CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DIGEST

I.POLITICAL LAW DEFINED

Macariola v. Asuncion, 114 SCRA 77, May 31, 1982
Facts:
When the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 rendered by respondent Hon. Judge
Elias B. Asuncion of Court of First Instance of Leyte became final on June 8,
1863 for lack of an appeal, a project of partition was submitted to him which
he later approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963. Among the parties
thereto was complainant Bernardita R. Macariola.
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184. This
lot according to the decision rendered by Judge Asuncion was adjudicated to
the plaintiffs Reyes in equal shares subdividing Lot 1184 into five lots
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E.
On July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E was sold to Dr. Arcadio Galapon who later sold a
portion of Lot 1184-E to Judge Asuncion and his wife Victoria Asuncion.
Thereafter spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon conveyed their respective
shares and interests in Lot 1184-E to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing
Industries Inc. wherein Judge Asuncion was the president.
Macariola then filed an instant complaint on August 9, 1968 docketed as Civil
Case No. 4234 in the CFI of Leyte against Judge Asuncion with "acts
unbecoming a judge" alleging that Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a
portion of Lot 1184-E violated Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code, Art.
14, pars. 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce, Sec. 3 par. H of R.A. 3019, Sec.
12 Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules and Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose Nepomuceno of the CFI of Leyte rendered
a decision dismissing the complaints against Judge Asuncion.
After the investigation, report and recommendation conducted by Justice
Cecilia Munoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, she recommended on her
decision dated March 27, 1971 that Judge Asuncion be exonerated.

Issue: Does Judge Asuncion, now Associate Justice of Court of Appeals

violated any law in acquiring by purchase a parcel of Lot 1184-E which he
previously decided in a Civil Case No. 3010 and his engagement in business

by joining a private corporation during his incumbency as a judge of the CFI

of Leyte constitute an "act unbecoming of a judge"?

Ruling: No. The respondent Judge Asuncion's actuation does not constitute
of an "act unbecoming of a judge." But he is reminded to be more discreet in
his private and business activities.
SC ruled that the prohibition in Article 1491 par. 5 of the New Civil Code
applies only to operate, the sale or assignment of the property during the
pendency of the litigation involving the property. Respondent judge
purchased a portion of Lot 1184-E on March 6, 1965, the in Civil Case No.
3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of
the parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period. Hence,
the lot in question was no longer subject to litigation. Furthermore, Judge
Asuncion did not buy the lot in question directly from the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased Lot1184E from the plaintiffs Reyes after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No.
3010.
SC stated that upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the US and
later on from the US to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of Code
of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new
sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly
re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. There appears
no enabling or affirmative act that continued the effectivity of the
aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce, consequently, Art.
14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and
cannot apply to the respondent Judge Asuncion.
Respondent Judge cannot also be held liable to par. H, Section 3 of R.A. 3019
because the business of the corporation in which respondent participated
had obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office.
SC stated that respondent judge and his wife deserve the commendation for
their immediate withdrawal from the firm 22 days after its incorporation
realizing that their interest contravenes the Canon 25 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.

II. THE BACKGROUND HISTROY OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
SIRS/MESDAMES:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court MAY 22,
1986.
In G.R. No. 73748, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines vs. President
Corazon C. Aquino, et al.; G.R. No. 73972, People's Crusade for Supremacy of
the Constitution vs. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., and G.R. No. 73990, Councilor
Clifton U. Ganay vs. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., the legitimacy of the
government of President Aquino is questioned. It is claimed that her
government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution.
As early as April 10, 1986, this Court* had already voted to dismiss the
petitions for the reasons to be stated below. On April 17, 1986, Atty. Lozano
as counsel for the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 73748 and 73972 withdrew the
petitions and manifested that they would pursue the question by extrajudicial methods. The withdrawal is functus oficio.
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners have
no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. For the
legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter. It
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they
have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in
effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely a de
factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the
community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present
government. All the eleven members of this Court, as reorganized, have
sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS
Clerk of Court
* The Court was then composed of Teehankee, C.J. and Abad Santos.,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo,
JJ.------------------------------------------

DIGEST
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the
Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new
government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.The
Court further held that:The people have accepted the Aquino government
which is in effective control of the entire country;It is not merely a de facto
government but in fact and law a de jure government; and The community of
nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
A. ADOPTION AND EFFECTIVITY OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION
De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987
(En Banc), J. Melencio-Herrera
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of
Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay
election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay
Election
Act
of
1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated
December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin
Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as
members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of
February 8, 1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be
prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act
of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall
commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall

have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the
ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no
longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective
and appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in
office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not
because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in
the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six
years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with
Sec.
2,
Art.
3
of
the
Provisional
Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners
was validly made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent
OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and
Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force
and
effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore,
the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art
3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by
petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides
in
part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw,
therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election
Act of 1982 should still govern.
(The 1987 Constitution took effect immediately upon its ratification by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held on February 2, 1987)
EFFECTIVITY OF STATUTES
TAADA VS. TUVERA (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern

as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be

published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal
of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring
the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law
or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It
would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in
the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent
officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general
applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of
general application which have not been published have no force and effect.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official

Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The Court has ruled that

publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the
fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for
the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the
date of its effectivity.

TAADA VS. TUVERA (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24,
1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity
and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as
an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect

the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to
inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.
The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible
III. THE PHILIPPINE AS A STATE
STATE DEFINED
THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA
October 29, 1971 (Applying reciprocity rule, is morocco a state even
if not recognized by the Philippines)
FACTS:
Antonio Campos Rueda is the administrator of the estate of the deceased
Maria Cerdeira. Cerdeira is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a
Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco up to her death. At
the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties
in the Philippines. The CIR then issued an assessment for state and
inheritance taxes of P369,383.96. Rueda filed an amended return stating that
intangible personal properties worth P396,308.90 should be exempted from
taxes. The CIR denied the request on the ground that the law of Tangier is
not reciprocal to Section 122 (now Section 104) of the National Internal
Revenue Code.
The case was elevated to the CTA which sided with Rueda. The CTA stated
that the foreign country mentioned in Section 122 "refers to a government of
that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense
of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible
person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a
similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier
should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the
petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax.
Code."

ISSUE: Whether the exemption is valid.

RULING:
YES.
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the
National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected
under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent
at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time
of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in
respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the
decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption
from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible
personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that
foreign country."
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a
state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a
politically organized sovereign community independent of outside
control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its
territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime
of law. A foreign country is thus a sovereign person with the people
composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a
government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its
commands.
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international
personality, the CIR has not successfully made out a case. The Court did
commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, like Liechtenstein,
hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt
TERRITORY- ARCHIPELAGO CONCEPT
Regime of Islands
Merlin Magallona vs Secretary Eduardo Ermita

655 SCRA 476 Political Law National Territory RA 9522 is Constitutional

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines
of the Philippines was enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law.
This law was meant to comply with the terms of the third United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the Philippines in
February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they
contend, among others, that the law decreased the national territory of the
Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional. Some of their particular
arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other
ancillary treaties this also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, describes the Philippine waters as
archipelagic waters which, in international law, opens our waters landward
of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels (innocent passage) and
aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging
marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the
Scarborough Shoal (bajo de masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to
UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is
not a means to acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has
nothing to do with the acquisition, enlargement, or diminution of the
Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or loss of
territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession
and prescription and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the
regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys
terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased
it. Under the old law amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the
rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines. The area that it covered was
440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime was
increased to 586,210 sq. na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States
parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:

a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision
of Section 2 of RA 9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the
Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may
term it as our internal waters, but the bottom line is that our country
exercises sovereignty over these waters and UNCLOS itself recognizes that.
However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the exercise
of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly

invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised

in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory
measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough
Shoal, as a regime of islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under
UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they are regimes of islands, they
generate their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be enclosed
within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island
group). This is because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area
which would already depart from the provisions of UNCLOS that the
demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal through effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime
zones where we exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise
sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where
we can enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where
we have the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is
covered by Article 77 of the UNCLOS.
Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the
Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a
Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and
official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD
and the holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOAAD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP
from signing the same.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for
adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on
matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure
of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents
to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a
departure by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing
amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by
any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus
standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. MacapagalArroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval
of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a
judicial controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a
singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional
scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and
the responsibility of the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution
involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy
of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28)

including public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of

1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of
the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to
reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern
involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to
information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the
executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on
both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensusbuilding. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information,
comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.
3. a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a
separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized
by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the
Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or,
at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present
Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under
our laws as having an associative relationship with the national
government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything
ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also
implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction
other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of
the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in
all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the
Montevideo Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined

territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with

other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed
itself by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national
government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is
not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the
formation and powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even
assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous region in the
constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with
it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the
MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework, implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of
office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power
does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but
simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper
procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere
recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the abovediscussed standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor
even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit
these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in
whom constituent powers are vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros
and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be
accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives
or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan
and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their
descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,
includes not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but
all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD
adds that the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected.
What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The
MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of
which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral
domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides
for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and
prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or
any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires
all national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program
critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call
for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the
diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave
abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation
process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act
No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to

a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.

