CT Vol. 3

....
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
c_ _
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO
R_ _
BC 286925
Case No.:
;,
Plaintiff(s) and
APPELLANT
Notice(s) of Appeal Filed:
JUNE 1, 2012
vs.
KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARKE, etc... ,

ET AL.,
YOLUME3
OF3YOLUMES
Defendant(s) and
RESPONDENTS
Pages 368 to 551
CLERK=S TRANSCRIPT
HONORABLE ROBERT L HESS, JUDGE
Appeal from the Superior Court, Los Angeles County

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND DIST.
A P P E A R A N C E S:
DAVID BLAKE CHATFIELD
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP
2625 TOWNSGATE RD., STE 330
WESTLAKE VILLAGE, CA 91361
IF TI 11 ffi, IW
DEC 1 4Z01Z
Clerk
JOSEPH A. LANE
Deputy Clerk
(805) 267-1220
Tel.#
Counsel for APPELLANT,
STEPHEN M. GAGG ERO
RANDALL A. MILLER
MILLER,LLP
515 S. FLOWER ST., STE 2150
LOS ANGELES, CA 90071-2201
(800) 720-2126
Tel.#
KANPP. PETERSON & CLARKE. ETC .... ET

AL.,
Counsel for RESPONDENT,
..
'
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
CLERK'S TRANSCRIPT
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
..
ii
......
---.
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO vs. KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARK

PrasKe, Joseph on 06/0812009
601 O_cean Front Walk, Venice, California, at any time?

A.
Prior to 1997'1 believe he was the owner
of the property.
Q.
How did that change?
A.
I believe that he transferred ownership by deed
Q.
Did you .draft that deed?
A.
No.
Q.
Do you know who did?
10
A.
No.
11
Q.
Do you know what he received in exchange for
10i32
transferring the deed? [QUES)
13
14
10:32
to Boardwalk Sunset LLC.
12
Yes.
10:31
MR. CHATFIELD:
privilege.
Objection.
Attorney-client
Right of privacy.
15
And I'm instructing the witness not to answer.
16
MS. COBO:
17
Q,
Are you going to follow that instruction?
A.
Yes.
.... . - ... 18
10:32
discussion is held off the record.}
19
(A
20
MS. COBO:
21
Q.
22
no question.
10:32
Do you know what he received
it's a yes or
in exchange.for transferring the deed
23 .... tci
_____ c ____
--24--------
(A. discussion-is .. held-off_the-r.ecord . ).__________________ ------ -----
. 25 . - .
MS. COBO:
Sorry.
Strike that.
Hutchings Court Reporters - Global Legal Services
..
. 10:33
Page48
800-697-3210
000368

Praske, Joseph on 06108/2009
l
2
Q.
Do you know if he received anything 'in exchange
for transferring the deed to Boardwalk Sunset LLC?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
Do you know if Mr. Gaggero has any
participatory role in Boardwalk Sunset LLC?
A.
Yes, I do know.
Q.
Can you tell me whether he does?
A.
No, he doesn't.
Q.
Has he ever been hired as a consultant for
10
10:33
Boardwalk Sunset LLC?
10:33
11
A.
No.
12
Q.
Does Mr. Gaggero have any financial interest in
13
any business or entity that has a financial interest in
14
Boardwalk Sunset LLC?

No.
15
A.
16
Q. -Are you familiar with Montecito Properties?
17
A.
18
Q. Are you familiar with Monticello Properties?
19
A.
No.
20
Q.
Are you familiar with Sulfer Mountain.Land &
21
10:33
10:34
No.
10:35
Livestock.Company?
22
A.
Yes.
23
Q.
can you te:n mawliat that :rir; plea1fe?
!----------- - 24-- -- -- A.-.. It-ts--a--limited-liability--company--whose-husiness-- ---------
!.
iI
25.
.is. the operation of s0l1le-.ra11ch __proper.ty.. -in .Ventura;- -: .:

800-697-3210
10:35
Page49
..
001)369
.L
'

Praske, Joseph on 06/08/2009
.
Q.
Have you ever heard of Workhorse LP?
A.
No.
Q.
Are you familiar with Malibu Broad Beach LP?
A.
Yes.
Q.
What is "it?
A..
Limited partnership.
Q.
What's the nature its business?
A.
It owned property on Broad Beach Road in
9
10
11
Q.
Does Mr. Gaggero have a financial interest in
10:42
Malibu Broad Beach?

No.
13
Q.
Did he ever?
14
A.
No, I don't think so.
15
Q.
Does Mr. Gaggero have a financial interest in
10:42
the property located on Broadbeach Road?
17
A.
No.
18
Q.
Did he ever?
19
A.
Yes, I think so.
20
Q.
And what was that financial interest?
21
A.
I think he was the owner of the property, and
23
10:42
he transferred it to Malibu Broad Beach LP.

Q.
Dci you know .when that took place?
24----- --- - A.- . I-bel ieve--approximatel;y_ 12_ .y:ears. _ago. _-------

25,
'......
.....'
Malibu, California.
A.
22
10:41
12
16
1- - -- - -- --- -
10:41
Q.
Wotild that be in 19.9.7.?

800-697-3210
10:43
Page 53
.-
000370

A.
Q.
trans~erring
A.
He may have, but I don't recall.
.5
Q.
Does any business or entity that Mr. Gaggero
97 or '98 I believe.
10:43
Do you know if he received any compensation for

that property?
has financial interest in have a financial interest in
Malibu Broad Beach?
A.
No.
Q.
Has Mr. Gaggero ever been hired by Malibu
10:4l
The property was sold many years ago.
10:44
10
Broadbeach?
11
A.
No ..
12
Q.
Has Mr. Gaggero ever been used as a consultant
13
for Malibu Broad Beach?
14
A.
No.
15
Q.
Are you familiar with Marina Glencoe LP?
16
A.
Yes.
17
Q.
What is it?
18
A.
A limited partnership.
10:44
Its business was the
19
ownership of real property on Glencoe Avenue in
20
Marina del Rey.
10:44
21
Q.
Is it .still in existence?
22
A.
The property was sold many years ago.
23
Q.
Does Mr. Gaggero iiave-a. finilli.ciai.iiitereiit in
----------- 24---Marina""-Glencoe ?-- -- ----------------------- ---- ---------------- ------------
25
~.
..
"
A.
.. 10i44 .
No;
Hutchings Court Reporters -_Global Legal Services
..
Page 54
800-697-3210
N.
000371
'
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO vs. KNAPP. PETERSON & CLARK

Q.
Did he ever?
A.
No.
Q.
Does Mr. Gaggero have a role in Marina.Glencoe?
A.
No.
Q.
Did he ever?
A.
,No.
Q.
Does Mr' Gaggero have a financial interest in
I'
the property owned in Marina del Rey on Glencoe?
A.
No.
10
Q.
Did he ever?
11
A.
Yes, I think so, prior to 1997 or 1998.
12
Q.
What was that?
13
A. I believe he was the owner of the property.
14
Q.
And how did that change?
15
A.
He transferred. the property by.deed to Marina
16
Glencoe LP.
10:45
18
A.
Did you draft that deed?

... - . .. ..
Yes, I believe so.
19
Q.
Do you know if Mr. Gaggero received any
20
I!- _...... ------
10:45
17
I
I
10:44
..-
Q.
"
compensation in exchange for that deed?
21
A.
I believe there was
22
Q.
What was it? [QUES]
23
THE WITNESS:
25
10:46
- ......
-2~--------
10:45
Well, yes.
Do I have to answer?
MR-. CBATFIELD:--No-:---- ------ - -
r'm
go.ing .to object on the grounds of the .
Page 55
800-697-3210
..
000372
'
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO vs. KNAPP. PETERSON & CLARK

Praska, Joseph on 06/0812009
1
2
Trust; it's an .irrevocable trust that was created in
1997; it is: a discretionary trust that. was created under
the law of a foreign jurisdiction; it is not a
California Trust; Steve Gaggero is not a beneficiary but
rather he, along with every other relative, is merely
within.a class of beneficiaries; the trustee, that's me,
has complete and unlimited authority to decide when and
if anyone within the class received a distribution;
10
Steve Gaggero has no right whatsoever to any property in
11
the possession or. control of the trust.
12
MS. COBO:
13
Q.
14
11:11
11:11
Has Mr. Gaggero received money from the
Arenzano Trust?
11:12
15
A.
No.
16
Q.
Has he ever?
17
A.
No.
18
Q.
Has Mr. Gaggero ever received any assets from
19
''
As I said earlier, I am the trustee of the Arenzano 11:10
the Arenzano Trust?

11:12
20
A.
No.
21
Q.
Has he ever?
22
A.
No.
.
.
..
- {A discussion is held off the record.)
,._,
23
- ,, __________ . - 24--- -- 'MS'; COBor--- ------------- - ----------.. -------- ..__ ,,, _________,, ____ _
25.
Ill
..."
'...
"'"'

800697-3210
..
Page 69
0. 00373 ...
.,

you as Exhibit 3?
11:13
A.
No.
(A discussion is held off the record.)
THE WITNESS:
MS. COBO:
Q.
Can I see it, please?
7.
A.
Sure.
Q.
Under what laws "is the Arenzano Trust created?
A.
The laws of Anguilla, A-N-G-U-I-L-L-A.
10
Q.
Have any businesses or entities that
I read it completely.
11:13
11:14
11
Mr. Gaggero has financial interest in ever received any
12
distribution of assets from the Arenzano Trust?
13
A.
No.
14
Q.
Has the Arenzano Trust ever made any
15
distributions to any of the -- Mr. Gaggero's family
16
members?
11:15
17
A.
I don't recall.
18
Q.
Have any distributions of assets ever been made
19
from the Arenzano Trust?

11:15
20
A.
No, I don't think so.
21
Q. What is held in the trust by the Arenzano
22
Trust? [QUES]
23
A.
Can I discuss with m'f attorney?
1A-aiscussion is 1re1-a.- off the record-;)--- - .c ----- ----------- --25 .
Ms . coBo, coi.i1d.
:You reaci i:iacit i:i:ie
Hutchings Court Reporters - Global Legal

800-697-3210
qii.est:io:ii~
Services
Page 70
..
000374
'

Q.
l
2
11:36
Do you know whether Mr. Gaggero has any
collections of paintings or ar.twork?
A.
No, I don't know.
Q.
Any collections of books?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
Any_collections of stamps?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
Do you know if Mr. Gaggero has any collections
11:37
of coins?
11:37
10
A.
I don't know.
11
Q_.
Do you know if Mr. Gaggero bas any collections
12
of antiques?
13
14
15
Q.
Do you know whether Mr. Gaggero has any

11:37
collections of guns?
I don't know.
16
A.
17
Q. ,Do you know whether Mr. Gaggero owns a car?
lB
A.
No, I don't know.
19
Q.
Do you know whether he leases a car?
20
A.
No, I don't know.
21
Q.
Have you ever known Mr. Gaggero to use a car?
''I
.. 22
A.
Yes.
'
23
Q.
Do you know whether .he
'
';
II
I
.11:37
awned it?" ....
;------- -- 2-4------ A;- - Theonly vehicle-t-bat--Iknow-abou t --is-a-t-~uc-k-
---------
;:::-:: : -:-. ..-..:.:::-:: :' fs~-.::.prov:fiied: i:O-n:iiii tiy-:.pac~~fi:::::-:caasG:K"aiiagemen:t;::-:~. -- ::-::.-~::-:.-.:_:---.1r:3r::- :.:

..
Page 80
800-69732.10
000375
,,1,..'--
.,
STEPHEN M. GAGGEROvs. KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARK

Praske, Joseph on 0610812009
Q.. And when was that truck provided to him?
A.
I don't know.
Q.
Does Mr. Gaggero still have use of that truck?
A.
Yes, I believe so.
One second.
1'
MS. COBO:
Q.
How long has Mr. Gaggero had use_ of the truck?
A.
I think for several years.
10
Q.
Can you give me an estimate?
11
A.
I would say approximately ten years.
12
Q.
Is there automobile insurance on that truck?
13
A.
Yes, I think so.
14
Q.
Do you know who pays for that automobile
insurance?
I think Pacific Coast Management.
.- ... - - ... 17
Q.
Do you kno\>1 if Mr. Gaggero
__
---
"..~
....
.....
'
_a_ut()I!IC)b_il_e ....
19
A.
I don't know.
20
Q .
Do you know who at Pacific Coast Management
~ould_pay
A.
22
ha~
insurance?
-~-43
______
..- - ---- -- - . -- -- --- 25'

-.
11:39
A.
21
11:39
16
18
~---
11:38
15
'
I don't recall.
discussion is held off the. record.)
(A
"6
11:37
for the automobile
ll:l9
insurai:i-c~?
The bookkeeper, I believe.
.;~- .;;8 ~-~~~-M~~-~a~~~-~~~~-?-------------------------------------- -- .... .. ......________ ---- -- --------
--

800-697-3210
..
-- - --------- --.. --11:40
Page 81
. 000376 .
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) ss
3
4
I, Heidi Hummel-Grant, CSR 12556, do hereby
declare:
5
6
That the above foregoing
one hundred and cue
( 101 ) pages contain a full, true and correct
transcription of the proceedings.
9
10
11
further declare that I have no interest in the
event of the action.
12
13
.I
declare under penalty of perjury under the laws
14
of the State of California that the foregoing is true
15
and co=ect.
16
17
18
WITNESS my hand this ~~-2_n_d~~~~ day of

2009
--~uly
19
i '
102
HUTCHINGS COURT REPORTERS, LLC - GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES

B00.697.3210
..
000377
'
.'.
',.,.
..
000378
David Blake Chatfield, State Bar No. 88991
2625 Townsgate Road, Suite 330

Westlake Village, California 91361
805-267-1220
Telephone:
Facsimile:
805-267-1211
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP

3
lMJcDA
SlJl>ERil
COUNT\' OF LOS ANGlfrn~NIA
MAY 15 Z01Z
4
5
'
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Stephen M. Gaggero
6
7
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
8.
FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

9
10
STEPHENM. GAGGERO,
13
14
BC286925
December 12, 2002
Plaintiff,
11
12
CASENO.:
Filed:
Assigned For All Purposes To:

Hon. Robert L. Hess
Dept. 24
v.
KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE; STEVEN
RAY GARCIA; STEPHEN M. HARRIS;
ANDRE JARDIN!; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive,
15
Defendants.
16
NOTICE OF OPPOSITION AND

OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT;
DECLARATION OF STEPHEN
GAGGERO
(Filed Concurrently With Plaintiffs Request
For Judicial Notice)
17
18
Date: May 29, 2012

Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept: 24
19
20
21
22
23
'
24
25
26
~'
''~"
'\
27
28
..
000379
""'
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

2
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT plaintiff Stephen M. Gaggero opposes the Motion to
Amend the Judgment filed by defendants Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen
M. Harris, and Andre Jardini on the following grounds:
l.
not have the authority to add non-party entities to the judgment against Stephen Gaggero as
defendants request in the Motion;
2.
must be denied because defendants have presented no evidence to prove an alter ego claim; and,
10
3.
California law expressly does not pennitoutside"reverse piercing, and thus court thus does
Even if California law did pennit outside reverse piereing, which it does not, the Motion
Defendants' Motion is barred by judicial estoppel and collateral estoppel.
11
Consequently, the court should deny defendants' Motion.
12
This Opposition is based on this Notice and Opposition, on the attached Memorandum of
13
Points and Authorities and Declaration of Stephen M. Gaggero, on the Request for Judicial Notice
14
filed concurrently herewith, on the complete court files and records in this action, and on any such
15
other oral or documentary evidence and argument as may be presented at the hearing.
16
DATED: May 15, 2012
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP
By:--:::-@~6,~-
17
18
i:
1
!
David Blake Chat e

Attorneys for Plai ff
Stephen M. Gaggero
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
~
',.
~
...'
27
28
..
"'
000380
OPPOSITION i:o MOTION TO AMEND JUDGME~T
.,
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. I
IL
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT.FACTS .............................................................................. 3
III.
KPC'S MOTION MUST BE DENIED BECAUSE IT IS PROHIBITED UNDER

CALIFORNIA LAW, IT LACKS ANY EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT, AND KPC
IS ESTOPPED FROM MAKING THE ARGUMENTS CONTAINED THEREIN ............ 4
A.
California Law Expressly Prohibits Reverse Piercing To Hold An Entity

Liable For Personal Debts Of An Individual ................................................................. 5
B.
KPC'Has Produced No Evidence To Establish Their Claim That The Entities

Are the Alter Egos ofGaggero, And The True Facts Refute Such A Finding .............. 7
C. KPC Is Estopped From Making The Arguments In Their Motion Based On

The Contrary Rulings They Sought And Obtained At Trial, And The Fact
They Have Waited Ten Years To Raise This Issue ..................................................... l 0
10
IV.
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 12
11
12
''I
13
!:
14
:1
,.
I
15
16
17
Ir
I.
I
18
I
!
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Ill
'"""
""''
27
28
..
000381.
11
'
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Carrv. Barnabey'sHote/Corp. (1994)23Cal.App.4th14 .......................................................... ;.12
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S 64 ........................................................................... 5
Greenspan v. LADT, LLC(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486 ..................... ;.............................................. 6
Hernandez v. City ofPomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501 ........................ :............................................ 11
Jackson v. County ofLos Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171 ................................................. l 0, 11
Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290 ................................................................. 9
NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App:3d 772 ................................................................ 7
10
Postal Instant Press,.fnc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162Cal.App.4th 1510 ......................................... 6
11
Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Sup. Ct.(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523 ........................................................ 8
12
Towe Antique Ford Foundation v. J.R.S. (9th Cir. 1993) 999 J'.2d 1387 .......................................... 5
13
Triplett v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1415 ........................ :.: .......... :............. 5, 7
14
Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799 ............................................................................ 8
15
Statutes:
1:
16
Business and Professions Code 6068(d) ............................. ;; .......................................................... 6
17
Code of Civil Procedure 197 ..................................................................... :.................................... 5
18
Rules
19
Wegner, Fairbank, & Epstein, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence
(The Rutter Group 2007) 17: 164 ............................................................................................... 6
:
1~
,..
'i
I!
.,1:
'
20
21
:1
j:
22
'
I
'
23
24
25
26
eo
27
UI
'...
...'
UI
28
"
_..:.J&.~---------
..
Ill
000382

I.
...
INTRODUCTION
This is an action for legal malpractice. In DecembeP200f, plaintiff Stephen M. Gaggero
sued Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M.. Harris, and Andre Jardini
(collectively ':KPC") the lawyers he. had retainei:L in August 2000. This court found that he
retained KPCto.represent him personally. [Statement of Decision, Exhibit A to KPC's motion, p.
16.] Court trial.commenced in July 2007. In Februa.ry 2008 this court ehteredjudgment in favor of
KPC against Gaggero personally, and in May 2008 the judgment was amended to award KPC
attorney fees and.costs. In May 2010, the judgment was affirmed on appeal.Jn December 2010 the
judgment was amended to award KPC its fees and costs on appeal..
II
I
I
!'
I
10
KP.C has now brought an undeniably belated and unfounded motion to amend the
11
judgment to add as judgment debtors several entities this court previously found were separate
12
from Gaggero. The entities are a corporation in which Gaggero is not a shareholder; officer, or
13
director; four limited partnerships in which Gaggero is not a general or limited. partner; two
14
limited liability companies in which Gaggero is not a member or manager; and two irrevocable
15
trusts and a foundation of which Gaggero is not the trustee. The sole ground KPC asserts for this
16
motion is that the entities are supposedly the alter egos of Gaggero, and fifteen years ago he
17
supposedly created these entities to defraud creditors who did not yet even exist. In support of this
18
motion, KPC's counsel intenti9nally misrepresents the law and facts in flagrant violation of
19
counsel's duty of candor owed to this court, apparently believing the court will ignore such
20
misrepresentations. Such conduct is sanctionable, and subjects counsel to disciplinary action.
1!
I
'
..
'\
"..'
21
In order to add the entities to the judgment against Gaggero, this court must engage in
22
outside reverse piercing. Contrary to the statements of KPC's counsel, Cali fomia law expressly
23
prohibits the reverse piercing of the comorate or entity veil that KPC requests. Even if California
24
law did permit reverse application of the alter ego doctrine; which it does not, there is no basis for
25
a finding of alter ego. KPC presents not one shred of evidence to support its repeated allegation
26
that Gaggero 's estate planning was done to defraud any creditor, not one that existed fifteen years
27
ago let alone one that exists today,
28
hi addition, KPC omits the fact that it produced evidenc~ at trial to prove Gaggero and
000383
"

~
-! -
these entit.ies were completely separate, anfi
1'
:,,
,,,.
, I
:i
1:
1 :~
I,.
court ruled in KPC's favor on that issue: "First,
the only plaintiff in this action is.Mr: Gaggero in his personal capacity. No other person or entity
has joined in this action as plaintiff, and there is no credible evidence that Mr. Gaggero has
authority to represent any other person or entity (whether by assignment or otherwise) in asserting
these damage claims." (Statement of Decision, p. 26'.] "Neither Pacific Coast Management nor
Avalon, nor any of the various other.entities was a party to the underlying litigation, nor.were they
ever a party to this suit." (Statement of Decision p. 14.] "There was no evidence that Mr. Gaggero
was
entities,. .. "[Statement of Decision, p. 27.] "Between 1995 and 1.998 he [Gaggero] did extensive
10
'estate planning'. .. resulting in all of his [Gaggero's] assets being. transferred to various
11
corporations, trusts and foundations ... he retained absolutely no ownership interest in and no
12
control over those. assets." [Statement of Decision, Exhibit A, pg. 18 footnote I 7.] The argument
13
by KPC and the ruling by this court regarding separateness eliminated Gaggero 's right to recover
14
the fee damages he was suing over, "Since he paid nothing, he can recover nothing." [Statement of
15
Decision, p: 28.]
represented
in
capacity as officer,
director or employee of any of these
II'
16
In addition, KPC omits the fact tha!'it has known of these entities and Gaggero's legitimate
17
estate planning 'since. 2000 when Gaggero retained KPC, but not until nowin 2012 does KPC
18
claim these entitiesare the real parties in interest in this action that was filed in 2002 and tried in
19
2007.
thi~
ii
I.
20
The true holdings of the .cases KPC cites and misrepresents state that this court is not
21
authorized to amend the judgment based on outside reverse. piercing in order to hold an entity
22
liable for the personal debts of an individual. The true facts KPC misstates or omits show no
23
impropriety or fraudulent intent by Gaggero when conveying the ownership of assets to entities
24
for estate planning purposes 'fifteen years ago. Indeed, the true facts show'this court has already
25
ruled on the separateness of Gaggero and the entities, and show .KPC argued for that separateness
26
with full knowledge of the facts regarding these entities for seven years: Thus, not only does the
27
law not authorize the specific:relief sought by this motion, but'KPC is estopped from bringing the
28
motion. The motion must be denied:
ii
2
OPPOSITION.TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
000384
.,
II.
1:
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
In 1997, fifteen years ago, Gaggero transferred ownership of certain property to various
entities. "My estate was - had grown rather large, and I had just weathered the early 1990's and
mid- '90's, which was a pretty rough time for anybody in real estate. And I decided that it would
be a prudent idea to get a lawyer to look at my portfolio and develop an estate plan so that my
estate would survive me and be for the benefit of my children and not be something that is
exposed. [Transcript in Gaggero v. Yura, Exhibit C to KPC's Motion 95:3-9.] This was a
legitimate estate planning decision. Nothing more, nothing less. KPC presents no evidence to
prove it was anything else, because no such evidence exists. Gaggero did not make the transfers
10
with the intent to defraud creditors. He certainly did not make the transfers with the intent to
11
defraud KPC, as he did not even know who they were in 1997. Gaggero's decision to transfer
12
ownership of property to various entities was, and continues to be, a generally accepted estate
,,,,i~
14
15
...
'...
UI
,..
16
Gaggero's prior estate planning decisions in 1997 as well as knowledge of all the entities and their
17
organization. KPC knew the full extent of the separateness ofGaggero from the entities. In late
18
2001, a dispute arose between Gaggero and KPC over KPC's handling of Gaggero's legal affairs,
19
and related billing practices. In December 2002, Gaggcro filed this action against KPC for legal
20
malpractice and breach of the retainer agreement between him and KPC. The case was pending for
21
several years, during which time extensive discovery was conducted. This discovery included
22
information relating to the entities to whom Gaggero had previously conveyed ownership of
23
property.
24
This case went to trial in July 2007. During the trial, KPC specifically argued Gaggero and
25
the entities were separate, and produced evidence to prove Gaggero was the only real party in
26
interest. KPC's counsel stated: "He testified at his deposition, and he testified at trial, that he is
27
merely a consultant to PCM. He has
28
for PCM. He is not listed as a direct~r. He is not an officer. He is nothing. He has expressly, by
'
noo~ershipjnterest. . .I
have all of the corporate documents
3
- --- ---------- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
000385
,,
,.
,1
'
design, disavowed any relationship with' that company. Your honor hit the nail on the head
when ... you said you can't have it both ways." [Trial Transcript, Exhibit A to Request for Judicial
Notice, 3629: 8:21.] This court expressly stated: "Either it is his alter ego, because it is all his
money. and he controls it, and he has absolute controL .. or they are separate entities." [Trial
Transcript 3632:2-4:]
It is undisputed that this court ruled in KPC's favor on the issue of separateness, The court
found .that Gaggero in his personal capacity, was the only, plaintiff in this action, that no other
person or entity had been joined as a plaintiff, and that there was no credible evidence to establish
that Gaggero had the authority to represent any other person or entity in connection with the
. 1
'l
10
claims asserted in this case. [Statement of Decision, p, 26.]
11
In February 2008, the court entered judgment-in favor ofKPC and against Gaggero in his
Ii
12
personal capacity. Based on the retainer agreements between KPC and Gaggero, KPC sought
13
recovery for its attorney fees and costs from Gaggero in his personal capacity. In May 2008, the
14
judgment against Gaggero in his personal capacity was amended to include an award of attorneys
15
fees and costs. In May 2010, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. Thereafter, KPC brought
16
a motion to recover their appellate fees and costs from Gaggero in his personal capacity. In
17
December2010 this court.awarded KPC their fees and costs on appeal, and amended the judgment
18
against Gaggero in his personal capacity.
I"
I
,1
I'
1:
I
19
Now, in April 2012, KPC has brought a motion to add as judgment debtors. the very
20
entities KPC successfully argued at trial that Gaggero had no ownership interest in or control over.
21
In this motion, KPC claims - in direct contrast to the position it took at trial and contrary to the
22
findings of this court - that. these entities are Gaggero's alter egos, that he and the entities are one
23
and the same, and that the entities are actually the real parties in interest in this action. As set forth
24
below, this motioffmustfail not only as unpermitted outside reverse piercing, but KPC's_motion is
25
also barred by both judicial and collateral estoppeL
26
III.
I
'
27
KPC'S MOTION MUST BE DENIED BECAUSE IT IS PROHIBITED UNDER

CALIFORNIA LAW. IT LACKS ANY EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT, AND KPC IS
ESTOPPED FROM MAKING THE ARGUMENTS CONTAINED THEREIN
28
KPC's .motion asks this cciuit to amend the judgment entered against Gaggero in his
u,
'".
..'
"'
I ----,Lb
4
~
000386
.,
personal capacity by adding entities as judgment debtors. California law expressly prohibits this
,,
)'.
outside reverse piercing application of the alter ego doctrine, and KPC's blatant misrepresentation
of the law should be sanctioned. 1 Even if the relief sought were legally permissible, which it is
not, KPC's motion contains no. evidence to support its alter ego claim. Moreover, the evidence
KPC presented at trial established that Gaggero and the entities were not only separate, but also
that Gaggero had no ownership,. authority, or control whatsoever with respect to the entities and
that Gaggero alone was the only real party in interest. Finally, KPC's motion should be denied on
estoppel grounds based on its argument a11d the court ruling at trial, and. on the fact that KPC has
know all the relevant facts since 2000.
I'
"
!'"
! ;!
10
11

Liable For Personal Debts Of An Individual
12
Code of Civil Procedure section 187 "has never been construed to allow imposition of
13
liability on an entity which was never a party to the action." (Triplett v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
14
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1420.) Cases using "section 187 to add new parties as additional
15
judgment debtors have always been rooted in the "alter ego" concept that the original party and
16
the new party were one and the same." (Id.) However, this "requires both (I) that the new party be
17
the alter ego of the old party and (2) that the new party had controlled the litigation, thereby
18
having had the opportunity to litigate, in order to satisfy due process concerns. The due process
19
considerations are in addition to, not in lieu of, the threshold alter ego issues. (Id. at 1421
20
[citations omitted].) In this case, KPC's motion fails on both prongs.
A.
21
Firstand most important, the alter ego doctrine may not be applied in reverse, as requested
22
here, to holdan entityJiable{or the debt of an individual. It is only the standard alter ego doctrine
23
that may be used in appropriate circumstances to pierce the corporate veil and hold an individual
24
liable for claims made against the entity. In this case, the claim and judgment are not against any
25
of the entities that KPC seeks to add as judgment debtors. This is a debt that is undisputedly owed
26
It is hombook law that the law of the forum state appli~S to issues of substantive law. which includes the
determination of whether alter ego liability applies, Therefore, California law must be applied to this Motion. (Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S 64, 79-80; Towe Antique Ford Foundation v. l.R.S. (9th Cir. 1993) 999
F.2d 1387, 1391.)
.
1
i~
'
"
~
27
28
5
000387
'
personal capacity by adding entities .as judgment debtors. California law expressly prohibits this
2
outside reverse piercing application of the alter ego doctrine, and KPC's blatant misrepresentation
of the law should be sanctioned. 1 Even if the relief sought were legally permissible, which it is
not, KPC's motion contains no evidence td support its alter ego claim. Moreover, the evidence
KPC presented at trial established that Gaggero and the entities were not only separate, but also
that Gaggero had no ownership, authority, or control whatsoever with respect to the entities and
that Gaggero.alone was the only real party in interest. Finally, KPC's motion should be denied on
estoppel grounds based on its argument and the court ruling at trial, and on the fact that KPC has
know all the relevant facts since 2000.
JO
11
A.

Liable For Personal Debts Of An Individual
12
Code of Civil Procedure section 1.87 "has never been construed to allow imposition of
Exchang~
13
liability on an entity which was never a party to the action." (Triplett v. Farmers Ins.
14
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1420.) Cases using "section 187 to add new parties as additional
15
judgment debtors have always been rooted in the "alter ego" concept that the original party and
16
the new party were or\e and the same." (Id.) However, this "requires both (1) that the new party be
17
the alter ego of the old party and (2) that the new party had controlled the litigation, thereby
18
having had the opportunity to litigate, in order to satisfy due process concerns. The due process
19
considerations are in addition to, not. in lieu .of, the threshold alter ego. issues. (Id. at 1421
20
[citations omitted].) In this case, KPC's motion fails on both prongs.
21
First" and most important, the alter ego doctrine may not be applied in reverse, as requested
22
here, to hold an entity liable for the debt of an individual. It is only the standard alter ego doctrine
23
that may be used in appropriate circumstances to pierce the corporate veil and hold an individual
24
liable for claims made againstthe entity. In this case, the claim and judgment are notagainst any
25
of the entities that KPC seeks to add as judgment debtors. This is a debt that is undisputedly owed
26
1
"...
I
1.I
...""
"
--.-
27
28
It is hombook law that the law of the forum state applies to issues of substantive law. which includes the
detennination of whether alter ego liability applies. Therefore, California law must be applied.to this Motion. (Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S 64, 79-80; Towe Antique Ford Foundation v. l.R.S. (9th Cir. 1993) 999
F.2d 1387, 1391.)
.
5
000387
........
by an individual. Yet, KPC is seeking to hold these entities liable for that debt under a reverse
alter ego theory. This request must be denied.
The law in California is crystal clear that a trial court is not authorized to amend a
judgment to add an entity as a judgment debtor urider a reverse alter ego theory. "[A] third party
creditor may not pierce the corporate veil to reach corporate assets 'to satisfy a shareholder's
personal liability." (Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal:App.4th 1510, 1512-
13.) (See, also: (Wegner, Fairbank, & Epstein, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence,
(The Rutter Group 2007) 18:522.1, citing Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp.)
'
"In Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510, 77
Cal.Rptr.3d 96, the Court of Appeal held that "outside reverse" piercing of the
corporate veil is not permitted in California,. that is, the corporate veil will not be
pierced to satisfy the debt of an individual shareholder. Rather, the court explained,
the.alter ego doctrine will only be applied to hold an individual shareholder liable
for a corporate debt where the individual has disregarded the corporate form."
(Greenspan v. LADT. LLC (2010) 191Cal.App.4th486, 513-14.)
I0
11
12
.
'
,,
Ill
'\
~
'
13
Incredulously, KPC's counsel cites 'to Postal Instant Press, Inc. and Greenspan and falsely
14
represents to this Court thaLthese cases in fact support application of reverse piercing. This
15
misrepresentation of the law was clearly intentional, as it is repeated throughout KPC's motion,
16
and KPC's counsel should be sanctioned for violating.its dut)iof candor fo the court. (See: (Bus.
17
& Prof. Code 6068(d).)
18
This was a legal malpractice action broughf by an individual client against the lawyers,
19
whom he alone hired to represent him personally in the underlying matters. The only parties to the
20
retainer agreements were Gaggero and KPC, and the only parties to this litigation were Gaggero
21
and KPC. This court expressly ruled, based on KPC's own argument and evidence at trial, that
22
Gaggero was the only real party in interest and that Gaggero had no authority to represent any
23
other person or entity in connection with the claims asserted in this case. The judgment in this
24
case was thus entered against Gaggero in his personal capacity. KPC's subsequent motions for
25
attorney fees and costs were based on the retainer agreements between Gaggero personally and
26
KPC, and the award of fees and costs was made against Gaggero in his personal capacity.
27
28
KPC's motion now asks this court to amend the judgment to add entities as judgment
debtors, who this court has already aetermined
1101
to be real parties in interest in this action. The
6
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND nJDGMENT
000388
' ,
motion is based on.an improper request for this court to apply qutside reverse piercing, which this
Ii
,,
i;
;'!'
court is not.authorized to do. Contrary to the misrepresentations ofKPC's counsel, California law
prohibits reverse application of the alter ego doctrine in order to hold an entity liable for the
personal debts of an individual. KPC's motion must be denied on this basis alone.
Even if reverse alter ego could be used to amend a judgment, which it undisputedly cannot,
KPC then still must prove it was the entities who controlled the underlying litigation. (Triplett v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at 1421.) KPC has produced no evidence to
establish the entities exercised any control over the litigation, let alone had the ability to represent
their interests at trial or at any other proceeding; Tei the contrary, KPC now argues it is Gaggero
10
who controls the entities, thereby conceding the entities had no control over the litigation. Even
11
where alter ego is proven, it is improper to add a new party who was never afforded the due
12
process right to litigate their interests in the underlying action. (Id.)
13
Finally, these entities all have shareholders, members, partners, and trustees whose
14
interests were clearly not the same as Gaggero's interests in this litigation or otherwise. It is again
15
improper to add a new alter ego party when the new party's interests are not the same as those of
16
the original party. (NEC.Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772, 780-81.) This case,
17
like that in NEC,
18
and its alter ego are: similar so that the trial strategy of the corporate defendant effectively
19
represents the interests of the alter ego." (Id. at 780.) Here, it is undisputed that the entities had no
20
control over the litigation, and no ability to litigate their differing interests, thus adding them as
21
judgment debtors under any theory would violate their due process rights.
:~
!:
22
B.
~contrasts
with the usual scenario where the interests of the corporate defendant
KPC Has Produced No Evidence To Establish Their Claim That The Entities
Are the Alter Egos of Gaggero, And The True Facts Refute Such A Finding
23
KPC has alleged that the entities are the alter egos of Gaggero, and that it is the entities
24
and not Gaggero who are the real parties in interest in this case. Based on these allegations, KPC
25
asserts the entities should be liable for the judgment entered against Gaggero in his personal
26
capacity. As discussed supra, California law does not permit such reverse application of the alter
27
ego doctrine in order to hold an
~~tity
liable for the personal debts of an individual. Even
28
7
....
--
000389
'
assuming 'that reverse piercing was permissible, which it clearly is not, !<PC's motion contains no
evidence to establish their alter ego claim. The facts and evidence already presented at trial
unequivocally show Gaggero and the entities are separate, and Gaggero is the only real party in
interest in this case. Indeed, this court has already so ruled in both its findings of fact; and its entry
of judgment against Gaggero individually.
It is well settled that in order to invoke the alter ego doctrine, a plaintiff must show "such a
unity of interest and ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate
personalities of the corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist," and also "an
inequitable result if the acts in question are treated as those of the corporation alone." (Sonora
IO
Diamond Corp. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538 [citations omitted].) As noted above,
11
Gaggero is not a shareholder, partner, member, or trustee of any of the entities. The usual
12
circumstances involve a situation where the creditor had been misled. In contrast, KPC hasalways
13
known of the separateness of the entities and Gaggero. KPC has not been misled.
14
In determining whether or not the appropriate separateness exits, courts have traditionally
15
looked at certain factors that include: "the holding out by one entity that it is liable for the debts of
16
the other, ... use of one as a mere shell or conduit for the affairs of the other," also "inadequate
17
capitalization, disregard of corporate formalities, lacJ<: of segregation of corporate records, and
18
identical directors and'officers." (Id. at 538-39.) The analysis is fact specific, and no one factor is
19
more important than the others. (Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799, 812;) Here,
20
KPC has not presented any admissible evidence of any of the factors required to support its alter
21
ego allegations.
22
The issue of Gaggero's sepa@teness from the entities was litigated at trial. KPCargued it
23
was Gaggero in.his personal capacity who was the only plaintiff and real party in interest; i.e., that
24
he was separate from and did not own, control, or represent the entities. This court agreed with
25
KPC and determined Gaggero personally paid nothirig 'to KPC and therefore could recover
26
nothing. Thus; this court has already ruled on the issue of ownership between Gaggero !Ind Jhe
27
entities, and specifically found there was no evidence to establish Gaggero had th.e authority to
.""'
28
represent any other person or entity iri connection with the claims asserted in this case.
"..
"
8
000390
.,
'
.....'...
"'
_K.PC now attempts to argue to the_contrary. The only facts K.PC points to is that Gaggero's
estate planning attorney Joseph Praske created the entities, and that ownership to. property was
transferred to separate legal entities. This was not sufficient to establish a lack of separateness at
trial, and it is not sufficient now. The evidence at trial and now shows the formation and operation
of the entities complied with all legal formalities, there is no commingling of funds, and that
Gaggero has no interest or control in any of the entities. The lone fact that Praske, an attorney, acts
as a representative for some ofthe_entities does not establish the entities are Gaggero's alter egos.
This is precisely why this court ruled that Gaggero and the entities were separate and that he had
no authority to represent them, as KPC argued at trial.
10
KPC presents no new facts to support its 180 degree change in position, because no such
11
facts exist. As the evidence presented at trial established, Gaggero has no ownership interest or
12
control over these entities, _and did not represent them in any way in.this litigation. Assuming K.PC
13
did provide sufficient evidence to show a unity between Gaggero and the entities, which it has not,
14
and cannot, that would only satisfy the first prong of KPC's new alter ego claim. KPC must also
15
prove an improper intent. "Traditional piercing of the _corporate veil is justified as an equitable
16
remedy when the shareholders have abused the corporate form to evade individual liability,
17
circumvent a statute, or' accomplish a wrongful purpose." (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co.
18
{1985) 39. Cal.3d 290, 300-01.) No such evidence is presented.
19
K.PC's motion states simply that Gaggero transferred ownership to property to separate
20
legal entities. Millions.of people and companies in.this country do exactly the same thing in their
21
estate planning. Yet, K.PC concludes with no evidentiary support that, unlike the similar decisions
22
made by millions of Americans, Gaggero's estate planning decisions were done with the intent to
23
defraud creditors. KPC cites to no evidence to support this allegation. K.PC also fails to explain
24
how Gaggero's estate planning decisions in 1997 could possibly have been _done to avoid payment
25
of the judgment in_ this case, which was first entered in 2008.
26
KPC is essentially arguing in this motion that if a person transfers ownership of property to
27
an entity that this decisicm is being made to defraud any creditor that the person may ever have at
28
any time during the rest of their life. 'The argument is ludicrous. Such a conclusion would defeat
9
000391.
' I
the purpose for the legitimate existence of corporations, limited liability companies, limited
2
partnerships, and estate planning in general. In the absence of real admissible evidence that the
transfer of property to entities was done with the intent to defraud an existing creditor, or a
creditor reasonably expected to exist, there is no abuse of the corporate form.
The evidence here shows that Gaggero and the entities are separate, as this court has
already ruled. There is no evidence that Gaggero's estate planning decisions were in any way
motivated by any intent to defraud, violate any statute, or accomplish any wrongful purpose.
There is thus no basis for a finding of alter ego.
c.
10
KPC ls Estopped From Making The Arguments In Their Motion Based On

The Contrary Rulings They Sought And Obtained At Trial, And The Fact
They Have Waited Ten Years To Raise This Issue
I!.
KPC argued at trial that Gaggero was,the only real party in interest in this case, and that
12
this court should rule that Gaggero was separate from the entities. This court agreed with KPC and
13
expressly ruled that Gaggero in his personal capacity was the only real party interest, and that
14
there was no .evidence to establish Gaggero had any authority to represent any other person or
15
entity in connection with the claims asserted in this case. On the basis of this ruling alone KPC is
16
estopped from now arguing otherwise.
17
"Judicial estoppel prevents.a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is
18
contrary to a position previously taken in the same or some .earlier proceeding." (Jackson v.
19
County ofLos Angeles (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 171, 181 [citations omitted].) This form ofestoppel,
20
which is "sometimes referred to as the doctrine of preclusion of inconsistentpositions, is invoked
21
to prevent a party from changing its position over the course of judicial proceedings when such
22
positional changes have an adverse impact on the judicial process." (Id.)
23
The doctrine of judicial estoppel applies where: ''(!) the same party has taken two
24
positions; (2) the positions were taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3)
25
the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the. positio!1 or
26
accepted it as true); (4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5}the first position was not
27
taken as a result of.ignorance, fraud; or mistake." (Id. at 183 [citations omitted].) All elements of
..."'
28
judicial estoppel are satisfied here.
'...
"
10
000392
KPC argued at trial that Gaggero alone was the real party in interest, and that he and the
2
entities were separate and.he.had no ownership, control or authority over the entities. This court
ruled in KPC's favor on.this issue. KPC now asserts the opposite argument that Gaggero and the
entities are one and the same and the entities are the real .parties in interest, which is totally
inconsistent with its position at.trial. Jhe opposite position that KPC adopted and won at"trial was
based on evidence obtainedin their representation ofGaggero, including privileged attorney client
information, and in discovery in this case, arid was thus not.taken as a result of any ignorance,
fraud, or mistake. KPC is thus judicially estopped from asserting its new inconsistent position that
the entities are Gaggero's alter egos.
10
"Collateral estoppel bars a party from relitigating an issue of ultimate fact that a court
ll
already has adjudicated." (Id. at 182 [citations omitted].) This form of estoppel "deals with the
12
finality of judgment on factual matters that were fully considered"and decided" and "deprives a
13
partyof the right to relitigate an issue." (Id.) "The rationale is to conserve judicial resources by
14
preventing repetitive litigation." (Id.)
15
The doctrint: of collateral estoppel will be applied \;\'here the following requirements are
16
meet: "First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that decided in
17
a former proceeding. Second, this issue .must have been actually litigated in the former
18
proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided in the fonrier proceeding. Fourth, the
19
decision in theformer proceeding must be final and on the merits. Finally, the party against whom
20
preclusion is sought nit.is! be the same as, or in privily with, the party to the former proceeding."
21
(Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 513 [citations omitted].) All elements of
22
collateral esfoppel are satisfied here.
23
A full court trial was held in this case, both KPC and Gaggero appeared. One of the
24
specific factual matters that KPC and Gaggero presented for. decision was the relationship between
25
Gaggero and the entities, and the issue of who was the .real party in interest. It was necessary for
26
the court to decide the issue as it bore directly on the damages alleged. Extensive evidence was
27
presented, which this court fully considered. After doing so, this court ultimately ruled that
28
Gaggero was the only real party in"interest, that he and the entities were separate, that he had no
11
.&
000393
'
con.trol or authority over them, and that there was no alter ego established. KPC is collaterally
estopped from relitigating this alter ego issue in its motion.
Finally, "[a]mendment of a judgment to add an alter ego is an equitable procedure." (Carr
v. Barnabey's Hotel Corp. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 14, 21.) Here, KPC has known for twelve years
all relevant facts re)ating to Gaggero and the estate planning decisions he made in 1997, three
years prior to when he retained KPC in 2000. This action was filed in 2002. Trial commenced in
2007. Judgment was entered in 2008. Appeal was
appeal. At no time during the eight years the case was pending did KPC seek toadd the entities as
real parties in 'interest. To the contrary, KPC at all times during those eight years asserted the
10
argument that Gaggero was the only real party interest, and that he was separateaiJd not acting by
11
or for any entity. Ten years after this case began, KPC brings a motion to amend the judgment to
12
add entities who it has now decided to claim are the real parties in interest. KPC offers no
13
explanation for why it waitt:d so long to bring these parties into the case when it had all the facts
14
in its possession, or for why KPG made the opposite argument at all times during the eight years
15
the case was pending. The equitable doctrine
ta~en.
Judgment was amend.ed in 2010 after
of !aches clearly applies to bar the motion.
16
The record is clear that KPC has previously sought and obtained a contrary ruling at trial
17
on the issue of separateness, and has had full knowledge of the relevant facts since before the
18
co111plaint was filed. KPC's motion should be denied on the grounds that they are estopped from
19
seeking any such amendment.
20
JV.
CONCLUSION
21
Based on theforegoing, it is clear that California law expressly prohibits adding entities as
22
judgment debtors under application of reverse alter ego, there is no evidence to even support a
23
finding of alter ego in this case, and KPC is estopped from requesting the relief it seeks in this
24
motion. This court should deny KPC's motion to amend the judgment.
25
DATED: May 5, 2012
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP
26
27
28
..
000394
12
---- .. -
L
.,
DECLARA 'flON ()f' STEPHEN GAGGERO
21 l, Stephen Gaggtro, declare as follows:

3
I.
I wn the plaintiff in the above-.:ntitled action. [ have personal knowledge of the
facts sci fonh in lhis Declaration and, if called as a witness, could aod would testify competently
thereto.
2.
This Declaration is submitted in support ofplil.intiffs' Opposition to w:"Motion to
7 Amend Judgment filed by defendants Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M
8
Hanis, and Andre Jmuni.

