation of the facts and the law involved, the Court finds
and so rules that, by a preponderance of proof, plaintiff Gerardo Rupa, Sr., either on July
30, 1979 or in January, 1980 (when the two identical deeds of sale involving the same land
in dispute were respectively executed by the Lim spouses in favor of defendant Magin
Salipot) was actually not a share-tenant but the overseer and administrator of the Lim
spouses of their five (5) parcels of land in Armenia, Uson, Masbate, in the light of his own
admission of such fact and status, under oath, in no less than a solemn judicial proceeding
which officially commenced on September 9, 1981, particularly in Criminal Case No. 532-U
of the MCTC of Dimasalang-Palanas-Uson (Exhs. 6 and 6-A), more so because seven (7)
months earlier, or specifically on March 21, 1981, he had already commenced the case at
bar in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, precisely to ventilate his alleged right of redemption as an
ousted share tenant of the land's former owner. The Court notes quite emphatically that
herein plaintiff, in making such an admission against his own interest, was fully aware of

the pendency of this instant suit but such fact notwithstanding, he nevertheless disclosed
under oath that he was, indeed, the overseer and administrator (not a mere share-tenant
of the Lim spouses, the two status being inherently incompatible (pp. 100-101 Expediente,
Decision .
The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact, may be given in evidence
against him (Section 22, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court). At the time the plaintiff-appellant
admitted that he was the administrator of Vicente Lim, he had already instituted the action
for redemption with damages against Magin Salipot, wherein he alleged that he was the
share-tenant of the Lim spouses. Knowing fully well that his right of legal redemption is
based on his status as share-tenant, he still admitted, six months later, in Crim. Case 532U, that he was the administrator of five (5) parcels of land owned by the Lim spouses in
Armenia, Uson, Masbate. His admission, which is clearly adverse to his own interest,
constitutes an admission receivable against him. A man's act, conduct and declaration,
whenever made, if voluntary, is admissible against him for it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth, and it is his fault if they do not (US vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578,
583).
Furthermore, the observation of the court a quo is correct in taking judicial notice of the
proceedings in other causes, because of their close connection with the matter in
controversy. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, 1980 ed. P. 48)
Aside from his own admission that he was the administrator of the Lim spouses, there is no
clear and positive proof that Gerardo Rupa performed the duties of a tenant in personally
tilling and cultivating the land which he allegedly tenanted. From the decision rendered in
Crim. Case 532-U, prosecution witnesses Pablito Arnilla and Antonieta Rongasan admitted
that they were the hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa in tilling the land in question (Under R.A.
1199, a share tenant must personally till the land, possibly with the aid of the immediate
farm household). The aforenamed witnesses may not have been aware of the implication
in admitting that they were the hired laborers of Gerardo Rupa. Their admission detracts
from the veracity of the claim of Gerardo Rupa that he personally tilled and cultivated the
land as share tenant. As found by the trial court in the said criminal case, "the said piece of
evidence (referring to the admissions) of the prosecution is sufficient to create doubt that
there is motive on their part, to testify falsely in favor of the complainant Gerardo Rupa,
who is so interested in redeeming the property of Magin Salipot wherein Mariano Luzong is
the tenant (Exh. 6, page 4).
As to Gerardo Rupa's claim of tenancy, Republic Act 1199, which governs the relations
between landholders and tenants of coconut lands, defines a tenant as a person who,
himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the
land belonging to, or possessed by another with the latter's consent for purposes of
production and sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system
(Sec. 5 (a) RA 1199). A person who does not work or till the land is not a tenant (Rural
Progress Administration v. Dimson, L-6068, April 26, 1955; Juanito Viernes v. Rodrigo
Reyes, CA-GR No. SP-05989, Feb. 24, 1977). For a person to be considered a tenant, one