It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws.
Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them,
namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the
BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated
entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.
PEOPLE
1.
A. INHABITANTS(?)
2. CITIZENSHIP
KILOSBAYAN VS ERMITA
Only natural-born Filipino citizens may be appointed as justice of the Supreme Court
Decision of administrative body (Bureau of Immigration) declaring one a natural-born
citizen is not bindingupon the courts when there are circumstances that entail factual
assertions that need to be threshed out inproper judicial proceedings
F ACTS:
This case arose when respondent Gregory S. Ong was appointed by Executive
Secretary, in representation of theOffice of the President, as Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court. Petitioners contended that respondent Ong isa Chinese citizen, born on
May 25, 1953 to Chinese parents. They further added that even if it were granted
that eleven years after respondent Ongs birth, his father was finally granted Filipino
citizenship by naturalization,that, by itself, would not make respondent Ong a naturalborn citizen. For his part, respondent Ong contendedthat he is a natural-born
citizen and presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration and
theDOJdeclaring him to be such.
ISSUE:Whether o r no t resp ond e n t Ong i s a na t u r al-bo r n F ili p ino ci t
izen
RULING:
xxx respondent Ong is a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the
DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and
his mother were naturalized along with his father.The series of events and long string of
alleged changes in the nationalities of respondent Ong's ancestors, by various births,
marriages and deaths, all entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in
proper judicial proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth

and citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok
Santos, respondent Ong's mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what still appears
inthe records of this Court. Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his
alleged ancestral tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an appointment to this
Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution. For this reason, he can be
prevented by injunction from doing so
appointment of Ong to the SC; natural born the alleged subsequent
recognition of a persons natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration
and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating such
individual and his mother were NATURALIZED along with his father; No
substantial change or correction in an entry in a civil register can be made
without a judicial order; change of citizenship status is a substantial change.
B. NATURALIZED CIIZENS
MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a nonimmigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she
stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13
March 1961 for a period of one month.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.
After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of
Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an
action for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years
after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and
speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name
any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the

Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction.
Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen
upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the
alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15
is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot
be denied the same privilege.
Pertinent part of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No 473, upon which
petitioners rely, reads.
Any woman who is not or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalised shall
be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
Citing several cases decided by the Supreme Court, the phrase, "who might
herself be lawfully naturalised," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully
naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the
naturalization laws was not required.
Being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully
naturalised," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but she must also possess the qualifications
enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral
character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine
Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of
real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the
principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc.
In Philippine jurisprudence it was held that an alien wife is required to prove
only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in the Section 4 of the law, on order to
establish her citizenship status as a fact.

Section 15 of the Naturalization law (Commonwealth Act 473), an

alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalised,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. likewise,
an alien woman married to an alien who i subsequently naturalised here
follows the Philippines citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.
Seciton 4 reads:
1. Person opposed to organised government or affiliate with any associations
or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organised
governments.
2. Persons defending or teaching the necessity
of propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas.
3. Polygamists, or believers in the practice of polygamy.
4. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
5. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.
6. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have
not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the
Filipinos.
7. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war.
8. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than United States, whose
laws does not grant Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
subjects thereof.
NATIONALITY THEORY
NGO BURCA VS RP DIGEST
FACTS:
Zita Ngo is a Chinese national married to Florencio Burca a Filipino citizen.
She claims that she possessed all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization as a Filipino citizen , she applied for
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration. This was opposed by the
Solicitor General, but the trial court dismissed the opposition and declare
that Zita Ngo Burca hass all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to become a Filipino citizen and that she being married to a
Filipino citizen is hereby declared as a citizen of the Philippines. Such
judgment of the trial court was appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition of Zita Ngo Burca should be granted?

RULING :
NO The SC discussed here that an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not
acquire the status of the Philippines unless there is proof that she herself
may be lawfully naturalized. An alien woman married to a Filipino who
desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition
for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in
Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the
Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of
First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office,
agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than the
judgment of a competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien
wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and
void. As to the merits of the case: Section 7 of the Naturalization Law
requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present
and former places of residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition
of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding
petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in
his actual, physical surrounding". the State is deprived of full opportunity to
make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places
of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a
former place of residence is fatal. We find one other flaw in petitioner's
petition. Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible
persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally
know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time
required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable,
and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to
become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under
the provisions of this Act. Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names
and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to
introduce at the hearing of the case". These witnesses should indeed prove
in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of
this, the petition must fail. Here, the case was submitted solely on the
testimony of the petitioner. No other witnesses were presented. This does
not meet with the legal requirement. Upon the view we take of his case, the
judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the petition dismissed.
EDISON SO VS. REPUBLIC
JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC
Co v. HRET (Re: Citizenship issue only) [consti1]
Facts:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of
a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).The
HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen
and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. On May 11,
1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar
was held.Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in
the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners, Sixto
Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.Respondent
Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of
Northern Samar.The petitioners filed election protests against the private
respondent premised on the following grounds:
o 1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
o 2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on
November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution
dated February 22, 1989.Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
Issue: WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes. Petitions are dismissed.
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution;
2.Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens.
The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to
those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also to
those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before
that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous
situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect Philippine
citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the
status of a natural-born

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution

accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before
January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship
when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was
already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his
father had been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years
old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the
Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn
statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a
citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual
and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine
years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act
of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage.
He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized citizen
because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping
respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a persons
citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity, therefore,
to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to respondents
father as null and void would run against the principle of due process
because he has already been laid to rest
3. LOSS AND REACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP
MAQUILING VS. COMELEC
FACTS:
ROMMEL ARNADO WAS BORN A FILIPINO CITIZEN. THEN HE BECAME A
NATURALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN. BEFORE BE RAN FOR MAYOR OF
KAUSWAGAN LANAO DEL NORTE HE EXECUTED AN AFFIDAVIT OF
RENUNCIATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP. BUT HE STILL USED HIS U.S.
PASSPORT.
ISSUE:WON HE STILL BE CONSIDERED AS DISQUALIFIED TO RUN FOR
MAYOR?
RULING
YES.
IT IS THE POLICY OF THE STATE THAT THOSE WHO SEEK TO RUN FOR PUBLIC
OFFICE MUST BE SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY A FILIPINO CITIZEN. TO ALLOW A
FORMER FILIPINO WHO REACQUIRES PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP TO CONTINUE
USING A FOREIGN PASSPORT WHICH INDICATES THE RECOGNITION OF A
FOREIGN STATE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AS ITS NATIONAL EVEN AFTER THE

FILIPINO HAS RENOUNCED HIS FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP, IS TO ALLOW A

COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THIS POLICY.
ARNADO ARGUES THAT SECTION 349 OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION ACT OF THE UNITED STATES PROVIDES THAT HIS
EXECUTION OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
HAS THE EFFECT OF EXPATRIATION AND THUS WAS DIVESTED OF ALL THE
RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN. IS HIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. THE FACT THAT HE WAS STILL ABLE TO USE HIS U.S. PASSPORT AFTER
EXECUTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF RENUNCIATION REPUDIATES HIS CLAIM.
FURTHERMORE, THE COURT CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN
LAWS, WHICH MUST BEPRESENTED AS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS OF A FOREIGN
COUNTRY AND MUST BE EVIDENCED BY AN OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
THEREOF. MERE REFERENCE TO A FOREIGN LAW IN A PLEADING DOES NOT
SUFFICE FOR IT TO BE CONSIDERED IN DECIDING A CASE.
BESIDES, AMERICAN LAW DOES NOT GOVERN IN THIS JURISDICTION.
WHAT IS THE APPLICABLE LAW?
SECTION 40(D) OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND SECTION 5(2) OF
R.A. 9225.
UNDER R.A. 9225 IT IS PROVIDED THAT THAT ALL PHILIPPINE CITIZENS
WHO BECOME CITIZENS OF ANOTHER COUNTRY SHALL BE DEEMED NOT TO
HAVE LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF THIS
ACT. THIS POLICY PERTAINS TO THE REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. SECTION 5(2) REQUIRES THOSE WHO HAVE RE-ACQUIRED
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP AND WHO SEEK ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE, TO
RENOUNCE ANY AND ALL FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP.SECTION 40(D) OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE DISQUALIFIES THOSE WITH DUAL CITIZENSHIP
FROM RUNNING FOR LOCAL ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
Valles vs. COMELEC

Principle of jus sanguinis

How Philippine citizenship is acquired
Effect of filing certificate of candidacy: express renunciation of other
citizenship
FACTS:
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino
father and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left
Australia and came to settle in the Philippines, where she later married a
Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as a
voter but as a candidate, as well. In the May 1998 elections, she ran for
governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on
the ground that she is an Australian.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rosalind is an Australian or a Filipino
HELD:
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took
into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States
governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo
Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.... Thus, under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed
to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in
force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the
principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship,
xxx
So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of
blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is
a Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being
born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If
Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent
can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
citizenship.

