Election Law Cases

(Admin)

G.R. No. L-46863

November 18, 1939

IRINEO MOYA, petitioner,

vs.
AGRIPINO GA. DEL FIERO, respondent.
Elpidio Quirino for petitioner.
Claro M. Recto for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:
This is a petition for review by certiorari of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in the above entitled
case declaring the respondent, Agripino Ga. del Fierro, the candidate-elect for the office of mayor of
the municipality of Paracale, Province of Camarines Norte, with a majority of three votes over his
rival, Irineo Moya. In the general elections held on December 14, 1937, the parties herein were
contending candidates for the aforesaid office. After canvass of the returns the municipal council of
Paracale, acting as board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as the elected mayor of said
municipality with a majority of 102 votes. On December 27, 1937, the respondent field a motion of
protest in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, the Court of Appeals, on July 13, 1939
rendered the judgment hereinbefore mentioned which is sought by the petitioner to be reviewed and
reversed upon the errors alleged to have been committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 8 ballots either inadvertently or
contrary to the controlling decisions of this Honorable Court.
2. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 3 ballots marked "R. del Fierro."
3. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 7 ballots marked "Rufino del Firro."
4. In admitting and counting in favor of the respondent, 72 ballots marked "P. del Fierro."
Taking up seriatim the alleged errors, we come to the first assignment involving the eight (8) ballots
now to be mentioned. (1) With reference to ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2, alleged to have
been inadvertently admitted in favor of the respondent, such inadvertence raises a question of fact
which could have been corrected by the Court of Appeals and which could we are not in a position to
determine in this proceeding for review bycertiorari. Upon the other hand, if the error attributed to the
Court of Appeals consisted in having admitted ballot Exhibit F-175 in precinct No. 2 instead of the
ballot bearing the same number corresponding to precinct No. 1, and this latter ballot clearly appears
admissible for the respondent because the name written on the space for mayor is "Primo del Fierro"
or "Pimo de Fierro", the error is technical and deserves but scanty consideration. (2) Ballot Exhibit F26 in precinct No. 3 was erroneously admitted for the respondent by the Court of Appeals, the name
written on the space for mayor being "G.T. Krandes." It is true that on the fourth line for the councilor
"Alcalde Pinong del Fierro": appears; but the intention of the elector is rendered vague and
incapable of ascertaining and the ballot was improperly counted for the respondent. As to this ballot,
the contention of the petitioner is sustained (3) Ballot Exhibit F-77 in precinct No. 2 should also have
been rejected by the Court of Appeals. The ballot bears the distinguishing mark "O. K." placed after

the name "M. Lopis" written on space for vice-mayor. The contention of the petitioner in this respect
is likewise sustained. (4) Ballot Exhibit F-9 in precinct No. 2 was properly admitted for respondent.
On this ballot the elector wrote within the space for mayor the name of Regino Guinto, a candidate
for the provincial board and wrote the respondent's name immediately below the line for mayor but
immediately above the name "M. Lopez" voted by him for vice-mayor. The intention of the elector to
vote for the respondent for the office of the mayor is clear under the circumstances. (5) Ballot F-131
in precinct No. 1 was also properly counted for the respondent. On this ballot the elector wrote the
respondent's name on the space for vice-mayor, but, apparently realizing his mistake, he placed an
arrow connecting the name of the respondent to the word "Mayor" (Alcalde) printed on the left side
of the ballot. The intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor is thus
evident, in the absence of proof showing that the ballot had been tampered with. (6) Ballot F-7 in
precinct No. 5 is admissible for the respondent and the Court of Appeals committed no error in so
adjudicating. Although the name of the respondent is written on the first space for member of the
provincial board, said name is followed in the next line by "Bice" Culastico Palma, which latter name
is followed in the next line by word "consehal" and the name of a candidate for this position. The
intention of the elector to vote for the respondent for the office of mayor being manifest, the objection
of the petitioner to the admission of this ballot is overruled. (7) Ballot F-1 in precinct No. 2 is valid for
the respondent. On this ballot the Christian name of the respondent was written on the second
space for member of the provincial board, but his surname was written on the proper space for
mayor with no other accompanying name or names. The intention of the elector being manifest, the
same should be given effect in favor of the respondent. (8) Ballot F-44 in precinct No. 2 wherein
"Agripino F. Garcia" appears written on the proper space, is valid for the respondent. In his certificate
of candidacy the respondent gave his name as "Agripino Ga. del Fierro." The conclusion of the trial
court, upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the letter "F" stands for "Fierro" and "Garcia" for the
contraction "Ga." is not without justification and, by liberal construction, the ballot in question was
properly admitted for the respondent.
The second error assigned by the petitioner refers to three ballots, namely, Exhibit F-119 in precinct
No. 1 Exhibit F-24 in precinct No. 2, and Exhibit F-6 in precinct No. 4. These three ballots appear to
be among the 75 ballots found by the Court of Appeals as acceptable for the respondent on the
ground that the initial letter "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in
the certificate of candidacy of the respondent. The petitioner contends that the initial "R" and not "P".
Even if we could reverse this finding, we do not feel justified in doing so after examining the
photostatic copies of these ballots attached to the herein petition for certiorari. The second
assignment of error is accordingly overruled.
Upon the third assignment of error, the petitioner questions the correctness of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals in adjudicating to the respondent the seven ballots wherein "Rufino del Fierro" was
voted for the office of mayor. We are of the opinion that the position taken by the Court of Appeals is
correct. There was no other candidate for the office of mayor with the name of "Rufino" or similar
name and, as the respondent was districtly identified by his surname on these ballots, the intention
of the voters in preparing the same was undoubtedly to vote for the respondent of the office for
which he was a candidate.
lawphi1.net

The fourth assignment of error deals with the 72 ballots wherein "P. del Fierro" was voted for the
office of mayor, and it is the contention of the petitioner that said ballots should not have been

counted by the Court of Appeals in favor of the respondent. For the identical reason indicated under
the discussion of petitioner's second assignment of error, namely, that "P" stands for "Pino" in "Pino
del Fierro" which is a name mentioned in the certificate of candidacy of the respondent, we hold that
there was no error in the action of the Court of Appeals in awarding the said ballots to the
respondent.
With the exception of ballot marked as Exhibit F-26 in precinct No. 3 and ballot marked as Exhibit F77 in precinct No. 2, we are inclined to accept the rest of the disputed ballots for the respondent not
only for the specific reasons already given but also and principally for the more fundamental reason
now to be stated. As long as popular government is an end to be achieved and safeguarded,
suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the manes by which
the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies wrought by the people
through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common weal. Republicanism,
in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government, necessarily points to the
enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate source of the
established authority. He has a voice in his Government and whenever called upon to act in
justifiable cases, to give it efficacy and not to stifle it. This, fundamentally, is the reason for the rule
that ballots should be read and appreciated, if not with utmost, with reasonable, liberality. Counsel
for both parties have called our attention to the different and divergent rules laid down by this Court
on the appreciation of ballots. It will serve no good and useful purpose for us to engage in the task of
reconciliation or harmonization of these rules, although this may perhaps be undertaken, as no two
cases will be found to be exactly the same in factual or legal environment. It is sufficient to observe,
however, in this connection that whatever might have been said in cases heretofore decided, no
technical rule or rules should be permitted to defeat the intention of the voter, if that intention is
discoverable from the ballot itself, not from evidence aliunde. This rule of interpretation goes to the
very root of the system. Rationally, also, this must be the justification for the suggested liberalization
of the rules on appreciation of ballots which are now incorporated in section 144 of the Election
Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357).
It results that, crediting the petitioner with the two ballots herein held to have been erroneously
admitted by the Court of Appeals for the respondent, the latter still wins by one vote. In view whereof
it becomes unnecessary to consider the counter-assignment of errors of the respondent.
With the modification of the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for the writ of certiorari is
hereby dismissed, without pronouncement regarding costs.

G.R. No. L-29333

February 27, 1969

MARIANO LL. BADELLES, protestant-appellant,

vs.
CAMILO P. CABILI, protegee-appellee.
-------------------------G.R. No. L-29334

February 27, 1969

BONIFACIO P. LEGASPI and CECILlO T. BARAZON protestants-appellants,

vs.
FELIX Z. ACTUB, PROVIDENCIO P. ABRAGAN, MANUEL F. CELDRAN, CASIMERO P.
CABIGON and BENITO ONG, protestees-appellees.
Bonifacio P. Legaspi for and in his own behalf.
Camilo P. Cabili. Gerardo B. Padilla and Ignacio Espaol and Voltaire I. Roviro for protesteesappellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
Two election protests against the duly proclaimed Mayor and Councilors of Iligan City, after the Nov.
14, 1967 elections, based on the allegations of flagrant violations of certain mandatory provisions of
the Election Code, to be more specifically set forth hereafter, were dismissed in a single order by the
Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, the Honorable Teodulo C. Tandayag presiding. The cases
are now before us on appeal.
In one of them, 1 the election of Honorable Camilo P. Cabili to the Office of City Mayor of Iligan City,
was contested by protestant, now appellant, Mariano Badelles. In the other, 2 the protestants are the
now appellants, Bonifacio P. Legaspi and Cecilia T. Barazon who along with the five protestees 3 were
among those who were registered candidates voted for in such election for councilors in the City of
Iligan, with the protestees being credited with the five highest number of votes, with protestants
Legaspi and Barazon obtaining sixth and seventh places, respectively.
In such order of dismissal, it was admitted that while irregularities as well as misconduct on the part
of election officers were alleged in the election protests filed, there was however an absence of an

allegation that they would change the result of the election in favor of the protestants and against the
protestees, that such irregularities would destroy the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast, or that
the protestees knew of or participated in the commission thereof. For the lower court then, the lack
of a cause of action was rather evident.
Hence the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, which was sought to be fortified by the invocation of
the doctrines that voters should not be deprived of their right to vote occasioned by the failure of the
election officials to comply with the formal prerequisites to the exercise of the right of suffrage and
that the rules and regulations for the conduct of elections while mandatory before the voting should
be considered directory thereafter. The validity of such order of dismissal is now to be inquired into
by us in this appeal.
In the petition of protestant Badelles, dated December 8, 1967, and marked as received the next day
by the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, 15th Judicial District, it was
stated that both he and protestee Camilo P. Cabili were the duly registered candidates for the Office
of City Mayor of Iligan City, both having filed their respective certificates of candidacy in accordance
with law and as such candidates voted for in the November 14, 1967 election. It was then alleged
that the Board of Canvassers, on November 25, 1967, proclaimed as elected protestee for having
obtained 11,310 votes while protestant was credited with 8,966 votes. Protestant would impugn the
election of Cabili on the ground that there were "flagrant violation of mandatory provisions of law
relating to or governing elections ...." in that more than 200 voters were registered per precinct
contrary to the provision limiting such number of 200 only and that no publication of the list of voters
for each precinct was made up to the election day itself, enabling persons who under the law could
not vote being allowed to do so. As a result of such alleged "flagrant violations of the laws relation to
or governing elections" around 8,300 individuals were allowed to vote illegally.
It was likewise asserted that not less than 8,000 qualified voters were unable to exercise their right
of suffrage in view of their failure, without any fault on their part, to have the proper identification
cards or the non-listing of their names in the list of voters. It was stated further that even in the case
of those individuals provided with identification cards with their names included in the list of voters,
they could not avail themselves of their right of suffrage as their applications for registration could
not be found. Mention was also made of the fact that the final lists of voters and the applications for
registration were delivered to their respective precincts late on election day itself thus preventing
them from voting. Moreover, confusion, so it was alleged, was caused by the excessive number of
voters being listed and many having been assigned to precincts other than the correct ones.
What was thus objected to is the fact that illegal votes were cast by those not qualified to do so,
numbering 8,300 or more and that an approximately equal number, who were duly registered with
the Commission on Elections, Iligan City, were unable to vote due to the above circumstances. The
proclamation then could not have reflected the true will of the electorate as to who was the mayor
elected, as the majority of protestee Cabili over the protestant consisted of only 2,344 votes.
The prayer was among others for the proclamation of protestee as well as other candidates for
elective positions in the City of Iligan being set aside and declared null and void, protestant pleading
further that he be granted other such relief as may be warranted in law and equity.
The protest of the candidates for councilor Legaspi and Barazon in the other case against
protestees 4 was in substance similarly worded. The prayer was for the setting aside and declaring
null and void the proclamation of protestees with protestants seeking such other relief which should
be theirs according to law and to equity.

In the first case, protestee Cabili moved to dismiss the petition on the following grounds: "1. That the
protest was filed beyond the reglementary period allowed by the Revised Election Code; 2. That [the
lower court] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the present case, the Commission on
Elections being the proper body to hear the same; 3. That the complaint states no cause of
action." 5 This very same grounds were relied upon in a motion to dismiss by protestees Actub and
Cabigon, filed in the other suit.
As above noted, in a single order of March 23, 1968, the two above election protests were
dismissed, the lower court being of the opinion that neither petition alleged a cause of action "to
justify [it] to try the same." The first ground of the motion to dismiss to the effect that the protests in
both cases were filed beyond the reglementary period was rejected. The claim as to lack of
jurisdiction was likewise held to be without merit. The single order of dismissal in both cases as
indicated was based on the lack of a cause of action.
The reasoning followed by the lower court in reaching the above conclusion that there was no cause
of action, proceeded along these lines: "Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election
officers which do not tend to affect the result of the elections are not of themselves either ground for
contest or for proper matters of inquiry... There is no allegation in the protest that the alleged
irregularities committed by the election officers would tend to change the result of the election in
favor of the protestants and against the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that the
8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted
were for the protestees. There is, therefore, no legal and practical justification for the court to inquire
into the irregularities committed by the election officials, as alleged in the petition, for it would not
give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be declared the duly elected
mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City." 6
It was further stated in such order of dismissal: "There is no allegation in the petition that the
irregularities committed by the election officials have destroyed the secrecy and integrity of the
ballots cast. There is no allegation in the petition that the non-compliance of the election officials of
the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters were intentional on their part
for the purpose of committing frauds for the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the
petition that because of the alleged irregularities committed by the election officials in not following
the provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters and the distribution of the
precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal, nor is there an allegation in the
protests that the irregularities committed by the election officials would affect the election in favor of
the protestees." 7
A greater regard for the cause of accuracy ought to have admonished the lower court from asserting
in an uncompromising tone the absence of an allegation that the protestants in both cases failed to
allege that if the facts pleaded by them were proved the result would not have been different. It is
true the complaints could have been more explicitly worded, but as they stood, the absence of such
a claim could not be so confidently asserted.
To repeat, both protests were dismissed. We do not discount a certain degree of plausibility
attaching to the line of reasoning thus pursued by the lower court. We are not unaware of the
undeniable fact that both petitions were not distinguished by skill in their drafting or precision in their
terminology. Nonetheless the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to have the elections
conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts, rational and
honest, as to who were the duly elected officials. Such allegations, it is to be stressed, would have to
be accepted at their face value for the purpose of determining whether there is a cause of action, a
motion to dismiss amounting to a hypothetical admission of facts thus pleaded. We cannot in law
and in conscience then sustain the order of dismissal.

Without the lower court having so intended, the dismissal would amount to judicial abnegation of a
sworn duty to inquire into and pass upon in an appropriate proceeding allegations of misconduct and
misdeeds of such character. Accordingly, we reverse.
Abes v. Commission on Elections 8 points the way, but the lower court was apparently impervious to
its teaching. It may not be controlling, but it furnishes more than a hint. It would seem, though, that
for the court below, its message did not ring out loud and clear.
The opinion in the Abes case, penned by Justice Sanchez, starts thus: "Petitioner's cry for relief, so
their petition avers, is planted upon the constitutional mandate of free, orderly, and honest elections.
Specifically, they list a number of repressible acts." Among those mentioned were that blank official
registration forms were taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Register several weeks
before election day, November 14, 1967; that active campaigning within the polling places by
Nacionalista leaders or sympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed; that voters were
permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista candidates; that voters
were compelled to fill their official ballots on open tables, desks and in many precincts outside the
polling places; that thousands of voters sympathetic to the Nacionalista candidates were allowed to
vote beyond the hours for voting allowed by law; that identification cards were delivered by partisan
leaders of respondents Nacionalista candidates, and those who did not signify their preference for
Nacionalista candidates were not given such cards; that the precinct books of voters were not sealed
within the deadline fixed by law; and that the resulting effect of irregularities was to prevent full fiftyone per cent of the registered voters from voting.
One of the issues raised on the above facts is whether or not the Commission on Elections could
annul the aforesaid election in Quezon City on the above allegations of fraud, terrorism and other
illegal practices committed before and during the election. The petition did not prosper; it was
dismissed. The remedy, we held, lay not with the Commission on Elections but with the courts of
justice in an election protest.
In the language of Justice Sanchez: "The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec may
not tread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek
annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle
emphasized in decisions of this Court." For as announced in Nacionalista Party v. Commission on
Elections, 9 assuming that there be a failure to conduct an election in a free, orderly and honest
manner, "the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil" did not rest with the Commission on Elections
but in "some other agencies of the Government." More specifically, with reference to provincial and
municipal officials, election contests "are entrusted to the courts." Then came this express
affirmation: "The power to decide election contests necessarily includes the power to determine the
validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the contestants." .
As so emphatically observed in the Abes opinion, "there has been neither deviation nor retreat from
the foregoing pronouncement." After which came the following: "The ratiocination advanced that
there was failure of election due to rampancy of terrorism, frauds, and other irregularities, before and
during elections, such that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters were not able to vote, will
not carry the day for petitioners. For, in the first place, this is grounded upon bare assertions.
Respondents contest the correctness thereof. And in the answer of respondents Amoranto, Mathay
and others, they aver that out of 162,457 registered voters in Quezon City, 100,382 voters actually
cast their votes about 62% of the registered voters. But above all, as pointed out in City Board of
Canvassers vs. Moscoso, [the] nullity of an election for municipal officials should be determined in a
petition contesting the election of municipal officers-elect to be filed before the Court of First
Instance."

Why an election protest is more fitly and appropriately the procedure for determining whether
irregularities or serious violations of the electoral law vitiated the conduct of elections was clearly
and succinctly explained in the Moscoso decision above cited, the opinion coming from Justice
Makalintal. 10 Thus: "The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and other
irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest,
pursuant to section 174 of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of
canvassers from canvassing the election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for
municipal offices."
It would follow then that if the grievance relied upon is the widespread irregularities and the flagrant
violations of the election law, the proper remedy is the one availed of here, the protest.
That such should be the case should occasion no surprise. Time and time again, 11 we have stressed
the importance of preserving inviolate the right of suffrage. If that right be disregarded or frittered
away, then popular sovereignty becomes a myth.
As Justice Laurel correctly pointed out: "As long as popular government is an end to be achieved
and safeguarded, suffrage, whatever may be the modality and form devised, must continue to be the
means by which the great reservoir of power must be emptied into the receptacular agencies
wrought by the people through their Constitution in the interest of good government and the common
weal. Republicanism, in so far as it implies the adoption of a representative type of government,
necessarily points to the enfranchised citizen as a particle of popular sovereignty and as the ultimate
source of the established authority." 12
A republic then to be true to its name requires that the government rests on the consent of the
people, consent freely given, intelligently arrived at, honestly recorded, and thereafter counted. Only
thus can they be really looked upon as the ultimate sources of established authority. It is their
undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice. The election law has no justification
except as a means for assuring a free, honest and orderly expression of their views. It is of the
essence that corruption and irregularities should not be permitted to taint the electoral process.
It may not always be thus unfortunately. That should be the ideal however. If there be a failure to
observe the mandates of the Election Code, the aggrieved parties should not be left remediless.
Under the law as it stands, it is precisely an election protest that fitly serves that purpose.
lawphi1.nt

It was sought to be thus utilized in these two cases, perhaps in a rather awkward and far from
entirely satisfactory manner. Than itself is no reason for the courts to slam the door against any
opportunity for redress. Yet, that is what would happen if the order of dismissal complained of were
not set aside.
Hence the inevitability of its reversal. The scope of our decision must not be misinterpreted however.
All that it directs is that the protetees in both cases be required to answer. Thereafter, if, as is not
unlikely, there be a denial of the serious imputations made as to the alleged irregularities, the lower
court could properly inquire into what actually transpired. After the facts are thus ascertained in
accordance with the accepted procedural rules, then the appropriate law could be applied.
It must be clearly emphasized that we do not at this stage intimate any view as to the merit, or lack
of it, of either protest. That would be premature to say the least. All we do is to set aside the order of
dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of March 23, 1968, is reversed and the two cases remanded
to the lower court for proceeding and trial in accordance with this opinion and the law. Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano and
Teehankee, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

I concur whole-heartedly in everything contained in the ably written opinion of our distinguished
colleague, Mr. Justice Fernando, including, of course, the disposition he makes therein of these
cases before Us. It may not be amiss, nonetheless, to add a few words which I consider appropriate,
in the light of my experience in handling some election cases before my appointment as Solicitor
General.
The thing that has struck me most in these two cases, both denominated as election protests, is that
the prayers of the two petitions therein are identical in that they do not ask for the seating of the
petitioners, who call themselves protestants, in the places of the protestees-respondents. What they
ask in the main is that "the proclamation of the protegees as duly elected (mayor and councilors) be
set aside and declared null and void". This sole principal prayer was precisely what gave appellees
in both cases cause to contend that (1) the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, it being allegedly the Commission on Elections that has such
jurisdiction, and (2) neither of the petitions state any cause of action. Of course, the trial court
properly overruled the first ground. It is, however, best for all concerned that the observations and
arguments adduced by the trial judge in disposing of the second ground are placed in proper light.
Ruling on the first ground above-stated, His Honor held thus:
Mere irregularities or misconduct on the part of election officers which do not tend to affect
the result of the elections are not of themselves either ground for contest or for proper
matters of inquiry... There is no allegation in the protest that the alleged irregularities
committed by the election officers would tend to change the result of the election in favor of
the protestants and against the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that the
8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who
voted were for the protetees. There is, therefore, no legal and practical justification for the
court to inquire into the irregularities committed by the election officials, as alleged in the
petition, for it would not give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be
declared the duly elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City.
The failure of election of officers to obey the mandatory provisions of a statute
relating to the conduct of the election and designed to secure the secrecy and
integrity of the ballot may so taint the votes with irregularity as to cause the rejection
of the entire votes of the district. It should be remembered, however, that all statutes
tending to limit the citizen in the exercise of the right of suffrage are to be construed
liberally in his favor, and that the courts are loath to disfranchise voters who are
wholly innocent of wrongdoing. As a consequence, it is a firmly established general
rule that voters will not be rejected, even though election officers fail to comply with
the directory provisions of a statute, if there is no fraud or other irregularity and failure
to comply is unintentional; nor is it material in this connection that the failure of the

election officers to perform their duty subjects them to penalties. Likewise, the courts
will not permit the will of the voters to be defeated by fraud on the part of election
officers if it is possible to avoid such a result. In short, a fair election and an honest
return should be considered as paramount in importance to minor requirements
which prescribe the formal steps to reach that end, and the law should be so
construed as to remedy the evils against which its provisions are directed and at the
same time not to disfranchise voters further than is necessary to attain that object. In
case of a violation of the law on the part of an election officer, punishment may be
provided therefor, and in this way the law can be rendered effectual without going to
the extent of depriving a voter of his right to have his vote counted in consequence of
such violation. It may, therefore, be stated as a general rule that if ballots are cast by
voters who are, at the time, qualified to cast them and who have done all on their part
that the law requires of voters to make their voting effective, an erroneous or even
unlawful handling of the ballots by the election officers, charged with such
responsibility will not be held to disfranchise such voters by throwing out their votes
on account of erroneous procedure had sorely by the election officers, provided the
votes are legal votes in their inception and are still capable of being given proper
effect as such. Nor will an election be set aside because of regularities on the part of
the election officials unless it appears that such irregularities affect the results. (18
Am. Jur. Sec. 225, pp. 331-332, cited on pp. 621-622, Revised Election Code by
Francisco).
There is no allegation in the petition that the irregularities committed by the election officials
have destroyed the secrecy and integrity of the ballots cast. There is no allegation in the
petition that the non-compliance of the election officials of the provisions of the election laws
regarding the registration of voters were intentional on their part for the purpose of
committing frauds for the benefit of the protestees. There is no allegation in the petition that
because of the alleged irregularities committed by the election officials in not following the
provisions of the election laws regarding the registration of voters and the distribution of the
precincts, that all the votes cast during said elections are illegal, nor is there an allegation in
the protests that the irregularities committed by the election officials would affect the election
in favor of protestees.
A misconduct or irregularity committed by an election official is not a sufficient ground
to annul the votes cast in the precincts where the person elected neither knew of nor
participated in the misconduct and it is not shown that any elector who voted or the
persons elected either participated in such misconduct. (18 Am. Jur. Sec. 228, p.
333, cited on page 622, Revised Election Code by Francisco).
While this ruling is, on the whole, correct, His Honor failed to emphasize that the cases before him
were precisely ones for the annulment and setting aside of the election for Mayor and Councilors in
the City of Iligan and that, therefore, the only question that should be resolved is whether or not the
facts alleged in the petitions in question constitute sufficient grounds for such relief. Instead, the trial
court made as may be seen above, a long discourse on the thesis that "the purpose of an election
contest is to correct the canvass," and that "the general rule is that whatever may be the cause of an
election contest, the true gravamen of the case is to determine who receives the highest number of
votes, etc." (pp. 5-8, Order in question) and then held that there was no allegation in both petitions
that "would give any benefit in favor of the protestants to the end that they will be declared the duly
elected mayor and councilors, respectively, of this City" ergo, the said petitions do not state any
cause of action. More specifically, the trial court looked in vain for allegations to the effect that "the
alleged irregularities committed by the elections in favor of the protestants and against the
protestees." (p. 7, id.) For example, His Honor reasoned out that "there is no allegation ... that the

8,000 voters who failed to vote were all voters of protestants and the 8,300 illegal voters who voted
were for the protetees." (id.).
I am afraid that such discourse, if quite impressive as an exposition of considerable learning in
election law matters, is rather irrelevant. I believe that what should be emphasized in these cases is
that ruling in Our decision to the effect that in an election protest, (otherwise entitled at times, petition
or complaint or motion of protest) it is not necessary to allege that the true results of the election in
question would be in favor of protestant and against protestee on the basis of the legal votes, or that
the proclaimed result would be changed if the facts alleged are proven, when the sole ground of
protest and the only purpose of the protestant is to have the whole election in a precinct or
municipality annulled and set aside. Indeed, as pointed out in the brief of appellants:
In the case G.R. No. L-29333, the prayer is for the annulment of the proclamation of
protestee-appellee Camilo P. Cabili and of the local elections held in Iligan City on November
14, 1967, while in case G.R. No. L-29334, the prayer is for the annulment of the
proclamation of protestee-appellees Felix Z. Actub et al. and of the local elections held in
Iligan City on November 14, 1967.
Section 177 of the Revised Election Code provides:
SEC. 177. Decision of the Contest. The court shall decide the protest ... and shall declare
who among the parties has been elected, or in the proper case, that none of them has been
legally elected....
Under the above-quoted provision of law, the courts are authorized to declare that none of
the candidates has been legally elected, which in effect would mean that the elections are
annulled.
If it were not the intention of the lawmaker not to authorize the courts to annul an election,
such authority would not have been provided in Section 177 of the Revised Election Code
quoted above.
Francisco, in his book How to Try Election Cases, 1952 Edition, p. 82, citing as authorities
the decisions of this Honorable Court in Bustos vs. Moir and Fajardo 35 Phil. 16; and Manalo
vs. Sevilla, 24 Phil. 609, states:
The court is authorized, in a proper case, not only to recount the ballots and reject
those which it considers illegal and accept those which it considers valid but it is also
authorized, in a proper case, to annul the election completely.
It is therefore clear that the trial court erred in holding that the purpose of the
protestants in filing these protest is not in accord with the purpose of the Revised
Election Code in allowing a defeated candidate to file an election protest.
In other words, I like to make it very clear that an election protest may be filed not only for
the purpose of having the protestant declared elected, but even for the purpose alone of
having the election annulled. Otherwise stated, protestants may come to court, not
necessarily to win an election, but even if solely to have the court declare that no one has
won because the election is void and that it is obvious and pure common sense that in the
latter case, the protestant does not have to allege the probability of his being the real victor,

for in such a case, his prayer precisely is that it be declared, using the language of the
law, "that none of them has been legally elected." Surely, the following ruling of the trial court:
An election contest is a summary proceeding the object of which is to expedite the
settlement of the controversy between candidates as to who received the majority of
the legal ballots (Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. 522, 524). The purpose of an election
contest is to correct the canvass of which the proclamation is a public manifestation
and the power granted by law to the court must agree with and be adequate to such
an object. Hence, the court can directly declare which candidate is to be elected
leaving the canvass made by the Board null and void, and the candidate so declared
elected may assume position of the office (Aquino vs. Calebia & Sahagun, 55 Phil.
984). It being the policy of the law to give effect to elections, the general rule is that
whatever may be the cause of an election contest, the true gravamen of the case is
to determine who receives the highest number of votes (20 C.J. 217). In an election
case, the court has an imperative duty to ascertain by all means within its command
who is the real candidate elected by the electorate. (Ibasco vs. Ilao, G.R. No. L17512, December 29, 1960). Hence, only candidates have the right to file an election
protest. (Gil Hermanos vs. Hord, 10 Phil. 217).
From the foregoing authorities, it could be concluded that the purpose of the election
law to allow a candidate to file an election protest is for the court to determine
whether the protestant or the protestee is the winner of the election under protest. In
the present case, the object of the protestants in filing their protests based on the
prayer of their petitions is not to declare them the duly elected mayor and councilors,
respectively, of this City but merely to declare null and void the proclamation and
election of the protestees as well as the elections held in Iligan City of November 14,
1967. The purpose, therefore of the protestants in filing these protests is not in
accord with the purpose of the Revised Election Code in allowing a defeated
candidate to file an election protest.
must be emphatically denounced as a misreading by His Honor of the real import of the authorities
cited by Him. Such proposition represents the most narrow concept of the judicial remedies in
matters of election. No single precedent in extant jurisprudence whether here or in any other country
can be found to support it. I am equally confident that no thesis in any of the existing legal
publications can be referred to as upholding such an illogical idea. To sanction such a ruling is to kill
almost entirely all hopes for a clean, orderly and honest suffrage in this country, which the
Commission on Elections alone may not be able to achieve in all possible cases. Indeed, as pointed
out by appellants the trial court would have been right if it had only adhered to the decisions already
rendered by this Court on the subject, cited by said appellants in their brief.
The real issue then in these cases is whether or not the facts alleged in the respective petitions of
appellants constitute sufficient ground or grounds for annulment of the election of Mayor and
Councilors in Iligan City, held in November, 1967. On this score, it has to be admitted that, indeed,
the petitions of appellants which appear to have been prepared by a single counsel are not as
accurately and precisely worded as to fit exactly into the pattern that may perhaps be most ideal in
cases of this nature, but I cannot go along with His Honor's ruling that the allegations in said
petitions are legally inadequate to serve as a basis for the relief of annulment of the election therein
prayed for. His Honor seemed to be more concerned with what he considered the need for direct
averments that the irregularities and violations of the election law alleged by appellants resulted in
the destruction of the "secrecy and integrity of the ballot cast," that "all the votes cast in said
elections are illegal" and that "the irregularities committed by the election officials would affect the
election in favor of the protestees." (p. 8, id.) I feel that His Honor was asking too much and

unnecessarily because, as they appear to me, these allegations as well as the others His Honor
considered as indispensably required, are more in the nature of legal conclusions, not supposed to
be averred in the pleadings, rather than statements of ultimate facts. The truth of the matter is that,
viewed as a whole, the petitions in question sufficiently lead to the conclusion that what appellants
are complaining about is that the elections held in Iligan City in November, 1967 were characterized
by general and specific circumstances, that leave rational doubt as to whether or not the true will of
the people of said City could be reflected in the proclaimed results. In the more polished and
inimitable language of Mr. Justice Fernando, "... the seriousness and gravity of the imputed failure to
have the elections conducted freely and honestly, with such irregularities alleged, give rise to doubts,
rational and honest, as to who were the duly elected officials".
It is my considered opinion that while it is truly desirable that election protests should be discouraged
where they have hardly any basis in fact or in law, the earlier to free from doubt the title to their
respective offices of those chosen to direct the affairs of our government, whether national or local,
thereby giving them the peace of mind and freedom of action gravely needed in the formulation of
policies and the implementation thereof, courts should also be careful in seeing to it that their doors
are not untimely shut to complaints regarding the commission of electoral frauds, irregularities and
illegalities, the most despicable banes of popular suffrage, which though unhappily worded are fairly
indicative of a situation wherein the will of the electorate has not been freely and clearly expressed.
To my mind, the rule foIlowed in an unbroken line of decisions of this Court, to the effect that the
commission of irregularities by election officials, no matter how serious, and the actual discovery of
frauds and violations of law by either candidates or voters, are not in themselves sufficient to cause
the annulment of an election unless so expressly provided by law, or that the frauds, illegalities and
irregularities are so rampant and diffusive as to place the result of such election in grave doubt, is
one that governs more the rendition of judgments in election cases and the evaluation of the
circumstances surrounding the elections in question, as portrayed in the evidence already presented
before the court, rather than as a strict criterion for determining whether a complaint or petition or
motion of protest sufficiently states a cause of action for annulment. Respecting contrary opinion
others may entertain on the matter, I regard it as a sound rule that pleadings in election cases, at
least, should not be subjected to such minute examination as should be done to facts duly
established after proper hearing, if only because facts are unerring manifestations of the truth, while
allegations in pleadings often suffer from the common flaws in the means of human expressions as
well as from the usual imperfection of human language. If words are but children of thoughts,
parents and offsprings not always, as among men and animals, look exactly alike. Pleadings in such
cases must, therefore, be read with more liberality so as to make it difficult, if not impossible for
grievances against the suppression in one form or another of the expression of the popular will, wellgrounded in fact, may not be thrown out merely because of lack of skill and precision in the
formulation of the corresponding protests. More importance should be given to the substantial
matters sufficiently appearing in such pleadings as intended to be brought to the court for a remedy,
than to the form, at times, ambiguous and often ungrammatically phrased, in which they are
expressed. In any event, in case of doubt as to which should be done, such doubt must be resolved
in giving due course to the protest, unless it is manifestly evident that the same has been filed for
other than legitimate purposes.
As already indicated, my vote is for the reversal of the appealed order sustaining the motion to
dismiss filed by appellees in the court below, because I agree with the decision herein of Mr. Justice
Fernando that there are enough indications, within the four corners of the questioned petitions, of
irregularities and illegalities which, if proven, may result in the annulment of the elections prayed for
by appellants.

Footnotes
1

L-29333.

L-29334.

Felix Z. Actub, Providencio P. Abragan, Manuel F. Celdran, Casimero P. Cabigon, and

Benito Ong.
3

Felix Z. Actub, Providencio P. Abragan, Manuel F. Celdran, Casimero P. Cabigon, and

Benito Ong.
4

Motion to Dismiss of Protestee Cabili.

Order of the lower court of March 23, 1968, pp. 6-7.

Ibid, p. 8.

L-28348, December 15, 1967.

85 Phil. 149 (1949).

10

City Board of Canvassers v. Moscoso, L-16365, September 30, 1963.

Cf. Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521 (1914); Garchitorena v. Crescini, 39 Phil. 258 (1918);
Cailles v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 496 (1921); Mandac v. Samonte, 49 Phil. 284 (1926); De Leon v.
Cruz, 92 Phil. 403 (1952); Ticao v. Nanawa L-17890, August 30, 1962; and City Board of
Canvassers v. Moscoso, L-16365, September 30, 1963.
11

12

Moya v. Del Fierro, 69 Phil. 199, 204 (1939).

