SANG MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

SMFM 19-14
ACCESS CONTROL TO CRITICAL SITES
AND INSTALLATIONS

HEADQUARTERS, SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL GUARD

FIELD TEST EDITION

APRIL 2009

SMFM 19-14

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

iv

CHAPTER 1
Para 1-1
Para 1-2
Para 1-3
Para 1-4
Para 1-5
Para 1-6
Para 1-7
Para 1-8
CHAPTER 2
Section I
Para 2-1
Para 2-2
Para 2-3
Para 2-4
Para 2-5
Section II
Para 2-6
Para 2-7
Para 2-8
Para 2-9
Para 2-10

1-1

General
Considerations
Identification System
Mechanized Automated Systems
Card/Badge Specifications
Visitor Identification and Control
Enforcement Measures
Security Controls of Packages, Personal Property, and Vehicles

1-1
1-3
1-3
1-5
1-6
1-6
1-7
1-8

ACCESS CONTROL POINTS

-

CHAPTER 3
Para 3-1
Para 3-2
Para 3-3
Para 3-4
Para 3-5
Para 3-6
Para 3-7
Para 3-8
Para 3-9

ACCESS CONTROL

2-1

Introduction to the Access Control Point

General
Access Control Point Classifications
Access Control Point Functions
Multi-Function Access Control Points
Planning and Site Selection Criteria
Organization and Operation of an Access Control Point
Access Control Point Zones
Approach Zone
Access Control Zone
Response Zone
Safety Zone

2-1
2-1
2-1
2-2
2-2
2-3
2-5
2-5
2-5
2-6
2-8
2-8

ACCESS CONTROL POINT INSPECTIONS

3-1

General
Inspection Procedures
Identification Documents
Photograph Identification Checks
Personal Access Control Procedures
Contract Worker/Vendor Access Control Procedures
General
Vehicle Inspections
Objectives of Vehicle Inspections

3-1
3-1
3-1
3-2
3-2
3-3
3-6
3-6
3-6

SMFM 19-14
PAGE
Para 3-10
Para 3-11
Para 3-12
Para 3-13

Avoidance of Inspection Points

Conduct of General Vehicle Searches
Conduct of Primary Searches
Conduct of Secondary Searches

3-7
3-8
3-9
3-14

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS AND SECURITY

MEASURES

4-1

Force Protection Conditions

Random Antiterrorism Measures Program

4-1
4-2

INSTALLATION SECURITY AND RESPONSE FORCE

CAPABILITY

5-1

Law Enforcement Commander

Tiered Response Capabilities
Emergency Responders
Installation Defensive Positions
Classes of Orders
General Orders
Special Orders

5-1
5-2
5-3
5-3
5-4
5-4
5-9

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACCESS

CONTROL POINTS

6-1

General
Airfields
Rail Yards
Pedestrian Gates
Special Events

6-1
6-1
6-1
6-2
6-3

INSTALLATION ENTRANCES

7-1

General
Perimeter Entrances
Entry Control Stations
Warning Signs
Other Signs
Installation Perimeter Roads and Clear Zones
Methods of Control

7-1
7-1
7-1
7-2
7-2
7-3
7-4

APPENDIX - A

VEHICLE INSPECTION HOT SPOTS

A-1

APPENDIX B

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

B-1

CHAPTER 4

Para 4-1
Para 4-2

CHAPTER 5

Para 5-1
Para 5-2
Para 5-3
Para 5-4
Para 5-5
Para 5-6
Para 5-7

CHAPTER 6

Para 6-1
Para 6-2
Para 6-3
Para 6-4
Para 6-5

CHAPTER 7
Para 7-1
Para 7-2
Para 7-3
Para 7-4
Para 7-5
Para 7-6
Para 7-7

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SMFM 19-14
PAGE
Para B-1
Para B-2
Para B-3
Para B-4
Para B-5
Para B-6
Para B-7

APPENDIX C
Para C-1
Para C-2
Para C-3
Para C-4
Para C-5
Para C-6

APPENDIX - D
Section I
Para D-1
Section II
Para D-2
Para D-3
Para D-4

General
Purpose of Rules of Engagement
Drafting Considerations
Elements of Self Defense
Characteristics of Effective Rules of Engagement
Standing Rules of Engagement
Interpret, Draft, Disseminate, and Train Method

B-1
B-1
B-1
B-2
B-3
B-3
B-3

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS

C-1

General
Force Protection Condition NORMAL
Force Protection Condition ALPHA
Force Protection Condition BRAVO
Force Protection Condition CHARLIE
Force Protection Condition DELTA

C-1
C-1
C-1
C-2
C-4
C-6

BARRIERS AND BLAST MITIGATION

D-1

Blast Mitigation
Introduction and Technical Definitions
Barriers
Intended Use and Context
Natural Material and Cosmetic Barriers
Fabricated Barriers

D-1
D-1
D-3
D-3
D-4
D-5

iii

SMFM 19-14

PREFACE
This manual provides installation commanders with the basic information necessary for effective
access control to their installations and facilities. It does not discuss the technical issues involved
with standards and designs. This manual provides commanders with inspection procedures at an
access control point. Additionally, this manual equips operators (which include military police
and sentinels of augmenting units) with the various vehicle and facility inspection criteria and
measures necessary to conduct an effective access control point.
The intent of this manual is to establish a standardized doctrine of tactics, techniques, and
procedures. The actions and standards in this manual will apply to all units of the National
Guard.
The proponent for this manual is Headquarters, National Guard Military Schools. Submit
changes for improving this publication on SM Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to
Publications and Blank Forms) and forward it to Headquarters, National Guard Military Schools;
Attention: Commander, Directorate of Training; Khasm Al An, Riyadh 11173, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia.

iv

SMFM 19-14

CHAPTER 1
ACCESS CONTROL
1-1.

GENERAL. Perimeter barriers, intrusion-detection devices, and protective lighting

provide physical-security safeguards; however, they alone are not enough. An accesscontrol system must be established and maintained to preclude unauthorized entry.
Effective access-control procedures prevent the introduction of harmful devices, materiel,
and components. They minimize the misappropriation, pilferage, or compromise of
materiel or recorded information by controlling packages, materiel, and property
movement. Access-control rosters, personal recognition, identification cards, badgeexchange procedures, and personnel escorts all contribute to an effective access control
system.
a.

Designated Restricted Areas. The installation commander is responsible for

designating and establishing restricted areas. A restricted area is any area that is
subject to special restrictions or controls for security reasons. This does not include
areas over which aircraft flight is restricted.
b.

Degree of Security. An installation may have varying degrees of security. It may be

designated in its entirety as a restricted area, with no further restrictions; or it may
be subdivided into controlled, limited, or exclusion areas with restrictions of
movement and specific clear zones. Figure 1-1 depicts a simplified restricted area
and the degrees of security. The degree of security and control required depends on
the nature, sensitivity, or importance of the security interest. Restricted areas are
classified as controlled, limited, or exclusion areas.

Figure 1-1. Schematic Diagram of a Simplified Restricted Area

and the Degrees of Security.

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SMFM 19-14

c.

1.

A controlled area is that portion of a restricted area usually near or

surrounding a limited or exclusion area. Entry to the controlled area is
restricted to personnel with a need for access. Movement of authorized
personnel within this area is not necessarily controlled since mere entry to the
area does not provide access to the security interest. The controlled area is
provided for administrative control, for safety, or as a buffer zone for in-depth
security for the limited or exclusion area. The commander establishes the
control of movement.

2.

A limited area is a restricted area within close proximity of a security interest.

Uncontrolled movement may permit access to the item. Escorts and other
internal restrictions may prevent access within limited areas.

3.

An exclusion area is a restricted area containing a security interest.

Uncontrolled movement permits direct access to the item.

Restricted Area. The security protection afforded by a restricted area pertains

particularly to subversive-activity control; that is, protection against espionage,
sabotage, or any such action adversely affecting national defense. Within this
context, the designation restricted area is not applicable to an area solely for
protection against common pilferage or misappropriation of property or material
that is not classified or not essential to national defense.
1.

For example, an area devoted to the storage or use of classified documents,

equipment, or materials should be designated as a restricted area to safeguard
against espionage.

2.

An installation communications center should also be so designated to

safeguard against sabotage. On the other hand, a cashier's cage or an ordinary
mechanic's tool room should not be so designated, although the commander
may impose controls to access. This may be a simple matter of posting an off
limits to unauthorized personnel sign.

3.

The senior law enforcement officer or the physical-security manager acts as

an advisor to the commander. In his recommendations, he must consider
evaluating the purpose of designating a restricted area and coordinating with
the intelligence officer.

4.

A restricted area must be designated in writing by the commander and must be

posted with warning signs. In areas where English is one of two or more
languages commonly spoken, warning signs will be posted in English and in
Arabic (Figure 1-2).

1-2

SMFM 19-14
RESTRICTED AREA
THIS INSTALLATION HAS BEEN DECLARED A RESTRICTED AREA BY AUTHORITY
OF (TITLE, COMMANDING GENERAL OR COMMANDING OFFICER) IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE DIRECTIVE ISSUED BY THE
COMMANDING GENERAL NATIONAL GUARD.
ALL PERSONS AND VEHICLES ENTERING HEREIN ARE LIABLE TO SEARCH.
PHOTOGRAPHING OR MAKING NOTES, DRAWINGS, MAPS, OR GRAPHIC
REPRESENTATIVES OF THIS AREA OR ITS ACTIVITIES ARE PROHIBITED UNLESS
SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED BY THE COMMANDER. ANY SUCH MATERIAL FOUND

IN THE POSSESSION OF UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS WILL BE CONFISCATED.

Figure 1-2. Sample Restricted-Area Warning.
1-2.

1-3.

CONSIDERATIONS. There are other important considerations concerning restricted

areas and their lines of division. These considerations include:
a.

A survey and analysis of the installation, its missions, and its security interests.
This can determine immediate and anticipated needs that require protection.
Anticipated needs are determined from plans for the future.

b.

The size and nature of the security interest being protected. Safes may provide
adequate protection for classified documents and small items; however, large items
may have to be placed within guarded enclosures.

c.

Some security interests are more sensitive to compromise than others. Brief
observation or a simple act by an untrained person may constitute a compromise in
some cases. In others, detailed study and planned action by an expert may be
required.

d.

All security interests should be evaluated according to their importance. This may
be indicated by a security classification such as confidential, secret, or top secret.

e.

Parking areas for privately owned vehicles are established outside of restricted
areas. Vehicle entrances must be kept at a minimum for safe and efficient control.

f.

Physical protective measures (such as fences, gates, and window bars) must be
installed.

IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM. An identification system is established at each

installation or facility to provide a method of identifying personnel. The system provides
for personal recognition and the use of security identification cards or badges to aid in the
control and movement of personnel activities.

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SMFM 19-14
a.

Standard identification cards are generally acceptable for access into areas that are
unrestricted and have no security interest. Personnel requiring access to restricted
areas should be issued a security identification card or badge as prescribed by
established policy.

b.

The cards/badges design must be simple and provide for adequate control of
personnel. A security identification card/badge system must be established for
restricted areas with 30 or more employees per shift. Commanders may (at their
discretion) authorize a card/badge system in restricted areas for less than 30 people.

c.

Identification Methods. Four of the most commonly used access-control

identification methods are the personal-recognition system, the single-card or badge system, the card- or badge-exchange system, and the multiple-card or -badge
system.
1.

The personal-recognition system. This system is the simplest of all systems. A

member of the security force providing access control visually checks the
person requesting entry. Entry is granted based on:

The individual being recognized.

The need to enter has been established.
The person is on an access-control roster.

2.

The single card or badge system. This system reflects permission to enter
specific areas by the badge depicting specific letters, numbers, or particular
colors. This system lends to comparatively loose control and is not
recommended for high-security areas. Permission to enter specific areas does
not always go with the need to know. Because the identification cards/badges
frequently remain in the bearers possession while off duty, it affords the
opportunity for alteration or duplication.

3.

The card or badge exchange systems. In this system, two cards/badges contain
identical photographs. Each card/badge has a different background color, or
one card/badge has an overprint. One card/badge is presented at the entrance
to a specific area and exchanged for the second card/badge, which is worn or
carried while in that area. Individual possession of the second card/badge
occurs only while the bearer is in the area for which it was issued. When
leaving the area, the second card/badge is returned and maintained in the
security area. This method provides a greater degree of security and decreases
the possibility of forgery, alteration, or duplication of the card/badge.

4.

The multiple card or badge system. This system provides the greatest degree
of security. Instead of having specific markings on the cards/badges denoting
permission to enter various restricted areas, the multiple card/badge system
makes an exchange at the entrance to each security area. The card/badge
information is identical and allows for comparisons. Exchange cards/badges

1-4

SMFM 19-14
are maintained at each area only for individuals who have access to the
specific area.
1-4.

MECHANIZED/AUTOMATED SYSTEMS. An alternative to using guards or military

police to visually check cards/badges and access rosters is to use building card-access
systems or biometric-access readers.
a.

These systems can control the flow of personnel entering and exiting a complex.
Included in these systems are:

b.

Coded devices such as mechanical or electronic keypads or combination

locks.
Credential devices such as magnetic-strip or proximity card readers.
Biometric devices such as fingerprint readers or retina scanners.

Access-control and identification systems base their judgment factor on a remote

capability through a routine discriminating device for positive identification. These
systems do not require guards at entry points; they identify an individual in the
following manner:

The system receives physical identification data from an individual.

The data is encoded and compared to stored information.
The system determines whether access is authorized.
The information is translated into readable results.

c.

Specialized mechanical systems are ideal for highly sensitive situations because
they use a controlled process in a controlled environment to establish the required
database and accuracy. One innovative technique applied to identification and
admittance procedures involves dimension comparisons. The dimension of a
person's full hand is compared to previously stored data to determine entry
authorization. Other specialized machine readers can scan a single fingerprint or an
eye retina and provide positive identification of anyone attempting entry.

d.

An all-inclusive automated identification and access-control system reinforces the

security in-depth ring through its easy and rapid change capability. The computer is
able to do this through its memory. Changes can be made quickly by the systems
administrator.

e.

The commercial security market has a wide range of mechanized and automated
hardware and software systems. Automated equipment is chosen only after
considering the security needs and the environment in which it operates. These
considerations include whether the equipment is outdoors or indoors, the
temperature range, and weather conditions. Assessment of security needs and the
use of planning, programming, and budgeting procedures greatly assist a security
manager in improving the security posture.

1-5

SMFM 19-14
1-5.

CARD/BADGE SPECIFICATIONS. Security cards/badges should be designed and

constructed to meet the requirements of the National Guard. Upon issuing a card/badge,
security personnel must explain to the bearer the wear required and the authorizations
allowed with the card/badge.

1-6.

VISITOR IDENTIFICATION AND CONTROL. Procedures must be implemented to

properly identify and control personnel. This includes visitors presenting their
cards/badges to guards at entrances of restricted areas. Visitors are required to stay with
their assigned escort. Guards must ensure that visitors stay in areas relating to their visit;
an uncontrolled visitor, although conspicuously identified, could acquire information for
which he is not authorized. Foreign-national visitors should be escorted at all times.
a.

Approval for visitors should be obtained at least 24 hours in advance (if possible).
Where appropriate, the installation should prepare an agenda for the visitor and
designate an escort officer.

b.

Measures must be in place to recover visitor cards/badges on the visits expiration

or when they are no longer required.
1.

2.

Physical-security precautions against pilferage, espionage, and sabotage

require the screening, identification, and control of visitors. Visitors are
generally classed in the following categories:
(a)

Persons with whom every installation or facility has business (such as

suppliers, customers, and government inspectors).

(b)

Individuals or groups who desire to visit an installation or facility for

personal or educational reasons. Such visits may be desired by
educational, technical, or scientific organizations.