Frivaldo vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and
assumed office in due time. The League of Municipalities filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative
defenses that he was naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself
against President Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter
must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being
an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid
repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the local elections, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United
States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was
between him and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American
citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by CA
No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
No. First, petitioners loss of his naturalized American citizenship did not and
could not have the effect of automatic restoration of his Philippine
citizenship.
Second, the mere filing of COC wherein petitioner claimed that he is a
natural born Filipino citizen, is not a sufficient act of repatriation.
Third, qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.
repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of his
application on August 17,1994.
In Re: Vicente Ching
Legal Profession Admission to the Bar Citizenship Requirement
FACTS:

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in
Baguio City. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised that he needs
to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his
oath. Apparently, Chings father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a
Filipino citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under
the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner,
acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching maintained that
he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public
accountant a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a
councilor in a municipality in La Union.
The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate
child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing
jurisprudence, upon reaching the age of majority is construed as within 7
years after reaching the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he
was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place).
Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing
for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority.
Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule be relaxed
due to the special circumstance of Ching.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers oath.
HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The
Supreme Court cannot agree with the recommendation of the SolicitorGeneral. Fourteen years had lapsed and its way beyond the allowable 7 year
period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years
but it was extended to 7 years. (It seems it cant be extended any further).
Chings special circumstances cant be considered. It is not enough that he
considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and a
public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place.
Further, Ching didnt give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect
Filipino citizenship (but I guess its simply because he never thought hes
Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in
electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election
of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil
registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election
cannot be simply glossed over.
BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ
FACTS:

The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the

constitutional requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in
1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine
Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an
oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino
citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service
to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship
was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with
his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
RA 2630 [(An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by
Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting
Commission In, the Armed Forces of the United States (1960)]. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of Pangasinan in
the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with
respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member
of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the
same in the manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally
a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be
restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service
to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United
States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with
Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the
Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered
his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at
birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he
lost his Philippine citizenship.
ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San
Jacinto, Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections.
On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose Almie Altiche and Vernon
Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a
petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of petitioner on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that
he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that [he] was
not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country.
Private respondents alleged that based on a letter[1] from the Bureau of
Immigration dated June 25, 2001, petitioner was a holder of a permanent
U.S. resident visa, an Alien Certificate of Registration No. E139507 issued on

November 3, 1997, and an Immigration Certificate of Residence No. 320846

issued on November 3, 1997 by the Bureau of Immigration.[2]
On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer[3] stating, among others,
that he did not commit false representation in his application for candidacy
as mayor because as early as December 17, 1997, he was already issued a
Certificate of Repatriation by the Special Committee on Naturalization, after
he filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to Republic Act No. 8171. Thus,
petitioner claimed that his Filipino citizenship was already restored, and he
was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections. Petitioner
sought the dismissal of the petition.
On the date of the hearing, the parties were required to submit their
Memoranda within three days. Private respondents filed their Memorandum,
while petitioner did not file one within the required period.[4] Petitioner,
however, filed a Reply Memorandum[5] subsequently.
Atty. Zacarias C. Zaragoza, Jr., regional election director for Region V and
hearing officer of this case, recommended that petitioner Altarejos be
disqualified from being a candidate for the position of mayor of San Jacinto,
Masbate in the May 10, 2004 national and local elections.
ISSUE: Is the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation?
RULING:
The provision of law applicable in this case is Section 2 of Republic Act No.
8171,[14] thus:
SEC. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the necessary oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper
civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration
shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien certificate of registration and issue
the certificate of identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen.
The law is clear that repatriation is effected by taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry
and in the Bureau of Immigration. Hence, in addition to taking the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the registration of the
Certificate of Repatriation in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of
Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.
In this case, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997,
but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered with the Civil Registry of

Makati City only after six years or on February 18, 2004, and with the Bureau
of Immigration on March 1, 2004. Petitioner, therefore, completed all the
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy
for a mayoralty position, but before the elections.
When does the citizenship qualification of a candidate for an elective office
apply?
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections,[15] the Court ruled that the
citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. The Court,
through Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, discussed, thus:
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, (a)n elective local official must
be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x
where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
* In addition, candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least
twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular
date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for
residence (which must consist of at least one years residency immediately
preceding the day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on
election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective
public office, and the purpose of the citizenship qualification is none other
than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit of territory thereof.
Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his
proclamation and on the day the law mandates his term of office to begin.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day the
term of office of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was
therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to
discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short,
at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is
the liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law
on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law was
enacted. x x x Paraphrasing this Courts ruling in Vasquez v. Giap and Li Seng

Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that
our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons
owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship
qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected
official and at the start of his term.[16] (Emphasis supplied.)
Moreover, in the case of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled
that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his
application. In said case, the repatriation of Frivaldo was by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 725, which took effect on June 5, 1975. The Court
therein declared that Presidential Decree No. 725 was a curative statute,
which is retroactive in nature. The retroactivity of Frivaldos repatriation to
the date of filing of his application was justified by the Court, thus:
The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was the intent of the
legislative authority that the law should apply to past eventsi.e., situations
and transactions existing even before the law came into beingin order to
benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling
them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and
expression, then there is all the more reason to have the law apply in a
retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions
subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to
Frivaldo x x x can and should be made to take effect as of date of his
application. As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar
this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative
authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or
anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity to his
repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of
any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right or breach of some
constitutional guaranty.
The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation. Petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only
after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position but before
the elections. Petitioners repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in
the government in the May 10, 2004 elections.

TECSON VS. COMELEC

FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed
his certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national
elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.,"
or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and
cancel his certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born
Filipino citizen, his parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe,
was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Based on the evidence presented which the Supreme consider as
viable is the fact that the death certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe,
who in turn was the father of private respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates
that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Poe
was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of any evidence to
the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the
place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence
before death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not
substantiated with proof and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited
from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private respondent Fernando
Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on August 20,
1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as
citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,
Fernando Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
regardless of whether or not he is legitimate or illegitimate.

Ma vs. Fernandez
Facts:
Petitioners are children of a Taiwanese father and a Filipino mother. Upon
reaching the age of majority, they executed their affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance before proper
authorities. However, they failed to have the necessary documents
registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No.625. It was only 30 years after, in 2005 that petitioners complied with
the said requirement after a complaint was filed against them before the
Bureau of Immigration (BI). The BI ruled that they violated Commonwealth
Act No. 613, in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031and ADD01-035 respectively. Upon motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed the
BIs ruling.
Hence, this present petition for review.
Issue:
Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an
alien father but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with
the nearest civil registry, bec onsidered foreign nationals?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court laid down the statutory formalities in electing
Philippine citizenship: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3)
registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil
registry. In the case at bar, the Court ruled that the right to elect Philippine
citizenship has not been lost and petitioners should be allowed to complete
the statutory requirements for such election, subject to any administrative
penalties, if any. This is because the petitioners have complied with the first
two requirements, and even though they are late in registering their
documents, they should be allowed to still do so because of their positive
acts of citizenship. These positive acts were equivalent to formal registration.
In justifying their ruling, the Court said that registration is made for the
purpose of notification, and does not add value to the validity of an
instrument nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one. In the case at
bar, registration is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has
been claimed
Republic v. Sagun
FACTS:
Nora Fe Sagun is the legitimate child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese national,
and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in
Baguio City and did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority. In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun,

she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Said

document was notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leungon but was not recorded and
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
Sometime in September 2005, respondent applied for a Philippine passport.
Her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and there
being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship. Consequently, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of
Philippine citizenship averring that she was raised as a Filipino and she is a
registered voter of Precinct No. 0419A of Barangay Manuel A. Roxas in
Baguio City and had voted in local and national elections as shown in the
Voter Certification. She asserted that by virtue of her positive acts, she has
effectively elected Philippine citizenship and such fact should be annotated
on her record of birth so as to entitle her to the issuance of a Philippine
passport.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision on
April 3, 2009 granting the petition and declaring respondent a Filipino citizen.
Upon payment of the required fees, the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City is
hereby directed to annotate [on] her birth certificate, this judicial declaration
of Filipino citizenship of said petitioner.
Petitioner, through the OSG, directly filed the instant recourse via a petition
for review on certiorari before us. Petitioner points out that while respondent
executed an oath of allegiance before a notary public, there was no affidavit
of her election of Philippine citizenship. Additionally, her oath of allegiance
which was not registered with the nearest local civil registry was executed
when she was already 33 years old or 12 years after she reached the age of
majority.
ISSUES: Whether or not an action or proceeding for judicial declaration of
Philippine citizenship is procedurally and jurisdictionally permissible;
and,Whether or not an election of Philippine citizenship, made twelve (12)
years after reaching the age of majority, is considered to have been made
within a reasonable time as interpreted by jurisprudence.
HELD: The original ruling was reversed.
POLITICAL LAW: requirements of citizenship
The petition is meritorious.
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally

demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a

remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident
only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court
may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status.
Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
Clearly, it was erroneous for the trial court to make a specific declaration of
respondents Filipino citizenship as such pronouncement was not within the
court's competence.
As to the propriety of respondent's petition seeking a judicial declaration of
election of Philippine citizenship, it is imperative that we determine whether
respondent is required under the law to make an election and if so, whether
she has complied with the procedural requirements in the election of
Philippine citizenship.
When respondent was born on August 8, 1959, the governing charter was
the 1935 Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority. Sec. 1, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution
reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
xxxx
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a
legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the
citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child
elected Philippine citizenship. The right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that [t]hose who elect
Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of
nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines. Likewise, this
recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987
Constitution which states that [t]hose born before January 17, 1973 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority are Philippine citizens. It should be noted, however, that the 1973
and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship
should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in
the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. If
the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it
remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial

challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply
with the procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of
Philippine citizenship. Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage
and the participation in election exercises constitutes a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship since the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of
suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place
of election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be
allowed to seek the intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine
citizenship when clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
As we held in Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP VS. DUAL ALLEGIANCE VS FOUNDLING
Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC
Facts:
In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared
that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up
to the day before 9 May 2016 would be 10 years and 11 months counted
from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay
in the PH for good. Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been
going to and fro between US and Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as
newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted. She immigrated to the US
in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18, 2006,
the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new
Philippine passport. In 2010, before assuming her post as an appointed
chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American citizenship to satisfy
the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on
the ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a
natural-born Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological
parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc

cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations
in her COC.
On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained
to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of
qualifications of candidates
Held:
No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and
functions of the COMELEC, and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof
of a candidate is not one among them.
In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals
have sole jurisdiction over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of
their respective members, whereas over the President and Vice President,
only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the qualifications of
candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before
elections. Such lack of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for
the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary to the
intent of the Constitution.
Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided
on the qualification issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for
cancellation of her COC.
Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen
Held:
Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that,
she satisfies one of the constitutional requirements that only natural-born
Filipinos may run for presidency.
First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her
physical features are typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as
an infant in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is
overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99% chance
that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial
evidence of her parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised

Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the

virtually impossible, as the norm.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class,
natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of
the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitutions
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity
in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to
examine the intent of the framers.
Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born
citizenship is supported by treaties and the general principles of international
law. Although the Philippines is not a signatory to some of these treaties, it
adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the
country in which the foundling is found.
Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement
Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with
animus revertendi in acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not
on July 18, 2006 when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the
BI. COMELECs reliance on cases which decree that an aliens stay in the
country cannot be counted unless she acquires a permanent resident visa or
reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are different
from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an
overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon
permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled with her eventual application
to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual continuous stay in
the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on
May 24, 2005, it was for good.
Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for
committing material misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she
misrepresented facts as to her citizenship and residency because such facts
refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a candidate is
suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the

COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false
representations regarding her qualifications.
In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced
qualified as a candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false
representations in her COC regarding her citizenship and residency.
AASJS vs Datumanong
FACTS:
Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship
of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending
for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other
Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it
violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law."
ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225
unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it
is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on
dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were
not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized
citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after
their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would
set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is
done, it would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court,
to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

MERCADO VS.MANZANO
FACTS:
In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent
to hold elective office on the ground that he is a dual citizen, having been
born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running any elective local position.
ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.
HELD:
No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is
inimical is not dual citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who

maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their

naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 must be
understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.
DUAL CITIZENSHIP: arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states
DUAL ALLEGIANCE: person owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states; result of an individuals own volition
Section 5 Art 4 of the Constitution concerns naturalized citizens who
maintain their allegiance to their country of origin.
Disqualification based on dual citizenship contemplates dual allegiance
For candidates with dual citizenship, it would be suffice if they elect
Philippine citizenship upon filing their CoC to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship.
Cordora vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before Comelec law department against
Tambunting asserting that Gustavo Tambunting made false assertion in his
certificate of candidacy by claiming that Natural Born Filipino and resident
before the election in 2001 and 2004. Cordora alleged that Tambunting was
not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the
required citizenship and residency requirements. Cordora presented a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which statedth at, in two
instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the
Philippines on 16 December 2000 and upon departure from the Philippines
on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that
Tambunting acquired American citizenship through naturalization in
Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000.Tambunting, on the other hand,
maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of
candidacy. To refute Cordoras claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born
Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed
that he was born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting
further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate
of citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambuntings father
petitioned him through INS Form I-130(Petition for Relative) merely confirmed
Tambuntings citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambuntings possession
of an American passport did not mean that Tambunting is not a Filipino
citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18November 2003
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 (R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.The Comelec law department
recommended the dismissal of complaint because it failed to substantiate

the charges. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution
of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced that
Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and
convincing evidence. Commissioner Sarmiento wrote a separate opinion
which concurred with the findings of the En Banc Resolution. Commissioner
Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen.
Moreover, Tambunting effectively renounced his American citizenship when
he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public
office. Petitioner filed a MR but was denied, hence, this petition.
ISSUE:Whether or not Tambunting is natural born Filipino
HELD:
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process
involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his fathers
citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other
hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.We agree with
Commissioner Sarmientos observation that Tambunting possesses dual
citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth, it was no longer
necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire
American citizenship. The process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to
confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The
certification from the Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented
contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American.
However, the same certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting
claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship
prior to the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001elections. The
fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running
for public office.
Dual citizenship is involuntary and arises when, as a result of the concurrent
application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Thus, like any other
natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who
seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of
allegiance contained therein.
Dual allegiance on the other hand, is brought about by the individuals active
participation in the naturalization process.
AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a naturalized
citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines. The act
of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized
citizens foreign citizenship.

LOPEZ VS COMELEC
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the
Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the
time of filing the certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolution and (2) Omnibus Order of the
Commission on Elections(COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner
from running as Barangay Chairman. Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez
was a candidate for the position of
Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo City in the synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29,2007. On
October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before the
Provincial Election Supervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the
disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an American citizen,
hence, ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,petitioner
argued that the is a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an
American, by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225,otherwise known as the
Citizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act of 2003.
He returned to the Philippines and resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he
said, he possessed
all the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After the votes for
Barangay Chairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner. On
February 6, 2008,COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution granting the
petition for disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners filing of a certificate of candidacy operated
as an Effective renunciation of foreign citizenship?
HELD:
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who reacquired Filipino
Citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said
law states: Section 5.Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities Those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy,
Make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.

(Emphasis added)Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the

cited law. This new
law explicitly provides that should one seek elective public office, he should
first "make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer
authorized to administer an oath."Petitioner failed to comply with this
requirement. We quote
with approval the COMELEC observation on this point: While respondent was
able to regain his Filipino Citizenship by virtue of the Dual Citizenship Law
when he took his oath of allegiance before the Vice Consul of the Philippine
Consulate General's Office in Los Angeles, California, the same is not enough
to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law
mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
There is no evidence presented that will show that respondent complied with
the
provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent to
run for Barangay
Chairman of Barangay Bagacay. For the renunciation to be valid, it must be
contained in an
affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to
administer an oath.
The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing
all foreign
citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's
failure to
renounce his American citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit
that will prove the contrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to
comply with the positive mandate of
law. Forfailure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to
the United States, this
Commission holds him disqualified from running for an elective position in
the Philippines.
While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath and began to
discharge the
functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity
Jacot vs. Dal

FACTS:
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him
from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14
May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make
a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of
the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December
1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225.
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to
qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?
HELD:
No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general
requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,
considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.
Japzon v Commission on Elections
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty ran for Mayor of
the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the local elections of
14 May 2007.Japzon instituted before the COMELEC a Petition to disqualify
and/or cancel Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material
misrepresentation. He averred that Ty is a US citizen and had been residing
in the USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of Candidacy he
falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion,
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar (Barangay 6), for one year before 14
May 2007 and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign
country. While Ty may have applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship, he never actually resided in Barangay 6 for a period of one year
immediately preceding the date of election as required under Section 39 of
LGCReacquisition of citizenship does not automatically establish his domicile
at Barangay 6. He had also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as
required by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003Ty admits that he had indeed lost his
Philippine citizenship when he was naturalized as a US citizen. However, he
alleges that prior to the election, he had successfully reacquired his Filipino
citizenship as shown by his act of executing an Oath of Allegiance to RP and
a duly notazaried Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He had also complied
with the 1-year residencey rule as shown by the following:CTC from Barangay

6 (March 2006).Passport indicating that his residence is in Barangay 6 (Oct

2005).Registered voter at Brgy 6 (July 2006) Pending this case, Ty won the
elections.COMELEC 1st Division ruled for Ty. COMELEC En Banc affirmed.
ISSUE:WON Ty complied with the one (1) year residency requirement under
the Local Government Code.
HELD:
YES. The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).A domicile
of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the
childs parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla, the Court
already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire American citizenship,
he must establish residence in the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he
became a naturalized American citizen, then he must have necessarily
abandoned Barangay 6 as his domicile of origin; and transferred to the USA,
as his domicile of choice.Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under
RA 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He
could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his
domicile in Barangay 6. Ty merely had the option to again establish his
domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The
length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he
made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time
of his birth.Tys intent to establish a new domicile of choice in
Barangay 6 became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring
his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005, he applied for a
Philippine passport indicating in his application that his residence in
the Philippines was Barangay 6. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty
voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of the Municipality
of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by paying community tax and securing
CTCs from the said municipality stating therein his address as Barangay 6.
Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a voter on 17 July 2006 in
Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6.
DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining orderassails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First
Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN fromrunning as
vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.Petitioner was a naturalized
American. However, on January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship
under RA9225. Upon approval of his application, he took his oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines onSeptember 6, 2006. Having
reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and
political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor
of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to
renounce his American Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.
HELD:
We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of
his failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to
allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:1. Natural born
citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;2. Natural born citizens of the
Philippines who after the effectivity of the law, becomes citizens of a foreign
country.The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioners oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply
with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which furtherrequires those seeking elective
public office in the Philippines to make a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce his American citizenship; as
such, he is disqualified from running for vice mayor.