15

must perform personally all the phases of cultivation with the aid of the immediate
members of his family. Thus, if a tenant merely hires laborers to do all the labor, he is
deemed to have waived or abandoned his tenancy rights over the land (Pellejera vs. Lopes.
CA-GR No. SP-06719, Oct. 28, 1971). Thus, absent personal cultivation on the part of the
plaintiff, no share tenancy relationship can be said to exist between the Lim spouses and
Gerardo Rupa.
There is further evidences to show that Gerardo Rupa could not have been the tenant of
the Lim spouses over the lot in question at the time of the sale. In his testimony, Vicente
Lim, owner of the land in question, testified that Gerardo Rupa was his comprador or agent
of copra, and had never been his tenant. He also stated that the plaintiff was the
administrator of his five parcels of land in Arsenia, Uson, Masbate (TSN, March 11, 1985, p.
14). This claim is corroborated by the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Uson,
Masbate, certifying that Gerardo Rupa had been engaged in business as copra buyer of
Armenia, Uson, Masbate from May 19, 1978 to October 10, 1979 (Exh. 4). 6
Hence, this petition was filed to seek a reversal of the decision of the CA. According to
RUPA, the CA erred in declaring that he is not a share tenant based on passing statements
contained in a decision in another case and on the certificate issued by the Office of the
Municipal Treasurer that RUPA was engaged in business as copra buyer from May 19, 1978
to October 10, 1979. Consequently, this Court is asked to determine the real status of
RUPA, who claims to be a tenant of the subject land and entitled to the benefits of tenancy
laws. SALIPOT objects, contending that the instant petition should be dismissed
considering that the issue raised is factual and that the admission made by RUPA in the
course of a judicial proceeding is a substitute for and reason to dispense with the actual
proof of facts.
We do not agree with the contentions of private respondent SALIPOT. The CA committed
reversible error in relying mainly on statements made in a decision in another case, and,
secondarily on the certificate of the Municipal Treasurer as basis for establishing the status
of petitioner as share-tenant in the subject land.
True, whether a person is a tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the findings of
the respondent CA and the trial court are, generally, entitled to respect and nondisturbance.7 In Talavero vs. Court of Appeals,8 this Court held that a factual conclusion
made by the trial court that a person is a tenant farmer, if it is supported by the minimum
evidence demanded by law, is final and conclusive and cannot be reversed by the
appellate tribunals except for compelling reasons. Inversely, a factual conclusion by the
appellate court that the evidence fails to establish the status of a person as a tenant
farmer is conclusive on the parties and carries even more weight when said court affirms
the factual findings of the trial court. In the case at bar, however, we find there are such
compelling reasons for this Court to apply the exception of non-conclusiveness of the
factual findings of the trial and appellate courts on the ground that the "findings of fact of
both courts is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is in actuality
contradicted by evidence on record." 9 A careful examination of the record reveals that,

indeed, both the trial court and the appellate court overlooked and disregarded the
overwhelming evidence in favor of RUPA and instead relied mainly on the statements
made in the decision in another case.
A tenant is defined under Section 5 (a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself
and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land
belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production,
sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both under the
leasehold tenancy system. Briefly stated, for this relationship to exist, it is necessary that:
1. The parties are the landowner and the tenant;
2. The subject is agricultural land;
3. There is consent;
4. The purpose is agricultural production;
5. There is personal cultivation; and
6. There is sharing of harvests.10
Upon proof of the existence of the tenancy relationship, RUPA could avail of the benefits
afforded by RA 384411, as amended, particularly, Section 12 thereof which reads:
Sec. 12. Lessee's right of redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third person
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have g arrangement taken
together with other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to be present in the case at
bar, strengthens the claim of RUPA that indeed, he is a tenant.
On the other hand, the stand of SALIPOT that RUPA was merely a copra agent and overseer
and that one Hermogenes Mahinay was the tenant of the Lims from 1963 up to the time he
bought the subject land in 1979 is belied by the records. SALIPOT offered in evidence his
own testimony and those of witnesses Arnulfo Morata, Felipe Gelordo, Mariano Luzong and
Vicente Lim, Sr. to support this version.
SALIPOT testified that he is a farmer and resident of Armenia, Uson, Masbate; that
Hermogenes Mahinay was the tenant of the Lims since 1962 until 1979 when he purchased
the property that he bought the property in July 29 or 30, 1979; that two deed of sale were
executed over the same property, one in July 30, 1979 and another in January 1981,
because he had not yet paid in full the purchase price; that RUPA was the copra agent of
Lim.21
Vicente Lim, Sr. corroborated the said testimony of SALIPOT. 22 Arnulfo Morata (MORATA)
and Felipe Gelordo (GELORDO) testified that they were both farmers residing in Armenia,