(c)

Individuals or groups specifically sponsored by the government (such as

foreign nationals visiting under technical cooperation programs and
similar visits). Requests for visits by foreign nationals must be
processed according to established policy.

(d)

Guided tours to selected portions of the installation in the interest of

public relations.

The identification and control mechanisms for visitors must be in place. They
may include the following:
(a)

Methods of establishing the authority for admitting visitors and any

limitations relative to access.

(b)

The use of visitor registration forms. These forms provide a record of

the visitor and the time, location, and duration of his visit.

1-6

SMFM 19-14

3.

1-7.

(c)

Positive identification of visitors by personal recognition, visitor permit,

or other identifying credentials. Contact the employer, supervisor, or
officer in charge to validate the visit.

(d)

The use of visitor identification cards/badges. The cards/badges bear

serial numbers, the area or areas to which access is authorized, the
bearers name, and escort requirements.

Individual groups entering a restricted area must meet specific prerequisites

before being granted access. The following guidance is for group access into a
restricted area:
(a)

Visitors. Before allowing visitors into a restricted area, contact the

person or activity being visited. After verifying the visitors identity,
issue a badge, complete the registration forms, and assign an escort (if
required). Visitors may include public-utility and commercial-service
representatives.

(b)

Very important persons. The procedures for admitting very important

persons and foreign nationals into restricted areas are contained in
established policy. Special considerations and coordination with the
protocol office are necessary. A 24-hour advance notice is desirable for
these requests, along with an agenda for the visit and the designation of
an escort, if appropriate.

ENFORCEMENT MEASURES. The most vulnerable link in any identification system

is its enforcement. Security forces must be proactive in performing their duties. A routine
performance of duty will adversely affect even the most elaborate system. Positive
enforcement measures must be prescribed to enhance security.
a.

Some of these measures may include:

1.

Designating alert and tactful security personnel at entry control points.

2.

Ensuring that personnel possess quick perception and good judgment.

3.

Requiring entry-control personnel to conduct frequent irregular checks of their

assigned areas.

4.

Formalizing standard procedures for conducting guard mounts and posting

and relieving security personnel. These measures will prevent posting of
unqualified personnel and a routine performance of duty.

5.

Prescribing a uniform method of handling or wearing security identification

cards/badges. If carried on the person, the card must be removed from the
wallet (or other holder) and handed to security personnel. When worn, the

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SMFM 19-14
badge will be worn in a conspicuous position to expedite inspection and
recognition from a distance.
6.

Designing entry and exit control points of restricted areas to force personnel to
pass in a single file in front of security personnel. In some instances, the use
of turnstiles may be advisable to assist in maintaining positive control.

7.

Providing lighting at control points. The lighting must illuminate the area to
enable security personnel to compare the bearer with the identification
card/badge.

8.

Enforcing access-control measures by educating security forces and

employees.

9.

(a)

Enforcement of access-control systems rests primarily with the security

forces; however, it is essential that they have the full cooperation of the
employees. Employees must be instructed to consider each unidentified
or improperly identified individual as a trespasser.

(b)

In restricted areas where access is limited to a particular zone,

employees must report unauthorized individuals to the security force.

Positioning identification card/badge racks or containers at entry control

points so that they are accessible only to guard-force personnel.

10. Appointing a responsible custodian to accomplish control procedures of

cards/badges in accordance with established policy. The custodian is
responsible for the issue, turn in, recovery, and renewal of security
identification cards/badges.
1-8.

SECURITY CONTROLS OF PACKAGES, PERSONAL PROPERTY, AND

VEHICLES. A good package-control system helps prevent or minimize pilferage,
sabotage, and espionage. The local policy may allow the entry of packages with proper
authorization into restricted areas without inspection. A package checking system is used
at the entrance gate. When practical, inspect all outgoing packages except those properly
authorized for removal. When a 100 percent inspection is impractical, conduct frequent
unannounced spot checks. A good package-control system assists in the movement of
authorized packages, material, and property.
a.

Property controls are not limited to packages carried openly, but they include the
control of anything that could be used to conceal property or material. Personnel
should not be routinely searched except in unusual situations. Searches must be
performed according to the local policy.

1-8

SMFM 19-14
b.

All privately owned vehicles on the installation should be registered with the
military police. Security personnel should assign a temporary decal or other
temporary identification tag to visitors vehicles to permit ready recognition.

c.

When authorized vehicles enter or exit a restricted area, they undergo a systematic
search, including but not limited to the following areas:

d.

Vehicles interior.
Engine compartment.
External air breathers.
Top of the vehicle.
Battery compartment.
Cargo compartment.
Undercarriage.

The movement of trucks and railroad cars into and out of restricted areas should be
supervised and inspected. Truck and railroad entrances are controlled by locked
gates when not in use and are manned by security personnel when unlocked. The
identification cards/badges are issued to operators to ensure proper identification
and registration for access to specific loading and unloading areas.
1.

All conveyances entering or leaving a protected area are required to pass

through a service gate manned by security forces. Drivers, helpers,
passengers, and vehicle contents must be carefully examined. The
examination may include:

Appropriate entries in the security log (including the date, operator's

name, load description, and time entered and departed).
A check of the operators license.
Verification of the seal number with the shipping document and
examination of the seal for tampering.

2.

Incoming trucks and railroad cars must be assigned escorts before they are
permitted to enter designated limited or exclusion areas. Commanders should
establish published procedures to control the movement of trucks and railroad
cars that enter designated restricted areas to discharge or pick up cargo
(escorts will be provided when necessary).

3.

The best control is provided when all of these elements are incorporated into
access-control procedures. Simple, understandable, and workable access
control procedures are used to achieve security objectives without impeding
operations. When properly organized and administered, access-control
procedures provide a method of positively identifying personnel who have the
need to enter or leave an area.

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SMFM 19-14

THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

1-10

SMFM 19-14

CHAPTER 2
ACCESS CONTROL POINTS
Section I
Introduction to the Access Control Point
2-1.

GENERAL. The perimeter security and access control systems form the first line of
defense for National Guard installations.
a.

The goal of perimeter security/access control is to safeguard the installation by

controlling access and protecting National Guard assets. This goal is accomplished
through the prevention, detection, and response to enemy/threat tactics, techniques
and procedures designed to observe, and disrupt National Guard operations. These
may include acts of terrorism, sabotage, theft, pilferage, trespass, espionage or
other threat activity. A properly designed perimeter security/access control system
should perform in an integrated, layered, defense-in-depth manner so that security
forces can achieve the following:

b.

The security elements that comprise the perimeter security system include:

2-2.

Detect attempts to reconnoiter or attack the Installation or interfere with the

performance missions/functions.
Warn the installation that an attack is imminent or under way.
Assess the size and intention of the enemy threat.
Deny unauthorized access to the installation.
Detect and deny the enemy/threat capability to threaten National Guard
installations.

Standoff.
Physical barriers.
Access control.
Entry control points.
Security lighting.
Hardened fighting positions/towers/overwatch.
Intrusion detection and surveillance systems.
Security forces.

ACCESS CONTROL POINT CLASSIFICATIONS. Access control points are

classified based on the intended function and anticipated usage of the access control
point. The four use classifications are outlined in Table 2-1. The use classification is a
function of the type of traffic, hours of operation, and force protection condition,
considerations.

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SMFM 19-14
Use
Classification

Operational
Hours

Force Protection
Condition
Considerations

Primary

24/7 Open
continuously

Open thru Force

Protection Condition
Delta

Secondary

Regular hours,
closed at times

Limited Use

Only opened for

special purposes
Varies

Potentially closed at or
above Force Protection
Condition Charlie
Closed at most times

Pedestrian Access

Potentially closed at or
above Force Protection
Condition Charlie

Preferred Operation

Vehicle registration/visitor pass

capacity. Regular operations, visitors
with authorization. Could also be
designated as truck and delivery gate
Regular operations, visitors with
authorization. Could also be
designated as truck and delivery gate
Tactical vehicles, hazardous material,
special events, etc
Personnel only. Could be located
near installation housing areas, near
schools, or as part of a primary or
secondary access control point

Table 2-1. Access Control Point Use Classifications.

2-3.

ACCESS CONTROL POINT FUNCTIONS. An access control point can have many
functions. Not all functions are required at every access control point. Functions for each
access control point are based on the installations mission, antiterrorism plan, access
control point use classification, and land area. Functions may change to meet the
demands of higher force protection condition levels. The basic functions associated with
an access control point are:

2-4.

Processing visitors.
Vehicle identification checks.
Personnel identification checks.
Privately owned vehicle inspections.
Commercial/large vehicle inspections.

MULTI-FUNCTION ACCESS CONTROL POINTS. When an installation has a

limited number of access points, functional requirements may be combined at the access
control point. For example, an installation with only one access control point may
combine all of the above functions, or may use a centralized truck inspection facility that
is separate from the access control points or the installation.
a.

A large installation may designate one access control point for truck inspection and
commercial vehicle access only. Not requiring support for all functions at each
access control point will reduce the infrastructure requirements. Additionally, when
designating the functions for all access control points at an installation, give
consideration to the requirements to support oversized, atypical vehicles such as
those frequently encountered during construction operations or during mobilization
of military vehicles and equipment. These atypical vehicles should be supported by
at least one limited use or primary/secondary access control point, which may
require modifications such as wider lanes, limiting the use of channelization
islands, or limiting potential obstructions.

2-2

SMFM 19-14
b.

2-5.

When possible separate truck and passenger vehicle traffic. For traffic lanes that
require speed management to delay a high performance passenger vehicle, exclude
truck traffic from these lanes. The effectiveness of most speed management
techniques for passenger vehicles decreases when trucks must use the same lanes.
Also, search requirements differ significantly for trucks and passenger vehicles.
Consider separate search facilities for those types of traffic to avoid congestion and
improve efficiency of search guards during higher force protection conditions.

PLANNING AND SITE SELECTION CRITERIA.

a.

b.

Planning. The following groups should be involved in the planning and design of
an access control point:
1.

Security forces (operations, security, crime prevention, personnel security, and

communications security).

2.

Installation facility and traffic engineering representatives.

3.

Installation antiterrorism officer.

4.

Communications officers.

5.

Safety officers.

6.

Local and national officials to ensure integrity of restrictive access to the

installation and reduce the potential adverse effects on surrounding
communities.

Site Selection Criteria.

1.

User demand. Site selection for a new access control point starts with an
extensive evaluation of the anticipated demand for access to the installation,
an analysis of traffic origin and destination, and an analysis of the capability
of the surrounding road network to tie in to the access control point, including
its capacity to handle additional traffic. Analyses of traffic patterns at
installation entry points should include the local department of transportation,
since any traffic changes will likely have some effect or impact on civilian
traffic patterns.

2.

Existing terrain and available space. The existing terrain can have a significant
impact on the suitability of a potential access control point site. Flat terrain is
generally preferred. a gentle rise in elevation up to the gatehouse allows for a
clear view of arriving vehicles, which helps entry control personnel monitor
potential threats. Access control point spatial requirements vary depending on
the type, the traffic demand, and the security measures necessary. The
installation should have a corridor (tract of land for the access control point) at

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least 43 meters wide for collector streets 2,000 to 8,000 vehicles per day and
55 meters wide for arterial streets 8,000 25,000 vehicles per day. These
corridors should have a dedicated right-of-way protected from encroachment
by buildings, trees, and other objects. This will provide a safe, clear roadway
and accommodate future expansion. Space must also be available for the other
access control point elements.
3.

Future development plans. Carefully evaluate future development plans for

the installation and the surrounding community when selecting a site for a
new access control point or modifying existing facilities. All access control
point development plans should accommodate future modifications
necessitated by increased demand or revised security measures.

4.

Compatible land use. Do not locate access control points near restricted/clear
zones, protection-level resources, and identified vulnerable assets. Locate
access control points away from housing, school, and commercial areas, both
on and off installation, to avoid interference with pedestrians, parked cars, and
driveways.

5.

Location. Give special attention to the requirements for parking and roadway
projects, which are necessary even if the project is not associated with a
building renovation, modification, repair, or restoration.

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Section II
Organization and Operation of an Access Control Point
2-6.

ACCESS CONTROL POINT ZONES. An access control point can be subdivided into
four zones, each encompassing specific functions and operations. Beginning at the
installation property boundary, the zones include the approach zone, access control zone,
response zone, and the safety zone. Specific components are used within each zone to
conduct the necessary operations. The location of each zone of the access control point is
illustrated in Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1. Access Control Point Zones.

2-7.

APPROACH ZONE. The approach zone lies between the installation boundary and the
access control zone. It is the interface between the off-facility road network and the
facility, and the area all vehicles must traverse before reaching the actual checkpoint.
a.

Design Elements. The approach zone should include design elements to support the
following functions and operations:

Reduce the speed of incoming vehicles to, or below, the design speed of the
access control point.
Perform sorting of traffic by vehicle type, e.g. Sorting trucks or visitors into
the proper lane before reaching the inspection area or checkpoint.
Provide adequate stacking distance for vehicles waiting for entry, especially
during times of peak demand, to ensure minimal impact on traffic approaching
the installation and on traffic safety operations of adjacent public highways.
Provide the first opportunity to identify potential threat vehicles, including
those attempting entry through the outbound lanes of traffic.

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Roadway layout and traffic control devices such as signs, variable message
systems, signals, and lane control markings should be utilized to perform these
functions. Drivers should be notified of the upcoming access control point, the
proper speed to travel, and proper lane to utilize.
b.

2-8.

Size of the Approach Zone. The length of the approach zone is based on available
land, distance required for queuing and performing traffic sorting, and the space
required to create additional lanes of traffic without queuing excessively onto
adjacent public highways. The design should also support measures that may be
needed during higher force protection condition levels, the use of random
antiterrorism measures at lower force protection condition levels, and the
temporary placement of traffic barriers as specified in the installation antiterrorism
plan to constrain and slow traffic. Space may also be required to support traffic
calming techniques to mitigate high-speed threats.

ACCESS CONTROL ZONE. The access control zone is the main body of the access
control point and includes guard facilities and traffic management equipment used by the
security forces. The design of the access control zone should be flexible enough to ensure
the infrastructure can support future inspection demands, access control equipment, and
technologies. When designing the access control zone, consider the requirements to
process the following types of vehicles depending on the intended functions of the access
control point:

Vehicles of authorized personnel.

Government vehicles.
Visitor vehicles.
Military convoys.
Delivery vans, trucks, and buses.

a.

Typical Operations in the Access Control Zone. Most installations conduct

identification procedures manually and require both vehicle and personnel
identification. Most installations issue visitor and/or vehicle passes at a centralized
visitors center. Security personnel generally conduct these procedures in access
control zones at Force Protection Condition BRAVO and below:

b.

Verification of vehicle decals.

Verification of personnel identification.
General surveillance of the vehicle and its contents.
Random and complete inspections of the vehicle and contents.

Inspection and Control of Vehicles. The frequency of complete inspections is

dependent on the force protection condition level, the use of random antiterrorism
measures, or the suspicions raised from general surveillance. Design inspection
areas to accommodate one or more vehicles requiring detailed inspection. Consider
monitoring and control of both inbound and outbound traffic. At high force
protection conditions, installations may conduct vehicle checks or check visitor

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SMFM 19-14
passes as personnel are leaving the installation. If a vehicle is denied entry during
identification checks, the access control zone must have room for that vehicle to be
re-directed to exit the installation. Traffic arms can be used to control traffic when a
vehicle is being rejected from the access control point (Figure 2-2).

Figure 2-2. Access Control Zone Operated by Security Personnel.

c.

Tandem Processing. Installations may use tandem processing, with two or more
security personnel posted to each lane of traffic, to increase the throughput of an
access control point. It has been estimated that tandem processing may improve
capacity by up to 50 percent per lane (traffic engineering and highway safety
bulletin: gates revisited). This additional capacity may be critical during increased
force protection condition levels or during the use of random antiterrorism
measures. Therefore, design access control zones to support tandem processing.

d.