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004]

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA, petitioners, vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and
SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5
June 2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001
(Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14 May
2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the ranking of the
13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
The Facts

Shortly after her succession to the Presidency in January 2001, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo nominated then Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Senator
Guingona) as Vice-President. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Guingona
who took his oath as Vice-President on 9 February 2001.
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation, the Senate on 8 February 2001 passed
Resolution No. 84 (Resolution No. 84) certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the
Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a special
election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Twelve
Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. Resolution
No. 84 further provided that the Senatorial candidate garnering the 13 th highest number
of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona,
Jr., which ends on 30 June 2004.
[1]

[2]

On 5 June 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the election results from all the
provinces but one (Lanao del Norte), COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005
provisionally proclaiming 13 candidates as the elected Senators. Resolution No. 01-005
also provided that the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years
and the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of
Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President. Respondents
Ralph Recto (Recto) and Gregorio Honasan (Honasan) ranked 12 th and 13th,
respectively, in Resolution No. 01-005.
[3]

On 20 June 2001, petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica (petitioners), as

voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for prohibition, impleading only
COMELEC as respondent. Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming
with finality the candidate for Senator receiving the 13 th highest number of votes as the
winner in the special election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners
prayed for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation
to such effect.
Petitioners contend that COMELEC issued Resolution No. 01-005 without
jurisdiction because: (1) it failed to notify the electorate of the position to be filled in the
special election as required under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6645 (R.A. No. 6645);
(2) it failed to require senatorial candidates to indicate in their certificates of candidacy
whether they seek election under the special or regular elections as allegedly required
under Section 73 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and, consequently, (3) it failed to
specify in the Voters Information Sheet thecandidates seeking election under the special
or regular senatorial elections as purportedly required under Section 4, paragraph 4 of
Republic Act No. 6646 (R.A. No. 6646). Petitioners add that because of these
omissions, COMELEC canvassed all the votes cast for the senatorial candidates in the
14 May 2001 elections without distinction such that there were no two separate Senate
elections held simultaneously but just a single election for thirteen seats, irrespective of
term.
[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

Stated otherwise, petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a

regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results.To support their claim, petitioners cite the special elections
simultaneously held with the regular elections of 13 November 1951 and 8 November

1955 to fill the seats vacated by Senators Fernando Lopez and Carlos P. Garcia,
respectively, who became Vice-Presidents during their tenures in the Senate.
Petitioners point out that in those elections, COMELEC separately canvassed the
votes cast for the senatorial candidates running under the regular elections from the
votes cast for the candidates running under the special elections. COMELEC also
separately proclaimed the winners in each of those elections.
[8]

[9]

Petitioners sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order during the

pendency of their petition.
Without issuing any restraining order, we required COMELEC to Comment on the
petition.
On 20 July 2001, after COMELEC had canvassed the results from all the provinces,
it issued Resolution No. 01-006 declaring official and final the ranking of the 13
Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005. The 13 Senators took their oaths of
office on 23 July 2001.
In view of the issuance of Resolution No. 01-006, the Court required petitioners to
file an amended petition impleading Recto and Honasan as additional respondents.
Petitioners accordingly filed an amended petition in which they reiterated the
contentions raised in their original petition and, in addition, sought the nullification of
Resolution No. 01-006.
In their Comments, COMELEC, Honasan, and Recto all claim that a special election
to fill the seat vacated by Senator Guingona was validly held on 14 May
2001. COMELEC and Honasan further raise preliminary issues on the mootness of the
petition and on petitioners standing to litigate. Honasan also claims that the petition,
which seeks the nullity of his proclamation as Senator, is actually a quo
warranto petition and the Court should dismiss the same for lack of jurisdiction. For his
part, Recto, as the 12th ranking Senator, contends he is not a proper party to this case
because the petition only involves the validity of the proclamation of the 13 th placer in
the 14 May 2001 senatorial elections.
The Issues
The following are the issues presented for resolution:
(1) Procedurally

(a) whether the petition is in fact a petition for quo warranto over which the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge;
(b) whether the petition is moot; and
(c) whether petitioners have standing to litigate.

(2) On the merits, whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate
seat was validly held on 14 May 2001.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the Preliminary Matters
The Nature of the Petition and the Courts Jurisdiction
A quo warranto proceeding is, among others, one to determine the right of a public
officer in the exercise of his office and to oust him from its enjoyment if his claim is not
well-founded. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral
Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the qualifications of the members of
the Senate.
[10]

A perusal of the allegations contained in the instant petition shows, however, that
what petitioners are questioning is the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in
which Honasan was elected. Petitioners various prayers are, namely: (1) a declaration
that no special election was held simultaneously with the general elections on 14 May
2001; (2) to enjoin COMELEC from declaring anyone as having won in the special
election; and (3) to annul Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 in so far as these
Resolutions proclaim Honasan as the winner in the special election. Petitioners anchor
their prayers on COMELECs alleged failure to comply with certain requirements
pertaining to the conduct of that special election. Clearly then, the petition does not seek
to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator. Petitioners prayer
for the annulment of Honasans proclamation and, ultimately, election is merely
incidental to petitioners cause of action. Consequently, the Court can properly exercise
jurisdiction over the instant petition.
On the Mootness of the Petition
COMELEC contends that its proclamation on 5 June 2001 of the 13 Senators and
its subsequent confirmation on 20 July 2001 of the ranking of the 13 Senators render
the instant petition to set aside Resolutions Nos. 01-005 and 01-006 moot and
academic.
Admittedly, the office of the writ of prohibition is to command a tribunal or board to
desist from committing an act threatened to be done without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Consequently, the writ
[11]

will not lie to enjoin acts already done. However, as an exception to the rule on
mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
evading review. Thus, in Alunan III v. Mirasol, we took cognizance of a petition to set
aside an order canceling the general elections for the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) on 4
December 1992 despite that at the time the petition was filed, the SK election had
already taken place. We noted in Alunan that since the question of the validity of the
order sought to be annulled is likely to arise in every SK elections and yet the question
may not be decided before the date of such elections, the mootness of the petition is no
bar to its resolution. This observation squarely applies to the instant case. The question
of the validity of a special election to fill a vacancy in the Senate in relation to
COMELECs failure to comply with requirements on the conduct of such special election
is likely to arise in every such election. Such question, however, may not be decided
before the date of the election.
[12]

[13]

[14]

On Petitioners Standing
Honasan questions petitioners standing to bring the instant petition as taxpayers
and voters because petitioners do not claim that COMELEC illegally disbursed public
funds. Neither do petitioners claim that they sustained personal injury because of the
issuance of Resolution Nos. 01-005 and 01-006.
Legal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act. The requirement of standing, which necessarily sharpens the
presentation of issues, relates to the constitutional mandate that this Court settle only
actual cases or controversies. Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only
when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

Applied strictly, the doctrine of standing to litigate will indeed bar the instant petition.
In questioning, in their capacity as voters, the validity of the special election on 14 May
2001, petitioners assert a harm classified as a generalized grievance. This generalized
grievance is shared in substantially equal measure by a large class of voters, if not all
the voters, who voted in that election. Neither have petitioners alleged, in their capacity
as taxpayers, that the Court should give due course to the petition because in the
special election held on 14 May 2001 tax money [was] x x x extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power or that
there [was] misapplication of such funds by COMELEC or that public money [was]
deflected to any improper purpose.
[19]

[20]

On the other hand, we have relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our
discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage. Also, in the
recent case of Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, we gave the same
liberal treatment to a petition filed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The IBP
[21]

[22]

questioned the validity of a Presidential directive deploying elements of the Philippine

National Police and the Philippine Marines in Metro Manila to conduct patrols even
though the IBP presented too general an interest. We held:

[T]he IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the
rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts
no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its
duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not
sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is
shared by other groups and the whole citizenry x x x.
Having stated the foregoing, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit
which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is
involved. In not a few cases, the court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus
standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance
to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a
reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents. Moreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless
violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by
the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost
certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the
Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
(Emphasis supplied)
[23]

We accord the same treatment to petitioners in the instant case in their capacity as
voters since they raise important issues involving their right of suffrage, considering that
the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again.
Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill
any vacancy in the Senate and the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed
by law, thus:

In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a special election

may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the
unexpired term. (Emphasis supplied)

To implement this provision of the Constitution, Congress passed R.A. No. 6645, which
provides in pertinent parts:

SECTION 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in
the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for
Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the
existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special
election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on
the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the
Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be
sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term.
SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election,
which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days
from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the
office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a
general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with such general election. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645, as follows:

Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x x x In case a permanent

vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of Representatives at least one (1) year
before the expiration of the term, the Commission shall call and hold a special
election to fill the vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90)
days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such vacancy in the
Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding
regular election. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration
of the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a
special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than
sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but in case
of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously with the
next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of, among other
things, the office or offices to be voted for.
Did COMELEC, in conducting the special senatorial election simultaneously with the
14 May 2001 regular elections, comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6645?

A survey of COMELECs resolutions relating to the conduct of the 14 May 2001

elections reveals that they contain nothing which would amount to a compliance, either
strict or substantial, with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended.
Thus, nowhere in its resolutions or even in its press releases did COMELEC state
that it would hold a special election for a single three-year term Senate seat
simultaneously with the regular elections on 14 May 2001. Nor did COMELEC give
formal notice that it would proclaim as winner the senatorial candidate receiving the
13th highest number of votes in the special election.
[24]

[25]

The controversy thus turns on whether COMELECs failure, assuming it did fail, to
comply with the requirements in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, invalidated
the conduct of the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 and accordingly rendered
Honasans proclamation as the winner in that special election void. More precisely, the
question is whether the special election is invalid for lack of a call for such election and
for lack of notice as to the office to be filled and the manner by which the winner in the
special election is to be determined. For reasons stated below, the Court answers in the
negative.
COMELECs Failure to Give Notice
of the Time of the Special Election Did Not
Negate the Calling of such Election
The calling of an election, that is, the giving notice of the time and place of its
occurrence, whether made by the legislature directly or by the body with the duty to give
such call, is indispensable to the elections validity. In a general election, where the law
fixes the date of the election, the election is valid without any call by the body charged
to administer the election.
[26]

[27]

In a special election to fill a vacancy, the rule is that a statute that expressly
provides that an election to fill a vacancy shall be held at the next general elections fixes
the date at which the special election is to be held and operates as the call for that
election. Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not invalidated by
the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of calling the election failed to do so.
This is because the right and duty to hold the election emanate from the statute and
not from any call for the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters
with knowledge of the time and place of the election.
[28]

[29]

[30]

Conversely, where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special
election but empowers some authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a
condition precedent, the statutory provision on the giving of notice is considered
mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.
[31]

In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of
vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special
election to fill the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment
as Vice-President in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held

simultaneously with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law
charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to
give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less
invalidate it.
Our conclusion might be different had the present case involved a special election
to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. In such a case, the holding of the
special election is subject to a condition precedent, that is, the vacancy should take
place at least one year before the expiration of the term. The time of the election is left
to the discretion of COMELEC subject only to the limitation that it holds the special
election within the range of time provided in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended. This makes mandatory the requirement in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as
amended, for COMELEC to call x x x a special election x x x not earlier than 60 days
nor longer than 90 days after the occurrence of the vacancy and give notice of the office
to be filled. The COMELECs failure to so call and give notice will nullify any attempt to
hold a special election to fill the vacancy. Indeed, it will be well-nigh impossible for the
voters in the congressional district involved to know the time and place of the special
election and the office to be filled unless the COMELEC so notifies them.
No Proof that COMELECs
Failure to Give Notice of the Office
to be Filled and the Manner of
Determining the Winner in the Special
Election Misled Voters
The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to
give notice of the special election is whether the want of notice has resulted in
misleading a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special
election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of voters who wrongly
believed that there was no special election to fill a vacancy, a choice by a small
percentage of voters would be void.
[32]

The required notice to the voters in the 14 May 2001 special senatorial election
covers two matters. First, that COMELEC will hold a special election to fill a vacant
single three-year term Senate seat simultaneously with the regular elections scheduled
on the same date. Second, that COMELEC will proclaim as winner the senatorial
candidate receiving the 13th highest number of votes in the special election. Petitioners
have neither claimed nor proved that COMELECs failure to give this required notice
misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the special senatorial
election or led them to believe that there was no such special election.
Instead, what petitioners did is conclude that since COMELEC failed to give such
notice, no special election took place. This bare assertion carries no value. Section 2 of
R.A. No. 6645, as amended, charged those who voted in the elections of 14 May 2001
with the knowledge that the vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas
appointment as Vice-President in February 2001 was to be filled in the next succeeding

regular election of 14 May 2001. Similarly, the absence of formal notice from COMELEC
does not preclude the possibility that the voters had actual notice of the special election,
the office to be voted in that election, and the manner by which COMELEC would
determine the winner. Such actual notice could come from many sources, such as
media reports of the enactment of R.A. No. 6645 and election propaganda during the
campaign.
[33]

More than 10 million voters cast their votes in favor of Honasan, the party who
stands most prejudiced by the instant petition. We simply cannot disenfranchise those
who voted for Honasan, in the absence of proof that COMELECs omission prejudiced
voters in the exercise of their right of suffrage so as to negate the holding of the special
election. Indeed, this Court is loathe to annul elections and will only do so when it is
impossible to distinguish what votes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any
certain result whatever, or that the great body of the voters have been prevented by
violence, intimidation, and threats from exercising their franchise.
[34]

Otherwise, the consistent rule has been to respect the electorates will and let the
results of the election stand, despite irregularities that may have attended the conduct of
the elections. This is but to acknowledge the purpose and role of elections in a
democratic society such as ours, which is:
[35]

to give the voters a direct participation in the affairs of their government, either in
determining who shall be their public officials or in deciding some question of public
interest; and for that purpose all of the legal voters should be permitted, unhampered
and unmolested, to cast their ballot. When that is done and no frauds have been
committed, the ballots should be counted and the election should not be declared
null. Innocent voters should not be deprived of their participation in the affairs of
their government for mere irregularities on the part of the election officers, for which
they are in no way responsible. A different rule would make the manner and method
of performing a public duty of greater importance than the duty itself. (Emphasis in
the original)
[36]

Separate Documentation and Canvassing

not Required under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
Neither is there basis in petitioners claim that the manner by which COMELEC
conducted the special senatorial election on 14 May 2001 is a nullity because
COMELEC failed to document separately the candidates and to canvass separately the
votes cast for the special election. No such requirements exist in our election
laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 is that COMELEC fix the
date of the election, if necessary, and state, among others, the office or offices to be
voted for. Similarly, petitioners reliance on Section 73 of B.P. Blg. 881 on the filing of
certificates of candidacy, and on Section 4(4) of R.A. No. 6646 on the printing of
election returns and tally sheets, to support their claim is misplaced. These provisions

govern elections in general and in no way require separate documentation of

candidates or separate canvass of votes in a jointly held regular and special elections.
Significantly, the method adopted by COMELEC in conducting the special election
on 14 May 2001 merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in
Resolution No. 84.Initially, the original draft of Resolution No. 84 as introduced by
Senator Francisco Tatad (Senator Tatad) made no mention of the manner by which the
seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the
suggestion of Senator Raul Roco (Senator Roco), the Senate agreed to amend
Resolution No. 84 by providing, as it now appears, that the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13 th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired
term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. Senator Roco introduced the
amendment to spare COMELEC and the candidates needless expenditures and the
voters further inconvenience, thus:

S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move that we now consider Proposed Senate
Resolution No. 934 [later converted to Resolution No. 84].
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
Consideration of Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 is now in order. With the
permission of the Body, the Secretary will read only the title and text of the resolution.
T[HE] S[ECRETARY]. Proposed Senate Resolution No. 934 entitled
RESOLUTION CERTIFYING TO THE EXISTENCE OF A VACANCY IN THE
SENATE AND CALLING ON THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)
TO FILL UP SUCH VACANCY THROUGH ELECTION TO BE HELD
SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE REGULAR ELECTION ON MAY 14, 2001 AND
THE SENATOR THUS ELECTED TO SERVE ONLY FOR THE UNEXPIRED
TERM
WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of
the Philippines in 1998 for a term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been confirmed by a majority
vote of all the members of both House of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of
the Philippines on February 9, 2001;

WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12)
Senators, all elective Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective
provincial city and municipal officials shall be held on the second Monday and every
three years thereafter; Now, therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved, to certify, as it hereby certifies,
the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with
the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senator thus elected to serve only for the
unexpired term.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. TATAD
Senator
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. John H. Osmea is recognized.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Thank you, Mr. President. Will the distinguished Majority
Leader, Chairman of the Committee on Rules, author of this resolution, yield for a few
questions?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. With trepidation, Mr. President. [Laughter]
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). What a way of flattery. [Laughter]
Mr. President, I think I recall that sometime in 1951 or 1953, there was a special
election for a vacant seat in the Senate. As a matter of fact, the one who was elected in
that special election was then Congressman, later Senator Feli[s]berto Verano.
In that election, Mr. President, the candidates contested the seat. In other words, the
electorate had to cast a vote for a ninth senator because at that time there were only
eight to elect a member or rather, a candidate to that particular seat.
Then I remember, Mr. President, that when we ran after the EDSA revolution, twice
there were 24 candidates and the first 12 were elected to a six-year term and the next
12 were elected to a three-year term.

My question therefore is, how is this going to be done in this election? Is the
candidate with the 13th largest number of votes going to be the one to take a three-year
term? Or is there going to be an election for a position of senator for the unexpired
term of Sen. Teofisto Guingona?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, in this resolution, we are leaving the mechanics
to the Commission on Elections. But personally, I would like to suggest that probably,
the candidate obtaining the 13thlargest number of votes be declared as elected to fill up
the unexpired term of Senator Guingona.
S[ENATOR] O[SMEA] (J). Is there a law that would allow the Comelec to conduct
such an election? Is it not the case that the vacancy is for a specific office? I am really
at a loss. I am rising here because I think it is something that we should consider. I do
not know if we can No, this is not a Concurrent Resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. May we solicit the legal wisdom of the Senate President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. May I share this information that under Republic Act No.
6645, what is needed is a resolution of this Chamber calling attention to the need for
the holding of a special election to fill up the vacancy created, in this particular case,
by the appointment of our colleague, Senator Guingona, as Vice President.
It can be managed in the Commission on Elections so that a slot for the particular
candidate to fill up would be that reserved for Mr. Guingonas unexpired term. In other
words, it can be arranged in such a manner.
xxxx
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Sen. Raul S. Roco is recognized.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. May we suggest, subject to a one-minute caucus, wordings to
the effect that in the simultaneous elections, the 13th placer be therefore deemed to be
the special election for this purpose.So we just nominate 13 and it is good for our
colleagues. It is better for the candidates. It is also less expensive because the ballot
will be printed and there will be less disfranchisement.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. If we can just deem it therefore under this resolution to be such
a special election, maybe, we satisfy the requirement of the law.

T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. In other words, this shall be a guidance for the Comelec.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. to implement.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. The Comelec will not have the flexibility.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. That is right.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. We will already consider the 13th placer of the forthcoming
elections that will be held simultaneously as a special election under this law as we
understand it.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Yes. That will be a good compromise, Senator Roco.
S[ENATOR] R[OCO]. Yes. So if the sponsor can introduce that later, maybe it will be
better, Mr. President.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. What does the sponsor say?
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Mr. President, that is a most satisfactory proposal because I
do not believe that there will be anyone running specifically
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Correct.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. to fill up this position for three years and campaigning
nationwide.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. Actually, I think what is going to happen is the 13th candidate
will be running with specific groups.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Yes. Whoever gets No. 13.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. I think we can specifically define that as the intent of this
resolution.
S[ENATOR] T[ATAD]. Subject to style, we accept that amendment and if there will
be no other amendment, I move for the adoption of this resolution.
xxxx
ADOPTION OF S. RES. NO. 934

If there are no other proposed amendments, I move that we adopt this resolution.
T[HE] P[RESIDENT]. There is a motion to adopt this resolution. Is there any
objection? [Silence] There being none, the motion is approved.
[37]

Evidently, COMELEC, in the exercise of its discretion to use means and methods to
conduct the special election within the confines of R.A. No. 6645, merely chose to adopt
the Senates proposal, as embodied in Resolution No. 84. This Court has consistently
acknowledged and affirmed COMELECs wide latitude of discretion in adopting means
to carry out its mandate of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections subject only to
the limitation that the means so adopted are not illegal or do not constitute grave abuse
of discretion. COMELECs decision to abandon the means it employed in the 13
November 1951 and 8 November 1955 special elections and adopt the method
embodied in Resolution No. 84 is but a legitimate exercise of its discretion. Conversely,
this Court will not interfere should COMELEC, in subsequent special senatorial
elections, choose to revert to the means it followed in the 13 November 1951 and 8
November 1955 elections. That COMELEC adopts means that are novel or even
disagreeable is no reason to adjudge it liable for grave abuse of discretion. As we have
earlier noted:
[38]

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct

and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a
less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this Court also. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly
and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless
these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere.
[39]

A Word to COMELEC
The calling of a special election, if necessary, and the giving of notice to the
electorate of necessary information regarding a special election, are central to an
informed exercise of the right of suffrage. While the circumstances attendant to the
present case have led us to conclude that COMELECs failure to so call and give notice
did not invalidate the special senatorial election held on 14 May 2001, COMELEC
should not take chances in future elections. We remind COMELEC to comply strictly
with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of regular
elections in general and special elections in particular.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, CarpioMorales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.
Puno, J., please see dissenting opinion.
Vitug, J., joins the dissent.
Ynares-Santiago, J., joins J. Punos dissent.
Tinga, J., joins Justice Punos dissent.

[1]

As provided under Section 2 of Republic Act. No. 7166, as amended.

[2]

Resolution No. 84 reads:

WHEREAS, the Honorable Teofisto Guingona, Jr. was elected Senator of the Philippines in 1998 for a
term which will expire on June 30, 2004;
WHEREAS, on February 6, 2001, Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo nominated Senator
Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the nomination of Senator Guingona has been conferred by a majority vote of all the
members of both Houses of Congress, voting separately;
WHEREAS, Senator Guingona will take his Oath of Office as Vice-President of the Philippines on
February 9, 2001;
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7166 provides that the election for twelve (12) Senators, all elective
Members of the House of Representatives, and all elective provincial, city and municipal officials
shall be held on the second Monday of May and every three years thereafter. Now, therefore be it
Resolved by the Senate, as it is hereby resolved to certify as it hereby certifies, the existence of a
vacancy in the Senate and calling the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to fill up said
vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and
the senatorial candidate garnering the thirteenth (13 th) highest number of votes shall serve only
for the unexpired term of former Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. (Emphasis supplied)
[3]

Resolution No. 01-005 reads:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, sitting [E]n [B]anc as the National Board of Canvassers for the
election of Senators of the Philippines, officially canvassed in open and public proceedings the
certificates of canvass of votes cast nationwide for senators in the national and local elections
conducted on May 14, 2001.
Based on the canvass of the Certificates of Canvass submitted by seventy-eight (78) out of seventy-nine
(79) Provincial Boards of Canvassers, twenty (20) City Boards of Canvassers of cities comprising
one (1) or more legislative districts, two (2) District Boards of Canvassers of Metro Manila, and
one (1) Absentee Voting, and the remaining uncanvassed certificate of canvass which will not
anymore affect the results, the Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the National Board of
Canvassers finds that the following candidates for senators in said elections obtained as of June
04, 2001 the following number of votes as indicated opposite their names:
Name

Votes Garnered
(as of 4 June 2001)

NOLI DE CASTRO

16,157,811

JUAN M. FLAVIER

11,676,129

SERGIO R. OSMEA, III

11,531,427

FRANKLIN M. DRILON

11,223,020

RAMON B. MAGSAYSAY, JR.

11,187,447

JOKER P. ARROYO

11,163,801

MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR.

11,084,884

FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN

10,877,989

EDGARDO J. ANGARA

10,746,843

PANFILO M. LACSON

10,481,755

LUISA P. EJERCITO ESTRADA

10,456,674

RALPH G. RECTO

10,387,108

GREGORIO G. HONASAN

10,364,272

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it under the Constitution, the Omnibus Election
Code and other election laws, the Commission on Elections sitting En Banc as the National Board
of Canvassers hereby PROCLAIMS the above-named thirteen (13) candidates as the duly
elected Senators of the Philippines in the May 14, 2001 elections. Based on the certificates of
canvass finally tabulated, the first twelve (12) Senators shall serve for a term of six (6) years and
the thirteenth (13th) Senator shall serve the unexpired term of three (3) years of Senator Teofisto
T. Guingona, Jr. who was appointed Vice-President of the Philippines pursuant to Section 9,
Article VII of the Constitution, in relation to Section 9, Article VI thereof, as implemented under
Republic Act No. 6645. (Emphasis supplied)
[4]

This provision states: The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall
not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such
resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted
for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held,
the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election.

[5]

This provision reads: Certificate of candidacy. No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.

A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by
submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.
No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his
certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However,
before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has
filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he
desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.

[6]

This provision reads: Certificates of Candidacy; Certified List of Candidates. x x x The names of all
registered candidates immediately followed by the nickname or stage name shall also be printed
in the election returns and tally sheets.

[7]

Rollo, pp. 5-7, 12-14.

[8]

Senator Roseller T. Lim was elected in the special election of 13 November 1951 while Senator
Felisberto Verano was elected in the special election of 8 November 1955.

[9]

Rollo, pp. 8-12.

[10]

Castro v. Del Rosario, 25 Phil. 611 (1967); Section 1(a), Rule 66, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.

[11]

Sections 1-2, Rule 65, THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

[12]

Gil v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 148179, 26 June 2001 (minute resolution).

[13]

Acop v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134856, 2 July 2002, 383 SCRA 577; Viola v. Hon. Alunan III, 343 Phil. 184
(1997); Alunan III v. Mirasol, 342 Phil. 467 (1997).

[14]

342 Phil. 467 (1997).

[15]

Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, 24 August 1993, 225 SCRA
568.

[16]

Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652 (1995).

[17]

CONST., art. VIII, secs. 1 and 5(2).

[18]

Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 352
Phil. 153 (1998).

[19]

See Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975).

[20]

Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, 22 January 1980, 95 SCRA 392 (internal citations omitted).

[21]

De Guia v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104712, 6 May 1992, 208 SCRA 420; Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129
Phil. 7 (1967). See also Telecom & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153
(1998).

[22]

G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.

[23]

Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 81.

[24]

E.g. Resolution No. 3258, dated 28 September 2000 (providing for the calendar of activities and
periods of prohibited acts in connection with the 14 May 2001 elections as amended by
Resolution Nos. 3322, dated 5 October 2000; 3284, dated 20 October 2000; 3306, dated 7
November 2000; 3426, dated 22 December 2000; and 3359, dated 6 February 2001); Resolution
No. 3632, dated 1 March 2001 (canceling the certificates of candidacy of nuisance senatorial
candidates); and Resolution No. 3743, dated 12 March 2001 (providing for the general
instructions to the Boards of Election Inspectors on the casting and counting of votes).

[25]

E.g. undated COMELEC pamphlet entitled Frequently Asked Questions on the May 14, 2001 Elections.

[26]

26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).

[27]

Ibid; ibid.

[28]

26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 282 (1996).

[29]

Ibid.

[30]

McCoy v. Fisher, 67 S.E. 2d 543 (1951).

[31]

26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 281 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 70 (1965).

[32]

See 26 AM. JUR. 2d Elections 292 (1996); 29 C.J.S. Elections 72 (1965).

[33]

Indeed, the fact that 13 senators were due to be elected in the 14 May 2001 elections and that the
senator elected to the 13th place will serve the remaining term of Senator Guingona was
published in news reports (see Philippine Star, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 6 and Daily Tribune, 9
February 2001, pp. 1, 8; Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 14 February 2001,
pp. 1, A20; Today, 8 February 2001, p. 10; Manila Bulletin, 9 February 2001, pp. 3,
8). Furthermore, the fact that the administration and opposition coalitions each fielded 13
senatorial candidates (and not only 12) was similarly given extensive coverage by news
publications (see Philippine Daily Inquirer, 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001, pp. 1,
A14; 14 February 2001, pp. 1, A20; Philippine Star, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 14 February
2001, pp. 1, 6; Today, 9 February 2001, pp. 1, 4; 12 February 2001, pp. 1, 10; 13 February 2001,
pp. 1, 10; Manila Standard, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 2; Malaya, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; 14
February 2001, pp. 1, 4; Daily Tribune 14 February 2001, pp. 1, 6; Manila Times, 14 February
2001, pp. 1, 2A; Philippine Star Ngayon, 13 February 2001, pp. 1, 4).

[34]

Florendo,
Sr. vs. Buyser, 129
Phil.
353
(1967); Capalla v. Tabiana,
63
Phil.
95 (1936); Kiamzon v. Pugeda, 54 Phil. 755 (1930); Cailles v. Gomez, 42 Phil. 852 (1924). Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, (Omnibus Election Code), on failure of elections (resulting to
the annulment of elections), provides: SEC. 6. Failure of election. If, on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place had not
been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the
Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by an interested party and after due notice
and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which
resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation
of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.

[35]

Alcala v. Commission on Elections, 218 Phil. 322 (1984); Villareal v. Fornier, 84 Phil. 756 (1949);
Lucero v. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 852 (1924).

[36]

Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 (1918).

[37]

Transcript of Session Proceedings of the Philippine Senate, 8 February 2001, pp. 49-54. (Emphasis
supplied)

[38]

E.g. Cauton v. COMELEC, 126 Phil. 291 (1967).

[39]

Pugutan v. Abubakar, 150 Phil. 1 (1972) citing Sumulong v. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 237
(1941)

G.R. No. L-22335

December 31, 1965

AMANTE P. PURISIMA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ANGELINO C. SALANGA, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur. THE
PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GREGORIO
CORDERO, respondents.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner.
Provincial Fiscal Juvenal K. Guerrero for respondent Provincial Board of Canvassers
Antonio Barredo for respondents Judge Salanga and Gregorio Cordero
Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
In the election of November 12, 1963, Amante Purisima and Gregorio Cordero were among the
candidates for any of the three offices of Provincial Board Member of Ilocos Sur. After the election or
on November 25, 1963 the provincial board of canvassers met and started canvassing the returns
for said office.
Purisima noted during the canvass that the returns from some precincts, forty-one (41) in all, showed
on their face that the words and figures for Cordero's votes had been "obviously and manifestly
erased" and superimposed with other words and figures. For purposes of comparison, the
Nacionalista Party copies of the returns for the aforesaid precincts were submitted to the board. A
discrepancy of 5,042 votes in favor of Cordero was thereby found, thus:

Provincial Treasurer's
copy:

7,277 votes for

Cordero

Nacionalista Party's copy

2,235 votes for

Cordero

A request for suspension of the canvass was thereupon made by Purisima. The board of canvassers
denied said request upon the ground that it was not yet ascertainable if the discrepancies would
materially affect the result. Canvass proceeded.
After the returns had all been read, the result for the office of third (and last) member of the
Provincial Board was the following:

Cordero

41,229 votes

Purisima

39,372 votes.

Difference

1,857 votes

Purisima again called attention to the erasures and discrepancies and asked for suspension of
canvass for him to have recourse to judicial remedy. Denying said request, the board of
canvassers finished the canvass and proclaimed Cordero the winner, on November 28.
On November 29, Purisima filed a petition in the Commission on Elections to annul the canvass and
proclamation above-mentioned. The Commission on Elections issued a resolution on November 30,
annulling the canvass and proclamation, as regards Cordero and Purisima.
Purisima, on December 10, filed in the Court of First Instance a petition for recount under Section
163 of the Revised Election Code. Subsequently, motions to dismiss the same were filed by the
board of canvassers and by Cordero. In his motion to dismiss, Cordero admitted the erasures and
discrepancies on the face of the returns from 41 precincts, but denied that said erasures were due to
tampering or falsification.
After a preliminary hearing on the motions to dismiss, the Court of First Instance, on December 27,
dismissed the petition for recount. And on December 28, Cordero filed in the Commission on
Elections a motion for resumption of the canvass.
Purisima, on January 2, 1964, moved for reconsideration of the Court of First Instance's order of
dismissal. In the same case, he also filed, on January 8, a petition for preliminary injunction to
restrain the holding of another canvass. Annexed to said petition were certified photostatic copies of
the Comelec's copies of the returns from the 41 precincts in question. Furthermore, Purisima filed
with the Commission on Elections, on January 11, an opposition to the resumption of the canvass.
Alleging that the Commission on Elections was about to order the canvass resumed, Purisima came
to this Court, on January 17, 1964, by petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Petitioner
asked that the lower court's order dismissing his petition for recount be set aside and that the
Commission on Elections be enjoined from ordering resumption of the canvass until after the judicial
recount.

On January 22, 1964 we ordered respondents to answer, and allowed preliminary injunction to be
issued as prayed for upon the posting of a bond of P500.00. After respondents filed their answer the
case was heard and submitted for decision.
The requisites for judicial recount are set forth in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code:
When statements of precinct are contradictory. In case it appears to the provincial board
of canvassers that another copy or other authentic copies of the statement from an election
precinct submitted to the board give to a candidate a different number of votes and the
difference affects the result of the election, the Court of First Instance of the province, upon
motion of the board or of any candidate affected, may proceed to recount the votes cast in
the precinct for the sole purpose of determining which is the true statement or which is the
true result of the count of the votes cast in said precinct for the office in question. Notice of
such proceeding shall be given to all candidates affected.
In dismissing the petition for recount, respondent Judge stated that some of the requisites were not
present, namely: first, that it appears to the provincial board of canvassers that a discrepancy exists;
second, that said discrepancy is between the copy submitted to the board and another authentic
copy thereof; third, that said authentic copy must also be submitted to the board.
First of all, it is not disputed that a candidate affected can file the petition for recount, even if he does
so alone, without the concurrence of the provincial board of canvassers (Cawa v. Del Rosario, L16837-40, May 30,1960). From the fact, therefore, that the provincial board of canvassers has not
petitioned for a recount it cannot be inferred that they were not convinced a discrepancy existed.
In fact, when Purisima first called attention to the discrepancy between the Nacionalista Party copies
and the Provincial Treasurer's copies, the board of canvassers admitted the discrepancy but stated
that it was not yet ascertainable whether the discrepancy would amount to enough votes as to affect
the result. There is no more question now that the number of votes involved in said discrepancy is
more than enough to alter the result.
Finally, in the motion to dismiss filed by the board of canvassers, the existence of the discrepancy is
not disputed, and the board merely raises the defense that the recount is up to the court and not to
said board (Annex D, Petition).
Passing on to the next point, the basis of the petition for recount was not merely a discrepancy
between the Nacionalista Party copies and the Provincial Treasurer's copies of the returns.
Paragraph 8 of said petition shows that, in addition, the Commission on Elections' copies were relied
upon:
That as a result of the aforesaid erasures, tampering and apparent falsifications, there exist
discrepancies between the Provincial Treasurer's copies (the basis of the canvass) of the
election returns in the precincts in question, on one hand, and the copies pertaining to the
Nacionalista Party and those pertaining to the Commission on Elections, on the other, and
that said discrepancies materially affect the result of the election as between herein
petitioner and respondent Gregorio Cordero;
Accordingly, even assuming for the nonce a point we do not here decide that the Nacionalista
Party copies are not copies that may be the basis of a petition for recount, the fact remains that the
Commission on Elections' copies were said to reflect the same discrepancy with the Provincial
Treasurer's copies. It is settled that the Commission on Elections' copies are authentic copies within

the meaning of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code (Laws in v. Escalona, L-22540, July 31,
1964; Matanog v. Alejandro, L-22502-08, June 30, 1964.)
The trial court. however, ruled that the Commission on Elections' copies had no application to the
petition for recount because they were not submitted to the board of canvassers. The record
definitely shows that the reason why Purisima was not able to submit to the board said Commission
on Elections' copies was because the board declined to suspend the canvass and proclamation.
It is the duty of the board of canvassers to suspend the canvass in case of patent irregularity in the
election returns. In the present case, there were patent erasures and superimpositions, in words and
figures on the face of the election returns submitted to the board of canvassers. It was therefore
imperative for the board to stop the canvass so as to allow time for verification of authentic copies
and recourse to the courts (Javier v. Commission on Elections, L-22248, January 30, 1965). A
canvass or proclamation made notwithstanding such patent defects, without awaiting proper
remedies, is null and void (Ibid.). In fact, as stated, the Commission on Elections declared the
canvass and proclamation, made by respondent provincial board of canvassers, null and void.
Since the board of canvassers prevented Purisima from securing the Commission on Elections'
copies of the returns to establish a discrepancy between them and the Provincial Treasurer's copies,
the failure to submit the Commission on Elections' copies to said board should not prejudice
Purisima's right to petition for recount before the court. It was therefore grave abuse of discretion for
respondent court to refuse to consider the Commission on Elections' copies, regardless of the patent
and admitted irregularities on the face of the Provincial Treasurer's copies and the alleged
discrepancy amounting to thousands of votes sufficient to affect the results.
Interpretation of election laws should give effect to the expressed will of the electorate. Patent
erasures and superimpositions in words and figures of the votes stated in the election returns strike
at the reliability of said returns as basis for canvass and proclamation. A comparison with the other
copies, and, in case of discrepancy, a recount, is the only way to remove grave doubts as to the
correctness of said returns as well as of ascertaining that they reflect the will of the people.
WHEREFORE, the dismissal of the petition for recount is set aside, respondent Judge is ordered to
proceed with the petition for recount, and respondents Commission on Elections and Provincial
Board of Canvassers are enjoined, until after the termination of proceedings in the petition for
recount, from ordering or holding another canvass and proclamation as between petitioner Purisima
and respondent Cordero.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Zaldivar, JJ.,concur

G.R. No. L-25467

April 27, 1967

LUCAS V. CAUTON, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and PABLO SANIDAD, respondents.
Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Ramon Barrios for respondent Commission on Elections.
Pablo C. Sanidad and F. D. Villanueva and Associates for respondent Sanidad.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
In the national elections held on November 9, 1965, petitioner Lucas V. Cauton and respondent
Pablo Sanidad, along with Godofredo S. Reyes, were candidates for the office of Representative in
the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur.
During the canvass by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur of the votes cast for the
candidates for Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur, and particularly after
the Board had opened the envelopes containing the copies of the election returns from each of the
election precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz that were presented by
the Provincial Treasurer of Ilocos Sur to the Board, respondent Sanidad brought to the attention of
the Board the fact that the entries of votes for the candidates for Representative in those copies of
the election returns that came from the envelopes presented by the provincial treasurer differed from
the entries appearing in the copies of the returns from the same election precincts that were in the
possession of the Liberal Party.
1wph1.t