Ugdoracion vs comelec
FACTS:
Ugdoracion and Tungol were rival mayoralty candidates in the municipality
of Albuquerque province of Bohol.Tungol filed a petition to deny due course
or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Ugdoracion, contending that
Ugdoracion's declaration of eligibility for mayor constituted material
misrepresentation because he is actually a green card holder or a permanent
resident of USA.He stated in his COC that he resided in Albuquerque for forty
one years beforeMay 14, 2007 and he is not a permanent resident or an
immigrant to a foreigncountry.It appears that Ugdoracion became a
permanent resident in USA on Septembe26, 2001.Ugdoracion alleged that he

retained his domicile of origin notwithstanding his ostensible acquisition of

permanent residency in the USA. COMELEC cancelled Ugdoracion's COC material representation
ISSUES:Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
cancelling Ugdoracion's COC for material representation
RULING:No grave abuse of discretion.
Section 74, in relation to section 78 of the omnibus election code,
requires that the facts stated In the COC must be true, and any false
representation therein of a material fact shall be a ground for cancellation
thereof. A material fact refers to a candidate's qualification for elective office
such as one's citizenship and residence. It is the deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.
Caasi vs Court of Appeals - that a Filipino citizen's acquisition of a
permanent resident status abroad constitutes an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. A green card status in the USA is a
renunciation of one's status as a resident of the Philippines.
Residence, In contemplation of election laws, is synonymous to
domicile. Domicile is the place where one actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return (animus revertendi ) and remain (animus
manendi). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but
also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention.
1.
2.
3.

1.
2.
3.

Domicile is classified into

Domicile of origin - acquired by every person at birth
Domicile of choice - acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin
Domicile by operation of law - which the law attributes to a person
independently of his residence or intention.
Three basic rules
A man must have a residence or domicile somewhere
Domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly acquired
A man can have but one residence or domicile at any given time.
The general rule is that domicile of origin is not easily lost, it is only when
there is actual removal or change of domicile, Nona dude intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which
correspond with such purpose. In the instant case however Ugdoracion's
acquisition of lawful permanent resident status in the USA amounted to an
abandonment and renunciation of his status as a resident of the Philippines.
C. Sovereignty

3. Sovereign Immunity
a. Basis
REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR,
Facts:
On July 7, 1969, a decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R
infavor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and
InternationalConstruction Corporation and against petitioner confirming the
arbitration award in theamount of P1,712,396.40.The award is for the
satisfactionof a judgment against thePhlippine Government.On June 24,
1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo Villasor issued an Orderdeclaring
thedecision final and executory.Villasor directed the Sheriffs of RizalProvince,
Quezon City as well as Manilato execute said decision.The Provincial Sheriffof
Rizal served Notices of Garnishment with several Banks,specially on
PhilippineVeterans Bank and PNB.The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with PhilippineVeterans Bank andPNB are public funds
duly appropriated and allocated for thepayment of pensions of retirees, pay
andallowances of military and civilian personneland for maintenance and
operations of the AFP.Petitioner, on certiorari, filed prohibition proceedings
against respondent JudgeVillasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with
grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack of jurisdiction in grantingthe
issuance of a Writ of Execution against the propertiesof the AFP, hence the
notices and garnishment arenull and void.
Issue: Is the Writ of Execution issued by Judge Villasor valid?
Held:
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of
theConstitution.It isa fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from
the juristicconcept of sovereignty that the stateas well as its government is
immune from suitunless it gives its consent.A sovereign is exempt from
suit,not because of any formalconception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that therecan beno legal right as against the
authority that makes the law on which the right depends.The State may not
be sued without its consent. A corollary, both dictated by logicand
soundsense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of
agarnishment proceeding even if theconsent to be sued had been previously
granted andthe state liability adjudged.The universal rule that wherethe
State gives its consent tobe sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limitclaimants actiononly up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and thatthepower of the
Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since the government fundsand
properties maynot be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy suchjudgments, is based on obviousconsiderations of public

policy.Disbursements of publicfunds must be covered by the

correspondingappropriation as required by law.Thefunctions and public
services rendered by the State cannot be allowedto be paralyzedor disrupted
by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects as
appropriated by law.
KAWANANAKOA v. POLYBLANK, (1907)
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is an appeal from a decree affirming a decree of foreclosure and sale
under a mortgage executed by the appellants to the appellee, Sister
Albertina. 17 Haw. 82. The defendants (appellants) pleaded to the jurisdiction
that after the execution of the mortgage a part of the mortgaged land had
been conveyed by them to one Damon, and by Damon to the territory of
Hawaii, and was now part of a public street. The bill originally made the
territory a party, but the territory demurred and the plaintiffs dismissed their
bill as to it before the above plea was argued. Then the plea was overruled,
and after answer and hearing the decree of foreclosure was made, the
appellants having saved their rights. The decree excepted from the sale the
land conveyed to the territory, and directed a judgment for the sum
remaining due in case the proceeds of the sale were insufficient to pay the
debt. Eq. Rule 92.
The appellants contend that the owners of the equity of redemption in all
parts of the mortgage land must be joined, and that no deficiency judgment
should be entered until all the mortgaged premises have been sold. In aid of
their contention they argue that the territory of Hawaii is liable to suit like a
municipal corporation, irrespective of the permission given by its statutes,
which does not extend to this case. They liken the territory to the District of
Columbia (Metr- [205 U.S. 349, 353] opolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia,
132 U.S. 1 , 33 L. ed. 231, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19), and point out that it has been
a party to suits that have been before this court (Damson v. Hawaii, 194 U.S.
154 , 48 L. ed. 916, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 617; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U.S. 255 , 50
L. ed. 470, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 248).
The territory, of course, could waive its exemption (Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S.
436 , 44 L. ed. 1140, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 919), and it took no objection to the
proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. See act of April 30,
1900, chap. 339, 96. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 160. But in the case at bar it did
object, and the question raised is whether the plaintiffs were bound to yield.

Some doubts have been expressed as to the source of the immunity of a

sovereign power from suit without its own permission, but the answer has
been public property since before the days of Hobbes. Leviathan, chap. 26, 2.
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. 'Car on peut bien recevoir loy d'autruy, mais il est impossible par
nature de se donner loy.' Bodin, Republique, 1, chap. 8, ed. 1629, p. 132; Sir
John Eliot, De Jure Maiestatis, chap. 3. Nemo suo statuto ligatur
necessitative. Baldus, De Leg. et Const. Digna Vox, 2. ed. 1496, fol. 51b, ed.
1539, fol. 61.
As the ground is thus logical and practical, the doctrine is not confined to
powers that are sovereign in the full sense of juridical theory, but naturally is
extended to those that, in actual administration, originate and change at
their will the law of contract and property, from which persons within the
jurisdiction derive their rights. A suit presupposes that the defendants are
subject to the law invoked. Of course it cannot be maintained unless they are
so. But that is not the case with a territory of the United States, because the
territory itself is the fountain from which rights ordinarily flow. It is true that
Congress might intervene, just as, in the case of a state, the Constitution
does, and the power that can alter the Constitution might. But the rights that
exist are not created by [205 U.S. 349, 354] Congress or the Constitution,
except to the extent of certain limitations of power. The District of Columbia
is different, because there the body of private rights is created and controlled
by Congress, and not by a legislature of the District. But for the territory of
Hawaii it is enough to refer to the organic act. Act of April 30, 1900, chap.
339, 6, 55. 31 Stat. at L. 141, 142, 150. Coffield v. Territory, 13 Haw. 478.
See, further, Territory v. Doty, 1 Pinney (Wis.) 396, 405; Langford v. King, 1
Mont. 33; Fisk v. Cuthbert, 2 Mont. 593, 598.
However it might be in a different case, when the inability to join all parties
and to sell all the land is due to a conveyance by the mortgagor directly or
indirectly to the territory, the court is not thereby deprived of ability to
proceed.
b. When is a suit against the state and when is it not
Begoso vs. Chairman