3.
In 1997, l decided to retain the services of an estate pianni.ng anomey to review my
10
asset portfolio and develop a:n estalc plan for me,. so that my estate would survive me. be legally
II
protected, and would provide a benefit for my family and children. I ultimately .retained Joseph
12
Praskc to prov.ide )his c.stllte planning advice and ser<1ces. Based on Mr. Praskc's
13
recommendations, I thereafter transfen'ed ownership of cenain propcny to varioui; entities .. This
14
was a Legitimate estate planning decision.
15
4.
I. did not make these transfers wi.01 any intent
16
acoo~plish
17
defraud KPC, as l had no intention of hiring them 1997.
18
5.
10
defraud, violate any statute, or
any wrongful puipose. l certainly did not make these transfers with lhe intent to
1 am not a shareholder, officer, or direc:1or of Pacific Management Corporation. I
19
am not a genentl or limited parmcr of Malibu Broad Beach LP, Marina Glencoe LP, 511 OFW LP,
20
or Gingerbread Court LP. I am not a member or manager of Blu House LLC or Boardwalk Sunset
21
LLC. lam not the trustee of the Giganin Tntsi, the Arenzano Trusr, or the Aquasantc Fowidation.
22
23
24
I declare under penalty of perjury und.cr the laws of the State of California. that the
foregoing is true and correct.
Eltecu1ed on May 14.2012, in Los Angeles, Cali
25
2.6
27
28
"'..
..'"'
(I\
13
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND JUOOMENT
..
000395
. .I
PROOF OF SERVICE
.2
I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to
the within action. My business address is 2625 Townsgate Road, Suite 330, Westlake Village,
3 California 91361.
On May 15, 2012, I served the foregoing docuinent(s) described as: NOTICE OF
OPPOSITION AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND
JUDGMENT; DECLARATION OF STEPHEN GAGGERO
6
BY MAIL I placed the above document(s) in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully
prepaid, in the United States mail at Westlake Village, California, addressed as set forth
below. I am readily familiar with the firm's practice for collection and processing of
documents for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. Postal Service on
that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am
aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation
date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
7
8
9
10
11
_x_
BY FEDERAL EXPRESS I placed the above document(s) in a sealed envelope and placed
it for deposit with Federal Express, prepaid for next day delivery, addressed as set forth
below.
12
13
BY FACSIMILE I transmitted the above document(s) by facsimile transmission to the fax

number(s) set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m., and received confirmed
transmission reports indicating that the document(s) were successfully transmitted.
14
15
16
17
18
BY PERSONAL DELIVERY I placed the above document(s) in a sealed envelope and

caused them to be personally delivered by hand to the person(s) set forth below:
Randall A Miller
Miller LLP
515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Facsimile: 888-749-5812
19
20
21
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
true and correct.
Executed on May 15, 2012, at Westlake Village, California.
22
23
24
.25
26
~
..
"..
'\
27
28
..
'\
"'
14
000396

2
3
4
DAVID A. ESQUIBIAS, SBN171327

TRACY H. KITZMAN, SBN 217224
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. ESQUIBIAS
Telephone: (805) 267- I 141
Facsimile: (805) 267-1140
lL
ir D
COUNT~ c}1/fo<ftA<;_1'-Llf'clRN
ovGELJ;s lil
SllPER1l
HAY 15 2012
John A. Clar
By ~u<:er/CJcrt
lF~.Ocpuri
Attorneys for Specially Appearing Parties
6
7
9
10
Plaintiff,
11
12
13
14
15
CASE NO.:
Filed:
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO,
v.
KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE; STEVEN

RAY GARCIA; STEPHEN M. HARRIS;
ANDRE JARDIN!; and DOES 1 through 50,
inclusive,
Defendants.
16
BC286925
December 12, 2002

Hon. Robert L. Hess
Dept. 24
NOTICE OF SPECIAL APPEARANCE
TO OPPOSE AND OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO AMEND
JUDGMENT; DECLARATION OF
JOSEPH PRASKE
17
Date: May_29, 2012
18.
Time: 8:30 a.m.

Dept: 24
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
~
27
'~
'...
28
"
..
000397
.........
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT 511 OFW LP; Gingerbread Court LP; Malibu
Broadbeach LP; Marina Glencoe LP; Blu House LLC; Boardwalk Sunset LLC; .Pacific Coast
Management; Joseph Praske, trustee, of the Giganin Trust; Arenzano Trust; and Aquasante
Foundation are making a special appearance in this matter to oppose the Motion to Amend
Judgment filed by defendants Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M. Harris,
and Andre Jardini ("KPC") on the following grounds:
9
10
'
"
Stephen.Gaggero in this matter because California law does not permit outside reverse piercing;
2.
Even if California law permitted a judgment creditor to add third party entities to a
12
Entities are not the alter egos of Stephen Gaggero;

3.
The Entities and Stephen Gaggero are not identical entities, but rather separate and
distinct;
15
4.
The Entities did not control the litigation between Stephen Gaggero and KPC;
16
5.
Stephen Gaggero did not represent the interests of the Entities during any stage of
17
the litigation; and,
18
The Court does not have the authority to add the Entities to the judgment against
judgment against an individual defendant through outside reverse piercing, which it does not, the
14
II)
I.
11
13
''"
...'"
TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
6.
It is inequitable to add the Entities to the Judgment, subjecting the assets of the
19
Entities to judgment enforcement, without having been given the requisite notice and opportunity
20
to be heard to protect their interests at any stage in the litigation.
21
Consequently, the Court should deny this motion.
22
This Opposition is based on this Notice and Opposition, on the attached Memorandum of
23
Points and Authorities and Declaration of Joseph Praske, on the Opposition and Request for
24
Judicial Notice filed by plaintiff, on the complete court files and records in this action, and on any
25
such other oral or documentary evidence and argument as may be presented at the hearing.
26
DATED: May 15, 2012
27
28
..
pecially Appearing Parties
000398

TABLE OF CONTENTS
'
I.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. I
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS BASED UPON EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN

SUPPORT OF THE MOTION AND AUGMENTED BY THE DECLARATION
OF JOSEPH PRASKE .......................
:..................................................................................
2
.
- .
.
Ill.
CALIFORNIA LAW PROHIBITS THE ADDITION OF THE ENTITIES TO THE

JUDGMENT AGAINST GAGGERO .................................................................................. 4
4
5
6
A. The Motion Must Be Denied Because California Law Does Not Allow
Imposition of Liability cin An Entity That, Was Not A Party To The Action ................ 4
B.
8
9
IV.
The Motion Should Be Denied Because the Entities Are Not the Alter Egos of
Gaggero .. :....................................................................................................................... 7
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................ 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
~
27
"
28
"...
..
'\
~
. N
II
Q0,0399
'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................................. I
II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS BASED UPON EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN

SUPPORT OF THE MOTION AND AUGMENTED BY THE DECLARATION
OF JOSEPH PRASKE ....................... :..................................................................................
2
. .
.
Ill.

JUDGMENT AGAINST GAGGERO .................................................................................. 4
5
6
A. The Motion Must Be Denied Because California Law Does Not Allow
Imposition of Liability on An Entity That, Was Not A Party To The Action ................ 4
B.
8
9
N.
The Motion Should ~e Denied Because the Entities Are Not the Alter Egos of
Gaggero ...................................................................... :................................................... 7
CONCLUSION ........................................................ : ............................................................... 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
~
27
"..
28
',..
..
'\
ll
00.0399
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304U.S 64 ........................................................................... 4
Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486 ........................................................ ,....... 1, 5
Meslerv. Bragg Management Co. (1985)39 Cal.3d 290 ................................................................. 9
NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208.Cal.App.3d 772 ............................................................ 6, 7
Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510 ................................. 1, 4, 5
Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Sup: Ct. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523 ..................... ;.................................. 7
Towe Antique Ford Foundation v. J.R.S. (9th Cir. 1993) 999 F.2d 1387 ......................................... .4
10
Triplett v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1994) 24.Cal.App.4th 1415 .................................................. 5, 6
11
Zoran Corp. v. Chen (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 799 ............................................................................ 8
12
Statutes
13
Code of Civil Procedure 187 ............................................................... , .......................................... 4
14
Rules
15
Wegner, Fairbank, & Epstein, Cal. Practice Guide:. Civil Trials and Evidence
(The Rutter Group 2007) 17:164 ................................................................................................ 5
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
~
27
'~
28
'..."
.,
Ill
. . . o i i i = = = - - - - - - - - - -.. -"'
000400

I.
Defendants Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M. Harris, and Andre
Jardini ("KPC") seeks to amend its judgment against Stephen Gaggero to add non-parties 511
OFW LP; Gingerbread Court LP; Malibu Broadbeach LP; Marina Glencoe LP; Blu House LLC;
Boardwalk Sunset 'LLC; Pacific Coast' Management; Joseph Praske, trustee, of the Giganin Trust;
Arenzano Trust; arid Aqua Sante Foundation (the "Entities") as new defendants and judgment
debtors (the "Motion") on the grounds that Entities are the alter egos of Gaggero, that they are the
real partiescin interest in the litigation, and that KPC should be permitted to execute on the assets
of: the Entities, because KPC claims to not be able to collect its judgment against Gaggero. The
I0
only way to add the Entities to the judgment is through the use of outside reverse piercing of the
11
corporate veil. For various, solid reasons, including violation of due process, California courts
12
have unanimously disallowed the adding of entities as judgment debtors to a judgment against an
13
individual. (Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1512-13;
14
Greenspan v. LADT, LLC(2010) 191Cal.App.4th486,513-14.)
15
Even if outside reverse piercing were available to add entities to a judgment, which it is not,
16
KPC has not proven through admissible evidence the requisite elements of alter ego. In fact, this
17
Court determined the opposite at trial--'that the Entities were separate and apart from Gaggero. The
18
facts are as follows:
19
20
21
22
''II
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
'
23
24
25
26
1. Gaggero 'is not a shareholder, officer, or director of Pacific Coast Management, one of
the entities sought to be added here as a judgment debtor;
2: The LLC's and LP's, to whom Gaggero had irrevocably transferred ownership of
property 15 years ago, are similarly separate and distinct from Gaggero;
3. Gaggero is not a general or limited partner of any of the LP's sought to be added and is
not a member or manager of the LLC's sought to be added;
4. Gaggero is not the named or defacto trustee of the trusts sought to be added;
5. Gaggero is not the beneficiary of the trusts; and
6. Gaggero has no authority to compel distribution from these trusts. (See the Praske
Ill
27
..'
28
'"".
Deel.):
..
1
000401.
Ironically, KPC conced'd at trial that each of these Entities was separate from Gaggero, and
therefore it is not surprising that it is unable to present evidence to support their new claim of lack
of separateness.
In addition, 511 OFW LP; Gingerbread Court LP; Malibu Broadbeach LP; Marina Glencoe
LP; Blu House.LLC; Boardwalk Sunset LLC; Pacific Coast Ma11agement; Joseph Praske, trustee, of
the Giganin Trust; Arenzano Trust; and Aquasante Foundation were notmade parties to this action
at any time after its filing in 2002, even though KPC represented Gaggero beginning in August Of
2000 and became intimately familiar with Gaggero's estate planning activities that had taken place
some years earlier. KPC cannot claim that it was misled during the case, .nor surprised, as it knew
10
all cif the facts beginning in 2000,. which facts were the subject of testimony in the 2007 trial,
11
wherein .KPC asserted and proved the separateness to the satisfaction of the Court as demonstrated
12
in the Requests for Judicial Notice by KPC and Gaggero.
14
KPC, having successfully used the separateness argument .in defeating Gaggero's claims
against them at trial, is both judicially and collaterally estopped from now claiming the reverse.
15
Had KPC believed that they had evidence that these Entities were the "alter egos and real
16
parties in interest" inthis litigation, they were required.to have added the Entities as parties to the
17
litigation. This would have permitted the Entities their constitutional due process rights to notice
18
and a hearing to protect the property.rights KPC:now seeks to deprive them of summarily by this
19
Motion. For all of the above reasons, and based upon these points and authorities, the
20
deny this Motion.
21
II.
should
22
23
The Entities sought to be added to this judgment were not parties to this litigation. The
24
Entities therefore provide this factual summary from the evidence submitted in support of the
25
Motion, augmented by the evidence contained in the attached declaration of Joseph Praske. 2
27
\.
c~urt
STATEMENT OF FACTS BASED UPON EVIDENCE SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT

OF THE MOTION AND AUGMENTED BY THE DECLARATION OF JOSEPH
PRASKE.
26
13
'
28
According to this Court's Statement of Decision, "Between 1995 and 1998 he [Gaggero]
1
..
KPC mis.named this trust in its Motion.
'The Entities also adopt the Statement of Facts set forth in lhe Opposition to the Motion filed by Gaggero.
2
000402
I)
"',..
"",..
"
'
did extensive: 'estate planning' ... resulting in all of his [Gaggero's] personal assets being
transferred to various corporations, trusts and foundations ... he retained absolutely n~o ownership
interest in and no control over these assets." (Statement of Decision, Exhibit A pg 18 footnote 17.)
The attached declaration of Joseph Praske confirms these facts. (See the Piaske Deel.)
Gaggero retained Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garc;ia, Stephen M. Harris, and
Andre Jardini (collectively "KPC") in August 2000 to represent him individually in several
lawsuits that were the subject of this litigation, wherein he was a named party. (Statement of
Decision 1-2; 16.) None of these lawsuits involved the Entities.that KPC now'seeks to add to the
judgment. (Statement of Decision, Exhibit A pp. 14 footnote 13; 18 footnote 17; also see the
10
Praske Deel.) In December 2002, Gaggero filed the complaint in this action against KPC for legal
11
malpractice and for breach of the retainer agreement between himself and KPC. This case finally
12
went to trial in July '2007. [Statement of Decision, Exhibit A pp. I.]
13
This Court's statement of decision stated, "First, the only plaintiff in this action is Mr.
14
Gaggero in his personal capacity. No other person or entity has joined in this action as plaintiff,
15
and there is no credible evidence that Mr. Gaggero has authority to represent any other person or
16
entity (whether by assignment or otherwise) in asserting these damage claims." [Statement of
17
Decision, p. 26.] "Neither Pacific Coast Management nor Avalon, nor any of the various other
18
entities was a party to the underlying litigation, nor were they ever a party to this suit." [Statement
19
of Decision p. 14.] "There was no evidence that Mr. Gaggero was represented in a capacity as
20
officer, director or employee of any of these entities, ... "(Statement of Decision, p. 27.] The
21
ultimate ruling in the case found separateness, preventing Gaggero any recovery, "Since he paid
22
nothing, he can recover nothing." [Statement of Decision, p. 28.]
23
The court entered judgment in favor of KPC and against Gaggero in his personal capacity
24
In February 2008, KPC thereafter sought recovery against Gaggero only for its attorney fees and
25
costs from Gaggero in his personal capacity based on the contractual fee provisions contained
26
written retainer agreements between KPC and Gaggero. This Court awarded these costs against
27
Gaggero personally. [Exhibit B to the Motion.]
28
No evidence is presented to the Court by KPC in support of its Motion to displace the above
3
000403
findings of the Court.

2
III.
'

JUDGMENT AGAINST GAGGERO.
KPC seeks, by way of this motion to amend the judgment entered singly and individually
against Gaggero in his personal capacity, and .add the Entities as judgment debtors. This outside
reverse piercing application of the alter. ego doctrine is unanimously prohibited by California law. 3
Even if outside reverse piercing were legally permissible, which it is not1 KPC presents no
evidence to support its alter ego claim. The trial court ruled Gaggero and the -Entities were
separate, that Gaggero had no ownership of or authority over the entities, and that Gaggero alone
IO
was_ the real party in interest:
11
A.
12
The Motion Must Be Denied Because California Law Expressly Prohibits

Reverse Piercing to Hold an Entity Liable For the Personsal Debts of an
Individual.
13
Under California Law, the alter ego doctrine may not be applied in reverse, as requested
14
here by KPC, to hold an entity liable for the debt of an individual. It is only the standard alter ego
15
doctrine that may be used under vary narrow circumstances to pierce the corporate veil and hold
16
an individual liable for claims made against the entity. Here, the claims and judgment are not
17
against the LLC's, LP's, trusts, or corporation. This debt is owed by an individual, and here,
18
contrary to seeking standard alter ego, KPC seeks the reverse, to add the Entities as new judgment
19
debtors.
20
In California, a trial court is not authorized to amend a judgment to add an entity as a
21
judgment debtor under a reverse alter ego theory. "(A] third party creditor may not pierce the
22
corporate veil to reach corporate assets to satisfy a shareholder's personal liability." (Postal
23
Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1512-13.) (See, also: (Wegner,
24
Fairbank, & Epstein, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Trials and Evidence, (The Rutter Group 2007)
25
26
3
Ii)
..'
"
.'"'
"
27
It is bombook law that the law of the forum state applies to issues of substantive law, which includes the
determination of whether alter ego liability applies. Contrary to KPC's claim, California law applies to this Motion
(Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U.S 64, 79-80; Towe Antique Ford Foundation v. l.R.S. (9th Cir. 1993)
28
999 F.2d 1387, 1391.)
4
oQQ404
"In Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510, 77
Cal.Rptr.3d 96, the Court of Appeal held that "outside reverse" piercing of the
corporate veil is not permitted in California, that is, the corporate veil will not be
pierced to satisfy the debt of an individual shareholder. Rather, the court explained,
the alter ego doctrine will only be applied to hold an individual shareholder liable
for a corporate debt where the individual has disregarded the corporate form."
(Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191Cal.App.4th486, 513-14.)
Here, the only parties to the retainer agreements were Gaggero and KPC, and the only
parties to this litigation were Gaggero and KPC. Appropriately the only parties to the legal
malpractice action were Gaggero and. KPC. This court expressly ruled, based on KPC's own
argument and evidence aftrial, that Gaggero was the only real party in interest.and Gaggero had
10
no authority to represent any other person or entity in connection with the claims asserted in this
11
case. The judgment in this case was entered against Gaggero in his personal capacity. KPC's
12
motions for attorney fees and costs were based the personal retainer agreements between Gaggero
13
and KPC, and the award of fees and costs was made against Gaggero in his personal capacity.
2
3
4
.'
'.."'
'
"'
18:522.1, citing Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Kaswa_Corp.)
14
Four years later, the court is being asked. to amend the judgment to. add the Entities, who
15
did not participate in this case, as judgment debtors. In fact, this court has already determined that
16
17
the Entities are not to be real parties in interest in this action. The motion is based solely on, an
'
unrecognized legal theory and asks for this court to apply prohibited outside reverse piercing.
18
Code of Civil Procedure section .187 "has never been construed to allow imposition of
19
liability on an entity which was never a party to the action." (Triplett v. Far:.mers Ins. Exchange
20
(1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1415, 1420.) Under a very narrow set of circumstances, none of which
21
exist here, the. court may (using the standard alter ego theory) exercise its equitable powers to
22
amend a 'judgment to add a new party to the judgment. Cases using "section 187 to add new
23
parties as additional judgment debtors have always been rooted in the standard "alter ego" concept
24
that the'original party and the new party were one and the same." (Id.) However, the ability under
25
section 187 to amend a judgment to add a .defendant, thereby impo_sing liability on the new
26
defendant without trial, requires both (1) that -.the new party be the alter ego of the old party and
27
(2) that the new party had controlled the litigation, thereby having had the opportunity to litigate,
28
in order to .satisfy due process concerns. The due process considerations are in addition to, not in
5
000405
'
lieu of, the threshold alter ego. issues. (Id. at 1421.) In order to protect the constitutional due
process rights of this new party, the court must find that during the underlying litigation there was
virtually no distinction between the defendant and the new party. Since this court ruled the entities
are separate and distinct from Gaggero, it cannot add the proposep new parties to the judgment.
(Id. at 1421.) Thus, KPC's Motion must fail.
Even if California law recognized outside reverse piercing to amend a judgment, which it
does not, KPC would then be required to establish, by a preponderance of admissible evidence, (I)
all of these Entities were the alter egos ofGaggero during the course of the underlying litigation,
and (2) each of the Entities exercised control of the underlying litigation, and (3) each of the
10
Entities' interests,were represented at each stageoftlie underlying litigation. (Triplett v. Farmers
11
Ins. Exchange, supra, 24 Cal.App.4th at 1421.)
12
KPC has produced no evidence to establish the Entities were the alter egos of Gaggero
13
during the course of the litigation. In additional, KPC has failed to provide admissible evidence to
14
establish that each of the Entities exercised any control over the litigation, let alone had the ability
15
to represent their interests at each stage of the proceeding, including trial. In addition to. the
16
undisputed. evidence provided in the Praske Declaration, KPC's motion claims "it is Gaggero who
17
controls the Entities and the Entities had no control over the litigation. All three of the above
18
factors must be fully satisfied in order in insure that all of the Entities' interests were, in fact,
19
represented during the underlying litigation. If the court finds that KPC cannot establish all three
20
factors, the motion must be denied. (NEC Electronics Inc..v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772.)
21
Even where alter ego is proven, it is improper to add a new party who. was never.afforded the due
22
process right to litigate their interests in the underlying action. (Triplett, Supra.) Clearly, KPC has
23
failed to meet its burdens here and the Motion must be denied.
24
The Entities that KPC seeks to add to the judgment all have shareholders, members,
25
partners, and trustees whose interests were clearly not the same as Gaggero's interests in this
26
litigation or the underlying litigations. As demonstrated.herein, it is improper to add a new alter
ll
27
ego party when the new party's interests are not the same as those of the original' party. (NEC
'.
28
Electronics Inc: v. Hurt, Supra, 208. Cal.App.3d at 780-81.) This case, like that in NEC, "contrasts
"..'
"
"
6
000406
'
with the usual scenario where the interests of the corporate defendant and its alter ego are similar
2
so that-the. trial strategy of the corporate defendant effectively represents the interests of the alter
ego." (Id. at. 780.) Here, it is undisputed the Entities were not;parties to the litigation, did not
control the litigation, and had no ability-to litigate their differing interests. (See Praske Deel.)
Subjecting the Entities to judgment enforcement after this litigation has been concluded, under
any theory, would violate their due process rights.
B.
8
The Motion Should Be Denied Because the Entities Are Not the Alter Egos of
Gaggero:
KPC asserts in their Motion that the Entities should be liable for the judgment entered.
10
against Gaggero in.his personal capacity.. As discussed above, Ci].lifomia Jaw does not permit such
11
reverse application of the alter ego.doctrine in order to hold an Entity liable for the personal debts
12
of an individual. Even assuming that reverse .piercing was permissible, which it clearly is not,
13
KPC's motion contains no evidence to establish an alter ego claim. The facts and evidence, which
14
was already presented at trial and is included in the Praske Declaration, unequivocally
15
demonstrate that Gaggero and the Entities are separate, and that the Entities were not represented
16
at all stages in this litigation. This court has already ruled in both its findings of fact, and its entry
17
of judgment against Gaggero individually.
18
A party seeking to invoke 'the alter ego doctrine must show "such a unity of interest and
19
ownership between the corporation and its equitable owner that the separate personalities of the
20
corporation and the shareholder do not in reality exist," and also "an inequitable result if the acts
21
in question are treated as those of the corporation alone." (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Sup. Ct.
22
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 538 [citations omitted].) As noted above and in the Praske
23
Declaration, Gaggero is not a shareholder, partner, member or trustee of any of the entities, and
24
does not control any o(the Entities.
25
Courts have traditionally looked at certain factors that include:
~the
holding out by one
26
entity that it is liable.for the debts of the other. .. use of one as a inere shell or conduit for the affairs
27
of the other," also "inadequate capitalization, disregard of corporate formalities, lack of
28
segregation of corporate records, ana identical directors and officers." (Id. at 538-39.)The analysis
7
000407
, I
'
is fact specific, and no one factor is more important than the others. (Zoran Corp. v. Chen.(2010)
2
185 Cal.App:4th 799, 812.) The Praske declaration proves that the Entities were properly formed
and maintained, do not commingle their. funds, keep separate records, do not hold themselves out
as liable "for the debts of Gaggero, Gaggero does not own or control any of the entities, and each
entity owns separate property at different addresses. (See Praske Deel.) This evidence defeats
KPC's argument.
KPC argued at trial that it was Gaggero in his personal capacity who was the only plaintiff
and real party in interest, i.e., that he was separate from and did not represent the Entities. This
court agreed with KPC when determining that Gaggero paid nothing to KPC and could recover
I0
nothing. Thus; this court has already ruled on the issue of alleged unity and, ownership between
11
Gaggero and the Entities, and specifically found insufficient evidence to establish, that Gaggero
12
had authority to represent any other person or entity in connection with the claims asserted in this
13
case.
14
The Praske Declaration shows that the formation .and operation of the Entities complied
15
with all legal formalities, there is no c'ommingling of funds, and in fact Gaggero has no interest.or
16
control in any of the Entities. The lone fact that Praske acts as
17
entities does not establish that the entities are Gaggero's alter egos. This is precisely why this
18
court.ruled that Gaggero and the Entities Mtere separate and that he had no authority to .represent
19
them, as KPC argued at trial.
a representative forsome of the
20
Nci new evidence has been presented to support KPC's change in position, because no such
21
facts exist. As the evidence presented at trial established, and as set forth in the attached
22
declaration of Joseph Praske; Gaggero had no authority, interest, or control over these Entities,
23
and Gaggero did not represent them at trial in any way.
24
Even if this court were inclined to reverse its prior ruling and somehow find that the
25
Entities were Gaggero's alter egos, which they are not, and that he fully controlled and
26
represented them at trial (which the Praske ,Declaration shows he did not), that would only satisfy
27
the first prong of KPC'.s new alter ego claim: KPC must also prove an improper intent.
28
"Traditional piercing of 'the cortiorate veil 1s justified as an equitable remedy when the
8
000408
shareholders have abused the corporate form. to evade individual liability, circumvent a statute, or
I:)
'..."'"'
'"'...
accomplish a wrongful purpose." (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (I 985) 39 Ca1.3d 290, 300-
01.) KPC has failed to meet its burden to present such evidence.
KPC's motion makes the bare accusation that Gaggero transferred ownership of property
to separate legal entities. Gaggero responds he did so for legitimate estate. planning purp9ses 15
years ago.
KPC concludes without evidentiary support that Gaggero's estate planning decisions were
done to defraud creditors. In fact, the only two creditor claims mentioned in the Statement of
Decision were noted by the Court to have either been "resolved in 2002 by full payment" or
10
"withdrawn or dismissed in May or June of 2002" [Statement of Decision, Exhibit A, 25 footnote
11
27.] It is a stretch of the imagination to now contend that Gaggero's 1997 estate planning was a
12
fraudulent conveyance done in anticipation of the 2008 judgment in this case.
13
KPC would have the court believe that, if a person or company conveys ownership of
14
property to an entity, the court must infer that the conveyance was made to defraud any creditor
15
that the person or company may ever have at any time during the rest of their life. The argument is
16
unreasonable. Such a conclusion would defeat the purpose for the legitimate existence of
17
corporations, limited liability companies, limited partnerships, and estate planning in general. In
18
the absence of speci fie and probative evidence of fraud, there is no abuse of the corporate form.
19
The evidence here does not support that Entities are the alter ego of Gaggero. This court
20
has already ruled on the issues of control and separateness. There is no evidence that Gaggero 's
21
estate planning decisions were in any way motivated by any intent to defraud anyone, violate any
22
statute, or accomplish any wrongful purpose. There is thus no basis for a finding of alter ego.
23
IV.
CONCLUSION
24
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that California law expressly prohibits adding 511 OFW
25
LP; Gingerbread Court LP; Malibu Broadbeach LP; Marina Glencoe LP; Blu House LLC;
26
Boardwalk Sunset LLC; Pacific Coast Management; Joseph Praske, trustee, of the Giganin Trust;
27
Arenzano Trust; and Aqua Sante Foundation as judgment debtors under application of reverse
28
alter ego, there is no evidence to even support a finding of alter ego in this case, and KPC is
9
000409
'::.
'
estopped from requesting the relief it seeks in this motion. This court should deny KPC's motion
2
to amend the judgment.
DATED: May 15, 2012
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
II
27
'"..
"
28
'"..
ooo4:S.O
10
DECLARATION OF JOSEPH PRASKF.
2
3
I, Joseph Praskc, declare as follows:

I.
I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Declarntion and, if called as
S . a witness, could and wouhl testify competently !hereto.
2.
This Declaration issubmittcd in support of S 11 OFW LP; Gingerbread Court LP;
Malibu Broadheach LP; Marina.Glencoe LP; Blu House LLC; Boardwalk Sunset LLC; Pacific
Coast Management; Joseph Praske. trustee, of the Giganin Trust; Arenzano Trust; and Aqua Same
Foundation {the "Entities")' Opposition to the Motion to Arnend Judgment liled by defendants
10
1I
Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M. Harris, and Andre Jardini.
3.
In J 997, I wa5 an estate planning attorney. I was contacted by Stephen Gaggero lo
.12
review his portfolio and develop an estate plan for him that would allow his estate to survive him,
13
be legally protected, and would provide a benefit for his family. Based on my recommendations.
14
Mr. Gaggero thereafter transferred ownership of certain property to various entities. This .was a
15
legitimate esU!te planning decision.
16
4.
Mr. Gaggero made U1csc transfers based upon my recommcndutions, sucll
,17
recommendations Iha! l made .for no other purposes than legitimate estate planning. I certainly
'18
would not have advised Mr. Gaggero to make transfcrll IO defraud anyone.
19
S.
l set up, and maintain in good standing, all of the Entities which KPC seeks to add
20
as judgment debtors in this case. I know who all of the shareholders, officers. and directors arc of
21
Pacific Coast Management Corporation, and Mr. Gaggero is not one of them, and was not one of
22
them al any stage oflhc underlying litigation. I set up !he limited partnerships which KPC seeks to
23
add to lhc judgment. Mr. Gai,'Kero is not.a general or limited partner of Malibu Broad Beach LP,
24
and was not one of them at any stage of the underlying litigation. Mr. Gaggero is noL a general or
25
limited partner o.f Marina Glencoe LP, and was not one of them at any stai,.-e of the underlying
26
litigation. Mr: Gaggero is not a gener.il or limited. partner of 511 OFW LP. In addition, Mr.
27
Gaggero is not a general or limited partner, of Gingerbread Court LP. Each or the Limited
28
PartncrShips has its own separate assets, none of which arc owned by Mr. Gaggero. Each of the
&'
'"
..
...."'
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO MlliND JUDO:>!!iKT
000411:
........
Limited Pannerships has a separate general partner, none of which is Mr. Gaggero. Each of the
2
Limited Partnerships maintains its own separate bank accounts, none
signatory.
6.
to which Mr. Gaggero is a
I set up, and maintain in good standing, the limited liability companies that KPC
seeks to add as judgment debtors. Mr. Gaggcro is not a member or manager of Blu House LLC.
and was not one of U1em al any stage of the underlying Ii ligation. Mr. Gaggero is not a member or
manager of Boardwalk Sunset LLC, and was not one of them at any stage of the underlying
litigalion. Each of the limited liability companies has its own separate assets, none uf which arc
owned by Mr. Gaggcro. Each of lhc limited liability companies has a separate manager, none of
10
which is Mt. Gaggcro. Each of the limited liability companies maintains its own separate bank
11
accounts, none to which Mr. Gaggcro is a signatory.
12
7.
I am the trustee of the Giganin Trust, the Arenzano Trust, and the Aquasante
13
Foundation. I control those entities as the trustee and Mr. Gaggero has no power or autl10rity to
14
c<;mtrol them. Mr. Gaggero has no power to command a distribution to him by any of the above
15
entities.
16
8.
Each of the above entities keeps separate records.
17
9.
Each of the entities maintain their own bank accounts.
18
10.
None of the above entities were parties lo, or were represented in, or controlled the
19
20
underlying litigation.
11.
All of the above Entities have shareholders, members, partners, trustees and/or
21
potential beneficiaries whose interests were clearly not the same as Gaggero 's interests in this
22
litigation or the underlying litigations.
23
24
25
26
27
28
12.
All of the required corporate formalities of the above stated entities have been
followed.
13.
My legal specialty over the past two decades has been creatin11 estate plannin11 for
individuals and I have created a multitude of estate plans for a multitude of clients.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California tltat the
foregoing is true and correct.
00041.2
'.
forcgoi~g is true and correct

2
. J
4
Excculcdon MayM, 2012, in
,.
...
5tP1'//a.;,, :::, SpiJn.
.. - -~.. .:
.,
, .
'
1~~-.
'
8
9
10 ,
11
12
IJ
14
IS
16
. 17
.18
19
20
21
<
22
23
24
2S
26
27
lB
00041.3
'
PROOF OF SERVICE
2
3
California 91361.
4
5
On May 15, 2012, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: NOTICE OF
SPECIAL APPEARANCE TO OPPOSE AND OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT; DECLARATION OF JOSEPH PRASKE
6
7
'8
9
I0
11
12
13
14
15
prepaid, in the United States niail at Westlake Village, California, addressed as set forth
below. I am readily familiar with the firm's practice for collection and processing of
documents for mailing. Under that practice it'would be deposited with U.S. Postal Service on
that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. 1 am
date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit.for mailing in affidavit.
below.
BY FACSIMILE 'I transmitted the above document(s) by facsimile transmission to the fax
number(s) set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m., and received confirmed
caused them to be personally delivered by hand to the person(s) set forth below.
16
17
18
Randall A. Miller
Miller LLP
Facsimile: 888-749-5812
19
20
true and correct.
21
22
23'
24
25
26
~
27
'
'
N
28
~
~
~
14
00041.4
..
'
2
3
David Blake Chatfield, State Bar No. 88991

WESTLAKE LAW GROUP
Telephone:
805-267-1220
Facsimile:
805-267-1211
4
5
Attorneys for Plain ti ff

Stephen M. Gaggero
6
7

8

CASE NO_:
Filed:
BC286925
December 12, 2002

Hon. Robert L. Hess
Dept. 24
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL

NOT.ICE
(Filed
Concurrently
With
. Opposition to Motion to Amend)
Plaintiffs
Date: May 29, 2012

Time: 8:30 a.m.
Dept: 24
000415
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOT[CE
'
'
'
i :
TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEiR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that plaintiff Stephen M. Gaggero requests, pursuant to
Evidence Code sections 452(d) and 453, that this court take judicial notice of the following
documents:
1.
The Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, August 21, 2007, pages 3629 and 3632.
A true and correct copy of the cited pages of the document is attached hereto as
Exhibit A.
8
9
The foregoing documents are part of the court files in this case, and/or are a matter of
10
public record. As such, this material is the proper subject for judicial notice by the Court. This
11
material is further relevant to the court's determination of plaintiffs' Opposition to the Motion to
12
Amend Judgment filed by defendants Knapp, Petersen & Clarke, Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M.
13
Harris, and Andre Jardini.
14
DATED: May 15, 2012
15
By:
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
~
..
",.'
..
'\
27
28
'
000416
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
'
B
.
'.."
"..
"'
000417
COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
I,
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

STEPHEN M. GAGGERO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
-vs-
I'
KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARKE, ET AL.,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS
)
)
)
) CASE NO.
) BC 286925
t(Q)fPY
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY

HONORABLE ROBERT L. HESS, JUDGE PRESIDING
REPORTERS' TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
TITLE, INDICES, CERTIFICATES
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS: BOSTWICK & JASSY LLP
BY: GARY L. BOSTWICK
12400 WILSHIRE BLVD.
SUITE 400
LOS ANGELES, CA 90025
(310) 979-6059
!.
'
JULIAN A. SIMONIS, ESQ.

2625 TOWNSGATE ROAD #330
WESTLAKE, CA 91361
(805) 267-1211
FOR DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS:
SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN

& ARNOLD, LLP
BY: HALL R. MARSTON
801 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET
18TH FLOOR
(213) 615-8047
CAROL CRAWLEY, CSR NO. 7518

OFFICIAL REPORTER
VOLUME 1 OF 10 VOLUMES
. ,,.
000418
'EK.A
'

~\Y.

DEPARTMENT LA 24
STEPHEN M.
HON. ROBERT L. HESS, JUDGE
GAG~ERO,
PLAINTIFF,
-vsKNAPP, PETERSON & CLARKE; STEVEN RAY

GARCIA, STEPHEN HARRIS, ANDRE JARDINI
AND DOES 1 THROU_GH 50, INCLUSIVE,
DEFENDANTS.
)
)
)
)
)
) CASE NO.
) BC286925
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
REPORTERS' TRANSCRIPTS OF PROCEEDINGS

JULY 25-27, 2007, JULY 30-31, 2007, AUGUST 1-2, 2007,
AUGUST 7-10, 2007, AUGUST 20-21, 2007, AUGUST 23-24, 2007,
AUGUST 27-30, 2007, SEPTEMBER 10, 2007, APRIL 29, 2008
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE PLAINTIFFS:
BOSTWICK & JASSY LLP

BY: GARY L. BOSTWICK
12400 WILSHIRE BLVD.
SUITE 400
JULIAN A. SIMONIS, ESQ.
2625 TOWNSGATE ROAD #330
WESTLAKE, CA 91361
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
SEDGWICK, DETERT, MORAN

& ARNOLD, LLP
BY: LORI S. BLITSTIEN
BY: RANDALL A. MILLER
801 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET
l8TH FLOOR
CHRISTINE KWON~CHANG, CSR #12143
MARY STOLL, CSR #2573
CAROL L: CRAWLEY, CSR 7518, RPR, CRR
000419
---------______
.iiiii!=-------- ---------------_ ________
___:__

MR. BOSTWICKf
THE COURT:
MR. MILLER:
IF I COULD JUST BE HEARD ON THIS ISSUE,
ABOUT WHAT MR. GAGGERO'S RELATIONSHIP IS TO PCM.

HE TESTIFIED IN HIS DEPOSITION, AND HE TESTIFIED AT
TRIAL, THAT HE IS MERELY A CONSULTANT "TO PCM.
HE HAS NO
OWNERSHIP INTEREST.
HE HAS HAD NO OWNERSHIP INTEREST FOR A NUMBER OF
12
YEARS.
13
MAY HAVE CALLED HIM A DIRECTOR AT SOME POINT IN TIME, BUT HE
14
LATER LEARNED THAT THAT WAS NOT AN ACCURATE DESCRIPTION OF
15
WHAT HE WAS.
16
FOR PCM,
SOMEBODY, I BELIEVE "HIS TESTIMONY WAS THAT SOMEBODY
OKAY.
I HAVE GOT ALL THE CORPORATE DOCUMENTS
HE IS NOT LISTED AS A DIRECTOR.

HE IS NOT AN OFFICER.
17
HE IS NOTHING.
HE IS
18
EXPRESSLY, BY DESIGN, "DISAVOWED ANY "RELATIONSHIP WITH' THAT
19
COMPANY.
20
21
22
YOUR HONOR HIT THE NAIL ON THE HEAD WHEN HE SAID
~-
WHEN YOU SAID YOU CAN'T HAVE IT BOTH WAYS.

IT IS NOT WHAT HE TOLD HIS' CREDITORS FOR YEARS.
23
HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST THAT HE COULD PULL MONEY OUT OF
24
THE TRUST.
25
/ .\;.)
OKAY.
11
': . /
I HAVE
BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN SOME INACCURATE "STATEMENTS HERE MADE
10
'
HE DIDN'.T PAY IT.
'
HE DIDN'T PAY IT.
NOW WHAT?
..\
3629
THE MINUTE THE TRUST SENT THE MONEY.
GOT A REAL DIFFICULTY WITH THIS.
/:.:
'
THE COURT:
HE
AND THAT HE HAD DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO
26
PULL MONEY OUT OF PCM BECAUSE IT WAS HIS MONEY.
THAT IS NOT
27
THE NOTION THAT HE HOISTED ON THE VNBC CREDITORS.
28
ISN'T WHAT HE WAS TELLING KNAPP, PETERSEN TO TELL VNBC.
THAT
000420
EITHER IT IS HIS. ALTER EGO, BECAUSE IT IS ALL HIS MONEY AND
HE CONTROLS IT, AND HE HAS ABSOLUTE CONTROL, WHICH IS WHAT I
THINK YOU. ARE ARGUING, OR THEY ARE SEPARATE ENTITIES.

MR. BOSTWICK:
NO, IT WAS
YEAH SO EITHER,
I AM NOT ARGUING EITHER ONE.
I AM ARGUING THAT ON THOSE OCCASIONS WHEN THESE
PARTICULAR BILLS THAT ARE AT ISSUE WERE PAID, IT WAS BECAUSE
HE ASKED THE TRUST TO. DO SO, AND THE TRUST GAVE MONEY TO ONE
OF ITS BENEFICIARIES, THAT IT COULDN'T GIVE TO SOMEBODY LIKE
10
PCM, AND HE DIRECTED THAT IT BE SENT TO PCM SO THAT IT COULD
11
BE FUNNELED TO KNAPP, PETERSEN AND CLARKE! AND THAT IS
12
EXACTLY THE MECHANISM THAT OCCURRED UNDER THOSE
13
CIRCUMSTANCES.
14
THE COURT:
15
MR. BOSTWICK:
16
17
BUT IT WAS THE TRUST'S MONEY.

NOT ONCE THEY GAVE IT TO HIM AS A
BENEFICIARY.
THE COURT:
OKAY.
BUT GIVING IT TO HIM MEANS JUST ANY
18
TIME IT LEAVES THE TRUST.
19
THEY PAY A BILL DIRECTLY, THEY GAVE IT TO HIM, RIGHT?
20
'
3632
GAGGERO'S MONEY IN PCM?
.. I
. J
........
MR. BOSTWICK:
21
THEN CONSIDERED IT.
22
THE COURT:
IF THEY PAY THE BILL DIRECTLY, IF
THEY GAVE IT TO HIM WHEN HE REQUESTED AND
THEY GAVE IT TO HIM, SO EVEN IF THE TRUST
23
WRITES A CHECK DIRECTLY TO A VENDOR, DIRECTLY TO THE
24
MORTGAGE, THE HOLDER OF THE MORTGAGE, THEY GAVE IT TO
25
GAGGERO.
IT WAS HIS MONEY IN HIS POSSESSION.
26
MR. BOSTWICK:
27
BENEFICIARY, YES.
28
THE COURT:
ONCE THEY DECIDED TO GIVE IT TO A
EVEN IF IT WAS PAID TO A THIRD PARTY
000421.
'
'
........
PROOF OF SERVICE
California 91361.
3
4
On May 15, 2012, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: :PLAINTIFF'S
5
prepaid, in the United States mail at Westlake Village, California, addressed as set forth
below. I am readily familiar with the finn's practice for collection and processing of
documents for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. Postal Service on
that same day with postage th.ereon fully prepaid in. the ordinary course of business. I am
date or postage meter date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
_2;_
below.
BY FACSIMILE I transmitted the above document(s) by facsimile transmission to the fax
number(s) set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m., and reeeivcd confinned
caused them to be personally delivered by hand to the person(s)sef forth below.
15
16
17
Randall A Miller
Miller LLP
515 South Flower Street, Suiie 2150
Facsimile: 888-749-5812
18
19
true and correct.
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
~
"',..
,.."
'
"
27
28
2
000422
',,
i ~;
2
3
4
5
6
RANDALL A. MILLER (Bar No. 116036)

AUSTAWAKIL Y
(Bar No. 257424)
MILLER LLP
Los Angeles, California 90071-2201
Telephone: 800. 720.2126
Facsimile: 888,749.5812
MAY 21
W12
~1~
Attorneys for Defendants, KNAPP, PETERSEN &

CLARKE, STEPHEN RAY GARCIA, STEPHEN
M. HARRIS and ANDRE JARDIN!
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
10
11
a..
_J
_J
c:::
w
_J
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO,
12
13
Plaintiff,
15
16
Defendants.
_J
BC286925
[Assigned for all purposes to Judge Robert L.

Hess, Dept. 24]
v.
KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE,

STEPHEN RAY GARCIA, STEPHEN M.
HARRIS and ANDRE JARDIN!,
14
CASE NO.:
KPC'S REPLY TO.STEPHEN GAGGERO

AND JOSEPH PRASKE'S OPPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
TO ADD JUDGMENT DEBTORS;
DECLARATION OF AUSTA WAKILYIN
SUPPORT OF REPLY
17
18
19
Date:
Time:
Dept.:
Judge:
May 29, 2012

8:30a.m.
Department 24
Honorable Judge Robert Hess
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
000423
28
-1-
KPC'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGG ERO & PRASKE TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
'
I.
INTRODUCTION
2
Judgment Debtor Stephen Gaggero and his estat~ planning attorney and trustee of his
3
estate, Joseph Praske, oppose KPC's motion to amend the judgment relying entirely on self4
5
6
7
8
I'
''
serving, conclusory, and unfounded statements that KPC has produced no evidence to establish
that the entities are Mr. Gaggero's alter egos or that he has used them to cheat his creditors. As
part of this, each ignore the evidence included in support of KPC's motion including the testimony
of Mr. Gaggero, Mr, Praske, and the testimony of Mr. Gaggero 's accountant, James Walters. The
evidence is very clear: Mr. Gaggero as part of an asset protection scheme has tied up all of his
personal wealth in multiple partnerships, corporations, trusts, including offshore trusts, and a
10
JI
0..
...J
...J
. 0:::
w
...J
...J
:2
12
13
14
15
16
17
foundation. Mr. Gaggero has retained full control over all of his property as the "manager" of the
trusts, foundation, and assets within the estate. plan. Although legal title to the property is no
longer in Mr. Gaggero's name- his accountant, Mr. Walter testified under penalty of perjury that
the gains and losses for the assets in the estate plan ultimately flow through Mr. Gaggero's tax
returns. The assertion that KPC has provided "no evidence" is absolutely baseless.
Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske next argue that California has an absolute prohibition on
reverse corporate piercing without exception. In making this argument both disregard California
case law allowing reverse corporate piercing where, as here, an entity or series of entities is
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
'i"
;1
26
~~;
'
27
...
28
i\;1
,...
;\:1
created with no business purpose and simply as a means of shielding personal assets from
creditors.Jmportantly, Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske ignore the fact that the trusts and foundation
can properly be added as his alter ego .. via. the trustee, Joseph Praske without reverse piercing.
Adding Mr. Praske, trustee of the trusts and foundation, as a judgment debtor, moots the reverse
corporate piercing issue as to the remaining entities since they can be added through the trusts and
found11.tion.
,Finally, Mi-. Gaggero obscures KPC's present motion with.the underlying legal malpractice
lawsuit arguing that KPC should have amended the judgment ten years ago. KPC's judgment,
affirmed on appeal, and supplemented. with additional fees, was entered on December 28, 2010.
Ten years ago, there was no judgment to amend.
Relying on the same flawed premise, Mr.
000424
........
Gaggero incorrectly states that KPC ':argued and proved" that Mr. Gaggero and the entities were
separate in the underlying lawsuit. This is incorrect KPC did not and had no reason to argue alter
ego status in the underlying lawsuit. On the contrary, this Court's ruling was grounded on Mr.
Gaggero's failure ''to present evidence that [he had] authority to represent any other person or
entity (whether by assignment or otherwise) in asserting these damage claims" -- not because KPC
''proved" Mr. Gaggero was separate from Pacific Coast Management. Mr. Gaggero seeks to apply
this flawed reasoning to bar KPC from asserting alter ego liability against not only Pacific Coast
Management, but all of the trusts, foundation, and business entities which were not addressed in
the underlying lawsuit. Mr. Gaggero's opposition on this basis is wholly without merit and should
10.
be rejected.
11
Mr. Gaggero has refused to pay one penny towards the judgment, yet he is presently
12
litigating a tf1ird legal malpractice lawsuit against KPC. 1 Remarkably, in the third lawsuit, filed
13
in his personal capacity, Mr. Gaggero asserts that because of KPC's legal malpractice he lost the
Cl'.:.
14
ability to purchase three ocean front properties in Santa Monica exceeding $2,000,000.00. It is
...J
...J
15
undeniable that Mr. Gaggero's ability to use his estate plan to pursue further costly and protracted
16
litigation against KPC while avoiding his legal obligation to pay the present judgment is
a..
...J
...J
w
~
l7 inequitable. KPC therefore respectfully requires this Court to grant the motion to amend the
18
judgment in its entirety.
19
20
11.
21
DISCUSSION
A. ALTER EGO WAS NOT AT ISSUE IN THE UNDERLYING LAWSUIT AND
KPC HAD NO PRACTICAL REASON OR LEGAL OBLIGATION TO
LITIGATE ALTER EGO LIABILITY
22
23
24
25
;r;.:.
26
:,:i
,;,.
27
, t
28
"l~:r..,
....
;\:.
See Declaration of Austa Wakily in Support of Reply to Opposition at Exhibits U. (Deel. AW at

Exh. U). Mr. Gaggero also filed a legal malpractice lawsuit against the law firm that represented
him at trial in Gaggero '" Yura (2001), Los Angeles Superior Court (Case No. BC 239810). (Id. at
Exh. V).
..
2
Because Mr. Gaggero's and Mr. Praske's raise the same arguments in their opposition KPC is
addressing the oppositions jointly in this reply. A reference to Mr. Gaggero's arguments, to the
extent it is also asserted by Mr. Pr!!ske, will respond to both oppositions.
000425
-3-
KPC'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGGERO &:. PRASKE TO.MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
........
I.
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
to
It
a..
...J
...J
0:::
UJ
-l
-l
::;?
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
KPC IS NOT JUDICIALLY ESTOPPED FROM RAISING ALTER EGO

LIABILITY FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THIS MOTION
Mr. Gaggero makes the absurd argument that because lie failed to proffer evidence to this
Court that he was entitled damages for fees incurred by Pacific Coast Management- that it serves
as conclusive evidence that not only Pacific Coast Management, but the other six entities, two
trusts, and foundation are separate entities. See Stephen Gaggero Opposition to MTA (S.G. Opp.
MTA: 10:5-1_6). Mr. Gaggero's argument is entirely without merit and misstates the issues
addressed in the underlying lawsuit. KPC did not, and had no reason, to argue alter ego liability. 3
Mr. Gaggero testified in the underlying legal malpractice lawsuit "that he is merely a consultant to
Pacific Coast Management" and disavowed any ownership or control of the corporation. See
Request for Judicial Notice (RJN Exh. A at 3629:8-20). KPC had no obligation to correct Mr.
Gaggero's statements, rather KPC merely pointed out to this Court that Mr. Gaggero's own
position precluded him from proving he is entitled to damages incurred by Pacific Coast
Management. (Id. at Exh. A). This Court subsequently ruled that Mr. Gaggero "failed to carry his
burden to provide credible. evidence to quantify and substantiate the amount of those losses."
(Deel. AW at Exh. A at pp. 26). Mr. Gaggero now seeks to bar KPC from asserting a position
inconsistent with the one he presented not only in the underlying lawsuit but to his previous
judgment creditors. This argument is illogical.
19
20
2.
21
;!11
=-
GAGGERO'S
To the extent that collateral estoppel is applicable- it clearly applies to Mr. Gaggero's
23
claim that KPC has failed to establish that he implemented the estate plan to defraud his creditors.
24
(S.G. Opp. MTA: I0:5-8). Initially, the alter ego doctrine does not require proof of fraud, and can
25
be satisfied by evidence that adherence to the fiction of the separate existence of the corporation
26
3
.,
27
:i:;
...
28
;~:I
APPLICABLE TO MR.
22
:1:.
;;,
1;,I
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IS
OPPOSITION IN THE MOTION
Had KPC argued that Pacific Coast Management was Gaggero's alter ego in the underlying
case, it would have supported Mr. Gaggero's claim for damages incurred by Pacific Coast
Management.
000426
KPC'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGGERO & PRASKE TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
........
would prom()te. injustice or bring about. inequi.table results. Misik v. D'Arco (2011) 197
Cal.App.4th I 065, J 073. Nevertheless, this issue has already been determined. This Coun found
after a bench trial held:
5
6
7
8
9
"The evidence clearly and unequivocally supports the conclusion that although there was
no legal justification whatsoever for refusing to pay the judgment in full, Mr. Gaggero
never had any intention to payoff thaf obligation I 00 cents on the dollar. Rather, his
absolutely single-minded focus was on delay as a tactic to force the VNBC judgment
creditors to accept a deeply discounted payoff. Every strategy devised or advocated by Mr.
Gaggero with. respect to the VNBC judgment creditors was designed to make it so difficult
and so expensive to continue the fight that they would capitulate .... (fn: In fact, it appears
this same strategy worked with respect to other judgment creditors" (Deel. AW at Exh. A
at pg. l 0, fn 8).
10
II
0..
....J
....J
a=
w
....J
....J
12
13
14
While he now asserts there is "not one shred" of evidence to support that the estate plan
was established to defraud creditors; this issue has been tried in the underlying lawsuit and clearly
resolved. (S.G. Opp. MTA at I :25).
3.
KPC WAS NOT REQUIRED TO FILE THIS MOTION TEN YEARS AGO
15
16
A court may amend its judgment so it will properly designate the real defendants at any
17
time, incl11ding after j11dgment. Greenspan v. 'LADT LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 517. Mr.
l8
Gaggero asserts that KPC should have filed the present motion twelve years ago when the
19
underlying lawsuit was filed. (S.G. Opp. MTA at 12:3-15). KPC was not a judgment creditor
20
twelve, ten, or even five years ago; thus, there was no basi_s to file a motion to amend the
21
judgment. (Deel. AW at Exh. B). Moreover, while_KPC obtained its initial judgment in May 2008,
22
the subsequent appeal placed in doubt whether there was a judgment to ultimately collect. KPC
23
did not have a final judgment until December 28, 20 I 0. (Id., at Exh. B). KPC, after obtaining a
24
final judgment affirmed on December 28, 2010, sought to enforce its judgment through traditional
25
post-judgment discovery. (Id., at Exh. Q, R). KPC filed and was granted a motion to compel
26
further responses to Special Interrogatories (Set One) on October 5, 2011. (Id., at Exh. N). Mr.
27
28
.5.
000427
KPC"S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGG.ERO & PRASKE Tq MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
'
Gaggero; on October 24, 2011 appealed the decision. Id. Less 1han six months later, KPC filed the
present motion. This can hardly be deemed "undeniably belated" as Mr. Gaggero asserts.
3
4
B. THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO GRANT KPC'S MOTION IN ITS

ENTIRETY WITHOUT.REVERSE PIERCING
s
1.
REVERSE PIERCING IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CONTEXT OF MR.