Support for Automation. In addition to supporting manual procedures, design the

access control zone to accommodate automated identification systems. In order to
use automated systems, vehicles will need to be channeled to the proper locations.
Design automated operations to mimic current identification procedures by
requiring identification of both vehicles and personnel. Pilot projects have been
initiated to test potential technologies, and it is anticipated that the use of
automated verification and identification procedures will become more widespread.

e.

Where the automated system is known, design the access control zone to provide
the necessary infrastructure to support the system. If the exact type of automated
equipment and procedures used for vehicle or personnel identification is unknown,
provide a flexible layout and electrical power infrastructure to support the future
installation of an automated system with limited disruption to operations of the
access control point.

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2-9.

RESPONSE ZONE. The response zone is the area extending from the end of the access
control zone to the final denial barrier. This zone defines the end of the access control
point. Design the response zone so that the security forces have time to react to a threat,
operate the final denial barriers, and close the access control point if necessary.

2-10. SAFETY ZONE. A terrorist vehicle could explode inside the contained area of the
access control point. Consider the effects an explosion may have on nearby personnel,
buildings, or assets. The safety zone extends from the passive and active barriers in all
directions to protect installation personnel from an explosion at the vehicle barricade.
Determine the acceptable standoff distance or safety zone by the expected weight of the
explosive charge and the facility or asset to be protected. Another consideration in the
development of the safety zone is any exclusion zones, which may be required to
minimize radiation exposure from x-ray, gamma ray, or similar inspection equipment.

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CHAPTER 3
ACCESS CONTROL POINT INSPECTIONS
3-1.

GENERAL. Installation commanders are responsible for protecting the personnel and
property under their jurisdiction and for maintaining order on the installation. A key part
of that responsibility is the requirement to emplace procedures for inspecting persons and
their property and vehicles at entry and exit points of the installation. In this manual, the
term inspection is used to describe a physical security measure. An inspection is
different from a search in that an inspection is not based on reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. An access control point inspection is the examination of a vehicle or a
hand carried item without the justification for a search.

3-2.

INSPECTION PROCEDURES. Installation commanders may direct or establish

procedures for access control point inspections of all or randomly selected vehicles
entering or leaving an installation under their jurisdiction. This is regardless of whether
the owner or operator of the vehicle is military or civilian.

3-3.

a.

Civilians attempting to enter an installation should not be inspected over their

objection, but instead, should be denied access to the installation. Such refusal
should be documented, reported, and treated as suspicious activity. Other access
control points should be notified with a description of the vehicle and occupants to
ensure that they do not try to gain access at another access control point. Vehicle
inspections at access control points are not based upon probable cause, but are
based on the commanders authority to protect the security of the installation,
protect government property, and prevent theft.

b.

All personnel entering a National Guard installation should have at least one form
of official photo identification. Normally, all visitors are required to sign in and
receive a temporary pass to enter the installation. Local policy describes the
procedure for issuing temporary passes.

IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS. The installation commander may direct what form

of personal identification will be used to gain access to the installation. When conducting
100 percent hands-on identification verification checks, access controllers normally
verify the identification of individuals by using one of the following documents or
methods:

Military identification card.

National identification card.
Drivers license.
Passport.
Iqama
Installation pass card

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SMFM 19-14
3-4.

PHOTOGRAPH IDENTIFICATION CHECKS. Access controllers physically take

the card and compare the picture on the card to the person. Other measures include
checking both sides of the card for the following:

3-5.

Expiration date.
Modifications or discrepancies.
Physical characteristics against the persons physical appearance.
Holograms, where appropriate.
That the card is not damaged, coming apart, or showing signs of tampering or
alteration.

PERSONNEL ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES. The objective of a personnel

access control system is to establish control pertinent to the National Guard or a protected
critical asset. Regardless of the type of measures used, a policy that clearly defines
authority and identifies the criteria for access should be established. This policy should
cover visitors, vendors, contracted workers (maintenance and support personnel), local
police, etc. The policy must also clearly define the types of identification to be presented
by personnel to verify authority and criteria for access. For example, if a badge system is
used, the policy should contain a complete description of acceptable badges. Personnel
access control procedures must also define personnel search procedures and methods. To
maintain positive control over personnel access to National Guard installations and
associated critical assets, security personnel can implement several access control
measures, including:

Access control lists.

Pass and badge system.
Exchange-pass system.
Escort system.

a.

Access Control Lists. Admission to certain National Guard sites, as well as to

critical assets, should be granted only to persons who have a valid reason to be on
the installation. Personnel desiring access should be positively identified prior to
granting access. Access control lists are essential to security. They should contain
names of only those individuals specifically authorized access to secure sites or
critical asset. They should be stringently controlled and continuously updated. They
should never be displayed to the public. If a computerized access list system is
used, the computer files used to generate such a list must be safeguarded against
tampering. Admission of persons other than those on the authorized access list
should be approved by the local commander or designated representative.

b.

Pass-and-Badge System. If the number of personnel requiring access to the critical

sites exceeds a number that can be recognized personally by security personnel for
the installation, a pass-and-badge identification system should be considered.
Security badges should contain a picture of the individual who has authorized
access and may contain additional information about the individual. Information
that should not be printed on the badge includes the home address, the specific

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work location address and telephone number, security information, or information
identifying the badge holder as a National Guard soldier.

3-6.

c.

Exchange-Pass System. An exchange-pass identification system may be employed

to ensure stringent access control for a installation. This system involves
exchanging one or more identification media (such as badges or passes) for another
separate type of identifier (such as badges or passes). This system is particularly
useful in controlling visitors. The process of exchanging passes is a personal one,
permitting security personnel an opportunity to examine closely all persons before
they enter and exit the installation.

d.

Escort System. Escorting is an effective method to control visiting personnel or

contracted workers within a installation. The escort must remain with the visitor at
all times while he/she is within the installation. If local written policy determines
that an individual does not require an escort within the area, the individual must
meet all the entry requirements for unescorted access. Escorts should be military
personnel assigned or attached to the installation. A major objective in escorting
visitors around a installation is to ensure that all material brought into the
installation by the visitor is searched for contraband or explosives and that no
packages or other materials are left behind when the visitor departs.

CONTRACT WORKER/VENDOR ACCESS CONTROL PROCEDURES. Contract

workers/vendors may be used to operate dining facilities, collect trash, perform custodial
services, and maintain utility systems on the installation.
a.

Procedures must be established to screen the background of these personnel and

control their access on installations. The best way to minimize the possible threat
posed by contract worker/vendors is to minimize their use and avoid fraternizing
with those who do work on the installation. The following are key elements to a
contract worker/vendor access control plan:

b.

Background investigation.
Control.
Contracted worker/vendor uniforms.
Control officer.
Parking.
Packages.

Background Investigation. All potential contracted workers/vendors should receive

a preliminary historical inquiry prior to their employment. An inquiry and thorough
investigation will identify any documented history of criminal activity. Important
background information for an individual includes:

Does the contracted worker/vendor have valid identification papers?

Does the contracted worker/vendor have any history of terrorist activity?

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SMFM 19-14

c.

Control. A pass and badge system coupled with an escort system is the most
effective way to control contracted workers/vendors. A pass-and-badge system
serves to identify and restrict access to certain areas of an installation. Badges can
be color-coded to identify the level of escort/supervision required. At the minimum,
a pass-and-badge system should include the following information on all contracted
workers/vendors:

d.

Does the contracted worker/vendor have any mental or physical problems that
could cause injury to other person(s)?
Does the contracted worker/vendor have a large family whose needs exceed
his financial capabilities?

Photo.
Name.
Duty.
Title.
Badge number.
Expiration date.

Some unique marking which can be used to help detect counterfeit badges Colorcoded badges work best at installations that are divided into zones or sectors. The
color of these badges should identify the specific zone or activity to which
contracted workers/vendors are restricted, such as the dining facility. Badges
should also identify whether or not a contracted worker/vendor has access to more
than one zone. When a contracted worker/vendor is outside of his assigned area, he
must be escorted. Contracted workers/vendors should also be controlled by use of
an access control list that names those contracted workers/vendors authorized
access to the installation. The access control list is most effective when used in
conjunction with the pass-and-badge system described above. If photo
identification are not available, security personnel at the access control point to the
installation should have a photograph book of authorized contracted
workers/vendors. Sample procedures for controlling contracted workers/vendors
access onto an installation are listed below:

The contracted workers/vendors arrive for work at a designated access control

point.
Security personnel verify a contracted workers/vendors identification against
his badge, which is kept at the access control point, or a photo book and the
access control list.
If the contracted worker/vendor has authorization for unescorted access, he is
issued his photographic badge and allowed to proceed to the search area.
If the contracted worker/vendor requires an escort, the appropriate unit is
contacted to provide an escort and verify the contracted workers/vendors
authorization to enter the base.
Once the escort arrives the contracted worker/vendor is allowed to proceed to
the search area.
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SMFM 19-14

If a contracted worker/vendor is not authorized onto the installation, the

individual is detained and local security forces are contacted.
All badges are collected as contracted workers/vendors leave the base.
All badges are reconciled daily to ensure that all contracted workers/vendors
have left the base and returned their badges.

e.

Contracted Worker/Vendor Uniforms. If resources are available, it is recommended

that contracted workers/vendors be issued uniforms, such as distinctive coveralls,
that will serve to enhance their control and movement. Uniforms must be
controlled in a similar manner and to the same degree as badges.

f.

Control Officer. A contracted worker/vendor liaison or control officer should be

designated to handle all contracted worker/vendor related affairs. This officer
should ensure that all contracted workers/vendors attend an indoctrination course
that clearly outlines access control rules and security policies. Likewise, all
national guard personnel should attend a class on the handling of and escort
procedures for contracted workers/vendors. Escorts must know how to properly
observe contracted workers/vendors and know the appropriate actions to take in the
event of a hostile or an emergency situation.

g.

Parking. Installations that contract their support services should stipulate that
workers will be transported to the site. If contracted workers/vendors are not
transported to the site, off-site parking should be available. Off-site parking areas
should be placed far enough away from the installation and access control point
that protective standoff is maintained.

h.

Entry Control Issues:

i.

No positive control of non-military vehicles entering and exiting the access

control point.
Guards must approach the vehicle to search and check identification of
operators.
Screening systems used to detect like the mobile vehicle and cargo inspection
system have actually become the targets of bombers and are increasing
vulnerability rather than decreasing.
Lack of adequate separation and isolation procedures prior to vehicle checks
increase chances of successful detonation of improvised explosive devices.
Lack of options and random antiterrorism measures create predictability at
access control points.
Non-military traffic is increasing on installations.
Military base operations contract limitations create a seam of vulnerability for
first responders at access control points where contract fire and rescue cannot
support an incident just outside the gate and units lack sufficient assets to
respond.

Material Delivery Issues:

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SMFM 19-14

Military resource limitations force us to use outside contracts for delivery.

Base defense operations are not tied well to Class 4 bulk delivery contracts.
Space limitations prevent bulk storage in some areas.
More joint and multi-national shared bases are creating additional control
issues.

3-7

GENERAL. Vehicle search covers a very broad field, from bicycles to cars and large
trucks. This section concentrates on the most common, the car, but the principles
involved embrace all forms of transport. All personnel involved in operations designed to
regulate the movement of members of the civilian community must be thoroughly
conversant with their duties and responsibilities. Soldiers must be able to work quickly
and methodically to prevent delay and disruption to legitimate traffic and avoid
unnecessary damage to vehicles and property.

3-8.

VEHICLE INSPECTIONS. For the purpose of this procedure, a vehicle is any

receptacle or means of transport in which something is carried or conveyed. All National
Guard forces have an important role to play in the search of vehicles. This is especially
important where there is a high probability that those vehicles are being used to transport
resources for the enemy or used as a platform to deliver explosive or incendiary devices.

3-9.

a.

The presence of millions of vehicles on the road can make the inspection of
vehicles at vehicle checkpoints can appear a daunting task. Vehicle inspections
should not rely on chance. It must be backed up by an efficient, intelligence system,
which targets specific vehicles and enables information to be quickly verified. This
involves close liaison with police records, vehicle registration authorities, and so
forth. The alertness and intuition of the policeman or soldier on the spot can achieve
much. He should be aware of the general characteristics of the construction of a
vehicle and signs which may indicate that a vehicle is suspect.

b.

Gate personnel have an important role to play in the inspection of vehicles where
there is a high probability that explosives or other contraband may be present.
However, the routine inspection of vehicles is a task that any member of the
National Guard may be called upon to perform.

OBJECTIVES OF VEHICLE INSPECTIONS. Vehicles are inspected with two

objectives in mind. They are:
a.

To find contraband resources while they are in transit, to deter the movement of
contraband, and to identify and intercept any items which may pose a threat to
National Guard personnel. These are referred to as general vehicle inspections and
will be conducted in conjunction with a access control point.

b.

To protect potential targets from booby traps placed on their vehicles. These are
referred to as defensive vehicle inspections.

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SMFM 19-14
3-10. AVOIDANCE OF INSPECTION POINTS. Suspicious persons will try to avoid being
inspected and may be working in liaison with others.
a.

Be on the alert for infiltrators seeking to bypass the access control point or deceive
the on duty personnel by using any of the following means:

b.

Getting out of the vehicle and walking past the vehicle checkpoint.
Pedestrians should be watched.
Scouting. One vehicle signaling to another should be watched; for example,
by using brakes and flashing headlights and vehicle to vehicle radio or cellular
telephones.
Creating a distraction. If an incident or disturbance occurs at the access
control point, caution should be used. (Disturbances cause congestion, thus
encouraging more vehicles to be let through without being searched.)
Being courteous or overly polite.
Acting suspicious. The faces of the passengers and drivers should be observed
and noted whether they are relaxed, tense, or nervous.
Driving cars with scanning radios tuned to National Guard or police
frequencies.
Driving cars with windows open on a cold day. They may be trying to disperse
the smell of explosives.

Stolen Car Test. When checking a suspect vehicle, the following stolen car test
should be applied:

Write down the vehicle license number as it approaches.

Ask the driver to switch off the engine.
Note the key. Look to see if it is on a key ring.
Check the doors and windows for signs of damage.
Ask for the drivers name and address.
Request a means of identification and the vehicle registration paperwork.
Ask the driver for the vehicle license number.
Examine the registration papers. Compare to the name and address given by
the driver.
Examine the license plates. Ensure that both are the same, and compare them
to the paperwork given by the driver.
Note if the driver is familiar with the instruments, odometer reading, and
registration data.
Note if the driver is wearing gloves. (Drivers wearing gloves may be trying
not to leave any fingerprints.)
Note the relationship between the driver and the passengers.
Pay particular attention to the stolen vehicle list. (The enemy infiltrator or
sympathizer may steal or hijack a car. Common makes of cars are popular
choices for the enemy.)

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SMFM 19-14
3-11. CONDUCT OF GENERAL VEHICLE SEARCHES. As with all actions on, the
action on a find will be dictated by the situation, intelligence, and the law. The search
advisor must outline a detailed list of actions on a find, and ensure that all search team
members are fully aware of the procedure to be taken.
a.

Conduct of Searchers. When conducting a vehicle search, there are a number of

general principles that should be observed by the vehicle checkpoint personnel.
1. Searchers work in pairs, examining the relevant section of the vehicle. They
must look for anything unusual or out of place.
2. Searchers must be courteous, efficient, thorough, quick, and must know exactly
what they are doing. This will reduce the possibility of a complaint. They must
not be put off searching the interior of vehicles by the presence of children,
babies, pets, old people, attractive individuals, and apparently sick or drunk
individuals. If necessary, special assistance should be requested.
3. Searchers must take particular care not to damage the vehicle or create
unnecessary inconvenience to members of the civilian community.
4. Personnel employed on vehicle search tasks must use common sense. They
must look for anything unusual (bright threads on bolts, scratched screw heads,
fresh adhesive on upholstery, or new work of any kind), and find an
explanation for it. They should try to remember details of cars they have
searched. It could be useful in future searches. Trends of activity may become
apparent.

b.