It is well settled that where a litigation may have adverse consequences on

the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss of
property, the public official proceeded against not being liable in his personal
capacity, then the doctrine of non-suability may appropriately be invoked. It
has no application, however, where the suit against such a functionary had
to be
instituted because of his failure to comply with the duty imposed by statute
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff or petitioner.
Del Mar. vs Phil. Veterans Adm.
FACTS:
On June 20, 1964, Quirico del Mar (hereinafter referred to del Mar) filed with
the Court of First
Instance of Cebu petition for mandamus (civil case R-8465) against the
Philippine Veterans
Administration (hereinafter referred to the PVA to compel the latter to
continue paying him monthly life pension of P50 from the date of its
cancellation in March 1950 to June 20, 1957, and thereafter, or from June 22
1957 his monthly life pension, as increased by Republic Act 1920, of P100
and to pay to him as well the monthly living allowance of P10 for each of his
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of pursuant to the said
Republic Act 1920 which took effect on June 22, 1957. Del Mar also asked for
compensatory, moral and exemplary damages. In his petition below, del Mar
averred that he served during World War II as chief judge advocate of the
Cebu Area Command (a duly recognized guerrilla organization) with the rank
of major; that he subsequently obtained an honorable discharge from the
service on October 20, 1946 on a certificate of permanent total physical
disability; that upon proper claim presented and after hearing and
adjudication, the Philippine Veterans Board (the PVA's predecessor granted
him a monthly life pension of P50 effective January 28, 1947; that in March
1950, the said Board discontinued payment of his monthly life pension on
the ground that his receipt of a similar pension from the United States
Government, through the United States Veterans Administration, by reason
of military service rendered in the United States Army in the
Far East during World War II, precluded him from receiving any further
monthly life pension from the Philippine Government; that he wrote the said
Board twice demanding that it continue paying his monthly life pension,
impugning the cancellation thereof as illegal; and that his demands went
unheeded. After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del
Mar claims.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner can file a suit against a Government agency such
as the PVA without consent?
RULING:

As a general proposition, the rule well-settled in this jurisdiction on the

immunity of the
Government from suit without its consent holds true in all actions resulting in
"adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether in the disbursements
of funds or loss of property."
Needless to state, in such actions, which, in effect, constitute suits against
the Government, the court has no option but to dismiss them. Nonetheless,
the rule admits of an exception. It finds no application where a claimant
institutes an action against a functionary who fails to comply with
his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public
funds already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said
claimant. As clearly discernible from the circumstances, the case at bar falls
under the exception.
Sanders

v.

Veridano

FACTS:
Petitioner Dale Sanders was the special services of the US Naval Station
(NAVSTA) in Olongapo city. Private respondents Anthony Rossi and Ralph
Wyers are American citizens permanently residing in the Philippines and who
were employed as gameroom attendants in the special services department
of NAVSTA. On October 3, 1975, the respondents were advised that their
employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent
part-time. In a letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with
the hearing officers report of the reinstatement of private respondents to
permanent full-time status plus backwages. Respondents allege that the
letters contained libellous imputations which caused them to be ridiculed
and
thus
filed
for
damages
against
petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when
they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages.
RULING:
It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the
petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the
discharge of their official duties. Sanders, as director of the special services
department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and
had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and
other related matters. The same can be said for Moreau. Given the official
character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the
petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government.
There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper

unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its
consent to be sued.
R e p u b l i c v. F e l i c i a n o
FA C T S :
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the
complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.On
January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the
Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel
of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of
1,364.4177hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of
Tinambac,Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in
questionfrom Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31,
1952,followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that
Gardiolahad acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of
Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an
informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual
possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and
caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the
Director of Lands on October 24, 1954.On November 1, 1954, President
Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement
purposes, under the administration of th eNational Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tractof land situated in the
Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, CamarinesSur, after which the NARRA
and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing
the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within
the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private
property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded there from.Feliciano
prayed that he bedeclared the rightful and true owner of the property in
question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based
on informacion posesoria
of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that
defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.
I S S U E : WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel
of land
RULING:
NO
R AT I O N A L E :
A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted,except
upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, eitherexpressly or
by implication through the use of statutory language tooplain to be

misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte atany stage of

the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be
inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest
right).Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of
theState to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State
immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Addtl:
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General,that the
informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of
Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted"possessory
information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicatepresented to this office
(Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano,"without the submission of proof
that the alleged duplicate was authenticor that the original thereof was lost.
Reconstitution can be validly madeonly in case of loss of the original. These
circumstances raise gravedoubts as to the authenticity and validity of the
"informacion posesoria"relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the
dubiousness of saiddocument is the fact that "possessory information calls
for an area of only100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent
Felicianocomprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064
hectares.Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information
documents,as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged
ownership of lands.
Tan v Director of Forestry
FACTS:
Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising
for public bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo,
Zambales consisting of 6,420 hectares, within the former U.S. Naval
Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland, which was turned over
by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan with
nine others submitted their application in due form.
The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary
Gozon of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum
order authorizing Dir. Of Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses
(OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein (not exceeding 3000
hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)
Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Feliciano (replacing Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a
memorandum revoking the authority delegated to the Director of Forestry to
grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name of Tan,
was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the

license was released by the Director of Forestry .
Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR
praying that the OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of
ANR declared Tans OTL null and void (but the same was not granted to
Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a reconsideration of the order, but
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the motion.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not petitioners timber license is valid (No)
II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies
available (No)
RULING:
I
Petitioners timber license was signed and released without authority and is
therefore void ab initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated
May 30, 1963, the Director of Forestry was authorized to grant a new
ordinary timber license only where the area covered thereby was not more
than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to
the petitioner, the Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant
any license. (The license was released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964
while on the other hand, the authority of the Director of Forestry to issue
license was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the Director of
Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6,
1964, and said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest
importance is the date of the release or issuance. Before its release, no right
is acquired by the licensee.
Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still
respondents-appellees can validly revoke his timber license. "A license is
merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can
be availed of to defeat the proper exercise of police power.

II

Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not
appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources to the President of the Philippines. Considering that the President
has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondents, the
failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his part to
exhaust his administrative remedies.
VETERANS MANPOWER VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
VMPSI (Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.) alleges that the
provisions of RA 5487(Private Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of
the Constitution against monopolies, unfaircompetition and combinations of
restraint of trade and tend to favor and institutionalize the PADPAO(Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI
questions theprovision on requiring all private security agencies or company
security forces to register as members of any PADPAO chapter organized
within the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement
wasexecuted by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly
contract rate per guard for 8hours of security service per day at P2,255.00
within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of MetroManila. PADPAO found
VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition when it charged
MetropolitanWaterworks and Sewerage System lower than the standard
minimum rates provided in the MOA. As aresult, PADPAO refused to issue a
clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil caseagainst
the PC chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for
Security andInvestigation Agencies). PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds that the case isagainst the State which had not given
consent thereto.
ISSUE:Whether or not VMPSIs complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA
is a suit against the Statewithout its consent.
HELD:
Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private
capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are
being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official
duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be
had against them in their private capacities. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
agrees with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated
May 12, 1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be
sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without
such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public

respondents. Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in toto.
Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan
FACTS:
Civil case was fi led against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged
illegal activities made byEnrile during the Marcos era. Enrirle fi led a
motion to dismiss and compulsory counter-claim. In thecounter-claim
Enrile moved to implead Chavez and other PCGG offi cials on the
basis that the casefi eld agaisnt him was a harassment suit. The
motion to implead Chavez and others was granted by the
Sandiganbayan.Chavez and the PCGG offi cials raised the defense that
they are immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1.
It was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by Jovito Salonga,the
there are no proof linking Enrile with the illegal activities performed
by Marcos. It was further averred that the case filed against Enrile was
instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez.Sol. Gen. Chavez defended himself by
saying that he was acting as a counsel and cannot by made a
defendant in a counter-claim.
ISSUE: W h e t h e r o r n o t S o l . G e n . C h a v e z c a n b e m a d e l i a b l e f o r
d a m a g e s i n fi l i n g t h e s u i t a g a i n s t Enrile.
RULING: The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory
counter-claim of Enrile was based on the malice or bad faith of Chavez in
filing the suit. It was further stated by the court that immunity from suit is
granted only because of the fact that the Commission has a multitude of
task. Immunity for suit on members of the PCGG and other public officers is
available only if such officers are acting in good faith and in the performance
of their duty. If the acts done are tainted with bad faith or in excess of
authority they can be held liable personally for damages.In the case at bar
the Sol. Gen. exceeded his authority and his act is tainted with bad
faith byfiling baseless suit against Enrile. His office does not give him the
license to prosecute recklessly to theinjury of another. Thus he is made liable
fro his actions in the opinion of the court.
4. Incorporation of government-owned or controlled corporations
PNB v. CIR
Facts:
Petitioners motion to quash a notice of garnishment was denied for lack of
merit. What was sought to be garnished was the money of the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in
Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondentCourt which had become final
and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private respondent Gabriel V.
Manansala had previouslybeen issued. He was the counsel of the prevailing