GAGGERO'STRUSTS AND FOUNDATION
7
8
9
10
II
a..
...J
...J
c:::
w
...J
...J
12
13
14
IS
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
:!\
;i:1
:~;
;~:.
The Arehzano Trust, Giganin Trust, and Aquasante Foundation can be properly be added
as judgment debtors, through the trustee Joseph Praske, as Mr. Gaggero's alter ego. Greenspan,
supra J91 Cal.App.4th at 518 (alter ego doctrine can apply to trust by adding the trustee); Jn re
Schwarzkopf (20 I 0) 626 F.3d I 032, I 03 7-1038 (rejecting application of Pos1anns1an1 Press in the
context of trusts). Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske/ai/ to address this in their oppositions. This Coun
has full authority to add the Arenzano Trust, Giganin Trust, and Aquasante Foundation as
judgment debtors, through ihe trustee Joseph Praske, without limitation.
Here, Mr. Gaggero has concealed his assets from the reach of creditors by transferring his
property to business entities that are owned by the Arenzano Trust, Giganin Trust, and Aquasante
Foundation. (MTA at 4:23-27, pp. 5-6:1-11). Mr. Praske described the Mr. Gaggero's estate plan
as follows:
"There are, in Mr. Gaggero's estate already, a total of three trusts ... and there are-- I don't
know the number - several LLCS and/or Limited Partnerships ... and so each property -at the end of the day, each property is held by either a limited partnership or a limited
liability company .... and then those limited liability companies and l.imited partnerships
in turned are held by these trusts that were set up, two of the trusts that were set up
[Aquasante Foundation. and Arenzano Trust]. .. and the ,third trust is for his residence.
That's called Giganin Trust" (MTA at 4:22-28, 5: 1-9).
23
Mr. Praske is the trustee of the trusts in Mr. qaggero's estate plan. (MTA at 5:10-14,
24
pp.10-11). All of Mr. Gaggero's assets are held by limited liability companies or .limited
25
partnerships which are in tum owned by one of the three trusts. Id Mr. Gaggero has retained
26
substantial control over the.trusts and foundation as the manager. (Id at 11-13; Deel. AW at T).
27
Importantly, Mr. Gaggero
contin~es
to benefit .from all gains on the assets in the estate plan.
28
-6-
000428
........
(MTA at 11 :2~3). There'is no doubt the Arenzano Trust, Giganin Trust, and Aquasante foundation
are Mr. Gaggero's alter egos. Thus, the trusts and foundation should be properly added as
judgment debtors, by the trustee, Joseph Praske.
4
2.
5
6
7
8
9
10
Every court has the power to compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process in an
action or proceeding pending before it., and to use all necessary means to carry its jurisdiction
into effect, even if those means are not specifically pointed out in statutes. Code Civ. Proc. 187;
Fairfield v. Superior Co11r1 for Los Angeles County (1966) 246 Cal. App. 2d I 13, 120.
II
Cl.
...J
...J
a::
w
....I
....I
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
THIS COURT MAY ADD THE BUSINESS ENTITIES AS THE ASSETS Of

THE TRUSTS AND FOUNDATION- OBVIATING THE APPLICATION Of
REVERSE PIERCING AS TO ALL THE ENTITIES
Upon granting KPC's motion to add the trusts and foundation, via the trustee as judgment
debtors, KPC seeks to add Mr. Gaggero's seven business entities as assets or property of the trusts
and foundation.
While this appears superfluous, it is necessary given the complexity .of Mr.
Gaggero's estate plan, his use of offshore trusts, foundations, numerous partnerships and
corporations, overlapping interests of the entities, and importantly Mr. Gaggero's well
4
documented history in refusing to cooperate with post-judgment enforcement efforts. (MTA at

6: 12-26, Deel. AW at Exh. W). There is no doubt that Mr. Gaggero will continue to assert that he
has no interest direct or otherwise in the assets of the trusts or foundation. (Deel. AW at Exh. Q,
R, W). Similarly, Mr. Praske will continue to assert that Mr. Gaggero has no "control" over the
trusts and is "not entitled" to distributions. (Id. at Exh. S, W). Mr. Praske and Mr. Gaggero may
seek to avoid KPC's enforcement efforts by creating additional entities in which to funnel money.
Thus, while adding the business entities as the trusts and foundation property/assets may appear
duplicative- it is necessary given the facts and history of the present case.
KPC, therefore,
respectfully requests that this Court exercise its broad equitable powers pursuant to Section 187, to
25
26
27
for example, the general partners of the LPs are trusts of which Joseph Praske is the trustee .. The
managing member of the LLC is a Corporation of which Mr. Praske is the President. Each layer
of entity creates further smoke and mirrors that judgment creditors must overcome.
28
-7-
000429
'
add the business entities as judgment debtors to protect KPC's rights. 5 Finally, adding the entities
on this ground does not constitute reverse piercing.
3
C. CALIFORNIA CASE LAW SUPPORTS THE APPLICATION OF REVERSE
CORPORA TE-PIERCING OF THE BUSINESS ENTITIES IN THIS CASE
5
Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske assert that California has an absolute bar on reverse
6
7
8
9
JO
11
a..
...J
...J
a::
LU
...J
...J
12
13
14
15
'16
corporate piercing without exception. (S.G. Opp. MTA at I :21-27, 6:3-12). This of course ignores
Califi:irnia case law supporting the application of reverse corporate piercing where, as here, a
defendant uses a corporation for his own purpose and. the separateness and individuality of the
defendant corporation and the judgment debtor does not exist. Taylor v. Newton (1953) 117
Cal.App.2d 752, 756; See e.g. In re Turner.. Bkrtcy. (N.D. Cal 2005) 335 B.R. 140, 146 (under
California law an entity or series. of entities created with no business purpose and simply as a
means of shielding personal assets from creditor is v.iewed as the alter ego of the individual
debtor and will be disregarded to prevent. injustice). These, cases have not been overruled by
Postal Instant Press. Pbstai Instant Press. Inc. v. Kaswa Carp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1510,
1518.
17
KPC's motion to amend provides a valid basis to distinguish the holding in Postal Instant
18
Press from the present case. (MTA at 13:23-28, 14:11-28, 15:1-17). Notably, Postal lns1an1Press
19
involved attempts by judgment creditors to enforce a judgment against a former shareholder.
20
Postal Instant Press. supra 162 Cal.App.4th at 1518. Here, Mr. Gaggero created a series of
21
business entities which are owned by trusts and foundations. (MTA at pp. 5:15-27, 6-7:1-22, 11-
22
15). Every'asset prior to the completion of the estate plan was owned 10_0% by Mr. Gaggero either
23
24
25
:r:
;L
"'
"',,....i.'...1
...
;~:
26
27
s Adding one of Mr. Gaggero's business entities will moot issues of reverse piercing as to all
entities since the remaining entities can be added through traditional alter ego principals of the
judgment debtor entity.
6
Where there is a split of ,authority in the law, an attorney in ou.r adversarial system may
reasonably rely on. and pursue either. authority. An attorney, in such circumstance, cannot be said
was acting without probable cause. Copenbarger v. International Ins. Co. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th
961, 966.)
28
000430
-8-
KPC'S REPLY TffOPPOSITION OF GAGG ERO & PRASKE TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
'
CL
_J
_J
a:::
w
_J
by virtue of his membership interest in. the. company, shares in the corporations, or direct title to
the property. (Id. at 5:15-27). Mr. Gaggero retained nothing in his personal name and conducts all
personal and business affairs through his estate plan. Id. In fact, Mr. aaggero testified that Pacific
Coast Management pays is "vet bills" and "utility bills." (MTA at 11:1-20). The facts in the
present case are substaritially different and certainly do hot raise the concerns addressed in Postal
Instant Press. (MTA ai 14:23~25, 15:1-17). Finally, Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske ignore the
court's holding in Postal Instant Press averring that if outside reverse piercing of the corporate
8.
veil was possible, the judgment creditor iii that case failed to meet the requirements for its
application. Postal lnsianl Press, supra 162 Cal.App.4th at 1523. The aitemate holding, based on
10
the issues of the reverse piercing doctrine and on the specific facts of Postal Instant Press,
11
undermine Mr. Oaggero's and Mr. Praske's assertfon that outside reverse pierCing is strictly
12
prohibited by Postal Instant Press without exception.
13
14
D. PACIFIC COAST MANAGEMENT SHOULD BE ADDED AS A JUDGMENT

DEBTOR AS THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
15
_J
16
This Court "has authority to add Pacific Coast Management as a judgment debtor on the
17
grounds that it was the real party in interest in the underlying lawsuit: Pacific Coast Management
18
paid for the legal fees that forced KPC to incur $1,395, 718.40
19
B). Code of Civil Procedure section 187 does not require that KPC allege and prove alter ego
20
liability before entry of judgment. Misik. supra 197 Cal.App.4th at I 075 (internal citations
21
omitted). Addirig Pacific Coast Management as a judgmeni debtor on this ground merely inserts
22.
the name of the true party and is not adding a new judgment debtor, thus, does not require reverse
23.
piercing. Id. Importantly, this will moot the issues relating to reverse piercing as to all the business
24
entities because they can be added as the alter ego of judgment debtor Pacific Coast Management.
25
26
In defense costs. (Deel. AW at Exh.
E. KPC HAS ESTABLISHED ALTER EGO LIABILITY AND THAT THE

TRUSTS, FOUNDATION, AND ENTITIES WERE FULLY REPRESENTED IN
THE UNDERLYING LAWSUIT
27
28
000431.
-9KPC'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGGERO & PRASKE TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
'
'
I.
THE TRUSTS, FOUNDATION, AND BUSINESS ENTITIES ARE MR.

GAGGERO'S ALTER EGO
2
3
4
s
6
7
8
9
IO
II
0...
..J
..J
0:::
UJ
..J
..J
:r1
!;
;1.1
'i",.
!1!1
"
...
""'
;t.
Gaggero is not presently the shareholder, officer, director, manager, or partner of any o( the
entities. (S.G. Opp. MTA atl:l2-15; J.P. Opp. MTA at 1:10-20, Deel. of SG and JP).
Mr.
Gaggero 's lack of direc~ ownership of his real property and busi.ness entities is entirely consistent
with the implementation of his estate plan. (MT A at pp 4-5, 6: 1-11 ). Mr. Gaggero after
transferring
$3~,000,000
in assets to various trusts, partnerships,.and entities- retained nothing in
his personal name. Id. Although Mr. Gaggero does 11ot have direct legal title to the assets or
ownership of the entities- he yel')'.. clearly has full control, albeit indirectly.
Further, while Mr. Gaggero is not directly related to the entities in his personal capacity his
12
indirect control i.s evidenced by the fact that his estate planning attorney and trustee is associated
I3
with all of the entities identified in the present motion to amend. (MTA at pp. 13-14). Mr. Praske
14
is the general partner of the limited partnerships either personally or as the trustee of a trust that is
IS
the general partner..Od., Deel. AW at Exh. X). Mr. Praske is the general nianager of the limited
16
liability companies personally or through a corporation in. which Mr. Praske is the president. (Id.
17
at Exh. X). Mr. Gaggero is the trustor or senior of the trusts and foundation and controls the estate
18
;';
Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske oppose KPC's motion, in part, on the ground that Mr.
as the "manager" of the trusts and foundation. (Id. at Exh. T). Mr. Gaggero is "the decisionrnaker"
19
with respect to all the real estate held in the estate plan while Mr. Praske's role is limited to
20
advice. (MTA at 5: 11-27):
21
Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske provide declarations with irrelevant, self-serving facts while
22
omitting key information relating to Mr. Gaggero's transfers, indirect control of the estate plan as
23
the "manager" of the trusts and foundation and through his authority over the trustee. (Deel. JP
24
4 -12; Deel. SG
25
Mr. Praske fail to address the fact that all gains and losses for the assets in the estate plan flow
26
through Mr. Gaggero's personal tax return, that Mr. Gaggero has authority to refinances, purchase,
27
sell, improve, negotiate, or otherwise dispose of assets within the estate plan. (MTA at pp 4-6) .
~'ii
~'ii
3-5). Significantly, the declarations and oppositions of both Mr. Gaggero and
28
-10-
KPC'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGGERO & PRASKE TO MOTION TO AM END JUDGMENT
'
1 While, Mr. Praske, is the trustee of the trusts and foundation, Mr. Gaggero has authority over him
2
as is evidenced by Mr. Praske's testimony that Mr. Gaggero is the Hdecisionmaker." Id.
2.
MR. GAGGERO REPRESENTED THE ENTITIES INTEREST IN THE

UNDELRYING LAWSUIT
Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske oppose KPC's motion to amend erroneously asserting that the
trusts and entities were not represented in the underlying lawsuit. Each entity was fully
represented in the underlying lawsuit by Mr. Gaggero whose interests are identical to the trusts,
foundation, and business entities. As such each had full and complete control of the underlying
10
lawsuit.
11
Gaggero's extensive litigation history, lawsuits involving the entities identified in KPC's motion
.12
involve the same individuals- Mr. Gaggero, as the purported agent, Mr. Praske, and Westlake Law
13
Group. (Deel. AW at Exh. X, Y). In fact, while Mr. Praske is purportedly represented by different
0:::
14
counsel, law offices of David A. Esquibias, in his special appearance opposing KPC's motion to
....J
....J
15
amend- the address of that firm, including suite number, is identical to Mr. Chatfield's law firm
16
(Westlake Group). Each entity was fully represented and had control of the underlying lawsuit
17
through their alter ego Mr. Gaggero. Mr. Gaggero and Mr. Praske fail to set forth a valid basis to
18
deny KPC's motion.
Cl.
...:.I
....J
w
~
Greenspan. supra 191 Cal.App.4th at 517.
Additionally, as documented in Mr.
19
20
Based on the foregoing, KPC respectfully requests that this Court grant KPC's motion to
22
add: Pacific Coast Management, Inc., 511 OFW, LP, Gingerbread Court, LP, Malibu BroadBeach,
23
LP, Marina Glencoe, LP, Blu. House, LLC, and Boardwalk Sunset, LLC, and Joseph Praske as
24
trustee of the Giganin Trust, Arenzano Family Trust, and Aquasante Foundation. KPC also seeks
25
to add any successors to the entities, trusts, or foundation as judgment debtors.
26
...,:..
27
..
28
.~
<!:'
)~'
;\:,
CONCLUSIONS
21
ff~
'
ii:1
III.
-11-
000433
KPC'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGG ERO & .PRASKE TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
........
Dated: May 21, 2012.
MILLER LLP
3
By:
RANCJeA~IL~01
AUSTA WAKILY, ESQ.

CLARKE, STEPHEN RAY GARCIA, STEPHEN M.
HARRIS and ANDRE JARDIN!
7
8
9
10
11
a..
....I
....I
lZ
13
0::
14
....I
....I
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
000434
-12KPC'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGGERO & PRASKE TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
........
DECLARATION OF AUST A WAKILY IN SUPPORT OF KPC'S REPLY TO STEPHEN

GAGGERO'S AND .JOSEPH PRASKE'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO AMEND
.JUDGMENT
3
4
a..
....J
....J
I Austa Wakily declare as follows:

I. I am one of the attorneys for judgment creditors Knapp, Peterson & Clarke, Stephen Ray
~tephen
Harris, and Andre Jardini (collectively KPC) in the above captioned matter. I
Garcia,
make this Declaration based on my own personal knowledge and would be competent to testify to
them in court.
2. Attached as Exhibits T is a true and correct copy of excerpts from .the Reporter's
to
Transcript on Appeal of Stephen Gaggero's Re-Direct Examination on July 8, 2005. Gaggero v.
11
Yura (2008), California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, (Appeal Case
12
No. 8203780) (Trial Case No. BC2398 l 0).
13
3. Attach\:d as Exhibit U is a true and correct copy of the Second Amended Complaintfiled
0:::
14
by Judgment Debtor, Stephen Gaggero, against KPC entitled Gaggero v. Knapp. Petersen &
....J
..J
15
Clarke, el al. (2011) Los Angeles County Superior Court (Case No. BC286924). Mr. Gaggero is
16
actively litigating this case at the time of the KPC filing this motion.
17
4. Attached as Exhibit V is a true and correct copy of the Complaint.filed by Judgment
18
Debtor, Stephen Gaggero, .against the law firm of Folely & B.ezek LLP and Behle Law
19
Corporation entitled Gaggero v. Foley & Bezek. et al. (2010) Los Angeles County Superior Court
20
(Case_No. BC445459).
21
5. Attached as Exhibit W is a true and correct copy of Mr. Gaggero's Supplemental
22
Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set Two). Mr. Gaggero has not provided any
23
documents or a privilege log substantiating the claims for withholding the documents on any
24
ground.
25
6. Attached as Exhibit X is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the motion to Expunge
26
Lis Pendens filed in Bunge v. 51 I O.F. W L.P.. et al, (2008), Los Angeles Superior Court, (Case
27
No. SC I00361 ). The trial court in that case is presently seeking the trust documents relating to
28
I
000435
'
'
a..
....I
....I
a::
w
....I
....I
Mr. Gaggero's estate plan. Attached with Exhibit X is a true and correct copy of the docket
summary obtained from the Los Angeles Superior Coun webpage by entering case summary for
Case No SCI00361.
7. Attached as Exhibit Y are true and correct copies of the appellate decision for cases 5i i
OFW, LP v. First Federal Bank (2007), Los Angeles County Superior Coun (Case No.
SC0980J2) and Marina Glencoe. LP v. AMA Construction and Real Es/ate. LLC (2004), Ventura
County Superior Coun (Case No. CIV213 l l 75)
8. Mr. Chatfield request that this Coun issue a sanction against me for arguing that the
holding in Postal Instant Press. Postal Insrant Press. Inc. v. KaS\va Corp. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
10
1510 is inapplicable to the present case. (S.G. Opp MT A at 6: 13-17). I personally researched and
11
wrote KPC's motion to amend the judgment. Based on my research and the facts of the present
12
case J believe I had a good faith basis in arguing that the holding of Postal ins/an/ Press is
13
inapplicable to the present inotion. Attached as Exhibit Z is a recent unpublished case that I am
14
attaching solely for the purpose of addressing Mr. Chatfield' s request for sanctions against me
15
based on my decision to argue Postal Instant Press holding should be limited to the facts of that
16
case. Herman v. Anolik, 2012 WL 974950, (Cal.App. I Dist. Mar 20, 2012). I believe the
17
arguments I raised in the Motion to Amend the Judgment are proper and that attached unpublished
18
decision suppons that I had a good faith basis in seeking to distinguish Postal instanl Press. This
19
case is not attached as precedent in determining whether reverse corporate piercing is applicable in
20
the present motion, but in reply to Mr. Chatfield's request for sanctions.
21
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on May~
22
2012 in Los Angeles California.
23
24
25
ff:'
;~:'
ib
:;.1
"'
;~:.
26
27
28
000436
:-2KPC'S REPLY TO OPPOSITION OF GAGGERO & PRASKE TO MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
,, .
........
.II'.. I 11 .1 i:i1li".!ll'(,.
'I I 'I I I I I '{.I' I ..
[i
..
.I
=I
:j
I
1.
,,
,,
'
I,
~
I
I
I.
':
I'
'
1.
I;
I'
000437
EXHIBIT 1'
l .'. i'
llJ
'
. I
.11..
.. '
jl
'I
'I
i:i.oli:.(11'(
,,
I
I I , , 11.1 .
II .I
,,
'
'
ri
'
1.
I:
'.
Ii
I
~
'/
'i
000437
EXHIBIT ,.
.......
Bc~03780
I, I
COURT, OF APPE:AL OF THE STATE OF.CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE 'DISTRICT
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO,
)
)
)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ANNA MARIE YURA, IN HER CAPACITY

AS TRUSTEE OF THE FREDERICK
EARL HARRIS II 1995 TRUST; AND
DOES 1 THROUGH 15,
)
)
)
)
)
NO. BC 239810
...JURT OF APPEAL Su.to
rf nrL, ~
MAY 2 0 2008
Clert
JOSEPH A. LANE
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS. )
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~)
APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY
HQNORABLE MARY ANN MURPHY, JUDGE PRESIDING
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
..
JULY 8, 2005 AND JULY 12, 2005

APPEARANCES:
'
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
BOSTWICK & JASSY LLP

BY: GARY L. BOSTWICK, ESQc
12400 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
SUITE 400
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90025
(310) 97.9-6059
FOR DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT:
MURPHY ROSEN & COHEN LLP

BY: DAVID E. ROSEN, ESQ.
100 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD
SUITE 1300.
SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA 90401
(310) 899-3300
VOLUME 6 OF l~
PAGES 2401 --'fsr9-2700
PAGES 2701 - 2802-3000
PAULA B. RENTERIA, CSR NO. 9374

OFFICIAL REPORTER
000438
(x-1
.......
2745
"QUESTION:
1
2
PROPOSE TO PAY THE JUDGMENT, IF AT
ALL?
"ANSWER:
MAYBE SOME DAY I'LL
MAKE SOME .MONEY .AND I.' LL SEND IT
YOUR WAY AS I MAKE IT.

"QUESTION:
OTHER THAN THAT, YOU
HAVE NO PRESENT ABILITY OR INTENTION
TO SATISFY THIS JUDGMENT --
10
"ANSWER:.
11
"QUESTION:
12
"ANSWER:
THAT'S NOT WHAT I SAID.

-- TODAY?
I'M HAPPY TO PAY THE
13
JUDGMENT WHEN I HAVE THE MONEY TO
14
PAY IT."
15
16
MR. GAGGERO, YOU ARE THE ASSET MANAGER FOR YOUR
ESTATE, CORRECT?
17
LET ME WITHDRAW THE QUESTION AND REASK IT.
18
YOU ARE THE ASSET MANAGER FOR THE ENTITIES WITHIN
19
20
21
22
iI~~
I'M ASKING HOW YOU
YOUR ESTATE, CORRECT?

A
I'M THE ASSET MANAGER FOR THE TWO TRUSTS AND THE
FOUNDATION THAT WERE DISCUSSED EARLIER IN THIS TRIAL.

.AND YOU' RE ALSO THE ASSET MANAGER FOR ALL OF THE
23
ENTITIES OWNED BY THOSE TWO TRUSTS AND THE FOUNDATION,
24
CORRECT?
25
YES.
26
THE COURT:
YOU KNOW WHAT.
I DION' T. TAKE THE MORNING
27
BREAK.
LET'S TAKE OUR 15-MINUTE BREAK NOW.
IT'S NOT TOO
28
LATE.
WE'VE BEEN GOING IN HERE SINCE 8:30.
SO LET'S DO
;i:1
..
;(1
,,,,
....
;i:1
000439
'
2745
.
"QUESTION:
1
2
PROPOSE TO PAY THE JUDGMENT, IF AT
ALL?
"ANSWER:
MAYBE SOME DAY I'LL
MAKE SOME MONEY AND I'LL SEND IT
YOUR WAY AS I MAKE IT,

"QUESTION:
OTHER THAN THAT, YOU
HAVE NO PRESENT ABILITY OR INTENTION
TO SATISFY THIS JUDGMENT --
10
"ANSWER:.
11
"QUESTION:
12
"ANSWER:
THAT'S NOT WHAT I SAID.

-- TODAY?
I'M HAPPY TO PAY THE
13
JUDGMENT WHEN I HAVE THE MONEY TO
14
PAY IT."
15
16
MR, GAGGERO, YOU ARE THE ASSET MANAGER FOR YOUR
ESTATE, CORRECT?
17
LET ME WITHDRAW THE QUESTION AND REASK IT.
18
YOU ARE THE ASSET MANAGER FOR THE ENTITIES WITHIN
19
20
21
22
:;;
I'M ASKING HOW YOU
YOUR ESTATE, CORRECT?

A
I'M THE ASSET MANAGER FOR THE TWO TRUSTS AND THE
FOUNDATION THAT WERE DISCUSSED EARLIER IN THIS TRIAL.

.AND YOU'RE ALSO THE ASSET MANAGER FOR ALL OF THE
23
ENTITIES OWNED BY THOSE TWO TRUSTS AND THE FOUNDATION,
24
CORRECT?
25
YES.
26
THE COURT:
YOU KNOW WHAT.
I DION' T. TAKE THE MORNING
27
BREAK.
LET'S' TAKE OUR 15-MINUTE BREAK NOW.
IT'S NOT TOO
28
LATE.
WE' VE BEEN GOING IN HERE SINCE 8: 30.
SO. LET'S DO
','
<
j\,I
.,'''
Ji,,..
....
;1:1
'
000439
........
2746
'
,,
THAT.
SORRY.
(RECESS TAKEN.)
3
4
THE COURT:
OKAY.
BY MR. ROSEN:
YOU MAY RESUME THE WITNESS STAND.

MR. GAGGERO, AS ASSET MANAGER FOR
THE TRUSTS AND FOUNDATION WITHIN YOUR ESTATE AND ALL THE
ENTITIES THAT THOSE TRUSTS AND FOUNDATIONS OWNED, IT WAS
YOUR JOB TO MAKE THE DETERMINATIONS AS TO THE HIGHEST AND
10
BEST USE OF THE ASSETS OWNED BY THOSE ENTITIES, RIGHT?
11
YES.
12
AND IT WAS YOUR JOB TO MAKE DECISIONS AS TO THE THE
13
DISPOSITION OF THE ASSETS OWNED BY THOSE ENTITIES, CORRECT?
14
YES.
15
AND ONE OF THOSE ENTITIES WAS MALIBU BROAD BEACH,
16
CORRECT?
17
CORRECT.
18
MALIBU BROAD BEACH WAS THAT AN LLP OR AN LLC?
19
DO
YOU REMEMBER?
20
I THINK IT WAS AN LP.
21
AND WITH RESPECT TO THIS MALIBU BROAD BEACH ENTITY,
22
YOU WERE THE PERSON THAT MADE THE DECISIONS WITH RESPECT TO
23
THE DISPOSITION OF THE ASSETS HELD BY THAT ENTITY, CORRECT?
24
ON BEHALF OF THAT ENTITY, YES.
25
AND ONE OF THE PIECES OF PROPERTY THAT MALIBU BROAD
26
BEACH OWNED AT ONE POINT IN TIME WAS A RENTAL HOUSE, RIGHT?
27
IT WAS A HOUSE THAT WAS RENTED cROM TIME TO TIME.
28
ANO DURING WHAT PERIOD OF TIME DID MALIBU BROAD
000440
'
\11 /.
..I I
11 , . I l tai~;.111."I I
y, I I I I'/..I" I .... "
~I
I'
I'
'i
,.i
'
I.
000441.
I.
.
'
........
l
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
BLECHER & COLLINS, P.C.

Maxwell'M. Blecher (State Bar No. 26202)
mblecher@blechercollins.com .
Donald R. Pepperman (State Bar No. l 09809)
dpepperman@blechercollins.com
John E. A!!drews (State Bar No. I 05336)
jandrews@blechercollins.com
515 South Figueroa Street, Suite 1750
L6s Angeles, California 90071-3334
Telephone: (213) 622-4222
Facsimile: (213) 622-1656
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP

David Blake Chatfield (State Bar No. 88991)
WestlakeVillagc, CA 91361
Telephone: (805) 267-1220 .
Facsimile: ~805) 267-1211
Stephen M Gaggero
.12
. 13
,,
FOR THE COUNTY. OF LOS ANGELES
14
15
16.
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO, an individual,
vs.
18
CASE NO. BC28~924

[PROPOSED) SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR PROFESSIONAL
NEGLIGENCE AND BREACH OF
.Plaintiff,
17
,
'
'
'
FIDUCIARYDUTY
KNAPP, PETERSEN AND CLARKE, a

19 California c:Orporation; STEVEN RAY
~SS!GNED FOR ALL PURPOSES TO THE
L..,._,____ tMRetA,-an-individttal;-S'ffiP"HEl--N----flll,--.--+HGWORABbE-RICRARD E RICO
20 HARRIS, an individual; ANDRE JARDINI, an DEPT. 17
.
individual; DOES I through 50, inclusive,
21
Defendants.
22
PARTIES
-23
Plaintiff Stephen M Gaggero ("GAGGER0'1 is an_ individual residing in the .
24
25'
26
County of Ventura.
2.
Defendants Knapp, Petersen and Clarke (''KPC''), Steven Ray Garcia, Stephen M.
27
Harris and Andre Jardini (collectively''Defendants") are attorneys who acted as attorneys and
28
pcrl'ormed'leg31 seivices'for the lleirefit of'Stepllcn M Gagger?: GAGGERO. is informed and
'
~
,,
,\
..
[PROPOSED] SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
00044'2
t,l\ u
........
believes, and on that basis alleges, that. Steven Rey Garcia, Stephen M. Harris !llld Andre Jardini
are sbarebolders of KPC. ,_
!.1
3.
and each of them, reside in the County of Los Angeles and were at all times mentioned herein
doing business in the cit}' of Glendale, County ofLos~geles.
4.
, I
GAGGERO is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants,
The true names and capacities of Defendants sued' as Does 1 through 50 are
unknown to GAGGERO at this time, who therefore sues said D~fendants by such fictitious names.
GAGOERO will seek leave of this Court to amend this complaint to inch!de such names when
they Mve been ascertained. GAGGERO is informed
10
ana believes, and on tbiit basis alleges, that
eacli"ofthe fictitiously named Defendants is liable to GAGGERO as hereinafter alleged.
5.
11
GAGGERO is infonned and believe.!, 'and on that basi~ alleg.;;, that Defendants
and co-
12
were; 1111d each of them was, ai all times mentioned herein, acting as the agent, employee
13
conspirator of the other defendants, an'd in doing the things mentioned herein, was acting within
14
the course and scope of such agency, employment and con.Spiiacy.
I
I
15
I
0
16
6.
furtherance of the acts alleged herein.
17
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
7.
18
19
&!-ch of the Defendants aided and abetted in, and acted in concert with each other iii
GAGGERO is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Defendants,
and each of them, reside in the County of Los Angeles and were, at all times mentioned herein
-----
~-~~----~f1-~~
20
21
doing business in the city of Glendale, County of Los Angeles.

. '
8.
The parties hereto entered into. an attorney-client relationship within the Co~ty of
22
Los Angeles, and the services were performed in the COunty of Los Angeles.
23
24
ALLEGATIONS APPLICABLE TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
9.
In 1998, GAGGERO entered llito negotiations with Frederick Harris(''Hanis'),
25
trustee of the Frederick Earl Harris II 1995 Trust ('The Tri.st"), for the purpose of acquiring real
26
property located at 93 8 Palisades Beach Road in Santa Monica, California ("93 8 Property'). Jn
27
order to have the option tofacilitate a tax-free exchange under section 103~ of the Internal
28
Revenue Code, GAGGERO's stejisiStl:r, Stephanie B6rco ("Boren"), entered into a-purchase and
.1
~.
,,
2
'
000443
',
sale agreement with the ~,Trust for the foregoing property, dated AugusUO, 1998, with the
mtention that Boren would serve as a .facilitator for the exchange, and ultimately transfer the 938
Property to GAGGERO or iln entity_ofhis choice.
Io,
In conjunction with the_ foregoing purchase and sale agreement, The Trust also
grantee! Boren or her assignee a right of first refusal on two adjacem properties owned by The
Trust,. l_ocated at 940 and 944 Palisades Beach Road. The right of first refusal was to be triggered
by_ the close of escrow on the 938 Property.
11.
As a condition precedent to the close of escrow on the 938 Property, Harris required
9 that aHtbree properties be subject to certain architectural and regulatory conditions, covenats anci.
'
1.0
'
restrictions ("Cc&Rs"), which were tO be negotiated between GAGGERO and Harris on behalf of
JI . The Trust with the final decision to be controlled by Harris, and that, in the event the parties could
12
not agree on the-terms of said CC&Rs, then Bore~ or her assignee could cancel the purcruise and
13
sale agreement. Consequentiy, following execution oftl!e purchase and sale agreement, Harris and
14
GAGOERO entered into negotiations over the tenns of the CC&Rs. Because Harris was
l5
simultaneously dealing with personal issues resulting from a contentious divorce and custody
16
proceedings, and also desired to control the-timing cifthe closing fqr purposes ofa tax-free
17
exchange, the negotiations were prolonged, and continued through.1_999 and 2000. Duringmuc!i
18
ofthis'time, GAGGERO was living in the 938 Property pursuant to a lice!ISC agreement'
19
incorporated into the purchase and sale agreement.
20
. 12. . After Harris and GAGGERO had agreed to the material terms of the Cc&Rs, they
inclu~g
21
continued to negotiate a few minor terms,
22
which dogs would be allowed on the properties: During this time period, GAQ.GERO had incurred
23
approximately $250,000 worth ofpredeveloptnent and improvements expenses on the 938
24
Property. !]AGGERO wanted to finalize the negotiations, believed that he and Harris had reached
25
an agreement on the CC&Rs and :was ready, willing and able to perform, but closing was delayed
26
for reasons ~ot controlled by him.
27
,28
13.
some architectural issues.and the extent to
In or about February 2000, Harris became seriousfy ill and was diagnosed with
terminal cancer. On April 21, 2000, Hllfiis dcsigmrte'da co-trustee for the Harris Trust, Ann Marie
;I.
"
"
"
3
[PRO}'OSED) SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
000144
i:1
'
,.
1
2
I,
I
'
Upon her designation; Ylira took active control of the negotiations, and thereafter.
regulatory CC&Rs, a position that GAGGERO knew did not originate with Harris, with whom he
believed he bad reached agreement

.15.
GAGGERO of the death; also infonitlng GAGGERO that permission be bad requested to niake
further improvements to the 938 Property wa denied:
16.
..
On August 16, 2000, '.The Trust, through i.ts attorney, informed GAGGERO that The
10
Trust continued to reserve the right to modify the CC&Rs .. In response, .GAGGERO informed The
11
Trust's attorney that he h;ul reached agreement with Harris on the CC&RS before his death, and
12
that the Cc&Rs should be recorded in accordance therewith.
1.3
attorney.
16
17.
This wasdisputed by the Trust's
"
.,
On. October 23, 2000; The Trust listed the 940 and 944 Properties for sale;
unburdened by -any CC&Rs or right of first refusal.

18.
On O~tobei 31, 2000, Boren and .GAGG ERO weltl infonned by The Trust's
17
attorney that they bad 45 days to close the escrow on the 938_ Property with the CC&Rs thal'111e
18
Trust intended to record.
19
..
Harris died in early May 2000. On May 8, 2000, Tue Trust's attorney informed
15
)4.
tnok the nonnegotiable position that the CC&Rs be materially changed by eliminating most of the
14
Yura ("Yura"). Yura lieCam.e the sole siiccessor trustee" upon Harris' subsequent death.
6
I
19.
On November!, 2000, GAGGERO was sent a 'courtesy copy" of the CC&Rs that
20
Tue Trust intended to record, which did not comport with the terms previously agreed between
21
Harris'and GAGGERO. Boren immediately.assigned the purchase agreement and right of first
22
refusal agreeme_nts that were attached as addendum to the purchase agreement to GAGGERO.
23
GAG.GERO immediately objected to the actions of The Trust regarding the CC&Rs on the 938
24
Property, asserting that this was an attempt to unilaterally modify the agri=ement on the CC&Rs he
25
'
26
bad reached with Harris. He demanded

that the
940 and 944 Properties, which were subject to the.
.
-
'
27
2"8
right of first refusal,. not be sold until the CC&Rs were finalized.
20.
Fearful that Yura was attempting to deprive him of his rights under the purchase
and .Sale agreement and his rights of first refusal, GAGGERO immediately sought legal counsel
I.
'.
"..
4
[PROPOSED]. !;)ECOND AMENDED COMPLAlNT
000445
........
I
2
rights under the purchase and sale agreement.and his rights of first refusal and specifically sought
Defendants' advice on the enforceability. of the CO&Rs Harris had submitted to GAGGERO and
that GAGGERO had accepted, but which had not been reduced to a signed writing. On November
2, 2000, GAGGERO retained Defendants to ~etas his attorneys and.provide legal services in
relation to his ~ispu_te with Yura and to protect and establish his rights in the 938, 940 and 944
Properties.
21.
'i
I
I
from Defendllnts. GAGGERO informed Defendan!S that he was retaining them to protect his
I)efendants advised GAGGERO that he should sue Yura to force Yura to recorrl the
CC&Rs as GAGGERO understood had been provided by Harris, and then close escrow on the.938
10
Property. Defendants further advised GAGGERO that they could tie up the properties with a lis
11
pendens and that because Harris'was dead and his testimony was lost, Yura had no witnesses to
12
present evidence conlrazy to GAGGERO's at trial and GAGGERO could not lose in their proposed
13
litigation. Despite (:JAGGERQ's repeated requests that Defendants seek to extend or toll the 45-
14
day deadline for closing escrow before i.ts expiration, and preserve his rights tci purchase the
15
propertiCs, Defendant5 took no steps to do ~o, provided inadequate adviceregarding ll;ie effect of
16
the expiration of the deadline on GAGGERO' s rights, and took no actigns to maintain the status
17
quo, such as obtaining a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or other similar relief.
18
The dead!inf.' subsequently expirf.'d and GA_GGERO lost his rights to purchase the properties even
if he agr~ to Yura's CC&Rs,_
,--------"
,
19
20
21
method to preserve his rights and obtain a fa"6rable-resolution. They gave no advice _co other
22
available options, did not wani GAGGERO oftbe potentially unfavorable effects of their
23
recommended actions and.filed 'suit immediately.. On November. 6; 2000, Defendants filed a
22.
-~~---
Defcnciar\ts advised GAGGERO that filing the suit against Yura was the proper
24 complaint alleging causes of action for. specific 11erformance, declaratory relief and breach of the
25
implied covenarit of good faith and ra'ir dealing on GAGGERO's behalf in the 'superior Court
26
Defendants rec6rded !is pendens on the pro!!Crtics. The complaint was subsequently amended on .
27
Janwtry 22, 200!.
28
23.
"The !is peiide!IS WllSsubsequently expunged becaIJSe, in the opposition to The
s
[PROPOSED) SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
"
000446
',
Trust's motion to expunge the lis pendens, Defemh1.nts failed to demonstrate a likelihood that
2
GAGGERO would prevail on the merits of the case.

24. .
Later, because of further improper advice by Defendants, the trial court granted
sw:iu:cyary judgment against GAGGERO, however, the summary judgment was reversed on appeal
.5
Gaggero v. Yura. 108 Cal. App. 4th 884 (2003).
25.
After the sWllillllljjudgment was granted, but before it was reversed, Defendants .
withdrew as counsel of record. The case was subsequently tii.ed by the Court, resulting in a
statement of decision on August.8, 2007. The trial court's decisi?n was substantially affirmed by
.9
the Court of Appeal_ in an unpublished decision dated September 14, 2009. Among otber things,
1O the Court of Appeal found tbat substantial evidence supported the finding tbat the partieS had
11
failed to create a legally enforceable contract complying with the slatute of frauds, and that the
12
implied covenant of good faith and faif dealing was legally iMpplicable in this context bCcause
13
The Tiust and Yura, as trustee, had an absoiute right to control tbe Cc&Rs. Both points were
14
contrary to the legal advice that had been provided by Defendants to GAGGERO on each issue, as
I,.
15 briefly described heremabove.
I
I
16
'
I
'------
,\.
. 26.
The foregoing advice was improvidently and n~gligently given. Had Defendants
17
advised GAGGERO of any potential litigation risk and/ot any risk of his losing his right to
18
purchase the properties, due to, among other things, the lack of written evidence supporting the
19
Utigatioi;i Defendants flied,' the expiration of the 45-day closing deadline, the risks and legal effects
20
of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel because of Defendants' inclusion of causes of action for
21
specific pefror111ance and/or breach of the implied covenw:it in a declaratory action regarding the
22
CC&Rs, arid/or provided GAGGERO with advice regarding

options Other than filing litigation,
.
.
23
Stich as; for example, accepting the CC&Rs as 'dictated b)'. The
24
45-day deadline set by The Trust, wid/oradvising GAGGERO to exclusively pur5ue declaratory
25
relief to resolve.the outstanding issues in an expedited manner, GAGGERO would have closed
26
escrow on the 938 Property and exercised the right of first remsa:J on the 940 and 944 Properties:
27
which were being sold by The Trust Instead, as a result of Defendants' negligence, GAGGERO
28
lost the right t6 purc1W1; the 931! Propertjr, lll!d lost the right af first refusal for the two other
Trust before the expiration of the
6
:.1
000447
'
properties. one of which v;as sold during the pendency of the underlying litigation without.
2
3
allowiJJ.g GAGGERO to exercise his right of first refusal and purcba.Se the property.
27.
Additional actions undertaken by Defendants on GAGGERO's ostensible behalf
were also performed negligently and below the standard of care required of attorneys. These .
.5
actions include; but are not limited to Defendants' representation of GAGGERO at his deposition,
during which they instructed GAGGERO to refuse to answer questions about his financial
condition on grounds of privacy, even though his financial ability to perfonn the alleged contraet
was a Irey.element of his affirmative burden ofproofon the Specific performance cause of action.
Defendants' erroneou5 instruction at GAGGERO's deposition led to summrur judgment being
! '.
''I
10
granted against GAGGERO qy the trial cowt. While summary judgment was subsequently
11
reversed by the Court of Appeal on the grounds \hat Yura's motion was not in_ compliance with
12
.13
Code of Civil Procedure 437c, GAGGERO was nevertheless incorrectly advised by Defendants
.
'
about his disdosure obligations in. discovery, and 'as a consequence, he incurred substan?al and
14
unnecessary.fees and costs in connection with the summary judgment and the appeal. Defendants'
15
advice also led to _GAGGERO's submission of inadequate written djscovcry responses that causCd
I'
16
him to be sanctioned by the coUrt. The5e actions caused GAGGERO to pay many thousands of
17
dollars in unnecessary legal fees and costs.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
18
I .
r---~-
(For Professional Negligence_ Against All Defendants)
19
.20
21
22
28.
GAGG@!.0 hereby realleges and ineorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through
27 .of this Second Amended Complaint

29.
Defendants, and eaeh of them, had an obligation to.provide competent,
23
nOfillegligent professi!)nal legal sCIViec, iii compliance-with the rules and laws that g~vem the
24
i:onduct of attorneys ~this community. By virtue of their relationship as auorneys for
25
GAGGERO, Defendilnts, and each of them, owed GAGGERO a duty of care to perform
26
responsibilities as attorneys competently, professionally,'di!igently and prudently, and to fully and'
27
corre~tly
28
c:nable lriln to avoid loss of the subject properties.
advise GAGGERO.as to all of his rights and remedies, to counsel_ GAGGERO so as to
'
,\
..
"
.-
000448
........
30.. Defendants, and each of'them,:breached their duties' to GAGGERO, by, among
.other things, failing to' competently ailvise him and otherwise takes steps to protect his rights under
the Purchase and Sale Agreement with the Harris Trust, so as t6 enable to him tO close the
acquisition of the 938 Property, and exercise his rights to purchase .the 940 and 944 Properties.
Defendants, and each of them, gave UOC(jllivocal and uoqualified, yet clearly illcorrect, advice on
plaintiff's ability to force the Harris Trust to adopt the CC&Rs negotiated between GAGGERO.
and Harris before his death, which were not reduced to a signed writing, and t6 force the Harris
Trust to close on the sale of the 93,8 Prop~rty. Had Defendants properly researched the elementary .
lega:i princip,les of contract and property law involved, they would have known that the advice they
ultimately
gave .was
erroneous
and they accordingly could hive taken steps and given advice to
.
. .
. I
11.
avoid injury _to GAGGERO .