Conduct of Initial Checks. The main purpose of the initial check is to select
vehicles for a more detailed examination, but personnel carrying out checks at the
entrance to barracks and installations must be aware of the threat from large
vehicle-mounted bombs. An initial check is carried out without the occupants
dismounting from the vehicle, although the driver may be asked to open the hood
and trunk. The check should be conducted at the barrier.
1.

The conduct of the initial check will depend on the number of troops
available. The barrier commander and cover man, or the vehicle checkpoint
commander with two searchers and a number of escorts, may undertake the
initial check. The initial check should take up to 3 minutes. A possible
breakdown of the task is as follows:
(a)

The team leader:

Controls the conduct of the check.

Controls the wanted vehicle check.
Checks the identity and license of the driver.
Questions the vehicle driver and passenger.

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SMFM 19-14
(b)

The searchers:

(c)

The cover man:

2.

Visually check inside the car.

Search outside and underneath the car.
Inspect the engine compartment and trunk with mirrors; the hood
and trunk may or may not be open.
Vary the search check procedures (do not carry out a routine
procedure for all vehicles).

Provides security for the team leader and searchers.

Keeps waiting vehicles under observation.
Keeps a clear line of fire between him and the driver.
Alerts the team leader to any changes in the situation.

It may not be possible to search all vehicles passing through the vehicle
checkpoint. Therefore, it is essential that procedures and selection criteria be
developed that will assist members of the vehicle checkpoint in identifying
those vehicles which are most likely to present a threat. In assessing which
vehicles should be subjected to a more detailed search, the vehicle checkpoint
commander should consider the following:

The quantity, age, and demeanor of the occupants.

The type, make, and model of the vehicle in relation to the occupants.
The wanted vehicle list. This provides an aid in identifying suspects in
high-volume traffic areas without causing unnecessary disruption.

3.

It is not necessary for the full sequence to be completed on all vehicles. The
parts applied should vary from vehicle to vehicle, to keep an enemy guessing.
It should be stopped once the integrity of the vehicle, passengers, and contents
are assured.

4.

When the initial check is complete, the vehicle should be allowed to proceed
unless suspicion remains about the vehicle and its occupants, or it has been
selected at random for further search. In such circumstances, the vehicle
should be retained for a primary search.

3-12. CONDUCT OF PRIMARY SEARCHES. The primary search should be conducted in a

blast-protected area at a vehicle checkpoint on vehicles selected during the initial check.
a.

The procedure for the primary search is as follows:

Ask the occupants to get out of the vehicle and stand clear of the vehicle.
Guard all occupants.
Ensure that the driver observes the search operation.
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SMFM 19-14

Remove all loose objects from the trunk and interior of the car.
NOTE

If an explosive-vapor detector is employed, use it before the occupants get out of the vehicle.
The explosive-vapor detector is used through a small opening, with all the other doors and
windows closed.
The threat and prevailing circumstances will determine whether the driver or the searcher
removes the items from the vehicle.
b.

The vehicle checkpoint commander will arrange for all vehicle occupants to be
searched and checked while the vehicle search takes place.

c.

While the driver and occupants are being questioned, the searchers:

d.

Carry out the person search before asking any questions about identity.
Determine implications regarding the search of individuals before the
deployment of the search teams.
Conduct an identity check on all vehicle occupants. If questioning is
necessary, do it individually.

Allow the specialized search dog, if available, to search the vehicle. Use the
search dog on the advice of its handler.
Search the engine compartment (under the hood).
Search the trunk of the vehicle.
Search the exterior of the vehicle, starting at the front (one searcher on each
side) and finishing at the front of the vehicle.
Search the underneath of the vehicle.
Check the inside of the vehicle, starting at the rear, with one searcher on each
side, and finishing at the front of the vehicle.

During the search of the vehicle and the questioning of its occupants, vehicle
checkpoint personnel should:

Watch for the driver, who has to search his pockets for his drivers license,
and upon finding it, tries to read it before handing it to you. It may not be his,
and the real license, if he has one, could still be concealed somewhere else in
the car or on his person.
Watch for a sudden movement that is not consistent with getting out of a
vehicle, such as reaching for an object.
Watch for covert signals between vehicle occupants.
Watch for delaying tactics.
Check the registration papers, and confirm that the driver is the owner of the
vehicle or has authority to use that vehicle.

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SMFM 19-14

Check the license plates. Ensure that they are the same on the front and rear of
the vehicle and that they correspond to the registration papers for the vehicle.
Ask the driver:

For registration details; for example, the expiration date and the
ownership.
Where he has come from.
Where he is going.
Why he is in the area (depending upon circumstances).
NOTE

If the car is full of smoke or smells of perfume, determine why. It could be to cover the smell of
explosives.
e.

The procedure above is a guide only. The actual conduct of the search will depend
on the time, the size of vehicle, the intelligence, and the current situation.

f.

All sedan-type vehicles are broken into five basic areas. Large box sections or
double skin areas to which access can be obtained with minimum modification
should be checked. Also, check for the smell of fresh glue, paint, cannabis, and so
forth, and if the vehicle is towing a trailer or boat. Points to remember when
searching these areas are listed below. Possible hide locations on a sedan-type
vehicle are shown in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Possible Hide Locations on a Passenger Vehicle.

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SMFM 19-14
1.

Engine compartment (hood). When checking the engine compartment, always

remember to:

2.

Trunk. This includes the load space of station wagons, hatchbacks, and so
forth. Stand back and look at the contents before searching. Always remember
to:

3.

Check the battery for signs of additional electrical wiring that may be
wired to a device within the vehicle. Check under the battery tray.
Look at the oil filter, and check for signs of recent installation or
modification. (It is possible to modify the oil filter internally to bypass
the engine oil, leaving the filter bowl hollow).
Look inside the radiator filter neck, expansion tanks, and windshield
washer fluid bottle.
Check for possible suspension of small objects. Be extremely careful
when removing the radiator cap as boiling water may gush out under
pressure.
Check around and under all structural members and engine parts for the
possible attachment of objects. Check the heater, ventilation motor,
ventilation hoses and vents, and air filter.
Look under the hood. Check inside the holes in the structural hood
brace attached to the hood.
Check for any sound-deadening material under the hood or heat shield.

Ensure that the contents are as described by the driver.

Check for any glue, mastic, under seal, pop rivets, and so forth.
Check for spare fuel tanks or false tanks.
Check under the rear window. Check and use particular care over the
space between the trunk and the rear seat.
Check the spare tire recess. Remove and check inside. (In some
vehicles, the spare tire is outside or under the trunk area.)
Check the spare tire. Deflate the spare tire and check thoroughly. Check
to see if it is full of air or explosives.
Check tail light assemblies. Remember that the lamp assemblies of most
cars are accessible through small holes in the side of the compartment
or by removing the back cover.
Check the floor, roof, and back and sides of the trunk. Remove all mats,
carpets, and so forth. Check for any signs of weld, mastic, new paint,
and lack of dirt. Check for double skins and the carpet being stuck
down.
Check the spaces in wings and tailgate.
Check for a natural false floor.

Exterior. When checking outside the vehicle:

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SMFM 19-14

Check behind all the lights (head lights, side lights, and rear lights).
Check behind the bumpers and fenders.
Check wheels and hubs. Check the tire pressure. Bleed a small amount
of air from the tires. Smell it for unusual odors.
Check under the wheel wells. Check for tampering of the bolts on the
mud deflectors.
Check the front and rear panels and spoilers.
Remove the fuel cap, and examine the inside of the pipe for possible
suspension of objects. Ensure that the level of gas or diesel match the
fuel gauge reading.
Check the bodywork and roof for signs of adaptation. Check for signs
of welding or new under-seal and if it is soft.
Determine if the shape of the inside of the wing conforms to the outside.

4.

Underneath. When looking underneath the car, check for signs of modification
work to the bottom of the radiator, engine sump, oil sump, exhaust muffler,
fuel tank, and the entire chassis and framework. The appearance of unusual
welds, soldering, or painting could indicate a possible false bottom. Check the
entire chassis framework and the body sills. Check for drain holes in seals.
Ensure that the fuel tank matches the vehicle (such as age).

5.

Interior and passenger compartment. Searchers should be clean before

checking the following areas:

Roof linings. Gain access by removing the door sealing strips or, if
sunroof-fitted, by removing the trim. Check the sun visors. Check the
front, rear, and center window and door pillars.
Door panels. Wind windows down first to make sure there is nothing
obstructing the mechanism. Ensure that they can be searched without
removing the trim. Avoid damage to spring clips, and so forth.
Rear side panels (2-door vehicles). Remove and check through the
trunk.
Back seats. Remove the back seat rest and cushion (some spring in,
some are bolted in). With the back seat removed, look up into the rear
area behind the seat back and car structure.
Front seats. Check underneath, and up inside the padding.
Dashboard area. Check to see if the battery is disconnected. Check
behind the dashboard panels. Check the inside of the ventilation and
heating ducts. Check the radio and speakers. Remove the ashtray, then
check the contents and the space inside the holder. Check behind,
above, and inside the glove box compartment. Check the center tunnel
console.
Front foot wells. Remove the panels to allow access to the wing space,
door seals, and so forth.

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SMFM 19-14

g.

Floor. Remove the carpets and the mats (they should not be stuck
down). Check for signs of false floors (welding, mastic, and so forth).
Check the bungholes.
Gear shift compartment. Ensure that there are no obstructions.

The equipment required for a search pair includes:

Three screwdrivers: one straight, one cross tip head, and one electrician.
One flashlight.
One telescope handle with a complete set of assorted mirrors.
One endoscope.
One adjustable wrench.

3-13. CONDUCT OF SECONDARY SEARCHES. A secondary search is a detailed search of

a highly-suspect vehicle. It is carried out in a specially prepared secure and blast-proof
area.
a.

If the searchers find an inconsistency or variation from what previous experience

has shown them to be normal, a secondary search should be performed on the
vehicle.

b.

It may involve dismantling parts of the vehicle and take many hours. However, the
legal time limit for which the vehicle or its occupants may be detained must not be
exceeded. Assistance may be required from a trained vehicle mechanic. Once it has
been decided that a vehicle is to be subjected to a secondary search, the following
procedure is suggested:
1.

Preferably, the driver drives the vehicle, under escort, to the search location. If
the driver refuses, he is arrested under normal arrest procedure and a suitably
qualified policeman or soldier drives the vehicle. Take care to avoid any
forensic contamination of the vehicle and to maintain continuity of evidence.
For a military operation, a soldier other than the arresting soldier remains with
the vehicle until it is released into the custody of the driver or civilian police
to maintain continuity of evidence.

2.

After the arrest procedure, the driver is taken back to his vehicle under escort.
He may watch the search.

3.

On completion of the search, if unproductive, the driver is taken through his

release procedures.

4.

He is offered the opportunity to sign the search report before the vehicle is
returned to him.

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SMFM 19-14

CHAPTER 4
FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS AND
SECURITY MEASURES
4-1.

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS. The level of identification and inspection

requirements at an access control point will vary depending on the force protection
conditions level.
a.

Table 4-1 shows the force protection conditions applications and descriptions, and
provides guidance on the expected capabilities and impacts associated with the
force protection conditions levels.

FORCE
PROTECTION
CONDITIONS

APPLICATION

DESCRIPTION

NORMAL

Applies when no general threat of possible

terrorist activity exists but warrants only a
routine security posture.

The baseline posture.

ALPHA

Applies when there is a general threat of

possible terrorist activity against personnel
and installations, the nature and extent of
which are unpredictable.

The measures must be capable

of being maintained indefinitely.

BRAVO

Applies when an increased and more

predictable threat of terrorist activity exists.

CHARLIE

Applies when an incident occurs or

intelligence is received indicating some
form of terrorist action against personnel
and installations is imminent.

DELTA

Applies in the immediate area where a

terrorist attack has occurred or when
intelligence has been received that terrorist
action against a specific location is likely.
Normally, Force Protection Conditions
DELTA is declared as a localized
warning.

The measures must be capable of

being maintained for weeks
without causing undue hardship
or extreme traffic delays,
affecting operational capability, or
aggravating relations with local
authorities.
Implementation of this measure
for more than a short period may
create hardship and affect the
peacetime activities of the unit
and its personnel.
Measures to be implemented in
response to local warning and not
intended to be sustained for
lengthy periods of time.

Table 4-1. Force Protection Condition Descriptions.

b.

It is important to understand the required operations and anticipated traffic volume

during all force protection conditions as outlined in the installations Antiterrorism
plan. Security measures employed during Force Protection Conditions BRAVO
must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship,
affecting operational capability, or aggravating relations with local authorities.

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SMFM 19-14
Therefore, an access control point designed in accordance with this guidance
should be capable of supporting the security measures employed during Force
Protection Conditions NORMAL, ALPHA, and BRAVO, including any
random antiterrorism measures employed in accordance with the installation
antiterrorism plan. For shorter durations, the access control point should be
designed to support operations at Force Protection Conditions CHARLIE and
DELTA, which includes 100 percent vehicle inspections. At Force Protection
Conditions CHARLIE and DELTA, traffic congestion is expected and can be
relieved by authorizing entry to mission-essential personnel only. Other methods of
reducing traffic congestion at higher level force protection conditions involve the
use of procedural rather than design elements and are not covered here.
4-2.

RANDOM ANTITERRORISM MEASURES. Implementing random Antiterrorism

measures involves identifying antiterrorism, and force protection conditions, a set of
measures extracted from higher force protection conditions or specific measures
prescribed by the installation commander, to be employed in addition to the basic force
protection conditions measures already in place.
a.

The level of identification and inspection at the entry control facility will vary
depending on the force protection conditions and the use of random antiterrorism
measures. The random antiterrorism measures will be identified in the installation
antiterrorism plan. Each installation will have an antiterrorism officer, who
maintains the antiterrorism plan.

b.

Random antiterrorism measures can include, but are not limited to:

Erection of barriers and obstacles to control traffic flow.

Vehicle, cargo, and personnel searches.
Variations in security routines.
Additional security checks.
In-depth identification checks.
Increased stand-off areas around buildings and facilities.
Roadside check points.
Security related e-mail messages and updates.

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SMFM 19-14

CHAPTER 5
INSTALLATION SECURITY AND RESPONSE FORCE
CAPABILITIES
5-1.

LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMANDER. The senior law enforcement officer advises

the commander and staff about military police abilities, prepares plans and policies,
directs and reviews military police operations, and provides staff supervision for the
installation confinement facility. The senior law enforcement officer on the installation is
responsible for the safety and security of all personnel and assets. This includes military
and civilian personnel and property alike.
a.

On installations the commander determines the degree of law and order needed to
support order and discipline. The senior law enforcement officer accomplishes this
mission in part by:
1.

Advising the commander on the means and methods needed to achieve the
commanders needs.

2.

Implementing the commanders law and order policies and plans.

3.

Ensuring military police plans and operations supporting the commanders

plan are carried out.

4.

Recommending when and where to concentrate the commands military

police assets.

5.

Supervising military police support on the installation or within the

commands area of operation.

6.

Coordinating matters of military police concern on a daily basis.

7.

Keeping the commander advised on military police operations.

8.

Ensuring that military police provide protection and assistance to the military
community.

9.

Requiring military police to enforce laws with objectivity.

10. Setting the example in community relations that reflect and enhance the
military police image.
11. Establishing command and control procedures to effectively manage military
police resources and provide law enforcement when and where needed.

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SMFM 19-14
b.

5-2.