Respondent Sanidad filed a petition with the Commission on Elections praying for the opening of the
ballot boxes in all the precincts of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz, in order to retrieve the election
returns deposited therein so that those election returns might be used in the canvass of the votes for
the candidates for Representative in the second district of Ilocos Sur, and that in the meantime the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur be ordered to refrain from proclaiming the winning
candidate for the office of Representative in said district. The Commission on Elections issued the
restraining order prayed for by respondent Sanidad and set his petition for hearing.
After hearing, the Commission on Elections found "that it had been clearly established that the
copies of the election returns for the Municipal Treasurer, for the Commission on Elections and for
the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality of Santa Cruz have uniform alterations in the entries of
the votes cast for representative showing different number of votes compared with the Liberal Party
copies, while the copies of the election returns for the Commission on Elections and the Provincial
Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon and Santiago have likewise uniform alterations and
showing different numbers compared with the Liberal Party copies ...."1The copies of the election
returns that were furnished the municipal treasurers of Candon and Santiago were never verified
because the municipal treasurers of those two municipalities did not comply with the
subpoena duces tecum issued by the Commission on Elections directing them to bring to the
Commission the copies of the election returns of the precincts in their respective municipalities that
were in their possession.
On December 22, 1965, respondent Commission on Elections issued an order providing, among
others, that
... to enable the aggrieved party to establish discrepancy between copies of the election
returns provided by law in the aforementioned precincts for the purpose of obtaining judicial
remedy under the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code, the
Commission Resolved ... to direct immediately the opening of the ballot boxes of the
municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago which are now impounded and under the
custody of the Zone Commander of the 1st PC Zone in Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga solely for the purpose of retrieving therefrom the corresponding election returns,
copies for the ballot box, in all the precincts of said municipalities.
Pursuant to the instructions of respondent Commission, contained in the resolution of December 22,
1965, the ballot boxes from all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago
were opened by the Chief of the Law Enforcement Division of the Commission, Atty. Fernando
Gorospe, Jr., in the presence of witnesses, and the envelopes containing the election returns found
inside the ballot boxes were taken and brought to Manila on December 23, 1965.
On the same date, December 23, 1965, herein petitioner, Lucas V. Cauton, filed before this Court a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, praying that the resolution of the
respondent Commission on Elections dated December 22, 1965 ordering the opening of the ballot
boxes used in all the precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago in the elections of November 9,
1965 be annulled and set aside. The petition further prays that the Commission on Elections be
restrained from opening, the envelopes containing the election returns found in the afore-mentioned
ballot boxes and be ordered to return the said envelopes to the corresponding ballot boxes. In his

petition, petitioner alleges that the respondent Commission on Elections acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction in issuing the resolution of December 22, 1965. This Court gave due course to the
petition, but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. This petition is now the case
before Us.
Upon instructions by respondent Commission on Elections, on December 28, 1966, the envelopes
that were taken from the ballot boxes were opened and the election returns were taken out and their
contents examined and recorded by a committee appointed by the Commission. This was done in a
formal hearing with notice to the parties concerned.
Respondent Pablo C. Sanidad filed his answer to instant petition on January 5, 1966, admitting
some of the allegations and denying others, and maintaining that the Commission on Elections had
acted well within the bounds of its authority in issuing the order of December 22, 1965. Respondent
Commission on Elections also filed its answer on January 5, 1966, maintaining that it has authority
under the law to order the opening of the ballot boxes as stated in its resolution of December 22,
1965.
In the meantime, on the basis of the discrepancies in the entries of the votes for the candidates for
Representative, between the election returns taken out of the ballot boxes that were opened by
order of the Commission of Elections and the election returns submitted by the Provincial Treasurer
of Ilocos Sur to the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Ilocos Sur, respondent Pablo C. Sanidad filed
a petition with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, docketed as Election Case No. 16-N, for a
recount of the votes in all the precincts of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code.
On February 14, 1966, petitioner filed before this Court in urgent motion, in this case, praying for the
issuance of an order enjoining the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur (Branch II-Narvacan) from
further proceeding with Election Case No. 16-N, abovementioned, pending final decision of the
instance case, upon the ground that the recount of the ballots in that case in the court below would
render the instant case moot and academic. This motion was denied by this Court in a resolution
dated February 17, 1966.
The principal issue in the present case revolves on the of the resolution of the respondent
Commission of Elections, dated December 22, 1965, which orders the opening of the ballot boxes
used in all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Sta. Cruz and Santiago, Ilocos Sur, during
the elections of November 9, 1965 for the purpose of retrieving therefrom the corresponding election
returns, copies for the ballot box, "to enable the aggrieved party to establish discrepancy between
copies of the election returns provided by law in the aforementioned precincts for the purpose of
obtaining judicial remedy under the provisions of Section 163 of the Revised Election Code."
It is the stand of the petitioner that respondent Commission on Elections is without jurisdiction to
issue, or has acted in excess of jurisdiction in issuing, the resolution in question, so that said
resolution is null and void and should not be given legal force and effect. The petitioner contends
that under Section 157 of the Revised Election Code the Commission on Elections has authority to
order the opening of the ballot boxes "only in connection with an investigation conducted for the
purpose of helping the prosecution of any violation of the election laws or for the purely

administrative purpose but not when the sole purpose is, as in this case, to assist a party in trying to
win the election ...." The petitioner further, contends that "the mere fact that the copies of the returns
in the precincts in question in the possession of the Liberal Party do not tally with the returns
involving the same precincts in the possession of the Provincial Treasurer, the Commission of
Elections and the Nacionalista Party as well does not legally support the validity of the resolution of
the respondent Commission in question ...."2
We cannot sustain the stand of the petitioner. We believe that in issuing the resolution in question
the Commission on Elections simply performed a function as authorized by the Constitution, that is,
to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and ... exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law." The
Commission has the power to decide all administrative questions affecting elections, except the
question involving the right to vote.3
This Court in a line of decisions has ruled that the Commission on Election has the power to
investigate and act on the propriety or legality of the canvass of election returns made by the board
of canvassers. In the case ofAlbano vs. Arranz, L-19260, January 31, 1962, this Court, through Mr.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, held as follows:
The suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate pending an inquiry into
irregularities brought to the attention of the Commission on Elections was well within its
administrative jurisdiction, in view of the exclusive authority conferred upon it by the
Constitution (Art. X ) for the administration and enforcement of all laws relative to elections.
The Commission certainly had the right to inquire whether or not discrepancies existed
between the various copies of election returns for the precincts in question, and suspend the
canvass all the meantime so the parties could ask for a recount in case of variance ....'
What the respondent Commission on Elections did in the case now before Us is just what is
contemplated in the abovequoted ruling of this Court. The power of the Commission on Elections in
this respect is simply administrative and supervisory intended to secure the proclamation of the
winning candidate based on the true count of the votes cast. When the Commission on Elections
exercises this power the purpose is not for the Commission to help a candidate win the election but
to bring about the canvass of the true results of the elections as certified by the boards of election
inspectors in every precinct. The object of the canvass is to determine the result of the elections
based on the official election returns. In order that the result of the canvass would reflect the true
expression of the people's will in the choice of their elective officials, the canvass must be based on
true, genuine, correct, nay untampered, election returns. It is in this proceedings that the
Commission on Elections exercises its supervisory and administrative power in the enforcement of
laws relative to the conduct of elections, by seeing to it that the canvass is based on the election
returns as actually certified by the members of the board of inspectors. Once the Commission on
Elections is convinced that the elections returns in the hands of the board of canvassers do not
constitute the proper basis in ascertaining the true result of the elections, it should be its concern,
nay its duty, to order the taking of such steps as may be necessary in order that the proper basis for
the canvass is obtained or made available.

The election law requires the board of inspectors to prepare four copies of the election return in each
precinct one to be deposited in the ballot box, one to be delivered to the municipal treasurer, one
to be sent to the provincial treasurer, and one to be sent to the Commission on Elections. In the case
of the canvass of the election returns for candidates for provincial or national offices, the election
returns received by the provincial treasurer from the boards of inspectors are used. It is the duty of
the provincial treasurer to turn over to the provincial board of canvassers the election returns
received by him from the boards of inspectors. If the Commission on Elections is duly informed and it
so finds, in appropriate proceedings, that the election returns in the hands of the provincial treasurer
are tampered, then the Commission should afford the candidate adversely affected by the tampering
an opportunity to show that there exist authentic copies of the same election returns which are not
tampered. A recourse may be had to the copies received by the Commission on Elections and to the
copies received by the municipal treasurer. If it is shown, that the copies in the hands of the
Commission on Elections and of the municipal treasurer are similarly tampered as the copies in the
hands of the provincial treasurer, then it becomes evident that all the three copies of the election
returns outside the ballot box do not constitute a reliable basis for a canvass. The only copies left to
be checked, whether they are also tampered or not, are the ones inside the ballot boxes. Certainly,
the Commission on Elections, in the exercise of its power to administer and enforce the laws relative
to the conduct of elections, may order the opening of the ballot boxes to ascertain whether the copy
inside each ballot box is also tampered like the three copies outside the ballot box, corresponding to
each precinct. The Commission on Elections may do this on its own initiative, or upon petition by the
proper party. Once it is found that the copy of the election return inside the ballot box is untampered,
the Commission on Elections would then have accomplished two things, namely: (1) secured a basis
for the prosecution for the violation of the laws relative to elections, and (2) afforded the party
aggrieved by the alteration of the election returns outside the ballot box a basis for a judicial recount
of the votes as provided for in Section 163 of the Revised Election Code. Thus, the Commission on
Elections has thereby made available the proper and reliable basis for the canvass of the votes that
will lead to the proclamation by the board of canvassers of the true winner in the elections. In so
doing the Commission on Elections, as we have said, had performed its constitutional duty of
administering and enforcing the laws relative to the conduct of elections with a view to promoting
clean and honest elections the very purpose for which the Commission on Elections was created
by constitutional mandate.
In the case now before Us, the Commission on Elections issued the questioned resolution "after
hearing the arguments of the petitioner and the opposition thereto and considering that it has
been clearly established that the copies of the election returns for the Municipal Treasurer, for the
Commission on Elections and for the Provincial Treasurer for the municipality of Sta. Cruz have
uniform alteration in the entries of the votes cast for representative showing different number of
votes compared with the Liberal Party copies, while the copies of the election returns for the
Commission of Elections and the Provincial Treasurer for the municipalities of Candon and Santiago
have likewise uniform alterations and showing different numbers compared with the Liberal Party
copies ..."5Indeed, in the face of this finding by the Commission on Elections, which indicates a clear
violation of the election law, and which indicates an attempt to procure the proclamation of the
winner in the elections for Representative in the second congressional district of Ilocos Sur by the
use of tampered election returns, can the Commission on Elections be remiss in the performance of
its duties as a constitutional body committed with the exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections? The Revised Election Code gives to

the Commission on Elections the direct and immediate supervision over provincial, municipal and
city officials designated by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections and included
among these officials are members of the provincial board of canvassers. 6The provincial board of
canvassers is enjoined by law to canvass all the votes cast for Representatives on the basis of the
election returns produced by the provincial treasurer.7The Commission on Elections has a duty to
enforce this law and it has the duty to see to it that the election returns to be used for canvassing
must be genuine and authentic, not falsified or tampered with. Where the election returns produced
by the provincial treasurer have been shown to have been tampered, and all the other copies
outside the ballot boxes have also been shown to have been tampered or falsified, it is certainly
within the power of the Commission on Elections to issue such order as would ascertain the
existence of the genuine, authentic and untampered election returns, and thus open the way for the
summary recount of the votes, in accordance with law, for the purposes only of the canvass of the
votes and the proclamation of the candidate found to have obtained the highest number of votes. In
the case now before Us, it is found by the Commission on Elections that no other copies can be had
except those deposited in the ballot boxes. Hence, the necessity for the Commission to order the
retrieving of the copies of the election returns from the ballot boxes. An order to this effect does not
affect the right to vote or the validity of any vote cast, so that it is perfectly within the power of the
Commission on Elections to issue such an order in the exercise of its exclusive power to administer
and enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections. It would indeed be absurd to say that the
Commission on Elections has a legal duty to perform and at the same time it is denied the necessary
means to perform said duty.
The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress all
evils that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters.8The purity of the elections is one of
the most fundamental requisites of popular government. 9The Commission on Elections, by
constitutional mandate, must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the
votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a
considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the
great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice
of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave
abuse of discretion, should not be interfered with. 10Technicalities, which are not conducive to free,
orderly and honest elections, but on the contrary may defeat the will of the sovereign people as
expressed in their votes, should not be allowed to hamper the Commission on Elections in the
performance of its duties. To sustain the petitioner in the present case is to deny the Commission on
Elections the power to retrieve the copies of the election returns from the ballot boxes in order that
the true number of votes cast for a candidate may be known and thus permit a canvass on the basis
of election returns that are patently falsified. We cannot, and We must not, sanction the stand of
petitioner.
As We have adverted to, the Commission on Elections has the power to inquire whether there exist
discrepancies among the various copies of the election returns.11Of all the copies prepared by the
board of inspectors the copy least susceptible to being tampered with is the one deposited in the
ballot box. Where the three copies outside the ballot boxes appear to have been uniformly altered,
there is no plausible reason why the copy deposited in the ballot box may not be used to determine
whether discrepancies exist in the various copies. Inasmuch as the Commission on Elections has
the right to determine whether said discrepancies exist, it must also have the right to consult said

returns, which cannot be done unless the ballot boxes are opened. It is noteworthy that the Revised
Election Code does not provide that it is the courts that have the power to order the opening of the
ballot box in a situation like this.
Section 157 of the Revised Election Code, on which petitioner herein relies in support of his stand in
the present case, authorizes the opening of the ballot box whenever it is the subject of an official
investigation. It provides:
The municipal treasurer shall keep the boxes unopened in his possession in a secure place
and under his responsibility for three months, unless they are the subject of an official
investigation, or a component court or tribunal shall demand them sooner, or the competent
authority shall order their preservation for a longer time in connection with any pending
contest or investigation.
Under this section the ballot boxes may be opened in case there is an election contest. They may
also be opened even if there is no election contest when their contents have to be used as evidence
in the prosecution of election frauds.12Moreover, they may be opened when they are the subject of
any official investigation which may be ordered by a competent court or other competent
authority.13The "competent authority" must include the Commission on Elections which is charged
with the administration and enforcement of the laws relative to the conduct of elections. In the instant
case the Commission on Elections found that it has been clearly established that the election returns
outside the ballot boxes, in all the precincts in the municipalities of Candon, Santiago and Sta. Cruz,
have been tampered with. It is within the power of the Commission to order the investigation of that
apparent anomaly that has connection with the conduct of elections. The investigation may be in
connection with the prosecution for the violations of the election laws and at the same time to
ascertain the condition of the election returns inside the ballot boxes as compared with the election
returns outside the ballot boxes, for the same precincts. The opening of the ballot boxes may,
therefore, be prayed for by a candidate who is prejudiced by the apparent falsification of the election
returns outside the ballot boxes, and in ordering the opening of the ballot boxes the purpose of the
Commission is not to help a particular candidate win an election but to properly administer and
enforce the laws relative to the conduct of elections.
From what has been said We hold that the order of December 22, 1965, being questioned by the
petitioner in the present case, was perfectly within the power of the Commission on Elections to
issue.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari and prohibition in the present case is dismissed, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1

As quoted from the resolution of the Commission on Elections dated December 22, 1965.

Words in quotation marks are as quoted from petitioner's memorandum.

Article X, Section 2, Constitution of the Philippines.

Mintu vs. Enage, L-1834, December 31, 1947; Ramos vs. Comelec, 80 Phil. 722;
Abendante vs. Relato, L-6813, November 5, 1953; Lacson vs. Comelec, L-16261, December
28, 1959; Santos vs. Comelec L-16413, January 26, 1960; Javier vs. Commission on
Elections, etc., L-22248, January 30, 1965.
4

As quoted from resolution of December 22, 1965; Emphasis supplied.

Section 3, Revised Election Code.

Section 160, Revised Election Code.

Camerino vs. Gonzales, L-14129, July 31, 1962.

U.S. vs. Cueto, 38 Phil. 935, 937; Gardiner vs. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521, 550.

10

Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288.

Albano vs. Arranz, L-19260, January 31, 1962.

11

12

Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija vs. Gutierrez David 59 Phil. 637.

13

Board of Inspectors vs. Piccio, 81 Phil. 577.

H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL

R. BUTUYAN, ROMEL R.
BAGARES, ALLAN JONES F.
LARDIZABAL, GILBERT T.
ANDRES, IMMACULADA D.
GARCIA, ERLINDA T.
MERCADO, FRANCISCO A.
ALCUAZ, MA. AZUCENA P.
MACEDA, and ALVIN A.
PETERS,
Petitioners,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Represented by HON. CHAIRMAN
JOSE MELO, COMELEC
SPECIAL BIDS and AWARDS
COMMITTEE, represented by its
CHAIRMAN HON. FERDINAND
RAFANAN, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET and MANAGEMENT,
represented by HON. ROLANDO
ANDAYA, TOTAL
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION and
SMARTMATIC
INTERNATIONAL

G.R. No. 188456

Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.

CORPORATION,
Respondents.
PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA,
Petitioner-in-Intervention.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President, JUAN
PONCE ENRILE,
Movant-Intervenor.

Promulgated:
September 10, 2009

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In a democratic system of government, the peoples voice is sovereign.
Corollarily, choosing through the ballots the men and women who are to govern
the country is perhaps the highest exercise of democracy. It is thus the interest of
the state to insure honest, credible and peaceful elections, where the sanctity of the
votes and the secrecy of the ballots are safeguarded, where the will of the
electorate is not frustrated or undermined. For when the popular will itself is
subverted by election irregularities, then the insidious seeds of doubt are sown and
the ideal of a peaceful and smooth transition of power is placed in jeopardy. To
automate, thus breaking away from a manual system of election, has been viewed
as a significant step towards clean and credible elections, unfettered by the travails
of the long wait and cheating that have marked many of our electoral exercises.
The Commission on Elections (Comelec), private respondents,
the National Computer Center and other computer wizards are confident that
nationwide automated elections can be successfully implemented. Petitioners and
some skeptics in the information technology (IT) industry have, however, their
reservations, which is quite understandable. To them, the automated election
system and the untested technology Comelec has chosen and set in motion are
pregnant with risks and could lead to a disastrous failure of elections. Comelec,

they allege, would not be up to the challenge. Cheating on a massive scale, but this
time facilitated by a machine, is perceived to be a real possibility.
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioners H. Harry L. Roque,
Jr., et al., suing as taxpayers and concerned citizens, seek to nullify respondent
Comelecs award of the 2010 Elections Automation Project (automation project) to
the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM) and
Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic)[1] and to permanently prohibit
the Comelec, TIM and Smartmatic from signing and/or implementing the
corresponding contract-award.
By Resolution[2] of July 14, 2009, the Court directed the respondents as well
as the University of the Philippines (UP) Computer Center, National Computer
Center (NCC) and Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines
(Infotech, hereinafter) to submit their collective or separate comments to the
petition on or before July 24, 2009.Before any of the comments could actually be
filed, Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra sought leave to intervene. In another resolution,
the Court allowed the intervention and admitted the corresponding petition-inintervention.[3]
On July 29, 2009, the Court heard the principal parties in oral arguments
which was followed by the submission of their and the resource persons
instructive, albeit clashing, memoranda. The Senate, through the Senate President,
would later join the fray via a Motion for Leave to Intervene. In a Resolution of
August 25, 2009, the Court admitted the Senates comment-in-intervention.
From the petition, the separate comments thereon, with their respective
annexes, and other pleadings, as well as from admissions during the oral
arguments, the Courtgathers the following facts:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 8436
authorizing the adoption of an automated election system (AES) in the May 11,
1998 national and local elections and onwards. The 1998, 2001, and 2004 national
and local polls, however, came and went but purely manual elections were still the
order of the day. On January 23, 2007, the amendatory RA 9369 [4] was passed
authorizing anew the Comelec to use an AES. Of particular relevance are Sections

6 and 10 of RA 9369originally Secs. 5 and 8, respectively of RA 8436, as

amendedeach defining Comelecs specific mandates insofar as automated elections
are concerned. The AES was not utilized in the May 10, 2000 elections, as funds
were not appropriated for that purpose by Congress and due to time constraints.
RA 9369 calls for the creation of the Comelec Advisory Council [5] (CAC).
CAC is to recommend, among other functions, the most appropriate, applicable
and cost-effective technology to be applied to the AES.[6] To be created by Comelec
too is the Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) [7] which is tasked to certify,
through an established international certification committee, not later than three
months before the elections, by categorically stating that the AES, inclusive of its
hardware and software components, is operating properly and accurately based on
defined and documented standards.[8]
In August 2008, Comelec managed to automate the regional polls in the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao[9] (ARMM), using direct recording
electronics (DRE) technology[10] in the province of Maguindanao; and the optical
mark reader/recording (OMR) system, particularly the Central Count Optical Scan
(CCOS),[11] in the rest of ARMM.[12] What scores hailed as successful automated
ARMM 2008 elections paved the way for Comelec, with some prodding from
senators,[13] to prepare for a nationwide computerized run for the 2010
national/local polls, with the many lessons learned from the ARMM experience
influencing, according to the NCC, the technology selection for the 2010
automated elections.[14]
Accordingly, in early March 2009, the Comelec released the Request for
Proposal (RFP), also known as Terms of Reference (TOR), for the nationwide
automation of the voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of
votes for the May 10, 2010 Synchronized National and Local Elections. What is
referred to also in the RFP and other contract documents as the 2010 Elections
Automation Project (Automation Project) consists of three elaborate components,
as follows:

Component 1: Paper-Based AES.[15] 1-A. Election Management System (EMS); 1B

Precinct-Count
Optic
Scan (PCOS) [16] System
and
1-C.
Consolidation/Canvassing System (CCS);
Component 2: Provision for Electronic Transmission of Election Results using
Public Telecommunications Network; and
Component 3: Overall Project Management
And obviously to address the possibility of systems failure, the RFP required
interested bidders to submit, among other things: a continuity plan[17] and a backup plan.[18]
Under the two-envelope system designed under the RFP,[19] each
participating bidder shall submit, as part of its bid, an Eligibility Envelope[20] that
should inter aliaestablish the bidders eligibility to bid. On the other hand, the
second envelope, or the Bid Envelope itself, shall contain two envelopes that, in
turn, shall contain the technical proposal and the financial proposal, respectively.[21]
Subsequently, the Comelec Special Bids and Awards Committee (SBAC),
earlier constituted purposely for the aforesaid project, caused the publication in
different newspapers of the Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid[22] for the
procurement of goods and services to be used in the automation project.
[23]
Meanwhile, Congress enacted RA 9525 appropriating some PhP 11.3 billion as
supplemental budget for the May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections.
Of the ten (10) invitation-responding consortia which obtained the bid
documents, only seven (7) submitted sealed applications for eligibility and
bids[24] which, per Bid Bulletin No. 24, were to be opened on a pre-set date,
following the convening of the pre-bid conference. Under the RFP, among those
eligible to participate in the bidding are manufacturers, suppliers and/or
distributors forming themselves into a joint venture. A joint venture is defined as a
group of two or more manufacturers, suppliers and/or distributors that intend to be
jointly and severally responsible or liable for a particular contract.[25]

Among the submitted bids was that of the joint venture (JV) of TIM and
Smartmatic, the former incorporated under the Corporation Code of
the Philippines. Smartmatic, on the other hand, was organized under the laws
of Barbados.[26] For a stated amount, said JV proposed to undertake the whole
automation project, inclusive of the delivery of 82,200 PCOS machines. After the
conclusion of the eligibility evaluation process, only three consortia [27] were found
and thus declared as eligible. Further on, following the opening of the passing
bidders Bid Envelope and evaluating the technical and financial proposals therein
contained, the SBAC, per its Res. No. 09-001, s.-2009, declared the above-stated
bid of the JV of TIM-Smartmatic as the single complying calculated bid.[28] As
required by the RFP, the bid envelope contained an outline of the joint ventures
back-up and continuity or contingency plans,[29] in case of a systems breakdown or
any such eventuality which shall result in the delay, obstruction or nonperformance
of the electoral process.
After declaring TIM-Smartmatic as the best complying bidder, the SBAC
then directed the joint venture to undertake post-qualification screening, and its
PCOS prototype machinesthe Smarmatic Auditable Electronic System (SAES)
1800to undergo end-to-end[30] testing to determine compliance with the pre-set
criteria.
In its Memorandum of June 01, 2009, on the Subject: Systems Evaluation
Consolidated Report and Status Report on the Post-Qualification Evaluation
Procedures, the SBAC Technical Working Group (TWG) stated that it was
undertaking a 4-day (May 27 to May 30, 2009) test evaluation of TIM and
Smartmatics proposed PCOS project machines. Its conclusion: The demo systems
presented PASSED all tests as required in the 26-item criteria specified in the
[RFP] with 100% accuracy rating.[31] The TWG also validated the eligibility, and
technical and financial qualifications of the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture.
On June 9, 2009, Comelec, upon the recommendation of its SBAC, the CAC
and other stakeholders, issued Resolution No. (Res.) 8608[32] authorizing the SBAC
to issue, subject to well-defined conditions, the notice of award and notice to
proceed in favor of the winning joint venture.

Soon after, TIM wrote Comelec expressing its desire to quit the JV
partnership. In time, however, the parties were able to patch up what TIM earlier
described as irreconcilable differences between partners.
What followed was that TIM and Smartmatic, pursuant to the Joint Venture
Agreement (JVA),[33] caused the incorporation of a joint venture corporation (JVC)
that would enter into a contract with the Comelec. On July 8, 2009, the Securities
and Exchange Commission issued a certificate of incorporation in favor of
Smartmatic TIM Corporation. Two days after, or on July 10, 2009, Comelec and
Smartmatic TIM Corporation, as provider, executed a contract [34] for the lease of
goods and services under the contract for the contract amount of PhP
7,191,484,739.48, payable as the Goods and Services are delivered and/or progress
is made in accordance [with pre-set] Schedule of Payments.[35] On the same date,
a Notice to Proceed[36] was sent to, and received by, Smartmatic TIM Corporation.
Meanwhile, or on July 9, 2009, petitioners interposed the instant recourse
which, for all intents and purposes, impugns the validity and seeks to nullify the
July 10, 2009 Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM Corporation automation contract adverted
to. Among others, petitioners pray that respondents be permanently enjoined from
implementing the automation project on the submission that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMELEC AND COMELEC-SBAC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AWARDING THE 2010
ELECTIONS
AUTOMATION
PROJECT
TO
PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TIM AND SMARTMATIC FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
x x x COMELEC DID NOT CONDUCT ANY PILOT TESTING
OF THE x x x PCOS MACHINES OFFERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, IN VIOLATION
OF [RA] 8436 (AS AMENDED BY [RA] 9369)
THE [PCOS] MACHINES [THUS] OFFERED BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS x x x DO NOT SATISFY THE MINIMUM
SYSTEM CAPABILITIES SET BY [RA] NO. 8436 (AS
AMENDED BY [RA] 9369).
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS x x x DID NOT SUBMIT THE
REQUIRED DOCUMENTS DURING THE BIDDING
PROCESS THAT SHOULD ESTABLISH THE DUE
EXISTENCE, COMPOSITION, AND SCOPE OF THEIR JOINT

VENTURE, IN VIOLATION OF THE SUPREME COURTS

HOLDING IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. 159139, Jan.
13, 2004).
THERE WAS NO VALID JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
[JVA] BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC
AND TIM DURING THE BIDDING, IN VIOLATION OF THE
SUPREME
COURTS
HOLDING
IN INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
COMELEC x x x WHICH REQUIRES A JOINT VENTURE TO
INCLUDE A COPY OF ITS [JVA] DURING THE BIDDING.
THE ALLEGED JOINT VENTURE COMPOSED OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS SMARTMATIC AND TIM, DOES NOT
SATISFY THE SUPREME COURTS DEFINITION OF A JOINT
VENTURE IN INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION
OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COMELEC x x x WHICH
REQUIRES A COMMUNITY OF INTEREST IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF THE SUBJECT MATTER.

Filed as it was before contract signing, the petition understandably did not
implead Smartmatic TIM Corporation, doubtless an indispensable party to these
proceedings, an incident that did not escape Comelecs notice.[37]
As a preliminary counterpoint, either or both public and private respondents
question the legal standing or locus standi of petitioners, noting in this regard that
the petition did not even raise an issue of transcendental importance, let alone a
constitutional question.
As an additional point, respondents also urge the dismissal of the petition on
the ground of prematurity, petitioners having failed to avail themselves of the
otherwise mandatory built-in grievance mechanism under Sec. 55 in relation to
Sec. 58 of RA 9184, also known as the Government Procurement Reform Act, as
shall be discussed shortly.
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS

The Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds

advanced by respondents.
Locus Standi and Prematurity
It is true, as postulated, that to have standing, one must, as a rule, establish
having suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the alleged illegal
government conduct; that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and
that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [38] The prescription on
standing, however, is a matter of procedure. Hence, it may be relaxed, as the Court
has often relaxed the rule for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens and
taxpayers, when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount
public interest.[39] As we wrote in Chavez v. PCGG,[40] where issues of public
importance are presented, there is no necessity to show that the suitor has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the
requisite injury is assumed.
Petitioners counsel, when queried, hedged on what specific constitutional
proscriptions or concepts had been infringed by the award of the subject
automation project to Smartmatic TIM Corporation, although he was heard to say
that our objection to the system is anchored on the Constitution itself a
violation [sic] of secrecy of voting and the sanctity of the ballot.[41] Petitioners also
depicted the covering automation contract as constituting an abdication by the
Comelec of its election-related mandate under the Constitution, which is to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections. Worse still, according
to the petitioners, the abdication, with its anti-dummy dimension, is in favor of a
foreign corporation that will be providing the hardware and software requirements.
[42]
And when pressed further, petitioners came out with the observation that, owing
in part to the sheer length of the ballot, the PCOS would not comply with Art. V,
Sec. 2 of the Constitution[43] prescribing secrecy of voting and sanctity of the
ballot.[44]

There is no doubt in our mind, however, about the compelling significance

and the transcending public importance of the one issue underpinning this petition:
the successand the far-reaching grim implications of the failureof the nationwide
automation project that will be implemented via the challenged automation
contract.
The doctrinal formulation may vary, but the bottom line is that the Court
may except a particular case from the operations of its rules when the demands of
justice so require.[45] Put a bit differently, rules of procedure are merely tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. [46] Accordingly, technicalities and
procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand in the way, if the ends of justice
would not be subserved by a rigid adherence to the rules of procedure. [47] This
postulate on procedural technicalities applies to matters of locus standi and the
presently invoked principle of hierarchy of courts, which discourages direct resort
to the Court if the desired redress is within the competence of lower courts to
grant. The policy on the hierarchy of courts, which petitioners indeed failed to
observe, is not an iron-clad rule. For indeed the Court has full discretionary power
to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actions
for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling
reasons[48]or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised
in the petition.[49]
The exceptions that justify a deviation from the policy on hierarchy appear
to obtain under the premises. The Court will for the nonce thus turn a blind eye to
the judicial structure intended, first and foremost, to provide an orderly
dispensation of justice.

Hierarchy of Courts
At this stage, we shall dispose of another peripheral issue before plunging
into the core substantive issues tendered in this petition.

Respondents contend that petitioners should have availed themselves of the

otherwise mandatory protest mechanism set forth in Sections 55 and 58 of the
procurement law (RA 9184) and the counterpart provisions found in its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)-A before seeking judicial
remedy. Insofar as relevant, Sec. 55 of RA 9184 provides that decisions of the bids
and awards committee (BAC) in all stages of procurement may be protested, via
a verified position paper, to the head of the procuring agency. On the other hand,
the succeeding Sec. 58 states that court action may be resorted to only after the
protest contemplated in Sec. 55 shall have been completed. Petitioners except. As
argued, the requirement to comply with the protest mechanism, contrary to what
may have been suggested in Infotech, is imposed on the bidders.[50]
Petitioners position is correct. As a matter of common sense, only a bidder is
entitled to receive a notice of the protested BAC action. Only a losing bidder
would be aggrieved by, and ergo would have the personality to challenge, such
action. This conclusion finds adequate support from the ensuing provisions of the
aforesaid IRR-A:
55.2. The verified position paper shall contain the following
documents:
a) The name of bidder;
b) The office address of the bidder x x x.

SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
We now turn to the central issues tendered in the petition which, in terms of
subject matter, revolved around two concerns, viz: (1) the Joint Venture Agreement
(JVA) of Smartmatic and TIM; and (2) the PCOS machines to be used. Petitioners
veritably introduced another issue during the oral arguments, as amplified in their
memorandum, i.e. the constitutionality and statutory flaw of the automation
contract itself. The petition-in-intervention confined itself to certain features of the
PCOS machines.

The Joint Venture Agreement: Its Existence and Submission

The issue respecting the existence and submission of the TIM-Smartmatic
JVA does not require an extended disquisition, as repairing to the records would
readily provide a satisfactory answer. We note in fact that the petitioners do not
appear to be earnestly pressing the said issue anymore, as demonstrated by their
counsels practically cavalier discussion thereof during the oral argument. When
reminded, for instance, of private respondents insistence on having in fact
submitted their JVA dated April 23, 2009, petitioners counsel responded as
follows: We knew your honor that there was, in fact, a joint venture agreement
filed. However, because of the belated discovery that [there] were irreconcilable
differences, we then made a view that this joint venture agreement was a sham, at
best pro forma because it did not contain all the required stipulations in order to
evidence unity of interest x x x.[51]
Indeed, the records belie petitioners initial posture that TIM and Smartmatic,
as joint venture partners, did not include in their submitted eligibility envelope a
copy of their JVA. The SBACs Post Qualification Evaluation Report
(Eligibility) on TIM-Smartmatic, on page 10, shows the following entry: Valid
Joint Venture Agreement, stating among things, that the members are jointly and
severally liable for the whole obligation, in case of joint venture Documents
verified compliance.[52]
Contrary to what the petitioners posit, the duly notarized JVA, as couched,
explained the nature and the limited purpose [53] of the joint venture and expressly
defined, among other things, the composition, scope, and the 60-40 capital
structure of the aggroupment.[54] The JVA also contains provisions on the
management[55] and division of profits.[56] Article 3[57] of the JVA delineates the

respective participations and responsibilities of the joint venture partners in the

automation project.
Given the foregoing perspective, the Court is at a loss to understand how
petitioners can assert that the Smartmatic-TIM consortium has failed to prove its
joint venture existence and/or to submit evidence as would enable the Comelec to
know such items as who it is dealing with, which between the partners has control
over the decision-making process, the amount of investment to be contributed by
each partner, the parties shares in the profits and like details. Had petitioners only
bothered to undertake the usual due diligence that comes with good judgment and
examined the eligibility envelope of the Smartmatic-TIM joint venture, they would
have discovered that their challenge to and arguments against the joint venture and
its JVA have really no factual basis.
It may be, as petitioners observed, that the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture
remained an unincorporated aggroupment during the bid-opening and evaluation
stages. It ought to be stressed, however, that the fact of non-incorporation was
without a vitiating effect on the validity of the tender offers. For the bidding
ground rules, as spelled out primarily in the RFP and the clarificatory bid bulletins,
does not require, for bidding purposes, that there be an incorporation of the bidding
joint ventures or consortiums. In fact, Bid Bulletin Nos. 19 and 20 recognize the
existence and the acceptability of proposals of unincorporated joint ventures. In
response to a poser, for example, regarding the 60% Filipino ownership
requirement in a joint venture arrangement, the SBAC, in its Bid Bulletin No. 22,
stated: In an unincorporated joint venture, determination of the required Filipino
participation may be made by examining the terms and conditions of the [JVA]
and other supporting financial documents submitted by the joint venture.
(Emphasis ours.) Petitioners, to be sure, have not shown that incorporation is part
of the pass/fail criteria used in determining eligibility.