16

Uson, Masbate; both stated that it was Hermogenes Mahinay who tenanted the
landholding; and that RUPA was merely the overseer of the same. According to MORATA he
always passes by the subject landholding because his own land is at the far end of the area
but he never saw RUPA in the subject land. 23 However, on cross-examination, he stated
that the first time he saw Mahinay in the land in question was only in 1979. 24 On the other
hand, according to GELORDO, he is familiar with the facts of the case as he stays on a
parcel of land opposite the subject landholding. He stated that he did not see RUPA occupy
the subject landholding.25 But on cross-examination, GELORDO admitted that the matters
he was testifying on were told to him by SALIPOT. 26
It is odd that MORATA and GELORDO testified that they never saw RUPA in the subject
landholding of which SALIPOT alleged RUPA to have been an administrator. Even more
strange is the testimony of MORATA that he only saw Mahinay in the subject land
sometime in 1979 contrary to SALIPOT's claim that he has been tenant of the subject land
since 1962. Further, GELORDO admitted that he was testifying on matters as told to him by
SALIPOT. The testimonies of MORATA and GELORDO are clearly flawed and detract from
their credibility.
Over and above the foregoing, RUPA has successfully rebutted the claims of SALIPOT in
presenting Hermogenes Mahinay himself in his favor. Hermogenes Mahinay himself
testified that he is a farmer and resident of Malamag, Pio V. Corpus, Masbate and
presently, Armenia, Uson, Masbate; that he knows the parties in the case; that he
transferred from Pio V. Corpus to Armenia, Uson in 1972; that RUPA was the one working
the subject land; that he stayed in the land in question for less than a year; that he was
never a tenant of the subject land from 1962 to 1979 contrary to the claim of
SALIPOT.27 On cross-examination, he reiterated that he was never a tenant but RUPA was;
that he executed an affidavit that RUPA was never a tenant in the land in question without
reading the same because he doesn't know how to read and write; that he affixed his
thumb mark anyway because he was told that the contents were good; that he was just
told to affix his thumb mark.28 There is no reason to doubt the credibility of this witness
who has candidly and straightforwardly denied ever being a tenant of the subject land.
We are also inclined to believe the position of RUPA that he came to know of the sale of the
land to SALIPOT only on February 16, 1981 as evidenced by a letter of the same date of
the former landowner Patrocenia Yu Lim to RUPA informing the latter to give up possession
of the land to SALIPOT as the land had already been sold to the latter. 29 Thus, the action for
redemption commenced on March 26, 1981 was filed within the six-month reglementary
period. SALIPOT is likewise estopped from claiming that the true purchase price is
P15,000.00 instead of P5,000.00 as reflected in the deed of sale, which was admittedly
done to lower the tax liabilities of the parties to the sale. 30 We cannot countenance this act
of misstating the true purchase price as a means to circumvent our tax laws. Hence,
SALIPOT cannot claim that the amount of P5,000.00 consignated by RUPA is inadequate for
purposes of exercising the right of redemption.

RUPA has since passed away and the right now devolves to his heirs, as the right to
redeem is a property right which is transmissible to the heirs. 31 The issue on damages and
share of harvests was not raised before the CA for failure of RUPA to file his memorandum,
hence, we cannot pass upon the same. It is well-settled that a party is not permitted to
raise before the Supreme Court an issue which he did not raise in the Court of Appeals. 32

RESURRECCION as acting Registrar of Deeds of the Province of


Laguna, defendants-appellees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

Sabio, Bonifacio and De Jesus for plaintiff-appellant.