31.
Defendants should have advised GAGGERO to either avoid litigation excc;pt as a
last resort, ~r to seek only limited and expedited 'declaratory re_liefto have hiscontractual rights .
judicially deteimined. Defendants should a!so hilve advised. GAGGERO to not file the ~is
pendetlS, to negotiate an extension of the 45-day deadline for closing escrow to allow further
negotiations, ~d ultimately to accept the terms of the CC&Rs insisied upon by The Trust because.
ihe allege_d side agreement wii:h Harris was not memorialized and the purehase and sale agreement
gave Tne Trust-the pow~r to dictate the terms oftheCC&Rs.. Had Deiendants so advised
.
GAGGERO, he would have followed their advice, accepted the CC&Rs as desired by The Trust,
closed onthe 938 Property and exercised the right of first refusal on the 940 and 944 Properties.
32.
-~--
Defendants, and each of them, erroneously advised GAGGERO that his rights In
..
the propertywereirrevoeably established, that lie could take a tough and aggressive stance against
Yura and The Trust, including the immediate filing of litigation and filing of a li.S pendens. This
had the opposite effect and hardened the re~olve ofYura and The Trust to oppose GAGGERO.
Because Defendants' aggressive posturing wasnot legally supportable, it caused GAGGERO to
lose all three of the properties. "
33.
Over and above the foregoing, Defendants, and each of them, were negligent in the
conduct of the litigation they-commenced, andcaused GAGGERO to incur significant and
8
[PROPOSED] SECOND AMENDED.COMPLAINT
.
.
0004.49
.........
'
- 1
11I111ecessary expenses. Defendants, aniong other_things, incorrectly instructed GAGGERO not to
answer deposition questions on directly relevant isses including his financial ability to perfonn
the purchase and sale contract;. failed to competently oppose Yura's Motion for Summary
Judgment after_ being made aware of deficiencies; prepared deficient discovery responses; and
otherwise provided advice and counseling that were substandard and caused injury and damage to
GAGGERO.
34.
As a proximate result of Defendants' breaches of duties; including, the acts .
described above, GAGGERO suffered compensatory and consecjuential damages from the loss of
the ~e properties l!lld in unnecessary expenditures incurred by_ Defendants mtheir
10
representation, in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdictional limits of the court, with the.
11
eXa.ct amount to be determined at trial.
12
SECOND CAUSE OF ACilON
13
(For.Breach oFiduciary Duty Against AUDe_fendants) .
14
3_5.
GAGGERO hereby realleges and
i~corporates
by reference paragraphs 1 through
15 34 of this Sec0nd Amended Complaint.

16
.17
'
36.
By virtue of the attorney-client.relationship bc:tWeen GAGGERP and Defendants,
Defendants, and each oftbem, at all times herein mentioned in this Complaint owed GAGGERO
and other ~uties, "which duties included; among others, the duties to provide.
18
the highest fiduciary
19
legai services professionally; to provide legal services _in compliance with the standards of_ -
20
competence and ethics ofattomeys in this community, to.fully-advise GAGGERO of his rights and
21
remedies, to make full disclosure of materlal facts relating to representatio~ of GAGGERO, to
:22
counsel GAGGERO so as to enable him to avoid injury; to act ethically and with integrity as to
23
GAGGERO, and to give paramount importance to the protection ofGAGGERO's interests, assets
24
and rights over Defendants' interest in generating significant attorneys' fees for their own benefit
25
In addition, Defendants, and each of them, had the further fiduciaiy duty to GAGGERO to
26
exercise reasonable ski!~ prudence and diligence_ in performing legal services for GAGGERO.
27
28
37.
Defendants, and each of them, breached their fiduciary oli!igations by, emong other
tl!ings; failing-to-properly ana!yzc1he case and advise G-AGGERO in a manner reasonably
:,,,
!t.
'.
:.
,\
I ..
:.1
'
9[PROPOSED] SECOND AMENDED COMPLAJNT
000450
'
calculated to enable him to secure ownership ofltle 938, 940 and 944 Properties, considering their
2
3
own interest in baving an extended litigation to bill at an bourly rate over the client's interest in an
.
.
expedited and economical result, and otherwise failing to competently, diligently and timely
perform r~quired legal services as beretofore alleged, and unduly risking GAGGBRO's assets and
rights; all of whi~h caused injury and damage to GAGGERO.
38.
A$~ proximate result of these breaches, GAGGERO ~suffered compensatory
and consequential
damages from the loss of the three properties. and in incurring unnecessary
.
.
expenditures, including atto~eys' fees, in an amount in excess of the minimum jurisdiction of the
court, in an amount to be proven at trial.
'
WHEREFORE, GAGGERO prays for judll"lent against Dcfen,dants, an~ each of them, as
10
-I 1
follows:
A.
12
13
14
Actual;md compensatory damages plu5 interest at the legal rate from the
date of payment in an amount t~ be proven at trial;
B.
15
On the Second Cause of Action, that GAGGERO be awarded:

I.
16
17
On the First Cause of Action, that GAGGERO be awarded:
Actual and co~pensatory damages plus interest at the legal rate froin the
date
at trial; and
. of payment in an amount to be proven
.
2.
18
bisgorgement of the fees paid to Defendants in an amount to be proven at
,I_________,._______ - - - ' ' - - - - - - - - - - --------19
trial;
c.
20
On All Causes of Action, that GAGGERO be awarded:
21
3.
Costs of suit incurred berein;
22
4.
Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
23
24
25
26
27
28
1146989.
'' .
.'
'
'~.
'.!
...
10
000451.
'
."
PROOF OF PERSONAL SERVICE
I am emp\oyed in the County of las Angeles, California; I am over the age of

eighteen years and not a party to the within cause; my business address is 515 S.
Figueroa Street, Suite 1750, Los Angeles, California 90071. O~ June 27, 2011, I
seived the within: NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
SECOND AMENDED COMPL,AINT on the interested parties in this action by personally
hand delivering a copy of said documents tothe address listed below:
Randall A. .Miller
Howard M. Fields
Miller LLP
515 S. Flower St., Suite 2150
Los Angeles; CA .90071
I declare. under pef1alty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that
the above is true and correct. Executed on June 27, 2011, at Los Angeles, California.
I
I.
Edgar Bravo
"'
''
.000452
'
.'
PROOF OF SERVICE
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the
age of eighteen and not a party to the within action; my business address is 515
Figueroa St., Suite 1750, Los.Angeles, Ca.lifornia 90071.
s:
On June 27, 2011, I.served the foregoing docl!ment described as:_ NOTICE OF
MOTION AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT on
the interested parties in this action as follows:
,
David Blake Chatfield
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP
2625 Tovmsgate Road, Suite 330
Westlake Village, CA 9_1361
''
ii/ (By Mail): As follows: I arri "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and
' -
iI
I
,I
I
''
processing correspondence for mailing. Under that practice: it would be deposited with
_the U.S. Postal 'Service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los
Angeles, California, in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of
the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage
meter date is more than one day after deposit for mailing affidavit
0 (By,F~csimile): Such document(s) were transmitted to the fatsimile number(s) listed

above. The facsimile machine I used complied with Rule 2.306 and-no error was
reported by the machine.

D (By E-mail): The document was transmitted via electronic transmission to:
--,
. --EXECtJTJ;D-ON-jorre-2;;-201T,1!ttorlmgeles, Califomi~-------. .
~
>' ...._, .. ::_t-: ,.:-. .- .;:": -..
..
.
. . .
.t (State).) .ci.eC,lare'uii~~r. pimalty of pe~ury under the laws of the State of California
th~~~he above1stre and correct ,
- .
.-
-._. .
.....
: .- !
.. '-;.;/
Lorelei L. Gerdine
;1
,!
'.
000453
'
I
1
'
i
I
. I
000454 '
E)(HIBIT V
'
'
- ..
Da\'id 'Blake Chatfield, suite Bar No. 88991
WESTLAKB LAW GROUP
:I. 2625 T~l!..olld., Soite 330.

Weatlal<o ~California 91361
Te~
Facsimile:
805-267-1220
805-267-1211
CASl!. NO.: .
Stephen M. Gaggero,
'
:v. '
..
~MPLAINT TiOR;
Foley &. BBU.k. LLV aka Foley Be:mk lleble &.

cum&. u.P; Petcr~ac; Roga- Bellle; BdJlo . 1 PR.oi1tSSloNAL NEGLIGENCE
14 Law
. Cotpollllion;
-- ~
- l lhrough 50, inclu!ivc, ,i BREACH
. . CiF'CONTRACr
.
. . . . , :. ..
.....
'
l)r,fimdAAli
15
..
. ..
1611-~~~~-'--'-~----'~~--'
.
'.
17
....
,-,
IS
'
19.
20
,
21
'
.... , ,.
I
'
Z2
'
. ...
t
Io
'
..
24
''
Z3
01
' ' I I
2S
26
-..
..
O.
27
,;.
28
:~
~,
'
.,
000455
{xv
..
"
,,
1
The plaintiff; Stephen M. Gaggem, is an individual.
2.
Defendan!s Foley & Bezek. LL1' ak1i Poley Bozek Behle & Cul'ti5.W: Peter Bezek;
4 RogC.. Beble; and. Bchlc Law Corporation

S
3.
115 atlomeyii
and
Plah!lii is infonned and believes, am! cm that basis alleges, that ildendants, and =b. of
!hem, perfomicd legal s=ices for plalmifrin 1hc COmUy <1fl.9s Angeles..
4.
and law!itms who lll:!ed
performed legal i;ervi.QeS far the belrnfit ofplalntifr.
6
7
Bll: a~
to plaintiff at
The tnie. names and capai:lties of the ~ sued as Does I through 50 are llllknOWD
ttik time, whti tbcrefoic 6Uc:8 said def'!lJdmts by such fu:titiocs ~.
PlaiolUf will seek.
10
lea.w of 1hia. Court to ammd. this complaint to ini;lude ~ names when they have bacn ascertained.
ll
l'laimlfl' is informed' and ~lievcs, and oii tbat
12
.
.
dtfcndants is liable to plaiiitiff as bacinatler alleged.
13
' 14
. IS
basi5 alleges,
tbat each
or !he licli1iously llSllltd
Piailiim' is informed and bC!icves, and ~ ~ basiB alleges, the defeDdsn13 wm.; 31!11
caoh of au:m~ at all limes mentioned herein, aafulS l!S lb~ agmt, Clllljlloyee m1d ~onsplialor of'lhe
other dof\mdatlls,. md in dOing lho,tbings mentioned.hCnliD,
'
was a. q ~uu;, 1ho 00\ltSll mid &eope of ' . .'
16 suo!i ~. llll!Ployiiicnt tllld con.piracy.

6.
17
'.
Plaintiff i informed mu! belie:..c., aIU! on that basis alleges,. each or lb.i dcfendinrs al.:red
~8
lllld abetted in,~ natcd inlXIOOOrtwitb-11 other in, the.~ oflhe iiCmalleP.bi:rein: each of
19
lb.e dcfcodants 1alew of the ~ of. iiu;t ll!ld law, tho laok of !Hi;l!llll basis fUr 1ll2llY or the
.20
rcpres.cntatiOm. and lhc omisslMS ~ llllep,ed end 'itiok active coordinated &lePS to oon=l the
21 adverse information; tbefe' was
II.
mmually
SllppOrtrvC
lldivily,, and
,,
.'
'
QOllllIIOD, DOll?SO Cf CCildu\;t. Ill
22
misrcPr=sent !ms endcanceal true' fact&~ plaintiffbythc dofcn.b.nts; aWt thedcfendams' agreemem
23
to engage ill the acts cun be infcm:d fioin the fact:; 5:t'forth ~
J!JlUSDICTION AND VENUE
24
1,
2S
Plainfiff is informed and belieYes, and Oil that basis alleges, that defendants, and mch of
26 tlwn, peifouned legal seivices forplsintiffin the Coimiy ofLos Angeles.

27
28
;~
''
a.- .
The real property purchase p;nd &ale asrcei?eot. which was the subject matter of 1hc
"
\iderly\ng litigstioDB in which dllfendznt& rep~ plaintiff, was cn!ered inlo ln. the County of Los
.
"
.'
0.00456
'
"
)
iro!Uect
ADgelc&. The R8l projl(llty wbicb w~ the
~represenllldplain!ifflslocated In the c.aunty~fLosAnge!e;.
mallet
of the underlying l!tigl!lions in wlt!cb
. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
9. .
In or about NaVember 2001, plaintiff, by way of a written retainer agreemen~ retained
J, ~ md his liml, Foley and Bezek Ll.P
whlch subsequently
and employed dciimdaxrts, Petre
bl'JCalrul Fo!eY Bezek Behle and Curtis LLP (colketively-"F&B") to act as altlJu!eys aDil provide legal
7 servlcea for bis b:ndh, and u111lzcd their scrvic:s lhIDugh at least July of ZOOS, during which time they
8
served as, among other lhinp. legal~ in relll1ion to his_ claims against Anna Mane Yura, as tni=
9 of~ Fllliicriok Earl Harris Il '1995 ~ and to protect and establish plaintiff's light& ill ihe teal
10
11
property known as 9js, 940 Bild 944 Palisades Bcach Road, Sillllll Monica, California (th$ "Properties").
.
'
Ta !hat end, F&B rep=entcd ptalntiff malitigation entitled $tqJhl!JI M. -Gaggero v. AnllD Mam Yunz
12 LASCCaseNo. BC239810("fura 1").

13
1O.
14
~ law
15
16
lllllmleyS
In or about
May- of 200S, F&B Ittaint.d tl:i8 &m'ic:i;s of Roger-Behlc aPd bis fiim, the
Cotporafum (coll~y "BEHLE; as ~ counsel for the plaintiff in Y11ra l to Bet as
am1 provide legal services 1br his benmt,'

and uliliz.Cd their~
.
. Plaintiff aiiiml to such
.. '
=tiOn elthi:r in writing or by an oial agieernent ID s1icluetention by F&B.
17
. 11.
_.
. On or abolil Allg1lst 10, i998, plimtilf! assigoor, Stcplwii~ Bomi; mid~ l!erl
18
Ihms. ("HARRIS") BS tnastee pf the Ftedmiok Earl Hmris ll 199S Trost (the "'frust") .;ecuzcd a
19
Residelltial Purchase Agreement ("RPA"),

entitling.Bmm 01
ltCr 8llSigl'lee
to purcbaac !be 93S Piqicrty
.
.
' .
20
for SUS million. Harris understood that plaintltf wu llClllally purchasing !he 938 l'mPertY l!lld Boren
21
wn5 12dli11l!ing.th: lr.msaction as an "accotlllilllda!ar" far e&1a1e plannlng and 13Xalion pllqlOSeS. A fully
.2.2
1:i1mated vc:iuion of the RPA mu! addendum lhln'eto was Sllbmitted in ~ escrow
12.
23
24
25
26
21
28
The RPA ~a. Lil:casc.Agrmllenlwhioh granted plaint!!TtbD rigbt Ta~ Ill
the 938 Propert)I while he awl Hanis nei;otlated Ille purehase.
13.
In addition, the RP A incorporated a ltlght gf F'U'St Rcfilsal Agrcenton!: (''ROFR."). wllioh
pioYidc4 llW after close of es=w on tho 938 Propfrty, Boren Dl' her assi~ would have tbe righl of
~ iefusal to p=lulse tho 940 and 944 Pioperues;
...
;~
14.
Between app:oximatdy Augast 1998
throu Ja:rmary
2001, Harris stated that fer
~ =ns, be was not coi=ed Wollt 1DQVing th~ sale of thll 938 'Propmy along quickly.
2
,I
:.
,,
-
"
000457
.......
.
.
um. He resi~
there far more than three yeus. with lhe knowledge Biid ctmScDt of both HARruS and Anna Manie Yum
~ to the Li~ Agmment, plainlitr begBD
3 ~j,
15.
9
10
. 11
12
13
14
lS
1~
17
~8
On or about Ml!)' 8, 2DOO, Hanis died. At Dr about the time of HARRIS' death,
YiJRA
be= Trustee of the. FredcrlckEartHarrisll 1995 Trust.

16.
7
8
the subsequent Trustee. Plaintiij ~ ayer S250,000 des(gnlng and improving th~
Pmpetty in mttiaiplltion of the close of escrow.
residing ;t ttu> 938 Propeny in
The RPA specified 1hal, as a. <:=iitina precedent 'to the close of esci:ow, 1he buyer and
sellel' llgrelj an identical Ominanls Couditions

end
Rcstricti01111
.
.
... ("CC&.R.'s") to be =orded on each of
.
~ 938, 940, and 944 Propmti.cs. If agrcea;ieot wu n~t reached, thtn the .S!:llcr could ~ _lls choioc of
ce&R'sand fhc buyc:rcould purchase, the Properties with lh!l ~ CC&R.'s, or cancol the pun:llas=Plaiiilifi'and Harris engaged in lengthy 11egotiatians over the terms of the CC&R's. PlaiiUiff"belltvcd
lbat be aud HaIIis !wl. =Jmd agieewenl an.the CC&:R's priDT to Harrill'
death.
Followi1>g Hmrls' death, plaintiff informed TI.IRA be bad !!CO~ Emis' jm>pOScd
.
..
CC&R's. A cpn!rovCt$)' =ued between phti:ntlfi'md~
regarding
plaintiff had agieed to
,
,
. wbetber
.
.
:17.
..
'
the CC&R's and wllethcrYURA ba4 a dllLy ~ rccogal7;etllea~tbetwe.in plaiut!lfiuui Hmris ll1lS1
n:oord those &peeific CC&R's.

is.
0n about October ii, 2000. YURAlisted.rcir sa1c, Ullburdl:i!:d b~
..
my ~s. the :-
940 and 944 Pniperties.
ts
19.
. ,;:
-.
Ou November l, 2000, Borell assigmld ro phintifhll ha rights, title iiad ~ ill the
19
=ow, the RPA ml the ROFIL
20
21
Ou er about Navamber I, 2000, YuRA lnfcmic4 tilaimitf fhat sbe was dircgmding the
.
.
CC&R'a pmioos!y pEep:ued by HARRIS. Instead; she luteridcd to iccord tbe CC&:R's She bBd llrefted
22
iudcpCndently ~ HarriS dealb,
23
hiB lhen ~ wansel. Kuspp, PC!:!Scu and Clarke {"KPC"), rer;itding.YlJRA's ~staled ectiam;.
20.
. '
Z4
25
.21.
and gav~ plaililiff 4S days to close ~row.
Plaiudff oonsulced with
On ahOut Novcmbel' 2, 2000, XPC ~!:llded !bat they prq>are 8lld file litigat!on to
Proll:Ct .i!ld estriblish plaill1i.tfs righ!S in the'Prop~. OD N~ 6, 2000, KPC fi1Cd Yura !, and
26 on 181lll2IY 22, 2001 tued a iimt ameDded c'omplaint.

27
~
;?:
28:
~intlfi's dcpositiop. inswctmg plaintilfnat_to ~ qu=;tions. YURA ~a moll~ far sunmmy
!~
22.
.
.A1ler Yuro J was filed, KPC prepmed disoqvery 1espuuscs in 1'lll'U l

.
8!ld clefmickd
.
:3
000458
J.
'
~ to
.
.
the Lic,ellS Agrefmenl, plainfilf begiin residing a1 tlu> 93 8 Propelly in 1998. He resided
2 lhe:!e far more than three yeua. with the knowledge llilll ccmsmu of both HARRIS and Anna Manie Yura
3 ("YURA j, the subsequ,eo.t :rtUStee. Plaintiff spem: over S2SO,OOO designing and improving the 938
4 Property In anticiplltion oflhe close of escrow.

15.
s
6
On or about Mey 8, 2DOO, Hanis dial. At Dr about the time ofHARRlS' death,
YuRA
becamcTrustccofthc.FredcickEartHarris ll 1995 Tru.si.
7
8
9
10
. 11
13
M
lS
16
17
S8ller agree on identical
Qmmanls ~nditio"6 Biid RcstrictiODS ("CC&R.'s") ro ha n:cardcd on eaoh of
~ 938, 940, and 944 Propenios. 'tr agl'CClllent ~ not reach=d, thl:ll the .seller could ~ lls choioc of
ce&R'sand thcbUY"could pun:base.th=Properties with the~ CC&R's, arcun\JCl the purellasc.
.l'laiuliffaod Harris engaged inlengthy negotiations over the ierms of the CC&.R.'s. Plaiiitiffbel!evcd
:17.
Following Hams' dealh, plaintiff informed YURA be bad l\COcptlld Emili'
jlIOpOScd
CC&R's. A CDDl?OYCI'$)' ensued between p~ and.Yuu

regarding whether p!aintifi'had
agiUd to
.
.
...
the cc&.R.'sandwl!etbcrYURAba4a~~~rec~thea~tbdwi:mip~!uui~~
.. ::'
record those Bpl:Cific CC&R's.

18.
On Mabout October 23, 2000, YURA'listcd'.for sale, llllburdcn:d l>y my CC&R's, the :
940 and 944 Pniperties.
18
19.
On November l, 2000, Boren assigned to pJ.aintiff all ha rightg. title and ~ ill the
19 =ow,lheRPAmltheROFll
20
20.
On or aboiit Navamber I, 2000,
22
\'URA inflmnc4 l'lalniili Iha. ebe was dim:gmding the

CC&R's prc.vioosly pcep:ued by HARRIS. Instea1!; she lnterided ID i:cord the CC&:R's she biul !lrefted
independently. HartiS death, and guve plllinliff 45 days to closC ~row. Ptiiinliff oollSlllce.d wilh
23
hii. lhcn auxmn wansel, KDapp, P~en and Clmkc ("KPC"), n:ga'rdingYURA's ~stated l!elinm.
. , 21
24
21.
On about November 2, 2000, ICPC ~!:llded that they prepare mid file litigation to
Protect <J!U! esliblish plain1ift's tigh!S in the"l'roperties.. OD Nov=bm' 6, 2000, KPC fiJCd YWll J, mu!
0
25
26
OD
IP.
27 ,~
!~
Janmry 22, 2001 ~a fim am81lded CompJ.sint.

22.
.A1ler Yura I was li~ UC. prepesed disoqvery 1espunscs in flllU 1 mu! .defended
.
23 ~fi's deposition. instructing plllilltifF net to ~ ~ons. YURA ~ B motio~ far
.
SWlllilm,Y
000458
........
.
..
--~
- --- ---- --
'
judgment based llpi>n b::r claim that plaintifi' & failure to ll!ISWer queG!ions Ill bis dcposlllon mrulted in
plaintiff's fail= ID aiU:qua!ely prove !hat he was teady willing and able to pllt'C:hago the PfOll'!llY 1,lllllcr
the !ll'A. KPC prepared the opposition and dcolalafiOllS and other evi_d=oo: in support of the opposition
totllDMot!Oll forSummmyJvdginmn.
5
6
about Augu&I 22, 2001, KPC

'
Wltltoto YURA axprllSSiugpJa!ntiff's on-go!ttg inumtimi ID purchase the Properties p11rsuant-10 !he RPA
and notified YURA that n:ganilm of the outromo of Yura I. plaintifi"'will agree to aix;epl iM CC&R'&
dmftcd on behalf of Yum." Plaintiff confimu:d ID YURA !bat if the court ruJ.Sd agaim;I ttiJJJ on tho
23.
Aile" YlJRi\. filed he1''summaly judgment matioc, on ar
9. CC&ll's ~
10
be WDUld agra to the Cc&Rs as ptUpo&ed 'oy YURA.
At that
time, KPC
plainlifi'that ~bad takl:li all ~onu=aiyto prot;ctbis righll; to pii!diaSe the Propmtitis.
24.
11
~ or abollt September 10, 200), llie trial court granted YURA's
motion tm 6\ln'lnuirr
12 judgment against plllintiff in Yllnl l. The uiabcriirt emmeously held. that plaintiff ceuld llOI n:qlliie
13
YURA to wcord or ll.8g01iate any psrticu!Sr CC&R's liecauaeplaint!ffbad been inslnlc~ byKPC mit
14
ta misWcr qucstiom at his dapositionmid he :fi>llowad those instructionS.
25.
lS
16
about
The trill! cOmt denied pluintifi's motian
Navernber
n, 2001;. Ille
m;, ~deralion in Yura .1. ~._on ar
trial court ~ l!lllllillUY judgm~t
a&a;nst plainrilf in
l"unz "J.
17 Alihough plaintiff did appeal the siPnmmy judgmcn~ md the Court of Appciil. subs~Ut:111ly revmed.the
18
111
ttial coUrt'$ ~ judgIDe!!t, YURA utated fut: lriB.I ~&summary j~t as final prior Ui tho
~
u:
20
In November
. 2001, plaintifi're!Dimd F&B to m:t es attameya and provide lcgiil s:Mces
.
Zl for bis benC!it to pTCteC'I mid ...iablisl,tp~s iigh!!; in the Properties us hereln alle&Cd.- N. the~ of
22 their retmtion. F&B \1/as given a ctJfJ'f of the com:spmldt:ncc tclating to 1b.e RP A and ROFR. includiDg
Z3
2S
pl.ahitlff'& hueresl in the l'fOPC~ im:lpro~ phiintiff's _righi to pUit>hase !hr: Properua in tho
ovem that the ~art deoid"d against plBinlifi' cm the ce&R issue. On ar ~Ollt November 27, 2001,
26
YURA noUfi.ed plaintill' she intended to evilit him from 1he 938 PmJ!erty.
27
::.
24
'
the above reCtirenced

August 22, 2001 KPC letttr.
and vias !Uny awiue that .F&a
.
.
. wm: .to prcitect
-
i:.
28
27.
Oil cit about, December 11, 2001, plaintlffwnitc m YURA and boOi: (l) ofimod to close
i\j. purchase of the 938 l'ropcrty buro~ by m
CC&R's; ond ('2) _provided proof tbal he was ~y.

4
;I
COMPl..AINT
:.
"
000459
L
".
........
- - - ---"'T"- ___ _.
'
'
willln& lllll1 a'o\c wpert"omi.
. On Deeeniher 13, 20Dl. YURA '&_ COlllJSel scnu a let!cr stating: "the Court Cllll:n:d
'
.
Judgment agiillst you end held that you did not have the right to enfolllc tbr; Agrcemems witil Frederick
28.
4 HmT!!h A& to the offer to purch83c the 938 Property eoutainedin your December ll, 2001, it iatejectW."
. 29.
On er about January 11., 2002, F&B filed a._s_econd 1awmi1 against 'YURA (Y= 2).
allegiiig
. lbll1 YURA .had lneaobocl lhio RPA Dll December 13, 2001 and sei:kin~ opccifu> performam:D. of
1 the RPA Bild .ROFR a.greemaita. At all tiines -mentioned bciein, F&B affinnatively repmscnted and
8 provided adviCCJti> plaintlff th!lt bis rigbls bl tim Propet!!c:swould beprotectod and were cnfoillcablcby
9
way afYura 2.
10
30.
On or about lanlll?Y 22, 2002, YURA sold th!l 944 property,ti> Michael Sinel.
ll
31.
On or about J1111iuur2S. 2002, plaintilllllechnlitlce of appeal In Yrw L
12
0n or aboutAprll. n. 2002, YURA evicted phiilltill"frmn dic938 Property.
13
33."
On or Dhout April 10, 2002._lhe_oourt in Y&ira 2 abated Yura 2 until the &al rcschllion of
Y~J Oil t1ieground. that there was auotbr:r_ actimi pendiDg"Rllating io 111e Smu:_tnmsact1on that w!'S IM
IS ili.lllject mailer Qf Yura l.
14
34.. On. or
about May Z3,. 2003,
judgment in Y.iro
.
. the Court
. of App111l revcmcd the snmm~ry
.
'
.
17 I. holding YURA had &iled tii provide. evidence showmg tbat plaintiff was not ready, wi11ing. and ablo
16
I S to '{Jlilcbasc ill<> 938 l"roPatY.

19
35. Defendanls, and eacli oflh=m, rqncsented plai:ltiffat the triafof Yura J.
_lo
36.
21
. :l
'!!!
finding Iha! plainlilf lllld H~S did llDt i=ch an. c:nf=eabll: apeinmt Oil lhe CC&R's, ,Ihm
YURA .
22
23
been fullilled.
'
or about September 14, 2009, t!1J: appell&caurt affimicd thejudgmt:at in.funz I.'
24
37.
On
25
38.
Aller Yura I was detamined in favor ofYURA. on or abOUI Novtllllbcr 27, 20!l9, YURA
' Z1
..
.
.'
could IllCiat4 her own &et af CC&R' &, and that th: CO!lditian pn:iccdciit to tho o!Cse of esarow hall not yet
26
'
... -;.t;.
On or abo1ll Allgust 8, 2007, lbe .oomt fomid in favor of YUllA and agaioGI plaintiff
28
=vcd fgr ~ jlldgmem in .Ytlt 2 asserting that plainliff's tigbi lo enfim:tJ 1hc RPA and RO"FR
P.,.
...
~
~ iri Yi= z involved
the
531De pdmary
r:igh! as Ywo l. On Mey S, 2010, the courl in Yuro ~
YURA's motiun mttl en~ j~ent against p~ denyiiii bil!I the
.
ai:hl ID cnfurce mo
I
I
I ;,
~.
000460
'
'
.. '" .
',
..
-----'
1 RPA and ROFR.

J1IRST CA.US_OFACTION
(ProfcsSimw Negligence Against 1111 DefCildants) .
39. Plaintiff hereby realleges and incotparates by reference paragmpbs l tb:ough 38,
S int;lusive, hcrei11.
6
7
40.
Dcfcndllnls, and eiich of1hem, bad 11 dllly lo provide competent, Jllllf=;sjonal legal advice
B!M! legal reprcsemat!on fa llCIXIIdZnce wltb the mndiird of i=i. establimed fur uttomeys in 1he relevant
8 legal COIJm;llDlity. By virnte. of their relationshlp 1t1 llttamey!i forplsirttiff, Defendants, and each of 1hem,
g owed plaintiff the highest duties of Clll'I) and loyalty, which dlltlcs inelwkd,. among othen, IO perfonn
10
respoitslllilitim as attorney oomPctcnuy and in a non:ll!lglig=t
11
pnidenl!y, to properly mid ftllly advise plainlifr BS to all gf hi& rigbls aiuf ramedics, imlluding !be best
12
5lrategy linl1 procechm:s to ~ all of bis legal rights;~ make lbU dlsclozure of mBtetisl lilcts
13
~ io rqws~on ofplaimiff; ID sci in.plaintlll's best interests, to coimsel plailltiff ooa:i to
14
enable him to avoid injury; rn act eihicaliy and '?lith integrity as.to_ Plal!ltiit Biid to oomply wllh the
lS
)lTOfessfonalty, diligently end .
aumd8ids of competence 8nd etbics of a!lmneys in rho re!Mmt legal oomm1111ily.
The D'*'1danis, 1111d
. 16 each oftbi:m, had a ilducimydutyto edvisc plaintiff of all matmaJ and relevant fa(ls; ill:ludiDg, wi!hollt
17
UnrllstlOn. that Defendants, and. each ofthmi, hall committed i=ll.ofnegligi:nccin ~ wilh th:ir
lS
rqrresentDtion of plaintiff.
111
20
4t DefcndantS wen: ~ ~ Iha! the goB.l of plaln!iff was to pmchasc !be _piopertics
1mder tM RPA Bild ROFR; Wheth=r or not the CC&R issues .vere dmnnined in ms favor. P!aintiir!iad
21
the o0111nilitual rlght to do so 1111(\ar the llXlllS or the R.!'A. ~fcadanls were tetained to protect the abQ~
22
melltloned rights.
23
.. 24
-~
failllls
42. Defem!DillS, snd each of them. breached lhW duties to plaintiff, by, among othel"tbings,
1n
.
competently pafoim the task&
ttiey agreed
I ".
to perfonn for plaintiff, such as, for example,
25
raiu 118 to ptotcct plniatiff's ~ UDdcr a;e IU'A 1111d ROFR;
26
pur~
27
Qf~ntifi"~ rightG bi tluo Piopl:rties; fziling to arlvise and disi:lcse. to plalntifi' tha1 .tluo effect of tb=_ir
28
~tion stmtcgy&?d 8Q(iansor imetions In Yw1d wouW be conclusive apmStpleintiffln Yura Z;.
-.~
fa11ing to pralloc! plaintifr dghts to
the J>roPertics; failing to litigate tho YuTiJ 1 aotian ln a mmmer that would prcvcm the lc$S of
il
,I
I.
000461
..
'
failing 1ll advise snd discloso iD plBimilf tllal he stood to lose bis tlght to pmcbase the ~. iis a
1W1lt of their fmUire to seek opecific per:frinn8ni:e of !he PSA and ROFR in Yiaa I. in lhe event the ooW'I
'.l
detemiinm that plaintiff end HARRlS bad not reached agreement on the CC&R.'s or that tru: YURA bl!d
the right to um1aietally chapgo them; fililirig 1D take actions to pievent the !tttim:tion ofplaiulifi's rigbt
S in the Piopcrtics; failing to adviset>~tifl'tha!tbe Iaws.iit reganling CC&R's, Yum 1, wouldextingD!sh
plaintiff'& right& ~ botb pl1?llhaS= the 938 Property and )Us nght of first refusal .Qll tho -~~
Propmlies; r~ to recognize and/or disdose_ 1111d/or elimlnate lhe riSb pn:sented by R'.PC's lltigalian
8 stramgy; end
fa_iting to take stt:ps in Yrmi 1 or gtlu:rwi;e to protect p!ahitiff's rigbl& in 1hc ProperlitlS,
9 whicbrigblswere lost on May S, 2010, wbm lllll courtin,Yunz 2 woukl not JlC!Tnit plaintiffto'liligatc the
LO
11
Yura 2 ii&tion end entctedjudglluml agniusl plaintiff on MB)' 5, 2010.

Ddcndanls, and each ofthtm, liJrther breached their dulies to plaintil!;_ by, among other
43.
ll
lhiugs, formulalhlg and then fiiiling to cmy out lilliiaticm Stral.el!les in a. oampetiiill ll!ld timely 11llltlllt:;
.
'
failing to take step& to protect pbiintiff'& rights, for e.x.11mplc:, .Wling lo properly aiial~ 1ile ek:mlmla
14
n=oary to litigate Yllrtl 1 and Y~ 2 to pmtcet _plainlifl"a rights iu the Propatie& ani(pre=tt
15
plainliff's dallJiF irom tho loi6 ofthOSll rigb!s; lluliDg to

.
'
.
.
..
12.
. 16
Yura J; BJJ.dfor' jo liL!ling ID litigato plaiXllift'e claims
protcet plaintiff"s.rigbl to 'Ille Pro~es. ~

'
in t'rtn1 1 in a m.amier that Wiillld. pre$mve "

'
17 pliiint!tl's rlghl to seek enf=emcnt of the PSA .and R.OFR in l'IU'll 2.

18
_;
By vimic of 11ieir n:la1ionsbip as attDmeys for plaintift defendSl!tB. w1 =1! of them, Ill
44.
19 all timea hcrcill inentioned in this ecinplalm cwo1lplainliff, BDd ea(:b. ofthmi, the highest fiduciaty Biid.
20
ctlu:r duties, which duties inr;luded, - g others, the duties to provide lcga1 services -proU:ssiOllally, in
21
utmost.good
22
utmOSt care, good fallh. integrity, hlnlcsty, and !Dyalty, md to. provide legal scrvlCes in comp~ wilb
23
the swulurdS of compctcD;C and
24
righls_ and
25
counsd plaintiff so as to c:118ble hiro to avoid iDjmy, ID act ethically 1111d with in1Cgtity as ID plaintlft mid
2.6
to avoid adverse' n:presmla!l.On&. In addlllon, Defendanls, 1111d each 11f them, had a.." further flduCi&ry
27
~ to plaln!iff'.of exercising ~!c sldi1. ;irudence !ind diligeni;e mperl'arming ie!Pl serliccs for
'
28
'
fahb. w!lh total dediGalion to plalliliifs ~t inter=u, wltholl! contllcts-oflmmsl, with

ethiC3 .of attomeys in Ibis cmnrnuolty, to fully advi~ p!ainliff of his
remedies, to mab full disclosure. of lll3leria1. facts relalin~ to iqnasenmtion cifplllilllif!', tc
~.
000462
lt
j
I
4S.
Defendants, and each of Wm, breached their fiducillry obligations by, anmng mh8r
thlf!gs, failhtg II> timely di<closa edvme Information to plainti~ fur example; f'allure tD advise plaln1iff
of tho risks
YUl'll J IOISO so as to~ result lna bar to the H~ ofYura 2; flulil!g 111 avoid prejudi~plairitifi's
oftheir litigetion ~in Ylll"U I llJJd Yunz 2; defeml.snls' failure to properly liHgate the
S righ!s by fiiilill!l to advise plai1'!1iff of !be riskS of !heir litigaticm strategies; failing to diwl.osc ro plainliff
6 that their w1= to litipte tbe issues raised in YURA 2 would oollatcrally cstop lltigstion of those issuCs
1 in YURA 2; falling to nwke ihe disclOs~ as allc:gcd herein; failing to oompeteotly, diligwitty and
ti:lnciy bsndleo the work; all ofwbich c:llUSCd i.ajury and damitgo to pialntiit
46.
Deflmlianni kntm, or Bhollld have knOWll, 1hat their fa!llll'C to properly litigate rights to
10 spcelfic pcrl'ormmce or brcm:b of conttaat in Y11111 J would ~I in tho loss of rights to purchas$ .Ille
11
Piopcrtics. I?dendant& failed
12
did :not 'know,. and could not; even with 1he exercise of reasonable clil!gence. lmvc:. discovered, that
lo
timely and.properly disdase lhal !hair strategy ~as in mer. Plaitlliff
l'.l
Dcfenrlant ~ ocimmltmd ibB fmegoing acts 0f ~g=e, until b Trial Comt in Y11n1 2 i'ulc:d that !lie
14
Yura 2 was bain:d on the iro1llJds

of mi judicata.on May S,2010. Arry cause of. BCtivn for negli8em:e
.
. '
15
againstlbb Dcfcndan~ ~ nothaVc ~ illttil MSy S; 2010-tho date
when clio Court in Ylll'P Z :..
16 .~ 118. judgment :agBinst p)aintiff - when plaintiff lbr

. the fir.;t time ~. that 1. The advice,.
17 Stralegy, Plld legal ~UllSCI of Defemtants to litigate Y~ l the way that DcfendaJ!IB in fuci liligUed Yum
18
1 was ea:micous, and Iha.I the~ upon. Yura 2 to c:cc?' plaintiff'$ rlghlll to puiclwe the Propmties -
19 M1$ inoo=t mu!. barred by res judica!a; 2. dcfcndanis.- end each of lherii, committed lhe biem:hes and
- 20 oiher misc<mduct all=i!cd he!ciJi. Plaintiff coald noi have disco~ er leilnled. even wilh lb: c=cisc
of-rcasolll!ble diligence, that the advii:e, stralcgy, aD!i legal anmsel of defendanls was. ln=ect or \WU
.
22 neglig;m mrtil May S, 2010, since Plaintiff lUSOl'lllbly rC!ied ll(>Dlt dcfcadanls' adWe, strategy, and
:Zl
'
23
legal GQ\\!ISC] as.to lbll proper eetiDDs l\!ld proclldu.res In Yw11 l Bild Yura 2. Based upon defC!Jdants'
legal advice wbm filing Yll1'0 2 and ~;plaintiff belicwetl he could pumu: enfmcoment of his
2S
righ1s to purchase the Ptaperties in Yura 2, mid did not kllow, UDlil May 5, 2010, that Ylll'll ~ wis barred
26
- __
by res Judicata. Mon:ovi:r, piaintilf did not~ any actual injury un111 May 5, 2010, when tho Court
,i;,
27 iler thD fim time di$llli$Sed YW'll 2 based upon a lin4ing of res judic:ata. Fer all aC\hesc =sons, the _
28
,. 5lallI cl.alms for malpractice did not ac= 1111til May 5, 2010.
8
CXlMl'l..AIN'r
'~.
0004S3
_..:.
',
..I
47.
On i~tiQll and belief, oetendants, lll:ld CB!lh of thtiri, 'willihlly concealed tbm-
3 s1at!J10 ofUniliatians as to Defendants' negligence was tolled as a rcsul1 ofthis willful con=lment until
4
May 5, 2oio, whm plaintiffacqllired llC!wil knowledge ofDrlimomJ!S' ncgligc:nce and plaintiff suffemi
w:too1 hi.jury BS 11 tesW1 ofDefendants' negligence.

48;
AA
11
proximate result or defeDdsnt's b~ of duties, illcludlng. fhc aat:n described
abow._ Dll or about May S, 2010 plaintiff' lost his rights to the 'Properties, suffiited c0mpen;atmy and
co=quential damages. inan amilUITT in excess of the minimum jurlsdietioml limits of the court, with
9 the. Clllld lllllllunl to be ~tcmrined at ma!, hilt believed to be in = o f $1 s.000,000.0().

10
49. . As a farther proiimale n:sult of defendanl'& breaches of duties, including, Iha a.ts
11
ilescn"bcd abO'le, plaintiff suffered fuithcr damages bY paying ~ fees tti the DfM<lm11S for wmk.
12
wbillh was 11egligent Pncl for which Defmdanta were not enlidcd to be cairipensated, in an amount ID be
13
. .. 14
IS
d&rmined at lrial. .
As tim:ht;;t proximate ~-of
ilmndant's ~
\he ic1S
' so.
.. of .~ei. mclllliing.
.
described above, 1he Courts in:Yura I imd Y= 2 have awanlcd aticmeye fees Bnd 'oosta in lliwr o~
-..'
- .
.
.
.
.
.YT.IRA
lllld
agiiinsl
platotiff
1b;se
.costs
an4
tees
constitute
fiuthlll'
AamgilS~
by plainlifl' for -. .: :. ' -'.
If> . . .
'
. .
.
-whiol1
ho
seeb
a
fll!1hcr
damage~
bllCOaUSe
such
ll1ICmeY"
f.ooS
and
Costs
~
the
product
o!
.
~
.
17
-
'
18 Defendanui' negligent legal edvice, OOUDSCl, a!!d stmw~es.

'SECOND CAUSE OF .ACTION
19
-.(For Breach ofContract Agsinst All Defendallls)
. 20
. 21
51.
22
Complaint.
'23
52.
PWnllff hea!Dy n:al1eg=; and incorpomtcs by mm== pmawa:pbs -1 lhrough 50 of lhl&
Subsequent
Ill
plaln!iff retalnhlg clcfcndfn!!s, dcf...,di!llb provided lCgal ~ to
cxmditiam '!lf the wrilt~
24
pllli!lliff wbidi wm not oompelr:nt and not in compllanDC with tbe 1mDS and
25
re!aiper agieelllr:nt with F&B.
26
~ p-l to thon:tainer agreemeiit, except to the extent =used by the conduct oftbe Defen6aw.
27
211
'""
,;:
53.
Plaillliffhas performed e2Qb aod svery obligation to be perlilrmed by
II
Defendants~ their coii=mal obliganona to plaintiff by, ainang otherlllillg!, !be
! ...
a@ts sctiOllh lm=iJi above.

r~
,!
0004S4
'
- ----:-------- -------------
..
l
2
-- - ..
---------.-- --
Defendants fiu1cd _to protect and preseiVe plaintiff's ~ in tJm Properties during !ho
54.
aPhm plaiuliff QJI the CC&R issues ~r abOU!
trial of y..,., 1 in which the judfl!Jlent was i:=idered
3 Augimt 8, 2007. DefrmdaJI!s further failed to protccit Slid prese:ve plllilltilrS inurest in the Pioperties
4
s
which was ID be enfl)rt>ed in Yura 2. Suboeqac:nt 11>. the e:lll'y a{ Jwli;mont in YllTQ 1, the dll~15, and
~ucnces
dist:ovei, and could ~orhs.ve ~ ~ ~ mid other misccnduet alleged h~ Ull!:il May S,
each of thorn, on mfi?imation lllld belie~ concealed lhe true facts from plailltifl' regarding the utiimate
of thei:1" brea.abes to plaintiff. ~ a =lt of dcf=ndant's conduct, plaiatiff ~ not
8 2010.
There ms implied in1o \he agr=ncnls bdtYTeen plaintiff" and the defendants. and e;ach of
SS.
Impliedly cavcmmted to, in good

10 them, a covlmillll of good fal!h lll1li mr dalliig
. . whmby the defi:ndanls
.
t..I
ftlitb, and in .tho cw:roise of.fair&aling, perl'ot111 tbc!r legal scmces tllld rsnder legal advjce &irly and
12 btlnes1ly and do n01hlng ID impair, inlctfere with, hinder, or pote11tially injore plaintiff or. deprive
13
plaint!ft' of the bCne1its ol'!he comraet. 11s aJ1eg<ld herein, d~!S, ind ew:h of them, lm=h:d Ille
14 ccvenant by their aets, -~ end cODCe81meais, as elleged bereinahove.