Planning military police support is a continuous process at every echelon. In the

absence of specific directions or orders, the senior law enforcement officer plans
the use of military police assets. The senior law enforcement officers management
and contingency planning are the key elements to ensuring effective law and order
operations.
1.

The senior law enforcement officer evaluates current operations and projects
future courses of action.

2.

He bases his plans on assumptions consistent with sound judgment and a

thorough knowledge of the situation and mission.

3.

He ensures military police planning is practical and flexible.

4.

He ensures that plans are coordinated with staff sections and subordinate
commands.

5.

He ensures plans reflect manpower and resources needed by military police.

(This includes needs for command and control, fire support, equipment, and
supplies. It also includes construction, communication, and transportation
support.) As new information is received, the senior law enforcement officer
reviews, updates, and modifies plans.

6.

He ensures that the commanders get the military police support they need.

7.

Ensures that military police show mutual respect and maintain a professional,
working relationship when working with local civilian police. Civilian police
are normally led and directed by persons with many years of experience in
dealing with people and law enforcement.

8.

Establishes policies to guide military police when dealing with civilian police.
For example, sometimes direct telephone lines for liaison are established
between a military police station and a civil police station. Arrangements may
be made for the use of the civil police radios, but use ordinarily is limited to
emergencies or special situations, and care is taken not to overload the civil
police networks.

TIERED RESPONSE CAPABILITIES. Military police are subject to responding to

and reacting to all types of emergencies. They must be prepared to handle the
unexpected. In order to accomplish this mission, military police must have a tiered
response capable of supporting many different scenarios. This tiered response is
comprised of many different agencies all with the same objective and goal which is to
defeat or deter a threat to the installation or residents. The tiered response can consist of
the following organizations and or agencies:

Emergency responders (military police/medics/fire personnel).

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SMFM 19-14

5-3.

Specialty units or guard force personnel.

Local police.

EMERGENCY RESPONDERS. Emergency responders provide basic support to

installations on a day-to-day basis, regardless of force protection condition levels. Many
of these forces are available 24 hours a day/seven days a week. Some installations have
most of the required emergency responders on their installation under the commanders
control. More often, however, the installation commander must look elsewhere for
assistance. There are various options for filling the need for a given capability. The
commander can work with the local community or other nearby military installations for
assistance and, within certain legal parameters.
a.

Connectivity with the local community also facilitates interoperability with local
incident response agencies and organizations. As a part of the commanders longrange strategy, he may only need to fill a gap in response capability until the
installation receives the requisite resources to fill the need without outside help.
The key is that once a required need has been identified, it must be accounted for in
some manner.

b.

Normally, emergency responders are integrated through the installation and are, in
fact, the first layer of security for the installation. Increases in military police
patrols provide the most seamless increase in security posture on an installation,
because the additional capabilities are integrated directly into its day-to-day
operations. Emergency responders on most installations include:

5-4.

Military police.
Guards.
Fire department.
Emergency medical services personnel.
Explosive ordnance disposal personnel.

INSTALLATION DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. Access control points are typically

vulnerable to attacks from anyone wishing to do harm. These attacks can come in the
form of vehicular or pedestrian traffic; therefore obstacles must be in place to slow, stop
or deter these attacks. Obstacles alone in many cases are not sufficient to defeat all
attacks therefore they must be supported and covered by fire. The force protection
condition determines the amount and duration of increased security posture for entry
control points.
a.

Firing Positions. Firing positions must be established at all entry control points.
The purpose and intent of firing positions is two-fold. First they are designed to
provide overwhelming force against anyone attempting to penetrate the installation
perimeter. Second, they are designed as a deterrent in preventing breeches to the
installation. Firing positions must provide a clear and unobstructed view of the
entry control point with left and right firing boundaries or fields of fire. Positions

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SMFM 19-14
must be camouflaged so that they are not easily detected form onlookers and
should be capable of relocating if necessary.
b.

Personnel and Equipment. Personnel manning firing positions must be fully trained
and qualified to safely operate the weapon systems that are in place. They must
also be well versed on the rules of engagement and use of force policies. There
must be sufficient ammunition at the firing position to sustain a reasonable amount
of time until replacements or reinforcements arrive. The position must have two
forms of communication with the entry control point and the emergency operations
center. This includes land lines and wireless communication devices such as
telephones and radios.

5-5.

CLASSES OF ORDERS. Two types of orders direct a guard on post: general orders and
special orders. General orders outline the fundamental responsibilities of a guard while
special orders instruct him in the performance of his duties while on a particular post.
General orders for both the interior and exterior guards must be supplemented by
realistic, detailed, and mission-oriented special orders carefully tailored for the specific
post and situation from the viewpoint of security and sentry effectiveness and protection.
The special orders for each post must be reviewed frequently to insure they do not
become obsolete. A special order may be added to a guard post for a length of time to
cover a certain situation and deleted at the end of a specific time, or on a specific event.

5-6.

GENERAL ORDERS. All interior guards are required to memorize, understand, and
comply with the following general orders.
a.

General Order One. I WILL GUARD EVERYTHING WITHIN THE LIMITS OF

MY POST AND QUIT MY POST ONLY WHEN PROPERLY RELIEVED.
1.

The guard is responsible for everything that occurs within the limits of his
post while he is on duty. He is also responsible for all equipment and properly
located within the limits of his post. The exact limits of his post are defined by
special orders. The special orders should also include every place a guard
must go to perform his duties.

2.

The guard investigates immediately every unusual or suspicious occurrence

on or near his post provided he does not have to leave his post to do so. If
necessary, the guard will contact the commander of the relief for instructions.

3.

The guard apprehends all suspicious persons and all persons involved in a
disorder occurring on or near his post provided he does not have to leave his
post to do so. When apprehending persons, the guard will use only necessary
force to overcome any resistance. Apprehension of persons should be included
in special orders or guard instructions. All persons apprehended are turned
over to the commander of the relief.

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SMFM 19-14

b.

4.

All persons, regardless of their rank, are required to respect members of the
guard in the performance of their duties.

5.

A guard will remain on his post and continue to perform all duties required on
that post until proper authority to relieve him.

6.

If a guard requires relief because of illness or any other reason, he will notify
the commander of the relief and wait until he is replaced by another guard or
has permission from the proper authorities to leave his post.

7.

If a guard is not relieved at the expiration of his tour of duty, he does not
abandon his post. He will contact the commander of the relief for instructions.

8.

Guards leave their posts for meals as specifically directed by the commanding
officer. Normally, this is accomplished by arranging for early and late meals
for guards going on and off post.

9.

When ordered by proper authority, or prescribed in the special orders, a guard

on the last relief of a post may be directed to leave the post at the proper time
and return to the guardhouse where he reports to the commander of the relief
on duty.

General Order Two. I WILL OBEY MY SPECIAL ORDERS AND PERFORM

ALL MY DUTIES IN A MILITARY MANNER.
1.

A guard will familiarize himself with the special orders for his post prior to
being posted. The guard will obey, execute, and enforce all special orders
pertaining to his post.
NOTE

The commander of the relief is responsible for insuring that all guards understand their
special instructions before being posted.
2.

In addition to his special orders, a guard is responsible to obey and carry out
any orders or instructions from the commanding officer, field officer of the
day, and officers and noncommissioned officers of the guard. No other
persons are authorized to give a guard orders or instructions. Any special
instructions for a guard must be issued through a guards chain of command.

3.

Guards on post will pass instructions to their relief when appropriate. The
information is also given to the commander of the relief. For example, a guard
is on duty at an ammunition holding area and discovers a hole in the fence
during his tour of duty. Upon finding the hole, the commander of the relief is

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SMFM 19-14
notified. The guard will pass this information to his relief so that special
attention can be paid to that portion of the fence until the fence is repaired.
4.

The guard will perform his duties in a military manner and serve as an
example to others.

5.

The guard is courteous to all persons. He will talk to no one except in the line
of duty. When persons make proper inquiries of a guard. He answers them in a
courteous manner.

6.

A guard on an interior guard post maintains an erect and soldierly bearing.

The weapon is carried in a manner prescribed by the commanding officer or
commander of the guard. A guard armed with a rifle or submachine gun may
be allowed to carry his weapon at sling arms to reduce fatigue.

7.

Guards on post salute individuals as prescribed in National Guard regulations.

(a)

A sentry, on a post that does not require challenging, carrying a

weapon, will, upon recognition of an officer, halt and present arms as
prescribed by National Guard regulations.

(b)

A sentry armed with a pistol, on a post, which does not require

challenging, will, upon recognition of an officer, render a hand salute.

(c)

No salute is given by a guard who is engaged in a specific duty, the

performance of which prevents saluting.
NOTE

The sentinels primary mission is to guard his post. Requiring salutes places the guard in a
vulnerable position. The sentinel will; however, display all other military courtesy and respect
while in conversation with an officer.
8.

A guard talking with an officer does not interrupt the conversation to salute
another officer. If the other officer salutes a senior officer; however, the guard
also salutes.

9.

The special orders will specify the time for challenging.

(a)

After challenging, a guard armed with a rifle or submachine gun will

challenge from the position of port arms as prescribed in the manual of
drill. If armed with a pistol, the guard will challenge from the position
of raised pistol.

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SMFM 19-14
(b)

After challenging, a guard will remain in the challenge position until the
individual challenged is allowed to pass, will depart, or is turned over to
the commander of relief.

(c)

Sentinels on posts requiring challenging will not render salutes.

(d)

Challenging one person or a group.

(1) If a guard sees any person on or near his post during the time for
challenging, he positions himself so that he can control the
situation. If possible, he should be out of sight when challenging.
When the person is approximately 30 paces or at sufficient
distance to allow the guard to react, the guard will assume the
correct challenge position and command, HALT! When the
person has halted, the guard asks, WHO IS THERE? The guard
may advance toward the person while challenging to put himself in
a better position. When the guard is in the best position to pass or
apprehend the person, he requires the person to advance towards
him, remain in position, or advance to a particular place, face
forward toward a light, or to take any position necessary to
determine whether the person should be passed, denied, or turned
over to the commander of the relief.
(2) The guard permits only one member of a group to approach him
for identification.
(3) If persons are in a vehicle, the guard proceeds as if they were on
foot. If necessary to carry out his duties, he may have one or all of
the passengers dismount.
(4) After halting a group and receiving an answer indicating that it is
authorized to proceed, the guard says, ADVANCE ONE TO BE
RECOGNIZED! After he has recognized the one advanced, the
guard says, ADVANCE, SERGEANT RASHID, naming the
person (or group) allowed to advance. If the answer is
FRIENDS, the guard says, ADVANCE ONE TO BE
RECOGNIZED! After recognition he says, ADVANCE
FRIENDS.
(5) The guard satisfies himself beyond a reasonable doubt that those
challenged are what they represent themselves to be and that they
have a right to pass. If he is not satisfied, he detains the person and
calls the commander of the relief. Normally, the guard will accept
a reasonable answer for identification if the post is not a vital area
and the persons are not suspicious looking.

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SMFM 19-14
NOTE
A visual check of an individuals identification card is considered the best means of
identification when in doubt.
(e)

Challenging two or more persons or group.

(1) If two or more persons or groups approach the guards post from
different directions at the same time, they are halted in turn and
remain halted until advanced by the guard.
(2) When two or more groups are halted at the same time, the senior
advances first.
(3) A guard advances different persons or groups with the following
priority:

Commanding officer.
Field officer of the day.
Officer of the day.
Officers of the guard.
Officers.
Patrols.
Reliefs.
Noncommissioned officers of the guards in order of rank.
Friends.

(4) If a person or group has been advanced and is talking with the
guard, the guard halts any other person or group that may
approach, but advances no one until the person or group with
whom he is talking leaves. He then advances the senior of the
remaining group.
(5) A guard must always be alert and never surprised. He never
permits two persons or groups to advance to his post at the same
time.
(6) Confusing or misleading answers to a guards challenge are not
acceptable. The answer FRIEND; however, is not considered
misleading and is the usual answer of an inspecting officer or
patrol when they do not wish to reveal their official capacity.
10. During his tour of duty a guard is required to execute orders of no one but the
commanding officer, field officer of the day, officer of the day, and officers of
the guard; however, any officer may investigate apparent violations of

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SMFM 19-14
regulations by members of the guard. In the event of an inspecting officer, or
any other person in the military service, finding an irresponsible guard on
post, it is his duty to notify the commander of the guard or a
noncommissioned officer of the guard and stay on the post until a qualified
guard is posted.
11. A guard surrenders his weapon to, and only on order of, a person from whom
he lawfully receives orders while on post. The persons should not order a
guard to surrender his weapon for inspection or any other purpose unless an
emergency exists.
c.

5-7.

General Order Three. I WILL REPORT VIOLATIONS OF MY SPECIAL

ORDERS, EMERGENCIES, AND ANYTHING NOT COVERED IN MY
INSTRUCTIONS, TO THE COMMANDER OF THE RELIEF.
1.

A guard reports all violations of his special orders to the commander of the
relief. He apprehends the offender, if necessary.

2.

A guard reports all emergencies that occur on or near his post. The guard will
take whatever action is prescribed by his special orders or guard instructions.
Anytime the guard is in doubt as to what action to take, or is not covered in
his special orders, he will call the commander of the relief for instructions or
assistance.

3.

In case of fire, occurring on or near his post, the guard calls, FIRE, (identify
the post) POST NUMBER (ONE). He gives the alarm or insures one has
been given. If possible, he extinguishes the fire. He helps direct the fire
fighting apparatus to the fire. He notifies the guardhouse of his actions as soon
as possible.

4.

A guard reports any disorder occurring on or near his post. He takes police
action as prescribed in his special orders or guard instructions. If assistance is
required, he calls, THE GUARD, (identify the post) POST NUMBER
(ONE).

5.

If the danger is great, he fires his weapon into the air three times in rapid
succession before calling. When instructed to do so, guards give warning of
air, chemical, and other attacks. Guards should receive special training if they
are to act as chemical sentinels while on post.

SPECIAL ORDERS. Special orders are established by the commanding officer and
differ for various posts depending upon the nature of the area being guarded.
a.

Special orders are based on :

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SMFM 19-14

b.

1.

Realism. Special orders are designed for a particular post, since two posts on
an installation are seldom identical. The orders for each post are devised to
provide increased protection for the sentinel concerned by locating him behind
natural or artificial obstacles that make surprise difficult. This calls for
flexible and imaginative planning when drawing up special orders. For
example: Ammunition dump security at a critical installation would be more
elaborate and tactically oriented than security of a motor pool.

2.

Clarity. Special orders should be stated in plain language that can be clearly
understood by the guard on post. The commander of the relief clarifies any
doubt as to their meaning before posting a guard.

The commanding officer is responsible for keeping the special orders up to date
and publishes any changes immediately. Copies of special orders are continuously
and conspicuously posted in the guardhouse for reference. A copy of the special
orders may be posted on a fixed post or the guard may be required to carry a copy
of the special orders with him while on duty. The special orders for each guard post
should explain (or diagram) the post location, boundaries, and any particular orders
for the post, including those conditions under which force will be used. Any special
orders received by a guard before going on guard and while on post are passed on
to the guard who relieves him. These additional orders may be written or oral.

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SMFM 19-14

CHAPTER 6
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR ACCESS CONTROL
POINTS
6-1.

GENERAL. National Guard installations share many similarities, with each other.
Depending on the location of the installation and the mission of the local National Guard
units, each will present diverse security and access control challenges to the installation
commanders. On some installations, only military members require access to the
installation, while others share roadways with nearby civilian communities. While many
installations do not operate pedestrian gates, some installations could not function
without them. These gates often serve as access control points and require special
considerations. Another unique access control consideration is associated with the
conduct of special events on an installation. These events pose special challenges and
vulnerabilities.

6-2.

AIRFIELDS. Installation commanders rely on the perimeter access control points for
validating the authenticity of a persons identification on an installation. This validation
process must overlap to an installation airfield.

6-3.

a.