Domingo T. Zaballa for defendants-appellees.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations, in CAR Case No.
1478, Laguna '65, on the sole question of whether tender of payment and judicial
consignation of the purchase price are necessary before a tenant-lessee may avail himself
of the right of pre-emption or of redemption provided in Sections 11 and 12 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code.
In the action filed by tenant Pablo Basbas in the Court of Agrarian Relations against the
alleged landholder or landholders Rufino Entena and the spouses Flaviano Tibay and
Angelina Entena, the parties agreed to stipulate on the following facts:
1. That plaintiff Pablo Basbas is the leasehold tenant of a 1- hectare parcel of riceland,
known as Lot No. 1520 of the Sta. Rosa Estate Subdivision, located at Barrio Dila, Sta.
Rosa, Laguna, formerly owned by defendant Rufino Entena and presently owned by
spouses Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena, his co-defendants.
2. That on April 11, 1964, defendant Rufino Entena executed a deed of sale of the
aforementioned lot in favor of defendant spouses Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena.
3. That on May 25, 1964, defendant Rufino Entena sent a letter, marked as Exhibit 'I', to
plaintiff, to which the latter sent a reply dated June 4, 1964, marked as Exhibit 'A'.
4. That under date of June 4, 1964, plaintiff wrote a letter, marked as Exhibit 'B', to the
Governor of the Land Authority, to which he received a reply from the Acting Officer in
Charge of the Land Authority, dated June 22, 1964, which is marked as Exhibit 'C', of which
reply (Exhibit 'C') defendants have not been given copy or otherwise informed.
5. That the deed of sale mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof, was registered in the office of
the register of deeds of Laguna on May 26, 1964. The certification of the Register of Deeds
respecting said sale is marked as Exhibit 'D'.
6. That defendant Rufino Entena and his wife Aniceta Carapatan executed an affidavit,
dated April 11, 1964, marked as Exhibit 'I' defendant Register of Deeds.

G.R. No. L-26255

June 30, 1969

PABLO BASBAS, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
RUFINO ENTENA, FLAVIANO TIBAY and ANGELINA ENTENA (Spouses), and R. M.

17

7. That defendant spouses Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena are son-in-law and
daughter, respectively, of defendant Rufino Entena, and said spouses live separately from
their father.

8. That plaintiff has not deposited any sum of money in this Court to cover the pre-emption
or redemption price.
Exhibit 'I' mentioned above (No. 3, Stipulation) refers to a letter sent by Rufino Entena to
the tenant, to the effect that the landholding was being put up for sale at P13,000.00 per
hectare and the tenant being given 90 days within which to communicate his intention to
purchase the same: otherwise, the land would be offered to other buyers (page 1 folder of
exhibits). Exhibit "A" (No. 3, Stipulation) is the tenant's reply to the landholder dated June
4, 1964, accepting the latter's offer to sell the land, although disagreeing to the quoted
price therefor. The tenant in the same letter informed the landholder that he was enlisting
the aid of the government in purchasing the land, as allowed by law. Exhibit "3" (No. 4,
Stipulation) is the tenant's letter of June 4, 1964 addressed to the Governor of the Land
Authority, asking the help of said agency to acquire the land he was working on and which
was being offered for sale. Exhibit "C" (No. 4, Stipulation) is the answer of the Acting
Officer in Charge of the Land Authority, informing the tenant that his petition was already
being processed and definite action thereon will be taken as soon as the Land Bank shall
have been fully organized. Exhibit "1-Register of Deeds" (No. 6, Stipulation) is the sworn
affidavit of the spouses Rufino Entena and Aniceta Carapatan, dated April 11, 1964,
attesting to the alleged fact that the tenant, Pablo Basbas, was fully notified of the sale of
their land 90 days before said conveyance, and that the tenant had refused, or failed to
exercise, the right of pre-emption granted him under the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(page 6, folder of exhibits). The submission of this affidavit enabled the registration on May
26, 1964 of the deed of sale in favor of vendees Flaviano Tibay and Angelina Entena.
On the basis of the aforequoted stipulation of facts, the Agrarian Court dismissed the case,
reasoning that as the plaintiff failed to make tender of payment and consignation of the
purchase price the landowner cannot be compelled to sell the property to him. Plaintifftenant thus interposed the present appeal.
The appellant-tenant's claim to preference in purchasing the land he is working on, in case
the said land is to be sold, or to his right to redeem it in 2 years should the land be sold
without his knowledge, is predicated upon Sections 11 and 12 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code (Republic Act 3844):
SEC. 11. Lessee's Right of Pre-emption. In case the agricultural lessor decides to sell the
landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the preferential right to buy the same under
reasonable terms and conditions: Provided, That the entire landholding offered for sale
must be pre-empted by the Land Authority if the owner so desires unless the majority of
the lessees object to such acquisitions: Provided, further, That where there are two or more
agricultural lessees, each shall be entitled to said preferential right only to the extent of
the area actually cultivated by him. The right of pre-emption under this section may be
exercised within ninety days from notice in writing, which shall be served by the owner an
all lessees affected.