..
S6.
IS
AB
Bil
ae111a1 and ptoximalc
~It
of the lm:aebes of. tho i8tBinm
and each ofti.em. ll!ld bI=h:s()flh:: implied covcnantE,plaiDlifi'~ sustrlneddamageo in
16
DCrendams,
17
111181ll0Unt In eiaiess of the minim.um jnrisdiaional limits of this c;oort, to be proven at the time oflrial..
\g
57.
.'
~- by. !bl:
.' .
..
.'
The rclainer agteemcllt b~ plaintill' and cldendimls provides lbr -=able
fees to me prevailing party whi~h ~ an lltltn1U:y in ~ ev~ an action is -prosecuted to
19
attorneys'
20
enforce or imerpret its tmns. ~laiulilf ~
1:11 recover
.
!Lis atlDmeyS'. fees im:umld in Qio fi1lpg and
Zl pro.secution of 1hia ACtion agaiust ell~

WHEREFORE, Plaintifi; Stcplien M. Gaggero, prays forjudgmmt ~Defendants. and caoh
:z2
23
oftbem, 11!1 filllowi:

A.
24
I. CompCJlSatOl'Y daluage$, plus iimest at the ll:gal nile, ln Bil lllDOllllt to be }l'IOWll Ill
2S
26 trial;
If:
21 .,.
28
'
On the First Caiiso of Actiou, tha1 plllill!ifrbe awa:rded:
1..
2. Conscque11tial damages, plus illt=st at 1he legal rat.c, u. an amount to be proveu at
~
10
,!
0004{)5
-----
----
---- -----------
"' ...
1
3. Cams of siilt iiu.tmed ~ and
4. Such Oiiier and fllrthM ielld' m: tile Catut deems j'wn and proper.
.
.
On th.; StcOnd CllllSeof Aelion, tlut pla!n!iff'be awarded:
.
.
I. Compeu5atmy damages, plllS Interest al tlw legal mle from the dam af breal:h, bi an
B.
S 11111auut to be proven at trial;

2. Disgotge.mmt of the fees paid to dcf<mdanls plus iJllereSt e:t tho legal ate from tho dato
7 of payment, in an amount to be proven m)rial:

B
3. Costs of suit inl:arred b=reln:
4. l.IJ:asonable 8llllmBy!I' fi:cs; and
S. SUch other ID!d furlhcr relief as Um Coutl deems just end proper.
lO
11
Sqit=ber 12, 2010
Wcstlab lAw G.tiup..
12
13
14
.. 15
16.
:....
... ..
..
..
. ' ,'
...
..
..
..
....
'
... ~
....
..
',,
: .
17
18
19
..
20.
21
22
23
24
25
26
21
28
p:.
;_!!
.,
''"'
\"'
P.
: 11
'
,,
"
000466
,.
rv;rrr
',
:.11, I II .i ltl! .11: .. 11
I 1 i'r I I I t I '/,I 'I '
. \
.,
,1
I:
000467
EXHIBIT W
',
1 WESTI-AKE LAW GROUP

David :Slake Chatfield (State Bar No. 88991)
2 2625 Townsgate Road, Suite 330
Westlake Village, CA 91361
3 Telephone: (805) 267-1220
Facsimile: (805) 267-1211
4

5 Stephen M Gaggero
6
7
SUPERIOR COURT OF TIIE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOR TIIE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
JO
STEPllENM GAGGERO, an individual,
11
::
14
15
Plaintiff;
KNAPP, PEW:EN AND CLARKE, a

Californiacoiporation; STEVEN RAY
GARClA, an mdividual; STEPHENM
HARJ.US, an individual; ANDRE JARDINI,
an individual; DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
.
)
)
)
)
CASE NO.: BC286925
11
PLAINTIFF STEPHEN M. GAGGERO'S

SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO
DEFENDANT KNAPP, PETERSEN &
CLARK'S REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS
.
[PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVlL
PROCEDURE 708.030]
Defendants.
16
17
lS
PROPOUNDINGPARTY:
DEFENDANT KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE
19
RESPONDING PARTY:
PLAINTIFF. S1EPHEN M GAGGERO
20
SET NUMBER:
ONE
21
22
23
24
25
26
~~-~- .-_~.:_::n:.
'
j ;I,
__ -.- __--:.-=-~::::::-~
_:.:.:..:... :.
-~--
. ----
->o
'
'
0004x_
.
58
w-
'.
1
2
Plaintiff Stephen M Gaggero ("Plaintiff") hereby resp mids and objects to Defendant
Knapp, Petersen & Clarke's ("Defendant") Request for Production of Documents.
3,
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Nothing in this supplemental response shall be construed as waiving any rights or
objections thiit might otherwise be available to Plaintiff, Plaintiff makes this response subject to
and without waiver of;

(!)the right to make additional objections or seek protective orders in the event additional
7
8
review of files results in further information;

{2) the right to object to other discovery directed to the subject matter of the Requests; and
(3) the right to revise, correct, supplement, or clarify the response.
JO
11
SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DOCUMENT REQUESTS
12
13
DOCUMENT REQUEST N0.1:
14
15
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE t.o theArenz.ano Trust
RESPONSE TO DOCUMENT REOUEST NO. 1:

Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad, unduly burdensome
16
17
and harassing and Unlimited 8.s to scope and time. Because plaintiff does not control the trust, and
18
is not entitled to any disnibution from the trust, plaintiff further objects to this request on the
19
grounds that it seeks d(){lUIDents that are n~th~ .relevant nor n:ase>nabl:,r calculated to.lead to ~e ..
20
discovery of admissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the
21
grounds that it calls for the production of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure
22
by plaintiff's and third parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff further objects
23
to this request on the grounds thiit it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the.
24
attorney-client privilege and/or the littorney work-product doctrine. Those documents include
. 25
..
communications between plaintiff and his co11I1Sel, the trust and their counsel, and the beneficiaries
............... 26 .... and-their-cGUnsel.--' ---- ----------.... --- - .............................. - ...............
- ..
,,.
__ ..................
. '
=- i..: ... .
--
. . . .. .. ..... - ~.991.~.~-
ii,
'-.
1 The trust is irrevocable and Plaintiff has no control or financial interest in it. The trust was set up
2
over 14years ago, well prior to defendant's judgment. Trust documents are believed by pli!intiffto
be in the possession and COJ!trOl of the attorney and Trustee, Joseph J. Praske, however, the
requested documents are irrelevant to the propounding parties' judgment collection efforts and are
otherwise subject to the privileges an~ privacy rights set forth above.
DOCUMENT REOUEST NO. 2:
7
8
10
and harassing and unlimited as to scope and time, Because plaintiff does not control the tru,st, and
11
is not entitled to any distribution fn1m the trust, plaintiff further objects to this request on the
12
grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the
13
discovery of admissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff furlher objects to this request on the
14
15
16
to this request on the grounds that it seeks doC!llllents :that a,re protected from clisclosure by.the
17
attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine. Those documents include
I8
conununications between plaintiff and his counsel, the trust and their counsel, and the beneficiaries
I9
and their counsel.
20
Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections and limitations, Plaintiff responds
21
as follows: I>.laintiffhas i;io trust documents responsive to this request in his possession or control.
22
The trust is irrevocable and Plaintiff has no control or interest in it The trust was set up over 13
23
years ago, well prior to defendant's judgment. Trust documents are believed by plaintiff to be in
24
the possession and control of the attorney and Trustee, Joseph J. Praske, however, the requested
25
doCllillents are irrelevant to the propounding parties' judgment collection efforts and are otherwise
- -26.
'
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to the Giganin Trust.
~bject-to
theprivileges and-privacy rights-set-forth above,.
'11
..
'--t.JlELA'lE to the-Aquasant~undatiou----------+---
'
000470
'
RE8PONSE TO DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 3:
3 and harassing and unlimited as to scope and time. Because plaintiff does not control the trust, and
4
is not entitled to any distribution from the trust, plaintiff further objects to this request on the
5 grounds that it seeks documents that are-neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the
6
discovery of admissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff finther objects to this request on the
grounds i:hat it calls for the production of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure
to this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the
10
attorney-client privilege and/or the a:ttoil:iey work-product doctrine. Those dociunents include
11
comm1m\cations between plaintiff and his counsel, the trust and their counsel, and the beneficiaries
12
and their counsel.
13
14
as follow8: Plaintiff has no trust documents responsive to this request in his possession or control.
15
The trust is irrevocable and Plaintiff has no control or interest in it: The trust was set up over 14
16
years ago, well prior to defendant's judgment Trust documents are believed by plaintiff to be in
17
ihe possession and control of the attorney and Trustee, Joseph J. Praske, however, the requested
18 ' documents are irrelevant to the propounding parties' judgment collection efforts and are otherwise
19
~ject to_ the p_ri~leg~ and p~vacy_ rights ~et fortha!J~ve ...
20
DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 4:

All DOCUMENTS that RELAIB tO iloy trust or foundation that is part of YOUR ESTA1E
21
22
PLAN,
23
RESPONSE TO DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 4:
Plaintiff objects to the definition ofESTAIB PLAN set forth inDefeiidant's Definitions in
24
25
that it includes but is not limited to the preparation of any plan of administration and disposition of
- - 26- Plainti.fr-s-preperty;OWned-by.P!aintiff-ai-any-time in any eapacity;-beforeor after-death-including
.~:
:\:'
'.~'
;i~1
[..
'
.. - . - .
..
'
... - ..
.... 00.9171 . ...
'
I.
on the ground that such an expansive group of definitions imposes a bwden greater than what is
required by the California Rules of Civil Procedure. and makes tile requests overly broad, unduly
bwtlensome, oppressive, harassing and/or.not otherwise reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of evidence relevant to the inquiry into Plaintiff's current assets, which is the sole
subject of this discovery.
Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it is not limited to any relevant
scope and time period. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks
documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence in this action: Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it calls for the
10
production of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff's and third
11
parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the
12
grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege
13
and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
14
15
as follows: Plaintiff has no trust documents responsive to this request in his possession or control.
16
Trust documents are believed to be in the possession and control of the attorney and Trustee,
17
Joseph J. Praske, however, the requested documents are irrelevant to the propounding parties'
18
judgment collection efforts and are otherwise subject to the privileges and privacy rights set forth
19
above..
20
21
22
All DOCTJMENTS tlmtRELAlEto YOUR ESTATE PLAN.
23
Plaintiff objects to the definition of ESTATE PLAN set forth in Defendant's Definitions in
24
that it includes but is not limited to the preparation of any plan of administration and disposition of
25
Plaintiff's property, owned by Plaintiff at any time in any capacity, before or after death including
- --26 -will;trust;-gifts;"or.Power-ofattorney,-or-any-cthermethodof-estate-planning-and-further-refers to
:~
.:....: : . zr tlle:ftiillSfer:or any-:-asseis:ownea.oy:l?laiiitiff..atfilly".tifue.Tu.&fy.l!ERSON..or.ENm:Y.co11eC!i.vely:. -.
:i:;
i..:;:'-:,----'n~nll'o-1n-the-growd-that-such-an-expansi>te-grwp.W.dc!initions-imposes.a-bllrden
:.: ...-::::
greater thB!I wha1...1",:;.....o-1---
~i~.
, 1
;~i
.. 000.472
required by the California Rules of Civil Procedure and makes the requests overly broad, unduly
burdensome, oppressive, harassing and/or not otherwise reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of evidence relevant to the inquiry into Plaintiffs current assets, which is the sole
4. subject of this discovery.
documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to .the discovery of ad!ll.issible
evidence in this ~ction. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it calls for the
9.
production of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff, s and third
10
parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy, Plaintiff further_ objects to this request on the
11
grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attClIley-client privilege
12
and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
13
14
as folloy;s: Plaintiffs estate plan was set up over 14 years ago. Plaintiff has no documents
15
responsive to this request in his possession or control that are within any reasonable time period of
16
the judgment Plaintiffs estate plan is irrevocable and was established over 14 years ago. Estate
17
Plan documents, as plaintiff interprets the definition, ari: ~!=1ieved to be in the possession and
18
control of attorney Joseph J. Praske, however, the requested documents are irrelevant to the
19
P~P!l.~~ng p~es' ~~d~ent ~.~.ection ef'fo~ and are o~envise S\lbiect to, attorney clie~t .
20
privil~ges
~l.
22
.23
24
25
and the other privileges and privacy rights set forth above.
All DOCUMENTS RELATING to any.COMMUNICATION REFERENCING YOUR
ESTATEPLAN.
Plaintiff objects to the definition of ESTATE PLAN set forth in Defendant's Definitions in
--26- .that.itincludes-but.is-not-limited-to.thepreyaration.of-any-plan.of.administration-and.disposition of..
I ~. -:~--=.:__-21:
. ;ri
ii:,
....
.,o
.-
11 ..............
~-
....
..
--
_..t.. .
- ... _ _..-...._
--~
- - --r-- . ,_
:~:
i~'I
, 1
:~,
. I
000473 ..
',
1 the transfer of any assets owned by Plaintiff at any time to aey PERSON or ENTITY collectively
2
on the ground that such an ei.pansive group of definitions imposes a burden greater than what is
required by the California Rules of Civil Procedure and makes the requests overly broad, unduly
burdensome, oppressive, harassing and/or not otherwise reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery.of evidence relevantto the inquiry into Plaintiff's current assets, which is the sole
subject of this discovery.
documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
IO
evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it calls for the
11
production ofirrelevant dOCUJnenis that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff's and third
12
13
grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege
14
and/or the attorney work-product doctrine. The documents requested relate to and include
15
comm~cations _between
plaintiff and his counsel over 14 years ago.
16 DOCUMENTREOUESTN0. 7:
All DOCUMENTS 1hat RELATE to any trust in which YOU are the trustor regardless of
17
18
YOUR present income or financial interest
19
RE~PO.~SE
20
:ro ~~-<;~~ ~<)UE~T N_~ 7:
21
and harassing and unlimited to scope and time. Because plaintift; does not control any trust and is
22
not entitled to any distribution from any 1rust, plaintiff further objects to this request on the
23
grounds thiit it seeks documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the
24
25
- ..... --26- by-plaintiff'-s-and-third-parties'--Goostitutionally-proteoted -right-of-privacy, Plaintiff-further-objects .. --.. . - .

..:::: .:. _.:.::: Zk:
fO
tDi!:IBqile.St mane 'gfiiffiids:tlilltit"SlffiKS "ilOQmre'ii!UliaU!re~ fi'Qm~e.hy:tife:::.~:. ~ .:
1-+.;t~i-'-''---~~-:l!...111.attcmtlejt.cl'~~u-~-~~--ri"~:ge.-m--o.dJ,~'oi:.th.fte..a:ltoI!le}LW<mk.iiiwe1uc1LW:x:ti:ine..:tlml>e..c11oC111111JeotiW.titcluide.~~l--~(~;.
.
.
000474
'
1 commUllications between plaintiff and his counsel, the trust and their counsel, and the beneficiaries
2
and their counsel.
as follows: Plaintiff has no trust documents responsive to this request in his possession or control.
5 Trust documents are believed by plaintiff to be in the possession and control of the attorney and
6 Trustee, Joseph J. Praske, however, the requested documents are inelevant to the propounding
7
parties' judgment collection efforts and are otherwise subject to the privileges and privacy rights
set forth above.
9 DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 8:
1O
11
..
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any trust in which YOU are a TRUST PROTECTOR.
12
13
and harassing and unlimited to scope and time. Because plaintiff does not control any trust and is
14
not entitled to any disttibution from any trust, plaintiff further objects to this request on the .
15
16
17
18
by plaintiff's and third parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff further.objects
19
I() this _i:equest OD t!ie_ ~llll~.thiit it se_eks dcx;um_ents. that
20
attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-product docttine. Those documents include
21
communications between plaintiff and his counsel, the trust and their counsel, and the beneficiaries
are (ll'C~tected frOO) dis.c!osure by th~
i2 and their counsel.

23
24
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control. Trust
25
documents are believed by plaintiff to be in the possession and control of the attorney and Trustee,
._ .. --... - .. 26- -Joseph J,-Praske; however;the-requested-Oocuments are-irrelevant-to-the-propounding parties'- ... -- --.. ...
...:. : __ :.: . :.-.'27 .. jiTdgmmJ collectioneffons1iiid:are:otlierwisifSiilijecttollie privileges-mdplivacy:-riglits.setfaffh_ : :...
ff~
:_-_
~0- -L---
.... 000475 ....
'
All DOCUMENTS thatRELA'IE to any trust in which YOU are a beneficiary, regardless
of YOUR present income or financial interest.
5_.
and harassing and unlimited to scope and time. Because plaintiff does not control any trust and is
not entitled to any distribution from any trust; plaintiff further objects to this request on the
10
11
12
to this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the
13 attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine. Those documents include
14
communications between plaintiff and his counsel, the trust and their counsel, and the beneficiaries
15
and their counsel.
16
17
as follows: Plaintiff bas no trust documents responsive to this request in his possession or control.
I8
Trust documents are believed by plaintiff to be in the possession and control of the Httomey and
19
~rust~! !o_s~ph J}>ra_:;~e,- hoY".i:ver?.the_~~esu:<I_d~!IBts_~e ~.!~a.iit to the P~()P~_u1:ui~g
20
parties' judgment collection efforts and are otherwise subject to the privileges and privacy rights
21
set forth above.
22
23
All DOCUMENTS that RELA'IE to any trust in which YOU are in class of beneficiaries,
24
regardless of YOUR present income or financial interest.
25
- - ---- -- -2&- -- - ---Plaintiff-ebj ects-to-tbis-requeSHlll-the-grounds--that-it-is-overly -broad;-unduly. burdensome-- -d1iarasSit;g;mi!imlimiWttlr.5Cl>pe:w1tt"time.-seca1iSe:plmntiff"ll.oeS.n~trusI;-!ild:is:~-
.:_::_:-:_-
ot entitled to aJIY distribution from any tnrst., plaimiftfw:tbet-objects.tcWhis.IeqtICSll-OIL.the..----J---
. 000'17G --- -
..
----
-~-------
'
'
I
I
'
1
to this request on the grounds that it seeks docuriients that are protected from disclosure by the
attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine. Those documents include
communications between plairitiff and his counsel, the trust and their counsel, and the beneficiaries
'
i
I
8 and their counsel.

9
IO
as follows: Plaintiff bas no trust'documents responsive to this request in his possession or control.
11
Trust documents are believed by plaintiff to be in the possession and control of.the attorney and
12
Trustee, Joseph J. Praske but that said documents are irrelevant to the propounding parties'
13 judgment collection efforts _and are ,otherwise subject to the privileges and privacy rights set forth
14
above.
15
16
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to bills, fees, invoices, or charges paid on YOUR behalf
17
by any PERSON or EN1ITY including, but not limited to, Pacific Coast Management and Avalon
18
Corporation since 2001.
. . _l? .. -~~}'~~~~ _!0 J)O~~-~Q~~1:.N._~:.!1:_ .. __

20
Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds that the term "on YOUR behalf' is overly
21
broad and compound. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it is i:>verl y broad
22
as to time and scope as to be unduly burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this
. ..
--
..
. .
23
request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated
24
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this
25
request on the grounds that it calls for the production of irrelevant documents that are protected
............... -- .... ------ ... ..
- .... . ... ... . . (}00477 ......
'
as follows: The specified tiJlle period is overlybroad_ and unrelated to any reasonable attempt to
collect this judgment If the propounding party agrees to limit this request to a relevant and
reasonable tiJlle period, Plaintiff will produce documents reasonably responsive to this request in
plaintiff's possession and control that are not privileged. As to fees paid by plaintiff that are not
privileged, those documents "1ave already been produced in discovery in.this action and the
7 . Gaggero v. Knapp, Petersen and Clarke action currently pending before the Los Angeles Superior
8
Court ill which the propounding parties' legal firm is the firm l;hat prepared these discovery
requestS.
10
11
DOCQMENT REQUEST NO. 12:

All DOCUMENTS thatRELAlEtotravel expei;tses paid by YOU or any PERSON or
12
ENTITY on your beh@" since 2001.
RESPONSE TO DOCQMENT REQUEST NO. 12:
14
15
broad and compound. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad
16
as to time and scope as to be unduly burdensome and harassing. -.Plaintiff further objects to this
17
reque~t on
18
19
request ~n the ~IJD.ds t!tat. it Cl!ll.s _for the P.roduction _of irrelevant. d~cuments that_are protected
20
from disclosure by plaintiff's and third parties' Constitutiooally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff
21
further objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from
22
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
23
the grounds that it Seeks documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated
Subjectto and without waiving the foregoing objections and limitations, Plaintiff responds
24
as follows: The 1illle period is overlybroad and unrelated to any reasonable attempt to collect this
25
judgment Should the propounding party agree to limit this Request to a relevant and reasonable
.... --26- tiJlle-periodPlaintiff-wilJ.producedocumenttteasonablyresponsiveto-this-request-in-plaintifr-s - - - - --
.,
I
..
. 000478.
'
--
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to litigation expenses paid by YOU or any PERSON or
ENTIIY on your b~ since 2001.
Plaintiff objects to this request on the grotinds that the term "on YOUR bebalf' is overly
broad and compound. Pl~ further objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad
as to tim~ and scope as to be unduly burdenoome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this
request on the grounds that it seeks documerits that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated
request on the grounds that.it calls for the production of irrelevant documents that are protected
from disclosure by plaintiff's and third parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff
further objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from
disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
as follows: The specified time period
is overlybroad and unrelated to any reasonable attempt to
collect this judgmenL Should the propounding party agree to limit this Request to a relevant and
reasonable time period; Plaintiff will produce dticuments reasonably responsive to this request in
plaintiff's possession and control that are not privileged. As to fees paid by plaintiff that are not
.!l~vi!~~d,_ !!i~~t'._ cl_~en~-~ll'le _alreaify_ b~n_ p~~ in_dis~'ll!f)' __in thjs ~on_l!Jld _th(l
Gaggero v. Knapp, Petersen and Clarke action currently. pending before the Los Angeles Superior
Court in which the propounding parties' legal firm is the firm that prepared these discovery
requests.
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to the transfer of any asset owned at any time by YOU in
25
any capacity.
-- - -------26- -RESfONSE-T-0-DOGUMEN-T-REQUESTN0.-14:----... ---,,--- --- - ---- - -- ------ ---- - - ---
-------------------
...
'
I_
it seeks documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it
calls for the production of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff's
and third parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff further objects to this request
on the grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
SUbject to and without waiving the foregoing objections and limitations, Plaintiff responds
as follows: Plaintiff is not aware of any assets he has transferred since the entry of judgment in
this matter.
10
11
DOCUl\'.lEN'I REQUEST NO. 15:

All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to the transfer of any asset owned at any time by YOU as
12
partofYOURESTATEPLANNING.
13
14
Defendant's Definitions in that it includes but is not limited to the preparation of any plan of
16
administration and disposition of Plaintiff's property, owned by Plaintiff at any time in any
17
capacity, before or after death including will, trust, gifts, or power of attorney, or any other method
18
of estate planning and further refers to the transfer of any assets owned by Plaintiff at any time to
19 ,?DY.P~9:N.o_r_~ coll.edjvely
on. th~gn:>~ ~t.S\lch an exp8J!siyegrollp o~.d~Jiniti?ns ..
20
imposes a burden greater than what is required by the California Rules of Civil Procedure and
21
makes the requests overly broad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, harassing and/or not otherwise
22
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of !Mdence relevant to the inquiry into Plaintiff's
23
current assets, which is the sole subject of this clisc:Oveiy.
25
Plaintiff objects to the definition of the definition of ESTATE PLAN set forth in
15
24
1:
scope and time period. Plii.intiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks
- ..... ----26- -<loGUmentsthat-are-neitherr-elevant-norreasonably-calculated-toleadtothe-discovery-of-admissible

~:: ,... :_:~~ _ ~ .21~
;}'i
0
,:.
"
..eizlaence m fl\is::actWn::: Plliintifffilither:oojeas:uffhi"sreqfiesrati the..groundS:tliar.it.call.ilOf.lh-e::: - _: ~:..:::.

;-i:oducti.-On-Qf:.meleani..cigc;wneots that ai:e pi:otected fl:gm..disdosw:e by p~ll..:tll111U---+--
:::
i :1
...
.~.I
, ...
000480
I
I
I'
.1
2. grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege
3
4
as follows: Plaintiffs estate plan was set up .aver 14 years ago. Plaintiff has no documents
responsive to this request in his possession or control that are within any reasonable time period of
the judgment: Plaintiffs estate plan is irrevocable and was established over 14 years ago. Estate
Plan documents, as plaintiff interprets the Request, are believed to be in the possession and control
of attomey Joseph J. Praske, however, the requested docum.ents are irrelevant to the propounding
10
parties' judgment collection efforts and are otherwise subject to attorney client privileges and the
11
otber privileges and privacy rights set forth above.
12

All DOCUMENTS that RELA1E to any post judgment discovery in any. matter to which
14
YOUresponded.
15
RESPONSE TO DOCUMENT REQUEST N0.16:
16
Plaintiff objects !Othis request on the grounds that it is overly broad as to time and scope as
17
t9 be unduly burdensome and harassing.
18
19
~ss1~~= ~-d~.C?C ~-this_ ~OD. _PI~tit:f_furt.b~':: o~_i:<:ts -~ ~s re.9.l_lest Oil tlie. gr.oun_~ ~ i_t_
20
calls for the production of.irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff's
21
22
23
24
25
Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents after entry of judgment in this case that are responsive to
--.... --26- -this-requestexcept-for-the-discovery-doneinthis case;-which.{focuments-are-already-in -possession- -. --
,.,;;: .. :. ..: .. :.:Z:L

lj:'
1,_r
13
and/or the attorney ~-product doctrine.
of.tlre:feq~::
.. ::.::.. :: ...::.. .:::... -::.....:::_.:::.::.. ::: ..::::...:.:::_ .:. ..::..:::.:::: . ::~::.:_:.-::~ - ::~_:: ~:_::.-::.
,, 0
000481
I'
I
I'
'
2
3
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any judgment debtor exam of YOU since 2001.
RESPONSE TO DOCUMENTREOUEST N0.17:
Plain.tiff o]>jects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad as to time and scope as
to be unduly burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that
admissible evid_ence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it
calls for.the production of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiffs
and third parties' Constitutionally protected rigbt of privacy. Plaintiff further objecits to this request
1O on the growids that it sei:ks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
11 privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
12
13
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents after entry of judgment in this case that are responsive to
14
this request except for the discovery done in this case, which documents are already in possession
15
of the requesting party. In addition,the requesting party is in already possession of all judgment
16
debtors exams taken of plaintiff since 2001.
17
18
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any ENTITY of which YOU are an officer or
_19. lll~b.e.~-. .. ... - . . ...... -. . . .. . ... . ... . .. . - - - .

20
21
Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad as to time and scope as
23
t6 be widuly burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that
- -
... - -- ........ -.... - . . it seeks _documents thatare neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
24
adnlissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it
25
calls for the production of irrelevant docunients th8.t are proiected from disclosure by plaintiff's
22
-- .......
-- ----26- and-third-parties'-Gonstitutionally-protected-rigbt-ofprivacy:..Plaintiff..f'urther-0bj eets-to-tbis-r<iquest- -- -
i"
000482
1
.. - . . . .
_ _l
as follows: Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections and limitations, Plaintiff
responds as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any property at which YOU have resided since
January 2011.
8
9
Plaintiff incoq>orates by reference each and every General Objection set forth above as
though fully set forth herein. Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds that it.is overly .broad,
10 unduly burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it
11
seeks documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
as follo~: Plaintiff does not have any documents responsive to.this request that are relevant to the
.. . . _. _.. ___ 1_9_. P.Tl_lP~u.!!c!i11g p_ai:ti~'- ~l!~Clll ~o~.~ 1:1!is 1Ilat.te1::. -

20
21
22
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to real property located at 3501 Canada Larga, Ventura
California, 93001.
23
RESPONSE TO DOCIJMENI REQUEST NO. 20:
24
25
- - - ---2{i -it-seeks-documents-thatare-neitherrelevant:-nor-reasonably-i:alculated-to-lead-tothe-discoverycof-- -- --..

~amTsSi"ble i:\iidence-iillliis:acficiii-asjilaililiffiS:1fofllie0Wliet..Of-Siiidieiir propettY-- PtrtiUtiff: ::-::: .: ..:. ~:.:. :.::.::
r:.~-... :. ~ :_:..=n:.:
.
0
;,i
;\:1
,;,_
~ ~ CF-ebjeGt&-to-this-request-mi-tbe-grounds-tbat-it-Galli:-the..prOOuGlion-Qf ir.relevallt dgcumems+---
,;...~...
r- .. I
.......
---- - .......
- ... -
---
--
- - -- --
..
---- - ......
000483
-
I I
'
that are protected from disclosiire by plaintiff's and third parties' Constitutionally protected right
of privacy. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are
protected from disclosure by the attomey'-Client privilege"and/or the attorney work-product
doctrine.

All DOCUMENTS that REL.ATE to any tax DOCUMENTS filed by YOU or on YOUR
behalf
10
11
12
13
14
15
on the grounds that it seeks documents thafare protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
16 privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.

17
18
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any taxes paid on YOUR behalf, including but not
19
-~!Doi~ !_o, in_9:9.R.. ~acity -~ti!.!?. ~-~le ow_n~_()f_l!Ily _El'{l1'.fY._
20
21
22 .b~~ ~~ C?mpound. _Plaintiff ~er _o_bjei:ts ~ thi~ r~~ ~ 1'.he _W<>tlilds that it i~ oyc:i:Iy broad
23
as to time and scope as to be unduly burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this
24
request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated
25
to lead to the discovecy of admissible evidence in this action. Piaintifffurther objects to this
-- ---- ----i6-
-reque~olt1he-grounds-thatit-callsfor-the-prodnction-ofirrelevant-documentsthat-are-protected--
000484
dt
':
.......
I
1
2
:
,,
W2's, 1099's, K-1 's, whether prepared forJederal, state, or municipal tliat RELATE to YOU since
January 1, 2005.
10
and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that
11
are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in
12
this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it calls for the production of
13
irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff's and third parties'
14
Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds
15
that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or
16
the attorney work-product doctrine.
17
19
__ - -- ... -
'
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any income tax returns including, but not limited to,
20
as follows: Plaintiff is not the owner of any Entity, equitable or otherwise.
18
disclosure by the attorney~client privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
--
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any money given to YOU for any purpose since 2010.
RESJ.'C>N.~~ TO !>4?.~JllT ~OUE;ST !"_0~ 24:.. - ...
Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overly broad,
21
unduly burdensome and harassing. .Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it
22
seeks dociuments that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
23
24
25
and third parties' Constitutionally protected. right of privacy. Plaintiff further objects to this request
---- -~~L-iHJrn-the-growids-that-it-iieeks-doGUIDents-that-arepr<>tected-from-disclosure-by-the-attomey-client-- -----
- _ _ __ . .. . _.
-. -- __ .00.04.SS . .. _
1 DOCUMENT REOUEST NO. 25:

2
3
4
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any income earned by YOU since 2010.
RESPONSE TO DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 25

5 to be unduly burdensome and harassing: Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that
6
admissible evidence in this action. p1aintifffurther objects to this request on the grounds that it
I0
on the grounds that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attlimey-client
11
privilege andlor the attorney work-product doctrine.
12
13
as follows: Plaintiff will produce any documents responsive to this Request in his possession and
14
control if the propounding party agrees to limit the document request to lhe relevant time period.
15
16
All banks statements for any personal or business account in which YOU have legal or
i 7 equitable interest
18
RESPONSE TO DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 26
__ 19
___ . ~l~-~tiJ!.obj~ to this reciueston Qie~~-~t it is ()Verl~b~ as to time an~ ~peas
20
21
22
~dmis~b!i:_ evi~ence in_ this ~on. Plaintifffurtiler objects to lli!s r~quest on_the _gr~~~ it
23
24
25
.. . ... - . .. . ... _0_09:1~6
....... -
account in which he has a legal or equitable interest
pOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 27:

All savings accounts in institutions that represent accounts in which YOU have an
3
4
equitable interest

Plaintiff further objects to.this request on the grounds that it seeks documents that are
6
7
neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in this
action.. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it calls for the production of
irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff's and third parties'
10
Constitutionally protected right of privacy . Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds
11
that it seeks documents that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and/or
12 the attorney work-product doctrine.

13
14
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control.
15
because he does not have a bank account in ~ch he has an equitable interest.
16
DOCUMENT.REQUEST NO. 28:

All deeds, leases, mortgages, or any other DOCUMENT evidencing any interest or
17
18
ownership, including equitable interest or ownership, by YOU in real property at any time since
19
1997.
20
21.
22
23
24
25
,....... ----26- and-third-parties!...Goustitutionally-proteGted-right-of-privacy:-Plaintiff-fmther-objects-to-thisrequest