Protection of airfields by dedicated access control points may not be possible or

appropriate, but protection of aircraft and helicopters on the ground at airfields is
vital. Dedicated security should be afforded to these airfields. Landing strips and
sites at installations must be checked and secured well in advance of arrivals.
Security must be maintained until departures have been completed.

b.

Inspections of outgoing and incoming cargo, passengers, and passenger baggage

will be made. If cargo is sealed, the seal will be checked and verified. The seal
represents that the cargo has been inventoried and inspected. If a seal has been
broken or tampered with, it must be immediately reported to the security
commander.

RAIL YARDS. Installation commanders are responsible for securing railways within the
installation boundary and securing off-post railway sections when they are used for
military purposes. The latter is inherent in the commanders in-transit cargo
responsibilities.
a.

Railways may be used to move military personnel and equipment during

deployments and redeployments. In stability operations and support operations, it is
conceivable that an adversary will make use of any railway service. Thus, it is
critical to secure railcars at all times. During loading, stops, and off-loading, allaround security must be provided.

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SMFM 19-14
NOTE
Never divulge the embarkation or debarkation times or the load of a train except to those who
have a need to know. Movement by rail is difficult to conceal and is manpower-intensive.

b.

Installation commanders must consider the following vulnerabilities and

capabilities when addressing rail security:

c.

6-4.

Portal locations and accessibility by those with criminal intent.

General accessibility to the rail by road.
Electrical power availability to rails.
Radio frequency communications accessibility.

Railcars that are incoming to an installation must be inspected. If a car is sealed

and is not intended for that installation, the seal must be checked and verified. If
the seal has been tampered with or broken, it must be reported to the train
commander. Again, because the feasibility to dedicate an access control point at a
rail yard is not likely, the installation commander will rely on the validation of
identification at an access control point to support the authenticity of personnel on
the ground at rail yards. Personnel, equipment, and baggage will be verified and
inspected upon deployments and redeployments.

PEDESTRIAN GATES. Safety considerations at pedestrian gates must be afforded to

both the controller and the pedestrian. The safety of the access controller and the safety
and identification of the pedestrian must be priorities.
a.

Many installation access control points handle pedestrian traffic. Special

considerations must be afforded to accommodate this traffic. They include:

b.

Providing a sidewalk and safety provisions to direct pedestrians to the

appropriate location of the access control points, while separating them from
vehicular traffic.
Providing breaks in the passive barriers to allow pedestrians to access the
access control points.
Ensuring that entry controllers have direct visual access to the pedestrians.
Incorporating access control point procedures at turnstiles, when present.
Access controllers must validate identification and inspect packages,
handbags, briefcases, and other items.

Pedestrian gates must be located so that access controllers have a complete view of
them. A pedestrian should never have the opportunity to appear at an access control
point without the controller being able to observe him from the onset. Access
controllers for pedestrian gates should have no other duties but that of the gate. The
same security and comfort considerations provided to access controllers at

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SMFM 19-14
vehicular access control points must be provided to access controllers at pedestrian
gates.
6-5.

SPECIAL EVENTS. Special events on military installations often raise the overall
installation threat level. Events demonstrating national pride, such as National Day, Hajj
Janidriha, all pose unique challenges. Law and order planners can expect large
concentrations of people attending the events and a substantial increase in traffic flow and
parking requirements. Additional law enforcement, force protection, and antiterrorism
measures are necessary to counter additional vulnerabilities associated with large crowds
on an installation. Local access control point plans should address these issues and the
effects on the surrounding community.

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CHAPTER 7
INSTALLATION ENTRANCES
7-1.

GENERAL. The number of installation or activity gates and perimeter entrances in

active use should be limited to the minimum number required for safe and efficient
operations. When necessary, install vehicle barriers in front of vehicle gates. Security
lighting should be considered at entry points. Plans to use guards for controlling entry to
an installation or activity must be predetermined based on the threat conditions.

7-2.

PERIMETER ENTRANCES. Active perimeter entrances should be designated so that

security forces maintain full control without an unnecessary delay in traffic. This is
accomplished by having sufficient entrances to accommodate the peak flow of pedestrian
and vehicular traffic and having adequate lighting for rapid and efficient inspection.

7-3.

a.

When gates are not operational during nonduty hours, they should be securely
locked, illuminated during hours of darkness, and inspected periodically by a
roving patrol. Additionally, warning signs should be used to warn drivers when
gates are closed.

b.

Doors and windows on buildings that form a part of the perimeter should be
locked, lighted, and inspected.

ENTRY CONTROL STATIONS. Entry-control stations should be provided at main

perimeter entrances where security personnel are present. Considerations for construction
and use should be based on the information outlined in the installation physical security
plan.
a.

Entry-control stations should be located as close as practical to the perimeter

entrance to permit personnel inside the station to maintain constant surveillance
over the entrance and its approaches. Additional considerations at entry-control
stations include:

b.

Establishing a holding area for unauthorized vehicles or those to be inspected

further.
A turnaround area should be provided to keep from impeding other traffic.
Establishing control measures such as displaying a decal on the window or
having a specially marked vehicle.

Entry-control stations that are manned 24 hours each day should have interior and
exterior lighting, interior heating and air conditioning (where appropriate), and a
sufficient glassed area to afford adequate observation for personnel inside.
1.

Where appropriate, entry-control stations should be designed for optimum

personnel identification and movement control. Each station should also
include a telephone, a radio, and badge racks (if required).

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SMFM 19-14
2.

Signs should be erected to assist in controlling authorized entry, to deter

unauthorized entry, and to preclude accidental entry. Signs should be plainly
displayed and be legible from any approach to the perimeter from a reasonable
distance.

3.

The size and coloring of a sign, its letters, and the interval of posting must be
appropriate to each situation.

4.

Entry-control stations should be hardened against attacks according to the type

of threat. The methods of hardening may include:

7-4.

7-5.

Reinforced concrete or masonry.

Steel plating.
Bullet-resistant glass.
Sandbags, two layers in depth.
Commercially fabricated, bullet-resistant building components or
assemblies.

WARNING SIGNS. A significant amount of warning signs should be erected to ensure

that possible intruders are aware of entry into restricted areas. Warning signs augment
control signs. They warn intruders that the area is restricted and that trespassing may
result in the use of deadly force.
a.

Warning signs should be installed along the limited areas physical barriers and at
each entry point where they can be seen readily and understood by anyone
approaching the perimeter.

b.

In areas where Arabic is one of two or more languages commonly spoken, warning
signs must contain the Arabic warning in addition to an English translated warning.
The wording on the signs will denote warning of a restricted area.

c.

The signs should be posted at intervals of no more than 30 meters. They must not
be mounted on fences equipped with intrusion-detection equipment. Additionally,
the warning signs prescribed should be posted at all entrances to limited,
controlled, and exclusion areas.

OTHER SIGNS. Signs setting forth the conditions of entry to an installation or area
should be plainly posted at all principal entrances. The signs should be legible under
normal conditions at a distance not less than 15 meters from the point of entry.
a.

Such signs should inform the entrant of the provisions (search of the person, the
vehicle, packages, and so forth) or prohibitions (such as against cameras, matches,
and lighters and entry for reasons other than official business) that may be
prescribed by the installation commander.

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SMFM 19-14
b.

7-6.

Signs or notices legibly setting forth the designation of restricted areas and
provisions of entry should be plainly posted at all entrances and at other points
along the perimeter line as necessary.

INSTALLATION PERIMETER ROADS AND CLEAR ZONES. When the perimeter

barrier encloses a large area, an interior all weather perimeter road should be provided for
security-patrol vehicles.
a.

Clear zones should be maintained on both sides of the perimeter barrier to provide
an unobstructed view of the barrier and the ground adjacent to it. Roads within the
clear zone should be as close to the perimeter barrier as possible without interfering
with it. The roads should be constructed to allow effective road barriers to deter
motor movement of unauthorized personnel during mobilization periods.

b.

Clear zones should be kept clear of weeds, rubbish, or other material capable of
offering concealment or assistance to an intruder attempting to breach the barrier.
1.

A clear zone of 6 meters or more should exist between the perimeter barrier
and exterior structures, parking areas, and natural or manmade features.

2.

When possible, a clear zone of 15 meters or more should exist between the
perimeter barrier and structures within the protected area, except when a
buildings wall constitutes part of the perimeter barrier.

3.

Ammunition supply points will have clear zones 4 meters outside of the
ammunition supply point and 9 meters inside, and the vegetation will not
exceed 20 centimeters (10 centimeters for high-threat and highly controlled
areas.

4.

When it is impossible to have adequate clear zones because of property lines

or natural or man-made features, it may be necessary to increase the height of
the perimeter barrier, increase security-patrol coverage, add more security
lighting, or install an intrusion detection device along that portion of the
perimeter.
(a)

When considering the construction of a new site or perimeter, ensure

that the plans include a fence located well inside the property line, thus
permitting control of enough space outside the fence to maintain at least
a minimal clear zone.

(b)

The following considerations apply:

(1) On a large installation, it is unreasonable to construct an expensive
perimeter fence and keep it under constant observation.

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SMFM 19-14
(2) Such an installation is usually established in a sparsely inhabited
area. Its comparative isolation and the depth of the installation give
reasonable perimeter protection. Under these circumstances, it is
usually sufficient to post warning signs or notices, reduce access
roads to a minimum, and periodically patrol the area between the
outer perimeter and the conventionally protected vital area of the
installation.
(3) An alternative to erecting new or replacing old chain-link fence
involving an entire installation perimeter is to relocate or isolate
the sensitive area or item by:

7-7.

a.

Relocating the item within a safe perimeter.

b.

Consolidating the item with other items.

c.

Erecting a chain-link fence around individual assets rather

than the installations perimeter.

METHODS OF CONTROL. There are a number of methods available to assist in the

movement and control of personnel in limited, controlled, and restricted areas. The
following paragraphs discuss the use of escorts and the two-person rule:
a.

Escorts. Escorts are chosen because of their ability to accomplish tasks effectively
and properly. They possess knowledge of the area being visited. Escorts may be
guard-force personnel, but they are normally personnel from the area being visited.
Local regulations and policy determine if a visitor requires an escort while in the
restricted area. Personnel on the access list may be admitted to restricted areas
without an escort.

b.

Two-Person Rule. The two-person rule is designed to prohibit access to sensitive

areas or equipment by a lone individual. Two authorized persons are considered
present when they are in a physical position from which they can positively detect
incorrect or unauthorized procedures with respect to the task or operation being
performed. The team is familiar with applicable safety and security requirements,
and they are present during any operation that affords access to sensitive areas or
equipment that requires the two-person rule.
1.

When application of the two-person rule is required, it is enforced constantly

by the personnel who constitute the team.

2.

The two-person rule is applied in many other aspects of physical security

operations, such as the following:

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SMFM 19-14

3.

(a)

When uncontrolled access to vital machinery, equipment, or materiel

might provide opportunity for intentional or unintentional damage that
could affect the installations mission or operation.

(b)

When uncontrolled access to funds could provide opportunity for

diversion by falsification of accounts.

(c)

When uncontrolled delivery or receipt for materials could provide

opportunity for pilferage through short deliveries and false receipts.

(d)

When access to an arms or ammunition storage room could provide an

opportunity for theft. Keys should be issued so that at least two people
must be present to unlock the locks.

The two-person rule is limited to the creativity of the senior law enforcement
officer and the physical-security manager. They should explore every aspect
of physical security operations in which the two-person rule would provide
additional security and assurance and include all appropriate
recommendations and provisions of the physical-security plan. An electronicentry control system may be used to enforce the two-person rule. The system
can be programmed to deny access until two authorized people have
successfully entered codes or swiped cards.

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APPENDIX A
VEHICLE INSPECTION HOT SPOTS
This appendix shows vehicle inspection hot spots that access controllers may encounter on
various vehicle types. A hot spot is an area on a vehicle where a device or contraband could be
hidden. These areas require special attention during inspections (Figures A-1 through A-14).

Figure A-1. Box Truck.

Figure A-2. Bus.

A-1

SMFM 19-14

Figure A-3. Camper/Motor Home.

Figure A-4. Closed Hopper Trailer.

A-2

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Figure A-5. Concrete Mixer.

Figure A-6. Dump Truck.

A-3

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Figure A-7. Garbage Truck.

Figure A-8. Fuel Tanker.

A-4

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Figure A-9. Liquid Tanker.

Figure A-10. Automobile.

A-5

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Figure A-11. Passenger Truck.

Figure A-12. Tractor.

A-6

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Figure A-13. Enclosed Trailer.

Figure A-14. Flatbed Trailer.

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APPENDIX B
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
B-1.

GENERAL. Rules of engagement are directives issued by military authority that outline
the circumstances and limitations under which the National Guard will start and/or
continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Rules of engagement specify
when, where, against whom, and how units can use force. The National Guard may use
rules of engagement to control the use of force across the range of operations. The
aggressiveness that is important in wartime must be tempered with restraint in the
ambiguous environment of internal security operations.

B-2.

PURPOSES OF RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. Rules of engagement are rules

implementing strategic policy decisions for operations or tactical military goal while at
the same time, bringing National Guard forces in compliance with domestic or
international law. The rules of engagement should be flexible and designed to best
support the mission. Rules of engagement provide guidance regarding the use of force by
commanders and individuals based on three types of considerations:

B-3.

a.

Military. Rules of engagement should be distinguished from tactical control

measures, threat conditions, arming orders and other polices and directives, such as
weapons confiscation rules. An example of military-driven rule is the commonly
encountered requirement for observed indirect fires for the purpose of effective
target engagement. Rules of engagement are not the same as fire control measures.

b.

Policy. Rules of engagement reflect the political will of the civilian leadership of
the National Guard. Additionally, developing and training rules of engagement to
multinational allies is an inherently political process, which may require
coordination with other government agencies. An example of a policy-driven rule
is the prohibition of first use of riot control agents without express orders.

c.

Legal. Rules of engagement also reflect domestic and international law. An

example of legal-driven rule is the prohibition, hospitals, mosques, shrines,
schools, museums, and any other historical or cultural sites will not be engaged
except in self-defense.

DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS. When drafting rules of engagement always

recognize the soldiers right of self-defense, the commanders right and obligation to selfdefense, and the Kingdoms right to defend itself and its allies and coalition partners
against aggression.
a.

Effective rules of engagement are enforceable, understandable, tactically sound,

and legally sufficient. Effective rules of engagement are responsive to the mission
and consistent with unit initiative.

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SMFM 19-14
b.

Effective rules of engagement comply with Kingdom and international laws,

including the body of international law pertaining to armed conflict; therefore,
rules of engagement never justify illegal actions. In all situations, soldiers and
commanders use force that is necessary and proportional.

c.

In passing orders to subordinates, a commander must act within the rules of

engagement received. Rules of engagement; however, never relieve the
commander from his responsibility to formulate the end state, objectives, missions,
and other elements of operational design. Commanders at all levels continually
review the rules of engagement to ensure their effectiveness in respect of their
current and future conditions in their area of operations. Figure B-1 shows where
rules of engagement information is included in an operation plan or order.
Where to Find Rules of Engagement

Kingdom level

Appendix 8 (Rules of Engagement) to Annex

C (Operations) of the operations plan or
operations order
Annex E (Rules of Engagement) to the
operations plan or operations order

Sector-, Brigade-, Battalion-level

Figure B-1. Where Rules of Engagement Information is Included in the

Operations Plan or Operations Order.
B-4.

ELEMENTS OF SELF DEFENSE. Nothing in the rules of engagement can limit the
inherent authority and obligation to use all necessary means available and take all
appropriate action in self-defense of an individual or a member of the National Guard. In
all situations, soldiers and commanders use force based on necessity and proportionality:
a.