18

SEC. 12. Lessee's Right of Redemption. In case the landholding is sold to a third person
without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter shall have the right to redeem
the same at a reasonable price and consideration: Provided, That the entire landholding
sold must be redeemed: Provided, further, That where there are two or more agricultural
lessees, each shall be entitled to said right of redemption only to the extent of the area
actually cultivated by him. The right of redemption under this Section may be exercised
within two years from the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other
right of legal redemption.
The case herein, which positively is an exercise by the tenant of his right to redeem the
landholding, 1 was nevertheless dismissed, the Agrarian Court considering as fatal the
tenant's failure to tender payment or consign the purchase price of the property.
It is argued for the appellant-lessee that the Court of Agrarian Relations erred in dismissing
the action for non-tender of the redemption price, since the law nowhere requires such
tender, and, furthermore, the tenant is not bound to redeem his landholding at the price
for which it was sold, but only at a reasonable price and consideration.
We find that no error was committed in dismissing the case. In the first place, there is no
showing that the Land Reform Council has proclaimed that the government machineries
and agencies in the region are already operating, as required by section 4 of Republic Act
3844.
In the second place, granting that sections 11 and 12 are operative, yet in Torres de
Conejero, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21812, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 775, this
Court ruled that the timely exercise of the right of legal redemption requires either tender
of the price or valid consignation thereof. Said the Court in said case (16 SCRA pages 781782):
It is not difficult to discern why the redemption price should either be fully offered in legal
tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such means can the buyer become
certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good faith. A buyer can not
be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without attendant evidence that the
redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different rule
would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots, as well as to
unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law. While
consignation of the tendered price is not always necessary because legal redemption is not
made to discharge a pre-existing debt (Asturias Sugar Central vs. Cane Molasses Co., 60
Phil. 253), a valid tender is indispensable, for the reasons already stated. Of course,
consignation of the price would remove all controversy as to the redemptioner's ability to
pay at the proper time.
This Court further elaborated the point in its ruling on the motion to reconsider in the
Torres case (16 SCRA, pages 783-784):

3. Whether or not the petitioners exercised diligence in asserting their willingness to pay is
irrelevant. Redemption by the co-owners of the vendor within 30 days is not a matter of
intent, but is effectuated only by payment, or valid tender, of the price within said period.
How the redemptioners raise the money is immaterial; timeliness and completeness of
payment or tender are the things that matter.

The situation becomes worse when, as shown by the evidence in this case, the
redemptioner has no funds and must apply for them to the Land Authority, which, in turn,
must depend on the availability of funds from the Land Bank. It then becomes practically
certain that the landowner will not be able to realize the value of his property for an
indefinite time beyond the two years redemption period.