party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity
of theorder assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the appointment
of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized deputy sheriff toserve the writ
of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds subject of the
garnishment "may be public in character."The order of August 26, 1970 of
respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this certiorari
proceeding, reads as follows:"The Philippine National Bank moves to quash
the notice of garnishment served upon its branch in Quezon City by the
authorizeddeputy sheriff of this Court. It contends that the service of the
notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section11 of
Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All writs and
processes issued by the Court shall be served and executedfree of charge by
provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the
same manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following
the law, the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the
Clerk of this Court who isits Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the authority to serve
the notice of garnishment, and that the actual service by the latter officer of
saidnotice is therefore not in order. The Court finds no merit in this
argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June 19, 1965, alreadyrepealed
Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the Clerk of this
Court that is at the same time the Ex-OfficioSheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff,
the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority to issue writs of execution
and notices of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the
country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority is coterminous
withthat of the Court itself, which is national in nature. ... At this stage, the
Court notes from the record that the appeal to the SupremeCourt by
individual employees of PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees
to Atty. Gabriel V. Manansala, has already beendismissed and that the same
became final and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer any
reason, therefore, for withholdingaction in this case. [Wherefore], the motion
to quash filed by the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The
said Bank istherefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with
the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970."There was a motionfor
reconsideration filed by petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22,
1970, it was denied. Hence, this certiorari petition.
Issue:WON the funds mentioned may be garnished
Ruling:
National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of Industrial Relations is squarely in
point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief
Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the
NASSCO are public funds of thegovernment, and that, as such, the same may
not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government
owned andcontrolled corporation. the NASSCO has a personality of its own,
distinct and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant toSection
2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which
the NASSCO has been established 'all thepowers of a corporation under

the Corporation Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be
subjected to court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act
No. 1459), as amended."In a 1941 decision,Manila Hotel Employees
Association v. Manila Hotel Company this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held:
"On theother hand, it is well settled that when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to betreated
like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank,
Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particularbusiness thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice
of its sovereign character, so as to renderthe corporation subject to the rules
of law governing private corporations."Both the Palacio and the
Commissioner of Public Highways decisions, insofar as they reiterate the
doctrine that one of the coronaries of the fundamental concept of nonsuability is that governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an
entirely different matter if,according to JusticeSanchez in Ramos v. Court of
Industrial Relations the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and
distinctcorporate existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its
funds may be levied upon or garnished.
RAYO vs. CFI of BULACAN
FACTS:
During the height of typhoon Kading , the National Power Corporations plant
superintendent Chavez opened simultaneously all the three floodgates of the
Angat Dam. As a direct and immediate result, several towns in Bulacan were
flooded ( particularly Norzagaray ). About a hundred of its residents died and
properties worth million of pesos were destroyed.
The petitioners, who are among the unfortunate victims of the man-caused
flood, filed several complaints for damages against NPC and the plant
superintendent. NPC claimed, as its defense, that in the operation of the
Angat Dam, it is performing a purely governmental function. Thus, it cannot
be sued without the express consent of the State. The petitioners opposed
the claim of NPC and claimed that it is performing not governmental but
merely proprietary functions and that based on the organic charter (charter
-a legal document that provides for thecreation of a corporate entity ) of
NPC, it can be sued and be sued in any court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the power of NPC to sue and be sued under its organic
charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
HELD :
The government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and
has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. NPC, as a
government owned and controlled corporation, has a personality of its
own,distinct and separate from that of the Government. In any court, NPC
can sue and be sued for tort. The petition of the petitioners was granted.
Notes
:Government-owned and controlled corporations have a personality of their
own, separate and distinct from thegovernment. Therefore, although they

are considered to be public in character,they are not exempt from

garnishment (legal proceedings)
SSS vs. CA
FACTS:
Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate loan by
the SSS
with residential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as collateral. The spouses Cruz
complied with their
monthly payments. When delayed were incurred in their monthly payments
SSS filed a petition
for foreclosure of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz
on the ground that
the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for these application for
foreclosure notices
were published on the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent a
letter to SSS
informing the latter that his clients are up to date in their payment of the
monthly amortization
and the SSS should discontinued the publication of the notices of foreclosure.
This request
remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages against SSS
before RTC in
Rizal. SSS invoking its immunity from suit being an agency of the
government performing
government function. The trial court and court of appeal nevertheless
awarded damages in
favor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is immune from suit?
HELD:
No,The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages.
The
SSS does not enjoy immunity from suit by express statutory consent. It has
corporated power separate and distinct from the government. SSS own
organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in court. These
words sue and be sued embrace all civil process incident to a legal action.
So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit
as an entity performing governmental function, by virtue of the explicit
provision of the aforecited enabling law, the government must be deemed to
have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby
concede its liability that statutory law has given to the private citizen a
remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby

has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the court; subject to its
right to interpose any lawful defense.
5. Municipal corporations (according to charter)
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO,LA UNIONvs.HON. JUDGE ROMEO
N. FIRME, ET.AL.
FACTS:
At about 7am of December 16, 1965, ac o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d i n v o l v i n g
a p a s s e n g e r jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot (owned bythe Estate
of Macario Nieveras), a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose
Manandeg (owned by Tanquilino Velasquez), and a dump truck of the
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and d r i v e n b y A l f re d o B i s l i g .
D u e t o t h e i m p a c t , several passengers of the jeepney including
L a u re a n o B a n i a S r. d i e d a s a re s u l t o f t h e injuries they sustained
and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. T h e p r i v a t e
re s p o n d e n t s i n s t i t u t e d a complaint for damages against the Estate
of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, ownera n d d r i v e r ,
re s p e c t i v e l y , o f t h e p a s s e n g e r jeepney. However, the aforesaid
defendantsfi l e d a T h i r d P a r t y C o m p l a i n t a g a i n s t t h e
petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner. Petitioner raised
as one of its defenses the non-suability of the State.
ISSUE: WON the Municipality of San Fernando is immune from suit.
HELD: YES. Anent the issue of whether or not themunicipality is liable for
the torts committed byi t s e m p l o y e e , t h e t e s t o f l i a b i l i t y o f
t h e m u n i c i p a l i t y d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e driver, acting in
behalf of the municipality, isp e r f o r m i n g g o v e r n m e n t a l o r
p r o p r i e t a r y functions.I n t h e c a s e a t b a r , t h e d r i v e r o f t h e dump
truck of the municipality insists that "hewas on his way to the Naguilian
river to get aload of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fe rn a n d o ' s
m u n i c i p a l s t re e t s . " We a l re a d y s t r e s s e d
i n t h e c a s e
o f
Palafox,et .al .vs.Province of Ilocos Norte,
the DistrictEngineer, and the Provincial Treasurer (102 P h i l 1 1 8 6 )
t h a t " t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o r maintenance of roads in which
the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are
admittedly governmental activities."W e a r r i v e a t t h e
conclusion
t h a t t h e municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was t h e n e n g a g e d i n t h e
d i s c h a r g e o f governmental functions. H e n c e , t h e d e a t h
o f the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on
the municipality onduty to pay monetary compensation.

c. Consent to be sued
How consent is given
R e p u b l i c v. P u r i s i m a
Fa c t s :
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and
Corn Administration in a pending civil suit inthe sala of respondent Judge for
the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract,
the plaintiff being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that
time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre
Service ,where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to
pass on the meritsof a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the
machinery of the national government unless consent beshown, had been
applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the
Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October
4, 1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
I s s u e : WON the respondents decision is valid
Ruling:
No.The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation
found in this provision of the presentConstitution: "The State may not be
sued without its consent.""The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this
jurisdiction even prior to the effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is alogical
corollary of the positivist concept of law which, to para-phrase Holmes,
negates the assertion of any legal right asagainst the state, in itself the
source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this all,
even if such aprinciple does give rise to problems, considering the vastly
expanded role of government enabling it to engage in businesspursuits to
promote the general welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of
thought alone that calls for itscontinued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby
cause private parties. They could still proceed to seek collection of
theirmoney claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of having the Auditor
General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited
Providence WashingtonInsurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of nonsuability of the government without its consent, as it has operated
inpractice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it could be the fruitful parent
of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of state activities
at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants may
still exist,is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the
balancing of interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles
must prevail if government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be,
as it has been these so manyyears, for its continuing recognition as a

fundamental postulate of constitutional law." [Switzerland General Insurance

Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines] ***The consent, to be effective, must
come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as
pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for
defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no bindingforce on
the government.
National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr.
An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical
personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with
an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against
the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated
government agency performing governmental function and one performing
proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of
the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such
function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not
in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a
business.
Lansang vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind (GABI) were allegedly
awarded a verbal contract of lease in Rizal Park by the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC). However, this verbal contract
accommodation was unclear because there was no document or instrument
involved.With the change of government, the new Chairman of NPDC,
petitioner Amado J. Lansang, sought to clean up Rizal Park and terminated
the said verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that they vacate the
area.The notice was signed by the president of GABI, private respondent Jose
Iglesias, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents but later on
claimed that he was deceived into signing the notice.On the day of the
supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and injunction in the
RTC against the petitioner but it was dismissed, ruling that the complaint was
actually directed against the state which could not be sued without its
consent.On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court and ruled that a government official being sued in his official capacity
is not enough to protest such official from liability for acts done without or in
excess of his authority.