Necessity. Necessity permits friendly forces to engage only those forces

committing hostile acts or clearly demonstrating hostile intent. Imminent danger
requires a resort to force when there is a hostile act (the actual use of armed force
(attacking)) or hostile intent (the threat or imminent use of force). This formulation,
a quire restrictive rule for the use of force, captures the essence of peacetime
necessity under international law. The precise contents of these definitions become
sensitive when the rules of engagement describe specific behaviors as hostile acts
or equate particular objective characteristics with hostile intent. For example, the
rules of engagement might define a foreign uniformed soldier aiming a machine
gun from behind a prepared position as a clear demonstration of hostile intent,
regardless of whether that soldier truly intends to harm National Guard soldiers.

b.

Proportionality. Force must be limited in intensity, duration, and magnitude to that

required to ensure the continued safety of armed forces. Graduated response
illustrates a technique that clearly incorporates the elements of necessity and
proportionality. This technique provides planned responses to an array of hostile
and nonhostile threats that the force may encounter. These responses are
specifically tailored to the situation and emphasize using minimal necessary force
B-2

SMFM 19-14
to diffuse the threat. However, graduated response includes the ability to quickly
escalate to the level of force required to accomplish the mission. For further
information on graduated response, refer to SMFM 19-15.
B-5.

CHARACTERISTICS OF EFFECTIVE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. Effective

rules of engagement conform to the following characteristics:
a.

Tactically Sound. Use rules of engagement to assist in course of action

development and selection, but take care to ensure that the mission drives the rules
of engagement and not vice-versa.

b.

Understandable. Rules of engagement should be unambiguous and written in terms

that soldiers can understand.

c.

Legally Sufficient. Rules of engagement comply with domestic and international

laws including the body of law pertaining to armed conflict. Rules of engagement
never justify illegal actions.

d.

Responsive. The development, distribution, training, and modification of rules of

engagement must be timely and responsive to a changing mission and threat.

B-6.

STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. Headquarters, National Guard has

developed standing rules of engagement as baseline guidance for National Guard units.
This guidance equally applies to all commands and can be easily and quickly modified or
clarified by mission-specific rules of engagement. Standing rules of engagement apply in
the absence of specific guidance from higher authority. The standing rules of engagement
provide a common template for developing and implementing rules of engagement across
the range of military operations. They include lists of numbered supplemental measures
that may be provided by, or requested from, higher authority. The supplemental measures
provided in the standing rules of engagement are intended as a planning tool to tailor
rules of engagement for a particular situation.

B-7.

INTERPRET, DRAFT, DISSEMINATE, AND TRAIN METHOD. Commanders and

staffs at all echelons use the four aspects of the interpret, draft, disseminate, and train
methodology to incorporate rules of engagement into the conduct of military operations.
Rules of engagement methodology is conducted throughout the military decision making
process with the training officer and staff officers engaged in targeting, and the legal
affairs and general department. The interpretation and drafting of rules of engagement
require special attention from the legal affairs and general department:
a.

Interpret. The office of the legal affairs and general department is instrumental in
interpreting rules of engagement. This may require constant situational
understanding by the office of the legal affairs and general department made
possible through his presence at command posts as required.

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SMFM 19-14
b.

Draft. In some operations, rules of engagement are top-driven, meaning that the
higher echelon commander establishes rules of engagement that must be
disseminated verbatim to all lower echelons. In contrast, top-fed rules of
engagement are established for the immediately subordinate echelon. This allows
the rules of engagement to be tailored to the particular units situation. When the
rules are top-fed, commanders and staffs down to brigade level draft rules of
engagement for their commands. Figure B-2 contains some of the areas considered
in drafting rules of engagement and rules of interaction.
Rules of Engagement Considerations

International law.
Operational concerns (mission requirements).
Commanders intent.
Threat.
Tactics and weapons organic to the force.
Legal requirement (laws of the Kingdom).
Kingdom policy (considering United Nations resolutions and international agreements).

Figure B-2. Considerations in Drafting Rules of Engagement.

Rules of Engagement
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

You have the right to use force in self-defense.

Use minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission.
Treat everyone, including civilian and detained hostile forces, humanely.
If the situation permits, issue a challenge. Do not fire warning shots.
Conditions for opening fire: Friendly forces, and persons or property under your protection is
threatened with deadly force. Examples of deadly force threats include: individual or
individuals are attempting to take possession of friendly forces weapons, ammunition, or
property with designated special status, and there is no other way of avoiding this.

6.

An individual is aiming and firing his weapon at you.

An individual is trying to plant, throw, or is preparing to throw an explosive or
incendiary device at you, friendly forces, persons or property under your protection.
An individual who deliberately drives a vehicle at you, friendly forces, persons or
property under your protection.

If you open fire, you must:

Fire aimed shots using only the necessary rounds.

Take all reasonable efforts to void the destruction of civilian property and cease firing as soon as the
situation permits.

Figure B-3. Example of Rules of Engagement.

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SMFM 19-14
c.

Disseminate. Rules of engagement are distributed through the chain of command

via a campaign plan, operation plan, or operation order. Figure B-3 shows a sample
of a rules of engagement card. All forces must have the same understanding of the
rules of engagement.

d.

Train. Rules of engagement must be disseminated throughout the National Guard

and reinforced by training and rehearsal. Soldiers execute in the manner they train;
they carry out their tasks in compliance with the rules of engagement when trained
to do so.
1.

In modern operations, a single solders action can change not only the tactical,
but the strategic and political setting as well. It is vital that commanders
disseminate and train rules of engagement to the lowest levels. Reinforce rules
of engagement in all training opportunities to train soldiers how to apply the
basic rules of self-defense. Individual and unit preparation for specific
missions must incorporate training that challenges soldiers to apply missionspecific rules of engagement.

2.

In crisis response situations, rules of engagement training may consist of

leaders and soldiers receiving and training on the mission-specific rules of
engagement on the way to a staging area. In that case, the knowledge gained
on the basic rules of self-defense and scenario-specific, situational rules of
engagement during past scheduled training enables soldiers to better
understand and adhere to the combat situation rules of engagement. When
preparing for internal security missions, commanders should remember that
these missions require soldiers to use greater restraint and discipline than in
offensive or defensive operations.

3.

The best training on rules of engagement is situational training. Situational

training challenges soldiers in employing weapons, levels of force, and other
rules of engagement. Situational training exercises focus on one or a small
group of tasks within a particular mission scenario and require that soldiers
practice until the tasks can be executed to the pre-established standard. To
conduct situational training exercises on rules of engagement, a commander or
other trainer places a soldier in a particular simulated operational scenario and
then confronts him with an event (crashing of a checkpoint barrier) by a
speeding vehicle. The trainer evaluates the soldiers response and afterwards,
conducts an after action review discussing alternative responses available in
the rules of engagement. The situational training exercise brings to life
abstract rules contained in the written rules of engagement, giving the soldier
solid reference frame within which to determine his response. The soldier is
then able to balance between initiative and restraint, which is important to
success, particularly to internal security operations.
(a) Return fire with aimed fire. Return force with force. A soldier always has
a right to repel hostile acts with necessary force.

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SMFM 19-14

4.

(b)

Anticipate attack. Use force if, but only if, there is clear indicators of
hostile intent.

(c)

Measure the amount of force. If time and circumstances permit,

measure the amount of force used to repel hostile acts. Use only the
amount of force necessary to protect lives and accomplish the mission.

(d)

Protect with deadly force only human life. Protect with deadly force
only human life and property designated by the commander. Do not go
beyond deadly force when protecting other property.

In all ongoing operations, but particularly volatile and rapidly changing

operations, commanders must conduct continuous refresher training.
Commanders must develop and update effective situational rules of
engagement based on actual events that take place during ongoing operations.
Actual events should be recorded and used in after action reviews and
implemented as lesson learned.

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APPENDIX C
FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS
C-1.

GENERAL. The five force protection condition levels that National Guard installations
respond to are NORMAL, ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, and DELTA. The
conditions characteristic to each level are described below.

C-2.

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION NORMAL. Force Protection Condition

NORMAL applies when there is no credible threat of terrorist activity and units are
conducting routine security operations in concert with the installation physical security
plan. When in Force Protection Condition NORMAL, implement a routine security
posture designed to defeat the routine criminal threat.

C-3.

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION ALPHA. Force Protection Condition

ALPHA applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against
installations, facilities, or personnel and the nature and extent of which are unpredictable.
Force Protection Condition ALPHA assumes Security Measures 110. ALPHA
measures must be capable of being sustained indefinitely, with limited impact on normal
operations. When in Force Protection Condition ALPHA, implement the following
security measures:
a.

b.

Security Measure 1. At regular intervals, remind all personnel, including family

members, to report the following to appropriate law enforcement or security
agencies:
1.

Suspicious personnel, particularly those carrying suitcases or other containers

or those observing, photographing, or asking questions about military
operations or security measures.

2.

Unidentified vehicles parked or operated in a suspicious manner on or in the

vicinity of national guard installations, units, or facilities.

3.

Abandoned parcels or suitcases.

4.

Any other activity considered suspicious.

Security Measure 2. The duty officer or personnel with access to building plans and
area evacuation plans must be available at all times. Key personnel should be able
to seal off an area immediately. Key personnel required to implement security
plans should be on call and readily available. Ensure that law enforcement and
security agencies have immediate access to building floor plans and emergency
evacuation plans for high-risk targets.

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SMFM 19-14

C-4.

c.

Security Measure 3. Secure buildings, rooms, and storage areas not in regular use.
Maintain a list of secured facilities and areas at installation, directorate, or activity
level.

d.

Security Measure 4. Increase unannounced security spot checks (inspection of

personal identification; vehicle registration; and contents of vehicles, suitcases,
briefcases, and other containers) at access control points on National Guard
installations and facilities.

e.

Security Measure 5. Reduce the number of access points for vehicles and personnel
to minimum levels, consistent with the requirement to maintain a reasonable flow
of traffic.

f.

Security Measure 6. As a deterrent, randomly apply Security Measures 14, 15, 17,
or 18 from Force Protection Condition BRAVO, either individually or in
combination with each other.

g.

Security Measure 7. Review all operations plans and orders and standard operating
procedures that pertain to the implementation of Force Protection Conditions
BRAVO through DELTA.

h.

Security Measure 8. Review security measures for high-risk personnel, and

implement additional security measures warranted by the threat and existing
vulnerabilities (for example, high-risk personnel should alter established patterns of
behavior and wear inconspicuous body armor when traveling in public areas).

i.

Security Measure 9. Increase liaison with local police, intelligence, and security
agencies to monitor the threat to National Guard personnel, installations, and
facilities. Notify local police agencies concerning Force Protection Condition
BRAVO measures that, if implemented, could impact on their operations in the
local community.

j.

Security Measure 10. Spare for local installation commander use.

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION BRAVO. Force Protection Condition

BRAVO applies when an increased and more predictable threat exists. Force protection
condition BRAVO encompasses Security Measures 1129, in addition to the security
measures of Force Protection Condition ALPHA. Force Protection Condition
BRAVO security measures must be capable of being maintained for weeks, without
causing undue hardship, substantially affecting operational capabilities, or aggravating
relations with local authorities and members of the local civilian community. When in
Force Protection Condition BRAVO, in addition to the security measures required by
Force Protection Condition ALPHA, implement the following security measures:
a.

Security Measure 11. Increase the frequency of warnings required by Measure 1

and inform personnel of additional threat information, as appropriate.

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b.

Security Measure 12. Keep all personnel on call who are involved in implementing
antiterrorism contingency plans.

c.

Security Measure 13. Review the provisions of all operations plans and orders and
standard operating procedures associated with the implementation of Force
Protection Condition CHARLIE.

d.

Security Measure 14. Move automobiles and objects, such as trash containers and
crates, away from high-risk targets and mission essential vulnerable areas to a
distance based upon countering the assessed threat. If the configuration of the
facility or area precludes implementation of this measure, take appropriate
compensatory measures according to local plans (for example, frequent inspection
by explosive detector dog teams, centralized parking, or controlled access to
parking areas).

e.

Security Measure 15. Secure and regularly inspect all buildings, rooms, and storage
areas not in regular use.

f.

Security Measure 16. At the beginning and end of each workday and at frequent
intervals, inspect the interior and exterior of buildings in regular use for suspicious
activity or packages, signs of tampering, and indications of unauthorized entry.

g.

Security Measure 17. Implement screening procedures for all incoming official
mail to identify possible explosive or incendiary devices or other dangerous
material. If available, use trained explosive detector dog teams to inspect
suspicious items and conduct periodic screening of mail. Encourage soldiers,
civilian employees, and family members to inspect their personal mail, report
suspicious items to local law enforcement agencies, and refrain from handling such
items until they are cleared by the appropriate authority.

h.

Security Measure 18. Inspect all deliveries to facilities, stores, libraries, schools,
and other locally designated common-use facilities to identify explosive or
incendiary devices. Use trained explosive detector dog teams for inspections, when
available, if intelligence is received or a specific threat has been addressed.
Encourage family members to report suspicious packages to local law enforcement
agencies and refrain from handling them until they are cleared by the appropriate
authority.

i.

Security Measure 19. Increase both overt and covert security force surveillance of
facilities, libraries, schools, mosques, and high-risk targets to improve deterrence
and build confidence among staff and family members.

j.

Security Measure 20. Inform soldiers, civilian employees, and family members of
the general threat situation to stop rumors and prevent unnecessary alarm.
Periodically update all personnel as the situation changes.

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C-5.

k.

Security Measure 21. Brief representatives of all units and activities on the
installation concerning the threat and security measures implemented in response to
the threat. Implement procedures to provide periodic updates for these unit and
activity representatives.

l.

Security Measure 22. Verify the identity of all personnel entering the installation,
high-risk targets, and other sensitive activities specified in local plans (inspect
identification cards or grant access based on visual recognition). Visually inspect
the interior of all vehicles and the exterior of all suitcases, briefcases, packages,
and other containers. Increase the frequency of detailed vehicle inspections (for
example, trunk, undercarriage, and glove boxes) and the frequency of inspections
of suitcases, briefcases, and other containers.

m.

Security Measure 23. Increase the frequency of random identity checks (inspection
of identification cards, security badges, and vehicle registration documents)
conducted by security force patrols on the installation.

n.

Security Measure 24. Increase security provided to off post personnel in

conjunction with local law enforcement agencies, where required and/or
practicable, or transport off-post personnel to protected areas according to local
contingency plans. Remind all personnel to lock parked vehicles and inspect
vehicles for suspicious items before entering and driving them.

o.

Security Measure 25. Implement additional security measures for high-risk

personnel, such as the conduct of counter-surveillance operations, according to
existing plans. Consider providing 24-hour protective services protection for
designated high-risk personnel, if not already provided.

p.

Security Measure 26. Brief all law enforcement personnel, guards, and security
augmentation force personnel concerning the threat and policies governing the use
of force/rules of engagement. Repeat this briefing on a periodic basis.

q.

Security Measure 27. Increase liaison with local police, intelligence, and security
agencies to monitor the threat to national guard personnel, installations, and
facilities. Notify local police agencies concerning Force Protection Condition
CHARLIE and DELTA measures that, if implemented, could impact on their
operations in the local community.

r.

Security Measure 28. Test attack-warning systems and supporting evacuation

plans, ensuring proficiency and appropriate operations security.

s.

Security Measure 29. Spare for installation use.

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION CHARLIE. Force Protection Condition

CHARLIE applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that
some form of terrorist action against facilities or personnel is likely. In addition to

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security measures from Force Protection Condition NORMAL, ALPHA, and
BRAVO, Security Measures 3040 will be implemented. Implementation of
CHARLIE security measures for more than a short period probably will create hardship
and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel. When in Force Protection
Condition CHARLIE, implement the following measures:
a.

Security Measure 30. Continue all Force Protection Condition ALPHA and
BRAVO security measures or introduce those that have not already been
implemented.

b.