Petitioners have made much of the Courts ruling in Information Technology

Foundation of the Philippines [Infotech] v. Comelec,[58] arguing in relation thereto
that the partnership of Smartmatic and TIM does not meet the Courts definition of
a joint venture which requires community of interest in the performance of the
subject matter.
Petitioners invocation of Infotech is utterly misplaced. Albeit Infotech and this case
are both about modernizing the election process and bidding joint ventures, the
relevant parallelism ends there. Cast as they are against dissimilar factual milieu,
one cannot plausibly set Infotech side with and contextually apply to this
case the ratio of Infotech. Suffice it to delve on the most glaring of differences.
In Infotech, the winning bid pertained to the consortium of Mega Pacific, a
purported joint venture. Extant records, however, do not show the formation of
such joint venture, let alone its composition. To borrow from the ponencia of then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Artemio Panganiban, there is no sign whatsoever of any
[JVA], consortium agreement [or] memorandum agreement x x x executed among
the members of the purported consortium.[59] There was in fine no evidence to
show that the alleged joint venture partners agreed to constitute themselves into a
single entity solidarily responsible for the entirety of the automation contract.
Unlike the purported Mega Pacific consortium in Infotech, the existence in this
case of the bidding joint venture of Smarmatic and TIM is properly documented
and spread all over the bid documents. And to stress, TIM and Smartmatic, in their
JVA, unequivocally agreed between themselves to perform their respective
undertakings. And over and beyond their commitments to each other, they
undertook to incorporate, if called for by the bidding results, a JVC that shall be
solidarily liable with them for any actionable breach of the automation contract.
In Infotech, the Court chastised the Comelec for dealing with an entity, the full
identity of which the poll body knew nothing about. Taking a cue from this
holding, petitioners tag the TIM-Smartmatic JVA as flawed and as one that would
leave the Comelec hanging for the non-inclusion, as members of the joint venture,
of three IT providers. The three referred to are Jarltech International, Inc.
(Jarltech), a subsidiary of Smartmatic that manufactures the Smartmatic voting
machines; Dominion Voting Systems (Domino), the inventor of said PCOS

machines; and 2GO Transportation System Corporation (2GO), the subcontractor

responsible for the distribution of the PCOS machines throughout the country.
Petitioners beef against the TIM-Smartmatic JVA is untenable. First off, the
Comelec knows the very entities whom they are dealing with, which it can hold
solidary liable under the automation contract, should there be contract violation.
Secondly, there is no requirement under either RA 8436, as amended, or the RFP,
that all the suppliers, manufacturers or distributors involved in the transaction
should be part of the joint venture. On the contrary, the Instruction to Biddersas
petitioners themselves admit[60]allows the bidder to subcontract portions of the
goods or services under the automation project.[61]
To digress a bit, petitioners have insisted on the non-existence of a bona fide JVA
between TIM and Smarmatic. Failing to gain traction for their indefensible posture,
they would thrust on the Court the notion of an invalid joint venture due to the
non-inclusion of more companies in the existing TIM-Smartmatic joint venture.
The irony is not lost on the Court.
This brings us to the twin technical issues tendered herein bearing on the
PCOS machines of Smartmatic.
At its most basic, the petition ascribes grave abuse of discretion to the
Comelec for, among other things, awarding the automation project in violation of
RA 8436, as amended. Following their line, no pilot test of the PCOS technology
Smartmatic-TIM offered has been undertaken; hence, the Comelec cannot conduct
a nationwide automation of the 2010 polls using the machines thus offered. Hence,
the contract award to Smartmatic-TIM with their untested PCOS machines violated
RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, which mandates that with respect to the May
2010 elections and onwards, the system procured must have been piloted in at least
12 areas referred to in Sec. 6 of RA 8436, as amended. What is more, petitioners
assert, private respondents PCOS machines do not satisfy the minimum system
capabilities set by the same law envisaged to ensure transparent and credible
voting, counting and canvassing of votes. And as earlier narrated, petitioners would
subsequently add the abdication angle in their bid to nullify the automation
contract.

Pilot Testing Not Necessary

Disagreeing, as to be expected, private respondents maintain that there is
nothing in the applicable law requiring, as a pre-requisite for the 2010 election
automation project award, that the prevailing bidders automation system, the
PCOS in this case, be subjected to pilot testing. Comelec echoes its co-respondents
stance on pilot testing, with the added observation that nowhere in the statutory
provision relied upon are the words pilot testing used. [62] The Senates position and
its supporting arguments match those of private respondents.
The respondents thesis on pilot testing and the logic holding it together are
well taken. There can be no argument about the phrase pilot test not being found in
the law. But does it necessarily follow that a pilot test is absolutely not
contemplated in the law? We repair to the statutory provision petitioners cited as
requiring a pilot run, referring to Sec. 6 of RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369,
reading as follows:
Sec. 5. Authority to use an Automated Election System.- To carry
out the above stated-policy, the [Comelec], x x x is hereby authorized to
use an automated election system or systems in the same election in
different provinces, whether paper-based or a direct recording electronic
election system as it may deem appropriate and practical for the process
of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation and transmittal
of results of electoral exercises: Provided, that for the regular national
and local elections, which shall be held immediately after
theeffectivity of this Act, the AES shall be used in at least two highly
urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao to be chosen by the [Comelec]: Provided,further, That local
government units whose officials have been the subject of administrative
charges within sixteen (16) month prior to the May 14, 2007 elections
shall not be chosen. Provided, finally, That no area shall be chosen
without the consent of the Sanggunian of the local government unit
concerned. The term local government unit as used in this provision shall
refer to a highly urbanized city or province. In succeeding regular
national or local elections, the AES shall be implemented. (Emphasis and
underscoring added.)

RA 9369, which envisages an AES, be it paper-based or direct-recording

electronic, took effect in the second week of February 2007 or thereabout.
[63]
The regular national and local elections referred to after the effectivity of this
Act can be no other than the May 2007 regular elections, during which time the
AES shall, as the law is worded, be used in at least two highly urbanized cities and
provinces in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The Court takes judicial notice that the
May 2007 elections did not deploy AES, evidently due to the mix of time and
funding constraints.
To the petitioners, the underscored portion of the aforequoted Sec. 6 of RA
8436 is the pilot-testing provision that Comelec failed to observe.
We are not persuaded.
From the practical viewpoint, the pilot testing of the technology in question
in an actual, scheduled electoral exercise under harsh conditions would have been
the ideal norm in computerized system implementation. The underscored proviso
of Sec. 6 of RA 8436 is not, however, an authority for the proposition that the pilot
testing of the PCOS in the 2007 national elections in the areas thus specified is an
absolute must for the machines use in the 2010 national/local elections. The Court
can concede that said proviso, with respect to the May 2007 elections, commands
the Comelec to automate in at least 12 defined areas of the country. But the bottom
line is that the required 2007 automation, be it viewed in the concept of a pilot test
or not, is not a mandatory requirement for the choice of system in, or a prerequisite
for, the full automation of the May 2010 elections.
As may be noted, Sec. 6 of RA 8436 may be broken into three essential
parts, the first partaking of the nature of a general policy declaration: that Comelec
is authorized to automate the entire elections. The second part states that for the
regular national and local elections that shall be held in May 2007, Comelec shall
use the AES, with an option, however, to undertake automation, regardless of the
technology to be selected, in a limited area or, to be more precise, in at least two
highly urbanized cities and two provinces each in Luzon, Visayas, and
Mindanao to be chosen by the Comelec. On the other hand, the last part,

phrased sans reference to the May 2007 elections, commands thus: [I]nsucceeding
regular national or local elections, the [automated election system ] shall be
implemented. Taken in its proper context, the last part is indicative of the legislative
intent for the May 2010 electoral exercise to be fully automated, regardless of
whether or not pilot testing was run in the 2007 polls.
To argue that pilot testing is a condition precedent to a full automation in
2010 would doubtless undermine the purpose of RA 9369. For, as aptly observed
during the oral arguments, if there was no political exercise in May 2007, the
country would theoretically be barred forever from having full automation.
Sec. 6 of the amended RA 8436, as couched, therefore, unmistakably
conveys the idea of unconditional full automation in the 2010 elections. A
construal making pilot testing of the AES a prerequisite or condition sine qua
non to putting the system in operation in the 2010 elections is tantamount to
reading into said section something beyond the clear intention of Congress, as
expressed in the provision itself. We reproduce with approval the following
excerpts from the comment of the Senate itself:
The plain wordings of RA 9369 (that amended RA 8436)
commands that the 2010 elections shall be fully automated, and such full
automation is not conditioned on pilot testing in the May 2007 elections.
Congress merely gave COMELEC the flexibility to partially use the AES
in some parts of the country for the May 2007 elections. [64]

Lest it be overlooked, an AES is not synonymous to and ought not to be

confused with the PCOS. Sec. 2(a) of RA 8436, as amended, defines an AES as a
system using appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting,
counting, consolidating, canvassing and transmission of election results, and other
electoral processes. On the other hand, PCOS refers to a technology wherein an
optical ballot scanner, into which optical scan paper ballots marked by hand by the
voter are inserted to be counted.[65]What may reasonably be deduced from these
definitions is that PCOS is merely one of several automated voting, counting or
canvassing technologies coming within the term AES, implying in turn that the

automated election system or technology that the Comelec shall adopt in future
elections need not, as a matter of mandatory arrangement, be piloted in the
adverted two highly urbanized cities and provinces.
In perspective, what may be taken as mandatory prerequisite for the full
automation of the 2010 regular national/ local elections is that the system to be
procured for that exercise be a technology tested either here or abroad. The ensuing
Section 8 of RA 8436, as amended, says so.
SEC 12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials. To achieve the
purpose of this Act, the Commission is authorized to procure, xxx, by
purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies, equipment,
materials, software, facilities, and other services, from local or foreign
sources xxx. With respect to the May 10, 2010 elections and
succeeding electoral exercises, the system procured must have
demonstrated capability and been successfully used in prior
electoral exercise here or abroad. Participation in the 2007 pilot
exercise shall not be conclusive of the systems fitness. (Emphasis
supplied).

While the underscored portion makes reference to a 2007 pilot exercise, what it
really exacts is that, for the automation of the May 2010 and subsequent elections,
the PCOS or any AES to be procured must have demonstrated its capability and
success in either a local or a foreign electoral exercise. And as expressly declared
by the provision, participation in the 2007 electoral exercise is not a guarantee nor
is it conclusive of the systems fitness. In this regard, the Court is inclined to agree
with private respondents interpretation of the underscored portion in question: The
provision clearly conveys that the [AES] to be used in the 2010 elections need not
have been used in the 2007 elections, and that the demonstration of its capability
need not be in a previous Philippine election. Demonstration of the success and
capability of the PCOS may be in an electoral exercise in a foreign jurisdiction.
[66]
As determined by the Comelec, the PCOS system had been successfully
deployed in previous electoral exercises in foreign countries, such
asOntario, Canada; and New York, USA,[67] albeit Smartmatic was not necessarily
the system provider. But then, RA 9369 does not call for the winning bidder of the

2010 automation project and the deploying entity/provider in the foreign electoral
exercise to be one and the same entity. Neither does the law incidentally require
that the system be first used in an archipelagic country or with a topography or a
voting population similar to or approximating that of the Philippines.
At any event, any lingering doubt on the issue of whether or not full
automation of the 2010 regular elections can validly proceed without a pilot run of
the AES should be put to rest with the enactment in March 2009 of RA 9525, [68] in
which Congress appropriated PhP 11.301 billion to automate the 2010 elections,
subject to compliance with the transparency and accuracy requirements in selecting
the relevant technology of the machines, thus:
Sec. 2. Use of Funds. x x x Provided, however, That disbursement of the
amounts herein appropriated or any part thereof shall be authorized only
in strict compliance with the Constitution, the provisions of [RA] No.
9369 and other election laws incorporated in said Act as to ensure the
conduct of a free, orderly, clean, honest and credible election and shall
adopt such measures that will guaranty transparency and accuracy in
the selection of the relevant technology of the machines to be used on
May 10, 2010 automated national and local elections. (Emphasis added.)
It may safely be assumed that Congress approved the bill that eventually became
RA 9525, fully aware that the system using the PCOS machines were not piloted in
the 2007 electoral exercise. The enactment of RA 9525 is to us a compelling
indication that it was never Congress intent to make the pilot testing of a particular
automated election system in the 2007 elections a condition precedent to its use or
award of the 2010 Automation Project. The comment-in-intervention of the Senate
says as much.
Further, the highly charged issue of whether or not the 2008 ARMM
electionscovering, as NCC observed, three conflict-ridden island provincesmay be
treated as substantial compliance with the pilot test requirement must be answered
in the affirmative. No less than Senator Richard J. Gordon himself, the author of
the law, said that the system has been tried and tested in the ARMM elections last
year, so we have to proceed with the total implementation of the law.[69]
We note, though, the conflicting views of the NCC[70] and ITFP[71] on the
matter. Suffice it to state at this juncture that the system used in the 2008 ARMM

election exercise bears, as petitioners to an extent grudgingly admit, [72] a similarity

with the PCOS. The following, lifted from the Comelecs comment, is to us a fair
description of how the two systems (PCOS and CCOS) work and where the
difference lies:
xxx the elections in the [ARMM] utilized the Counting Center Optical
Scan (CCOS), a system which uses the Optical Mark Reader (OMR), the
same technology as the PCOS.
Under the CCOS, the voters cast their votes by shading or
marking the circles in the paper ballots which corresponded to the names
of their chosen candidates [like in PCOS]. Thereafter, the ballot boxes
were brought to the counting centers where they were scanned, counted
and canvassed.
xxx Under the PCOS, the counting, consolidation and canvassing of the votes
are done at the precinct level. The election results at the precincts are
then electronically transmitted to the next level, and so on. xxx PCOS
dispenses with the physical transportation of ballot boxes from the
precincts to the counting centers.[73]

Moreover, it has been proposed that a partial automation be implemented for the
May 2010 elections in accordance with Section 5 of RA 8436, as amended by RA
9369 instead of full automation. The Court cannot agree as such proposition has no
basis in law. Section 5, as worded, does not allow for partial automation. In fact,
Section 5 clearly states that the AES shall be implemented nationwide.[74] It
behooves this Court to follow the letter and intent of the law for full automation in
the May 2010 elections.
PCOS Meets Minimum Capabilities Standards
As another ground for the nullification of the automation contract, petitioners posit
the view that the PCOS machines do not satisfy the minimum system capabilities
prescribed by RA 8436, as amended. To a specific point, they suggest that the
PCOS system offered and accepted lacks the features that would assure accuracy in
the recording and reading of votes, as well as in the tabulation,
consolidation/canvassing, electronic transmission, storage results and accurate
ballot counting.[75] In this particular regard, petitioners allege that, based on

Smartmatics website, the PCOS has a margin of error of from 2% to 10%, way
beyond that of the required 99.99% accuracy in the counting of votes.[76]
The minimum system capabilities provision cited is Sec. 7 of RA 8436, as
amended, and the missing features referred to by petitioners are pars. (b) and (j). In
full, Sec. 7 of RA 8436, as amended, reads:
SEC. 6. Minimum System Capabilities. - The automated
election system must at least have the following functional capabilities:
(a) Adequate security against unauthorized access;
(b) Accuracy in recording and reading of votes as well as in the
tabulation, consolidation/canvassing, electronic transmission, and
storage of results;
(c) Error recovery in case of non-catastrophic failure of device;
(d) System integrity which ensures physical stability and functioning of
the vote recording and counting process;
(e) Provision for voter verified paper audit trail;
(f) System auditability which provides supporting documentation for
verifying the correctness of reported election results;
(g) An election management system for preparing ballots and programs
for use in the casting and counting of votes and to consolidate, report
and display election result in the shortest time possible;
(h) Accessibility to illiterates and disabled voters;
(i) Vote tabulating program for election, referendum or plebiscite;
(j) Accurate ballot counters;
(k) Data retention provision;
(l) Provide for the safekeeping, storing and archiving of physical or paper
resource used in the election process;
(m) Utilize or generate official ballots as herein defined;
(a) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether or not
the machine has registered his choice; and

(o) Configure access control for sensitive system data and

function.
In the procurement of this system, the Commission shall develop and
adopt an evaluation system to ascertain that the above minimum system
capabilities are met. The evaluation system shall be developed with the
assistance of an advisory council.
From the records before us, the Court is fairly satisfied that the Comelec has
adopted a rigid technical evaluation mechanism, a set of 26-item/check list criteria,

as will be enumerated shortly, to ensure compliance with the above minimum

systems capabilities.
The SBAC Memorandum[77] of June 03, 2009, as approved by Comelec Res. 8608,
[78]
categorically stated that the SBAC-TWG submitted its report that
TIM/Smartmatics proposed systems and machines PASSED all the end-to-end
demo tests using the aforementioned 26-item criteria, inclusive of the accuracy
rating test of at least 99.955%. As appearing in the SBAC-TWG report, the
corresponding answers/remarks to each of the 26 individual items are as herein
indicated:[79]

ITEM

REQUIREMENT

Does the system allow manual

feeding of a ballot into the PCOS
machine?
Does the system scan a ballot sheet at
the speed of at least 2.75 inches per
second?

REMARK/DESCRIPTION

Yes. The proposed PCOS machine

accepted the test ballots which were
manually fed one at a time.
Yes. A 30-inch ballot was used in this
test. Scanning the 30-inch ballot took
2.7 seconds, which translated to
11.11inches per second.
Is the system able to capture and store Yes the system captured the images of
in an encrypted format the digital
the 1,000 ballots in encrypted format.
images of the ballot for at least 2,000 Each of the 1,000 images filescontained
ballot sides (1,000 ballots, with back
the images of the front and back sides
to back printing)?
of the ballot, totaling to 2,000 ballot
side.

Is the system a fully integrated single

device as described in item no. 4 of
Component 1-B?

Does the system have a scanning

resolution of at least 200 dpi?

To verify the captured ballot images,

decrypted copies of the encrypted files
were also provided. The same were
found to be digitized representations of
the ballots cast.
Yes. The proposed PCOS is a fully
integrated single device, with built-in
printer and built-in data
communications ports (Ethernet and
USB).
Yes. A portion of a filled up marked
oval was blown up using image editor
software to reveal the number of dots

per inch. The sample image showed

200 dpi.

Does the system scan in grayscale?

Does the system require authorization

and authentication of all operators,
such as, but not limited to, usernames
and passwords, with multiple user
access levels?
Does the system have an electronic
display?

Does the system employ error

handling procedures, including, but
not limited to, the use of error
prompts and other related
instructions?

10

Does the system count the voters vote

as marked on the ballot with an
accuracy rating of at least 99.995%?

File properties of the decrypted image

file also revealed 200 dpi.
Yes. 30 shades of gray were scanned in
the test PCOS machine, 20 of which
were required, exceeding the required
4-bit/16 levels of gray as specified in
the Bid Bulletin No. 19.
Yes. The system required the use of a
security key with different sets
ofpasswords/PINs for Administrator
and Operator users.
Yes. The PCOS machine makes use of
an LCD display to show information:
if a ballot may be inserted into
the machine;
if a ballot is being processed; if
a ballot is being rejected;
on other instructions and
information to the voter/operator.
Yes. The PCOS showed error messages
on its screen whenever a ballot
is rejected by the machine and gives
instructions to the voter on what to do
next, or when there was a ballot jam
error.
Yes. The two rounds of tests were
conducted for this test using only valid
marks/shades on the ballots. 20,000
marks were required to complete this
test, with only one (1) allowable
reading error.
625 ballots with 32 marks each were
used for this test. During the
comparison of the PCOS-generated
results with the manually
prepared/predetermined results, it was
found out that there were seven (7)
marks which were inadvertently missed
out during ballot preparation by the
TWG. Although the PCOS-generated

results turned out to be 100% accurate,

the 20,000-mark was not met thereby
requiring the test to be repeated.

11

Does the system detect and reject

fake or spurious, and previously
scanned ballots?

12

Does the system scan both sides of a

ballot and in any orientation in one
pass?

13

Does the system have necessary

safeguards to determine the
authenticity of a ballot, such as, but
not limited to, the use of bar codes,
holograms, color shifting ink, micro
printing, to be provided on the ballot,
which can be recognized by the
system?

14

Are the names of the candidates preprinted on the ballot?

To prepare for other possible missed

out marks,650 ballots with (20,800
marks) were used for the next round of
test, which also yielded 100% accuracy.
Yes. This test made use of one (1)
photocopied ballot and one (1) recreated ballot. Both were rejected by
the PCOS.
Yes. Four (4) ballots with valid marks
were fed into the PCOS machine in the
four (4) portrait orientations specified
in Bid Bulletin No. 4 (either back or
front, upside down or right side up),
and all were accurately captured.
Yes. The system was able to recognize
if the security features on the ballot are
missing.
Aside from the test on the fake or
spurious ballots (Item No. 11), three (3)
test ballots with tampered bar codesand
timing marks were used and were all
rejected by the PCOS machine.
The photocopied ballot in the test for
Item No. 11 was not able to replicate
the UV ink pattern on top portion of the
ballot causing the rejection of the
ballot.
Yes. The Two sample test ballots of
different lengths were provided:
one (1) was 14 inches long while
the other was 30 inches long.
Both were 8.5 inches wide.
The first showed 108 pre-printed
candidate names for the fourteen
(14) contests/positions, including
two (2) survey questions on
gender and age group, and a
plebiscite question.

15

Does each side of the ballot sheet

accommodate at least 300 names of
candidates with a minimum font size
of 10, in addition to other mandatory
information required by law?

The other showed 609 pre-printed

candidate names, also for fourteen
(14) positions including three (3)
survey questions.
Yes. The 30-inch ballot, which was
used to test Item No. 2, contained 309
names for the national positions and
300 names for local positions. The total
pre-printed names on the ballot totaled
609.
This type of test ballot was also used
for test voting by the public,
including members of the media.

16

Does the system recognize full shade

marks on the appropriate space on the
ballot opposite the name of the
candidate to be voted for?

17

Does the system recognize partial

shade marks on the appropriate space
on the ballot opposite the name of the
candidate to be voted for?

Arial Narrow, font size 10, was used in

the printing of the candidate
names.
Yes. The ballots used for the accuracy
test (Item No. 10), which made use of
full shade marks, were also used in this
test and were accurately recognized by
the PCOS machine.
Yes. Four (4) test ballots were used
with one (1) mark each per ballot
showing the following pencil marks:
top half shade;
bottom half shade;
left half shade; and
right half shade

18

19

20

Does the system recognize check

()marks on the appropriate space on
the ballot opposite the name of the
candidate to be voted for?
Does the system recognize x marks
on the appropriate space on the ballot
opposite the name of the candidate to
be voted for?
Does the system recognize both
pencil and ink marks on the ballot?

These partial shade marks were all

recognized by the PCOS machine
Yes. One (1) test ballot with one check
() mark, using a pencil, was used for
this test.
The mark was recognized successfully.
Yes. One (1) test ballot with one x
mark, using a pencil, was used for this
test.
The mark was recognized successfully.
Yes. The 1000 ballots used in the
accuracy test (Item No. 10) were
marked using the proposed marking
pen by the bidder.

21

In a simulation of a system shut

down, does the system have error
recovery features?

A separate ballot with one (1) pencil

mark was also tested. This mark was
also recognized by the PCOS machine.
Moreover, the tests for Items No. 17, 18
and 19 were made using pencil marks
on the ballots.
Yes. Five (5) ballots were used in this
test. The power cord was pulled from
the PCOS while the 3rd ballot was in the
middle of the scanning procedure, such
that it was left hanging in the ballot
reader.
After resumption of regular power
supply, the PCOS machine was able to
restart successfully with notification to
the operator that there were two (2)
ballots already cast in the machine. The
hanging 3rd ballot was returned to the
operator and was able to be re-fed into
the PCOS machine. The marks on all
five (5) were all accurately recognized.
Yes. The PCOS was able to transmit to
the CCS during the end-to-end
demonstration using GLOBE prepaid
Internet kit.

22

Does the system have transmission

and consolidation/canvassing
capabilities?

23

Does the system generate a backup

copy of the generated reports, in a
removable data storage device?

Yes. The PCOS saves a backup copy of

the ERs, ballot images, statistical report
and audit log into a Compact Flash
(CF) Card.

24

Does the system have alternative

power sources, which will enable it to
fully operate for at least 12 hours?

Yes. A 12 bolt 18AH battery lead acid

was used in this test. The initial test had
to be repeated due to a short circuit,
after seven (7) hours from start-up
without ballot scanning. This was
explained by TIM-Smartmatic to be
caused by non-compatible wiring of the
battery to the PCOS. A smaller wire
than what is required was inadvertently
used, likening the situation to incorrect
wiring of a car battery. Two (2)
COMELEC electricians were called to
confirm TIM-Smartmatics explanation.
The PCOS machine was connected to

regular power and started successfully.

The following day, the re-test was
completed in 12 hours and 40 minutes
xxx 984 ballots were fed into the
machine. The ER, as generated by the
PCOS
was
compared
with
predetermined result, showed 100%
accuracy.
25

Is the system capable of generating

and printing reports?

26

Did the bidder successfully

demonstrate EMS, voting counting,
consolidation/canvassing and
transmission?

Yes. The PCOS prints reports via its

built-in printer which includes:
1. Initialization Report; 2. Election
Returns (ER); 3. PCOS Statistical
Report; 4. Audit Log.
Yes. An end-to-end demonstration of all
proposed systems was presented
covering: importing of election data
into the EMS; creation of election
configuration data for the PCOS and
the CCS using EMS; creation of ballot
faces using EMS; configuring the
PCOS and the CCS using the EMSgenerated election configuration file;
initialization, operation, generation of
reports and backup using the PCOS;
electronic transmission of results to the:
[1] from the PCOS to city/municipal
CCS and the central server. [2] from the
city/municipal CCS to the provincial
CCS. [3] from the provincial CCS to
the national CCS; receipt and canvass
of transmitted results: [1] by the
city/municipal CCS from the PCOS. [2]
by the provincial CCS from the
city/municipal CCS. [3] by the national
CCS from the provincial CCS; receipt
of the transmittal results by the central
server from the PCOS.

Given the foregoing and absent empirical evidence to the contrary, the
Court, presuming regularity in the performance of regular duties, takes the demotesting thus conducted by SBAC-TWG as a reflection of the capability of the
PCOS machines, although the tests, as Comelec admits,[80] were done literally in
the Palacio del Governadorbuilding, where a room therein simulated a town, the

adjoining room a city, etc. Perusing the RFP, however, the real worth of the PCOS
system and the machines will of course come after they shall have been subjected
to the gamut of acceptance tests expressly specified in the RFP, namely, the lab
test, field test, mock election test, transmission test and, lastly, the final test and
sealing procedure of all PCOS and CCS units using the actual Election Day
machine configuration.[81]
Apropos the counting-accuracy feature of the PCOS machines, petitioners
no less impliedly admit that the web page they appended to their petition, showing
a 2% to 10% failing rate, is no longer current. [82] And if they bothered to examine
the current website of Smartmatic specifically dealing with its SAES 1800, the
PCOS system it offered, they would have readily seen that the advertised accuracy
rating is over 99.99999%.[83] Moreover, a careful scrutiny of the old webpage of
Smarmatic reveals that the 2% to 10% failure rate applied to optical scanners and
not to SAES. Yet the same page discloses that the SAES has 100% accuracy.
Clearly, the alleged 2% to 10% failing rate is now irrelevant and the Court need not
belabor this and the equally irrelevant estoppel principle petitioners impose on us.
Intervenor Cuadras concern relates to the auditability of the election results.
In this regard, it may suffice to point out that PCOS, being a paper-based
technology, affords audit since the voter would be able, if need be, to verify if the
machine had scanned, recorded and counted his vote properly. Moreover, it should
also be noted that the PCOS machine contains an LCD screen, one that can be
programmed or configured to display to the voter his votes as read by the
machine. [84]
No Abdication of Comelecs Mandate and Responsibilty
As a final main point, petitioners would have the Comelec-Smartmatic-TIM
Corporation automation contract nullified since, in violation of the Constitution, it
constitutes a wholesale abdication of the poll bodys constitutional mandate for
election law enforcement. On top of this perceived aberration, the mechanism of
the PCOS machines would infringe the constitutional right of the people to the
secrecy of the ballot which, according to the petitioners, is provided in Sec. 2, Art.
V of the Constitution.[85]

The above contention is not well taken.

The first function of the Comelec under the Constitution [86]and the Omnibus
Election Code for that matterrelates to the enforcement and administration of all
laws and regulations relating to the conduct of elections to public office to
ensure a free, orderly and honest electoral exercise. And how did petitioners
come to their conclusion about their abdication theory? By acceding to Art. 3.3
of the automation contract, Comelec relinquished, so petitioners claim,
supervision and control of the system to be used for the automated elections. To
a more specific point, the loss of control, as may be deduced from the ensuing
exchanges, arose from the fact that Comelec would not be holding possession of
what in IT jargon are the public and private keys pair.
CHIEF JUSTICE: Well, more specifically are you saying that the
main course of this lost of control is the fact that SMARTMATIC holds
the public and private keys to the sanctity of this system?
ATTY. ROQUE: Yes, Your Honor, as well as the fact that they
control the program embedded in the key cost that will read their votes
by which the electorate may verify that their votes were counted.
CHIEF JUSTICE: You are saying that SMARTMATIC and not its
partner TIM who hold these public and private keys?
ATTY. ROQUE: Yes, Your Honor.

The Court is not convinced. There is to us nothing in Art 3.3 of the automation
contract, even if read separately from other stipulations and the provisions of the
bid documents and the Constitution itself, to support the simplistic conclusion of
abdication of control pressed on the Court. Insofar as pertinent, Art 3.3 reads:
3.3 The PROVIDER shall be liable for all its obligations under this Project
and the performance of portions thereof by other persons or entities not
parties to this Contract shall not relieve the PROVIDER of said
obligations and concomitant liabilities.
SMARTMATIC, as the joint venture partner with the greater track
record in automated elections, shall be in charge of the technical
aspects of the counting and canvassing software and hardware,
including transmission configuration and system integration.
SMARTMATIC shall also be primarily responsible for preventing and

troubleshooting technical problems that may arise during the elections.

(Emphasis added.)

The proviso designating Smartmatic as the joint venture partner in charge of

the technical aspect of the counting and canvassing wares does not to us translate,
without more, to ceding control of the electoral process to Smartmatic. It bears to
stress that the aforesaid designation of Smartmatic was not plucked from thin air,
as it was in fact an eligibility requirement imposed, should the bidder be a joint
venture. Part 5, par. 5.4 (e) of the Instruction to Bidders on the subject Eligible
Bidders, whence the second paragraph of aforequoted Art. 3.3 came from, reads:
5.4 A JV of two or more firms as partners shall comply with the
following requirements.
xxxx
(e) The JV member with a greater track record in automated
elections, shall be in-charge of the technical aspects of the counting and
canvassing software and hardware, including transmission configuration
and system integration

And lest it be overlooked, the RFP, which forms an integral part of the
automation contract,[87] has put all prospective bidders on notice of Comelecs intent
to automate and to accept bids that would meet several needs, among which is a
complete solutions provider which can provide effective overall nationwide project
management serviceunder COMELEC supervision and control, to ensure
effective and successful implementation of the [automation] Project.
[88]
Complementing this RFP advisory as to control of the election process is Art.
6.7 of the automation contract, providing:
6.7 Subject to the provisions of the General Instructions to be
issued by the Commission En Banc, the entire processes of
voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes
shall be conducted by COMELECs personnel and officials, and their
performance, completion and final results according to specifications
and within the specified periods shall be the shared responsibility of
COMELEC and the PROVIDER. (Emphasis added.)

But not one to let an opportunity to score points pass by, petitioners rhetorically
ask: Where does Public Respondent Comelec intend to get this large number of
professionals, many of whom are already gainfully employed abroad? [89] The
Comelec, citing Sec. 3[90] and Sec. 5 of RA 8436,[91] as amended, aptly answered
this poser in the following wise:
x x x [P]ublic respondent COMELEC, in the implementation of the
automated project, will forge partnerships with various entities in different
fields to bring about the success of the 2010 automated elections.
Public respondent COMELEC will partner with Smartmatic TIM
Corporation for the training and hiring of the IT personnel as well as for
the massive voter-education campaign. There is in fact a budget allocation
x x x for these undertakings. x x x
As regards the requirement of RA 9369 that IT-capable personnel shall be
deputized as a member of the BEI and that another IT-capable person shall
assist the BOC, public respondent COMELEC shall partner with DOST
and other agencies and instrumentalities of the government.

In not so many words during the oral arguments and in their respective
Memoranda, public and private respondents categorically rejected outright
allegations of abdication by the Comelec of its constitutional duty. The petitioners,
to stress, are strangers to the automation contract. Not one participated in the
bidding conference or the bidding proper or even perhaps examined the bidding
documents and, therefore, none really knows the real intention of the parties. As
case law tells us, the court has to ferret out the real intent of the parties. What is
fairly clear in this case, however, is that petitioners who are not even privy to the
bidding process foist upon the Court their own view on the stipulations of the
automation contract and present to the Court what they think are the parties true
intention. It is a study of outsiders appearing to know more than the parties do, but
actually speculating what the parties intended. The following is self-explanatory:

CHIEF JUSTICE: Why did you say that it did not, did you talk with the
Chairman and Commissioners of COMELEC that they failed to perform
this duty, they did not exercise this power of control?
ATTY. ROQUE : Your Honor, I based it on the fact that it was the
COMELEC in fact that entered into this contract .

CHIEF JUSTICE : Yes, but my question is did you confront the

COMELEC officials that they forfeited their power of control in over our
election process?
ATTY. ROQUE : We did not confront, your Honor. We impugned their
acts, Your Honor.[92]

Just as they do on the issue of control over the electoral process, petitioners also
anchor on speculative reasoning their claim that Smartmatic has possession and
control over the public and private keys pair that will operate the PCOS machines.
Consider: Petitioners counsel was at the start cocksure about Smartmatics control
of these keys and, with its control, of the electoral process.[93]
Several questions later, his answers had a qualifying tone:
JUSTICE NACHURA: And can COMELEC under the contract not
demand that it have access, that it be given access to and in fact generate
its own keys independently with SMARTMATIC so that it would be
COMELEC and not SMARTMATIC that would have full control of the
technology insofar as the keys are concerned xxx?
ATTY. ROQUE: I do not know if COMELEC will be in a position to
generate these keys, xxx. [94]

And subsequently, the speculative nature of petitioners position as to who

would have possession and control of the keys became apparent.
CHIEF JUSTICE: Yes, but did you check with the COMELEC who will
be holding these two keys x x x did you check with COMELEC whether
this system is correct?
ATTY.ROQUE: We have not had occasion to do so, x x x Your Honor.
xxxx
CHIEF JUSTICE: Why do you make that poor conclusion against the
COMELEC x x x May not the COMELEC hire the services of experts in
order for the institution to be able to discharge its constitutional
functions?

ATTY. ROQUE: That is true, but x x x there is too much reliance on

individuals who do not have the same kind of accountability as public
officers x x x
CHIEF JUSTICE: Are you saying that the COMELEC did not consult
with available I.T. experts in the country before it made the bidding rules
before it conducted the bidding and make the other policy judgments?
ATTY. ROQUE: Your Honor, what I am sure is that they did not confer
with the I.T. Foundation x x x.
CHIEF JUSTICE: But is that foundation the only expert, does it have a
monopoly of knowledge?[95]

The Court, to be sure, recognizes the importance of the vote-security issue

revolving around the issuance of the public and private keys pair to the Board of
Election Inspectors, including the digital signatures. The NCC comment on the
matter deserves mention, appearing to hew as it does to what appear on the
records. The NCC wrote:
The RFP/TOR used in the recent bidding for the AES to be used
in the 2010 elections specifically mandated the use of public key
cryptography. However, it was left to the discretion of the bidder to
propose an acceptable manner of utilization for approval/acceptance of
the Comelec. Nowhere in the RFP/TOR was it indicated that COMELEC
would delegate to the winning bidder the full discretion, supervision and
control over the manner of PKI [Public Key Infrastructure] utilization.

With the view we take of the automation contract, the role of Smartmatic
TIM Corporation is basically to supply the goods necessary for the automation
project, such as but not limited to the PCOS machines, PCs, electronic
transmission devices and related equipment, both hardware and software, and the
technical services pertaining to theiroperation. As lessees of the goods and the
back-up equipment, the corporation and its operators would provide assistance
with respect to the machines to be used by the Comelec which, at the end of the
day, will be conducting the election thru its personnel and whoever it deputizes.

And if only to emphasize a point, Comelecs contract is with Smartmatic

TIM Corporation of which Smartmatic is a 40% minority owner, per the JVA of
TIM and Smartmatic and the Articles of Incorporation of Smartmatic TIM
Corporation. Accordingly, any decision on the part or on behalf of Smartmatic will
not be binding on Comelec. As a necessary corollary, the board room voting
arrangement that Smartmatic and TIM may have agreed upon as joint venture
partners, inclusive of the veto vote that one may have power over the other, should
really be the least concern of the Comelec.
Parenthetically, the contention that the PCOS would infringe on the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot because, as petitioners would put it, the voter would be
confronted with a three feet long ballot, [96] does not commend itself for
concurrence. Surely, the Comelec can put up such infrastructure as to insure that
the voter can write his preference in relative privacy. And as demonstrated during
the oral arguments, the voter himself will personally feed the ballot into the
machine. A voter, if so minded to preserve the secrecy of his ballot, will always
devise a way to do so. By the same token, one with least regard for secrecy will
likewise have a way to make his vote known.
During the oral arguments, the notion of a possible violation of the AntiDummy Law cropped up, given the RFP requirement of a joint venture bidder to
be at least be 60% Filipino. On the other hand, the winning bidder, TIMSmartmatic joint venture, has Smartmatic, a foreign corporation, owning 40% of
the equity in, first, the joint venture partnership, and then in Smartmatic TIM
Corporation.
The Anti-Dummy Law[97] pertinently states:
Section 1. Penalty. In all cases in which any constitutional or
legal provision requires Philippine or any other specific citizenship
as a requisite for the exercise or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege, any citizen of the Philippines or of any other specific country
who allows his name or citizenship to be used for the purpose of evading
such provision, and any alien or foreigner profiting thereby, shall be
punished by imprisonment xxx and by a fine xxx.