. - . -.
..
. .
.
. ... .. .
..
. . ...
_______ ..:: .,.., .. :on:w:-:grow~tliiitiue&ao~rmeaed.from-disctoSW:e:by the:af!Otiie.)kelient.:::_
,
ff~
:.~~-:..::::.
0
~~~~-J..D..~
-+Pnm.ilege..and/QJ:.tbe-atlllmC-WQrk,.pwduc;t..docmn-~.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-;~~
j\.I
;;'
i\\1
,,:1
:;~
,\,
OQ9.4~7.
..
Subject to and without waiving th~ foregoing objections and limitations, Plaintiff responds
l
2
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control which
would evidence any interest or ownership held in real property after entry ofjudgment in this
matter.

6
7
ownership, by YOU in any asset at any time since 1997.
Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds that it is overly broad as. to time and scope as
10
11
it. seeks documents that are neither relevant nor reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
12
admissible evidence in. this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it
13
calls for the prod,uction of irrelevant documents that are p~otected from disclosure by plaintiff's.
14
and. third parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff further objects to this request
15
16
privilege and/or the attom~ work-product doctrine.
17
Subject to and without w,aiving the fc;iregoing objections and limitations, Plaintiff responds
18
as follows: Plaintiff will r!'Spond to this request should the requesting party limit the ~qu~t to the
... ____ J~.

20
21
.. -
All DOCUMENTS evidencing any interest or ownership, including equitable interest or
.~etlt.5>~~.E..~f_ru.:iy_non-e!_e_ei,nll!_ ~tan~ d~C!!h~~1!1'-as~~. ______ .

All stock certificates or other DOCUMENTS evidencing ownership of stocks and bonds
22
held by YOU in any capacity .

- - - - - -- .... - - .
23
..... ..
24
25
to be undul burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the, grounds that
fo---------~- t-it-seeksdocumenWtbat-areneitherrelevant-norreasonably-calculated-to:Iead-to-the-discoveiy-of-
000188
1 and third parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff further objects to this request
2
privilege and/or the attorney wolk-productdoctrine.
Subject to and without.waiving the foregoing objections and limitations, Plaintiff responds
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control.
All DOCUMENTS RELATING to Pacific Coast Management Corporation.
8 RESPONSE TO DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 31:

9
Plaintiff objects to this request on the grounds thiit it is overly broad as to time and scope as
1O to be unduly burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that
11
it seeks docwnents that are neither relevant nQr reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
12
admissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects t:O this request on the grounds that it
13
calls for the production of irrelevant documents that are protected frrim disclosure by plain~s
14
15
16
privilege and/or the attorney wolk-product doctrine.
17
18
. .. .. . .. 19
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control and
.~~_th~ r~9~ .~s__ ~o.~:V.~}' ~~!!'!_as.~..~? 1111_d .~~l'.El, pl~tiff.is:iinw.~e.~q_p~~e_tll~.i.~~tity..
20
of any individuals who may have responsive documents.
21
22
23
All DOCUMENTS RELATING to Avalon Corporation.
24
25
--- --26- it-seeksdocuments-that-are-neither-relevant-nor-reasonably-Ollculated-to-lead-tothe-discovery-of--- --- - -
.~~--.:~.-- _:::..:rJ::. a"dffiiSSiJ.il e mii ~C!Jce' ~iimiit1Uittier.:olijects:t6'lhiS.request:Oiillie ~Wills.'tllatff-. __ - : .. ::_:_:
...:~:
\.
1
000489
I
l
on the grounds thafit seeks doeuments that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections.and limitations, Plaintiff responds
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control and is
unaware of anyone who would be in possession of such documents.
8
9
10
11
All DOCUMENTS RELATING to any ENTITY in which Pacific Coast Management

Corporation is a general partner.
12 to be unduly burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that
13
14
admissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grollnds that it
15
16
17
18 ' privilege and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
-~?.-
...... _-~~i.~ .!O ~<! l'ljt!!~ut.~ving_t!ie oregoiJ!g_obje~--~-11!1.~ !i_m!~o_ns,:1.'.l.~!!.'tiif.E~2~n~~
20
as follows: Plaintiff haS no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control and is
21
iinaware of anyone who would be in possession of Sllch documents.
23
All DOCUMENTS RELATING to any ENTITY in which Avalon Corporation is a general
24
partner.
25
RESPONSE To DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 34:
.------i6- ---Plaintiff-objects1othis-TeqUest-on-1he-groundsthat-1t-is uverly-broad-asto1ime-and'scope-
,
.
i~'..
,...
...
;\:;
- - .... -- .. - --- - - ----- .. ......00.0.490. -
''
calls for the production "of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff's
on the grounds that it seeks doeuments that are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client
privilege and/or.the attorney work-product doctrine.
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control and is
unaware of anyone who would be in possession of such documents.

10
11
All DOCUMENTS RELATING to any lawsuit in which YOU are involved as a
representative for any PERSON or ENTITY.
12 . RESPONSE TO DOCUMENT REQUEST NO. 35:

13 '
14
to be unduly burdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds.that
15
16
admissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this reqi.iest on the grounds 'that it
17
18
____ 19. _o~_~e~un~ !h~-' _i~ ~f!_e!cs~<>c.!1m.!ll_lts !ha!~J>l"C)~ct~ fl:~ .d!~clo~<:.~}'. Qie_ll.tto_~~~!i_~'!t
20
21

Subject to and.without waiving the foregoing objections and limitations, Plaintiff responds
22
as follows: There are none.
23
24
All DOCUMENTS tliatRELAIB to insurance policies that insure loss to any property, real
25
or personal, which YOU own, including equitable ownership, individually or jointly with any other
---------26--PERSQ~----------'---
.C------------------------------------------
i- -- -- .... .. - -- - ---- .................... -- .... --- ,.. - - -000491

I
I
. I
S and third parties' Constitutionally protected right of privacy. Plaintiff further objects to this request
6
pri~lege and/or the attorney
8
9
work-product doctrine.
Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections and limitlltions, Plaintiff responds
as follows: Plaintiff bas no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control
10
because be bas no legal or equitable ownership interest in property.
11

deb~ incurred by
12
All DOCUMENTS that RELATE to any
13
YOU since 2005.
calls for the production of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiffs
!!lld_~~~ ~~~-eo~~.!'~'.l:t p~~.~-~~!.C>f_PriY.!lo/: ..J'.1.~t!!!:_~.~~-obj~.t!J.~~ re.<fl:l~st _..... _ .
21
23
Subject to and without waiving the foregoing objections and limitlltions, Plaintiff responds
-- - ------ -- ----- --- -- - - - -
-
as follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control
24
relating to any debt incurred after the judgment in this case became final.
22
------------------" ------- --
....
--
25 . DOCUMENT REOuEST NO. 3S:

,_ -----46
All-DOGl:JMENf-S-tbat-REbA!f.B-loiJayment-ofany-debt-incurredby-Y-0"[}.---- - - - - - - . . . . . . -
.. .
..
-
- - - -
- - -
:.:....:.-.... :.:::_ ... ?7 .. -.zF.SEONSE:ro:JJOCUMENI:REQllES:r:N0:.38~=:.::_-.:.:__:..-.-_-_:__-:.:_.:..:::.:-..=:,:::::.::..:::::_:_::_::~
''.Ii'
11:1
::
~o
bj~est-OD-tlie-grwt1~ad-as-to-time-a~GGiJe-llS-cl---
ii:
,;1
I.
;1:.
--- .... ---- -- ... --------- - --- -- -- ... - -.......... ---- ...... -.......... - - . - -000192-- -.
to be unduly bmdensome and harassing. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that
ad!llissible evidence in this action. Plaintiff further objects to this request on the grounds that it
ca!Js for the production of irrelevant documents that are protected from disclosure by plaintiff's
privilege _and/or the attorney work-product doctrine.
8
9
as. follows: Plaintiff has no documents responsive to this request in his possession or control
I0
relating to any debt incurred after the judgment in this case became final.,
11
Dated: April 30, 2012
WESTLAKE LAW GROUP
12
I
I
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
--
,-
.............
- .. - -
20
21
22
23
24
25
~~
,-------.AJ- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
.. - -- - - .
i..... '" .... -- - --- ------
- - . .
. -- ---- --. --- ...... - -- ---- - - - - .--- cH'.>"0493- .....
,.
r.l .f~ll
.. ,
1, : ,,..~
'I
o:" , .
t ' . .~ .
'
o .
1.
: .
'
',1
f ... t
n
. t.
' ' '

t~
'I.
.:1
. . .'..,.: ::f::
.. ~~..-: .; 1-w~
.~, .;.~~i
-
_,
I .
'
~!
. 1,
~:: :t:~
d
'".:.:~.... . .!
....
'
<;
,,'
l i~1
.1 IJ
: i
21
:.:
- - - --~'--.:.!1------- .;: .
.:
f:
I I. '
I
I
:.
'
.1 i'1! . ., . : If
'
.. .
~ --
-- - .
-- . --- . -- ..-
;~_
.!... _
.
..
.,..
i
.1.!' _!_.'....:.":~~_:.!. ~4- ~~-: . 11:.
_., --- -----.:__-.. ,..:_: _:----..2::.

I
GA6Gat.o
.
-------;---:--1- - - 0
- .. .
...J__
.
.:...::....::.;_: ~--~ ---. ~___:
n~
'
,l:
- ..... - . - ()00494-- ...
PROOF OF SERVICE
I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, and not a party to the
within action. My business address is 2625 Townsgate Road, Suite 330, Westlake Village,
California 91361.
On April 30, 2012, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: PLAINTIFF
S'""l'E""'r"'JIE"'N M. GAGGERO'S SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DEFENDANT KNAPP,
PETERSEN & CLARK'S REQlJESTFORPRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
[PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVlLPROCEDURE 708.030]
_X _ BY MA1L I placed the above document(s) in a sea.led envelope with postage thereon fully
prepaid, in the United States mail at Westlake Vtllage, California. addressed as set forth below. I
am readily familiar with the firm's practice for collection and processing of documents for mailing.
Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. Postal Service on that same day with postage
thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party
seived, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than
one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
_ BY FEDERAL EXPRESS I placed the above docwnent(s) in a sealed envelope and placed
ltfor deposit with Federal Express, prepaid for neict day delivery, addressed as set forth below.
__ BY FACSIMILE I transmitted the above document(s) by facsimile transmission to the fax
number(s) set forth below on thi_!!.dslr;. ~ef~ 5,;00P.JI!.;, and received confi.nned transmission
reports indicating that the docunieAJUJwere successfully transmitted.
_ _ BY PERSONAL DELIV'ERYipia~ th~ above. documem(s) in a sealed envelope and
caused them to be personally delivered by hamJ to the person(s) set forth below.
\.. ,. '-""~~ ',_1,. - . . '
Randall A Miller
MillerLLP
515 South Flower Street, Suite #2150
I declare under penalty of peij_ury ~~er~e_la:\Y~.Pf th~_l!tie_of Califomia that lhel!bov~-is..
true and correct - .. - - -- - - -
Executed on April 30, 2012, at Westlake Village, California..
~--1r----
- - - - - - ------- - - - ----
___.:__
---if-------------
---
--------- -------- - - - - - - - -
- -
- . --- -
---------------
--- -- - ......
- - -- .
------------~---~---
----
000495
'
II
EX~lBIT
Declaration of Joseph Praske
2 I, Joseph Praske, state and declare:

I am 1he Manager of Boardwalk Sunset LLC and make this declaration in support of
I.
Boardwalk SIDlSel LLC's Motion to Expunge the Notice of Peoding Action [/Ls pendens] recorded
against the real property owned by Boardwalk Sunset UC located at 60! Ocean Front Walk,
Venice, CA (the "601 Property"). I have personal knowledge of the matters set forth herein and, if'
cslled as a witness, I could competently testify thereto.
2.
chose to use Pacific Coast Management ("PCM"). as their asset manager. Ted Folken is a licensed
IO
real estate broker and a principal of Accorp Inc. PCM hired Accorp lnc. to act as the property
JI
manager for the 601 Property. Accorp also acted

as' lhe real estate broker for Boardwalk
Sunset
..
.
12
.1)
As the Manager of Boardwalk Sunset LLC, I make all of the executive decisions and I
"
LLC in the subject transaction.

3.
On about September 13, 2007,
~-
Folkert brought Boardwalk Sunset LLC an offer from
14
Jose Bunge and .Victoria Bunge to supplement the tCllllS. under which Boardwaik Sunset LLC
15
provided parking 'to several adjacent properties, namely 511, 517 and 523. Ocean Front Walk;
. 16
Venice. CA. The 'Bunges offered $100,000 for Boardwalk Sunset Ll-C to. agree to a deed
17
restriction that would assure: them that if tlu:ri: wa5 a change of use on Sl 1, S17 and/or 523 Ocean
1g Front Walk, the parlcing rights ~ obligations presently conveyed by Coastal Pcnnit #5-89-059
19
would not be affected. Stephen Gaggero works for PCM and he, along. with our broker, Ted
20
Folken, negotiated the tenns with the Bungcs and their attorney. Mr. Gaggero does not own any
21.
part of Boardwalk Sunset LLC, as is atleged in the Complaint, nor docs he control it.
........... 21:
-4:---oobchalf-of-Boardwalk.Sunset.LLC,J_l!P.PJ9.V.~-~~
23
executed the Agreement and Joint

-- .... - -- --- ,---
Escrow. Instructions ("Deed Restriction Agreemcnl'') on October 30, 2007 for the sale of a deed
24
restriction that is meant to insure 11iat .the parking rights and obligations presently enjoyed on
25
Boardwalk Sunset
26
Walle wi11 not change it the use is changed on Sil, 517, S23,-or 601 Ckean Front Walk. A'true 1111d
27
correct copy of the executed Deed RJ:StrictionAgrcemcnt is attacbed hereto as Exln"bit "A".
- --- -----
L~'s
-- :
..
property at 601 Ocean Front Walk by SI 1. 517 and 523 Ocean Front
2S
7
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION 'fQ.liXPUNOE .LIS PENDENS
000497
{x x.
,,I
,_
I declare under penalty of perjury under lhe laws of the State of California that the foregoing is
,.
2
true and correct Executed ihis 14th day ofNovcmbcr2008, al La Canada, California.
J
4
s
6
.. '9
10
1I
t2
13
14
15
16
17
- -- ........,
-~
--- -- --- -- .. -
23
24
25
26
WI
i~;I
:~~',
21'
;.o
19.1
;\:,
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO EXPUNGE US PENDENS
000498
'
'
..
\
ji
~
.Declaration or Joseph Praske
I, Joseph Praske, state and declare:

I am the Trustee of the GBC Trust. the General Partner of Gingerbread Court L.P.- and
I.
make this declaration in support of Gingerbread Court's Motion to Expunge \he Notice of Pending
Action [tis pendensJ recorded againsi \he real property owned by Gingerbread Court LP located at
517 Ocean Front Walk, Venice, CA_ (the "517 Propcrt)>''). I have personal lcnowiCdge of the
mailer.>
set forth herein and, if called as a witnes5, 1 could competently testify theretO.
2.
As the Trustee of the GBC Trust, 11\e General Partner for Gingcrbread Court LP, I make all
of the executive decisions and I chose to appoint Pacific Coast _Management ("PCM") as the asset
manager for Gingerbread Court LP.. Ted Folkert is a licensed real estate broker and a principal of
Accoq) Inc.
PCM hired Accorp Inc. to act as the property manager for the 517 Property.
In la\c August 2007, Mr. Folkcrt brought Gingerbread Court LP an offer from lose B\11\gc
12
3.
13
and Victoria Bunge to purchase the 517 Property. Stephen Gaggero _works for PCM and he,_ with
14
our broker, Ted Folkert, negotiated the tcnns of the PSA with the Bunges and thciI attorney. Mr.
15
Gaggero
16
he control it_
1'7
4.
18
and Sale and Joint Escrow Instructions {"PSA'') on October 30, 2008 and Special Sale Instructions
19
to Maia Escrow ("Special Instructions") on November 3, 2007 for the sale of 5!1 Ocean Front
~oes
not own any part of Gingerbread Com:t"LJ>, as is alleged in the Complaint, nor does
On behalf.of Gingerbread Court LP. I approved and
20 wallc, Venice, CA
21
~xecuted
the Agreement of Purchase
The PSA and Special Instructions are the only two. agreements. that
Gingerbread Court LP has ente~ into with the Bunge:;. A inie and correct copy of th~ executed
........ - -22- P-SA. and.SpccialJns\n!i:tioris ~-~itaE~ed hereto as Exhibits "'A and "B".
--
------------ --------..-------
--
.. ---- . ---
I declare under penalty ofpcljul')'. under the laws of the State of California \hat the foregoing is
24
__:_ ;_d I
25
26
'
tru,e and_eorrecL Executed this 14th day of November 2008, at La Canada, California.
Jo~
By;
27
;J:;
_J
_ ... _
10
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO EXPUNGE US PENDENS
000499
< -
-------- ... - . -
-~~--i
sAngeles Superior Coun - Ci\'il
e.. .....aiouin<>NUNE News & Media

Civil
Jury
AppeUale
CMI
Small Claims
fnlllily
l'mbale JUYellile
Traffic
Case Number: SC100361

JOSE BUNGE ET. AL. VS. 511 OFW ET. AL.
Case Document
Images
Filing Date: 10/28/2008

Case Type: Other Real Property Rights Case (General Jurisdiction)
Status: pending
Case Summary
Calendars
Future Hearings
Courtroom
Information
:1
06/06/2012 at 08:30 am in department WEB at 1725 Main Street, Santa Monica,

CA 90401
Motion - Vacate (ORDERS)
Filing Court
Locator
Tentative
Rulings
MenlDI Health
Case Summary
General
Information
Party Name
Search
Criminal
Documents Ejled
Ii
l pmceedjog lnformatjon
Parties
511 OFW - Defendant
BEECHEN PAUL D. - Atty for Plaintiff and Cross-Deft
BLECHER & COLLINS Attorney for Defendant
Tools for
Litigators
ADR
Forms
BOARDWALK SUNSET - Defendant
BUNGE JOSE Plaintiff
BUNGE VICTORIA Plaintiff
GAGGERO STEVE - Defendant

Fees
GINGERBREAD COURT- Defendant
Court Rules
JOSEPH. PRASKE - Defendant

NEWMAN HON. JACK M. (RETIRED) - Mediator
POLK CHRISTOPHER - Attorney for Plaintiff
Cl 2000. lnrcrmalion
Systems ond
Technotogy Bul"OaU
PRASKE JOSEPH J. - Defendant

WESTLAKE LAW GROUP - Former Attorney for Defendant
case lnfponatjon I
Party lnfoqpatjnn
Pmcegdjog lnformatjgn
Doc11ments Filed {Filing dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see documents filed on or before the date
indicated:
1QIQ4/2011
06/09f2010
10128/2009
01/2Z/2009
05/16/2012 Ex-Parle Application (TO ADVANCE HEARING DATE; MEMORANDUM
filc:lllFJISTACEY/Los%20Angelcs%20Supcrior"/o20Coun'Yo20-%20Bungc,htm IS/2112012 9:S9: 14 AM]
1
J,
....r
000500
i;
sAngeles Supcri,or Court - Ci,il

OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF JOHN E. ANDREWS )
Filed by Attorney for Defendant
05/16/2012 Notice of Motion (AND .MOTION TO VACATE ORDERS; DECLARATION

OF DAVID BLAKE CHATFIELD )
Filed by Attorney .for Defendant
04/30/2012 Ex-Parte Application (SEEKING EXTENSION OF TIME; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND.AUTHORITIES; DECLARATION OF JOHN E: ANDREWS; )
04/30/2012 Order (RE EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME )

04/20/2012 Application - misc (Re: Sealing of Redacted Trust Documents )

04/20/2012 Declaration (Of Joseph Parske Re: Trust Documents )

Filed by Attorney .for Plaintiff
04/ 13/2012 Miscellaneous-Other (PLAINTIFFS' POCKET BRIEF RE: 1.

CONSTRUCTION OF DEED RESTRICTION 2. REQUIREMENT OF RECORDING DEED
RESTRICTION )
Filed by Atty for Plaintiff and Cross-Deft
04/13/2012 Miscellaneous-Other (POCKET BRIEF RE: 1. CONSTRUCTION OF DEED

RESTRICTION; 2. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO RECORD )
02/29/2012 Response (TO PRASKE'S MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND

AUTHORITIES RE: RIGHT OF .PRIVACY ISSUES )
02/10/2012 Response (TO PROPOSED DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF JOSE BUNGE )
Filed by Atty for Plaintiff and Cross-[)eft
02/ 10/2012 Memo points & authorities (RE RIGHT TO PRIVACY ISSUES ON
BEHALF OF JOSEPH PRASKE )
02/06/2012 Miscellaneous-Other (EX. PARTE OBJECTION AND MOTION TO QUASH

RE: NOTICE FOR JOSEPH PRASKE TO APPEAR IN COURT ON FEBRUARY 7, 2012;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORmES; DECLARATION OF JOHN E ANDREWS
AND EXHIBITS THERETO)
01/30/2012 Notice (OF RESUMPTION OF TRIAL )

01/24/2012 Application - misc (Defendant's Application for Relief From Failure to
Timely Serve Objections To Notice To Appear And Produce at Trial Declaration of
John E. Andrews and Joseph Praske Attached hereto)

01/23/2012 Exhibit List (DEFENDANTS' AMENDED TRIAL EXHIBIT UST)
Filed by Attorney for Defendant.
01/20/2012 Exhibit List (TRIAL .EXHIBIT UST. )

01/20/2012 List of Witnesses

Flied by Attorney for Defendant
01/19/2012 Brief (TRI.AL BRIEF. )
filc://lfVSTACEVILos~~OAngel~020Supcrior'~OCourt'Q2().'~0Bungc.hun(S/2112012
'i
~n
9:!19: 14 A Ml
00.0501
',
Angeles Superior Court Civil
01/19/2012 List of Witnesses

01/19/2012 Exhibit List

01/17/2012 Objection {TO DECLA OF JOHN E. ANDREWS AND EXHIBITS THERETO

SUBMITTED WITH REPLY MEMORANDUM. )
01/13/2012 Reply (DECLARATION OF JOHN E. ANDR.EWS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF
ISSUES)
01/13/2012 Objection Document Filed (TO EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS

IN SUPPORT OF THEIR OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES [CRC
3.1354])
01/13/2012 Notice of Withdraw! of Attorney

Filed by Atty for Defendant and Cross-Compl
01/13/2012 Reply (MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES )
01/04/2012 Miscellaneous-Other (PLAINTIFFS' EVIDENCE IN OPPOSITION TO

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT/ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES )
01/04/2012 Response (TO DEFENDANTS' REVISED AND AMENDED SEPARATE

STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES)
01/04/2012 Objection Document Filed (TO DECLARATIONS OF JOHN E. ANDREWS

AND TED FOLKERT SUBMITTED IN .SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT )
Flied by Atty for Plaintiff and Cross-Deft
01/04/2012 Memo points &. authorities (IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES; DECLARATIONS OF PAUL D. BEECHEN, CHRISTOPHER
POLK, JOSE BUNGE, CORI)
.,
11/16/2011 Stipulation and Order (RE: TRIAL PRESENTATION AND ORDER

THEREON )
Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff
11/09/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (PLAINTIFFS' SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT BY
DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER POLK CONCERNING MEET AND CONFER EFFORTS
REGAROINGS PLAINTIFFS'. MOTIONS TO COMPEL SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES AND
DEFENDANTS'MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE)
11/09/2011 Miscellaneous-other (EXHIBIT "D" TO PLAINTIFFS' REPORT RE: MEET
AND CONFER; DECLARATION OF PAUL D .. BEECHEN SEALED BY MARCH 11,2011
ORDER OF THE COURT)
lilc:fl/FVSTACEY llos~~0Angeles,~0Superio~020Coun~~O.~Q0Bwigc.hunl sn 112012 9:59: 14 AM]
000502
I
_J
'
AngeleS Superior Court - Civil
11/09/2011 Miscellaneous'Other (DEFENDANTS' REPORT RE MEET AND CONFER

IN CONNECTION WITH PENDING DISCOVERY AND PROTECTIVE ORDER MOTIONS )
Filed by Attomey for Defendant
11/09/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (PLAINTIFF'S REPORT RE: MEET AND CONFER;
DECLARATION OF PAUL D. BEECHEN )
11/04/2011 Amended Notice {OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENTOR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES )
11/04/2011 Memo points'& authorities (DEFENDANTS' REVISED AND AMENDED
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORmES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF
ISSUES)
11/04/2011 Separate Statement of Und. Facts (DEFENDANT'S REVISED AND
AMENDED SEPARATE STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF
ISSUES)
10/ 18/2011 Mis.cellaneous-Other (DOCUMENTS LODGED WITH COURT FOR IN
CAMERA REVIEW )
10/11/2011 Objection (TO DECL OF PAUL D: BEECHEN IN SUPPORT OF DEFTS'
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER. )
10/11/2011 Reply (DECL OF jOHN E. ANDREWS IN SUPPORT OF DEFTS' MOTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER. )
10/11/2011 Reply to Opposition (TO THEIR MOTIONS TO COMPEL WRITIEN

I
RESPNSES TO .REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS )

10/11/2011 Reply (MEMO IN SUPPORT OF DEFTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE

ORDER. )
indicated:
me
1010412011
oom912010
1012a12009
0112112009
10/04/2011 Memo.points & authorities (IN OPPOSmON TO MOTIONS TO COMPEL

)
10/04/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (PLAINTIFFS' REQUEST TO STRIKE DECLARATION

OF JOHN E. ANDREWS SUBMITIED IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR
PROTECTI VE ORDER J
0
10/04/2011 Declaration (OF JENNIFER S. ELKAYAM !N SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS

.
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO COMPEL FURTHER RESPONSES )
Flied i?Y Attorney for Defendant
10/04/2011 Declaration (OF JOHN E. ANDREWS IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO
COMPEL FURTHER RESPQNSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS )
...
;\,/
filc://IFVST ACH /Los%20Angcles%ZOSuperior%20Courto/.21J..%20Bunge.htm(S/2112012 9:59: 14 AM J
000503
L ~u~rior
Angeles
Coun - Civ:
10/04/2011 Objection Document Filed (TO PROPOSED PROTECTIVE ORDER

SUBMITTED BY DEFENDANTS )
10/04/2011 Memo points & authorities (IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANTS MOTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER; DECLARATION OF PAUL D. BEECHEN; REQUEST FOR
SANCTIONS)
09/23/2011 Declaration (OF TED FOLKERT IN SUPPORT OF DEFTS' MOTION FOR

ISSUES. )
09/23/2011 Memo points & authorities (IN SUPPORT OF'MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES. )
09/23/2011 Motion for Summary Judgment (OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY

ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES. (PROPOSED) ORDER. )
09/23/2011 Notice of Lien (DEPOSITION TRANSCRIPTS OF JOSE BUNGE IN

SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES. )
09/23/2011 Declaration (OF JOHN E. ANDREWS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY AD- JUDICATION OF
ISSUES. )
09/23/2011 Separate Statement of Und. Facts (IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR

ISSUES, )
09/09/2011 Notice of Motion (FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER)

09/09/ZOll Declaration (OF JOHN E. ANDREWS )
09/09/2011 Memo points & authorities
09/06/2011 Proof of Service

09/06/2011 Statement - General (SEPARATE - IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO

COMf>EL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO THIRD SET OF REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENT FROM
DEFENDANT AND .CROSS COMPLAINANT BOARDWALK SUNSET, LLC; REQUEST FOR
MONETARY SANCTIONS IN)
Filed by Atty for f>laintiff and Cross-Deft
09/06/2011 Motion to Compel (VERIFIED RESPONSES TO THIRD SET OF

REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT BOARDWALK SUNSET, LLC;
REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $6320.00 AGAINST SAID
PARTY AND ITS ATTORNEYS; ... )
09/06/2011 Declaration (OF CHRJS POLK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
filc:/l/fl/STACE Y/l.os%20Angelcs%20Su~rio1%20Coun%20-%20Bungc.hun( S/2112012 9:59: 14 AM]
000504
L,
Angeles Superior Court - Civil
RESPONSES FROM BOARDWALK SUNSET, LLC TO REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS AND

FOR SANCTIONS )
Filed by Atty for Plaintiff ancl Cross-Deft
09/D2i2D11 Declaration (OF CHRIS POLK JN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL

RESPONSES FROM 511 OFW, LP. TO REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS AND FOR
SANCTIONS )
.
.
09/02/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
TO COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO FIFTH SET OF REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS
FROM DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT 511 OFW LP. AND ITS COUNSEL OF
RECORD)
09/02/2011 Declaration (OF CHRIS POLK IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL
RESPONSES FR,OM GINGER- BREAD TO REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS AND FOR
SANCTIONS)
09/02/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (SEPARATE STATEMENT IN, SUPPORT OF MOTION

TO COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO FIFTH SET OF REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS
FROM DEFENDANT AND CROSS-COMPLAINANT GINGERBREAD COURT, L.P.;
REQUEST FOR MONETARY)
09/02/2011 Notice of Motion (AND MOTION TO COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO
FIF)H SET OF REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT AND CROSSCOMPLAINAINT GINGERBREAD COURT, LP; REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
IN THE AMOUNT OF $4440.0)
09/02/2011 Notice of Motion (AND MOTION TO COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO

FIFTH SET OF REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS FROM DEFENDANT AND CROSSCOMPLAINANT 511 OFW, LP; REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE
AMOUNT OF $640.00 AGAINSTS SA!)
06/20/2011 Association of Attorney

04/25/2011 Not,ice of Association of Attorneys
03/11/2011 Order (PROTECTIVE ORDER)
03/11/2011 Ex-Parte Application

Filed by Atty for Defendant and Cross-Campi
03/11/2011 Miscellaneous-Other (copies)

03/09/2011 Reply To Motion (DEFT/CROSS-COMPLAINANTS' REPLY TO BUNGES'

OPPOSITION TO MTN .fOR PROTEcTIVE ORDER )
03/07/2011 Declaration (OF CHRIS POLK IN SUPPORT OF BUNGES' MEMO OF

POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO MTN FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER )
03/07/2011 Memo points & authorities (IN OPPOSITION TO MTN FOR,PROTECTIVE

: 1
~~-'
;~:,
i
I
,...,.If
_______
____,
ORDER)
filc;:///Ff/STt\CEY/Los,020Angelcs,QOSupcrio~~OCcurt'}t.20-~0208unge.hbn( sn Ino 12 9:~9: 14 AM I
000505
Los Angeles Superior Coun - Civil
02/28/2011 Notice of Motion (-for Protective Order)

Filed. by Attorney for Defendant
02/23/2011 Ex-Parte Application (FOR AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME FOR
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE .ORDER AND TO TEMPORARILY SUSPEND DEPOSmONS
UNITL ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER )
Filed by Atty for Defendant and Cross-Comp!
02/23/2011 Order (SHORTENING TIME FOR MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

AND TO SUSPEND DEPOSmONS UNTIL ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER )
02/09/2011 Stipulation and Order (STIPULATION FOR ORDERS COMPELLING

DEPOSITIONS )
Filed by Attorney for- Plaintiff
10/25/2010 Notice of Ruling ( ON APPL FOR EX PARTE ORDER CONTINUING MSC,
FSC & TRIAL DATE )
10/19/2010 Ex-Parte Application (FOR AN ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE OF

MEDIATION AND TRIAL )
Filed byAttorney for Defendant
07/22/2010 Answer to Third Amended Complaint (UNVERIFIED)
Filed by !lttomey for Defendant
07/16/2010 Stipulation (TO AMEND DOE AMENDMENTS AND PROOF Of SERVICE

OF SUMMONS AND THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT AND ORDER ***SIGNED BY
JUDGE TARLE*** )
06/24/2010 Objec;tion Document Filed (TO REQ THAT THE COURT STRIKE PLFFS
REPLY BRIEF OR THAT ALL REFERENCES IN PLFFS' REPLY BRIEF TO THE
STATEMENT OF DECISION IN THE UNRELATED MATTER BE STRJKEN FROM THE
RECORD)
06/24/2010 Objection Document Filed (DEFTS' EV!DENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO

DECLARATION OF CHRIS POLK FILED IN SUPPORT OF MOT FOR APPT OF
DISCOVERY REFEREE & PROPOSED ORDER )
06/24/2010 Objection Document Filed (DEFTS' OBJECTION TO PLFFS' REQ

JUDICIAL NTC FILED IN SUPPOln'oF MOT FOR APPOINTMENT OF DISCOVERY
REFEREE)
06/21/2010 Reply To Motion (PLFFS' REPLY TO DEFTS' OPPOSITION TO PLFFS'

MOT FOR APPT OF DISCOVERY REFEREE; REQ JUDICIAL NTC & DECLARATION OF
CHRIS POLK IN SUPPORT THEREOF )
06/21/2010 Miscellaneous-Other (STATEMENT OF DECISION )

06/14/2010 Opposition (DEFTS OPPOSITION TO PLFF'S MTN FOR REFERNECE OF

DISCOVERY PROCEEDING; DECLARATION OF DAVID CHATFIELD & EXHIBITS
THERETO)
Indicated:
flle:lllFJIST ACEY /lns%20/\ngcleso/o20Supcrior%20Couno/o20-%201lunge.html5121/2012 9:59: 14 AM]
000506
lAls An@eles Superior Court CivH
TOP
1010412011
0610912010
1012812009
0112712009
06/09/2010 Proof-Service/Summons
Filed by Attorney for Plaintiff'
05/20/2010 Summons Filed

05/07 /2010 Notice-Assignment-Mediator

Filed by ADR Clerk
05/03/2010 Miscellaneous-other (CERTIFICATIOl\l OF REFEREE UNDER RU.LE 3.924

OF THE CA RULES OF COURT)
05/03/2010 Notice of Motion (FOR REFERENC.E OF DISCOVERY PROCEEDING CCO

639 (a)(S); DECL. OF CHRIS f'OLK & MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES JN
SUPPORT THEREOF )
04/29/2010 Amendment to Complaint (DOE 2 JOSEPH J. PAASKE )

04/29/2010 Ar?lendment to Complaint (DOE 1 JOSEPH J. PAASKE )

04/14/2010 Statement-Case Management

04/07 /2010.Answer to Cross-Complaint
03/25/2010 Order ( **signed by Judge Tarle** )

03/01/2010 Cross-complaint filed

Flied by Attorney for Cross-Complainant
03/.01/ 2010 Summons Filed

Filed by Attorney for Cross-Complainant
03/01/2010 Answer to Third Amended Complaint

Filed by .Attorney for Defendant
02/03/2010 Reply To Motion (DEFTS' JOINT REPLY IN' FURTHER SUPPORT OF
DEMURRERS TO 3RD AMENDED COMPLAINT )
02/03/ 2010 ~eply To Motion (DEFTS' JOINT REPLY IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF
MTNS TO STRIKE 3RD AMENDED COMPLAINT )
01/28/2010 Opposition (plffs' opposition to defts' motion to strike 3rd amended

complaint)
01/28/2010 Miscellaneous-other (plaintiffs points & authorities in opposition to

defts' demurrer to 3rd amended complaint )
01/04/2010 Demurrer (DEFT GINGERBREAD COURT LP & 511 OFW LP'S NTC
DEMURRER TO 3RD AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORmES )
01/04/2010 Demurrer (BY STEPHEN GAGGERO'S DEMURRER TO 3RD AMEND
lilcJ//Fj/STACEY /los~~OAngeleso/o20Supcrio~~OCoun,~O-o/m20Bunge.hrm( 5/2l/2012 9:S9: 14 AM]
000507
1; .
'
....
' Los Angeles Superior Coun - Civil
COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORmES )

01/04/2010 Demurrer (DEFT BOARDWALK SUNSET'S NTC DEMURRER TO 3RD

AMEND COMPLAINT; MEMO. OF POINTS & AUTHORffiES )
01/04/2010 Motion to Strike (DEFT BOARDWALK SUNSET LLC'S MOT TO STRIKE

3RD. AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
01/04/2010 Motion to Strike (DEFTS GINGERBREAD COURT LP & 511 OFW LP'S
MOT TO STRIKE 3RD AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
01/04/2010 Motion to Strike (BY STEPHEN GAGGERO'S MTN STRIKE 3RD AMEND
COMPLAINT; MEMO POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
12/24/2009 Objection Document filed (DEFTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO
DECLARATION OF CHRIS POLK FILED IN SUPPORT OF MTN TO CLERICAL MISTAKE )
filed by Attorney for Defendant
12/24/2009 Objection Document Filed (DEFTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO
DECL. OF CHRIS POLK FILED IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSmON TO MTN TERM
SANCTIONS & AWARD Of FEES )
filed by Attorney for Defendant
12/24/2009 Objection Document filed (DEFTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO

DECL. oF JEFF BERKE FILED IN SUPPORT OF MTN TO CLERICAL MISTAKE )
12/24/2009 Reply To Motion (plaintiffs' reply to defts' opposition to mtn to correct
clerical mistake or, for relief under CCP 473(b); declaration of Chris Polk in support
thereof )
12/ 18/ 2009 Opposition (plffs' opposition to Gingerbread Court's mot for
Terminating Sanctions & req for fees; req for sanctions against defendant & its
counsel )
Filed .by Attorney ror Plaintiff
12/18/2009 Declaration (of Chris Polk in spport plffs' opposition to Gingerbread
Court's mtn for terminating sanctions & req for fees; req for sanctions against deft
& Its counsel )
12/18/2009 Objection Document Filed (to declaration of David Chatfield )
12/17/2009 Opposition (DEFT, GINGERBREAD COURT L.P'S, OPPOSITTON TO MTN
TO CORRECT CLERICAL MISTAKE IN COURT ORDER PURSUANT TO CCP 473 (D), OR
RELIEF FROM THE ORDER PURSUANT TO CCP;473 (B); DECL Of D.B.CHATFIELD)
12/08/2009. Notice of Motion (TO CORRECT CLERICAL MISTAKE JN COURT ORDER

PURSUANT TO CCP 473(d) or relief from order pursuant to ccp 473 (b); memo of
points & authorities in support )
12/08/2009 Declaration (of Chris Polk in support of mtn to correct clerical mistake
in court order pursuant to ccp 473(d) )
filed by Attorney for Plaintiff
'
file:l//~ISTACEY/Los%201\ngeles%20Superior%20Coun%20.%20Bungc.h1m(5/2Il2012
9:59: 14 AM I
000508
os Angeles Superior Court - Civil
12/08/ 2009 Declaration (of Jeff Berke in support of mtn to correct clerical mistake
in court order pursuant to ccp 473 {d))
11/30/2009 Third Amended Complaint (FOR DAMAGES, ILLEGAL PENALTY,
RESCISSION AND RESTITUTION, AND DECLARATORY RELIEF )
11/20/2009 Notice of Motion (FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS AND REQUEST FOR

REASONABLE FEES AND COSTS IN THE AMOUNT OF $5,650; DECLARATION OF
DAVID BLAKE CHATFIELD (PROPOSED ORDER))
Filed l:>Y Attorney for Defendant
11/09/2009 Objection Document Filed (OBJECTION TO ORDER)

10/30i2009 Notice (NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER )
10/30/2009 Notice (NOTICE OF UNAVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL DAVID BLAKE

CHATFIELD ATTY FOR DEFTS FROM 11-4-09 - - 7-09)
Filed by Attorney. for Defendant
Click on any of the below link(s) to see documentsfiled on or before the date
indicated:
me 1010412011 osm912010 1012a(2009 0112117009
10/28/2009 Order
10/22/2009 Reply To Motion (DEFTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MTN TO STRIKE 2ND

AMENDED COMPLAINT )
Filed by Attorney ,for Defendant
10/22/2009 Reply To Motion (REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFTS, DEMURRERS TO 2ND
AMENDED COMPLAINT)
10/22/2009 Objection Document Filed (AND REQ. TO STRIKE LATE-FlLED REPLY

DOCUMENTS)
10/22/2009 Reply To Motion (DEFT GINGERBREAD COURT'S REPLY IN SUPPORT
OF MTN TO COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES.TO lST SET OF PRODUCTION DEMANDS
& FOR PRODUCT- ION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLFFS VICTORIA & JOSE BUNGE;REQ
SANCTION)
10/14/2009 Declaration (OF CHRIS POLK IN OPPOSITION TO GINGERBREAD
COURT LLP'S MTN TO COMPEL.VERIFIED RESPONSES TO lST SET OF PRODUCTION
DEMANDS)
10/14/2009 Opposition (PLFFS' OPPOSmON TO DEFTS' MTN TO STRIKE 2ND
AMENDED COMPLAINT)
Filed by.Attorney for Plaintiff
10/14/2009 Opposition (OF PLFFS JOSE & VICTORIA BUNGE TO DEMURRER TO
2ND AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES & DECL. OF CHRIS
POLK IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION )
~:
i~:
. 1
10/14/2009 Opposition (OF PLFFS JOSE & VICTORIA BUNGE TO DEFT

GINGERBREAD COURT, L.P'S MTN TO COMPEL; REQ FOR SANCTIONS )
filc"'IFVSTACEY /Los%20Angeles%20Soperior%20Court%2().%20Bunge.hun(5/2J/2012 9:59: 14 AM)
000509
Los Angeles Superior Coun Civil
10/14/2009 Opposition (OF PLFFS JOSE & VICTORIA BUNGE TO DEFT

GINGERBREAD COURT, L.P.'S SEPARATE STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MTN TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO lST SET OF PRODUCTION DEMANDS )
10/14/2009 Objection Document Filed (OF PLFFS JOSE & VICTORIA BUNGE TO
DECLARATION OF DAVID CHATFIELD )
09/28/2009 Motion to Compel (DEFENDANT GINGERBREAD COURT'S MTN TO
COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO FIRST SET OF PRODUCTION DEMANDS & FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLTFF'S VICTORIA BUNGE & JOSE BUNGE;REQ
FOR MONETARY SANC!TONS)
09/28/2009 Miscellaneous-Other (DFNT GINGERBREAD COURT'S SEPARATE

STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF MTN TO COMPEL VERIFIED RESPONSES TO FIRST SET
OF PRODUCTION DEMANDS & FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM PLTFF'S
VICTORIA BUNGE & JOSE BUNG)
09/21/2009 Notice of Hearing on Demurrer (BOARDWALK SUNSET'S LLC

DEMURRER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHO;
09/21/2009 Request for Judicial Notice (IN SUPPORT OF DFNT'S DEMURRER &
MOTION TO STRIKE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; )
09/21/2009 Defendant's qemurrer (SU OFW LP'S DEMURRER TO SECOND

AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHO; )
09/21/2009 Motion to Strike (STEPHEN GAGGERO'S TO SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHO)
..
09/21/2009 Motion to Strike (BOARDWALK SUNSET'S LLC MOTION TO STRIKE

SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHO }
09/21/2009 Defendant's Demurrer (STEPHEN GAGGERO'S DEMURRER TO SECOND
09/21/2009 Motion to Strike (511 OFW LP'S MTN TO STRIKE TO SECOND
09/21/2009 Motion to Strike (GINGERBREAD COURT LP'S SECOND AMENDED

COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHO; )
09/21/2009 Defendant's Demurrer (GINGERBREAD COURT LP'S MTN. TO SECOND

08/14/2009 Second Amended Complaint
.08/04/2009 Ex-Parte Application (FOR AN ORDER COMPELLING PRODUCTION OF

DOCUMENTS ALTERNATIVELY, APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER SHORTENING TIME FOR
file:l/IFllSTACEY !Los'~OAngeles,~OSuperio"'G20CourtH120.~~riBunge.hun( 512112012 9:S9: 14 AM]
00051.0
Los Angeles Superior Court - Civil

~
THE HEARING OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS)

08/04/2009 Declaration (CHRISTOPHER POLK IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S

APPLCATION FOR AN EX PARTE ORDER SHORTENING TIME )
07/27/2009 Reply To Motion (IN SUPPORT OF DEFTS, DEMURRERS TO lST

AMENDED COMPLAINT )
07 /22/2009 Opposition (PLFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFT'S DEMURRERS TO PLFFS'

lST AMENDED COMPLT )
07/22/2009 Opposition (PLFFS' OPPOSITION TO DEFTS' MTNS TO STRIKE

PORTIONS OF lST AMENDED COMPLT )
05/22/2009 Stipulation and Order (TERMINATING STAY AND FOR DEADLINES FOR
CERTAIN DISCOVERY AND PLEADING MATTERS, AND ORDER THEREON; . ***Order
Signed by Judge Tarle**)
05/18/2009 Demurr.er (GINGERBREAD COURT LP'S DEMURRER TO lST AMENDED

COMPLT; MEMO POINTS & AUTHORmES )
05/18/2009 Motion to Strike (PORTIONS OF lST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO

OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
05/18/2009 Motion to Strike (DEFT (BOARDWALK SUNSET LLC) MDT STRIKE

PORTIONS OF lST AMENDED COMPLT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
05/18/2009 Demurrer (DEFT (BOARDWALK SUNSET'S) MTN STRIKE PORTIONS OF

FIRST AMENDED COMPLT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
05/18/2009 Request for Judicial Notice

OS/18/2009 Motion to Strike ( PORTIONS OF lST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO

OF POINTS. & AUTHORITIES; (S. GAGGERO) )
05/18/2009 Demurrer (DEFT (S. GAGGERO'S) DEMURRER lST AMENDED

COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES)
05/18/2009 Motion to Strike (DEFT (511 OFW L.P.'S) MTN STRIKE PORTIONS OF
lST .AMENDED COMPLT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
05/18/2009 Demurrer (TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS &

AUTHORITIES; (BROADWALK SUNSET LLC) )
.05/18/2009 Demurrer (DEFT (511 OFW L P'S) DEMURRER TO lST AMENDED
COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
03/24/2009 Proof of Service
fi\e:l//Fj/STACEY/Los"/o20Angclcso/o20Superior%20Coun%20-o/o20Bunge.htm)fil I/2012 9:59: 14 AM]
00051.1.
'i'"
.' II
I!
i.il.~s~ng.eles Superior Coun. Civil
111 ..
II .'
Filed by Attorney .for Plaintiff
!r'
03/23/2009 Stipulation (REGARDING SETTLEMENT DISCUSSIONS RE: MSC signed
'i.
by all parties )
Filed by Court
03/ 18/2009 Proof-Service/Summons
''
03/18/2009 Notice (CORRECTED NOTICE OF CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

RULING )
03/ 17 /2009 Stipulation (FOR BRIEFING SCHEDULE & PROPOSED ORDER )

'
03/03/2009 Application - Miscellaneous (AS TO V. BUNGE )

03/03/ 2009 Application - Miscellaneous. ( AS TO JOSE BUNGE )

Filed by Attorney for. Defern;iant
02/2.4/200.9 Notice (of CMC Ruling )

02/13/2009 Statement-Case Management (QUESTIONNAIRE. )

02/11/2009 Statement-Case Management

02/04/2009 First Amended Complaint (SUMMONS ISSUED )

02/04/2009 Summons Filed

Filed by Attorney tor Plaintiff
indicated:
IQE 10/04/2011 D6!09/201 o 1012a12oog 01121/2009
01/27 /2009 Notice (ntc of non'receipt of opposition to deft Gingerbread Court

LP'S mtn to strike )
01/27 /2009 Notice (of non-receipt of opposition to deft Gingerbread Court LP'S
:
'
'
Demurrer)
01/27 /2009 Notice (of non-receipt of opposition to deft Boardwalk Sunset LLC ntc
mtn judgment on pleadings )
'
01/27/2009 Notice {of non-receipt of opposition to deft Gingerbread court LP'S ntc
mot for Judgment on Pleadings )
01/27 /2009 Notice {of non-receipt of opposition to deft 511 OFW LP'S Demurrer )
01/27 /2009 Notice {of non-receipt of opposition to. deft Boardwalk Sunset LLC's
Demurrer)
01/27 /2009 Notice (of non-receipt of opposition to deft 511 OFW LP'S ntc Mtn
rilc:l//FJ/STACEY /Los'-G.20Angeles''o20Superio~::i2ocoun''o20'~0Bunge.h1ml5/2112012 9:59: 14 AM}
00051.2
i
1,
I.Os Angeles Superior Court~ Civil
'fllt
Judgment on the Pleadings )
01/27/2009 Notice (of non-receipt of opposition to deft Boardwalk Sunset LLC'S

.
Mtn to Strike )
01/27/2009 Notice (of non-receipt of opposition to deft 511 OFW LP'S Mot to
Strike )
12/31/2008 Request for Judicial Notice

12/31/2008 Notice of Motion (FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS; MEMO OF
POINTS & AUTHORITIES (511 OF W LP) )
POINTS & AUTHORmES (BOARDWALK SUNSET LLC) )
POINTS & AU.THORITIES (GINGERBREAD COURT LP) )
I
I
I
12/24/2008 Objection Document Filed (plffs' objections to defts' proposed order

expunging Lis Pendens & Plaintiffs' proposed order )
12/23/2008 Notice (DEFT 511 OFW NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER )
12/23/2008 Notice (DEFT BOARDWALK SUNSET LLC'S ENTRY OF ORDER )

J'.iled by Attorney for Defendant
12/23/2008 Notice (DEFT GINGERBREAD COURT LP'S NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
ORDER)
Filed by Attorney for Defe.ndant
12/19/2008 Demurrer ( TO COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORITIES )
12/19/2008 Motion to Strike ( PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS &
AUTHORITIES )
.
.
Filed by Attom.ey for Defendant
i2/19/2008 Demurrer (TO COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORmES )
Filed by Attorney for D.efendant
12/19/2008 Demurrer (TO COMPLT; MEMO OF POINTS & AUTHORmes )
12/19/2008 Motion to Strike
12/19/2008 Request for Judicial Notice (IN SUPPORT OF DEFT'S DEMURRER &
MOTION TO STRIKE )
12/19/2008 Order (Expunging Notice of Pending Action (Lis Pendens) and for
Award of Attorneys Fees (511 OFW, LP) *U**Slgned by Judge Tarle***** )
12/19/2008 Motion
'to Strike (PORTIONS OF COMPLAINT; MEMO OF POINTS &
file:l//FlfSTACEY fLo~'20Angc1es~~OSuperio''020Coun~~O-~G20Bungc.htm(Sn I12012 9:59: 14 AM)
000513
: s An~clcs Superior Coun - Civil
i~.
AUTHORITTES)
Filed by Attorney ,for Defendant
12/19/2008 Order (Expunging Notice of Pending Action (LisPendens) and for

Award of Attorneys Fees (Gingerbread Court, LP} ****Signed by Judge Tarte**** )
12/19/2008 Order (Expunging Notice of Pending Action (Lis Per;idens) and for
Award of Attorneys ,Fees (Boardwalk Sunset LLC} ****Signed by Judge Tarle**** )
Filed by Attorn,ey for Defendant,
12/10/2008 Reply To Motion (REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFT ,511 OFW'S NTC OF
MOTJON & MTN TO EXPUNGE US PENDENS DECLARATION OF JOSEPH PRASKE &
EXHIBITS THERETO,)
12/10/2008 Reply To Motion (IN SUPPORT OF DEFT BROADWALK SUNSET, LLC'S

NTC OF MTN TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS DECLARATION OF JOSEPH PRASKE &
EXHIBITS)
12/10/2008 Reply To Motion (REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFT GINGERBREAD
COURT'S NTC OF MTN TO EXPUNGE US PENDENS DECL;,QF JOSEPH PRASKE &
EXHIBITS THERETO )
12/10/2008 Miscellaneous-Other (DEFTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE
DECLARATION OF JOSE BUNGE )
12/10/2008 Miscellaneous-Other (DEFTS/ EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE
DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER POLK )
12/10/2008 Miscellaneous-other (DEFTS' EVJDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE

DECLARATION OF, BRITTON SHUFORD )
12/10/2008 Miscellaneous-other (DEFTS' EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS TO THE
DECLARATION OF DOROTHY REIK )
12/10/2008 Supplement (DECLARATION OF TED FOLKERT & EXHIBITS THERETO
IN SUPPORT OF DEFTS' MTN TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS )
12/05/2008 Declaration (OF DOROTHY REIK IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITTON TO
MOTIONS TO EXPUNGE US PENDENS )
12/05/2008 Declaration (OF MICHAEL DERK IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
MOTIONS TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS )
12/05/2008 Declaration (OF CHRISTOPHER POLK IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
12/05/2008 Declaration (OF JOSE BUNGE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITTON TO
MOTIONS TO EXPUNGE US PENDENS )
12/05/2008 Objection {TO EVIDENCE IN DEFENDATS' MOTIONS )
file://lfl/ST ACEY /LoS,~OAngeles~620Superio1'~20Court~~O-o/..20Bunge.hun(5/21/2012 9:59: 14 "AM)
000514
" Ir
Uis Angeles Superior CoW'I - Civil
12/05/2008 Memo po.ints & authorities (IN OPPOSmON TO DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS }
Flied by Attorney for Plaintiff
12/05/2008 Notice of Ruling ((2) NOTICES FILED )

12/05/2008 Declaration (OF BRITTEN SHUFFORD IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO

12/01/2008 ExcParte.Application (PLAINTIFFS' FOR ORDER CONTINUING HEARING
ON MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS ACTION FILED )
12/01/2008 Opposition (TO PLAINTIFF'S EX PARTE TO CONTINUE MOTION TO
EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS )
12/01/2008 Opposition (TO PLAINTIFFS' EX PARTE )

..
i
11/26/2008 Opposition (TO EX PARTE APP. TO CONT. MOT. TO EXPUNGE LIS

PENDENS)
11/26/2008 Ex-Parte Application (FOR ORDER CONTINUING HRNG ON MOT. TO
EXPUNGE LIS PEND ENS ACTION FILED }
11/26/2008 Opposition (TO CONT. MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS )

11/18/2008 Declaration (OF TED FLOKERT AND EXHIBITS THERETO IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT BOARDWALK SUNSET LLC'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS }
11/18/2008 Notice of Motion (TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS )
11/18/2008 Declaration (OF TED FLOKERT AND EXHIBITS THERETO IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT GNGERBREAD COURT LP'S MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS )
11/18/2008 Notice of Motion (L(GINGERBREAD COURT) TO EXPUNGE LIS
PENDENS 2.(BOARDWALK SUNSET) TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS )
11/10/2008 Notice of Pendency (AGAINST 601 OCEAN FRONT WALK, VENICE
CALIFORNIA )
.
11/10/2008 Notice of Pendency (AGAINST 511 OCEAN FRONT WALK, VENICE.
CALIFORNIA )
11/10/2008 Notice of Pendency (AGAINST '517 OCEAN FRONT WALK, VENICE,
CALIFORNIA )
,
10/28/2008 Complaint Filed
Click on any of the below link(S} to see documents filed on or before the date
indicated:
flle:ll/FllST ACEY/Los~:.20Angeleso/o20Superio~020Courto/o20-o/o20Bunge.htm IS/2112012 9:59: 14 AMl
000515
!~
'
!~
'
i losAngeles Superior Coun Civil

1
, ..,.,._,
IQE
10/0412Ql 1
06/09/2010
10128/2009
Case lnfocmatjon
01121/2009
I party !nforroa1jon I Documents Fj!ed
Proceedings Held (Proceeding dates listed in descending order)

Click on any of the below link(s) to see proceedings held on or before the date
indicated:
11J1612010
04/30/2012 at 08:30 am in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarle, Presiding

Ex-Parte Application - Motion Granted
04/23/2012 at 08:30 am In Department WEB, Norman P. Tarle, Presiding
Court Order - Completed
Trial - Resumes (CLOSING ARGUMENTS3 HOUR ESTIMATE2) IN CAMERA REVIEW OF
TRUST DOCS) - Half Day of Trial Held
Hearing-Other (IN CAMERA REVIEW OF TRUSTDOCUMENTS) - Continued
Non-Appearance (Case Review) - Completed
Non-Appearance (Case Review) (FOR CLERK TO MONITOR CASE(JUDGE TO
RESPOND TO SUBMITTEDDOCS RE: WITNESS OBJECTIONS)) - Continued
03/20/2012 at 08:30 am in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarte, Presiding

Court Order - Completed
02/28/2012 in Department ADRO, ADR Neutral, Presiding
Closed-ADR - Not held-Rmvd ADR-Other
02/07 /2012 at 09:30 am in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarle, Presiding
Trial - Resumes - Half Day of Trial Held
Triai - Resumes - Full Day of Trial Held
Trial - Resumes - Full Day of Trial Held
Trial - Resumes - Full Day of Trial Held
Court Trial - Short.Cause (MEDIATION COMPLETION DATEEXTENDED TO l-9-12(see
11-16-11 minute order)) - Full Day of Trial Held
Motion - Summary Judgment (OR IN THE ATLERNATIVE, SUMMARYADJUDICATION
OF ISSUES) - Motion Denied

Conference-Post Mediation Status (Mediation Completion Date Extendedto 11-16112. RESERVED FOR CONTINUATION OFMOTIONS FROM 10-18-11) - Matter is
taken under submission
11/16/2011 at 03:30 pm in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarle, Presiding
Ruling on Submitted Matter - Completed
10/18/2011 at 08:30 am in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarle,. Presiding

ri!c:/f!FVSTACE V/Los'~OAngcles,~OSuperio~~OCouno/a20'~0Bunge.htmf 5121/2012 9:59: 14 AMJ
000516
,..,..
Angeles Superiof Coun Civil

.
Motion to Compel (2. MOTION TO COMPEL3. FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER) - HeldContinued

I
06/20/2011 at 02:30 pm in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarte, Presiding

Non-Appearance
(Ca~
Review) - Completed

Conference-Post Mediation Status (Trial 6-7-11) - Continued.
03/11/2011 at 09:00'am in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarte, Presiding
Mot.ion - Protection Order - Motion Granted

Ex-Parte Application - Motion Granted
indicated:
IQE
111161201Q

Trial Setting Conference (Status on preparation) - STC held, Med ordered, trial
set
Ex-Parte Application (FOR CONTINUANCE OF MEDIATION ANDTRIAL) - Motion
Granted
Motion (For Reference of Discovery) - Motion Denied

Trial Setting Conference - STC held, Med ordered, trial set
'i '.
Hearing on Demurrer (- And Motion to Strike ThirdAmended Complaint-"3" Separate

Defendants Filed) - Demurrer overruled
I'
I'

Ruling on Submitted Matter - Court Makes Order
01/19/2010 at 04:00 pm In Department WEB, Norman P. Tarte, Presiding

Non-Appearance (Case Review) (issue of sanctions to be takenunder submission) Completed

Motion (for terminating sanctions andrequest for reasonable fees andcosts in the
amount of $5,650;-Motion to Correct ClericalMistake) - Motion Denied
,Ii
11/17 /2009 at 03:30 pm in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarte, Presiding

Ruling on Submitted Matter - Order Issued
I!

Motion to Strike (4 Demurrers to Second AmendedComplaint;4 Motions to Strike to
SecondAmended ComplaintMotion to Compel Verified Responseto First Set of
Production Demand) - Submitted
08/04/2009 at 08:30 am in Department WEB, Norman P. Tarie, Presiding
Hearing on Demurrer - Demurrer sustained with leave

Status Conference (2. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARD!NGDEFAULT AS TO
DEFENDANT STEVEGAGGERO) - osc Discharged
: ,
:,._'_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __,,
OSC-Failure to File Proof of Serv (As to Defendant Steve Gaggero.2. Reserved for
j~1
flle://IFJISTACEY /l..Also/o20Angelcs,~0Supcrio~~0Court'020-o/o208unge.hun(5/2112012 9:59: 14 AM I
000517
i!!'
I,,
1
.r.
l' .osAngcles
11~1
Superior Cour1 Civil
defendant'sDemurrer) - OSC Discharged

Judgment Debtor Examination Hrg - Conference held, not settl., cont.

Mandatory Settlement Conference - Held-Continued

Initial Status Conference - Held-Continued
'
~
~

Hearing on Demurrer - Off Calendar
'
Motion Expunge Lis Pendens (TD EXPUNGE US PENDENS (3 MOTIONS)) - Motion

Granted
,
'

EK-Parte Application (For an Order Continuing Hearingon Motion to Expunge Lis
PendensAction Filed) Denied
,,'
11/26/2008 at 08:30 am in Department WEJ, Terry B. Friedman, Presiding

Ex-Parte Application - Motion Denied
'
indicated:
me
1i11s12010
Case !nfonnatjpn
I party lnforroatjgn I Qocumeots Ej!ed I pmceedjng Information
1'
..
=I
if:
r
i .
I '
..
'
' I~~
'
'
'c!.:
'
I
.,
'
'.
: -~
'
..
~'.iri
.::
;1,1
"'
ii::
r'r
'
~ l:1
~:lllfl/ST
ACEY/Los%20Angclcs%20Superior%.:JOCourt%2().%20Bungc.h1m (5121/2012 9:59: 14 AM]
'
I
II
!
JI
'"
I
II
!.
,I
'it
'
1i
!'i
I [I
I'
'I
,,I',
'if'
iii
'1
1:
Ii
!r
i,,
II
I
I
I
II
'I
I
I
I
:
:I
r.1
,I
---,
E~Hn!ffJY>S,-
ilr
l
west~w.
Page I
Not Reponed in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2009 WL.82356 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)

Nonpublished/Noncitubl (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8. l !05 and 8.1110, 8, 1115)
(Cite as: 2009 WL 82356 (Cal.App. 2 DisL))
i-Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115. restricts cita

tion of unpublished opil_l_ions in Cnlifomin couns.
Coun of Appeal, Second District Division 5. Cali-
fornia.
511 OFW, LP .. Plaintiff and Appellant,
V.
FIRST FEDERAL BANK OF CALIFORNIA. Defendant and Respondent.

No. B209057.
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. SC098012).
Jan.14, 2009.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Coun of Los
Angeles County, Ann I. Jones. Judge. Affinned.
Bosrwick & Jassy, Garv L. Bosrwjck. Jean-Poul Jassv:
Westlake Law Group and David Blake Chotfield, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Eppon, Richman & Robbins, Steven N. Richman and
Lawrence A. Abelson for Defendant and Respondent.
TURNER, P.J.
I. INTRODUCTION
1 Plaintiff, 511 OFW, L. P., appeals from an
order denying a request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff
sought to restrain defendant First Federal Bank of
California. from issuing a beneficiary payoff statcmen~. The payoff statcmcr:n related to a loan secured
by commercial propeny owned by plaintiff. According to plaintiff. the payoff statement contains dollar
amounts which exceed the balance owed on the loan.
Plaintiff contends that defendant improperly included

irl the" payoff stotement anomey fees ond costs arising
out or a scparnte action entitled Stephen Al. Gaggero v.
Firs/
Federal
Bank of California
(Super.Ct.L.A.County. No. BC257767) (''!he Gaggero
litigation"). We conclude the order must be affirmed.
Because lhc trial coun did not abuse its discretion in
denying the preliminary injunction request because
plaintiff has an adequate legal remedy, we affirm the
order under review.
....
;.;:,
II. BACKGROUND
On April 29, 2008, plaintiff filed a declaratory
relief complaint which contained the following allegations. Plaintiff. o limited partnership. is the _owner of
real propeny located at 511 Ocean Front Walk in
Venice, California. The propeny is subject to a
mongage held by defendant with principal and interest
currently due in the amount of approximately
$793,626. Defendant imposed an improper and illegal
$3,463.992 lien on plaintiffs propeny. According to
the complaint, defendant demanded this additional
amount from plaintiff: The lien resulted fTom litigation
between Mr. Gaggero and defendant.
According to the complaint, in 1990, Mr. Gaggero was the owner of rour contiguous properties
located on Ocean Front Walk including 511 and 517
Ocean Front Walk. Mr. Gaggero and defendant entered into loan agreements on three of the properties.
The Joan number was 000-9609223. In 1994, one of
the three loans was paid off after a dispute arose between Mr. Gaggero and defendant. The disputes as to
511and517 Ocean Front Walk were litigated resulting in an award Of SI .2 million in Mr. Gaggero's favor.
The complaint funher ~lleged that, in 1997, Mr.
Gaggero transferred title to the Venice propenies to
family owned limited pannerships as a pan of an
estate plan. The 51.1 Ocean Front Walk propeny is
now owned by plaintiff. Defendant claimed the 1997
title change was an unauthorized transfer. As a resul~
defendan1 required that plaintiff enter into an as
sumption agreement. The assumption agreement v.as
executed on June 4, 1999. The assumption agreement
provides in pan Iha! plaintiff would assume the 1990
note and deed of trust for the 511 Ocean Front propeny. loan No. 000-9609223. According to the assumption agreement, Mr. Gaggero .is the managing
general panner of plaintiff. In 2006, the loan on the
517 Ocean Front Walk propeny was paid off but defendant did not demand any outstanding fees in the
payout amount.
In June 2007, plaintiff tendered the full amount to

defendant of all amounts owed on the 511 Ocean Front
Walk property. Defendant refused the June 2007
tender. In 2008, plaintiff requested a beneficiary de-
0 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000519
{x Y
l'I
1!
'
;:
'
...~
Page2
Not Reponed in Cal.Rptr.3d. 2009 WL 82356 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Coon, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115).
(Cit< as: 2009 WL 82356 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.))
mand statement on the S11 Ocean Front Walk property. In an April 4, 2008 payoff SUltement. defendant
listed as outstanding fee; $3.463.992. In a cover lener
accompanying the April 4, 2008 payoff statement.
defendant assened the fees and costs were awarded in
the Gaggero litigation. Plaintiff alleged that it was not
a party to the Gagerro litigation. Plaintiff alleged there
was an appeal and cross.-appeal from the judgment in
the Gagerro litigation. In any even~ plaintiff alleged
that defendant had only been awarded fees and costs
totaling S 1,606.873.43 in the Gaggero litigation which
was far less than the demand in the payoff statement in
the amount of$3,463.992.
'2 Defendant refused plaintiffs request to remove
the outstanding fees from the payoff statement. Defendant claimed the $3.463,992 demand was author
ized pursuant to paragraph 9 of the trust deCd which
provides: "Protection-of Lender's Security~ If Borrower fails to perfonn the covenants and agreements
contained in this Deed of Trust or if any action or
proceeding is commenced which affects the Property
or title thereto or the i11terest of Lender therein, including, but not .lim~ted to, eminent domain, _insolvency, code enforcement, or arrangements or prD6
ceedings involving a bankrupl or decedent then
Lender at Lende(s option may make such appearances, disburse such sums and take such action. ns
Lender deemed necessary, in,, i_ts .sole discretion, to
protect Lender's il1teresr. including:bul not limited to.
(i) disbursement of anorney's fees; (ii) entry onto the
Property to make repairs; (iii) procurement of.satisfactory insurance as provided in paragraph 4 hereof
and (iv) if this Deed of Trust is a leasehold, exercise
any option to renew or extend the-ground lease on
behalf of Borrower and curing any default by borrower in the terms and eonditions of the ground lease.
["J] Any amounts disburSed by Lender pursuant to this
paragraph 9, with interest thereon. shall become additional indebtedness of Borrower secured by lhis
Deed of Trust. Unless Borrower and Lender agree to
other tcnns of-paymcnt5, such amounts _shall be immediately due and payable and shall bear interest from
the date of disbursement at the Default Rate:,
Plaintiff assened that a controversy existed between the parties concerning their rights under the
Joan documents and the trust deed. Funher, there was
a contmverSy as to whether defendant was entitled to
Claim attorney fees ond costs in defense of the Gaggero litigation. Plaintiff sought a declaration that de-
fendant had no right to add anomey fees and costs in

any pending lhiga1ion related to the loan balance.
On May I. 2008, plaintiff filed an application for
a tCinporary restraining order and for an order to show
cause why defendant should no\ be restrained from
issuing a beneficiary payoff statement which exceeded
the amount owed on the loan and included anomey
fees and costs from the Gaggero litigation. In supp0n
of the application. Joseph Prask declared that he is
the trustee of the general panner of plaintiff. Mr.
Praske receives notices for the 511 Ocean From Walk
propeny. Mr. Praske works with Pacific Coast Management nnd Mr. Gaggero in managing plaintiffs
property. Mr. Praske was involved in financing of the
propeny and worked with counsel regarding lhe
property. Mr. Praske reiterated the allegations in the
complaint about'thc: 1990 loan agreement; June 4,
1999.loan assumption agreement; and note and trust
deed for the 511 Ocean Front Walk property.. Mr.
Praske also verified that plaintiff had attempted to
tender the full amount of the principal and interest
owed on the loan to defendant. However, defendant
had refused to accept the tender claiming that the
charge of $3.463,992 in outstanding fees was proper
due to the Gaggero litigation. According to Mr.
Praske, plaintiff was not a pany to the Gaggero litigation. Mr. Praske declared that, if the demand forihe
outstanding fees is not removed. it will make it impossible to refinance. pay off, leverage, sell, or otherwise alienate the property.
*3 Plaintiff's points and authorities assen: defendant had no legal or equitable basis for including
the fees and costs fium the Gaggero litigation; defendant added the anomey fees and costs even thou!ih
the case was dismissed prior to trial; further. in the
Gaggero litigation defendant was found not to be the
prevaHing party for purposes of contractual nuomey
fees pursuant to Civil Code section I717; fees and
costs in the Gaggero litigation were awarded for defending against ton claims; and both parties in the
Gaggem appealed the award. Plaintiffs points and
authorities further argued: defendant's conduct in
adding the fee and costs amounts to a constitutional
taking without due process of low; defendant did not
comply with the anachnieitt law (Code Civ. Proc ..
481.10 et seq.); the addition of anomey fees and costs
to the payoff statement was not pennined under the
tenns of the trust deed; paragraph 9 of the trust deed
provides security for a debt that is due, it does not
IO 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000520
'!i
I<
I:
I
!I~,'
I'
Page 3
'Not Reponed in Cal.Rptr.3d. 2009 WL 82356 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
allow defendant to unilaterally odd any claim to the
debt; and paragraph 9 also requires the borrower to
pay fees in the event the borrower fails to protect lhe
propeny from third panics by allowing defendant to
defend the propeny against third pany claims. Plaintiff argued that paragraph 9 of the trust deed was inapplicable because defendant took no actlon in the
Gaggero litigation to protect the value of the 51 l
Ocean Front Walk property or its security interest
from third panies. In the Gaggero litigation, defendant
Y?as defending against.ton claims and contract breach
claims. Finally, plaintiff asserted it would be-irreparably hanned unless injunctive relief was provided.
Plaintiff contended that the addition. of the fees to lhe
payoff statement would prevent it from refinancing,
selling. or otherwise disposing of the propeny. This
wo.uld thereby violate plaintiff's constitutional right .to
~l ienate its property free from any wrongful liens of
third parties. The temporary restraining request was
denied. ~u~ an order to show cause re preliminary
injunction was issued and set for-hearing on May 29.
2008.
0
'
Defendant sought judicial notice of 22 separate

documents. First, defendant sought judicial notice of
certain papers filed in the case of Gaggero litigation.
pn or about May 30, 2007, Mr. Gaggero sought a
preliminary injunction, or in the alternative. a temporary restraining order. Mr. Gaggero sought to have
defendant issue a beneficiary pay~ffstatement which
did not contain its c:l":i.me~ attorney fees. Mr. Gaggero,s ex parte request was denied. Mr. Gaggcro then
filed a request to have a referee appointed to dete"!line
lhe validity of the issues raised by the inclusion of
$2,464.532.93 in the payoff statement. The ex pane
motion for nppointment of a referee was denied Mr.
_Gaggero later filed 8 noticed motion for a restraining
order.or preliminary injunction which sought the deletion of the anomey fees and costs from the beneficiary statement. On July 3, 2007, Mr. Gaggero's motion was denied. On September 18 ..2007, Mr. Gaggero
filed a request to dismiss the Gaggero litigation. On
March 24, 2008, defendant received its anomey fees
and costs in the sum ofSl.606,873.43 in the Gaggero
litigation.
4 Second, defendant requested judicial notice of
documents filed in the case ofS// OFll'. L.P. v. First
Federal Bank of California (Super.Ct.LA.County.
No. BC373336). On June 26. 2007, in case No.
BC373336. plaintiff filed a complaint against de-
fendant. In the complaint, plaintiff sought declaratory

relief as to a loan funded by defendant. The loan encumbered the same propeny involved in this case. On
May 8. 2007. plaintiff requested a sUttement of the
balance owed on the loan. According to the complaint
in case No. BC373336, the payoff statement was
backda1ed, failed 10 comply with Civil Code section
2943, subdivision (b)(I ). and inaccurately included a
charge of $2,464.532.93 for attorney fees. Plaintiff
assened it was not responsible for the $2.464.532.93
in attorney fees and sought a declaration to that effect.
Plaintiff also alleg~d t_hat defendant's inclusio_n of the
$2.464,532.93 in anomey fees in the payoff statement
constituted a contract breach and a violation of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On
.June 28. 2007. plaintiff sought issuance of a temporary
restraining order and a preliminary injunction to
,compel defendant to remove any fees or costs from the
payoff statement for the loan funded by defendant. On
June 28. 2007, the application was denied without
prejudice. On September JO, 2007, plaintiff again
sought issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction which sought to compel defendant to remove aily fees or costs from the payoff
statement for loan No. 000-9609223. On September
10, 2007. lhe temporary restraining order request was
denied. But an order to show cause re: preliminary
injunction was issued. On October 16. 2007, the preliminary injunction request was denied. On November
30. 2007, a hearing was held on defendant's request for
appointment of a rCceiver. At the conclusi6n of the
hearing. defense counsel requested that the motion for
appointment ofa receiv~r be taken off calendar.
In addition to the judicially noticed documents,
defendant relied on the declaration of Lawrence A.
Abelson. one of its attorneys, as pan of the opposition
to' the present preliminary injunction request. Mr.
Abelson stated: the Gaggero action was dismissed
prior to trial 'by means of a voluntary dismissal; attorney fees were awarded in defendant's favor and
against Mr. Gaggero in the sum ofSI.606,873.43; on
March I 9, 2008. plaintiff requested a payoff statement
on the ""subject loan"; on April 4, 2008, defendant
served a payoff statement which included $3,463,922
,in attorney fees incurred in the Gaggero action and in
case No. BC373336; and the,latest payoff statemem
was consistent with the prior statements. And Mr.
Abel,so,n's declaration explained the need for a bond in
the event a preliminary injunction issued and settlement options.
li:J 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000521
Page 4
Not Reported in Cal.Rpti.3d, 2009 WL 82356 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncitoble (Col. Rules of Court, Rules 8.llOS and 8.1110, 8.11 IS)
(Cite as: 2009 WL 82356 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.))
Defendant op-posed the prelirriinary injunctiori

request on the grounds: ii was entilled 10 add the 01tomey fees and costs to the payoff statement; Ibis was
entitled to any provisional remedy because it could not

demonstrate irreparable injury. Rather, defendant
asserted that lf a preliminary injunction issued. it
would suffer irreparable harm. This is because: de-
because they were incurred in enforcing its rights and

protecting its interests under the loan documents; arid
plaintiff was .. forum shopping" because two other'
fendant would be forced to give up its security without

being paid: defendant would lose its security or senior
lien; and a new lender would have a security in the
judges had denied the relief sought in the current ap-
property.
plication on at least sevcr'I prior occasions in two different lawsuits. Defendant cited as examples of prior
adverse rulings on this issue: the 2007 ex parte application for injunctive relief and two related ex parte
applications seeking the appointment of a special
master to consider the original application and order
shonening time for hearing on motion for prCliminary
iRjunction all of which were denied; a noticed motion
for prohibitory preliminary injun_ction which was
denied on July J. 2007; and in case No. BC373336
filed by Mr. Gaggero in plaintifl's name. injunctive
relief requests filed on June 26. September 10, and
October 16, 2007. which were denied on each occasion. Defendant contended these prior rulings required
the present preliminary injunction motion be denied

under res judicata or colh:neml estoppel principles.
s Defendant argued that the loan documents

coupled with the trust deed gave ii the right 10 odd the
onomey fees and costs in the payoff sta1emen1. Defendant cited paragraph 8(e) of the note and paragraph
9 of the trust deed. Paragraph 8(e) states: "Payment of
Note Holder's Costs and Expenses. ['ii If the Note
Holder has required me 10 pay immediately in full as
describe above, the Note Holder will have the right to
be paid back by me for ~II its costs and expenses in
enforcing this note to the extent not prohibited by
applicable law. Such expenses include, for example,
reasonable anomey's fees." In addition. to paragraph
8(e) of the note and paragraph 9 of the trust deed.
defendant cited the following language from the trust
deed which provides: This Deed of Trust secures to

Lender: (a) the repayment of the debt evidenced by the
Note with interest and all renewals. extensions and

modifications: (b) the payment of all sums. with interest, advanced urider p'11"3graph 6 to protect the security of this Deed of TrtJSt; (c) the performance of
borrower's covenants and agreements under this Deed

of Trust and the Note; ... (g) the performance of nny
agreement of Bori"ower to pay fees and charges to

Lender whether or not set forth in this Deed of Trust.
Defendant further argued that plaintiff was no1
A hearing on plaintiffs application for injunctive

relief was held on June 3. 2008. At the hearing, the
trial court ruled: plaintiff had failed to show irrepara