4. The offer of the redemption price is not bona fide where it is shown that the offerer
could not have made payment in due time if the offer had been accepted. Note that the
co-owners' right to redeem, being granted by law, is binding on the purchaser of the
undivided share by operation of law, and the latter's consent or acceptance is not required
for the existence of the right of redemption. The only matter to be investigated by the
courts, therefore, is the timely exercise of the right, and the only way to exercise it is by a
valid payment or tender within the 30 days Prefixed by the Civil Code.

The appellant herein, like the appellants in the Torres case, urge that this Court has ruled
that previous tender of the redemption money is not indispensable in De la Cruz vs.
Marcelino, 84 Phil. 709, and Torio vs. Del Rosario, 93 Phil. 800. It was, however, pointed out
in the Torres decision that in the two cases relied upon by appellant the redemptioners had
consigned or deposited in court the redemption price when action was filed, for which
reason prior tender was held excused. In the case now before us, there was neither prior
tender nor did judicial consignation accompany the filing of the suit. Furthermore, in the
cases aforesaid, the Court took into account the brevity of the periods (9 days) allowed by
the law operating at the time (Civil Code of 1889); in the case at bar the statute grants the
tenant two years to redeem.

That the legal redemptioner is only required to pay a reasonable price is no obstacle to the
requirement of tender, as ruled also in the Torres case (16 SCRA, page 781):
It is, likewise, argued that tender of the price is excused because Article 1620 of the new
Civil Code allows the redemptioner to pay only a reasonable price if the price of alienation
is grossly excessive, and that the reasonableness of the price to be paid can only be
determined by the courts. We think that the right of a redemptioner to pay a reasonable
price under Article 1620 does not excuse him from the duty to make proper tender of the
price that can be honestly deemed reasonable under the circumstances, without prejudice
to final arbitration by the courts; nor does it authorize said redemptioner to demand that
the vendee accept payment by installments, as petitioners have sought to do.
In our opinion, the foregoing considerations are applicable to redemption (and preemption) under sections 11 and 12 of the Land Reform Act. Both under said law and under
Article 1620 of the Civil Code, the right of legal redemption must be exercised within
specified time limits: and the statutory periods would be rendered meaningless and of easy
evasion unless the redemptioner is required to make an actual tender in good faith of what
he believed to be the reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed. The existence of
the right of redemption operates to depress the market value of the land until the period
expires, and to render that period indefinite by permitting the tenant to file a suit for
redemption, with either party unable to foresee when final judgment will terminate the
action, would render nugatory the period of two years fixed by the statute for making the
redemption and virtually paralyze any efforts of the landowner to realize the value of his
land. No buyer can be expected to acquire it without any certainty as to the amount for
which it may be redeemed, so that he can recover at least his investment in case of
redemption. In the meantime, the landowner's needs and obligations cannot be met. It is
doubtful if any such result was intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that
effect.1awphil.nt

19

It may be added that unless tender or consignation is made requisite to the valid exercise
of the tenant's right to redeem, everytime a redemption is attempted, a case must be filed
in court to ascertain the reasonable price. On the other hand, a prior tender by the tenant
of the price that he considers reasonable affords an opportunity to avoid litigation, for the
landowner may well decide to accept a really reasonable offer, considering that he would
thereby save the attorney's fees and the expense of protracted litigation.
Section 74 of the Land Reform Act (Republic Act No. 3844) establishes a "Land Bank of the
Philippines" intended "to finance the acquisition by the Government of landed estates for
division and resale to small landholders, as well as the purchase of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee from the landowner." No expression in this part of the law, however,
indicates, or even hints, that the 2-year redemption period will not commence to ran until
the tenant obtains financing from the Land Bank, or stops the tenant from securing
redemption funds from some other source. The considerations expressed in this decision
on the confiscatory result of requiring the landowner to wait an indefinite time until the
lessee acquires the means for making the redemption militate against construing the
statement of purposes for which the Land Bank is created (section 74) as condition
precedent to the alienation of a landholding.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order granting the motion to dismiss the complaint is affirmed.
No costs.

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