SECTION 2. Simulation of minimum capital stock In all cases in

which a constitutional or legal provision requires that a corporation
or association may exercise or enjoy a right, franchise or privilege,
not less than a certain per centum of its capital must be owned
by citizens of the Philippines or any other specific country, it shall be
unlawful to falsely simulate the existence of such minimum stock or
capital as owned by such citizen for the purpose of evading such
provision. xxx
SECTION 2-A. Unlawful use, Exploitation or Enjoyment. Any
person, corporation, or association which, having in its name or under its
control, a right, franchise, privilege, property or business, the
exercise or enjoyment of which is expressly reserved by the
Constitution or the laws to citizens of the Philippines or of any other
specific country, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, permits or
allows the use, exploitation or enjoyment thereof by a person,
corporation, or association not possessing the requisites prescribed by
the Constitution or the laws of the Philippines; or leases, or in any other
way, transfers or conveys said right, franchise, privilege, property or
business to a person, corporation or association not otherwise qualified
under the Constitution xxx shall be punished by imprisonment xxx
(Emphasis added.)

The Anti-Dummy Law has been enacted to limit the enjoyment of certain
economic activities to Filipino citizens or corporations. For liability for violation of
the law to attach, it must be established that there is a law limiting or reserving the
enjoyment or exercise of a right, franchise, privilege, or business to citizens of
the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least 60 per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens. In the case at bench, the Court is not
aware of any constitutional or statutory provision classifying as a nationalized
activity the lease or provision of goods and technical services for the automation of
an election. In fact, Sec. 8 of RA 8436, as amended, vests the Comelec with
specific authority to acquire AES from foreign sources, thus:
SEC 12. Procurement of Equipment and Materials. To achieve the
purpose of this Act, the Commission is authorized to procure, xxx,
by purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition, supplies,

equipment, materials, software, facilities, and other services, from local

or foreign sources xxx. (Emphasis added.)

Petitioners cite Executive Order No. (EO) 584, [98] Series of 2006,
purportedly limiting contracts for the supply of materials, goods and commodities
to government-owned or controlled corporation, company, agency or municipal
corporation to corporations that are 60% Filipino. We do not quite see the
governing relevance of EO 584. For let alone the fact that RA 9369 is, in relation
to EO 584, a subsequent enactment and, therefore, enjoys primacy over the
executive issuance, the Comelec does fall under the category of a governmentowned and controlled corporation, an agency or a municipal corporation
contemplated in the executive order.
A view has been advanced regarding the susceptibility of the AES to
hacking, just like the voting machines used in certain precincts in Florida, USA in
the Gore-Bush presidential contests. However, an analysis of post-election reports
on the voting system thus used in the US during the period material and the AES to
be utilized in the 2010 automation project seems to suggest stark differences
between the two systems. The first relates to the Source Code, defined in RA 9369
as human readable instructions that define what the computer equipment will do.
[99]
The Source Code for the 2010 AES shall be available and opened for review by
political parties, candidates and the citizens arms or their representatives;
[100]
whereas in the US precincts aforementioned, the Source Code was alleged to
have been kept secret by the machine manufacture company, thus keeping the
American public in the dark as to how exactly the machines counted their votes.
And secondly, in the AES, the PCOS machines found in the precincts will also be
the same device that would tabulate and canvass the votes; whereas in the US, the
machines in the precincts did not count the votes. Instead the votes cast appeared to
have been stored in a memory card that was brought to a counting center at the end
of the day. As a result, the hacking and cheating may have possibly occurred at the
counting center.
Additionally, with the AES, the possibility of system hacking is very slim.
The PCOS machines are only online when they transmit the results, which would
only take around one to two minutes. In order to hack the system during this tiny
span of vulnerability, a super computer would be required. Noteworthy also is the

fact that the memory card to be used during the elections is encrypted and readonlymeaning no illicit program can be executed or introduced into the memory
card.
Therefore, even though the AES has its flaws, Comelec and Smartmatic have
seen to it that the system is well-protected with sufficient security measures in
order to ensure honest elections.
And as indicated earlier, the joint venture provider has formulated and put in
place a continuity and back-up plans that would address the understandable
apprehension of a failure of elections in case the machines falter during the actual
election. This over-all fall-back strategy includes the provisions for 2,000 spare
PCOS machines on top of the 80,000 units assigned to an equal number precincts
throughout the country. The continuity and back-up plans seek to address the
following eventualities: (1) The PCOS fails to scan ballots; (2) The PCOS scans
the ballots, but fails to print election returns (ERs); and/or (3) The PCOS prints but
fails to transmit the ERs. In the event item #1 occurs, a spare PCOS, if available,
will be brought in or, if not available, the PCOS of another precinct (PCOS 2 for
clarity), after observing certain defined requirements, [101] shall be used. Should all
the PCOS machines in the entire municipality/city fail, manual counting of the
paper ballots and the manual accomplishment of ERs shall be resorted to in
accordance with Comelec promulgated rules on appreciation of automated ballots.
[102]
In the event item #2 occurs where the PCOS machines fail to print ERs, the use
of spare PCOS and the transfer of PCOS-2 shall be effected. Manual counting of
ERs shall be resorted to also if all PCOS fails in the entire municipality. And
should eventuality #3 transpire, the following back-up options, among others, may
be availed of: bringing PCOS-1 to the nearest precinct or polling center which has
a functioning transmission facility; inserting transmission cable of functioning
transmission line to PCOS-1 and transmitting stored data from PCOS-1 using
functioning transmission facility.
The disruption of the election process due to machine breakdown or
malfunction may be limited to a precinct only or could affect an entire
municipal/city. The worst case scenario of course would be the wholesale

breakdown of the 82,000 PCOS machines. Nonetheless, even in this most extreme
case, failure of all the machines would not necessarily translate into failure of
elections. Manual count tabulation and transmission, as earlier stated, can be done,
PCOS being a paper-ballot technology. If the machine fails for whatever reason,
the paper ballots would still be there for the hand counting of the votes, manual
tabulation and transmission of the ERs. Failure of elections consequent to voting
machines failure would, in fine, be a very remote possibility.
A final consideration.
The first step is always difficult. Hardly anything works, let alone ends up
perfectly the first time around. As has often been said, if one looks hard enough, he
will in all likelihood find a glitch in any new system. It is no wonder some IT
specialists and practitioners have considered the PCOS as unsafe, not the most
appropriate technology for Philippine elections, and easily hackable, even. And the
worst fear expressed is that disaster is just waiting to happen, that PCOS would not
work on election day.
Congress has chosen the May 2010 elections to be the maiden run for full
automation. And judging from what the Court has heard and read in the course of
these proceedings, the choice of PCOS by Comelec was not a spur-of-moment
affair, but the product of honest-to-goodness studies, consultations with CAC, and
lessons learned from the ARMM 2008 automated elections. With the backing of
Congress by way of budgetary support, the poll body has taken this historic, if not
ambitious, first step. It started with the preparation of the RFP/TOR, with a list of
voluminous annexes embodying in specific detail the bidding rules and
expectations from the bidders. And after a hotly contested and, by most accounts, a
highly transparent public bidding exercise, the joint venture of a Filipino and
foreign corporation won and, after its machine hurdled the end-to-end
demonstration test, was eventually awarded the contract to undertake the
automation project. Not one of the losing or disqualified bidders questioned, at
least not before the courts, the bona fides of the bidding procedures and the
outcome of the bidding itself.

Assayed against the provisions of the Constitution, the enabling automation

law, RA 8436, as amended by RA 9369, the RFP and even the Anti-Dummy Law,
which petitioners invoked as an afterthought, the Court finds the project award to
have complied with legal prescriptions, and the terms and conditions of the
corresponding automation contract in question to be valid. No grave abuse of
discretion, therefore, can be laid on the doorsteps of respondent Comelec. And
surely, the winning joint venture should not be faulted for having a foreign
company as partner.
The Comelec is an independent constitutional body with a distinct and
pivotal role in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its awesome
functions as overseer of fair elections, administrator and lead implementor of laws
relative to the conduct of elections, it should not be stymied with restrictions that
would perhaps be justified in the case of an organization of lesser responsibility.
[103]
It should be afforded ample elbow room and enough wherewithal in devising
means and initiatives that would enable it to accomplish the great objective for
which it was createdto promote free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This is
as it should be for, too often, Comelec has to make decisions under difficult
conditions to address unforeseen events to preserve the integrity of the election and
in the process the voice of the people. Thus, in the past, the Court has steered away
from interfering with the Comelecs exercise of its power which, by law and by the
nature of its office properly pertain to it. Absent, therefore, a clear showing of
grave abuse of discretion on Comelecs part, as here, the Court should refrain from
utilizing the corrective hand of certiorari to review, let alone nullify, the acts of
that body. This gem, while not on all fours with, is lifted from, the Courts holding
in an old but oft-cited case:
x x x We may not agree fully with [the Comelecs] choice of
means, but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical matter,
and political questions must be dealt with realisticallynot from the
standpoint of pure theory [or speculation]. x x x
xxxx
There are no ready-made formulas for solving public problems.
Time and experience are necessary to evolve patterns that will serve the

ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of the laws

relative to the conduct of elections, x x x we must not by any excessive
zeal take away from the [Comelec] the initiative which by constitutional
and legal mandates properly belongs to it. Due regard to the independent
character of the Commission x x x requires that the power of this court to
review the acts of that body should, as a general proposition, be used
sparingly, but firmly in appropriate cases. [104] x x x
The Court, however, will not indulge in the presumption that nothing would
go wrong, that a successful automation election unmarred by fraud, violence, and
like irregularities would be the order of the moment on May 10, 2010. Neither will
it guarantee, as it cannot guarantee, the effectiveness of the voting machines and
the integrity of the counting and consolidation software embedded in them. That
task belongs at the first instance to Comelec, as part of its mandate to ensure clean
and peaceful elections. This independent constitutional commission, it is true,
possesses extraordinary powers and enjoys a considerable latitude in the discharge
of its functions. The road, however, towards successful 2010 automation elections
would certainly be rough and bumpy. The Comelec is laboring under very tight
timelines. It would accordingly need the help of all advocates of orderly and honest
elections, of all men and women of goodwill, to smoothen the way and assist
Comelec personnel address the fears expressed about the integrity of the system.
Like anyone else, the Court would like and wish automated elections to succeed,
credibly.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

(On official leave)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

G.R. No. 199082

July 23, 2013

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., in his
capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE and FACT-FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 199085
BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON. SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR.,
in his capacity as COMELEC Chairperson; RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO V. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM AND AUGUSTO C.
LAGMAN, in their capacity as COMELEC COMMISSIONERS; CLARO A. ARELLANO, GEORGE
C. DEE, JACINTO G. ANG, ROMEO B. FORTES AND MICHAEL D. VILLARET, in their capacity
as CHAIRPERSON AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE JOINT DOJ-COMELEC
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE ON THE 2004 AND 2007 ELECTION
FRAUD, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 199118
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairperson Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, represented by Secretary Leila M. De Lima, JOINT DOJCOMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, SENATOR AQUILINO M. PIMENTEL
III, and DOJ-COMELEC FACT FINDING TEAM, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERALTA, J.:

For resolution are the separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (GMA)1 in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo (Mike Arroyo )2 in G.R. No. 199082
praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision 3 dismissing their
petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the
Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJComelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding
Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.
For a better perspective, we briefly state the relevant factual and procedural antecedents as found
by the Court in the assailed decision, to wit:
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and
constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team (referred to as Joint Panel) on the 2004 and
2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The Joint Committee was mandated
to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the evidence gathered and the
charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team. The Fact-Finding Team, on the other hand, was
created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and testimonial evidence which can be
utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee. Pursuant to Section
74 of the Joint Order, on August 23, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated its Rules of Procedure.
In its Initial Report5 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of
the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato,
and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated.6 The Fact-Finding Team recommended, among others,
that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. (Abalos) be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral
sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South Cotabato; that GMA
and Abalos be subjected to another preliminary investigation for manipulating the election results in
Maguindanao;7 and, that Mike Arroyo be subjected to further investigation. 8 The case was docketed
as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Pimentel filed a ComplaintAffidavit 9 for Electoral Sabotage
against petitioners and twelve others, and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was
docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.
On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJComelec Case Nos. 001-2011 and 002-2011.10 On November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel,
appeared before the Joint Committee11 and respondents therein were ordered to submit their
Counter-Affidavits by November 14, 2011.12
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel. 13 The petitions were eventually consolidated.
On November 14, 2011, Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings 14 before the Joint
Committee, in view of the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, GMA filed
before the Joint Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam15 to require Senator Pimentel to furnish
her with documents referred to in his complaint-affidavit and for the production of election documents
as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA prayed that she be allowed to file her counteraffidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested documents. 16 Petitioner Abalos, for his
part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam),17 in view of the pendency
of his petition brought before the Court.

In an Order18 dated November 15, 2011, the Joint Committee denied the aforesaid motions of
petitioners. GMA, subsequently, filed a motion for reconsideration.19
On November 16, 2011, the Joint Committee promulgated a Joint Resolution which was later
indorsed to the Comelec.20 On November 18, 2011, the Comelec en banc issued a
Resolution21 approving and adopting the Joint Resolution subject to modifications. The Comelec
resolved, among others, that an information for electoral sabotage be filed against GMA and Abalos,
while the charges against Mike Arroyo be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelecs Law Department filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal
Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H. Bedol, for violation of Section 42(b)(3) of Republic Act (RA) No.
9369, amending Section 27 (b) of RA 6646, docketed as Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432CR.22 The case was raffled to Branch 112 and the corresponding Warrant of Arrest was issued which
was served on GMA on the same day.23
On November 18, 2011, GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam 24 with
leave to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer
issuance of a warrant of arrest and a hold departure order, and to proceed to judicial determination
of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam 25 praying
that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC, nonetheless, issued a Warrant for
her arrest which was duly served. GMA was later arraigned and she entered a plea of "not guilty."
She was, for some time, on hospital arrest but was able to obtain temporary liberty when her motion
for bail was granted. At present, she is again on hospital arrest by virtue of a warrant issued in
another criminal case.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED.
Comelec Resolution No. 9266 dated August 2, 2011, Joint Order No. 001-2011 dated August 15,
2011, and the Fact- Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID.
However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election
Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
In view of the constitutionality of the Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in
accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.
Let the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, where the criminal cases
for electoral sabotage against petitioners GMA and Abalos are pending, proceed with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.26
Hence, these motions for reconsideration.
Issues
Mike Arroyo reiterates his arguments on the independence of the Comelec as basis in nullifying the
subject joint DOJ-Comelec resolutions. Echoing Justice Arturo Brion in his Dissenting and

Concurring Opinion,27 Mike Arroyo insists that the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the
decisional independence of the Comelec.28
Mike Arroyo also maintains that the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when
deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction.29 Finally, as has been repeatedly
pointed out in his earlier pleadings before the Court, Mike Arroyo claims that the proceedings
involving the electoral sabotage case were rushed because of pressures from the executive branch
of the government.30
For her part, GMA claims that in availing of the procedural remedies available, she merely exercised
her earnest efforts to defend herself and should not have been deemed by the Court as acts which
purportedly tend to demonstrate that she either waived or forfeited her right to submit her counteraffidavit and countervailing evidence.31 Citing several cases decided by the Court, she likewise faults
the Court in not upholding her right to ask for additional time within which to submit her counteraffidavit and countervailing evidence.32 GMA highlights that the subject Comelec Resolution creating
the Joint Panel is different from the previous Comelec resolutions requesting the DOJ Secretary to
assign prosecutors to assist the Comelec, as the latter emphasize the role of the DOJ as deputized
agency in the conduct of preliminary investigation. She maintains that it is the Comelec and not the
Joint Committee that has the primary, if not exclusive, authority to conduct preliminary investigation
of election cases.33
In their Consolidated Comment,34 respondents defend the creation of the Joint Committee and argue
that it does not undermine the independence of the Comelec as a constitutional body because it is
still the Comelec that ultimately determines probable cause.35 As to the conduct of the preliminary
investigation, respondents maintain that no rights were violated as GMA was afforded the
opportunity to defend herself, submit her counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence. 36 They,
thus, consider GMAs claim of availing of the remedial measures as "delaying tactics" employed to
thwart the investigation of charges against her by the Joint Committee. 37
The Courts Ruling
Clearly from the above discussion, movants raise issues that have been thoroughly explained by the
Court in the assailed decision. The issues were all addressed and the explanation was exhaustive,
thus, we find no reason to disturb the Courts conclusions.
At any rate, if only to address the motions of the movants herein and to put an end to the questions
attached to the creation of the Joint Panel and, consequently, to the performance of their assigned
tasks, we hereby reiterate our findings and conclusions made in the assailed decision.
This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue of whether the Comelec has the
exclusive power to investigate and prosecute cases of violations of election laws. In Barangay
Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) Party-List v. Commission on
Elections,38 the constitutionality of Section 4339 of RA 936940 had already been raised by petitioners
therein and addressed by the Court. While recognizing the Comelecs exclusive power to investigate
and prosecute cases under Batas Pambansa Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code, the Court
pointed out that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not have such intention. This exclusivity is
thus a legislative enactment that can very well be amended by Section 43 of RA 9369. Therefore,
under the present law, the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government, such as the
DOJ, now exercise concurrent jurisdiction in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses.
Indeed, as aptly pointed out by GMA, there is a discrepancy between Comelec Resolution No.
346741 dated January 12, 2001 and Joint Order No. 001-2011, dated August 15, 2011, creating and

constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases. However, GMA seemed to miss the date when these two
resolutions were promulgated by the Comelec. It is noteworthy that Comelec Resolution No. 3467
was issued when Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code was still effective, while Joint Order No.
001-2011 as well as Comelec Resolution Nos. 873342 and 905743 mentioned in the assailed decision
but missed out by GMA in her motion, were issued during the effectivity of Section 43 of RA 9369,
giving the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government the concurrent jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute election offenses. This amendment paved the way for the discrepancy. In
Comelec Resolution No. 3467, the Comelec maintained the continuing deputation of prosecutors
and the Comelec Law Department was tasked to supervise the investigatory and prosecutory
functions of the task force pursuant to the mandate of the Omnibus Election Code. However, with the
amendment, the Comelec likewise changed the tenor of the later resolutions to reflect the new
mandate of the Comelec and other prosecuting arms of the government now exercising concurrent
jurisdiction. Thus, the Comelec Law Department and the Office of the Chief State Prosecutor of the
DOJ were tasked to jointly supervise the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the ComelecDOJ Task Force. Considering, therefore, that the later resolutions, including Joint Order No. 0012011, were issued pursuant to Section 43 of RA 9369 amending Section 265 of BP 881 which was
declared "constitutional" in Banat, there is no reason for us to declare otherwise. To maintain the
previous role of other prosecuting arms of the government as mere deputies despite the amendment
would mean challenging Section 43 of RA 9369 anew which has already been settled in Banat.
To be sure, the creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent
jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law. As we explained in our September 18, 2012
Decision:
x x x The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject
matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise
of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a
complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the
same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by
the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or
agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others.
xxxx
None of these problems would likely arise in the present case. The Comelec and the DOJ
themselves agreed that they would exercise their concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the
preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis of two complaints the initial report of the
Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator Pimentel both complaints were filed with the Joint
Committee. Consequently, the complaints were filed with and the preliminary investigation was
conducted by only one investigative body. Thus, we find no reason to disallow the exercise of
concurrent jurisdiction jointly by those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given
the magnitude of the crimes allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation
also serves to maximize the resources and manpower of both the Comelec and the DOJ for the
prompt disposition of the cases.44
Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included
a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding
probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.45 With more reason, therefore, that we cannot consider the creation of

the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelecs independence enshrined in the 1987
Constitution.
Finally, we focus on the validity of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Joint Committee.
The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under both
Rules,46 the respondent shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other
supporting documents relied upon for his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena,
with the complaint and supporting affidavits and documents.47Also in both Rules, respondent is given
the right to examine evidence, but such right of examination is limited only to the documents or
evidence submitted by complainants which she may not have been furnished and to copy them at
her expense.48
As to the alleged denial of GMAs right to examine documents, we maintain that no right was violated
in view of the limitation of such right as set forth above. We reiterate our explanation in the assailed
decision, to wit:
While it is true that Senator Pimentel referred to certain election documents which served as bases
in the allegations of significant findings specific to the protested municipalities involved, there were
no annexes or attachments to the complaint filed. As stated in the Joint Committees Order dated
November 15, 2011 denying GMAs Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam, Senator Pimentel was ordered to
furnish petitioners with all the supporting evidence. However, Senator Pimentel manifested that he
was adopting all the affidavits attached to the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report. Therefore, when
GMA was furnished with the documents attached to the Initial Report, she was already granted the
right to examine as guaranteed by the Comelec Rules of Procedure and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Those were the only documents submitted by the complainants to the Committee. If
there are other documents that were referred to in Senator Pimentels complaint but were not
submitted to the Joint Committee, the latter considered those documents unnecessary at that point
(without foreclosing the relevance of other evidence that may later be presented during the trial) as
the evidence submitted before it were considered adequate to find probable cause against her. x x
x49
1wphi1

Neither was GMAs right violated when her motion for extension of time within which to submit her
counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence was consequently denied. The Rules use the term
"shall" in requiring the respondent to submit counter-affidavit and other countervailing evidence
within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena. It is settled that the use of the word "shall" which
is a word of command, underscores the mandatory character of the rule. 50 As in any other rule,
though, liberality in the application may be allowed provided that the party is able to present a
compelling justification for the non-observance of the mandatory rules. In the 2008 Revised Manual
for Prosecutors, investigating prosecutors allow or grant motions or requests for extension of time to
submit counter-affidavits when the interest of justice demands that respondent be given reasonable
time or sufficient opportunity to engage the services of counsel; examine voluminous records
submitted in support of the complaint or undertake research on novel, complicated or technical
questions or issues of law and facts of the case.51
In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit within the prescribed period
because she needed to examine documents mentioned in Senator Pimentels complaint-affidavit. It
appeared, however, that said documents were not submitted to the Joint Committee and the only
supporting documents available were those attached to the Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team.
Admittedly, GMA was furnished those documents. Thus, at the time she asked for the extension of
time within which to file her counter-affidavit, she very well knew that the documents she was asking

were not in the record of the case. Obviously, she was not furnished those documents because they
were not submitted to the Joint Committee. Logically, she has no right to examine said documents.
We cannot, therefore, fault the Joint Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to
file counter-affidavit as there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the period
she was earlier required to follow.
And as we held in the assailed decision:
There might have been overzealousness on the part of the Joint Committee in terminating the
investigation, endorsing the Joint Resolution to the Comelec for approval, and in filing the
information in court.
However, speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasijudicial officer cannot per se be
instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions. The orderly administration of justice
remains the paramount consideration with particular regard to the peculiar circumstances of each
case. To be sure, petitioners were given the opportunity to present countervailing evidence. Instead
of complying with the Joint Committees directive, several motions were filed but were denied by the
Joint Committee. Consequently, petitioners right to submit counter-affidavit and countervailing
evidence was forfeited. Taking into account the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases
and following the procedures set forth in the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, the Joint Committee finally reached its conclusion and referred the case to the Comelec.
The latter, in turn, performed its task and filed the information in court. Indeed, petitioners were given
the opportunity to be heard. They even actively participated in the proceedings and in fact filed
several motions before the Joint Committee. Consistent with the constitutional mandate of speedy
disposition of cases, unnecessary delays should be avoided. 52
Finally, in our assailed decision, we already took judicial notice that not only did GMA enter a plea of
"not guilty," she also filed a Motion for Bail and after due hearing, it was granted. Apparently, she
benefited from the RTC Order giving her temporary liberty. In filing the motion before the RTC and
actively participating therein, she has chosen to seek judicial remedy before the RTC where the
electoral sabotage case is pending instead of the executive remedy of going back to the Joint
Committee for the submission of her counter-affidavit and countervailing evidence. Besides, as
thoroughly discussed in the assailed decision, the irregularity or even the absence of preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the information filed against her.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

(Dissenting Opinion)
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 845-867.

Rollo (G.R. No. 199082), pp. 1155-1174.

Id. at 1188-1247.

Section 7. Rules of Procedure. Within forty-eight (48) hours from the issuance of this Joint
Order, the Committee shall meet and craft its rules of procedure as may be complementary
to the respective rules of DOJ and Comelec, and submit the same to the Secretary of Justice
and the Comelec En Banc for approval within five (5) days from such initial meeting.
4

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 58-143.

Id. at 124.

Id. at 132-134.

Id. at 137.

Rollo (G.R. No. 199085), pp. 162-194.

10

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), p. 316.

11

Id. at 17.

12

Rollo (G.R. No. 199082), p. 21.

13

Refers to the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team.

14

Rollo (G.R. No. 199082), pp. 158-161.

15

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 250-259.

16

Id. at 257.

17

Rollo (G.R. No. 199085), pp. 302-306.

18

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 260-264.

19

Id. at 224.

20

Id. at 318.

21

Id. at 265-273.

22

Id. at 321.

23

Id. at 226.

24

Id. at 274-280.

25

Id. at 439-451.

26

Id. at 756-757. (Emphasis in the original)

27

Rollo (G.R. No. 199082), pp. 1106-1146.

28

Id. at 1161.

29

Id. at 1162.

30

Id. at 1163

31

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 850-854.

32

Id. at 854-857.

33

Id. at 860-862.

34

Id. at 902-932.

35

Id. at 906-911.

36

Id. at 911-913.

37

Id. at 913.

38

G.R. No. 177508, August 7, 2009, 595 SCRA 477.

Section 43. Section 265 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
39

"SEC. 265. Prosecution. The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the
government, to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same."
An Act Amending Republic Act No. 8436, Entitled "An Act Authorizing the Commission on
Elections to Use an Automated Election System in the May 11, 1998 National or Local
Elections and in Subsequent National and Local Electoral Exercises, to Encourage
Transparency, Credibility, Fairness and Accuracy of Elections, Amending for the Purpose
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as Amended, Republic Act No. 7166 and Other Related Election
Laws, Providing Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes." Approved on 23 January 2007.
40

"In the Matter of Requesting the Honorable Secretary of Justice to Assign Prosecutors as
Members of a Special Task Force to Assist the Commission in the Investigation and
Prosecution of Election Offenses in the May 14, 2001 National and Local Elections and
Reiterating the Continuing Deputation of Prosecutors under Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure."
41

"In the Matter of Requesting the Honorable Secretary of Justice to Assign Prosecutors as
Members of a Special Task Force Created by the Commission to Conduct the Investigation
and Prosecution of Election Offenses in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and
Local Elections"
42

"In the Matter of Requesting the Honorable Secretary of Justice to Assign Prosecutors as
Members of a Special Task Force to Assist the Commission in the Investigation and
Prosecution of Elections Offenses in Connection with the October 25, 2010 Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections"
43

44

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 734-736. (Citations omitted)

45

Id. at 733.

46

Section 3 (c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
(c) Within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena with the complaint and
supporting affidavits and documents, the respondent shall submit his counter-

affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his
defense. x x x
***
Section 6 (a), Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, on the other hand,
provides:
(a) If on the basis of the complaint, affidavits and the supporting evidence, the
investigating officer finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, he shall recommend
the dismissal of the complaint and shall follow the procedure prescribed in Section 8
(c) of this Rule. Otherwise, he shall issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching
thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents giving
said respondent ten (10) days from receipt within which to submit counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents. The respondent shall have the right to examine all
other evidence submitted by the complainant.
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 112, Section 3 (c) and Comelec Rules of
Procedure, Rule 34, Section 6 (a).
47

48

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), p. 746.

49

Id. at 746-747. (Citations omitted)

50

Tan v. Link, G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008, 573 SCRA 479, 490.

51

2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, p. 89.

52

Rollo (G.R. No. 199118), pp. 750-751. (Citations omitted)

G.R. No. 207264

October 22, 2013

REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is
upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination
as regards her qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of
the HRET to solely and exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC
Resolutions for having denied Petitioner her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a
qualification not otherwise required by the constitution." 1 (as originally underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly
proclaimed winner and who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the lone congressional district of Marinduque." 2
Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is
a duly proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of
Representatives, all questions regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The
crucial question is whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated,
was there basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?

Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013.
Without the proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent
oath of office, there can be no valid and effective assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy that before the proclamation
of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of
petitioner's lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14
May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's
qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives. x x x As the point
has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the basis of her due
proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here
repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the
COMELEC En Banc has already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider
the decision o the COMELEC First Division that CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of
candidacy.
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of
petitioner's certificate o candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation.
On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been removed, there was not even any attempt to remove
it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may
be removed. Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En
Bane shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a
restraining order that will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier
to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That did not happen. Petitioner did not
move to have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being
proclaimed. Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy
has been ordered cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding
against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed a restraining order from the Supreme Court to
avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision adverse to her became
executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative. She
would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which
would allow her proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated
possibility of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and
after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there was not even an attempt at the legal remedy,
clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What petitioner did was to "take the law
into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC En Bane
decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.

4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18 in
the provision that the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND
EXECUTORY after five days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."
On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision, unrestrained, moves from promulgation into
becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5 of Rule 18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a
division shall be made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon
the parties or their attorneys personally or by registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date of its
promulgation on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she in fact
received a copy of the decision on 16 May 20 13.4 On that date, she had absolutely no
reason why she would disregard the available legal way to remove the restraint on her
proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two days thereafter. The
utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that her
proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative
of bad faith on the part of the petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation as
the very reason to support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it is the HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the
issue of her qualifications for office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she
directs, as well as in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her procured
proclamation that petitioner nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc
and pre-empts any Supreme Court action on the COMELEC decision. In other words,
petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and judicial actions thereon, past
and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the congressional seat that
she sought to be a candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the
impermissibility of the objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of
Representatives by virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the
existing legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has
exclusive jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives.
That the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives is a written constitutional
provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the
House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful winner in
the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's
certificate of candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of
petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully
litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May
2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision sealed
the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for
Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The
bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court
within five days from 14 May 2013.

9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the
COMELEC First Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her
baseless proclamation on 18 May 2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become
valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the Supreme Court regarding the decision of
the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was indispensably needed, not to
legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with the Supreme
Court decision as basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action for
a writ of Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules and
principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard summarily.
The nature of the proceedings is best indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special
Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the Commission may designate any
of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the case and to receive
evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the
proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties
may, after due notice, be required to submit their position paper together with
affidavits, counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence; x x x and that this
provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing and reception of evidence
are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x x.
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
because of passion or hostility.6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of the
COMELEC summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme Court's
authority over the FINAL COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's
submission before the Court should be adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition of 25
June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of
"newly-discovered evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in
evidence. She assails the admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends that there was
a violation of her right to due process of law because she was not given the opportunity to question
and present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.

It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of
procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure shall be liberally construed in order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission. In
view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel certificate of
candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was
filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of
five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the
opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in
its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a
party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC
First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law
requires that she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements.
Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her
American citizenship, contending that it is petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the
USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7,
2013, however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she
continues to use until June 30 2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden
now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent
utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her
COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter,
made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen
and is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines."
(Emphasis in the original.)

Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC,
respondent submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a
US passport, and that her status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No.
9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner submitted
no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of R.A.
No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that
she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen,
thus the requirements of R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that
she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with
rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's explanation. If petitioner
executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225
applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the
COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012.
1wphi1

Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, to this effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of
office as Provincial Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The reference
to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what is already part of the records and
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that
was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of questions
-Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she
did, why did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an
admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner
contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial
Administrator of Marinduque, she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this
Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be
considered compliance with Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules Governing
Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised
Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance
in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship.
Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET
insofar as the petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The
COMELEC covers the matter of petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its
cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions that determines who can be legally

proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a continuation of the
proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before the
Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave
abuse of discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any
certificate cancellation matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s
constitutional authority opens, over the qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only
upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and unavoidable step towards such
membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of the House of
Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by
the proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET
proceedings is a regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the
Member of the House. It must be made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no
hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in the House because there is such a
representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till termination. Such
representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of
cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that
representative. And this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit
in the House in representation of Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the
qualifications of the Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be
attributed, as the dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June
2013. It was not done to prevent the exercise by the HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite
the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition was done to pave the way for the
unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The petitioner can very well
invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of
Representatives.8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was contained
in a letter to the members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to the
Court. The ponente now seeks the Courts approval to have the explanation published as it is now
appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in
order to remind petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties,
but continues until the case is terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction
vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition.
Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal of the petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has
legal consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative
and nullify the Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against
trifling with court processes. Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot
withdraw her petition to erase the ruling adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she
designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy of the law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed.
Entry of Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
See Separate Concurring Opinion
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
See Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

(NO PART)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

See: Dissent.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

No Part
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

No part
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
Associate Justice

See Concurring opinion

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

I join J. Carpio in his Dissent

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

No part
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

No Part
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

See dissenting opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
*

On official leave.

Rollo, p. 325.

Id. at 9.

"The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final (or
'executory' as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order
is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in
respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are
and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground,
for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended,
as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is
concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties' next
move (which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution
of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and more distinctive term,
'final and executory. ' See Investments Inc v Court o Appeals 231 Phil. 302, 307 (1987).
3

Thus, when the COMELEC En Bane rendered its Resolution dated 14 May 2013,
such was a final judgment the issue of petitioner's eligibility was already definitively
disposed of and there was no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications
to run for office, and the COMELEC's task of ruling on the propriety of the
cancellation of petitioner's COC has ended. This final judgment, by operation of Sec.
3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, became final and executory on 19
May 2013, or five days from its promulgation, as it was not RJ restrained by the
Supreme Court. See rollo pp. 163-165.
4

Rollo p. 5.

Parenthetically, the surrounding facts of the case show that the Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBOC), as well as the parties, already had notice of the COMELEC En Bane
Resolution dated 14 May 2013 before petitioner was proclaimed. As alleged in the Comment
on the Motion for Reconsideration, and which was not disputed by petitioner, the COMELEC
En Bane found that On May 15 2013, the Villa PBOC was already in receipt of the May 14
2013 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of petitioner thereby affirming the
March 27, 2013 Resolution of the First Division that cancelled petitioner's COC. The receipt
was acknowledged by Rossini M. Ocsadin of the PBOC on May 15,2013. On May 16,2013,
Atty. Nelia S. Aureus, petitioner's counsel of record, received a copy of the same resolution.
On May 18 2013, the PBOC under ARED Ignacio is already aware of the May 14,2013
Resolution of the Commission En Bane which is already on file with the PBOC. Furthermore,
PBOC members Provincial Prosecutor Bimbo Mercado and Magdalena Lim knew of the 14
May 2013 Resolution since they are the original members of the Villa PBOC. However, while
counsel for petitioner, Atty. Aureus, already received a copy of said resolution on May 16,
2013, the counsel for petitioner, Atty. Ferdinand Rivera (who is an UNA lawyer), who
appeared before the Ignacio PBOC on May 18,2013, misrepresented to said PBOC that
[petitioner] has not received a copy of the said May 14 2013 Resolution of this Commission.
This has mislead the Ignacio PBOC in deciding to proclaim petitioner believing that petitioner
is not yet bound by the said resolution. See rollo pp. 392-393.

In the case at bar, as the PBOC and the parties all had notice of the COMELEC En Bane
Resolution dated 14 May 2013, the PBOC should have, at the very least, suspended
petitioner's proclamation. Although COMELEC Resolution No. 9648 or the General
Instructions for the Board of Canvassers on the Consolidation/Canvass and Transmission of
Votes in Connection with the 3 May 2013 National and Local Elections authorizes the PBOC
to proclaim a winning candidate if there is a pending disqualification or petition to cancel
COC and no order of suspension was issued by the COMELEC, the cancellation of
petitioner's COC, as ordered in the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated 14 May 2013, is of
greater significance and import than an order of suspension of proclamation. The PBOC
should have taken the COMELEC En Bane s cue. To now countenance this precipitate act of
the PBOC is to allow it to render nugatory a decision of its superior. Besides, on 18 May
2013, there was no longer any pending case as the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated
14 May 2013 is already a final judgment.
5

Beluso v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180711, 22 June 2010, 621 SCRA 450, 456.
In De Ia Cruz v COMELEC and Pacete the Court ruled that the COMELEC being a
specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country, its
factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within
its competence shall not be interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. (G.R. No. 192221, 13
November 2012, 685 SCRA 347, 359).
In Mastura v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that the rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts of justice except when there
is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such findings
should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers
of the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC -created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself -on a level higher than statutory administrative
organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election
by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not strictly bound by the
rut of evidence. (G R. No. 124 521, 29 January 1998, 285 SCRA 493, 499).

Rollo, pp. 181-184.