ble harm: plaintiff had adequate alternative remedies
rather than the extraordinary relief it sought; plaintiff
could bond the amount of anomey fees and costs

allegedly owed and then sell the property; plaintiff
could sue for damages; or plaintiff could pay the
amount with a reservation of rights. By contrast, the

trial court found that defendant would be irreparably
harmed if the request for injunctive relief "'ere

granted. Plaintifl's timely appeal followed.
Ill. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff contends the trial coun erred in denying

the preliminary injunction request. Our Supreme
Court has stated: "[nrial courts should evaluate two
interrelated factors when deciding whether or not to

issue a preliminary injunction. The first is the likeli
hood that the plaintiff will prevail on the merits at trial.
The second is the interim harm that the plaintiff is
likely to sustain if the injunction were denied os

compared to the hann that the defendant is likely to
suffer if the preliminary injunction were issued. [Citations.]" (IT Corp " Co11n11 of/mreria/ 0983) 35
Col.3d 63, 69-70: accord ll'hiie " Davis 120031 30
Cal.4th 528. 554; .Jar Bharal Deieloaers Inc. 1.
Minidis (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 437, 443.) A decision
to grant or deny a preliminary injunction request rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court. ( Cohen
1' Board o(S1meni.rar.t (198<) 40 Cal.Jd 277. 286
citing IT Core. '' Cout11> o(/nrneria/ sunra. 35 Cal.3d
~-) The determination will not be reversed on
appeal absent a showing of a manifest abuse of discretion. ( Cohen " Board ofSunervisors. suvra 40
Cal.3d at p. 286: Caminemal Baking Co. .-. Ka1:
(1968) 68 Cal.2d 512 527 .) Before equitable relief
will be granted. there must be a demonstration of
irreparable injury by the party seeking the injunction
and a showing that damages are inadequate. (~
Civ. Proc. S 526, subd. (a)(2), (4) & (5); Wilki.<011 1,
Wiederkehr 120021 101 Cal.App.4th 827 831-832:
C 2012 Thomson Reuu:rs. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000~22
Page S
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.Jd, 2009 WL 82356 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncilable (Cal. Rules Court, Rules 8.1105 ond 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite os: 2009 WL 82356 (Cal.App. 2 DisL))
or
1'1iedman "- Priedman 119931 20 Cal.App.4th 876.
m tf;u1vcr P/yn1011th Cente, lac_ v Chry.i;/cr Afotors

Com.11967\ '5' Ca1.Aop.2d 300 306.)
6 Here, the trial court Found that plaintiff had nol

established either irreparable injury in that money was
an inndequate remedy or that plaintiff had a substantial
probability of prevailing on the merits. The trial court
I.
ruled: the evidence only established plaintiff would

suITei a monetary loss; plaintiff had failed tO show
irreparable harm; and defendant would suffer irreparable harm if plaintiff received the requested. relief.
Plaintiff claims thal it would suffer a pecuniary loss if
it cannot sell or refinance its commCrcial real propeny
in a timely manner. However, without abusing its

discretion, the trial coon could find if plaintiff ultimately prevails on the issue of rights under the note
nnd
I~
,,
'
tnlSI deed~
the nmount of any such loss is ascer-
tainable and could be proved by testimony at a trial.

The trial court could have reasonably ruled plaintiff
would not suffer any irreparable injury because de-
!"'
fendant would be required to provide monetary compensation for any injury caused by the claim for at
tomey fees in the payoff statement. Thus, it was not an

abuse of discretion for the trial court to rule that
damages would be an adequate remedy at law should
plaintiff ultimately prevail. (Cod<' Civ. Proc. 526;
dill J1r.~. Co. l'. Sunerior Cqurt (1990) Sl Ca1.3d 1107.
838-819.)
IV. DISPOSITION
Thi: order denying ihe preliminary injunction is

.''i
affirmed. Defendant, First Federal Bank of California.

is awarded its costs on appeal from plaintiff, 511
OFW,L.P.
We concur: ARMSTRQNG and MQSK. JJ.
Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2009.
511 OfW, L.P. v. First Federal Bank of California
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d., 2009 WL 82356
(Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
END OF DOCUMENT
<O 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim 10 Orig. US Gov. Works.
000523
'i;
westlaw.
Page I
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d. 2010 WL 4928071 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncitable (CaL Rules of Court, Rules 8.11 OS and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite os: 2010 WL 4928071 (Col.App. 2 Dist.))
FN !. On October 17. 2008, we consolidated
the appeals for deeision.
P"
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115. restricts cit_a-
tion of unpublished opinio.ns in California couns.

Court of Appeal, Second District. Division 6, Cali-
fornia.
MARINA GLENCOE, LP et al., Plaintiffs,
Cross-defendanis and Appellanis.
v.
AMA CONSTRUCTION & REAL ESTATE, LLC;
Defendant and Respondent;
Amidi Partners. LLC, Defendant, Cross-complainant
and Respondent.
2d Civil Nos. B204839, B207180. B2 I 1310.
(Ventura County Super. Ci. No. CIV 231175).
Dec. 6. 20 I0.
Steven Hint7., Judge, Superior Coun County of Ventura.
I
1:
I~
Westlake Law Group, David B. Chatfield, Julian A

Simonis;-Benedon & Scrlin, Gerald M. Serlin. Douglas G. Benedon for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendanis and
Appellanis Marina Glencoe. LP and Stephen Gaggero.
Law Office of Michael D. Liberty; Law Office of
Kimball
J.P.
Sargeant
for
Defendant.
Cross-complainant and Respondent Amidi Partners.
LLC. and for Defendant and Respondent AMA Construction & Real Estate. LLC.
GILBERT, P.J.
1 Marina Glencoe, LP (Marina) appeals a
judgment and an award of attorney's fees and cos1s in

favor of Amidi Piirtners, l..LC (Amidi) and AMA
Construction and Real Estate, LLC (AMA). We af-
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL 11/STORI'

In 2004. Amidi owned commercial property located at 701 East Sama Clara S1reet in Ventura. Rahim
Amidhozour, the principal manager of Amidi and an

experienced- real estate investor, decided to sell the
property when n long-1erm tenant vacated. On Augusl
12, 2004, Amidi and a local developer. James Mesa,
executed a purchase agreement on a standard real

estate form.
The agreement identified James Mesa or Assignee" as lhe buyer. II provided that "'Buyer shall
have the right 10 assign Buyer's righlS hereunder, but
any such assignment shall not relieve Buyer of Buyer's

obligations herein unless Seller expressly releases
Buyer." The agreement provided for escrow c1osing
on November 16. 2004. and Slaled Iha.I "[l]ime is of
lhe essence of this Agreement" Paragraph 8.8 provided 1ha1 escrow would close on 1he expecied closing
date '"or as soon thereafter as the Escrow is in condition for Closing: The agreement contained this provision for extension; ""[l]f the Closing does not occur
by the Expecied Closing Date and said Dale is not
exlended by mutual instructions of the Parties. a Party
not then in default under this Agrecmenl may notify
the other 'Party, Escrow Holder. and Brokers. in writing that, Unless the Closing occurs within S business
days following said no1ice, 1hc Escrow shall be
deemed tenninated without further notice or instruc ..

tions."
The agreement provided for a sales price of
$3.150.000. including a $90,000 deposit and a
$1.102.500 down payment. Amidi agreed to finance
the balance of the pu-rchase price for two years. The

agreement obligated the buyer to deposit the cash
firm.
portion of the purchase price "no later than 2:00 P.M.

on the business day prior to the Expected Closing
Date." The seller was obligated to provide to escrow
Stephen Gaggero appeals an order imposing

$12,000 sanctions. payable 10 Amidi and AMA, as
"in time for delivery to buyer at the Closing" an executed original grant deed, among other documents.
sanctions for his failure to appe8r a1 trial. We affinm.E>l
Paragraph 16 of the agreement provided for at-
torney's fees in the event of li1igation: "1 f any Party ...

brings an action or proceeding ... involving the Prop
0 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim lo Orig. US Gov. Works.
000524
Page 2
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d. 20 IO WL 4928071 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)

(Cite as: 2010 WL 4928071(Cal.App.2 Dist.))
eny, to enforce the terms hereof, or to declare rights
hereunder, the Prevailing Party ... in any such proceeding, action, or appeal thereon. shall be entitled to
reasonable attorneys' fees."
1'
1',,
i'
I'
i
,,ji
:,,
1
In October 2004. Mesa requested a 30-day escrow

extension .. Amidi agreed, bu1 conditioned the cxten~
sion upon payment of $20,000. Mesa and the real
estate broker for the transaction paid the additional
sum ,and escrow was extended for 30 days by the
parties' written agreement.
In November 2004. Mesa informed Amidhozour
that he was unable to complete the purchase of the
property. Instead, he proposed entering into a devel-
opmenfagreement with Amidi to build condominiums

and offices on the property. On November 17. 2004,
Amidhozour met wilh Mesa to discuss the proposal.
The parties discussed preparing a written development
agreement, rescinding the purchase agreement, and
cancelling the escrow.
*2 On December 3, 2004. Mesa sent Amidi an
unsigned "Letter of intent for develo"pment agreement
at 70 I E: Santa Clara Street Ventura CA." The lener
set forth.the financial terms and Mesa's responsibilities for the project. Amidhozour executed the letter on
behalf of Amidi and returned it to Mesa. Mesa did not
execute the lener nor did he agree in writing to canceL
the escrov...
I~
'1
Meanwhile~
Gaggero, an agent for Marina, contacted the escrow officer and stated that Marina was
Mesa's assignee for purchase of the property. The
escrow officer prepared supplemental instructions
stating that Marina would take title to the property and
requested Amidi to <acknowledge an assignment of
Mesa's interest. Gaggero also requested the escrow
officer to prepare an instruction deleting the
due-on-sale clause in the purchase agreement. Gaggero later telephoned Amidhozour and asked if he
would agree to the removal of the due-on-sale clause.
Amidhozour responded that he would not.
On December 13. 2004. Amidhozour spoke with
Joseph Prnske, the general partner of Marina. Praske
stated that he wanted to purchase the property as a
tax-deferred exchange. Amidhozour requested that
Praske provide financial infonnation and bank references and the panics discussed increasing the down
payment and the interest rate on the promissory note.
At the same time, Marina was negotiating to

purchase ieal property in Malibu as a tax-deferred
exchange. On December 16. 2004, Marina terminated
the Malibu purchase agreement. cancelled escrow, and
commenced litigation agains1 the seller _of that prop
erty.
On December I 6. 2004, the Santa Clara Street
property escrow was due to close. Marina had not
deposi1ed the down payment and Amidi had not
submitted its executed documents. The escrow officer
described the situation as a standoff'" because Marina
failed to put their money in'" and Amidi '"said they
weren't going to sign [the required documents]." The
following day. Amidhozour and his anomey inquired
of the escrow officer if she had an executed assignment of Mesa's interest in her file. When she replied
that she did not; Amidhozour cancelled the escrow. On
December 20, 2004, Marina informed escrow that its
down payment was ready and available upon Amidi's
filing o,f an. executed grant deed and beneficiary
statement with escrow. Amidi did not deposit the
executed documents _with escrow. Four months later,
on March 28. 2004, Amidi sold the property to AMA,
a related entity. pursuant to the tenns of a December
I 7, 2004 agreement.
On Decem_ber 28, 2004. Marina filed an action
again~t Amidi seeking specifiC perfOrynance 9f ~~e
A,ugust 12, 2004, purchase agreement., and damages
for breach of contract. Amidi filed a second amended
cross-complaint against Marina. Mesa. and Gaggero,
seeking specific performance of the ... agreement and
damages for misrepresentation, among other remedies. After< presentation of Marina's case, Amidi
moved for judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 631 8, ~ The trial court granted the
motiori. Thereafter, Arriidi dismissed its cross-action.
fl:S2 All
further statutory references are to

the Code of Civil Procedure unless stated
otherwise.
*J The trial coun issued a brief statement of decision pursuant to section 632. It found that the
agreed-upori date for close of escrow was December
16. 2004, and that Marina failed to deposit the down
payment _and required documents into escrow by the
c)ose of business that day. The court concluded _that
Marina "failed to timely perform its duties" and "'thus
0 2012 Thomson Re~ters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000525
Pagc3
Not Reponed in Cal.Rptr.3d. 2010 WL 4928071 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
.
Nonpublished/NoncilJlble (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1 IOS and 8.1110, 8.1115)
.cannot eslJlblish that it was ready, willing and able 'to
purchase the propeny. ReJyjng upon our decision in
Pittman 1 Canham !1992! 2 Col.App.4th 556,
559560, the coun determined that neither Marina nor
Amidi performed their duties by December 16. 2006.
and therefore both panies were discharged !Tom per
forming. (Ibid ["The failure of both panies to perform
concurrent conditions during the time for perfonnance
results in a discharge of both panics' duty to per
form").)
The tr'ial court expressly- found that- there was
insufficient evidence of an oral agreement between
Mesa nnd Amidi to rescind the purchase agreement
and that they did not rescind the agreement by con
duct. The coun also concluded that the statute of
frauds precluded an oral rescission.
Thereafter, Amidi sought $943,543 in attorney's
fees pursuant to Paragraph' 16 of the purchase agreement, and nearly $75,000 in costs. Marina opposed the
motion. The trial court-directed Amidi to exclude any
anomeys
fees
or- costs
associated
with
its
cross-complaint. Amidi later submitted amended
statements of nnorney's fees and costs. The trial -court

thereafter swarded Amidi $538.884 in anorney's. fees
and $16.876.69 in costs. allowing only those fees and
costs incurred in defense of Marina's complaint. -In
ruling, the trial court stated: "The magnitude of these
fees is due. in part. to the scorched earth mentality
which prevailed during both discovery and trial. Ma:
rina was a willing participant in this_, and h"as no basis
to now complain[ )[t)hat the fees are too high.''
Sanctions against Gaggero

On May 24, 2007, Amidi served a notice to ap
pear at trial to Gaggero by mailing the notice to his
attorney.( 1987, subd. (b).) Gaggero did not appear
and on October 3, 2007. his attorney stated that he did
not receive the notice: "I didn't get it. but I'm not
saying they didn~ serve it." Counsel explained that
Gaggero \\'3.5 then overseas.
The trial coun determined that the notice to ap
pear had been served but that "through some admin
istrative oversight' Gaggero's anomey was not per
sonally aware of it." The coun added. that Gaggero
~as ..a significant witness" regarding Amidi's
cross-complaint. The parties _then discussed op~io~s to
deal_ ~ith Gaggcro's absence. The court printed a list
,of the possibilities for the panics to consider, ranging
from a mistrial to imposing money sanctions: The

court made no decision that day. however, and trial
continued.
On October 12. 2007, 'the trial coun reconsidered
the possibility of sanctions after Amidi called Gaggero
to testify. Gaggero's anorney stated that Gaggero was
in Vietnam and would not be present at trial. The court
ruled that sanctions were appropriate because Gag
gem's absence hindered Amidi's proOf of its
cross-complaint. The coun then imposed $12,000
sanctions against Gaggero, payable to Amidi and
AMA.
4 Following the imposition o( sanctio~s. Amidi
dismissed Mesa as a pany to the cross-complain~ and
dismissed three of its causes of action. Five days later,
Amidi
dismissed
the
remainder
of
the
cross-complaint.
Gaggero thereafter moved to vacate the monetary
sanctions. The trial court denied the motion. In -n
wrinen ruling. the court stated: "The ilrguments that
the sanctions were inappropriate at the time they were
ordered are not new, and do not cause the coun 10
doubt tha1 its origin.ii order was .correct .... Amid i's
presentation of the case was clearly harmed .... Amidi's
pragmatic decision not to pursue the cross-complaint
-was motivated by 1he absence of the key witness.
exactly the predictable harm that justified the sane
tions." The coun also decided that the reponer's
transcript provided a clear basis for the sanction order.
Marina appeals and contends that: I) the trial
coun erred by entering a motion for judgment; 2) the
'trial coun erred by awarding $538,884 attorney's fees
to Amidi; and 3) the trial coun abused its discretion by
a\\11rding cenain costs.
Goggero appeals and challenges the contempt
order imposing monetary sanctions.
DISCUSSION
I.
Ma_rina argues that the trial court erred by grant

ing a motion for judgment because the evidence established that it was a ready. willing, and able buyer.
Relying upon Paragraphs 8.3, 8.8, and 15, Marina
assens that the purchase agreement remained enforceable even after the expectCd closing date of December 16. 2004. Marina also claims that Pit1'nan ''
"O 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000526
'
Page4
Not Reponed in Cal.Rptr.3d. 20 I 0 WL 4928071 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
Nonpublishrd/Noncitable (Cal. Rules or Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.11 IO, 8.1115)
(Cite as: 2010 WL492807J (Cal.App. 2 Dist.))
,.i:
Canham sunra, ? Cal.App.4th 556. is inapplicable

because it is distinguishable.
'
In panicular, Paragraph 8.3 of the agreement au-
;lhorii.ed the escrow holder "'lo conduct the Escrow in
Ii
I
I
1:
1:
,.
II
Ii'
I
i.
I.
accordance with [the) AgreemenL applicable law and

custom and practice of the community in which [the
escrow] is located." Marina points out lhal lhe escrOw
officer testified that escrow remaiii.ed open al time of
trial because it had not beeri cancelled by both panics.
Marina adds th:it the officc:r teslified that under local
escrow custom, the buyer deposits funds after the
seller deposits the required documents.
Paragraph 8.8 provides that if escrow does riot
close on the Cxpected closing date; a Party not then in
defauh under this Agreement may notify the other
Pany 1 Escrow Holder, and Brokers. in writing that,
unless the Closini: occurs within 5 business days following said noiice, the Escrow shall be deemed terminated without funher notice or instructions: Marina points out that after December 16, 2004, it demanded that Arnidi perform its obligations as seller.
Paragraph 15 provides that the panies shall act
""diligently and in good faith ... to place the Escrow in
condition for. Closing." Marina points out that ii contacted Amidi on December 13, 2004, rind requested a
timely closing.
'~
!
Section 631.8, subdivision (8) provides: "After a

pany has completed his presentation of evidence in a
trial by the coun, the other pany ... may move for a
judgment. The coun as trier of the facts shall weii:h
the evidence artd may render a judgment in favor of
the moving party ...: The purpose of the section is to
enable the triat coun to weigh evidence and make
factual findings when ii finds that plaintiffs case does
not require the defendant to produce evide~ce. ( Pe11us
v. Cale! 1996)49 Cal:App.4th 402 424.) Ourstandard
of review of the evidence _is '"the same as if the court
had rendered judgment after a completed trial [i.e.,] ...
the substantial evidence ~1e ,applieS." <fd_ at pp.
424-42~.)
s The interpretation of a wrinen instrument is a

question of la\V for the court. ( Parrons r_ Bris10/
Dl?l'e/apmenl C.o. <1965) 62 Cal.2d 861. 865: DVD
Cop)' Conrrol Ass1111 Inc. \". Kaleidescope. Inc. (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 697. 713.) We independently interpr~I the purchase agreement because the panics did
not offer disputed evidence regarding its meaning.

(Parsons. at pp. 865-866.) Our interpretation must
give effect to the. mutual intentio11 of the panics as it
existed at the time they entered the contract.
ICiv.Code 1636;Parsons, at p. 865.)
In our independent review, the purchase agreement required the buyer to deposit the purchase funds
by 2:00 p.m. on the day prior to the expected closing
date. (Par. I0.3.) The agreement also states that
'"[t)ime is of the essence of this Agreement.'' (Par.
23.3.) Although Paragraph 8.3 au1horized the escrow
officer to conduct the esc_row in_accordance with l_ocal
custom. Paragraph 8.1 provides that the agreement
constitutes the agreement of purchase and sale as well
as lhe instructions to the escrow holder. Thus the
specific requirement that the buyer deposit the purchase funds on the day prior to the expected closin&
date govems.
Moreover, Paragraph 8.8, permitting "a Pany not
"then in default"" to demand that the other party perform
Within rive days or suffer tennination of escrow does
not assist Marina. Among other reasons. the plain
meaning of the provision does not extend the escrow
under the agreement; the provision merely allows one
pany to warn thar escrow will tenninate unless the
other pany perfonns within five business days.-Paragraph 8.8. does not give a party the unilateral right to
demand perfonnancc after the time for performance
has passed.
Piuman ''- Ca11ha1n sunra. 2 Cal.Aop.4th 556 is

on point. In Pittman. a real estate purchase agreement
had a clause making time of the essence. Neither pany
tendered performance by the closing date. We held
that the failure.of both parties to tender perfonnance
by the closing date discharged them from perforining.
(Id at pp. 559-560.) "[nhe failure of both panies to
perfonn concurrent conditions docs not leave the
contract open for- an indefinite period so that either
pany can tender performance at his leisure. The failure
of both parties to perform concurrent conditions during the time for performance results in a discharge of
both panies' duty to perform." (Ibid.) The factual
circumstances of Pi11man are similar to those here.
including a time-is-of-the~ssence clause.
II
Marina assens that the trial coun erred by
awarding anomey's fees to Amidi because. in its view,
CO 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000527
'
Page 5
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d; 2010 WL 4928071(Cal.App.2 Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncitoble (Col; Rules of Court, Rules 8.1 IOS and 8.1110, 8.11 IS)
there is no prevailing party in the action. Marina
points out that Amidi dismissed its cross-complaint
which alleged in part a contract cause of ac1ion. Marina argues that Amidi did not properly apponion its
attorney's fees between de_fending the ma~~ action and
prosecuting the cross~omplaint. nnd that Amidi's
second anomey was unnecessary and duplicative. ( /J.
vcorial Ouner.v' As.tn. v. DLC Pla.v1ering Inc_ <20071
154 Cal.App.41h 1337. 1366-1367 ["A court may
subsiantially reduce fees where multiple counsel rep,
resenl a party leading to a duplication ofeffort"J.)
1
*6 Jn determining whether. there is a prevailing

party on the contract, the trial court must compare the
relief av.arded on the contract claim or claims with the
panics' demands and their litigation objectives as
disclosed by pleadings, trial documents and other
sources. ( ll.<!1 v. Abbara ( 1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 876.)
..The prevailing pany detemiination is to b.~ m_ade only
upon final resolution of the contract claims and only
by a comparison of lhe e><lent to which each party
ha[s] succeeded nnd railed to Succeed in its.contentions.' " (Ibid) A party who is denied direct relief on a
daim may nevertheless be found to be a prevailing,
party if ii is clear that he has otherwise nchicve.d his
main li1igation objective. lid at p. 877,l If the-trial
coun concludes that a defendant's cross-action on a
contract was "essentially defensive in nature," it may
properly find defendant. to be a_ prevailing party although he does nol obiain any relief on his
cross-action. lid at p. 875, fn. 10 )
i
I
I
Here the trial court properly found Amidi to be

the prevailing party because it defeated Marina's recovery on the contract claim for breach of contract and
specific
performance.
Allhough
Amidi
cross-complained ngninst Marina, Gagger(). and Mesa,
the cross-complaint sought to enforce Mesa's oral
contract to rescind the wrinen purchase agreement and
to develop ihe property wi1h Amidi. Amidi alleged
that. Marina abandoned the purchase agreement by
failing to fund escrow by December 16. 2004. and by
failing to complete necessary documents. Amidi
its
litigation
objective
and
its
achieved
cross-complaint was !'essentially defensive concerning Marina.
11
11
Ii
I'
II
Ii'
I
I
11
i
11
I,,,
Iir
Following the trial court's order that Amidi apponion its anomey's fees and costs between defending
Marina's
complaint
and
prosecuting
its
cross-complaint, Amidi submitted a motion and sup-
porting documents seeking $598.884 in attorney's

fees. The trial_ coun expressly found Amidi's apportionment reasonable, but funher reduced its fees nnd
awarded $538,884. The apportionment of anomey's
fees is within the discretion of the trial court. ( fJ.
Escorial O.vners' As.tn. \'. DLC Pia.tiering Inc. SU
nra, 154 Cal.App .4th 1337. 1365.) We cannot say the
trial court's decision was unreasonable or that Amidi's

documentation and- suggested apponionmcnt percentages were insufficient or unreasonable.
Moreover. Marina misreads our decision in fil
Escorial Oivners' As.wr 1' DLC P/osterin'{ /nc1 su
ara 154 Cal.App.4!h 1337 1366-1367. The decision
does not hold that the trial coun lacks discretion to
award anorney's fees to each of the lawyers representing one party. The decision affirms the trial court's
discretion to ..substantially reduce fees where multiple
counsel represen~ a pany leading to a duplication of
effort." (Ibid) Here the trial court found that Marina
prac_ticed "scorched cart~" litigation; it impliedly
found that the legal services of a second anomey
(Amidi's general counsel) were reasonably necessary
to defend the lawsuit.
Ill.
"7 Marina contends that the trial coun abused its
discretion by awarding certain costs. It complains of
$2, 189.39 travel costs for Amidi's counsel from
Northern California. $745.84 for rental cars, and
$20.87 lnternel charges, amounting to $2,956.10.
Marina also claims that the cosl of $1,065.39 for trial
exhibits is improper because Amidi's exhibits were of
little value at trial.( 1033.5, subd. (a)(l2) [coSIS of
photocopies or exhibits allowable if reasonably helpful io trier of fact).) Relying upon Carr 811.<incss Enterori.~cs. Inc. 1. Ci111 n( Chowchilla C2008l 166
Cal.Apo.4th 25, 30, Marina asserts that recovery of
S 11.000 discovery referee costs is not recoverable
because Amidi agreed to share the cost ofihc referee.
Amidi does not respond to these specific contenlions.
Seclion 1033.5, subdivision (a) sets forth costs
recoverable by a prevailing party. Subdivision (a)(3)
allows travel expenses to attend depositions as an
allowable cost. Subdivision (c)(4) permits an award or
denial of costs for items not specifically mentioned in
the statute "'in the court's discretion." ( Gihsnn 1.
Bobrolf<i996l 49 Cal.App.41h 1202. 1208.) To recover a cost, it must be reasonably necessary to the
litigation and reasonable in amount. ( Thon \'.
Id
'.::
..
111.1
'
.it~
fr;.1
..,,
C 2012 Thomson Reulers. No Claim 10 Orig: US Gov. Works.
1ii:1
I,
I;'
'
..Ji
.!
000528
'
Page 6
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.Jd. 2010 WL 4928071 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
Nonpublished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Coun, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite as: 20!0 WL 4928071 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.))
7"homnwn 119941 29 Col.App 4th 1546. 1548.)
.. Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary lo the
litiga1ion presents a question of fact for the trial coun
and its decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion." (
I.ados \'. California Stale A11to. A.un. (19931 19
Col.App.4th 761. 774.)
In an amended memorandum of costs, Amidi

requested $49.053.05 in reimbursement. The trial
court allowed $8,332.53 for depositions. $7.152. 75 for
s Although Gaggero and
his anomey may not
have received notice by the written notice to appear

mailed on May 24. 2007. they received notice from the
trial proceedings on October), 2007. I 0 days before
Amidi called Gaggero as a witness. Indeed. the trial
coun printed a list of possible sanctions and provided

them to the attorneys for purposes of discussion. Im
position of monetary sanctions was a listed sanction.
travel costs associated with depositions. Sl 12 for
Moreover. Gaggero's argument lhat the trial court
Oling fees, $14 for process server fees. and $1,065.39

for trial exhibits. for a total of $16.876.69. The court
disallowed all other costs.
lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions because Amidi

later dismissed its cross-complaint against him is
The trial court properly allowed deposilion travel

expenses for Amidi's Northern California anorney.
Section !033.5, subdivision (a)(3) does not limit
deposition travel reimbursement to attorneys practicitlg within the trial court's jurisdiction. ( Thon \.
Thom11.10n s11nra 29 Cal.App.4th 1546. 1548.) The
court also properly allowed cost reimbursement for
each of Amidi's attorneys. Marina practiced "scorched
earth" litigaiion against Amidi and cannot complain

now that Amidi required two anorneys in its defense.
Moreover, the court impliedly found that the rental car
and lnlernel expenses were associated with the depositions, and that Amidi's trial exhibits were helpful al
trial. The coun did not aY.11rd reimbursement of the
discovery referee costs o.nd we do not discuss. that
contention.
II'
Gaggero argues that the trial coun lacked jurisdiction to impose sanctions because it expressly found
that neither he nor his attorney kne~ of the notice to
appear pursuant to section 1987, subdivision (b). The
court stated: "(S]ome sanction is appropriate for
Gaggero's failure to attend the trial. The selection of
specious. The trial court properly rejected this argument and staled: "(The argument] fails because
Amidi's pragmatic decision not to pursue the

cross-complaint was motivated by lhe absence of the
key witness. exactly the predictable harm !hat justified
the sanctions: In addition, the court's written order,

supported by three pages of reporter's transcript
(which it anached), provides sufficiently specific
findings to support the sanctions order.
In view of our discussion. it is no1 necessary to

discuss the panics' remaining contentions.
The judgment and orders are affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.
We concur: COFFEE and PERREN, JJ.
Cal.App. 2 Dist..2010.
Marina Glencoe. LP v. AMA Const. & Real Estate,
LLC
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.Jd. 2010 WL 4928071
(Cal.App. 2 Dist.)
END OF DOCUMENT
1he sanction is mitigated by my finding 1hat [Gaggcro's anorney] was not aware tha1 the order to appear
had been issued and Gaggero was not aware thal it had
been issued." Gaggero points out that disobedience
"connotes a specific violation of command or prohibition." ( Coon1es '' State Personnel Board ( 1963>
215 CatApp.2d 770 775.) Gaggero also asserts that
the court lacked jurisdiction regarding sanctions because Amidi later dismissed its cross-complaint
against him. He reasons that Amidi "is manipulating
the system- by seeking sanctions and then dismissing
its cross-complaint.
IC 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000529
'
tj ' "'
,I
r.v1-1 :\'
.1.
r"
II: .l
I
'I
):
;: i
I'
!':
I I
II
I I
'
i ,,
I'
I
'.i
II
'i
000530
EXHIBIT
wesiiaw
Page 1
Not Reponed in Cal.Rp1r.3d. 2012 WL 974950 {Cal.App. 1 Dist.)
Nonpubllshed/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite as: ZOIZ WL 974950 (Cal.App. i Dist.))
,...
ander Anollk (Anolik) engaged in extensive litiga-
or an access
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
tion regarding the use and maintenance
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restricts

citation of unpublished opinions in California
road .between their neighboring propcnies on

Lakeville Road In Petaluma. In March 2007. respondent.flied an action against Anolik alleging unfair competition, unjust enrichment, and nuisance.
courts.
Respondent_ asserted that Anolik-owns and operates
Court or Appeal.
First District, Division 5; California.
Howard HERMAN, Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
Al ANOLIK. Defendant:
Alexander Anolik, a Professional Law Corporation.
Objector and Appellant.
Al31927
Flied March 20. 2012
(Sonoma County Super. Ci. Nos. SCV-240423 and
SCV-243304)
Kim Omer Dinccl. Hines Smith CarderDincel
Bland. 25 Metro Drive-Suite 600, San Jose. CA
95110, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jonathan Charles Harriman. Alexander Anollk. 280
Round Hill .Road, Belvedere Tiburon, CA 94920.
for Defendant and Appellant.
SIMONS.].
1 Objector Alexander Anollk. a Professional
Law Corporation (appellant). appeals an amended
judgment In favor of plaintiff Howard Herman
(respondent) adding appellant as a judgment debtor
under .an aher ego theory. Appellant contends the
trial_ court improperly granted respondent's morion
and denied appellant's request for a statement of decision. Appellant also contends respondent failed to
notify appellant that he sought amendment of the
judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section
187 In violation of appellant's right lo due process.
BACKGROUND
Between 2007 and 2010. respondent and Alex-
a t;ommerclal horse stable and. in violation of local.

stale and federal law, . erected residential and commercial units and a hay barn thereon.
Anollk filed a first amended cross-complain!
against respondent alleging declaratory relief,
equilablc Indemnify, unjust enrichment. trespass.
unfair business practices. accounting. nuisance,
waste, and Intentional interference with economic
advantage. Anolik alleged that. he owns the Anolik
Ranch on Lakeville Road and respondent owns the
adjoining property known as the Riverside Equestrian Center.
In August 2008. rcsp.ondent and plaintiff Burgundy Far\I!~ doing business as Riverside Equestri1
filed a related action against Anollk
an Center.
alleging slander and Interference wi1h economic relations. In December 2008. the two actions were
consolidated.
FNI. Burgundy Farms Is not a pany to this
appeal.
In April 2010. following a jury trial on the consolidated actions. a judgmenl issued requiring Anolik to pay respondent $151.980.75 In damages and
attorney recs. Thereafter. Anolik and respondent
reached a settlement agreement regarding the total
amounl of auorney fees. cosrs. and interesl for enforcement of the seltJement agreement. In June.
judgmenl was entered confinning 1hc settlemcn1.
Motion co Amend the Judgment

In December 2010~~~..Suant to Code or Civil
Procedure section 4 73.
respondent filed a' motion to amend the judgment against Anollk to add
C 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000531.
f'x 2
'
,i
;
,,
::
::
.~
Page 2
Nat Repaned in Cal.Rptr.3d. 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. !Dist.)
NonpubUslied/Nondtable (Cal. Rules or Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite as: 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. I Dist))
appellant, a lilw .corporation. as a judgment debtor

under an alter ego theory. Respondent argued that
Anolik's representations 1ha1 the funds of appellanr
were exempt from levy were disingenuous and devised ta avoid payment of the judgment/settlement.
Respondent also argued that Anallk Improperly
commi!'lgled personal and corporate funds ln an attempt to profeel his assets from levy. Respondent
sought $8,875 In attorney fees and costs Incurred in
attempting to secure payment for tlie judgment and
settlement. The supporting declaration of respondent's counsel. Julie Rogers, stated the following:
FN2. All undesignated section references
are to the Cade of Ci vii Procedure.
"'2 Afler the settlement was confirmed, re-
spondent received Intermittent payments from Ano

lik from two Citibank accounts. Then. without explanation, the payments stopped. On December 8,
2010, Anollk's counsel informed .Rogers that Anolik's payments had stopped because Anolik "does
not have the money." Thereafter. respondent obtained a wri1 of execution and levied the-two bank
accounts from which he had reCeived past payment$
for the Anolik judgment. Anolik then filed a claim
of exemption, maintaining that- the two bank accounts were not his personal accounts. but were appellant's corpo~a,te accounts. Rogers submitted doc
uments establishing that Anolik and appellant
shared the same Tiburon address and Anolik used
appellant's lenerhead 'for personal correspondence
"unrelated lo any pending_ legal matters In his corporate legal office."
The declaration of Jonathan Harriman submitted in opposition to respondent's motion to amend
the judgment stated the following: Appellant Is a
professional law corporation focusing on the law of
the travel industry. It has been registered with the
Callfomla Secretary of State since 1973 and em'
ploys multiple auorneys and staff members. lt uses
letterhead, business cards and e-mail signatures
which identify It as appellant. All of the shares of
appellant are owned by its president. Anolik. For
almost 40 years. appellant maintained a physical
address in San Francisco separate from Anollk's

residence. On October I. 2010. appellant moved to
Anolik's address in Tiburon. Appellant now occupies a building separate from Anolik's residence
and pays monthly rent and utilities. During the lit
igation between respondent and Analik, appellant
acted as counsel to Anolik:: Appellant was not a
party to the action and did not engage in any of the
activity alleged in respondent's complaints. Appel
)ant has never. owned or operated Anolik's personal
ranch on Lakeville Road.
Harriman also declared the following: On April
23.- 2010, .Anollk paid the SI0.000 "defamation
award'" with a check from his insurance company,
American Bankers Insurance Company (American
Bankers). On April 15 he paid the first Installment
of S7 ,000 under the senlement with a check from
American Bankers. On May 15, he paid $3,436.46
of' the $7.000 installment due .with a check from
American Bankers and $3.563.54 with a check from
appellant. On June 15, Analik paid the $7.000 due
with a check from appellant. It Is appellant's ordinary practice 10 make payments on behalf of clients
who agree. ro fund and/or reimburse appellant for
case-related costs. Anolik personally funded each
of the payments from appellant. In July, Anolik did
not have the resources to fund the payments to respondent so appellant did not issue any additiona?
Installment payments for the remaining judgment of
$!20,980. Respondent took no action to enforce his
judgment until la!C November, when he levied the
bank accounts of Anolik and appellant. Respondent
successfuliy obtained funds from Anollk's personal
bank ~ccount: thcl"'eaf1er, appellant nled a notice or
third pany claim of ownership prevenling the levy
of its account
ln opposing the motion 10 amend, appellant ar
gued. in reliance on Postal Instant Press. Inc. v.
Kaswa Corporation (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1512 (
Pos1al lnsran1 Press), that reverse piercing of the
corporate veil is not permiued in California. Appellant noted that respondent is attempting to amend
the judgment to add appellant. a third pany, as a
io12 Thomson Reuters. Na Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000532
Page 3
Not Reported In Cal.Rptr.3d. 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. 1 Disi.)
Nonpubllshed/Nondtable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite as: ZOIZ WL 974950 (Cal.App. I Dist.))
judgment debtor in order to satisfy the outstanding

debt of appellant's shareholder. Anollk. an Individual. At the hearing on the motion. appellant also argued respondent erroneously sought to amend the
judgmenpKJursuant to sccli.on 473 rather than section 187; 3
FN3. Appellant did not raise this argument
in his memorandum of points and authOrities in opposition to respondent's motion 10
amend the judgment; but only at the hearing on th3t morion.
'3 In reply, Rogers's supplemental declaration

stated that Anolik: (I) "owns at least two revenuegC!:nerating rental properties in Sausalito and/a~ Tiburon: (2) owns a "personal getaway' in
Petaluma from which he collecis rent and horse
boarding fees": (3) owns a JO-bedroom.
6000-square-foot residence/commercial office In
Tiburon being marketed for almost $13 million: and
(4) filed for bankruptcy on January 9, 201 I.. Re
spondent argued that Postal lnsra'j!J'{ess is factually dislinguishable from this case.
some courts
have rejected the holding in Postal Instant Press,
!here is an undisputed unity of interest between Anollk and appellan1 and an inequi1ablc result will occur If the coun did not pennil reverse piercing.
FN4. Respondent argued the following distinguishing facts: (1) Anolik is the sole
shareholder and officer in lhe corporation:
(2) appellam is the only parly affected by
the molion 10 amend and there has been no
transfer of ownership: (3) respondent could
nol have been expected lo secure his interest by obtaining a guaranty or seeking
collateral in advance of obtaining thejudg
mcnt against Anoilk; (4) no known fraudulent conveyances occUrrcd here: (5) respondent tried several melhods of securing
payment on his judgment agains1 Anoilk:
and (6) respondent is unaware of any other
creditors'who might be harmed by reverse
piercing.
Motion 10 Amend Hearing

At the outset of the hearing on the motion 10
amend the judgment. the court stated. "The court. I
think. could clarify in a further ruling as to exactly
how !Postal Instant Press ) was used wllh respect
to 1he court's interpretation here. But suffice it to
say for-purposes of this determination. the reverse
piercing . ... Is appropriate under 1he circumstances
of this case, this particular professional corporation.
this particular defendanL It's ... distinguishable
from (Postal Insranl Press I on the mere facts of the
cases themselves, especially in light of the individual nature of your client's status versus the corporate status imposed (in Posral Instant Press]."
At the conclusion of the hearing. the coun
granted respondent's motion 10 amend the judgment: making appellant liable for the judgment as
an alter ego. The court also awarded respondent
$8.875 in attorney fees. In, response to Harriman's
requeSt for a statement or decision the court stated,
"The order is going to be the only writing that 1he
court will be providing at this point. The court's
order granting respondenl's motion to amend the
judgmenl staled, "lappellanl] is liable for the judgment by Irespondent] as alter ego."
Five days later. appellant filed a written reques1
for a wrillen slatement of decision ( 632). Including findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
following issues: (I) the nnding of a "unity of inlerest" between appcllan1 and Anolik; (2) the nnding that an '"inequitable result" would occur if Anolik. were solely responsible for payment of the judgment; (3) 1he inapplicability of Postal Instant Press
: (4) how Postal Instant Press is factually distinguishable: (5) the denial of appellant's rcquesl lo
stay the court's decision based on the possibility of
irreparable harm; (6) the decision 1hat respondent is
enlitled 10 SS.875 in attorney fees and costs: (7) the
denial of appellant's request 10 challenge the
amount of fees and costs requested by respondent;
and (8) the nnding that respondent was entitled to
amend the judgment to include appellant as a deblor under section [473) as opposed lo section 187.
2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
0005.33
I
II
ii
~4
p
,
Not Reponed In Cal.Rptr.3d, 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. I Dist.)

Nonpubllshed/Nondtable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.111 S)
(Cite as: 2012 WL 974950 (CaJApp. I DlsL))
No statement of decision issued. Appellant filed a

timely n.otice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the order granting respondenl's motion to amend the judgment to include ap-
pellant as an alter ego defendant ls erroneous on the

following four grounds and must be reversed; (1)
the order violated the binding precedent set fonh in
Postal lnstant Press ; (2) respondent failed to
present
sufficienl evidence cs1ab1ishing the

result"' element necessary to pierce the
corporate veil; (3) respondent improperly sought to
amend the judgment under inapplicable statutes and
failed to seek to amend under section 187; and (4)
~inequitable
the court erred In denying appellant's timely requcsl
for a statement of decision.

L Respondent's Failure to Seek to Amend the Judgment Under Section 187
4 Appellant contends. and respondent concedc~rJgal rcspondenl erred in re\Af1tf _upon ~ction
473,
rather than section 187,
m movmg to
amend the judgment. For the first time on appeal.
appellant argues that respondent's failure lo provide
notice that he was seeking to amend under section

187 violated appellant's right to due process. Since
appellant's due process claim is raised for the first
time on appeal and Is unsupponed by any legal authorily we need not consider ll. ( Dietz ''- A1eisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771. 799;
Dabney v. Dabney (2002) 104 Cai.App.4th 379,
384.)
FNS. In part, section 473 provides for the

amendment of a pleading or proceeding
based on mistake.
FN6. Section 187 provides: "When jurisdiction Is, by the Constitution or this Code.
or by _any other: statute, <;onferred on a
Coun or judicial officer. all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given: and in the exercise of this jurisdiction,
If the ~curse of proceeding be not specific
ally pointed out by this Code or .the statute,
any suitable process or mode of proceeding

may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this code."
Section 187 authorizes a trial court 10
amend a judgment to add additional judg

ment debtors on the ground they are the alter egos of the original judgment debtor. (
McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome
Owners Assn. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 746.
752; Hall. Goodhue, Haisley & Barker,
Inc. v. Marconi Conf. Center Ed. (I 996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1551. 155401555.)
Appellant"s waiver notwithstanding, it has
falled to. establish any prejudice. Respondent's
points and authorlllcs memorandum in support of
his motion to amend the judgment solely sought to
amend the judgment to include appellant as an additional judgment debtor under an alter ego theory.
Although respondent erroneously failed to cite section 187 as aulhority for the motion. he cited
Wollershelm v. Ch11l'ch of ScJenrology (1999) 54
Cal.App.4th 1012. 1013-1015, which concerned a
trial court's amendment Or a judgriienl to add two
addilional judgment debtors on an alter ego theory.
Appelianl's wrincii opposition 10 the motion addressed the motion on the merits: ii did not address
respondent's error in seeking to amend the judgment under section 473 instead of section 187. At
the hearing on the motion. appellant argued that respondent's moving papers failed to cite or rely on
section 187. However, appellant did not assert lt
was unaware that respondent sought to amend the
judgment to add appellant under an alter ego theory. Consequently, no due process error ls shown.
II. The Court Erred in Failing to Jssue a St'a1ement

of Decision
Appellant contends the coun erred in denying

appellanr's requests for a statement of decision. Re
spondent does not dispute this but notes that the
case "may .. be remanded for issuance of a statement
. . FJ\J1
ord ec1s1on.
FN7. For lhe first time at oral argument.

respondent argued that a statement of de
\Q 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
ooos.34
Page 4
Not Reponed in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. I Dist.)

Nonpubllshed/Nondtable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.111 S)
(Cile as: 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. 1 DlsL))
No s1a1emen1 of decision Issued. Appellant filed a

timely nolice of appeal.
the
any su!lable process or mode of proceeding

may be adopted which may appear most
conformable to the spirit of this code."
Section 187 authorizes a trial courl to
amend a judgment 10 add add!lional judgment debtors on the ground they arc the alter egos of the original judgment debtor. (
McClellan v. Northridge Park Townhome
Owners Assn. (2001) 89 Cal.App.41h 746.
752; Hall. Goodhue. Haisley & Barker.
lnc. v. Marconi Conf. Center Bd. (1996) 41
Cal.App.4th 1551. 1554~1555.)
corporate veil: (3) respondent improperly sought 10

amend the judgment under.inapplicable slatules and
failed 10 seek 10 amend under section 187; and (4)
Appellant's waiver notwithstanding. ii has

falled 10 establish any prejudice. Respondent's
the court erred in denying appellant's timely request
points and authorities memorandum in support of
,!
for a statement of decision.
his motion to amend the judgment solely sought to

amend the judgment 10 include appellant as an additional judgment debtor under an alter ego theory.
Although respondent erroneously failed 10 cile sec
tion 187 as ati1horl1y for the motion. he clled
Wollershelm v. Church of Scientology (1999) 64
Cal.App.41h 1012. 1013-1015, which concerned a
trial coun's amendment of a judgmeni 10 add two
addllional judgment debtors on an alter ego theory.
Appellan1's wrincn opposition to the motion ad
dressed the motion on the merits: ii did not address
respondent's error in seeking 10 amend the judgment under section 473 instead of scclion 187. At
the hearing on the motion. appellant argued that respondent's moving papers failed 10 cite or rely on
section 187. However, appellant. did not assert lt
was unaware lhat respondent sought 10 amend lhe
judgment lo add appellant under an alter ego the
ory. Consequently, no_ due process erro~ ls shown.
t,
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the order granling respondent's motion to a_mcnd the judgment to include ap
petlant as an alte~ ego defendant is erroneous on the
following four grounds and must be reversed: (I)
lhe order violated lhe binding precedent set fonh In
Postal f115tant Press : (2) respondent failed 10
present sufficienl evidet1ce estab1ishing the
"inequitable result" clement necessary
to pierce
l. Respondent's Failure to Seek to Amend the Judgmen1UnderSec1ion187

4 Appellant contends. and respondent. conced~Nga1 respondent erred in re~Af'if _upon 5'.'ction
473.
rather lhan section 187,
m moving 10
amend the judgment. For 1he first lime on appeal.
appellant argues thac respondent's failure to provide
nolice that he was seeking 10 amend under section

187 violated appcllanl's right 10 due process. Since
appellant's due process claim is raised for lhe firsl
lime on appeal and Is unsupponed .by any legal authority we need not consider ll. ( Dietz ,._ A1eisenheimer & Herron (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 771, 799;
Dabney '" Dabney (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 379,
384.)
FN5. In part, section 473 provides for the
amcndmenl of a pleading or proceeding
based on mistake.
FN6. Section 187 provides: "When jurisdiclion Is. ~y the Conslilulion or lhis Code.
or by any other ~r.atute. conferred on ,a
Court or judicial officer~ all the. means necessary to carry .it into effect are also giv-
en; and in the eerclse of lhis jurlsdicllon,

If the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this_ Code or lhe statute,
h
'.
r
I i
II. The Court Erred in Failing to Issue a Statement

of Decision
Appellanr contends the coun erred in denying
appellant's requests for a s1a1emen1 of decision. Respondent does not dispute lhis but notes that the
case may" be remanded for issuance of a statemen1

. . FN7
o rd ec1s1on.
FN7. For the first time at oral argument,

of de-
respondent argued that -a statement
.i
! :
"'
~
2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim lo Orig. US Gov. Works.
0005.34
Page 5
Not Reponed in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. 1 Disl.)
(Cite as: ZOIZ WL 974950 (Cal.App. I Dist.))
c1s1on is not required here because substantial evidence supports the trial court's
order. We will nol consider argumen1s
raised for the first time at oral argument. (
Palp. Inc. . WJlliamsburg Nationa.l Ins.

Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 282, 291. fn. 2
.)
Section 632 provides, in part: "In superior

courts. upon the trial of a question of fact by the
c:;_ourt, written findings of fact and conclusions of
law shall nor be required. The court shall issue a
statement of_ decision explaining the factual and
l~gal
basis for lts decision as to each of the princip-
al controverted issues at lrial upon the requesl of
any party appearing at the trial. Th~ reque~t must be

made wit~in 10 days after the court announces a
tentative decision unless the trial is concluded within one calendar day or in less than eight hours. over
more than.one day In which event the requcs1 must
be made prior to the submission, of the. matter for
decision ....
5 The general rule .is that a trial court Is not
required lo.issue a statement or decision after gran1ing or denying a motion. even ir the motion in
valves extensive evldenliary hearings and the resulling order is appealablc. ( Gruendl " Oewel Part11ership. Inc. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 654. 660 (Gru
endl), and cases cited therein.)
However. in Gruendl. this court determined
that the general rule is not absolu1e. and declined lo
apply it 10 a trial court's decision granting a motion
to amend a judgment to add judgment debtors on an
alter ego theory. ( Gruendl. supra. 55 Cal.App.4th
al pp. 660-661.) We concluded that the trial court
should have issued a statement o'r decision for lhe
Following reasons: First the alter ego issue involved questions of fac1 that were '"necessarily
'tried.' " ( Id. at p. 661.) Second, the trial court's
decision resulted in the imposition or liability on
the appellant for a substantial monetary judgment
upon the trial or a case in which the appellant was
not named or served as a defendant. Third, had the
aller ego aUegations been asserted in 'the respond-
ent's complaint, the issue would have been tried and

t.he trial court would have been obligated to set
forth its findings on the aher ego Issue in a statement of decision. Finally, 1he. absence of factual
findings Impacted the abllily or the proposed judgmenl debtors 10 challenge lhe trial court's decision
on appeal. (Ibid.) Gruendls1a1ed. "One or lhe
pri~~ry purposes of a statement of decision i}~ fa8
cililale appella1e review. [Citation.)" (/bid.)
h
also noted that the failure to issue a statement of
decision in response 10 a timely request therefor is
reversible error. ( '/d. al pp. 659-660.)
FNS. In Gruendl, lhe trial court did not expressly rule. on the question or whether the
respondent was estopped from asserting an
alter ego theory of liability against the appellant.
The reasons given in Gruendl for reversing the
judgment and remanding the case for the trial
court's preparation of a statement of decision apply
here. Appellant's oral rcquesl for a s1a1emen1 of de
clsion was made at the hearing on the motion to
amend the judgment and prior to submission of the
maner For decision, Under section 632, the request
was timely.
In both ils opening and .reply briers. appellant

argues that the trial court's denial of Its request (or a
statement of decision is in "direcl conntct" with the
holding in Gruendl. and compels reversal or 1he
judgment. However, in Its reply brieF. appellant argues that remand for a statement of decision
wilhoul ruling on the propriety of reverse piercing
of the corpora1e veil '"would serve no beneficial
purpose" because "[r]egardless of the trial court's
reasoning. outside reverse piercing of the corporate
veil is strictly prohibited by Postal Instant Press
wilhout exception."
In Postal Ins/an/ Press. supra. 16Z Cal.App.
4th 1510, the Fourth District explained 1ha1 1radi1ionally the alter ego doctrine is applied to pierce
the veil of a corporation so thal a corporale shareholder may be held liable for lhe corporation's debts
2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
000535
Page 6
Not Reported in Cal.Rptr.3d, 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. I Dist.)
NonpubUshed/Nondtable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
or conduct. Ouislde or third parly reverse piercing
court concluded 1hat existing judgmenl collection
occurs when a 1hlrd party seeks to reach the assets
procedures offer judgment creditors adequate pro-
of a corporation in order to satisfy the third party"s

claims against an individual shareholder. (Id. at p.
1518.) Postal Instant Pressnoted that the California
tection against altempts to shield assets from creditors through the improper or fraudulenl transfer of
such assets 10 a corporation. (Id. alp. 1524.)
Supreme Coun has no1 weighed in on 1hc issue of
outside reverse piercing of the corporate veil. (Ibid

.) In a case of first impression. the Fourth District
agreed with the reasoning and analysis of cases
from other jurisdictions \Yhich have rejected outside
reverse piercing of the corporate ve11. and found the
coun alternatively held that, even If outside reverse

piercing of the corporate veil was possible, the
reasoning in cases permilling the doctrine to be unpersuasive and flawed. (Id. at pp. 1519- 1522.)
Postal Instant Pressemphasized four major points.
First, although the traditional alter ego doctrine and
judgment creditor In that case failed to meet the requirements for its application. (Id. at p 1524.) The
reverse piercing have similar goals. they advance
aherna1c holding. based on the meri1s of the reverse
those goals by addressing very different concerns. (

Id. at p. 1522.) When a judgment debtor is a
corporal ion, the judgment creditor cannot reach
the assets of the Individual shareholders due to
limitations on liability Imposed by corporate law
piercing doctrine and on the particular facts of

Postal Instant Press. belie appellant's assertion that
outside reverse piercing "is strictly prohibited by
Postal Instant Press wlthou1 exception."
. Traditional piercing of the corporate veil isjus
tlfied as an equitable remedy when the shareholders have abused the corporate form to evade
individual liabllity, circumvent a statute or ac-
complish a wrongful purpose. I Citations.]" (Ibid.

) However, when the judgment debtor is the share
holder, the corporate form is not being used to

evade a shareholder's personal liablllty. because
the shareholder did not incur the debt through
the corporate guise and misu5e that guise to es-
cape personal liability for the debt." (/bid.)

Second, the Judgment creditor "can enforce the
judgment against the shareholder's assets, Including
shares in the corporation. Upon acquiring the
shares. the judgment debtor will have whatever
rights the shareholder had in the corporation. (
Ibid.) Third. the goal of outside reverse piercing,
I.e., to protect the judgment creditor from the shareholder's fraudulent transfer of assets to the corporation. can be accomplished by the less invasive. ad
equate. tradlllonal 1heories of conversion, fraudulent conveyance of assets, and respond eat superior.
"'
ji:.
"6 Postal lnstaru Press held that a third

party creditor may not pierce the corporate veil
10 reach corporate assets to satisfy a shareholder's personal liability." ( Postal Instant Press.
supra. 162 Cai.App. 4th al pp. 1512- 1513.) The
In this case, al the hearing on the motion to
amend the judgment. in response to appellant's assertion that Postal Instant Press is binding California precedenl. which absolutely prohibits reverse
piercing of the corporate veil. the trial court stated,
without sufficient explanation, that Postal Instant
Press is factually distinguishable from the instant
case. Under thae circumstances, the matter mus1 be
reversed and remande~~g the court's issuance of a
sta1ement of decision.
In lhe statement of decision, among other things. If the trial court determines that Postal Instant Press does nol govern, It
shall sci out the reasons why.
FN9. In light of our conclusion that appellant was nol prejudiced by respondent's
moving to amend the judgment under sec-
tion 473 instead of section 187. no statemen1 of decision on that issue is necessary.
DISPOSITION
The judgment Is reversed. The matter is re
(Id. at pp. 1523- 1524.) Fourth, reverse piercing
manded wilh directions to the trial court 10 issue a

s1a1emen1 of decision on the Issues requested by ap-
may hann Innocent shareholders and creditors. The
pellant and thereupon to render a new judgment.
C> 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim
10
Orig. US Gov.. Works.
000536
' ,,[!~
'
Page 7
Not Rcponed in Cal.Rptr.3d. 2012 WL 974950 (Cal.App. I Dist.)
Nonpubiished/Noncitable (Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)
(Cite as: ZOIZ WL 974950 (CaLApp. I Dist.))
The panics shall bear their own costs on appeal.

We concur.
JONES, P.J.
NEEDHAM,J.
Cal.App. I Dist .. 2012
Herman v. Anollk
Not Reported in Cal.Rp1r:3d, 2012 WL 974950,
(Cai.App. I Dist.)
"'
END OF DOCUMENT
IC 2012 Thomson Reuters. No Claim lo Orig, US Gov. Works.
00053'7
I
'
PROOF OF SERVICE
1
2
3
4
s
6
7
8
the within action. My business address is Miller LLP, 515 South Flower Street, Suite 2150, Los
Angeles, CA 90071-2201. On May 21, 2012, I served the within documents:
KPC'S REPLY TO STEPHEN GAGGERO AND JOSEPH PRASKE'S OPPPOSITION TO
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT TO ADD JUDGMENT DEBTORS; DECLARATION OF
AUSTA WAKIL YIN SUPPORT OF REPLY
by transmitting via facsimile the docurnent(s) listed above to the fax number(s) set
forth below on this cllite before 5:00 p.m.
by placing the document(s) listed above in a sealed envelope with postage thereon
fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Los Angeles, California addressed as set
forth below.
by causing to be personally served to the person(s) at the address(es) set forth below
on this date before 5 :00 p.m.
by causing such document to be transmitted by electronic mail to the office of the

addressees as set forth below on this date before 5:00 p.m .
10
11
c.
...J
...J
12
13
0:::
14
...J
IS
w
...J
:i:
16
by causing such document(s) to be sent overnight via Federal Express; I enclosed

such docurnent(s) in an envelope/package provided by Federal Express addressed to
the person(s) at the address (es) set forth below and I placed the envelope/package
for collection at a drop box provided by Federal Express .
SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
17
18
19
20
21
I am readily familiar with the firm's practice of collection and processing correspondence
for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with the U.S. Postal Service on that same
day with postage thereon fully prepaid in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on
motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter
date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
true and correct.
22
23
24
25
+.r
ii!1
i~:
''"
Executed on May 21, 2012, at Los Angeles, California.
~I
Joseph Dirkx
26
27
28
0oos.38
;1:1
PROOF OF SERVICE
,,
-~----------------
SERVICE LIST
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Tel: (805) 267-1220

Fax: (805) 267-1211

Westlake Law Group
Email: David@ChatfieldLaw.com
Allorney for Stephen M. Gaggero
Tel: (805) 267-1141

Fax: (805) 267-1140
Allorneysfor Specially Appearing Parties
'David A. Esquibias
Tracy H. Kitzman
9
10
11
a.
...J
...J
12
13
0:::
14
...J
...J
JS
16
,,.
"
I
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
000539
-2-
PROOF OF SERVICE
,,
'
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

DATE:
05/29/12
' HONORABLE
DEYf.
Robert L. Hess
JUDGE
JUDGE PRO TEM
HONORABLE
#5
8: 33
G. Charles
B. Bell
C/A
Depu1y Sheriff
am BC286925
STEPHEN M GAGG ERO
VS
KNAPP PETERSEN AND CLARKE
24
DEPUTY CLERK
ELECTRONIC RECORDING MONITOR
C. Crawley
Reporter
Plaintiff
Coun:;:el
David Chatfield
David Esquibias
(x)
(x)
Defendant
Counsel
Aus ta Wakily
(x)
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS:
NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT TO ADD

JUDGMENT DEBTORS;
The cause is called for hearing.
Per Mr. Esquibias, he has numerous objections not
raised in the o~position based on the Probate Code
and lack of notice. He offers, no explanation for
not raising them in the opposition.
The Court notes that Mr. Praske, represented by the
same .counsel who represented Mr. Gaggero, has apparently refused to produce the trust documents oh the
grounds that they are confidential. That refusal has
resulted in ther now being no evidentiary for any of
the factual assertions concerning ,the trust which
counsel has made today. In partucular, to the extent
counsel sug~ests there are beneficiaries and contingent beneficiaries who are entitled to notice, the
actions of Mr. Praske, while represented by Mr. Gaggeros counsel, have made this impossible. The offer
to provide further information is of limited scope.
The motion of KPC sets forth a convincing basis that
the entities are ,the alter ego of Mr. Gaggero,. who
controlled this litigation.
The motion is granted.
Court and filed.
Page
The order is signed by the
of
DEPT. 24
MINUTES ENTERED
05/29/12
COUNTY CLERK
000540
'
'-
1
2
3
4
5
6'
RANDALL A. MILLER (Bar No. 116036)

SCOTT NEWMAN
(Bar No. 238788)
AUSTA WAKILY
(Bar No. 257424)
MILLERLLP
515 South Flower_ Street, Suite 2150
Los Angeles, California 90071-2201
Telephone: 800.720.2126
Facsimile: 888. 749-5812
MAY 2 9 2012

CLARKE, STEPHEN RAY GARCIA, STEPHEN
M. HARRlS and ANDRE JARDIN!
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
10
11
c..
..J
...J
():'.
w
...J
...J
STEPHEN M. GAGGERO,
12
13
14
Plaintiff,
BC286925
[Assigned for all purposes to Judge Robert L.

Hess, Dept. 24]
v.
15
KNAPP, PETERSEN & CLARKE,

STEPHEN RAY GARCIA, STEPHEN M.
HARRlS and ANDRE JARDIN!,
16
Defendants.
17
CASE NO.:
[
ORDER GRANTING KPC's
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT TO
ADD JUDGMENT DEBTORS
Date:
Time:
Dept.:
Judge:
May 29, 2012

8:30 a.m.
Department 24
18
19
Having considered Defendants and Judgment Creditors Knapp, Petersen and Clarke,
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
,-,.
Stephen Ray Garcia, Stephen Harris, and Andre Jardini (KPC) motion to amend the judgment to
add judgment debtors pursuant to the Code Civil Procedure Section 187, and the papers and
pleadings submitted in support of and in opposition, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby
grants KPC's motion. Pacific Coast Management, 511 OFW LP, Gingerbread Court LP, Malibu
Broad Beach LP, Marina Glencoe LP, Blu House LLC, and Boardwalk Sunset LLC, are the
Stephen Gaggero's alter egos and are hereby added as judgment debtors. The Giganin Trust,
Arenzano Family Trust, and Aquasante Foundation are Stephen Gaggero's alter egos. Joseph
;~;7
,,,
'-
000541
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING KPC'S MOTION TO AMEND JUGMENT
...
'
I11
:i
"
Praske in his capacity as the trustee the Giganin Trust, Arenzano Family Trust, and Aquasante
Foundation is hereby added as a judgment debtor.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
4
5
Dated;
8
9
10
11
a_
12
..J
..J
13
0:::
14
..J
..J
15
i
'
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
~
,. '
26
.~;27
1.~
000542
..:. .
.; 28
'"
[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING KPC'S MOTION TO AMEND JUGMENT

-2...
,.
j@
..,_
'
.....
APP-002
FOR COURT USE OHL V
ATTORNEY OR PARTYWITHOUl' ATI ORN EV (Notnft, litilfe btdoonDN. and ldltDs:it
~David
Blake Chatfield (SBN ~8991)

. ..
Westlake Law Group
2625 Townsfiate Road, Suite 330
Westlake Vi !age, CA 91361
TEl.EPHONENO,, 805 267-1220
FAXNO.(Optk:NIJ:
E..fMlL ACORESS (OplJcnal):
M. Ga1rnero
SUPERIOR COURT OF CAl.IFORNIA, COUNTY OF Los Angeles
STAEEl AOORE5'i, 111 North Hill.Street
i~'iL~D~
"OS ANGl:1..ES SUPERIOR COURT
rrORNEYFOl""""t Stephen
MAILING ADDRESS:
crTYANDZIcoo.eo
BRANCHNAMEc

Central
JUN -1 Z01Z
J~~~K
GF1AC'O :~a. D PlfTY
PLAINTIFFIPETmONER: Stephen M. Gaggero

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Knapp, Peterson & Clarke, etc. et al
CASE NUMBER
[ZJ NOTICE OF APPEAL
CJ CROSS-APPEAL
BC286925
(UNLIMITED CML CASE)
Notice: Please read lnfOnnatlon on Appeal Procedures for Unlimited Civil Cases (Judicial Council form
APP-001) before completing this form. This form must be filed ln the superior court, not In the Court of Appeal.
1.
NOTICE 1s HEREBY GIVEN lhat (name/: See list of Appellant's attached hereto on Attachment "A"
appealstrom the lollowingjudgment or artier In lhls case, which was entered on (dale/: May 29, 2012
CJ
CJ
CJ
CJ
CJ
CJ
Judgment after jury trial
[ZJ
An order after judgment under Code of Civil Proce<lure sactlon 904. I (a)(2)
An ort!er or judgment under Coda of Civil Procad..-a sectfon 904.1(aX3H13)
CJ
CJ
2.
Judgment ofter court trial

Defaull judgment
Judgmenl after en artier granllng a sununary judgment motion
'
fEE RECEIVED
/.''?
~ ?'-f7/
Judgment of dlsmlml under COda of Civil Procedure sections 581d, 583.250, 583.360. or 583.430 1
II /
17 b
Judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer
Other (de senbe an~ specify code Sl>CfiOn that authCldzes this appeal/:
For cross-appeals only:
a. Date noticed appeal was filed In origlnal appeal:

b. Date superior court clerk malled notice of original appeal:
c. Court of Appeal case number (if known}:
Date:
June I, 2012

(TYPE OR PRINT NAME)
,I.I'
I'
Fam Apr.t'cMld fcJ' Opblal Ula

. Jlddal Cou'!dl d CalfDmla
APP-002 jRav. .y 1, 2010I
NOTICE OF APPEAUCROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

(Appellate)
000543
~).)-
'.
1,
;~.
-,
1 1 .
'
"
,. '
L ~'.
I.
"
MC-025
~SHORT TITLE:
: .......:.
1 ,
!
.
.
BC286925
Gaggero v. Knapp, Peterson & Clarke, etc, et al

..
ATTACHMENT (/I/umber): _A_ _ _ _ __
(This Attachment may be used.with any Judicial CouniJI form.)
Appellants:
Stephen M: Gaggero; Pacific Coast Management; 511 OFW L.P.; Gingerbread Court L.P.; Malibu Broadbeilch
LP.; Marina Glerici?e L.P.; Blu House LLC; Boardwalk Sunset LLC; Joseph J. Praske in h.i.s capacity as'the
upstee of the Giganin Trust, A_renzano Trust, and Aquasarite Foundation; Giganin Trust; Arerizano Trust;
,. Aqtiasante Foundation
.-. '
..
'.
'
'
"
,.
'
(If !he Item !hat !hi; Allachmenl concerns Is made under penalty of peljury, all slalemenls in this
made under penalty of pequry.)
Attachment
'
are
Pago
of ~-3-
(Add pages as required)
. ATTACHMENT
to Judicial councll Form
000544
,.
I
... ,,.J
, ...
,_ !
"I
.'
....... i
'
APP-002
CASE NUMBER:
CASE NAME:
Gaggero v. Knapp, Peterson & Clarke, etc et al
.BC286925
NOTICE: TO PARTIES: A copy of this document mus1 be mailed. or personally delivered to the other party or parties to thlS appeal. A PARTY TO
THE APPEAL MAY NOT P~RFORM THE MAILING OR DELIVERY HIMSELF OR HERSELF. A person who is at least 18 years old and is not a
party to this appeal must complete the lnfonnaticn below and mall (by fint-<:las& mail, postage prepaid) or petSOnally Cfellver the front and back of
this document. When the front and back of this document have been completed and a copy mailed or personally delivered, tho origlnal may then
be filed with the court.
PROOF OF SERVICE
IZI
Mall
Personal Service
1. Al the ume of service I was at least 18 years of age.and not a party to IJils logal action.
2. My residence or business addres& is (specify!'
2625Townsgate Road, Suite 330

3. I mallOd or personalty delivered a copy cf Iha NoUoa of AppeaVCross~poal (Vnlimnod Civil. case) as follows (oompllt either a orb):
-.a.
ITJ
Mall. I am a resident of or employed In hacountywhera Ule malling occurred.

(1) I enclosed a copy In al'l envelope and
(a)
CJ doposl!Bd the sealed enwlcpa with Iha Vntled S!aies Postal Seivlce, IMlh the pastaga rulty pmpald.
(b)
[L]
placed the envelope f01 collectlon and malling on lhe data and at the place shovm In Items below, folla.vlng
our ordinary business practices. I am readily familiar \\'tlh this business's practice for collecUng and process!ng
eormspondence for mailing. On the same day that correspondence is placed for mUection and maiUng, It ls
deposited In Iha ordinary murse of busl.ness with the United States Postal Service. in a sealed envelope with
postage fully prepaid.
(2) The envelope was addressed and mailed as follows;
() NamoQfpersonserved:
Randall A. Miller
(b) Address on envelope:
Miller LLP, S 15 South Flower Street, Suite 2150

(c) Darsolmaling: June I, 2012
(d) Place <ifmatung (cl,Yandstaia): Westlake Village, CA 91361
b.
CJ Porsonal dollv0ty.
I personalty delivered a oopy as follows:

(1) Name of person SB1Ved:
(2) Addres wh8re dellvered:
(3)
Date dollVered:
(4) Time de!Jvered:
I declare under penalty of perjWy under the laws of ui:e S~te of Californfa that lha fon1gdng ls true and conect.
Dais:
June. I, 2012
(SIGNA.nJRE OF DECl.ARANT}
'
":i:
~.
..
APP-oo2 !Rcw. Jl8( 1, 2010f
NOTICE OF APPEAUCROSS-APPEAL (UNLIMITED CIVIL CASE)

.
Page2afj
(Appellate)
'
000545
~ ~
I I
....
~~~-
'~~':
:_ 'L
I
'I"
I'
'
APP-003
ATTOR~~ORPARlYW11llOUTATTOR-NE"V-IN-..._-...
-~-8'1-n---.-.--------------,----RlR.,.--COll,,--1fT-,--U-:cSE:-:ONL--:-:-Y~~;--''-"-"1
..
.""""i_ '~~v~~~~t~;'a1:g~~- SBN #88991