Issues:Whether or not private respondents' complaint against petitioner

Lansang, as Chairman of NPDC, is in effect a suit against the state which
cannot be sued without its consent.
Whether or not petitioner Lansang abused his authority in ordering the
ejectment of private respondents from Rizal Park.
Held:
No, the complaint is not a suit against the state.
No, Lansang did not abuse his authority.
Ratio:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against
public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is
that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of
the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself
to perform a positive act.
Lansang was sued not in his capacity as NPDC Chairman but in his personal
capacity. It is evident from the complaint that Lansang was sued allegedly for
having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.
There was no evidence of abuse of authority.
FESTEJO v. FERNANDO
FACTS:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, took possession of
the three parcels of land on February 1951 without obtaining first a right of
way, without consent and knowledge of plaintiff, and against her express
objection. The petitioner demands that the lands be restored to its former
condition and the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P19, 343.20 for
the unlawful taking possession of the defendant.
ISSUE:
Is the defendant liable for the unlawful possession of the lands?
HELD:
The evidence and conceded facts permitted the jury in finding that in the
trespass on plaintiffs land, defendant committed acts outside the scope of
his authority. There can be no claim that he thus invaded plaintiffs land
southeasterly of the right of way innocently for the surveys clearly marked
the limits of the land appropriated for the right of way. It is a general rule

that an officer-executive, administrative, quasi-judicial, ministerial, or

otherwise who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without
authorization of law may thereby render himself amenable to personal
liability in a civil suit. He cannot shelter himself by the plea that he is a public
agent acting under the color of his office and not personally.
CALUB V. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner from DENR apprehended two vehicles carrying illegally sourced
lumber and thereafter confiscated them. The owners of the vehicles filed an
action for replevin to recover the vehicles. They won in the trial court on the
ground that petitioner did not act in accordance with the law. So petitioner
appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the
State and is therefore valid.
ISSUE:1) Whether or not a replevin may be instituted for recovery of property
under custodia legis.
2) Whether or not replevin in this case is a suit against the State
RULING:
1) No! Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by
virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of the law.
2) Yes! This suit is not valid because the State may not be sued without its
consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his
duties. It has been established that the DENR acted within its authority.
Hence, its action is the action of the State.
Express consent
1. Money claims arising from contract.
Sayson vs. Singson
To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the
Republic. The lower court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of nonsuability. So it was stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General
Makasiar. Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a
money claim against the government, for the payment of the alleged
balance of the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public
Highways. Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will
be shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or consideration is

contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to

enforce the collection of such claim against the State but a ordinary action
for specific performance ... . Actually, the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for
payment, is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be
entertained by the Court except with the consent of the State ... . In
other words, the respondent should have filed his claim with the General
Auditing Office, under the provisions of Com. Act 327 ... which prescribe the
conditions under which money claim against the government may be
filed ...." 5 Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided:
"In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those
of accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same
within sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation.
If said accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices,
or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time
the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by
him." 6 Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party
aggrieved by the final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an
account or claim may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an
appeal in writing: (a) To the President of the United States, pending the final
and complete withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To
the President of the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the
Philippines if the appellant is a private person or entity."
Department of Agriculture vs. National Labor Relations Commission
NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency
entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security
Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for
underpayment of
wages, non payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift
differential pay, holiday
pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages before the Regional
Arbitration Branch X of
CDOC against the DA and the security agency.The Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency
for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA
and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision
became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to
enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and the

security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor
vehicles of the DA. DA filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for preliminary injunction with NLRC alleging that the
writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly acquired
jurisdiction over the petitioner, and therefore, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was null and void. The NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution.
1.) that The enforcement and execution of the judgments against petitioner
in NLRC are temporarily suspended for a period of two months.
2.) , petitioner is ordered and directed to source for funds within the period
above-stated and to deposit the sums of money equivalent to the aggregate
amount.
3.)petitioner is likewise directed to put up and post sufficient surety and
supersedeas bond equivalent to at least to fifty (50%) percent of the total
monetary award.
4) City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the properties of petitioner.
5.) . The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim reimbursement
against each other for any payments made. Finally, the petition for injunction
is dismissed for lack of basis.
The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued is Lifted and Set Aside
and in lieu thereof, a Temporary Stay of Execution is issued for a period of
two (2) months but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year
1991, conditioned upon the posting of a surety or supersedeas bond by
petitioner within ten (10) days from notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this
disposition. The motion to admit the complaint in intervention is Denied for
lack of merit while the motion to
dismiss the petition filed by Duty Sheriff is Note. The petitioner filed to the
Supreme Court a case charging the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for
refusing to quash or reject the writ of execution. The petitioner fault the
NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department,
which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the
cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.The private respondents, on
the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity
from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the
case
HELD:
The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be
sued without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the
sovereign character of the State and an
express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A
sovereign is exempt from suit based on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on

which the right depends.The rule is not really absolute for it does not say
that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at
times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly or impliedly.
Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law.
Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself
commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterlaim, or when it enters
into a contract. In this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested
itself of its sovereign immunity.But not all contracts entered into by the
government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be
made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function
and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said
to have descended to the level of an individual and can this be
deemed to have actually given its consent to be sued only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract
relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.In the case, the DA has not
pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental
entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact, performed any act proprietary in character.But, be that as it may, the
claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.
Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant,
however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amendedby PD 1145, the money
claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.The Supreme Court
GRANTED the petition of the petitioner. The resolution, dated 27 November
1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution directed
against the property of the Department of Agriculture is nullified, and the
public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from doing, issuing and
implementing any and all writs of execution issued pursuant to the decision
rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.
NOTES:
petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus - When any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental
reliefs as law and justice may require.
ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT OF
THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
Section 1. Complaint against Government. Subject to the provisions of this
Act, the Government

of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to be sued upon any
moneyed claim involving
liability arising from contract, expressed or implied, which could serve as a
basis of civil action
between private parties.
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 327 - AN ACT FIXING THE TIME WITHIN WHICH
THE AUDITOR
GENERAL SHALL RENDER HIS DECISIONS AND PRESCRIBING THE MANNER OF
APPEAL
THEREFROM
SECTION 1. In all cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other
than those of
accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same
within sixty days, exclusive of
Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said accounts or claims
need reference to other
persons, office or offices, or to a party interested, the period aforesaid shall
be counted from the time
the last comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him. With
respect to the accounts of
accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act on the same within one
hundred days after their
submission, Sundays and holidays excepted.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1445 - ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A
GOVERNMENT
AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Section 49. Period for rendering decisions of the Commission. The
Commission shall decide any
case brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
resolution. If the account or
claim involved in the case needs reference to other persons or offices, or to a
party interested, the
period shall be counted from the time the last comment necessary to a
proper decision is received by
it.
Section 50. Appeal from decisions of the Commission. The party aggrieved
by any decision, order or
ruling of the Commission may within thirty days from his receipt of a copy
thereof appeal on certiorari
to the Supreme Court in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court.
When the decision,
order, or ruling adversely affects the interest of any government agency, the
appeal may be taken by the prope
2. Special law

Civil Code, Art. 2180 (quasi delicts committed by special agents

PD 1620 (IRR)
Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands,
FACTS:
Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was
bumped by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe
injuries rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted
Act 2457 authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to
fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court held that
the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It
then determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay
the same.

ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance?

HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of
action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously
recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and
submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose
any
lawful
defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special
agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to
whom properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one

who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the

exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does
not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting
administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions
which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are
regulated by law and the regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not a special agent; thus the Government is not liable.
(Merritt vs Government of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. L-11154, March 21
1916,
34
Phil.
311)
NOTE:
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains. (Art. 2180 par. 6, Civil Code)
The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals
in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the
functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence
can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of
public service and in the appointment of its agents. (Merritt vs. Government
of the Philippine Islands)
The State is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents
whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment.
The government does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity
of the officers or agents whom it employs since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands)
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent;
but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task
done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall
be applicable. (article 2180)
What is a special agent?
A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official.
The State has voluntarily assumed liability for acts done through special agents. The State's
agent, if a public official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that

such task must be foreign to said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is
not a public official, and is commissioned to perform non-governmental functions, then the State
assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held liable as such for its agent's tort.
Where the government commissions a private individual for a special governmental task, it is
acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.
Implied Consent
1. When the Govt. enters into business contracts.

US Vs. Ruiz
Facts:
The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military
bases agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding
conducted by the US for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to
another group. For this reason, a suit for specific preformance was filed by him against the US.
Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions
to be able to invoke state immunity.
Held:
The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of
another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of
indepemndence and equality of states. Howecer, the rules of international law are not petrified;
they are continually and evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial
and proprietory acts. the result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign and
governmental acts.
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of
commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs.
A state may be descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where
the conracts relates the exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a
function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for , nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.