Petitioner before the HRET, can manifest what she desires in this Motion for
Reconsideration concerning the existence of Identification Certificate No. 05-05424 issued
by the Bureau of Immigration dated 13 October 2005, ostensibly recognizing her as a citizen
of the Philippines as per (pursuant) to the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003 (R.A. 9225) in relation to Administrative Order No. 91, S. of 24 and Memorandum
Circular No. AFF-2004-01 per order of this no. CRR No. 05-10/03-5455 AFF No. 05-4961
signed by Commissioner ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ dated October 6 2005. Petitioner belatedly
submitted this manifestation in her Motion for Reconsideration for the stated reason that her
records with the Bureau of Immigration has been missing. Fortunately, her Index Card on file
at the Fingerprint Section was found and it became the basis, together with Petitioner's copy
of the certificate which she just unearthed lately, for the issuance of a certified true copy of
her Identification Certificate No. 05-05424." See rollo, pp. 364 and 311.
8

Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez G.R. No. 172700,23 July 2010, 625 SCRA 299,
307.
9

Omnibus Election Code

Sec. 118. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from
voting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
imprisonment for not less than one year, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon or granted amnesty: Provided, however, That
any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically
reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five years after service of
sentence.
(b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by competent
court or tribunal of having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the
duly constituted government such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the antisubversion and firearms laws, or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided,
That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five
years after service of sentence.
(c) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 157 March 30, 1987

PROVIDING FOR ABSENTEE VOTING BY OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF GOVERNMENT
WHO ARE AWAY FROM THE PLACE OF THEIR REGISTRATION BY REASON OF OFFICIAL
FUNCTIONS ON ELECTION DAY
WHEREAS, under the electoral law now in force the rule is that a person has to be physically
present in the polling place whereof he is a registered voter in order to be able to vote;
WHEREAS, the only exception is that established by Section 169 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881,
which allows members of the board of election inspectors to vote in the polling place where they are
assigned on election day, under certain conditions;
WHEREAS, there are other persons who, by reason of public functions and duties, are assigned on
election day in places other than their place of registration, and under existing rules, are thus unable
to vote;
WHEREAS, the democratic principle requires the broadest participation in electoral and similar
exercises by persons who have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote;
WHEREAS, government officials and employees who are assigned to places other than their place
of registration must not be deprived of their right to participate in electoral exercises;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do hereby order:
Sec. 1. Any person who by reason of public functions and duties, is not in his/her place of
registration on election day, may vote in the city/municipality where he/she is assigned on election
day: Provided, That he/she is a duly registered voter.
Sec. 2. Thirty (30) days before the election, the appropriate head of office shall submit to the
Commission on Elections a list of officers and employees of the office who are registered voters, and
who, by reason of their duties and functions, will be in places other than their place of registration,

and who desire to exercise their right to vote, with the request that said officers and employees be
provided with application forms to cast absentee ballots in their place of assignment.
The list and the request shall be under oath.
Sec. 3. Upon verification by the Commission on Elections that the persons included in the list are
qualified voters, it shall transmit the exact number of application forms to the head of the office
making the request.
Sec. 4. The application forms shall be returned only accomplished to the Commission on Elections
not later than April 25, 1987.
Sec. 5. Upon verification of the applications, the Commission shall transmit the exact number of
absentee ballots to the appropriate head of the government office for distribution to the applicants.
Sec. 6. The head of the office shall prepare a sworn report on the manner of distribution of the
absentee ballots, indicating therein the number of ballots transmitted to each province, the names of
the persons to whom the absentee ballots are delivered, and the serial numbers of ballots. It shall be
accompanied by a certificate of eligibility to vote absentee for each particular voter.
Sec. 7. For the purpose of the 1987 congressional election, the absentee voters shall vote only for
candidates for senator.
Sec. 8. The voters who cast absentee votes shall vote one week before election day. They shall do
so by delivering to the Commission on Elections Regional Director, or the Provincial Election
Supervisor or the City or Municipal Election Registrar of the place of their assignment ballot within
two security envelopes, the one containing the absentee ballots indicating only that it is an envelope
of the Commission on Elections, and the other envelope indicating the name of the absentee voter
and his/her affidavit number.
Sec. 9. The Commission on Elections official concerned to whom the absentee vote is delivered
shall immediately transmit by the fastest means available to the Commission on Elections the
special Commission on Elections absentee ballot within two security envelopes so that the same are
in the central office of the Commission one day before the elections.
The transmittal letter shall indicate the names of the persons who cast the absentee votes, their
voters' affidavit numbers and their certificates of eligibility to vote absentee.
Sec. 10. The Commission on Elections shall canvass the votes cast by absentee voters and shall
add the results of the same to the votes reported throughout the country.
Sec. 11. The Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this
Executive Order.
Sec. 12. Section 169 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall remain in force and effect, and shall
continue to govern the voting privilege of members of the Board of Election Inspectors. All laws,

orders, issuances, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Executive Order are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
lawphi1.net

Sec. 13. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 30th day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
eighty-seven.

RA 7166
Section 12. Absentee Voting. - Absentee voting as provided for in Executive Order No. 157 dated
March 30, 1987 shall apply to the elections for President, Vice-President and Senators only and
shall be limited to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police
and other government officers and employees who are duly registered voters and who, on election
day, may temporarily be assigned in connection with the performance of election duties to place
where they are not registered voters.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10380

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR LOCAL ABSENTEE VOTING FOR MEDIA

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled:
Section 1. Declaration of Policy. The State shall ensure the free exercise of the
right of suffrage by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law.?
r?l??
Section 2. Local Absentee Voting for Members of Media. The Commission on
Elections shall extend the right to vote under the local absentee voting system
provided under existing laws and executive orders to members of media, media
practitioners, including the technical and support staff, who are duly registered
voters and who, on election day, may not be able to vote due to the performance of
their functions in covering and reporting on the elections: Provided, That they shall
be allowed to vote only for the positions of President, Vice President, Senators and
Party-List Representative.

Section 3. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Commission on Elections

shall, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, promulgate the
implementing rules and regulations which shall include a system of accreditation
and verification of the members of media, media practitioners, the technical and
support staff, who are qualified to avail of local absentee voting.
Section 4. Appropriations. The initial funding of this Act shall be charged against
the current year's appropriations or from any available savings of the Commission
on Elections. Thereafter, such amount as may be necessary for the continued
implementation of this Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriations
Act.
Section 5. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act shall be declared
unconstitutional or invalid, other provisions hereof which are not affected thereby
shall continue to be in full force and effect.
Section 6. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders,
resolutions, rules and regulations, other issuances, and parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
Section 7. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.cralaw

Republic Act No. 9189

February 13, 2003

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING BY QUALIFIED

CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES ABROAD, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. This Act shall be known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003."
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of honest and
orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot. Towards this
end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad in the
exercise of this fundamental right.

Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act:

a. "Absentee Voting" refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines
abroad exercise their right to vote;
b. "Commission" refers to the Commission on Elections;
c. "Certified List of Overseas Absentee Voters" refers to the list of registered overseas
absentee voters whose applications to vote in absentia have been approved by the
Commission, said list to be prepared by the Committee on Absentee Voting of the
Commission, on a country-by-country basis. This list shall be approved by the Commission in
an en banc resolution;
d. "Day of Election" refers to the actual date of elections in the Philippines;
e. "National Registry of Absentee Voters" refers to the consolidated list prepared, approved
and maintained by the Commission, of overseas absentee voters whose applications for
registration as absentee voters, including those registered voters who have applied to be
certified as absentee voters, have been approved by the Election Registered Board;
f. "Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register
and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day of
elections.
Sec. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law,
at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president,
senators and party-list representatives.
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
1. Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
2. Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged
allegiance to a foreign country;
3. Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of
an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who
have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the
Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or
amnesty; Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall
automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take cognizance of final judgments
issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject to the
formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
4. An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country,
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under this Act.
Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country.
Failure to return shall be the cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or

permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
5. Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by
competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies,
consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such competent authority
subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or incompetent.
Sec. 6. Personal Overseas Absentee Registration. Registration as an overseas absentee voter
shall be done in person.
Qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad who failed to register under Republic Act No. 8189,
otherwise known as the "The Voters Registration Act of 1996", may personally apply for registration
with the Election Registration Board of the city or municipality where they were domiciled
immediately prior to their departure from the Philippines, or with the representative of the
Commission at the Philippine embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments that
have jurisdiction over the locality where they temporarily reside. Subject to the specific guidelines
herein provided, the Commission is hereby authorized to prescribe additional procedures for
overseas absentee registration pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, whenever
applicable, taking into strict consideration the time zones and the various periods and processes
herein provided for the proper implementation of this Act. The embassies, consulates and other
foreign service establishments shall transmit within (5) days from receipt the accomplished
registration forms to the Commission, after which the Commission shall coordinate with the Election
Officer of the city or municipality of the applicants stated residence for verification, hearing and
annotation in the permanent list of voters.
All applications for the May, 2004 elections shall be filed with the Commission not later than two
hundred eighty (280) calendar days before the day of elections. For succeeding elections, the
Commission shall provide for the period within which applications to register must be filed.
In the case of seafarers, the Commission shall provide a special mechanism for the time and
manner of personal registration taking into consideration the nature of their work.
6.1. Upon receipt of the application for registration, the Election Officer shall immediately set
the application for hearing, the notice of which shall be posted in a conspicuous place in the
premises of the city or municipal building of the applicants stated residence for at least one
(1) week before the date of the hearing. The Election Officer shall immediately furnish a copy
of the application to the designated representatives of political parties and other accredited
groups.
6.2. If no verified objection to the application is filed, the Election Officer shall immediately
forward the application to the Election Registration Board, which shall decide on the
application within one (1) week from the date of hearing without waiting for the quarterly
meeting of the Board. The applicant shall be notified of the approval or disapproval of his/her
application by registered mail.
6.3. In the event that an objection to the application is filed prior to or on the date of hearing,
the Election Officer shall notify the applicant of said objection by registered mail, enclosing
therein copies of affidavits or documents submitted in support of the objection filed with the
said Election Officer, if any. The applicant shall have the right to file his counter-affidavit by
registered mail, clearly stating therein facts and defenses sworn before any officer in the host
country authorized to administer oaths.

6.4. The application shall be approved or disapproved based on the merits of the objection,
counter-affidavit and documents submitted by the party objecting and those of the applicant.
6.5 A Certificate of Registration as an overseas absentee voter shall be issued by the
Commission to all applicants whose applications have been approved, including those
certified as registered voters. The Commission shall include the approved applications in the
National Registry of Absentee Voters.
6.6. If the application has been approved, any interested party may file a petition for
exclusion not later than two hundred ten (210) days before the day of elections with the
proper municipal or metropolitan trial court. The petition shall be decided within fifteen (15)
days after its filing on the basis of the documents submitted in connection therewith. Should
the court fail to render a decision within the prescribed period, the ruling of the Election
Registration Board shall be considered affirmed.
6.7. If the application has been disapproved, the applicant or his authorized representative
shall, within a period of five (5) days from receipt of the notice of disapproval, have the right
to file a petition for inclusion with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court. The petition
shall be decided within five (5) days after its filing on the basis of documents submitted in
connection therewith.
Qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad, who have previously registered as voters pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8189 shall apply for certification as absentee voters and for inclusion in the
National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters, with a corresponding annotation in the Certified
Voters List.
Sec. 7. System of Continuing Registration. The Commission shall ensure that the benefits of the
system of continuing registration are extended to qualified overseas absentee voters. Towards this
end, the Commission shall optimize the use of existing facilities, personnel and mechanisms of the
various government agencies for purposes of data gathering, data validation, information
dissemination and facilitation of the registration process.
Pre-departure programs, services and mechanisms offered and administered by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Commission on Filipinos Overseas and
other appropriate agencies of the government shall be utilized for purposes of supporting the
overseas absentee registration and voting processes, subject to limitations imposed by law.
Sec. 8. Requirements for Registration. Every Filipino registrant shall be required to furnish the
following documents:
a. A valid Philippine passport. In the absence of a valid passport, a certification of the
Department of Foreign Affairs that it has reviewed the appropriate documents submitted by
the applicant and found them sufficient to warrant the issuance of a passport, or that the
applicant is a holder of a valid passport but is unable to produce the same for a valid reason;
b. Accomplished registration form prescribed by the Commission containing the following
mandatory information:
i. Last known residence of the applicant in the Philippines before leaving for abroad;

ii. Address of applicant abroad, or forwarding address in the case of seafarers;

iii. Where voting by mail is allowed, the applicants mailing address outside the
Philippines where the ballot for absentee voters will be sent, in proper cases; and;
iv. Name and address of applicants authorized representative in the Philippines for
purposes of Section 6.7 and Section 12 hereof.
c. In the case of immigrants and permanent residents not otherwise disqualified to vote
under this Act, an affidavit declaring the intention to resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years after approval of his/her registration
as an overseas absentee voter under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country.
The Commission may also require additional data to facilitate registration and recording. No
information other than those necessary to establish the identity and qualification of the applicant
shall be required.
Sec. 9. National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters. The Commission shall maintain a National
Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters. Approved applications of overseas absentee registrants shall
also be included in the permanent list of voters of the city or municipality where the registrant is
domiciled, with the corresponding annotation that such person has been registered or will be voting
as an overseas absentee voter. The registry shall also include those registered under Republic Act
No. 8189 and who have been issued certifications as overseas absentee voters. The entries in the
National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters and the annotations as overseas absentee voters in
the Certified Voters List shall be permanent, and cannot be cancelled or amended except in any of
the following cases:
9.1. When the overseas absentee voter files a letter under oath addressed to the
Commission that he/she wishes to be removed from the Registry of Overseas Absentee
Voters, or that his/her name be transferred to the regular registry of voters; or,
9.2. When an overseas absentee voters name was ordered removed by the Commission
from the Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters for his/her failure to exercise his/her right to
vote under this Act for two (2) consecutive national elections.
Sec. 10. Notice of Registration and Election. The Commission shall, through the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments, cause the publication in a newspaper of
general circulation of the place, date and time of the holding of a regular or special national election
and the requirements for the participation of qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad, at least six
(6) months before the date set for the filing of applications for registration.
The Commission shall determine the countries where publication shall be made, and the frequency
thereof, taking into consideration the number of overseas Filipinos present in such countries.
Likewise, the Commission and the Department of Foreign Affairs shall post the same in their
respective websites.
Sec. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.
11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for registration has
been approved, including those previously registered under Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in

every national election, file with the officer of the embassy, consulate or other foreign service
establishment authorized by the Commission, a sworn written application to vote in a form
prescribed by the Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or other
foreign service establishment shall transmit to the Commission the said application to vote
within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The application form shall be accomplished in
triplicate and submitted together with the photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter
certificate of registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to, the
embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction over the country
where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas absentee
voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas absentee voter.
Sec. 12. Verification and Approval of Application to Vote. All applications shall be acted upon by
the Commission upon receipt thereof, but in no case later than one hundred fifty (150) days before
the day of elections. In the event of disapproval of the application, the voter or his authorized
representative may file a Motion for Reconsideration with the Commission personally, or by
registered mail, within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice of disapproval. The Commission shall
act within five (5) days from receipt of such Motion for Reconsideration and shall immediately notify
the voter of its decision. The decision of the Commission shall be final and executory.
The Commission shall issue an overseas absentee voter identification card to those whose
applications to vote have been approved.
Sec. 13. Preparation and Posting of Certified List of Overseas Absentee Voters. The Commission
shall prepare the Certified List of Overseas Absentee Voters within one hundred twenty (120) days
before every election, and furnish within the same period copies thereof to the appropriate
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments, which shall post the same in their
bulletin boards within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
Subject to reasonable regulation and the payment of fees in such amounts as may be fixed by the
Commission, the candidates, political parties, accredited citizens arms, interested persons and all
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments shall be furnished copies thereof.
Sec. 14. Printing and Transmittal of Ballots, Voting Instructions, Election Forms and Paraphernalia.
14.1. The Commission shall cause the printing of ballots for overseas absentee voters,
voting instructions, and election forms in such number as may be necessary, but in no case
shall it exceed the total number of approved applications. Security markings shall be used in
the printing of ballots for overseas absentee voters.
14.2. The Commission shall present to the authorized representatives of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and the accredited major political parties the ballots for overseas absentee
voters, voting instructions, election forms and other election paraphernalia for scrutiny and
inspection prior to their transmittal to the embassies, consulates and other foreign service
establishments concerned.
14.3. The Commission shall, not later than seventy-five (75) days before the day of elections,
transmit by special pouch to the embassies, consulates and other foreign service

establishments, the exact number of ballots for overseas absentee voters corresponding to
the number of approved applications, along with such materials and election paraphernalia
necessary to ensure the secrecy and integrity of the election.
14.4. The authorized representatives of accredited major political parties shall have the right
to be present in all phases of printing, transmittal, and casting of ballots abroad. Unclaimed
ballots properly marked as such, shall be cancelled and shipped to the Commission by the
least costly method.
Sec. 15. Regulation on Campaigning Abroad. The use of campaign materials, as well as the limits
on campaign spending shall be governed by the laws and regulations applicable in the Philippines.
Sec. 16. Casting and Submission of Ballots.
16.1. Upon receipt by the designated officer of the embassy, consulate and other foreign
service establishments of the ballots for overseas absentee voters, voting instructions,
election forms and other paraphernalia, he/she shall make them available on the premises to
the qualified overseas absentee voters in their respective jurisdictions during the thirty (30)
days before the day of elections when overseas absentee voters may cast their vote.
Immediately upon receiving it, the overseas absentee voter must fill-out his/her ballot
personally, in secret, without leaving the premises of the embassies, consulates and other
foreign service establishments concerned.
16.2. The overseas absentee voter shall personally accomplish his/her ballot at the embassy,
consulate or other foreign service establishment that has jurisdiction over the country where
he/she temporarily resides or at any polling place designated and accredited by the
Commission.
16.3. The overseas absentee voter shall cast his ballot, upon presentation of the absentee
voter identification card issued by the Commission, within thirty (30) days before the day of
elections. In the case of seafarers, they shall cast their ballots anytime within sixty (60) days
before the day of elections as prescribed in the Implementing Rules and Guidelines.
16.4. All accomplished ballots received shall be placed unopened inside sealed containers
and kept in a secure place designated by the Commission.
16.5. The embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned shall
keep a complete record of the ballots for overseas absentee voters, specifically indicating
the number of ballots they actually received, and in cases where voting by mail is allowed
under Section 17 hereof, the names and addresses of the voters to whom these ballots were
sent, including proof of receipt thereof. In addition, the embassies, consulates and other
foreign service establishments shall submit a formal report to the Commission and the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created under this Act within thirty (30) days from the
day of elections. Such report shall contain data on the number of ballots cast and received
by the offices, the number of invalid and unclaimed ballots and other pertinent data.
16.6. The overseas absentee voter shall be instructed that his/her ballot shall not be counted
if it is not inside the special envelope furnished him/her when it is cast.
16.7. Ballots not claimed by the overseas absentee voters at the embassies, consulates and
other foreign service establishments, in case of personal voting, and ballots returned to the

embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned, in the case of
voting by mail, shall be cancelled and shipped to the Commission by the least costly method
within six (6) months from the day of elections.
16.8. Only ballots cast, and mailed ballots received by the Philippine embassies, consulates
and other foreign service establishments concerned in accordance with Section 17 hereof
before the close of voting on the day of elections shall be counted in accordance with
Section 18 hereof. All envelopes containing the ballots received by the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments after the prescribed period shall not be
opened, and shall be cancelled and shipped to the Commission by the least costly method
within six (6) months from the day of elections.
16.9. A Special Ballot Reception and Custody Group composed of three (3) members shall
be constituted by the Commission from among the staff of the embassies, consulates and
other foreign service establishments concerned, including their attached agencies, and
citizens of the Philippines abroad, who will be deputized to receive ballots and take custody
of the same preparatory to their transmittal to the Special Boards of Election Inspectors.
16.10. During this phase of the election process, the authorized representatives of the
political parties, candidates, and accredited citizens arms of the Commission shall be
notified in writing thereof and shall have the right to witness the proceedings.
16.11. The Commission shall study the use of electronic mail, Internet, or other secured
networks in the casting of votes, and submit a report thereon to the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee.
Sec. 17. Voting by Mail.
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more
than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee.
Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a. Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent the
occasion of fraud;
b. Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and,
c. Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and
well-secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
17.2. The overseas absentee voters shall send his/her accomplished ballot to the
corresponding embassy, consular or other foreign service establishment that has jurisdiction
over the country where he/she temporarily resides. He/She shall be entitled to cast his/her
ballot at any time upon his/her receipt thereof, provided that the same Is received before the
close of voting on the day of elections. The overseas absentee voter shall be instructed that

his/her ballot shall not be counted if not transmitted in the special envelope furnished
him/her.
17.3. Only mailed ballots received by the Philippine embassy, consulate and other foreign
service establishments before the close of voting on the day of elections shall be counted in
accordance with Section 18 hereof. All envelopes containing the ballots received by the
embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments after the prescribed period
shall not be opened, and shall be cancelled and disposed of appropriately, with a
corresponding report thereon submitted to the Commission not later than thirty (30) days
from the day of elections.
Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.
18.1. The counting and canvassing of votes shall be conducted on site in the country where
the votes were actually cast. The opening of the specially-marked envelopes containing the
ballots and the counting and canvassing of votes shall be conducted within the premises of
the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments or in such other places
as may be designated by the Commission pursuant to the Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The Commission shall ensure that the start of counting in all polling places
abroad shall be synchronized with the start of counting in the Philippines.
18.2. For these purposes, the Commission shall constitute as many Special Boards of
Election Inspectors as may be necessary to conduct and supervise the counting of votes as
provided in Section 18.2 hereof. The Special Boards of Election Inspectors to be constituted
herein shall be composed of a Chairman and two (2) members, one (1) of whom shall be
designated as poll clerk. The ambassador or consul-general, or any career public officer
posted abroad designated by the Commission, as the case may be, shall act as the
chairman; in the absence of other government officers, the two (2) other members shall be
citizens of the Philippines who are qualified to vote under this act and deputized by the
Commission not later than sixty (60) days before the day of elections. All resolutions of the
Special Board of Election Inspectors on issues brought before it during the conduct of its
proceedings shall be valid only when they carry the approval of the chairman.
Immediately upon the completion of the counting, the Special Boards of Election Inspectors
shall transmit via facsimile and/or electronic mail the results to the Commission in Manila and
the accredited major political parties.
18.3. Only ballots cast on, or received by the embassies, consulates and other foreign
service establishments before the close of voting on the day of elections shall be included in
the counting of votes. Those received afterwards shall not be counted.
18.4. A Special Board of Canvassers composed of a lawyer preferably of the Commission as
chairman, a senior career officer from any of the government agencies maintaining a post
abroad and, in the absence of another government officer, a citizen of the Philippines
qualified to vote under this Act deputized by the Commission, as vice-chairman and membersecretary, respectively, shall be constituted to canvass the election returns submitted to it by
the Special Boards of Election Inspectors. Immediately upon the completion of the canvass,
the chairman of the Special Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail,
or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and
the Statements of Votes to the Commission, and shall cause to preserve the same
immediately after the conclusion of the canvass, and make it available upon instructions of
the Commission. The Special Board of Canvassers shall also furnish the accredited major

political parties and accredited citizens arms with copies thereof via facsimile, electronic mail
and any other means of transmission equally safe, secure and reliable.
The Certificates of Canvass and the accompanying Statements of Votes as transmitted via
facsimile, electronic mail and any other means of transmission equally safe, secure and
reliable shall be the primary basis for the national canvass.
18.5. The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning
candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results thereof.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the proclamation of
winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a
particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered
impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, and
which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Commission.
18.6. In the preparation of the final tally of votes on the results of the national elections, the
Commission shall ensure that the votes canvassed by each and every country shall be
reflected as a separate item from the tally of national votes. For purposes of this Act, the
returns of every election for president and vice-president prepared by the Special Board of
Canvassers shall be deemed a certificate of canvass of a city or province.
18.7. Where feasible, the counting and canvassing of votes shall be automated. Towards this
end, the Commission is hereby authorized to borrow, rent, lease or acquire automated voting
machines for purposes of canvassing and counting of votes pursuant to the provisions of this
Act, and in accordance with the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission.
Sec. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall issue the
necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this Act within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.
In the formulation of the rules and regulations, the Commission shall coordinate with the Department
of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Philippine Overseas and Employment
Administration, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration and the Commission on Filipinos
Overseas. Non-government organizations and accredited Filipino organizations or associations
abroad shall be consulted.
Sec. 20. Information Campaign. The Commission, in coordination with agencies concerned, shall
undertake an information campaign to educate the public on the manner of absentee voting for
qualified overseas absentee voters. It may require the support and assistance of the Department of
Foreign Affairs, through the embassies, consulates and other foreign service establishments,
Department of Labor and employment, Department of Transportation and Communications,
Philippine Postal Corporation, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Workers
Welfare Administration and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas. The Commission may deputize
Filipino organizations/associations overseas for the same purpose: Provided, That any such
deputized organization/association shall be prohibited from participating in the elections by
campaigning for or fielding candidates; Provided, further, That if any such deputized
organization/association is discovered to have a member who is not a qualified overseas absentee
voter as herein defined, such deputized organization/association shall be banned from participating
in any manner, and at any stage, in the Philippine political process abroad.

Such information campaign shall educate the Filipino public, within and outside the Philippines, on
the rights of overseas absentee voters, absentee voting processes and other related concerns.
Information materials shall be developed by the Commission for distribution, through the said
government agencies and private organizations. No government agency or accredited private
organizations shall prepare, print, distribute or post in websites any information material without the
prior approval of the Commission.
Sec. 21. Access to Official Records and Documents. Subject to the pertinent provisions of this Act,
any person shall have the right to access and/or copy at his expense all registration records, voters
lists and other official records and documents, subject to reasonable regulations as may be imposed
by the Commission.
Sec. 22. Assistance from Government Agencies. All government officers, particularly from the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Transportation
and Communications, Philippine Postal Corporation, Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Commission on Filipinos Overseas and
other government offices concerned with the welfare of the Filipinos overseas shall, to the extent
compatible with their primary responsibilities, assist the Commission in carrying out the provisions of
this Act. All such agencies or officers thereof shall take reasonable measures to expedite all election
activities, which the Commission shall require of them. When necessary, the Commission may send
supervisory teams headed by career officers to assist the embassies, consulates and other foreign
service establishment concerned.
Sec. 23. Security Measures to Safeguard the Secrecy and Sanctity of Ballots. At all stages of the
electoral process, the Commission shall ensure that the secrecy and integrity of the ballots are
preserved. The Committee on Absentee Voting of the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring
the secrecy and sanctity of the absentee voting process. In the interest of transparency, all
necessary and practicable measures shall be adopted to allow representation of the candidates,
accredited major political parties, accredited citizens arms and non-government organizations to
assist, and intervene in appropriate cases, in all stages of the electoral exercise and to prevent any
and all forms of fraud and coercion.
No officer or member of the foreign service corps, including those belonging to attached agencies
shall be transferred, promoted, extended, recalled or otherwise moved from his current post or
position one (1) year before and three (3) months after the day of elections, except upon the
approval of the Commission.
Sec. 24. Prohibited Acts. In addition to the prohibited acts provided by law, it shall be unlawful:
24.1. For any officer or employee of the Philippine government to influence or attempt to
influence any person covered by this Act to vote, or not to vote, for a particular candidate.
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prohibit free discussion regarding politics or
candidates for public office.
24.2. For any person to deprive any person of any right secured in this Act, or to give false
information as to his/her name, address, or period of residence for the purposes of
establishing his/her eligibility or ineligibility to register or vote under this Act; or to conspire
with another person for the purpose of encouraging the giving of false information in order to
establish the eligibility or ineligibility of any individual to register or vote under this Act; or, to
pay, or offer to pay, or to accept payment either for application to vote in absentia or for
voting;

24.3. For any person to tamper with the ballot, the mail containing the ballots for overseas
absentee voters, the election returns, including the destruction, mutilation and manipulation
thereof;
24.4. For any person to steal, destroy, conceal, mutilate or alter any record, document or
paper as required for purposes of this Act;
24.5. For any deputized agent to refuse without justifiable ground, to serve or continue
serving, or to comply with his/her sworn duties after acceptance of his/her appointment;
24.6. For any public officer or employee who shall cause the preparation, printing,
distribution of information material, or post the same in websites without the prior approval of
the Commission;
24.7. For any public officer or employee to cause the transfer, promotion, extension, recall of
any member of the foreign service corps, including members of the attached agencies, or
otherwise cause the movement of any such member from his current post or position one (1)
year before and three (3) months after the day of elections, without securing the prior
approval of the Commission;
24.8. For any person who, after being deputized by the Commission to undertake activities in
connection with the implementation of this Act, shall campaign for or assist, in whatever
manner, candidates in the elections;
24.9. For any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines to participate, by word or deed,
directly or indirectly through qualified organizations/associations, in any manner and at any
stage of the Philippine political process abroad, including participation in the campaign and
elections.
The provision of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, and with due regard to the Principle of
Double Criminality, the prohibited acts described in this section are electoral offenses and
punishable in the Philippines.
The penalties imposed under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, as amended, shall be
imposed on any person found guilty of committing any of the prohibited acts as defined in this
section: Provided, That the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any person found guilty of Section 24.3 hereof without the benefit of the operation of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. If the offender is a public officer or a candidate, the penalty shall be
prision mayor in its maximum period. In addition, the offender shall be sentenced to suffer perpetual
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to vote.
Immigrants and permanent residents who do not resume residence in the Philippines as stipulated in
their affidavit under Section 5(d) within three (3) years after approval of his/her registration under this
Act and yet vote in the next elections contrary to the said section, shall be penalized by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, and shall be deemed disqualified as provided in Section
5(c) of this Act. His/her passport shall be stamped "not allowed to vote".
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is
hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated by the Senate
President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and

seven (7) other Members of the House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of
Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate the
implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations promulgated by the Commission.
Sec. 26. Applicability of Other Election Laws. The pertinent provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code, as amended, and other election laws, which are not in conflict with the provisions of this Act
shall remain in full force and shall have suppletory application to this Act.
Sec. 27. Enforcement and Administration by the Commission. The Commission shall, for the
purpose of ensuring honest, orderly, peaceful and free elections abroad, have exclusive charge of
the enforcement, administration and implementation of this Act.
Sec. 28. Mandatory Review. Congress shall complete a mandatory review of this Act within two (2)
years following the May, 2004 elections for the purpose of amending it to expand or restrict its
coverage, scope and application, as well as improve its procedures and institute measures and
safeguards, taking into account the experience of the previous election, technological advances and
structural political changes.
Sec. 29. Appropriations. The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be
provided in a supplemental budget or included in the General Appropriations Act of the year of its
enactment into law. Thereafter, the expenses for its continued implementation shall be included in
the subsequent General Appropriations Act.
Sec. 30. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act shall be declared unconstitutional
or invalid, other provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and
effect.
Sec. 31. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations,
other issuances, and parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 32. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in three (3)
newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

Speaker of the House of
Representatives

FRANKLIN DRILON
President of the Senate

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2104 and House Bill No. 3570 was finally passed
by the Senate and House of Representatives on February 4, 2003 and February 11, 2003,
respectively.

ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
House of Represenatives

OSCAR G. YABES
Secretary of Senate

Approved: February 13, 2003

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

REPUBLIC ACT No. 10590

AN ACT AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9189, ENTITLED "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A
SYSTEM OF OVERSEAS ABSENTEE VOTING BY QUALIFIED CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES
ABROAD, APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 9189 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as 'The Overseas Voting Act of 2013."
Section 2. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9189 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. - For purposes of this Act:
"(a) Certified List of Overseas Voters (CLOV) refers to the list of registered overseas
voters whose applications to vote overseas have been approved by the Commission,
said list to be prepared by the Office for Overseas Voting of the Commission, on a
country-by-country and post-by-post basis. The list shall be approved by the
Commission in an en banc resolution.
"(b) Commission refers to the Commission on Elections.
"(c) Day of Election refers to the actual date of elections in the Philippines.
"(d) Department of Foreign Affairs Overseas Voting Secretariat (DFA-OVS) refers to
the secretariat based at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) home office tasked
to assist the Office for Overseas Voting (OFOV) under the Commission, and to direct,
coordinate and oversee the participation of the DFA in the implementation of the
Overseas Voting Act.
"(e) Field Registration refers to the conduct of registration of overseas voters at
predetermined locations, either in the Philippines, as may be determined by the
Commission, or outside the posts, upon the favorable recommendation of the DFAOVS, both being of limited duration and based on the guidelines prescribed by the
Commission for that exclusive purpose; the government shall not collect fees for the
same.
"(f) Mobile Registration refers to the conduct of registration of overseas voters at
various locations outside the posts, other than at field registrations, undertaken as
part of the posts' mobile consular and outreach activities to Filipinos within their
jurisdictions.
"(g) Municipal/City/District Registry of Overseas Voters (ROV) refers to the
consolidated list prepared, approved and maintained by the Commission for every
municipality/city/district of overseas voters whose applications for registration as
such, including those registered voters under Republic Act No. 8189, 'Voter's
Registration Act of 1996, who applied for certification as overseas voters, have been
approved by the Election Registration Board and/or resident Election Registration
Board.

"(h) National Registry of Overseas Voters (NROV) refers to the consolidated list
prepared, approved and maintained by the Commission of overseas voters whose
applications for registration as overseas voters, including those registered voters
under Republic Act No. 8189 who have applied to be certified as overseas voters,
have been approved by the resident Election Registration Board, indicating the post
where the overseas voter is registered.
"(i) Office for Overseas Voting (OFOV) refers to the Office of the Commission tasked
to oversee and supervise the effective implementation of the Overseas Voting Act.
"(j) Overseas Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to register
and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on the day
of elections.
"(k) Overseas Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote.
"(l) Posts refer to the Philippine embassies, consulates, foreign service
establishments and other Philippine government agencies maintaining offices abroad
and having jurisdiction over the places where the overseas voters reside.
"(m) Resident Election Registration Board (RERB) refers to the in-house Election
Registration Board in every post and in the OFOV, which processes, approves or
disapproves all applications for registration and/or certification as overseas voters,
including the deactivation, reactivation and cancellation of registration records.
"(n) Seafarers refer to ship officers and ratings manning ships, including offshore
workers, service providers and fishermen, as denned in the revised rules on the
issuance of seafarer's identification and record book of the Maritime Industry
Authority.
"(o) Special Ballot Reception and Custody Group (SBRCG) refers to the group
constituted by the Commission to receive and take custody of all accountable and
other election forms, supplies and paraphernalia from the OFOV for transmittal to the
Special Board of Election Inspectors and Special Board of Canvassers.
"(p) Special Board of Canvassers (SBOC) refers to the body deputized by the
Commission to canvass the overseas voting election returns submitted to it by the
Special Board of Election Inspectors.
"(q) Special Board of Election Inspectors (SBEI) refers to the body deputized by the
Commission to conduct the voting and counting of votes.
"(r) Voting Period refers to a continuous thirty (30)-day period, the last day of which is
the day of election, inclusive of established holidays in the Philippines and of such
other holidays in the host countries."
Section 3. Section 4 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Coverage. - All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for

President, Vice-President, Senators and Party-List Representatives, as well as in all national

referenda and plebiscites."
Section 4. Section 5 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 5. Disqualifications. - The following shall be disqualified from registering and voting
under this Act:
"(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
"(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged allegiance to a foreign country, except those who have reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known
as the 'Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003;
"(c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a Philippine
court or tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1)
year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or
amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this
subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon the expiration of five (5)
years after service of sentence; and
"(d) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent
by competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine
embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such
competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent."
Section 5. Section 6 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Personal Overseas Registration and/or Certification. - Registration and/or
certification as an overseas voter shall be done in person at any post abroad or at
designated registration centers outside the post or in the Philippines approved by the
Commission.
"Field and mobile registration centers shall be set up by the posts concerned to ensure
accessibility by the overseas voters.
"All applicants shall submit themselves for live capture of their biometrics.
"The Commission shall issue an overseas voter identification card to those whose
applications to vote have been approved."
Section 6. A new Section 7 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 7. Resident Election Registration Board (RERB); Composition, Appointment,
Disqualification and Compensation. - The RERB shall be composed of the following:
"(a) A career official of the DFA, as Chairperson;

"(b) The most senior officer from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
or any government agency of the Philippines maintaining offices abroad, as
member: Provided, That in case of disqualification or nonavailability of the most
senior officer from the DOLE or any government agency of the Philippines
maintaining offices abroad, the Commission shall designate a career official from the
embassy or consulate concerned; and
"(c) A registered overseas voter of known probity, as member.
"The Commission shall appoint the members of the RERB upon the recommendation of the
DFA-OVS.
"The RERB in the OFOV shall be based in the main office of the Commission and shall be
composed of a senior official of the Commission as the Chairperson and one (1) member
each from the DFA and the DOLE, whose rank shall not be lower than a division chief or its
equivalent.
"No member of the RERB shall be related to each other or to an incumbent President, VicePresident, Senator or Member of the House of Representatives representing the party-list
system of representation, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
"Each member of the RERB shall be entitled to an honorarium at the rates approved by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM)."
Section 7. A new Section 8 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 8. Duties and Functions of the RERB. - The RERB shall have the following duties and
functions:
"(a) Post in the bulletin boards of the embassy or consulates or at the OFOV, as the
case may be, and in their respective websites, the names of the applicants and the
dates when their applications shall be heard, as well as the place where the RERB
will hold its hearing;
"(b) Notify, through the OFOV, all political parties and other parties concerned of the
pending applications through a weekly updated publication in the website of the
Commission;
"(c) Act on all applications received;
"(d) Notify all applicants, whose applications have been disapproved, stating the
reasons for such disapproval;
"(e) Prepare a list of all approved applications during each hearing and post the
same at the bulletin boards of the embassy or consulates or at the OFOV, as the
case may be, and in their respective websites;
"(f) Deactivate the registration records of overseas voters; and
"(g) Perform such other duties as may be consistent with its functions as provided
under this Act."