.::i'\ 2625 Townsi:late Road. Suite #330. Westlake VillaQe. CA 913611
TELEPHCMN0,805<267"1220
"2S
1
E-MAL AOORESS (Opt.bn&O:
FAXNO.-:
805-267-1211
-r
I '
FILE ..
LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COUR.T
' ~rioRNFVFORt1>1am1,s1.,l"he M. Ga
e al.
SUpERJOR COURT OF CALJJ'ORNIA. COUNTY OF Los.Anoeles
srREET ACOOEss: 11 ~ North Hill Street
I
JUN 111ZO\~
JoWn ~~i<.t:J11~~ . . .
MAJ LING ,t.DDRESS:
' ~ITY:.;.,,".~:l:.os AnQeles. CA 90012

efc(M~-~
BRANCHNAME: Ceotral
"---,--....,.,,.....,,,-----,----,---:--------1
' PLA1NTIFF1PET1T10NEl'l: Steohen M. GaQciero; etc. el al.
DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Kila
Pele se & Clarke etc:et al
SUper1or Court case Number.
-- i
APPELLANj\S NOTICE DESIGNATING.RECORD ON APPEAL
BC286925
"c. .
<' ' UNLIMITED CML CASE
Court of Appeal Case. Number (if known):
RE:Ai)pealfiledon(daleJ: 16/1/12
8241675
--------
Notice: Please read fonn APP:.001 before completing this fonn. This form must be flied In the superior.
court, not In the'Court of Ap.peal.
.'
.
1. '.REC.ORD OF THE DOCUMENTS FILED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

1
1elect to use the}ollciwing method of providing the Courfof Appeal with a record of the documen1s filed in the superior.(check a, b,
c;.d,. ore and fillln liny
mquired information):
, - ,..
I
. a:.-
[LI: A cler1<'s transaipt under rule e. 122. (You musf check (1) or (2) and ft/lout lhe clerk'stranscript secUon on pegs 2 oflhis
form.)
. (1) [LI I will pay the superior court cler1< for.this transaipt myself when I receive the cler1<;s estimate of the cos1s of this
tra_n~\:Jipt. I understand that if I do not pay for this transcript, it will not be preparedand provided to the Court of
Appeal.
(2)
J)
~ '
b.D
/.
c:
i;
e.
2.
I request that the der1<'s transcript be provided to me at no cost because I cannot afford to pay this cost. I have
attaclied the following document (check (a) or (b)):
(a)
D. An order granting a waiver of court fees and costs under rule 3.50 et seq.; or
(b)
An application for a waiver of court fees and costs under rule 3.50 et seq. (Use Request to waive Court
F11es (form FW--001) to prepam and fila lhis app/icaUon.)
An appendil<
under rule B.124.
. I
The origin~I superior court file under rule 8.128. (NOTE: Local rules in the COurt of Appaal, First, Th/Tri, Fourth, aild Fifth
Appellata Dislricfs. permit parlies to stipulate lo use Iha original superior court ft/a instead of a clerk's transcript; you may
seliicf this;oplion if your appeal ls in one of these districts and all fhe partias have stipulated lo use th original superior
court file instead of a c/ork's fmnscript in this case. Attach e copy of this stipulatkJn.)
An agreed statement under rule 8, 134. (You niust complate item 2b(2) below and attach to your agreed statement copies
of at/ Iha documonfs that are mquired to be included in lh6 clorl<'s transcript -These documents are listed in rule 11;1~{!!1.)~
I .
, d.
. .
!!l
.
RECORD OF ORAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE S.UPERIOR.COURT
.
..
. I ~led to p,roceed_:
a.
t::
~~-~~~
A settled statement under rule 8.137. (You must complete dem 2b(3) below and attach to your proposed statem9;lt31i,:,, 'ii ~
appeal cioples of Bii the documents that are mqulmd to be included in the clerk's transcript. These ~!iiit~Ji.il'~n;
rula 8.137(4)(3).)
6: s; !2 !:i ... :' "'
.
C'J=-:::
,,.,
..
~-~-
c,,;::: 2 !:;
l Q1,_ti';N
~
N ~- ~
WITHOUT a record of the oral proceedings in the superior court. I understand that without a record of the onb'.'orili:ei!d,]9~ ~
in the superior court, the Court of Appeal.will not be able to consider what was said during those proceedingS:ln .
~ ~ jil
!!I
determini~g whether an error was made in the superior court proceedings.
'P
APPELLANTS NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

"(Urillmlted Clvll Case)
'~
Cal. RI.des aleol.t. Rllfll 3!50..

1.121...a 124, a_12a. a 130. a.1Sf. ~1
-.all#tint>.ca.gov
000546
.....
'
I
I
'
"
CASE NAME:
b.
CZJ
(I)
Gaggero v. Knapp, Peterson & Clarke, etc. et al.
I CASE NUMBER: BC286925
APP~03
WITH the following record or the oral proceedings in the superior court
[ZJ A reporte(s transcript under rule 8.130. (You must fill out the reporter's transcript section on page 3 of this fonn.)
I have (check all that apply):
(a)
Deposited the approximate cost of transcribing the designated proceedings with this notice as provided in rule
8.130(b)(1 ).
.(b) CJ Attached a copy of a Transcript Reimbursement Fund application filed under rule 8.130(c)(1 ).
(c)' CJ Attached the reporte(S written waiver of a deposit for (check eiiher (1) or (ii)):
(i)
CJ all of the designated proceedings.
(II)
CJ pan of the designated proceedings.
(d) CJ Attached a certifiea transcript under rule 8.130(b)(3).

(2) CJAn agreed statement. (Check and complete either (a) or (b) below.)
(a) CJ I have attached an agreed statement to this notice.

(b) CJ All itte parties have agreed in Writing (stipulated) to try to agree on a statement. (Yau mus(attach a copy of this
slfpulalion to this notice.) I understand Iha~ within 40 days after t file the notice of appeal, I must file either the
agreed statement or a notice indicating the parties were unable to agree on a statement and a new notice
designating the record on appeal.
(3) CJ A settled statement unde_r rule 8.137. (You must attach the motion required 1inder role 8. 137(a) to this fonn.)
3. RECORD OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEED.ING TO BE TRANSMITTED TO THE REVIEWING COURT
CJ I request that the derk transmit to the reviewing court under rule 8.123 lhe record of the following administrative proceeding
that was admitted into evidence, refused, or lodged in the superior court (give the lil/e and date or datos of the administrative
proceoding):
4. NOTICE DESIGNATING CLERK'S TRANSCRIPT

(You must complete this section if you checked item 1a. above indicallng that you erect to use a clerk's transcript as the recon:t of
the documents fJ/ed in the superior court.)
e. Required documents. The derk will automatically Include the following Items In the clerk's transcript, but you must provide the
date each document was filed or, If that is not available, the date the document was signed.
'-~~~~~~~--'Do<=c~u~m~e~nt~Tl.:.::oUe::.:an~d::.::D~s~c~ri2p~U~o~n~~~~~~~~~!l.._~.....=cD~ate~o~l~F~lll~n~g~~~
June 1, 2012
(1) Notice of appeal
June 11, 2012
(2) Notice designating record on appeal (this document)
May29, 2012
(3) Judgment or order appealed from
:r"
(4)
Notice of entry of judgment (if any)
(5)
Notice of lntenti'on to move for new trial or motion to vacate the judgment; for judgment
notwilhstanding the verdict. or for reconsideration of an appealed order (if any)
(6)
Ruling on one or more of the items listed in (5).
(7)
Register of actions or docket (if any)
APP-000 [Rev .Aly 1, 2010]
APPELLANTS NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

(Unlimited Civil Case)
May 29, 2012

June 1, 2012
Page2af4
I11
11
000547
',
'1,
CASE NAME:
APP-003
CASE NUMBER: BC2B6925
4. NOTICE DESIGNATING CLERK'S TRANSCRIPT

b. Additional documenls. (If you want any documants from the supenbr court pfOC8eding in addition to the its ms listed In s.
above to be lncludsd in the clell<'s transcript, you must identify those documents hara.)
CZJ
I reques1 lhal lhe clerk Include lhe following documents from 1he superior court proceeding in 1he transcript (You must
identify each document you want included by its Ws snd provida ths dale it was filed or, if thst is not available, the dais
the document was signed
Document Title and Description
I l..__
(Bl Notice of Motion and Motion to Amend Judgment to Add Judgme

Wa~ily
April 10, 2012
(9)
Declaration of Austa
(10)
Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Motion to Amend Judgm
April 10, 2012
(11)
Proposed Order
April 10, 2012
(12)
Notice of Opposition and Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Am
May 15, 2012
CZJ
in Support of Motion to Amend Judg
_.D
...a;;.;;te~ol...F""ll"'ln..,g..___.
April 10, 2012
See additional pages.
c. Exhibits to be Included In clerk's transcripL
I mquest that the derk include in the lranscript the following exhibils thal were admitted in evidence, refused, or lodged
in the superior court (for each exhibit, give the exhibit number, such as Plaintiff's #1 or Defendant's A, ands brief
description of the exhiM. Indicate whether or not the court sdm1ltsd the exhibit Into evidance):
Exhibit Number
II
DescripUon
I !,.....,.A..,.dm-l"'tte_d.,..!"'Y,...es""'1N"o..,)"'I
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
5. NOTICE OESIGNATING REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

(You must complets this section if you checked item 2b(1) above indicating that you elect to use a raportor's transcript as tho record
of tho oral proceedings in the superior court. Plasse ramsmbsr that you must pay for the cost of preparing the raportar's transcript.)
I reques1 that the reporters provide (check ono):
(1)
My copy of the reportets transcripl in paperlormal
(2)
CZJ
D
My copy of the reportets transcript In computer-readable formal.
(3)
My copy ol tho reportets transcript in paper formal and a second copy In computer-readable formal
(Cods Civ. Proc., 271; Cal. Rules of Court, rule B.130ml4J.)
,.,.
APP-003 (Rv .Uy 1. 2010)
APPELLANrs NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL

(Unlimited Civil Case)
Pag 310f'
000548
"'. -
\ ,_:
,1 ' I /
..~'.
'
/~ !
,.
L '_
\I
'
' .. '
. ....
."'i
,1
.
'
'
...
'Notice of Designating Clerk's TranscriptAttachment

I
''
.1
13. Plaintiffs' Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Amend Judgment:
May i5, 2012.
I4. Notice of Special Appearance to Oppose and Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Amend
Ju~gment; Declaration of Joseph Praske;
May I 5, 201.2 !
'15, KPC's Reply to Stephen Gaggero and Joseph Praske's Opposition to Motion to Amend
.J~dgmentto Add Judgment Debtors; Declaration of Austa Wakily;
May 21, 20.12

,
.1
-r .
';
000549'
I .
'.,
. \. -_l.._
.! l
<
-,-,...-
!'
._,
'
'
~.
,r
- ., '
'.
, ,....
,~,
' .1\
'
;r CA~E
'
APP'003
'
NAME:
1 CASE NUMBER: sc2ass2s
b., .Pn:i~eedlnga.
1
j''
I request that the following proceedings in the superior court be induded in the reporter's transcript. (You must
id_entify each pmceeiting )IOU want included by ifs date, the department in which it took place, a dascription of the
proceedings-for example, the examination of jurors, motions before triel, the taking of testimony, or the giving ofjury
iil_slluclions-<tnd, if you know ii, the name of the court reporter who recorded the proceedings}.
' I
Date _ ! Department! !Full/Partlal Day!
: 1i) S-29-1i .24
Partial
DescrlpUon of Proceedings
Hearing on Motion to Amend
11
Reportefs Name I
1,
Carol Crowley
f
I
: (2)
(3)
,.
(5)
(6)
ct>
~D:
c. 'The proceedings designated In 5b
[ZJ
indude
CJ
do not indude
all of the testimony in the superior court
' If the_ designated proceedings DO NOT indude all of the testimony, state the points that you intend to raise on appeal (rule
8. i30{s)_(2) provides I/let Jl!IUr appeal will be limited to these points unte5s, r>n motkJn; the reviewing court penni/s otheiwise}.
'
Date'-June 11, 2012

.David Blake Chatfield
'
. _
""~..Q03 (Rev ~J 1, 2010)
..
Pap4Gl4
APPEl:.LANrs NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ONAPPEAL

(Unllmlted Clvll Case)
ooosso
I'
.f. !
--- \
'
.J.,
..'~ ~-
~' \
'
'
PROOF OF SERVICE
(C.C.P. 1013a; 20155)
2
3
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF VENTURA:
I am employed in the County of Ventura, State of California I am over the age of eighteen and not a
party to the within action. My business address is 2625 Townsgate Road, Suite 330, Westlake Village,
California 91361.
5
6
7
8
9
10
On June 11, 2012, I served the foregoing document(s) described as: APPELLANT'S
NOTICE DESIGNATING RECORD ON APPEAL, on the interested parties in this action as
follows;
RandaU A. Miller, Esq.

MlLLER,LLP
LosAngeles,CA 90021-2201
11
12
l3
14
15
16
BY MAIL: I placed the above document(s) in sealed envelopes that I placed for deposit with the
U.S. Postal Service at Westlake Village, California, with postage thereon fully prepaid. I am readily
familiar with the finn's practice of collection and processing documents for mailing. Under that
practice it would be deposited with U.S._Postal Service on that same day with postage thereon fully
prepaid at Westlake Village, California in the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on
motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter
date is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.
BY FEDERAL EXPRESS: I placed the above document(s) in sealed envelopes and placed them
for deposit with Federal Express, prepaid for next day delive1y..
17
BY FACSIMILE: I transmitted the above document(s) by facsimile transmission to the parties and
.,..--- facsimile numbers set forth herein,
18
BY ELECTRONIC MAIL SERVICE: I served the above-mentioned document electronically on

the parties listed at the email addresses above and, to the best of my knowledge, the transmission
was complete without error in that I did not receive an electronic notification to the contrary.
State: I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
true and correct.
Federal: I declare that I am employed in the office of a member of the bar of this cowt at whose
direction the service was made.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Executed on June 11, 2012 at Westlake Village, California.
~~~
Dawn Masters
26
'
'
27
28
PROOF OF SERVICE
''
000551
-----------..,.---------------
---
'
2
3
4
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, County of Los Angeles
7
8
No. BC 286925
9
10
I, JOHN A. CLARKE, Executive Officer/Clerk of the Superior Court for the
11
County and State aforesaid, do hereby certify the foregoing transcript to be a full, true
12
and correct copy of the original DOCUMENTS AS REQUESTED on file or of
13
record in my office, and that I have carefully compared the same with the original.
14
15
IN WITNESS THEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the Seal
of the Superior Court.
16
17
JOHN A. CLARKE, Executive Officer/

Clerk of the Superior Court of the State
of California, County of Los Angeles
18
19
20
Date: December 12, 2012
21
22
23
'
24
BY:
25
d232~y
C. KHALIL
26
27
28
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK
,,
I~
....
Ii="
4
5
6
7
Iii
.h
~
'
I
10
11
12
13
14
..
..
,;
'
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
~
~
23
24
25
26
27
28
,
I

CT Vol. 3

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

CT Vol. 3

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

....

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE ST ATE OF CALIFORNIA

Notice(s) of Appeal Filed:

KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARKE, etc... ,

Pages 368 to 551

Appeal from the Superior Court, Los Angeles County

STEPHEN M. GAGG ERO

KANPP. PETERSON & CLARKE. ETC .... ET

Counsel for RESPONDENT,

STEPHEN M. GAGGERO vs. KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARK

601 O_cean Front Walk, Venice, California, at any time?

Prior to 1997'1 believe he was the owner

How did that change?

I believe that he transferred ownership by deed

Did you .draft that deed?

Do you know who did?

Do you know what he received in exchange for

transferring the deed? [QUES)

to Boardwalk Sunset LLC.

And I'm instructing the witness not to answer.

Are you going to follow that instruction?

discussion is held off the record.}

Do you know what he received

in exchange.for transferring the deed

(A. discussion-is .. held-off_the-r.ecord . ).__________________ ------ -----

Hutchings Court Reporters - Global Legal Services

STEPHEN M. GAGGERO vs. KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARK

Do you know if he received anything 'in exchange

for transferring the deed to Boardwalk Sunset LLC?

Do you know if Mr. Gaggero has any

participatory role in Boardwalk Sunset LLC?

Can you tell me whether he does?

Has he ever been hired as a consultant for

Boardwalk Sunset LLC?

Does Mr. Gaggero have any financial interest in

any business or entity that has a financial interest in

Boardwalk Sunset LLC?

Q. -Are you familiar with Montecito Properties?

Q. Are you familiar with Monticello Properties?

Are you familiar with Sulfer Mountain.Land &

can you te:n mawliat that :rir; plea1fe?

!----------- - 24-- -- -- A.-.. It-ts--a--limited-liability--company--whose-husiness-- ---------

.is. the operation of s0l1le-.ra11ch __proper.ty.. -in .Ventura;- -: .:

STEPHEN M. GAGGERO vs. KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARK

Have you ever heard of Workhorse LP?

Are you familiar with Malibu Broad Beach LP?

What's the nature its business?

It owned property on Broad Beach Road in

Does Mr. Gaggero have a financial interest in

Malibu Broad Beach?

No, I don't think so.

Does Mr. Gaggero have a financial interest in

the property located on Broadbeach Road?

Yes, I think so.

And what was that financial interest?

I think he was the owner of the property, and

he transferred it to Malibu Broad Beach LP.

Dci you know .when that took place?

24----- --- - A.- . I-bel ieve--approximatel;y_ 12_ .y:ears. _ago. _-------

Wotild that be in 19.9.7.?

STEPHEN M. GAGGERO vs. KNAPP, PETERSON & CLARK

He may have, but I don't recall.

Does any business or entity that Mr. Gaggero

Do you know if he received any compensation for