Security Measure 31. Keep all personnel who are responsible for implementing
antiterrorism plans at their place of duty.

c.

Security Measure 32. Reduce installation and high-risk target access points to the
absolute minimum necessary for continued operation.

d.

Security Measure 33. Verify the identity of all personnel entering National Guard
installations, facilities, and activities (to include housing areas, schools, and other
facilities that are not located on installations). Inspect identification cards, security
badges, or other forms of personal identification. Visually inspect the interior of all
vehicles and the exterior of all suitcases, briefcases, and other containers. Increase
the frequency of detailed vehicle inspections (such as the trunk, undercarriage, and
glove boxes) and the frequency of inspection of suitcases, briefcases, and other
containers.

e.

Security Measure 34. Remove all vehicles parked within or near mission essential
vulnerable areas and high-risk targets specified in local plans to a distance based
upon countering the assessed threat. Implement centralized parking and shuttle bus
service, where required.

f.

Security Measure 35. Issue weapons to all law enforcement personnel, security
guards, and guard force augmentation personnel, if not already implemented.
Ensure that all personnel have been briefed concerning the policies governing the
use of force/rules of engagement, particularly the criteria for the use of deadly
force. Ensure that ammunition is available for immediate issue (for those personnel
not already issued ammunition) and that supervisory personnel are familiar with
the policies governing the issuance of ammunition.

g.

Security Measure 36. Increase security patrol activity to the maximum level
sustainable. Weight the effort toward high-risk targets.

h.

Security Measure 37. Position guard force personnel in the vicinity of all high-risk
targets and mission essential vulnerable areas. In areas where necessary, position
additional security personnel in the vicinity of otherwise unprotected housing
areas, schools, hospitals, and other soft targets. Request additional security
augmentation particularly in unprotected areas when needed.

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SMFM 19-14

C-6.

i.

Security Measure 38. Erect barriers required to control the direction of traffic flow
and to protect facilities vulnerable to a bomb attack by parked or moving vehicles.

j.

Security Measure 39. Consult local authorities about closing public (and military)
roads and facilities that might make sites more vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

k.

Security Measure 40. Spare for installation use.

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITION DELTA. Force Protection Condition

DELTA applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or
intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is
imminent. Force Protection Condition DELTA is normally issued as a localized
warning and requires implementation of mandatory Security Measures 4151. All
measures from Force Protection Condition NORMAL, ALPHA, BRAVO, and
CHARLIE are continued or introduced if not previously implemented. Implementation
of Force Protection Condition DELTA cannot be sustained for extended periods
without causing significant hardships for personnel and affect the peacetime activities of
units and personnel. When in Force Protection Condition DELTA, implement the
following measures:
a.

Security Measure 41. Continue all Force Protection Condition ALPHA,

BRAVO, and CHARLIE measures or introduce those that have not already
been implemented.

b.

Security Measure 42. Augment guard forces to ensure absolute control over access
to the installation, mission essential vulnerable areas, and high-risk targets.

c.

Security Measure 43. Identify the owners of all vehicles already on the installation.
In those cases where the presence of a vehicle cannot be explained (owner is not
present and has no obvious military affiliation), inspect the vehicle for explosive or
incendiary devices or other dangerous items and remove the vehicle from the
vicinity of high-risk targets as soon as possible. Commanders may take unilateral
action off post only in circumstances where there is a reasonable basis to believe
that death, grievous bodily harm, or significant property damage will otherwise
occur.

d.

Security Measure 44. Inspect all vehicles entering the installation, facility, or
activity. Inspections should include cargo storage areas, the undercarriage, glove
box(es), and any other area where explosive or incendiary devices or other
dangerous items could be concealed. Briefcases, suitcases, boxes, and other
containers in vehicles should also be inspected.

e.

Security Measure 45. Limit access to installations, facilities, and activities to those
personnel with a legitimate and verifiable need to enter.

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SMFM 19-14
f.

Security Measure 46. Inspect all baggage (such as suitcases, packages, or

briefcases) brought on the installation for the presence of explosive or incendiary
devices or other dangerous items.

g.

Security Measure 47. Take measures to control access to all areas under the
jurisdiction of the National Guard command or agency.

h.

Security Measure 48. Implement frequent inspections of the exterior of buildings

(to include the roof and subterranean areas) and parking areas. Security force
personnel should conduct inspections at high-risk targets and mission essential
vulnerable areas.

i.

Security Measure 49. Cancel or delay all administrative movement that is not
mission-essential.

j.

Security Measure 50. Request that local authorities close public roads and facilities
in the vicinity of military installations, facilities, and activities that might facilitate
the execution of a terrorist attack.

k.

Security Measure 51. Spare for installation use.

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APPENDIX D
BLAST MITIGATION AND BARRIERS
Section I
Blast Mitigation
D-1.

INTRODUCTION AND TECHNICAL DEFINITIONS. The goal of employing blast

and fragment mitigation techniques is to reduce the number of casualties associated with
terrorist bombings. The primary explosive quantities addressed in this section are vehicle
bombs found in passenger cars, 226.80 kg, vans or cargo trucks, 453.59 kg, and tanker or
tractor-trailer trucks, 9,071.85 kg.
a.

The detonation of vehicle bombs generates four primary hazards to personnel in

fixed structures, shelters and in the open:
1.

Primary fragments. Consisting of vehicle debris ejected at moderate to high

velocities and generally low trajectories.

2.

Secondary fragments from barriers and structures countermobility devices and

structures near the large vehicle bomb and entry control point will be
completely involved in the large vehicle bomb explosion and will produce
secondary debris as they are broken up by the force of the blast. This debris
will again be launched at relatively low trajectories, but will have significant
velocity.

3.

Secondary debris in fixed structures, window glass, and some structural

materials such as masonry walls can fail and become debris that is hazardous
to personnel occupying perimeter spaces in buildings.

4.

Blast. The force of the explosion as it is transmitted through the air (blast) can
cause injury to personnel in the open. It can pick up and translate ground
debris, and can fail and collapse structures, generating numerous injuries and
deaths. These hazards are considered in the sitting, barrier, and retrofit
recommendations presented in this section.

b.

Breach. Occurs when brittle materials like concrete are destroyed by very intense
and local overpressure, resulting in a hole.

c.

Spall. When fragments are dislodged at high velocities from the backside of a
brittle material like concrete.

d.

Secondary debris occurs when objects surrounding a detonation become projectiles

and fragments with enough energy to create damage of their own. Secondary
debris can be categorized as near field secondary debris that results from barriers or

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entry control point structures and, building debris that results from the blast wave
blowing out windows and walls.
e.

Primary fragments are parts, pieces, and fragments of the truck and bomb that are
thrown outward from the detonation at high velocity. Primary fragments are
generally the most lethal projectiles from a bomb detonation.

f.

Far field conditions generally refer to relatively low overpressures found at greater
distances from the detonation point.

g.

Near field refers to the area immediately surrounding a detonation in which blast
and fragment damage will be extensive.

h.

Blast Walls are protective walls employed at an occupied position (such as a

building) that are designed to reduce reflected pressures to incident pressures on
vertical surfaces.

i.

Blast Barriers are employed near the large vehicle bomb (at the access control
point) and can attenuate blast in their shadow to levels acceptable for hardened
structures. Blast barriers do not reduce blast damage significantly for conventional
and expeditionary structures, and are ineffective for mitigating blast effects.

j.

Fragment Barriers (Figure D-1) are employed close to the large vehicle bomb (at
the access control point) and in the far field adjacent to occupied positions.
Fragment barriers provide protection from impacting primary and secondary
debris. These barriers should not be employed with the intent to mitigate blast.

Figure D-1. Fragment Barriers at the Access Control Point.

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SMFM 19-14

Section II
Barriers
D-2.

INTENDED USE AND CONTEXT. The purpose in presenting this information on

intended use is to provide you with the appropriate context in which to implement these
devices, and to remedy the shortcomings addressed above.
a.

b.

c.

d.

Jersey Barrier. Intended use:

1.

Countermobility.

2.

Should not be used to mitigate blast damage in the near field.

3.

Should not be used to mitigate fragment damage in the near field.

4.

May be used to mitigate fragment damage in the far field region.

5.

Must always be inter-connected with cables.

Bitburg Barrier. Intended use:

1.

Countermobility.

2.

Should not be used to mitigate blast damage.

3.

Should not be used to mitigate fragment damage in the near field.

4.

May be used to mitigate fragment damage in the far field.

Sandbags. Intended use:

1.

Fragment Mitigation.

2.

May also be used behind Jersey and Bitburg Barriers to reduce or eliminate
secondary debris hazard associated with spalling concrete.

3.

If implemented correctly, may be used to mitigate blast damage.

Water or Sand Filled Plastic Barriers. Intended use:

1.

Limited countermobility for low speed impact (certified by tests).

2.

Could be used to mitigate fragment damage in the near field depending on the
threat level.

3.

May be used in the far field to mitigate fragment damage.

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SMFM 19-14
e.

f.

D-3.

Concertina Styled Barriers. Intended use:

1.

Blast and fragment mitigation.

2.

May also be used for countermobility purposes.

Soil-Backed Barriers. Intended use:

1.

Countermobility.

2.

May also be used for fragment mitigation in the near field if implemented
correctly.

3.

May be used for fragment mitigation in the far field.

4.

Implemented in the appropriate manner, soil-backed barriers may also provide

some blast mitigation capability in the far field.

NATURAL MATERIAL AND COSMETIC BARRIERS. Natural and cosmetic

barriers are effective if integrated into security planning, new construction, or renovation
projects. Natural obstructions such as hills, outcroppings, lakes, and ponds can be used to
stop, deter, or slow a vehicle trying to enter a facility. Natural materials, wood, dirt, and
rock, can be used to build berms and walls that prove to be effective barriers, yet do not
detract from the aesthetics of the site landscaping. Factors to take into account include:
a.

Vegetation. Vegetation along standoff zone perimeters and on off-road approaches

to the perimeters can deter aggressors from approaching the protected facility from
that route. Vegetation may also slow the approach of vehicles by providing
obstacles to direct approach. Closely spaced plants in multiple, overlapping rows
with trunk diameters greater than 13 centimeters are the best deterrents to
stationary vehicles. Perimeter barriers capable of stopping moving vehicles can be
integrated with plantings of vegetation for aesthetics purposes. Because mature
plants are the most effective deterrents, the required plant material should be
provided by retaining existing vegetation where possible.

b.

Water. The effectiveness of bodies of water used as barriers to moving vehicles has
not been quantified, but their value in slowing vehicles and as a deterrent is
obvious. Water that is deep enough to submerge the exhaust pipes of vehicles will
provide an effective barrier. Lesser depths may only slow vehicles. For example,
cars and light trucks will be limited to speeds of approximately 40 kilometers per
hour by large bodies of water only 15 centimeters deep. Bodies of water 91
centimeters deep would act as barriers to moving vehicles. If the body of water
floor is uneven or contains several deep trenches, the effectiveness as a barrier
increases significantly.

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SMFM 19-14
c.

D-4.

Terrain. Terrain features such as ditches, berms, hills, or large rocks may provide
effective barriers to vehicles. Rocks or groups of rocks that have a collective mass
equal to approximately twice that of the threatening vehicle make effective
barriers. To be effective, rock ditches, and berms must span the approach route to
block it. Those of lesser extent or such features of a size too small to stop a vehicle
can be used as obstacles to slow vehicle approaches. In designing terrain obstacles,
circuitous, off-road approach routes are far more effective than direct routes. As an
example, the use of inclines can slow vehicle approaches by limiting their ability to
accelerate.

FABRICATED BARRIERS. The types of fabricated vehicle barriers include:

a.

Concrete Barrier (Jersey Barrier). Barriers can be erected from either precast
tongue and groove sections or cast in place with special concrete-forming
equipment. These barriers can be used around a fixed site as a perimeter vehicle
barrier. Barriers can also be arranged to direct and slow traffic flow into a site. This
gives the security personnel at the gate more time to react to a potential threat.

b.

Portable Water/Sand-Filled Barriers. Plastic water or sand-filled barriers can be

effective, as well as being easily moved without the need for heavy equipment.

c.

Chain Link Gate Reinforcement. Wire ropes are fastened to gates and anchored on
either side of the gate. For a relatively weak gate, the reinforcement transfers the
force of a vehicle impact to a more substantial anchor system. It can be used on
many different gate applications.

d.

Cable Barrier. Cable is fastened to each post with U-clamps at a height of 100
centimeters and is periodically anchored. The cable is typically 2 cm diameter or
larger aircraft cable mounted between chain link fabric and upright posts. The
barrier prevents light vehicles from crashing through a standard chain link fence.
One disadvantage is that the cable can be covertly cut when installed along the
outermost perimeter.

e.

Drum and Cable Barrier. Standard 208 liter drums are filled with dirt, rock or
concrete-weighing about 400 to 550 kilograms-attached by a 2 centimeter aircraft
cable to another drum or fixed object. Requires minimal setup time and expense.
This can be a cost-effective application since empty storage drums, dirt and rock
are readily available.

f.

Dragnet. This consists of a chain link "net" assembly with arresting cables attached
to an energy absorber that is attached to the anchor system. In the open position,
the dragnet is suspended above the access road. When a vehicle hits the dragnet in
the closed (dropped) position, the energy form the impact is transferred through the
arresting cables to an energy absorber that brings the vehicle to a controlled stop.

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SMFM 19-14
g.

Bollard. A bollard is a post made of concrete, stainless steel, aluminum, cast iron,
or other durable material, that creates an aboveground obstacle. Bollards can be
fixed or retractable. At the high end, bollards are constructed to completely stop
most vehicles.

h.

Removable Nuisance Barrier. An 8 centimeter pipe driven into the ground and
fastened with 0.65 centimeter coil chain, is used to channel traffic and create
marked isolation zones around sensitive areas, equipment, and buildings. It can be
set up and removed quickly and easily.

i.

Guardrail. Standard highway guardrails or median barriers; cable, W-beam, or box

beam guardrails are used as a perimeter barrier. They are not designed to prevent
head-on penetrations but can immobilize a lightweight vehicle attempting an
intrusion.

j.

Traffic Control Island with Vehicle Barriers. Standard guard post, with two
automatic gates, a custom base, platform curb assembly with three pass-throughs,
and 16 barrier posts provide protection for security personnel stationed at vehicle
entrance.

k.

Motorized Barricade. This refers to a steel barricade with standard height of 33

centimeters, and a maximum height of 100 centimeters. Several activation options
are possible, such as by remote switch or card reader. These barricades provide a
steel barrier that can be deployed to close off vehicle access in approximately three
seconds.

l.

Hydraulic Barricade. Upon major impact, the lifting mechanism absorbs the shock.
In emergency situations, a steel barricade closes off vehicle access in just one
second.

m.

Electronic Barrier Gate. Chain link gates and turnstiles used for vehicle and
personnel entrances, electronic barrier gates may be activated by remote switch,
numerical code, or card reader.

n.

Tire-Penetrating Traffic Barrier (one-way tire trendles). A row of 1.25 centimeter

steel teeth that are unidirectional, spring-loaded, are embedded in the road. The
barrier punctures the tires of an intruding vehicle, while allowing passage of
vehicles in the opposite direction.

o.

Portable Roadblock Tire-Puncturing Device. Hollow stainless steel spikes mounted

on aluminum scissors action arms expand to stretch across a vehicle access.
Anchors hold the scissors in place. The system expands to cover 7 meters and folds
into a case weighing 16 kilograms. When an intruding vehicle passes over the
system, the spikes imbed into the vehicle's tires and detach from the aluminum
frame. This opens several "tubes" which cause rapid uniform deflation and prevent
the holes from sealing. Since the air loss is uniform from all times, the operator is

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SMFM 19-14
more likely to maintain control of their vehicle. These devices are most effective
against light vehicles with standard 2 centimeter thick rubber tires.

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D-8