Section 8. A new Section 9 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 9. Petition for Exclusion, Motion for Reconsideration, Petition for Inclusion. "9.1. Petition for Exclusion. - If the application has been approved, any interested party may
file a petition for exclusion not later than one hundred eighty (180) days before the start of
the overseas voting period with the proper Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court in the City of
Manila or where the overseas voter resides in the Philippines, at the option of the petitioner.
"The petition shall be decided on the basis of the documents submitted within fifteen (15)
days from its filing, but not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the start of the
overseas voting period. Should the Court fail to render a decision within the prescribed
period, the ruling of the RERB shall be considered affirmed.
"9.2. Motion for Reconsideration. - If the application has been disapproved, the applicant or
the authorized representative shall have the right to file a motion for reconsideration before
the RERB within a period of five (5) days from receipt of the notice of disapproval. The
motion shall be decided within five (5) days after its filing on the basis of documents
submitted but not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the start of the overseas
voting period. The resolution of the RERB shall be immediately executory, unless reversed or
set aside by the Court.
"9.3. Petition for Inclusion. - Within ten (10) days from receipt of notice denying the motion
for reconsideration, the applicant may file a petition for inclusion with the proper
Municipal/Metropolitan Trial Court in the City of Manila or where the overseas voter resides
in the Philippines, at the option of the petitioner.
"The petition shall be decided on the basis of the documents submitted within fifteen (15)
days from filing, but not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the start of the
overseas voting period. Should the Court fail to render a decision within the, prescribed
period, the RERB ruling shall be considered affirmed.
"Qualified Philippine citizens abroad who have previously registered as voters pursuant to
Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the 'Voter's Registration Act of 1996, shall apply
for certification as overseas voters and for inclusion in the NROV. In case of approval, the
Election Officer concerned shall annotate the fact of registration/certification as overseas
voter before the voter's name as appearing in the certified voters' list and in the voter's
registration records."
Section 9. A new Section 10 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 10. Transfer of Registration Record. - In the event of change of voting venue, an
application for transfer of registration record must be filed by the overseas voter with the
OFOV, through its Chairperson, at least one hundred eighty (180) days prior to the start of
the overseas voting period: Provided, That those who would eventually vote in the
Philippines should register within the time frame provided for local registration in the
municipality, city or district where they intend to vote: Provided, further, That those who have
registered in the municipality, city or district where they resided prior to their departure
abroad need not register anew: Provided, finally, That transferees shall notify the OFOV,
through its Chairperson, of their transfer back to the Philippines at least one hundred eighty
(180) days prior to the next national elections for purposes of cancelling their names from the
CLOV and of removing their overseas voter's registration from the book of voters."

Section 10. Section 7 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 11 and is amended to read
as follows:
"SEC. 11. System of Continuing Registration. - The Commission shall ensure that the
benefits of the system of continuing registration are extended to qualified overseas voters.
Registration shall commence not later than six (6) months after the conduct of the last
national elections. Towards this end, the Commission shall be authorized to utilize and
optimize the use of existing facilities, personnel and mechanisms of the various government
agencies for purposes of data gathering and validation, information dissemination and
facilitation of the registration process.
"Pre-departure Orientation Seminars (PDOS), services and mechanisms offered and
administered by the DFA, the DOLE, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA), the Overseas Workers' Welfare Administration (OWWA), the Commission on
Filipinos Overseas and by other appropriate agencies of the government and private
agencies providing the same services shall include the salient features of this Act and shall
be utilized for purposes of supporting the overseas registration and voting processes.
"All employment contracts processed and approved by the POEA shall state the right of
migrant workers to exercise their constitutional right of suffrage within the limits provided for
by this Act."
Section 11. Section 8 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 12 and is amended to read
as follows:
"SEC. 12. Requirements for Registration. - Every Filipino registrant shall be required to
furnish the following documents:
"(a) A valid Philippine passport. In the absence of a valid passport, a certification of
the DFA that it has reviewed the appropriate documents submitted by the applicant
and has found them sufficient to warrant the issuance of a passport, or that the
applicant is a holder of a valid passport but is unable to produce the same for a valid
reason;
"(b) Accomplished registration form prescribed by the Commission; and
"(c) Applicants who availed themselves of the 'Citizen Retention and Reacquisition
Act' (Republic Act No. 9225) shall present the original or certified true copy of the
order of approval of their application to retain or reacquire their Filipino citizenship
issued by the post or their identification certificate issued by the Bureau of
Immigration.
"The Commission may also require, additional data to facilitate registration and
recording. No information other than those necessary to establish the identity and
qualification of the applicant shall be required.
1wphi1

"All applications for registration and/or certification as an overseas voter shall be considered
as applications to vote overseas. An overseas voter is presumed to be abroad until she/he
applies for transfer of her/his registration records or requests that her/his name be cancelled
from the NROV."

Section 12. Section 9 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 13 and is amended to read
as follows:
"SEC. 13. National Registry of Overseas Voters (NROV). - The Commission shall maintain a
National Registry of Overseas Voters or NROV containing the names of registered overseas
voters and the posts where they are registered.
"Likewise, the Commission shall maintain a registry of voters (ROV) per municipality, city or
district containing the names of registered overseas voters domiciled therein. The
Commission shall provide each and every municipality, city or district with a copy of their
respective ROVS for their reference."
Section 13. A new Section 14 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 14. Deactivation of Registration. - The RERB shall deactivate and remove the
registration records of the following persons from the corresponding book of voters and place
the same, properly marked and dated, in the inactive file after entering any of the following
causes of deactivation:
"(a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment by a Philippine court or
tribunal to suffer imprisonment for not less than one (1) year, such disability not
having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any
person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall automatically reacquire the
right to vote upon the expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence, as
certified by the Clerks of Courts of the Municipal, Municipal Circuit, Metropolitan,
Regional Trial Courts or the Sandiganbayan;
"(b) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent, unless
such disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper
authority that such person is no longer insane or incompetent;
"(c) Any person who did not vote in two (2) consecutive national elections as shown
by voting records; and
"(d) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the courts.
"The fact of deactivation shall be annotated in the NROV and the corresponding ROV."
Section 14. Section 10 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 15.
"SEC. 15. Notice of Registration and Election. - The Commission shall, through the posts
cause the publication in a newspaper of general circulation of the place, date and time of the
holding of a regular or special national election and the requirements for the participation of
qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad, at least six (6) months before the date set for the
filing of applications for registration.
"The Commission shall determine the countries where publication shall be made, and the
frequency thereof, taking into consideration the number of overseas Filipinos present in such
countries. Likewise, the Commission and the DFA shall post the same in their respective
websites."

Section 15. Sections 11 and 12 of the same Act are hereby deleted.
Section 16. A new Section 16 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 16. Reactivation of Registration. - Any overseas voter whose registration has been
deactivated pursuant to the preceding section may file with the RERB at any time, but not
later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the start of the overseas voting period, a
sworn application for reactivation of registration stating that the grounds for the deactivation
no longer exist."
Section 17. A new Section 17 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC 17. Cancellation of Registration. - The RERB shall cancel the registration records of
those who have died, as certified by either the posts or by the local civil registrar, and those
who have been proven to have lost their Filipino citizenship."
Section 18. A new Section 18 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 18. Voters Excluded from the NROV Through Inadvertence. - Any registered overseas
voter whose name has been inadvertently omitted from the NROV may, personally or
through an authorized representative, file with the RERB through the OFOV or the post
exercising jurisdiction over the voter's residence, an application under oath for reinstatement
not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before the start of the voting period.
"The RERB shall resolve the application within one (1) month from receipt thereof, otherwise
the application shall be deemed approved."
Section 19. A new Section 19 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 19. Application for Correction of Entries and Change of Name. - Any registered
overseas voter who intends to change her/his name by reason of marriage, death of
husband, or final court judgment; or to correct a mispelled name or any erroneous entry in
the NROV, CLOV and voter's identification card may, personally or through an authorized
representative, file an application under oath for change of name or correction of entries with
the RERB through the OFOV or the post exercising jurisdiction over the voter's residence not
later than ninety (90) days before the start of the voting period.
"The RERB shall resolve the application within one (1) month from receipt thereof, otherwise
the application shall be deemed approved."
Section 20. Section 13 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 20 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 20. Preparation and Posting of Certified List of Overseas Voters. - The Commission
shall prepare the Certified List of Overseas Voters or CLOV not later than ninety (90) days
before the start of the overseas voting period, and furnish within the same period electronic
and hard copies thereof to the appropriate posts, which shall post the same in their bulletin
boards and/or websites within ten (10) days from receipt thereof.
"Subject to reasonable regulation and the payment of fees in such amounts as may be fixed
by the Commission, the candidates, political parties, accredited citizens' arms, and all other

interested persons shall be furnished copies thereof: Provided, That nongovernmental

organizations and other civil society organizations accredited by and working with the
Commission as partners on overseas voters' education and participation shall be exempt
from the payment of fees."
Section 21. Section 14 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 21 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 21. Printing and Transmittal of Ballots, Voting Instructions, Election Forms and
Paraphernalia. "21.1. The Commission shall cause the printing of ballots for overseas voters, and all other
accountable election forms in such number as may be necessary, but in no case shall these
exceed the total number of approved applications. Security markings shall be used in the
printing of ballots for overseas voters.
"21.2. The Commission shall present to the authorized representatives of the DFA and of the
accredited major political parties the ballots for overseas voters, voting instructions, election
forms and other election paraphernalia for scrutiny and inspection prior to their transmittal to
the posts.
"21.3. The Commission shall transmit, as far as practicable, but not later than forty-five (45)
days before the day of elections, by special pouch to all posts the exact number of ballots for
overseas voters corresponding to the number of approved applications, along with such
accountable forms necessary to ensure the secrecy and integrity of the election.
"21.4. The authorized representatives of accredited major political parties shall have the right
to be present in all phases of printing, transmittal, and casting of mailed ballots abroad.
Unclaimed ballots properly marked as such, shall be cancelled and shipped to the
Commission by the least costly method."
Section 22. Section 15 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 22 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 22. Regulation on Campaigning Abroad. - Personal campaigning, the use of campaign
materials, as well as the limits on campaign spending shall be governed by the laws and
regulations applicable in the Philippines: Provided, That all forms of campaigning abroad
within the thirty (30)-day overseas voting period shall be prohibited."
Section 23. A new Section 23 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 23. Voting. - Voting may be done either personally, by mail or by any other means as
may be determined by the Commission. For this purpose, the Commission shall issue the
necessary guidelines on the manner and procedures of voting.
"The OFOV, in consultation with the DFA-OVS, shall determine the countries where voting
shall be done by any specific mode, taking into consideration the minimum criteria
enumerated under this Act which shall include the number of registered voters, accessibility
of the posts, efficiency of the host country's applied system and such other circumstances
that may affect the conduct of voting.

"The Commission shall announce the specific mode of voting per country/post at least one
hundred twenty (120) days before the start of the voting period."
Section 24. Section 16 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 24 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 24. Casting and Submission of Ballots. "24.1. Upon receipt by the SBEI of the ballots for overseas voters, voting instructions,
election forms and other paraphernalia, they shall make these available on the premises to
the qualified overseas voters in their respective jurisdictions during the thirty (30) days before
the day of elections when overseas voters may cast their vote. Immediately upon receiving it,
the overseas voter must fill-out her/his ballot personally, in secret, without leaving the
premises of the posts concerned.
"24.2. The overseas voter shall personally accomplish her/his ballot at the post that has
jurisdiction over the country where she/he temporarily resides or at any polling place
designated and accredited by the Commission.
"24.3. The overseas voter shall cast her/his ballot, upon presentation of the voter
identification card issued by the Commission or such other documents deemed by the SBEI
at the post as sufficient to establish the voter's identity.
"24.4. x x x
"24.5. The posts concerned shall keep a complete record of the ballots for overseas voters,
specifically indicating the number of ballots they actually received, and in cases where voting
by mail is allowed under Section 25 hereof, the names and addresses of the voters to whom
these ballots were sent, including proof of receipt thereof. In addition, the posts shall submit
a formal report to the Commission and the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created
under this Act within thirty (30) days from the day of elections. Such report shall contain data
on the number of ballots cast and received by the offices, the number of invalid and
unclaimed ballots and other pertinent data.
"24.6. Ballots not claimed by the overseas voters at the posts, in case of personal voting,
and ballots returned to the posts concerned, in the case of voting by mail, shall be cancelled
and shipped to the Commission by the least costly method within six (6) months from the day
of elections.
"24.7. Only ballots cast, and mailed ballots received by the posts concerned in accordance
with Section 25 hereof before the close of voting on the day of elections shall be counted in
accordance with Section 27 hereof. All envelopes containing the ballots received by the
posts after the prescribed period shall not be opened, and shall be cancelled and shipped to
the Commission by the least costly method within six (6) months from the day of elections.
"24.8. A special ballot Reception and Custody Group composed of three (3) members shall
be constituted by the Commission from among the staff of the posts concerned, including
their attached agencies, and citizens of the Philippines abroad, who will be deputized to
receive ballots and take custody of the same preparatory to their transmittal to the SBEI.
"24.9. x x x

"24.10. x x x."
Section 25. Section 17 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 25 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 25. Voting by Mail. "25.1. x x x
"(a) x x x;
"(b) x x x; and
"(c) x x x.
"25.2. The overseas voter shall send her/his accomplished ballot to the corresponding post
that has jurisdiction over the country where she/he temporarily resides. She/He shall be
entitled to cast her/his ballot at any time upon her/his receipt thereof: Provided, That the
same is received before the close of voting on the day of elections. The overseas absentee
voter shall be instructed that her/his ballot shall not be counted if not transmitted in the
special envelope furnished her/him.
"25.3. Only mailed ballots received by the post before the close of voting on the day of
elections shall be counted in accordance with Section 27 hereof. All envelopes containing
the ballots received by the posts after the prescribed period shall not be opened, and shall
be cancelled and disposed of appropriately, with a corresponding report thereon submitted to
the Commission not later than thirty (30) days from the day of elections."
Section 26. A new Section 26 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 26. Voting Privilege of Members of the SBEI, SBRCG and SBOC. - Government
employees posted abroad who will perform election duties as members of the SBEI, SBCRG
and SBOC shall be allowed to vote in their respective posts: Provided, That they are
registered either in the Philippines or as overseas voters."
Section 27. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 27 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 27. On-Site Counting and Canvassing. "27.1. x x x
"27.2. For these purposes, the Commission shall constitute as many SBEIs as may be
necessary to conduct and supervise the counting of votes as provided in Section 27.2
hereof. The SBEIs to be constituted herein shall be composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members, one (1) of whom shall be designated as poll clerk. The ambassador or consulgeneral, or any career public officer posted abroad designated by the Commission, as the
case may be, shall act as the Chairman; in the absence of other government officers, the two
(2) other members shall be citizens of the Philippines who are qualified to vote under this Act
and deputized by the Commission not later than sixty (60) days before the day of elections.

All resolutions of the SBEIs on issues brought before it during the conduct of its proceedings
shall be valid only when they carry the approval of the Chairman.
"Immediately upon the completion of the counting, the SBEIs shall transmit via facsimile
and/or electronic mail the results to the Commission in Manila and the accredited major
political parties.
"x x x
"27.3. x x x
"27.4. The SBOC composed of the highest ranking officer of the post as Chairperson, a
senior career officer from any of the government agencies maintaining a post abroad and, in
the absence of another government officer, a citizen of the Philippines qualified to vote under
this Act and deputized by the Commission, as vice chairperson and member-secretary,
respectively, shall be constituted to canvass the election returns submitted to it by the SBEIs.
Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairperson of the SBOC shall transmit
via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of transmission equally safe and reliable
the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of Votes to the Commission, and shall cause
to preserve the same immediately after the conclusion of the canvass, and make it available
upon instructions of the Commission. The SBOC shall also furnish the accredited major
political parties and accredited citizens' arms with copies thereof via facsimile, electronic mail
and any other means of transmission equally safe, secure and reliable.
"x x x
"27.5. x x x
"27.6. x x x. For purposes of this Act, the returns of every election for President and VicePresident prepared by the SBOCs shall be deemed a certificate of canvass of a city or a
province.
"27.7. x x x."
Section 28. A new Section 28 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 28. Authority to Explore Other Modes or Systems Using Automated Election System. Notwithstanding current procedures and systems herein provided, for the proper
implementation of this Act and in view of the peculiarities attendant to the overseas voting
process, the Commission may explore other more efficient, reliable and secure modes or
systems, ensuring the secrecy and sanctity of the entire process, whether paper-based,
electronic-based or internet-based technology or such other latest technology available, for
onsite and remote registration and elections and submit reports and/or recommendations to
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee."
Section 29. A new Section 29 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 29. Procurement of Facilities, Equipment, Materials, Supplies or Services. - To
achieve the purpose of this Act, the Commission may, likewise, procure from local or foreign
sources, through purchase, lease, rent or other forms of acquisition, hardware or software,

facilities, equipment, materials, supplies or services in accordance with existing laws, free
from taxes and import duties, subject to government procurement rules and regulations."
Section 30. A new Section 30 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 30. Establishment of an Office for Overseas Voting (OFOV) Under the Commission. The Commission is hereby authorized to establish an OFOV tasked specifically to oversee
and supervise the effective implementation of the Overseas Voting Act: Provided, That its
secretariat shall come from the existing secretariat personnel of the Commission on
Elections."
Section 31. A new Section 31 of the same Act is hereby inserted to read as follows:
"SEC. 31. Creation of the Department of Foreign Affairs Overseas Voting Secretariat (DFAOVS). - A secretariat based in the DFA home office is hereby created to assist the OFOV,
and to direct, coordinate and oversee the participation of the DFA in the implementation of
the Overseas Voting Act: Provided, That its secretariat shall come from the existing
secretariat personnel of the DFA."
Section 32. Section 19 of the same Act is hereby deleted.
Section 33. Section 20 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 32 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 32. Information Campaign. - The Commission, in coordination with agencies
concerned, shall undertake an information campaign to educate the public on the manner of
overseas voting for qualified overseas voters. It may require the support and assistance of
the DFA, through the posts, the DOLE, the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC), the POEA, the OWWA
and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas.
Such information campaign shall educate the Filipino public, within and outside the
Philippines, on the Philippine Electoral System, the rights of overseas voters, overseas
voting processes and other related concerns. Information materials shall be developed by
the Commission for distribution, through the said government agencies and private
organizations. No government agency shall prepare, print, distribute or post any information
material without the prior approval of the Commission."
Section 34. Section 21 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 33.
Section 35. Section 22 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 34 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 34. Assistance from Government Agencies. - All government officers, particularly from
the DFA, the DOLE, the DOTC, the PPC, the POEA, the OWWA, the Commission on
Filipinos Overseas and other government offices concerned with the welfare of the Filipinos
overseas shall, to the extent compatible with their primary responsibilities, assist the
Commission in carrying out the provisions of this Act. All such agencies or officers thereof
shall take reasonable measures to expedite all election activities, which the Commission
shall require of them. When necessary, the Commission may send supervisory teams
headed by career officers to assist the posts.

"Likewise, consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas voting
processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas voters."
Section 36. Section 23 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 35 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 35. Security Measures to Safeguard the Secrecy and Sanctity of Ballots. - At all
stages of the electoral process, the Commission shall ensure that the secrecy and integrity
of the ballots are preserved. The OFOV of the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring
the secrecy and sanctity of the overseas voting process. In the interest of transparency, all
necessary and practicable measures shall be adopted to allow representation of the
candidates, accredited major political parties, accredited citizens' arms and nongovernment
organizations to assist, and intervene in appropriate cases, in all stages of the electoral
exercise and to prevent any and all forms of fraud and coercion.
"No officer or member of the foreign service corps, including those belonging to attached
agencies shall be transferred, promoted, extended, recalled or otherwise moved from his
current post or position one (1) year before and three (3) months after the day of elections,
except upon the approval of the Commission."
Section 37. Section 24 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 36 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 36. Prohibited Acts. - In addition to the prohibited acts provided by law, it shall be
unlawful:
"36.1. For any officer or employee of the Philippine government to influence or
attempt to influence any person covered by this Act to vote, or not to vote, for a
particular candidate. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to prohibit free discussion
regarding politics or candidates for public office;
"36.2. For any person to deprive another of any right secured in this Act, or to give
false information as to one's name, address, or period of residence for the purposes
of establishing the eligibility or ineligibility to register or vote under this Act; or to
conspire with another person for the purpose of encouraging the giving of false
information in order to establish the eligibility or ineligibility of any individual to
register or vote under this Act; or, to pay, or offer to pay, or to accept payment either
for application for registration, or for voting;
"36.3. For any person to steal, conceal, alter, destroy, mutilate, manipulate, or in any
way tamper with the mail containing the ballots for overseas voters, the ballot, the
election returns, or any record, document or paper required for purposes of this Act;
"36.4. For any deputized agent to refuse without justifiable ground, to serve or
continue serving, or to comply with one's sworn duties after acceptance of the
deputization;
"36.5. For any public officer or employee or accredited or deputized organization or
association to cause the preparation, printing, distribution or posting of information or
material, without the prior approval of the Commission;

"36.6. For any public officer or employee to cause the transfer, promotion, extension,
recall of any member of the foreign service corps, including members of the attached
agencies, or otherwise cause the movement of any such member from the current
post or position one (1) year before and three (3) months after the day of elections,
without securing the prior approval of the Commission;
"36.7. For any person who, after being deputized by the Commission to undertake
activities in connection with the implementation of this Act, shall campaign for or
assist, in whatever manner, candidates in the elections;
"36.8. For any person to engage in partisan political activity abroad during the thirty
(30)-day overseas voting period;
"36.9. For any person who is not a citizen of the Philippines to participate, by word or
deed, directly or indirectly through qualified organizations/associations, in any
manner and at any stage of the Philippine political process abroad, including
participation in the campaign and elections.
"The provision of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, and with due regard
to the Principle of Double Criminality, the prohibited acts described in this section are
electoral offenses and shall be punishable in the Philippines.
"The penalties imposed under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, as
amended, shall be imposed on any person found guilty of committing any of the
prohibited acts as defined in this section: Provided, That the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person found guilty under
Section 36.3 hereof without the benefit of the operation of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. If the offender is a public officer or a candidate, the penalty shall
beprision mayor in its maximum period. In addition, the offender shall be sentenced
to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to
vote."
Section 38. Section 25 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 37 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 37. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. - A Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairperson of the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators
designated by the Senate President, and the Chairperson of the House Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of
Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House
of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority to include the chair of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the remaining three (3) from the minority.
"The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor and evaluate
the implementation of this Act."
Section 39. Sections 26, 27 and 28 of the same Act are hereby renumbered as Sections 38, 39 and
40, respectively.

Section 40. Section 29 of the same Act is hereby renumbered as Section 41 and is amended to
read as follows:
"SEC. 41. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall
be included in the budgets of the Commission on Elections and the DFA in the annual
General Appropriations Act."
Section 41. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The Commission shall promulgate rules and
regulations for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of this Act within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity thereof.
In the formulation of the rules and regulations, the Commission shall coordinate with the DFA, the
DOLE, the POEA, the OWWA and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas. Nongovernment
organizations and accredited Filipino organizations or associations abroad shall be consulted.
Section 42. Amending Clause. - Consistent with the amendments introduced by this Act, Section 2
of Republic Act No. 9189, on the declaration of policy, is, hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of
honest and orderly overseas voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.
Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right."
Section 43. Separability Clause. - If any part or provision of this Act shall be declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue
to be in full force and effect.
Section 44. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations, other issuances and parts thereof which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 45. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,

(Sgd.) JUAN PONCE ENRILE

President of the Senate

(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.

Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 3312 and House Bill No. 6542 was finally passed
by the Senate and the House of Representatives on February 5, 2013 and February 6, 2013,
respectively.

(Sgd.) EDWIN B. BELLEN

Acting Senate Secretary

(Sgd.) MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary General
House of Representatives

Approved: MAY 27 2013

(Sgd.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
President of the Philippines

ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity
as Executive Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN,
Secretary
of
the
Department
of
Budget
and
Management, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the
subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used
and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
[1]

The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee
Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides
that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its
enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its
provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. The Court
has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds because
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
[2]

[3]

[4]

The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great number of
citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases whenever
the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people. This has been explicitly pronounced in Kapatiran ng
mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan, where the Court held:
[5]

Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of
the cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the

discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
has taken cognizance of these petitions.
[6]

Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the constitutional
right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited by
the vice of prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or
before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as
required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. In Taada vs. Angara, the Court held:
[7]

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.
The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate)
remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy
as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by
constitutional mandate to decide.
In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has been expressed that it
is illogical to await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the
controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. In yet another case, the Court said
that:
[8]

. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is
convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will
be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning
and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are
irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as
intimidation, for all the awesome power of the Congress and Executive, the Court will
not hesitate to make the hammer fall heavily, where the acts of these departments, or
of any official, betray the peoples will as expressed in the Constitution . . .
[9]

The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further
buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the
1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court
resolves the instant petition and determine whether Congress has acted within the
limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it.
[10]

[11]

The petitioner raises three principal questions:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters
who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere
act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list
representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the
constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that
the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections shall promulgate without violating the
independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution?
The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?
Section 5(d) provides:

Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this
Act:
.........
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the

Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court
in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a
green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines.
[12]

Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not allow
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to
vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the
requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon
which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted to anyone
who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications provided for by
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
[13]

[14]

Respondent COMELEC refrained from commenting on this issue.

[15]

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor General filed his
comment for all public respondents. He contraposes that the constitutional challenge to
Section 5(d) must fail because of the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that
said provision of law is repugnant to the Constitution. He stresses: All laws are
presumed to be constitutional; by the doctrine of separation of powers, a department of
government owes a becoming respect for the acts of the other two departments; all laws
are presumed to have adhered to constitutional limitations; the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible, and just law.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions. Thus, he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives wherein the Court held that the term residence has been understood
to be synonymous with domicile under both Constitutions. He further argues that a
person can have only one domicile but he can have two residences, one permanent
(the domicile) and the other temporary; and that the definition and meaning given to
the term residence likewise applies to absentee voters. Invoking Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC which reiterates the Courts ruling in Faypon vs. Quirino, the Solicitor
General maintains that Filipinos who are immigrants or permanent residents abroad
may have in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile.
[16]

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

Taking issue with the petitioners contention that green card holders are considered
to have abandoned their Philippine domicile, the Solicitor General suggests that the
Court may have to discard its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals in so far as it relates
to immigrants and permanent residents in foreign countries who have executed and
submitted their affidavits conformably with Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains
that through the execution of the requisite affidavits, the Congress of the Philippines
with the concurrence of the President of the Republic had in fact given these immigrants
and permanent residents the opportunity, pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the
Constitution, to manifest that they had in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile;
[21]

that indubitably, they would have formally and categorically expressed the requisite
intentions, i.e., animus manendi and animus revertendi; that Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents abroad possess the unquestionable right to exercise the right of
suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution upon approval of their registration,
conformably with R.A. No. 9189.
[22]

The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the phrase,
qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad as it appears in R.A. No. 9189, to wit:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of
honest and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified
citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act:
a) Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad, exercise their right to vote;
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
f) Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to
register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad on
the day of elections. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. (Emphasis
supplied)
in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:

SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or
other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be

exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law, (3)
at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least one
year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those disqualified
from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval
of his/her registration under said Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to
qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote. He
focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional
infirmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2
empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the
impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and
abandoned the Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a
provision in the law enfranchising those who do not possess the residency requirement
of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intent to
return to the Philippines within a given period, risks a declaration of
unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent than real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
[23]

Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs.

COMELEC, the Court said:

. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within

constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on
the courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every
statute is first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.
[24]

Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly:

. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution

must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some
public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law
there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits,
the statute allows it to be done.
[25]

As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos, it

behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the
Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the
Constitution should be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon, the Court
held that a constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its substance and
its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by
express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest. The
intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the document
itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through
their debates in the constitutional convention.
[26]

[27]

[28]

R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph of
Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting
by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the
absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as
defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the
significance of absentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. It is
viewed thus:

The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct
from the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting
from that previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of
voting. The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election
is purely statutory; absentee voting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the
common law.
Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions devised to
accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it
impracticable for them to attend their polling places on the day of election, and the
privilege of absentee voting may flow from constitutional provisions or be conferred
by statutes, existing in some jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the
casting and reception of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent
on election day from the district or precinct of their residence.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute
right. When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate
with equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature
may be limited in their application to particular types of elections. The statutes
should be construed in the light of any constitutional provisions affecting
registration and elections, and with due regard to their texts prior to amendment and
to predecessor statutes and the decisions thereunder; they should also be construed in

the light of the circumstances under which they were enacted; and so as to carry out
the objects thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to their provisions and
mandates. Further, in passing on statutes regulating absentee voting, the court
should look to the whole and every part of the election laws, the intent of the entire
plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and try to give effect to every portion
thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
[29]

Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the
same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and
the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered
synonymous with domicile.
[30]

In Romualdez-Marcos, the Court enunciated:

[31]

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of
habitual residence. In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to
mean an individuals permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business
or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent. Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite
perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various
places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various
reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of
choice. InUytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have
a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A
man can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of

domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence

without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile. (Emphasis supplied)
[32]

Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence in
this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that impelled
them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting, thus:

MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage,
which here has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens temporarily residing
or working abroad. Based on the statistics of several government agencies, there ought
to be about two million such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier
pointed out that these provisions are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions
of 1935 and 1973, with the exception of the last paragraph. They could not therefore
have foreseen at that time the phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force
explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and
employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate communities of
workers are to be found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in the
world.
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies,
the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that there was no
insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos
overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong
temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And those
who on their own or under pressure of economic necessity here, find that they have to
detach themselves from their families to work in other countries with definite tenures
of employment. Many of them are on contract employment for one, two, or three
years. They have no intention of changing their residence on a permanent basis, but
are technically disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage in their countries of
destination by the residential requirement in Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified
by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the election.

I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might entertain an
amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for Filipino citizens
an effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just saying
that, I would like to make a comment on the meaning of residence in the Constitution
because I think it is a concept that has been discussed in various decisions of the
Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954 case which
dealt precisely with the meaning of residence in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying
goes, to improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, reengaging in business.When an election is to be held, the citizen who
left his birthplace to improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast
his ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of
such residence of origin.
In other words, residence in this provision refers to two residence qualifications:
residence in the Philippines and residence in the place where he will vote. As far as
residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word residence means domicile, but as
far as residence in the place where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the
meaning seems to be different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is
a resident of a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there may
be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the person
who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast in the place of his
domicile.
MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should enjoy
the right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these overseas Filipino
communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that when this Article of the
Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to

Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of global proportions. In effect,
this will require budgetary and administrative commitments on the part of the
Philippine government, mainly through the COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of this mechanism that will be put
in place to make effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in some wise
jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the right of
suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have mentioned. But I want to thank the
Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may be entertained at the
proper time. . . . . . . . . .
[33]

(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of
Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no
small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as
the choice of this countrys leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and
considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting
overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially
because the Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters:

MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if
the term absentee voting also includes transient voting; meaning, those who are, let us
say, studying in Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for instance, in
Mindanao, to cast their votes.
MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.
MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the places where
they are registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for allowing
students and military people who are temporarily in another place to register and vote.
I believe that those situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election Code. The
reason we want absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a mandate to the
legislature is that there could be inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a
question of legislation by Congress. So, by allowing it and saying that this is
possible, then legislation can take care of the rest. (Emphasis supplied)
[34]

Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to
the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any
problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest
number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional

Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee

voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the residency
requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on the proposed
system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening:

MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain
qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory
requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right of suffrage by the absentee
voters like Filipinos abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas,
that the domicile requirements as well as the qualifications and disqualifications
would be the same.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system?
FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.
FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the residence
requirement or the place where they vote in practice; the understanding is that it is
flexible. For instance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he
satisfies the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the Committee to change
the word Filipinos to QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of VOTING BY
FILIPINOS ABROAD, it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the
Committee wants QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD, would that not satisfy
the requirement?
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS ABROAD because QUALIFIED would assume that he has the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.
MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?
FR. BERNAS. QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD?
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed
amendment, I specifically stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a system
which will enable qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to vote.
According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase absentee voting already
took that into account as its meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens
temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to
registration we will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to require
where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be
continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can be a system of registration in
the embassies. However, we do not like to preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsods amendment is only to
provide a system.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new
qualifications for these absentee voters.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
[35]

Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to

Congress the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications
of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This
is in fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified
Filipinos abroad with respect to the system of absentee voting that Congress should
draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the
adjective qualified with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote. In fine-tuning the provision on
absentee voting, the Constitutional Commission discussed how the system should work:

MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the record that in
the case of qualified Filipino citizens residing abroad and exercising their right of
suffrage, they can cast their votes for the candidates in the place where they were
registered to vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for example, if
they are registered in Angeles City, they could not vote for a mayor in Naga City.
In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote
only for the local and national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to make that
clear for the record.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?
MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of Commissioner Suarez
that this envisions Filipinos residing abroad. The understanding in the amendment
is that the Filipino is temporarily abroad. He may not be actually residing abroad;
he may just be there on a business trip. It just so happens that the day before the
elections he has to fly to the United States, so he could not cast his vote. He is
temporarily abroad, but not residing there. He stays in a hotel for two days and
comes back. This is not limited only to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad.
Butas long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the elections, then he
can fall within the prescription of Congress in that situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification. Precisely, we need
this clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by temporarily abroad,
it need not be on very short trips. One can be abroad on a treaty traders visa.
Therefore, when we talk about registration, it is possible that his residence is in
Angeles and he would be able to vote for the candidates in Angeles,
but Congress or the Assembly may provide the procedure for registration,
like listing ones name, in a registry list in the embassy abroad. That is still
possible under the system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if Commissioner Monsod agrees
with this.

Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who reaches the voting
age while living abroad and he has never registered here. Where will he register?
Will he be a registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to comply with
the registration requirements in an embassy in the United States and his name is
then entered in the official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los Angeles, but a
registered voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the Philippines to
comply with the registration procedure here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to inquire if there are
more clarifications needed from the body.

Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more registered
Commissioners to propose amendments. So I move that we close the period of
amendments.
[36]

(Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission

that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend
to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is in
the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional
provisions, the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section
1 with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect
declared that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote
even though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
[37]

That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency

requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate
when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the
Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to the
constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.

Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, Suffrage. It says:

Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote
for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the
Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They have changed residence so
they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee
amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of the bill will have any
effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in various
fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the interpretation here of
residence is synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return to ones
home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the
Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for
example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him
qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that we that Congress
must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as demanding
physical presence, then there is no way we can provide for offshore voting
to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in Section 2 of Article V, it
reads: The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity
of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words,
anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be
anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification,
they cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called green-card holders, but the
Constitution is the Constitution. We cannot compromise on this. The Senate
cannot be a party to something that would affect or impair the Constitution.
Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano lives. We are
separated only by a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros
unless he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our Constitution
is. I am not talking even about the Election Code. I am talking about the
Constitution.

As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes, he may do so.
But he must do so, make the transfer six months before the election, otherwise, he
is not qualified to vote.
That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a fundamental difference
here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a point already welldebated even in the constitutional commission of 1986. And the reason Section
2 of Article V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year residency
requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes
absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year residency
requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence and I think this is so
well-entrenched that one need not argue about it residency has been interpreted
as synonymous with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow the
interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally
impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not
physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is
exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and empower
them to vote.
[38]

(Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee
voting process, to wit:

SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the
assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:

SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this
Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined
under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed

by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to

vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration
of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission
may take cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on
the basis of reciprocity and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by
the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of
his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by
competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine
embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such
competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies
an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country
because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of
ones residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and
permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an
affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the
constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of
suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise,
if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee
voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of
the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency
in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had
not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the
execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to
vote in a political exercise.

To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents abroad

because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have relinquished
their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the presumption of
abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings discloses another
reason why the Senate required the execution of said affidavit. It wanted the affiant to
exercise the option to return or to express his intention to return to his domicile of origin
and not to preempt that choice by legislation. Thus:
Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.
It states that: For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired permanent resident
status abroad, a requirement for the registration is the submission of a Sworn
Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before any Philippine embassy or
consulate official authorized to administer oath
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the purpose of this
Sworn Declaration to include only those who have the intention of returning to be
qualified to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant has no
purpose of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from exercising this right to
suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we want to be
expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That as long as he is a Filipino, no
matter whether he is a green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be
authorized to vote. But if he is already a green-card holder, that means he
has acquired permanent residency in the United States, then he must
indicate an intention to return. This is what makes for the definition of
domicile. And to acquire the vote, we thought that we would require the
immigrants and the green-card holders . . . Mr. President, the three administration
senators are leaving, maybe we may ask for a vote [Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The rationale for
the requirement that an immigrant or a green-card holder should file an affidavit
that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an immigrant or a
green-card holder, that means he may not return to the country any more and that
contradicts the definition of domicile under the law.
But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide the choice to
the voter. The voter, after consulting his lawyer or after deliberation within the
family, may decide No, I think we are risking our permanent status in the United
States if we file an affidavit that we want to go back. But we want to give him the
opportunity to make that decision. We do not want to make that decision for
him. [39] (Emphasis supplied)

The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card holders
are disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application to the present case
because theCaasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting
rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.

In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they may
still be considered as a qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad upon fulfillment of the
requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right
of suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a
promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three years from approval of his/her registration, the Filipinos abroad must also declare
that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to
the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of
their names from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter
permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not
actually abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the
Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other
foreign service establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over the country
where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections, while
providing for safeguards to a clean election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:

SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.

11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for
registration has been approved, including those previously registered under Republic
Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, file with the officer of the embassy,
consulate or other foreign service establishment authorized by the Commission, a
sworn written application to vote in a form prescribed by the Commission. The
authorized officer of such embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment
shall transmit to the Commission the said application to vote within five (5) days from
receipt thereof. The application form shall be accomplished in triplicate and submitted
together with the photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter certificate of
registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to,
the embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction over
the country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas
absentee voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas absentee
voter.

Contrary to petitioners claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,

Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that
Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad is not physically present in the country. The
provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee
voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the
affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not
to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become
an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines.
Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not
actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by
Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
Petitioners speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section 5(d) would
affect the credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is important is to ensure that
all those who possess the qualifications to vote on the date of the election are given the
opportunity and permitted to freely do so. The COMELEC and the Department of
Foreign Affairs have enough resources and talents to ensure the integrity and credibility
of any election conducted pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking to
return to the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by
Section 5(d) would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her
undertaking under the affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of immigrants renege on their
promise to return, the result of the elections would be affected and could even be a
ground to contest the proclamation of the winning candidates and cause further
confusion and doubt on the integrity of the results of the election. Indeed, the probability
that after an immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he shall opt to remain in his host
country beyond the third year from the execution of the affidavit, is not
farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of a legislative
exercise. As expressed in Taada vs. Tuvera, the Court is not called upon to rule on the
wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it impractical.
[40]

Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed the
expected problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino
who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under Section 9,
should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national
elections, his name may be ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas
Absentee Voters.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens to the
votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not able to return within three years
as promised?What is the effect on the votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of the
winning candidates? The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return
within three years shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the

date of the elections, but their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the
names of the immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and their permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find
Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in
contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for
president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.

.........
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning
candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has
not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein
has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such
country or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the
control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 empowering
the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it affects the
canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vicepresident, is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4,
Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:

SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate.Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives
in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and
due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in
case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall

forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of
the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
...
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph
4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that COMELEC
can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not the
President and Vice-President.
[41]

Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.

Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No.
9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning
candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:

18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special
Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means
of transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the
Statements of Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that
the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the
board of canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to
proclaim the winners for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the
hands of Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution?

Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A
(Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the
power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the
COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the
executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can
promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority
of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any
law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its Comment. It
agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are
unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of
unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution
providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been upheld
in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. where this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to
formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement regulations under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in
asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to
interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review
COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
[42]

[43]

The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rule-making
power, to wit:

SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in
not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the
following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion
for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and wellsecured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and
approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the
constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25
are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the
Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much as imply that Congress has
concurrent power to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by
the principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare
tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority
to the exclusion of all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of Section
17.1 are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question raised
by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress through
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis--vis the independence of the
COMELEC, as a constitutional body.
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:

SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional Oversight

Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other
Senators designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the
House of Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives: Provided, That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each
House of Congress, four (4) should come from the majority and the remaining three
(3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall
issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of
this Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing
Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no
question that the authority of Congress to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and
thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189 gives to
the JCOC the following functions: (a) to review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections 25
and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in
not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country determined
by COMELEC.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is circumscribed
by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of Article IX-A of the
1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as the COMELEC
shall be independent.
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there shall be
an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that [w]hatever may be the nature of the
functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the Constitution
wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the Government. In an
earlier case, the Court elucidated:
[44]

The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct

and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a
less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It
should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will
insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly
and honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless
these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not
interfere. Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with
realistically not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections,
because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in
a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions.

[45]

(Emphasis supplied)

The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an

independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to
review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein, it is not correct to hold that
because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws, Congress
may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers
over its rule-making authority.
[46]

By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the COMELEC
to issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of
this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of law follows the
usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law the legislature
grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and regulations
implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative expertise of
that agency in its particular field of operation. Once a law is enacted and approved, the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The legislative function may
spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that body deems it proper to
review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve, review, revise and
amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
[47]

By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option
but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval, and the second
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission, whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not
specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for
constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the
independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
Committee in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to
authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections;
and the phrase, only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as
they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004
elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove
the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC
pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189. Otherwise,
Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC.
[48]

During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the separate
opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the unconstitutionality of
Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as they relate to the creation of and
the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No.
9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to
wit: subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval; and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: It shall review,
revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated
by the Commission of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect only
to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the
Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and
proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with
Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law
continues to be in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

CORRAL, accused-appellant.

vs. IRENEO

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

Appellant herein, Ireneo Corral y Paladino, was charged in three separate

informations for two counts of rape and one count of acts of lasciviousness. He
was convicted on all three charges by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86 of Quezon
City. For each count of rape, appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. For
the acts of lasciviousness, he was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12
years and 1 day to 18 years, 2 months, and 20 days of reclusion temporal. He was
likewise ordered to pay the complainant P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00
as moral damages.
[1]

Appellant made a timely appeal to the Court of Appeals for his conviction for the
acts of lasciviousness. The two cases of rape are therefore now on automatic review
before this Court.
In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75096, the information alleged:

That on or about and prior to November 30, 1996 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously ordering the undersigned minor, 12 years of age, to
remove her T-shirt and then accused sucked her breast and removed her shorts and
panty and forcibly opened her thighs and inserted his penis inside her vagina and
thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will
and without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[2]

In Criminal Case No. Q-97-73195, the information alleged:

That on or about the 30th day of November, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously removing the short and panty of the undersigned, a minor,
twelve years of age, [his] stepdaughter and put [himself] on top of her and thereafter
[had] carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and
without her consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[3]

Upon being arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon the cases were
jointly tried.

The prosecution presented witnesses whose testimonies are as follows:

Complainant Jobell B. Galang was 13 years old when she testified. Sometime in
May, 1994, at around 9:00 oclock to 10:00 oclock in the evening, while she was
sleeping on the floor of her familys small shanty in Balintawak, Quezon City, she woke
up to find the appellant beside her. Complainant tried to run away, but he poked a knife
at her neck. Appellant removed his pants and then mounted the complainant, while
rubbing his penis against her vagina for about three to four minutes. Nothing more
happened that night.
[4]

After that incident, complainants family moved to another shanty in North Fairview,
Quezon City. Sometime in November, 1996, but prior to November 30, 1996, around
11:00 oclock in the evening, while complainant was again sleeping on the floor of their
shanty, the appellant, already naked, poked a balisong at her and ordered her to
remove her shorts and panties. He then made her lie on the floor and mounted her as
he tried to spread her legs. Complainant resisted, but appellant struck her legs. With her
legs already spread, appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellants dastardly
act would not have ended that night had it not been for a knock on the door. Appellant
then stood up and talked to the person who knocked.Complainant kept her silence since
appellant threatened to kill her mother, brothers, and sisters should she tell anybody
about her harrowing experience.
[5]

On November 30, 1996, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, while complainant
was again asleep, she was roused by the appellant who was removing her shorts and
panties. Again, complainant resisted but he slapped her hard three times. She lost
consciousness and when she woke up, she realized that she was already naked from
the waist down. Her vagina felt painful. When she urinated, she saw a smear of blood.
She only reported these incidents to the police on September 20, 1997, almost a year
after the last incident of rape occurred.
[6]

Dr. Cristina B. Freyra, Medico Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Crime Laboratory, examined the complainant on September 24, 1997. The examination
revealed that complainant sustained both deep and shallow healed lacerations in her
vagina, which appeared to have been inflicted more than seven days prior to the
examination. A hard and blunt object, such as an erect penis, may have caused these
lacerations. Her report reads, thus:
[7]

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female subject. Breast[s] are
hemispherical with dark brown areola and nipples from which no secretion could be
pressed out. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with
pinkish brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same disclosed

an elastic, fleshy-type hymen with a deep-healed laceration at 4 and shallow, healed

laceration at 9 oclock position. External vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to
the introduction of the examining index fin[g]er. Vaginal canal is narrow with
prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency.
CONCLUSION
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of
the examination.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram-negative diplococci and for
spermatozoa.
[8]

For its part, the defense presented three witnesses whose testimonies are, as
follows:
Amalia Galang testified that she is the mother of complainant. The complainant is
her daughter by a previous marriage. She has four other children, two girls and two
boys, who are all residing with her. In May, 1994, when their family was still residing at
Balingasa, Balintawak, Quezon City, she did not notice anything unusual with her
daughter. She testified that her daughter appeared happy and was, in fact, playing most
of the time. When they transferred to Fairview, Quezon City sometime around
November, 1996, her daughter was already in Grade Five. Again, she did not find
anything unusual with the actions of her daughter. The witness likewise testified that she
was at home on November 30, 1996, when the second rape allegedy occurred since
that day was a holiday. Her husband arrived home that night at around midnight. She
ate supper with her husband and watched television up to 2:00 oclock in the morning
before going to sleep. She usually sleeps beside her husband. The children sleep
beside her together with her husbands sister-in-law. She woke up at around 3:00 oclock
in the morning and while in bed, she did not notice anything unusual. Upon being asked
the question as to why her daughter would file these charges against appellant, she
answered that her uncle is using her daughter as a leverage against her husband in his
quarrel with the latter.
The second witness for the defense, Jobert Manonag, a neighbor of the family in
Fairview since 1996, testified that on November 30, 1996, he was watching television at
the house of the appellant from 8:00 oclock in the evening to 12:00 oclock
midnight. There were around five people in the house, the four children and appellants
sister-in-law. The appellant and his wife were still at work. Appellant had not yet arrived
when he left the house at around midnight.

The third witness for the defense was appellant himself. Appellant testified that he is
the common-law husband of complainants mother, Amalia Galang, with whom he has
three children. Complainant is the daughter of Amalia Galang by her first husband. On
the night of November 30, 1996, he was driving his tricycle until 10:00 oclock in the
evening. He arrived home at around past 11:00 oclock that night. His common-law wife
was already home as were their three children, the complainant, and his sister-inlaw. After talking to his wife for a short while, he went to sleep. He usually sleeps beside
his wife at the end of the room. Their house has only one room where they all
sleep. This room measures about five meters wide and five meters long. The
complainant sleeps on the other side of the room. He woke up the next day at 4:00
oclock in the morning together with his wife and he went back to driving his tricycle. The
children were still asleep when he went back to work. He denied ever raping the
complainant or committing acts of lasciviousness upon her.
On August 7, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as

follows:
1.) In Criminal Case No. Q-97-73195[,] the Court finds the accused Ireneo Corral y
Paladio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against Jobell
Galang y Bucalig, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of death.
2.) In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75096, the Court finds the same accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape committed against the same complainant, and
likewise sentences him to suffer the penalty of death.
3.) In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75097, the Court finds the same accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness in relation to Republic Act No.
7610 committed against the same complainant and hereby sentences him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days
of reclusion temporal.
The Court hereby orders the accused to indemnify the private complainant the amount
of P75,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

[9]

Appellant submits the following assignments of errors for the consideration of this
Court:
I.

Under the first and second informations, the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty despite the fact that the qualifying circumstance of use of deadly weapon was
not alleged in the informations.
II.
Under the first and second informations, the trial court erred in imposing the death
penalty despite the fact that the qualifying circumstance that the accused is the
common-law spouse of the parent of the victim was not alleged in the informations.[10]

Conviction or acquittal in a rape case more often than not depends almost entirely
on the credibility of the complainants testimony because, by the very nature of this
crime, it is usually only the victim who can testify as to its occurrence. In rape cases,
certain well-established principles and precepts are controlling. These are (a) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to the nature of the crime of
rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution, and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. The determination of the outcome of every
rape case hinges upon the credibility of the complainants testimony. If the complainant
testified in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and consistent manner, then she
is considered a credible witness and her testimony is worthy of judicial acceptance.
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best
undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination.
[11]

[12]

[13]

In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of complainant to be
straightforward, sincere, candid, and very consistent.
In Criminal Case No. Q-97-73195, complainant testified, as follows:
Q: On November 30, 1996 at around past 10:00 oclock in the evening, what did the
accused do to you if there was any?
A: He forcibly took off my shorts and panty.
Q: What did you do when he was forcibly removing your shorts and panty?
A: I resisted but he slapped me hard 3 times.
Q: And what happened to you when he slapped you?
A: I became unconscious.
Q: And when you woke up what did you observe if any?
A: I had no more shorts and panty on.
Q: And what did you do after that?
A: I cant do anything, I just cried and just covered myself with a blanket.
Q: What did you feel when you woke up?
A: When I woke up, I urinated, I felt pain in my vagina and I saw a smear [of] blood.

Q: Do you know the accused in this case?

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Kindly pinpoint.
A: (INTERPRETER) Witness eyeing a person who gave his name as Ireneo Corral, the
accused in this case.
Q: Was he the one who abused you?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: When did you report this incident?
A: On September 20, 1997.
Q: Why did it take almost a year before you reported the matter to the police?
A: Because he was threatening me not to report because he will kill my mother, and my
brothers and sister.
FISCAL SEMANA: That would be all for the witness.[14]

In Criminal Case No. Q-98-75096, the complainant testified, as follows:

Q: Sometime in November 1996 but prior to November 30, 1996, do you remember
where were you?
ATTY. VENTURANZA: We just like to repeat our objection, that it be noted.
COURT: The objection is duly noted by the Court.
A: I was at home.
Q: Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that all about?
A: It happened in our house in Fairview when my brothers and sister were the[re],
including myself. We were 3 in all and my stepfather was also there and something
happened.
Q: What is that unusual incident that took place?
A: What happened between me and my stepfather was, when he inserted his penis
into my vagina.
Q: How was he able to do that?
A: He was already naked during that time, he already removed his underwear.
Q: What about you, what did he do to you if there was any?
A: He told me to remove my shorts, my panty.
Q: Did you comply with his demand?
A: Because of fear I obeyed him.
Q: Why, what frightened you?

A: Because he also pointed a knife at me, (balisong).

Q: When you were asked to remove your garments what did he do thereafter?
A: After he ordered me to remove my shorts and panty[,] he told me to lie down.
Q: [On] [w]hat part of the house did you lie down?
A: On the floor.
Q: And after you [lay] down on the floor, what did your stepfather do to you?
A: He went on top of me.
Q: And after he went on top of you[,] what else did he do thereafter?
A: He inserted his penis into my vagina.
Q: When he went on top of you and thereafter he inserted his private part into your
private part, what did you do?
A: I resisted.
Q: And when you resisted[,] what did he do?
A: He was forcing me to spread my legs and when I refused he tried to strike me or hit
me.
Q: In what part of your body?
A: On my legs.
Q: And after he hit you on the legs what did he do thereafter?
A: After he hit my legs and after my legs were spread, he inserted his penis into my
vagina.
Q: And when he was able to insert his penis into your private part[,] what did he do?
A: That is all, he just inserted his penis.
Q: If you remember, how long did his penis stay or inserted into your private part?
A: I cannot remember anymore.
Q: After having inserted his penis into your private part, what did he do thereafter?
A: Because after he used me somebody knocked [on] the door and after that he told
me to dress up. So I did what he told me.
Q: And after having dressed up what else happened?
A: After I dressed up, he talked to that person who knocked at the door.[15]

During the trial, appellant interposed a denial as his defense. His denial, however,
could not prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As
between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth on one hand
and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
[16]

Appellant now does not challenge the findings of the court a quo and in fact adopts
the same in his Statement of Facts. He, however, argues that the two informations for
[17]

rape were silent as to the relationship of complainant and appellant. Hence, he claims,
the crimes committed were only simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua and not
death.
The relationship of complainant to the accused is a special qualifying circumstance
in the crime of rape and may raise the penalty from reclusion perpetua to that of
death. Hence, this circumstance must be alleged in the criminal complaint or information
and proved by the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. If these special qualifying
circumstances are not alleged, the crime committed would be simple rape and the
penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.
A stepdaughter is a daughter of ones spouse by a previous marriage. A stepfatherstepdaughter relationship presupposes a valid marriage between the mother of
complainant and appellant. The failure to allege the relationship between appellant
and the complainant in the information bars the formers conviction of rape in its qualified
form.
[18]

[19]

Appellant testified that he was not legally married to Amalia Galang:

Q: Can you tell us the date of your marriage with your wife Amalia Galang?
A: We are not legally married.
Q: You are telling us that you are only common-law spouses?
A: Yes, sir.[20]

The best evidence to prove the marriage between appellant and complainants
mother is a marriage contract. In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove a
legitimate marital relationship between appellant and Amalia Galang, complainants
mother.
[21]

Amalia Galangs claim during trial that appellant is her husband is

inconsequential. This claim did not dispense with the burden of the prosecution to
adduce in evidence the marriage contract of appellant and complainants
mother. Neither may the prosecution rely solely on the disputable presumption that
when a man and a woman who live together as husband and wife are presumed to be
married. Again, relationship is a qualifying circumstance in rape. Therefore, it must not
only be alleged in the information, but must also be proved beyond reasonable doubt in
the same way as the crime itself.
[22]

Appellant further claims that the information in Criminal Case No. Q-98-75096 did
not allege that he employed a deadly weapon in forcing complainant to submit to his
will. Hence, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua and not death.
This argument is correct. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, simple rape
is punishable by reclusion perpetua:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. --- Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
The said article further states:

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
However, this circumstance must be alleged in the information because it is in the
nature of a qualifying circumstance which increases the range of the penalty to include
death.
[23]

Neither may this circumstance be considered as a generic aggravating

circumstance. The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now explicitly mandates
that qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise
language in the complaint or information. When the law or rules specify certain
circumstances that can aggravate an offense or that would attach to such offense a
greater penalty than that ordinarily prescribed, such circumstances must be both
alleged and proved in order to justify the imposition of the increased penalty.
[24]

[25]

With respect to the awards of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as

moral damages, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, the same should be changed to
awards, for each of the two cases, of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as
moral damages.
[26]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Quezon City,
insofar as it finds appellant Ireneo Corral y Paladino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the two counts of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the death sentence
imposed by the trial court in each case is reduced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua in
each case. In addition, appellant is ordered to pay the offended party, Jobell B. Galang,
in each of the two cases, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr.,
JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago and Corona, JJ., on leave.

Republic Act No. 8189

June 11, 1996

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM

OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND
AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to systematize the present method of
registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:
a) Registration refers to the act of accomplishing and filing of a sworn application for
registration by a qualified voter before the election officer of the city or municipality wherein
he resides and including the same in the book of registered voters upon approval by the
Election Registration Board;
b) Registration Record refers to an application for registration duly approved by the Election
Registration Board;
c) Book of Voters refers to the compilation of all registration records in a precinct;
d) List of Voters refers to an enumeration of names of registered voters in a precinct duly
certified by the Election Registration Board for use in the election;
e) Illiterate or Disabled person refers to one who cannot by himself prepare an application for
registration because of his physical disability and/or inability to read and write;
f) Commission refers to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC);
g) Election Registration Board refers to the body constituted herein to act on all applications
for registration;
h) Voters Identification Number (VIN) refers to the number assigned by the Commission on
Elections to a registered voter that shall consist of three (3) parts: (1) The current address
(city/municipality and province); (2) the current precinct assignment of the voter and (3) the
permanent birth and name code unique to every voter;
i) Political Parties refer to local, regional or national political parties existing and duly
registered and accredited by the Commission;
j) Precinct refers to the basic unit of territory established by the Commission for the purpose
of voting;

k) Precinct Maps refers to a sketch or drawing of a geographical area stated in terms of

streets or street blocks or sitios the residents of which would belong to a particular precinct;
l) Polling place refers to the place where the Board of Election Inspectors conducts its
proceeding and where the voters cast their votes;
m) Voting center refers to the building or place where the polling place is located;
n) Election Officer refers to the highest official or authorized representative of the
Commission in a city or municipality; and
o) Board of Election Inspectors refers to the body which conducts the election in the polling
place of the precinct usually composed of three (3) public school teachers appointed by the
Commission.
Section 4. Permanent List of Voters. There shall be a permanent list of voters per precinct in each
city or municipality consisting of all registered voters residing within the territorial jurisdiction of every
precinct indicated by the precinct maps.
Such precinct-level list of voters shall be accompanied by an addition deletion list of the purpose of
updating the list.
For the purpose of the 1997 general registration, the Commission shall cause the preparation and
posting of all precinct maps in every barangay nationwide. Five days before the 1997 general
registration, individual precinct maps shall be posted at the door of each polling place. Subsequently,
the Election Officer shall be responsible for the display, throughout the year, of precinct maps in his
office and in the bulletin board of the city or municipal hall.
The precinct assignment of a voter in the permanent list of voters shall not be changed or altered or
transferred to another precinct without the express written consent of the voter: Provided, however,
That the voter shall not unreasonably withhold such consent. Any violation thereof shall constitute an
election offense which shall be punished in accordance with law.
Section 5. Precincts and their Establishment. In preparation for the general registration in 1997, the
Commission shall draw updated maps of all the precincts nationwide. Upon completion of the new
precinct maps, all the precincts established in the preceding elections shall be deemed abolished.
For the purpose of the general registration, the Commission shall create original precincts only. Spinoff precinct may be created after the regular elections of 1998 to accommodate additional voters
residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the original precincts.
The Commission shall introduce a permanent numbering of all precincts which shall be indicated by
Arabic numerals and a letter of the English alphabet. Original or mother precincts shall be indicated
by the Arabic numeral and letter "A of the English alphabet. Spin-off or daughter precincts shall be
indicated by the Arabic numeral and letter of the English alphabet starting with letter B and so on.

No territory comprising an election precinct shall be altered or a new precinct be established at the
start of the election period.
Splitting of an original precinct or merger of two or more original precincts shall not be allowed
without redrawing the precinct map/s one hundred twenty (120) days before election day.
Section 6. Arrangement of Precincts. Every barangay shall have at least one (1) precinct. Each
precinct, shall have no more than two hundred (200) voters and shall comprise contiguous and
compact territories.
a) A precinct shall be allowed to have less than 200 registered voters under the following
conditions:
1) As soon as the 200-limit for every precinct has been reached, a spin-off or
daughter precinct shall be created automatically by the Commission to accommodate
voters residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the original precinct. Thereafter, a
separate list of new voters shall be prepared by the Election Officer; and
2) An island or group of islands with less than two hundred (200) voters may
comprise one (1) original precinct.
b) Every case of alteration of precincts shall be duly announced by posting a notice thereof
in a conspicuous place in the precinct, in the office of the election officer and in the city or
municipal hall and by providing political parties and candidates a list of all the precincts at the
start of the campaign period; and
c) Consolidation or merger of at most three (3) precincts may be allowed: Provided, That the
computerized counting shall be implemented: Provided, further, That the merger of such
precincts shall be effected ninety (90) days before election day.
Section 7. General Registration of Voters. Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the
existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposed of the May
1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives, and recalls subsequent thereto,
the Commission shall undertake a general registration of voters before the Board of Election
Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21, and 22 and, subject to the discretion of the Commission, on June 28
and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.
Section 8. System of Continuing Registration of Voters. The personal filing of application of
registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer during regular office
hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty
(120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
Section 9. Who may Register. All citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who
are at least eighteen (18) years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one
(1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately
preceding the election, may register as a voter.

Any person who temporarily resides in another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his
occupation, profession, employment in private or public service, educational activities, work in the
military or naval reservations within the Philippines, service in the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
the National Police Forces, or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance
with law, shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.
Any person, who, on the day of registration may not have reached the required age or period of
residence but, who, on the day of the election shall possess such qualifications, may register as a
voter.
Section 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of
voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To
register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as prescribed
by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours
after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
a) Name, surname, middle name, and/or maternal surname;
b) Sex;
c) Date, and place of birth;
d) Citizenship;
e) Civil status, if married, name of spouse;
f) Profession, occupation or work;
g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
h) Exact address with the name of the street and house number for location in the precinct
maps maintained by the local office of the Commission, or in case there is none, a brief
description of his residence, sitio, and barangay;
i) A statement that the applicant possesses all the qualifications of a voter;
j) A statement that the applicant is not a registered voter of any precinct; and
k) Such information or data as may be required by the Commission.
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and
legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four (4) identification size copies of his latest
photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.

Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform
him of the qualifications and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it
that the accomplished application contains all the data therein required and that the applicants
specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voters
application.
Section 11. Disqualification. The following shall be disqualified from registering:
a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less
than one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty:
Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall
automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence;
b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of
having committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government such as
rebellion, sedition, violation of the firearms laws or any crime against national security, unless
restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with law: Provided, That he shall
automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence; and
c) Insane or incompetent persons declared as such by competent authority unless
subsequently declared by proper authority that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. Any registered voter who has
transferred residence to another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new
residence for the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing
and the approval of the Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval of
the application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election Officer of the former
residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voters registration
record to the Election Officer of the voters new residence.
Section 13. Change of Address in the Same City or Municipality. Any voter who has changed his
address in the same city or municipality shall immediately notify the Election Officer in writing. If the
change of address involves a change in precinct, the Board shall transfer his registration record to
the precinct book of voters of his new precinct and notify the voter of his new precinct All changes of
address shall be reported to the office of the provincial election supervisor and the Commission in
Manila.
Section 14. Illiterate or Disabled Applicants. Any illiterate person may register with the assistance of
the Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizens arms. The Election Officer shall place
such illiterate person under oath, ask him the questions, and record the answers given in order to
accomplish the application form in the presence of the majority of the members of the Board. The

Election Officer or any member of an accredited citizens arm shall read the accomplished form
aloud to the person assisted and ask him if the information given is true and correct The
accomplished form shall be subscribed by the applicant in the presence of the Board by means of
thumbmark or some other customary mark and it shall be subscribed and attested by the majority of
the members of the Board.
The attestation shall state the name of the person assisted, the name of the Election Officer or the
member of the accredited citizens arm who assisted the applicant, the fact that the Election Officer
placed the applicant under oath, that the Election Officer or the member of the accredited citizens
arm who assisted the applicant read the accomplished form to the person assisted, and that the
person assisted affirmed its truth and accuracy, by placing his thumbmark or some other customary
mark on the application in the presence of the Board.
The application for registration of a physically disabled person may be prepared by any relative
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity or by the Election Officer or any member of
an accredited citizens arm using the data supplied by the applicant. The fact of illiteracy or disability
shall be so indicated in the application.
Section 15. Election Registration Board.There shall be in each city and municipality as many as
Election Registration Boards as there are election officers therein. In thickly populated
cities/municipalities, the Commission may appoint additional election officers for such duration as
may be necessary.
The Board shall be composed of the Election Officer as chairman and as members, the public
school official most senior in rank and the local civil registrar, or in this absence, the city or municipal
treasurer.
In case of disqualification of the Election Officer, the Commission shall designate an acting Election
Officer who shall serve as Chairman of the Election Registration Board. In case of disqualification or
non-availability of the Local Registrar or the Municipal Treasurer, the Commission shall designate
any other appointive civil service official from the same locality as substitute.
No member of the Board shall be related to each other or to any incumbent city or municipal elective
official within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. If in succeeding elections, any of the
newly elected city or municipal officials is related to a member of the board within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity, such member is automatically disqualified to preserve the
integrity of the Election Registration Board.
Every registered party and such organizations as may be authorized by the Commission shall be
entitled to a watcher in every registration board.
Section 16. Compensation of the Members of the Board. Each member of the Board shall be
entitled to an honorarium to Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) for each day of actual service rendered
in the Board, which amount the Commission may adjust every three (3) years thereafter. No member
of the Board shall be entitled to travelling expenses.

Section 17. Notice and Hearing of Applications. Upon receipt of applications for registration, the
Election Officer shall set them for hearing, notice of which shall be posted in the city or municipal
bulletin board and in his office for at least one (1) week before the hearing, and furnish copies
thereof to the applicant concerned, the heads or representatives of political parties, and other
accredited groups or organizations which actively participate in the electoral process in the city or
municipality. On the date of the hearing, the Election Officer shall receive such evidence for or
against the applicant.
A registrant whose application is not seasonably objected to shall be notified in writing stating therein
that no objection was raised against his application and that he need not appear on the date set for
the hearing of his application. Physical presence of the applicant concerned shall, however, be
mandatory in all cases where objections against his application have been seasonably filed with the
proper Election Registration Board for him to rebut or refute evidence presented in opposition
thereto.
All applications for registration shall be heard and processed on a quarterly basis. For this purpose,
the Election Registration Board shall meet and convene on the third Monday of April, July, October,
and January of every calendar year, or on the next following working day if the designated days fail
on a non-working holiday, except in an election year to conform with the one hundred twenty (120)
days prohibitive period before election day. Should one day be sufficient for the processing of all
accepted applications, the Board shall adjourn from day to day until all the applications shall have
been processed.
Section 18. Challenges to Right to Register. Any voter, candidate or representative of a registered
political party may challenge in writing any application for registration, stating the grounds therefor.
The challenge shall be under oath and be attached to the application, together with the proof of
notice of hearing to the challenger and the applicant.
Oppositions to contest a registrants application for inclusion in the voters list must, in all cases, be
filed not later than the second Monday of the month in which the same is scheduled to be heard or
processed by the Election Registration Board. Should the second Monday of the month fall on a
non-working holiday, oppositions may be filed on the next following working day. The hearing on the
challenge shall be heard on the third Monday of the month and the decision shall be rendered before
the end of the month.
Section 19. Power to Administer Oath and Issue Summons. For purposes of determining the right of
the applicants to be registered as a voter, the Election Officer shall have the power to administer
oath, issue subpoena duces tecum and swear in witnesses. The fees and expenses incidental
thereto shall be paid in advance by the party in whose behalf the summons is issued.
Section 20. Approval and Disapproval of Application. The Election Officer shall submit to the Board
all applications for registration filed, together with the evidence received in connection therewith. The
Board shall, by majority vote, approve or disapprove the applications.
Upon approval, the Election Officer shall assign a voters identification number and issue the
corresponding identification card to the registered voter. If the Board disapproves the application, the

applicant shall be furnished with a certificate of disapproval stating the ground therefor. In cases of
approval or disapproval, any aggrieved party may file a petition for exclusion or inclusion, as the
case may be, with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court as provided for in this Act.
Section 21. Publication of Action on Application for Registration. Within five (5) days from approval
or disapproval of application, the Board shall post a notice in the bulletin board of the city or
municipal hall and in the office of the Election Officer, stating the name and address of the applicant,
the date of the application, and the action taken thereon. The Election Officer shall furnish a copy of
such notice personally, or by registered mail or special delivery to the applicant and heads or
representatives of registered political parties in the city or municipality.
Section 22. Preservation of Voters Registration Records. The Election Officer shall compile the
original copies of the approved applications for registration per precinct and arrange the same
alphabetically according to surname. He shall preserve the book of voters and ensure its integrity.
The second and third copies of the registration records shall be sent to the provincial and national
central files within three (3) days after the approval of the Board.
Section 23. Provincial File. There shall be a provincial file consisting of the duplicate copies of all
registration records in each precinct of every city and municipality in the province. It shall be in the
custody of the Provincial Election Supervisor and shall be compiled and arranged by precinct, by
municipality and alphabetically by surnames of voters.
Should the book of voters in the custody of the Election Officer be lost or destroyed at a time so
close to election day that there is no time to reconstitute the same, the corresponding book of voters
in the provincial file shall be used during the voting.
Section 24. National Central File.There shall be a national central file under the custody of the
Commission in Manila consisting of the third copies of all approved voter registration records in each
city or municipality. It shall be compiled by precinct in each city/municipality and arranged
alphabetically by surname so as to make the file a replica of the book of voters in the possession of
the Election Officer. Thereafter a national list shall be prepared following the alphabetical
arrangements of surnames of voters.
There shall be a national file consisting of the computerized voters list (CVL), both in print and in
diskette, submitted by the Election Officers in each city and municipality concerned, under the
custody of the Commission in Manila.
The computerized voters list shall make use of a single and uniform computer program that will have
a detailed sorting capability to list voters alphabetically by the precincts where they vote, by the
barangays, municipalities, cities or provinces where they reside and by their voters identification
number (VIN).
Section 25. Voters Identification Card. The voters identification card issued to the registered voter
shall serve as a document for his identification. In case of loss or destruction, no copy thereof may
be issued except to the registered voter himself and only upon the authority of the Commission.

The Commission shall adopt a design for the voters identification card which shall be, as much as
possible, tamper proof. It shall provide the following: the name and address of the voter, his date of
birth, sex, photograph, thumbmark, and the number of precinct where he is registered, the signature
of the voter and the chairman of the Election Registration Board and the voters identification number
(VIN).
Section 26. Voters Identification Number (VIN). The Commission shall assign every registered voter
a voters identification number (V1N) consisting of three parts, each separated by a dash. For
example: 7501 -00191 -C145BCD.
a) Part 1: Current Address of the Voter
1) the first two digits 75 stand for the province; and
2) The last two digits, 01, stand for the city, municipality, or a district, particularly in
Manila.
The code assignment for provinces, cities and municipalities shall follow the Urban
Code devised by the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).
b) Part II: Current Precinct Assignment of the Voter
1) The first four digits, 0019, stand for the permanent number of the precinct where
the voter is currently assigned: and
2) The letter indicates whether it is a mother or a daughter precinct.
The number assigned to the precinct in every city or municipality shall be permanent
but the voter may transfer his precinct number. The VIN reflects the current precinct
assignment of the voter.
c) Part III: Permanent Birth and Name Code Unique to the Voter
1) The letter, C, stands for the month, i.e., A for January, B for February, and so forth;
2) The next two digits, 14, stand for the date of birth;
3) The next two digits, 51, stand for the year of birth; and
4) The last three letters, BCD, stand for the name code, i.e., Bayani Cruz Davide.
The last three letters shall stand for the first letter of the first name, the middle name,
and the last name in that order.

The Commission shall ensure that Part III hereof of the voters identification number
(VIN) shall be permanent and unique to each voter. If necessary, the Commission
may expand and modify the same.
d) The combined birth and name code is assigned during the lifetime of every voter. Upon
transfer of the voter to another precinct, the first two parts of the VIN shall change.
Section 27. Deactivation of Registration. The board shall deactivate the registration and remove the
registration records of the following persons from the corresponding precinct book of voters and
place the same, properly marked and dated in indelible ink, in the inactive file after entering the
cause or causes of deactivation:
a) Any person who has been sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less
than one (1) year, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon or amnesty:
Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this paragraph shall
automatically reacquire the right to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of
sentence as certified by the clerks of courts of the Municipal/Municipal
Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan;
b) Any person who has been adjudged by final judgment by a competent court or tribunal of
having caused/committed any crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government
such as rebellion, sedition, violation of the anti-subversion and firearms laws, or any crime
against national security, unless restored to his full civil and political rights in accordance with
law; Provided, That he shall regain his right to vote automatically upon expiration of five (5)
years after service of sentence;
c) Any person declared by competent authority to be insane or incompetent unless such
disqualification has been subsequently removed by a declaration of a proper authority that
such person is no longer insane or incompetent;
d) Any person who did not vote in the two (2) successive preceding regular elections as
shown by their voting records. For this purpose, regular elections do not include the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections;
e) Any person whose registration has been ordered excluded by the Court; and
f) Any person who has lost his Filipino citizenship.
For this purpose, the clerks of court for the Municipal/Municipal Circuit/Metropolitan/Regional
Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan shall furnish the Election Officer of the city or
municipality concerned at the end of each month a certified list of persons who are
disqualified under paragraph (a) hereof, with their addresses. The Commission may request
a certified list of persons who have lost their Filipino Citizenship or declared as insane or
incompetent with their addresses from other government agencies.

The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a certified list of those
persons whose registration were deactivated and the reasons therefor, and furnish copies
thereof to the local heads of political parties, the national central file, provincial file, and the
voter concerned.
Section 28. Reactivation of Registration. Any voter whose registration has been deactivated
pursuant to the preceding Section may file with the Election Officer a sworn application for
reactivation of his registration in the form of an affidavit stating that the grounds for the deactivation
no longer exist any time but not later than one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election
and ninety (90) days before a special election.
The Election Officer shall submit said application to the Election Registration Board for appropriate
action.
In case the application is approved, the Election Officer shall retrieve the registration record from the
inactive file and include the same in the corresponding precinct book of voters. Local heads or
representatives of political parties shall be properly notified on approved applications.
Section 29. Cancellation of Registration. The Board shall cancel the registration records of those
who have died as certified by the Local Civil Registrar. The Local Civil Registrar shall submit each
month a certified list of persons who died during the previous month to the Election Officer of the
place where the deceased are registered. In the absence of information concerning the place where
the deceased is registered, the list shall be sent to the Election Officer of the city or municipality of
the deceaseds residence as appearing in his death certificate. In any case, the Local Civil Registrar
shall furnish a copy of this list to the national central file and the proper provincial file.
The Election Officer shall post in the bulletin board of his office a list of those persons who died
whose registrations were cancelled, and furnish copies thereof to the local heads of the political
parties, the national central file, and the provincial file.
Section 30. Preparation and Posting of the Certified List of Voters. The Board shall prepare and post
certified list of voters ninety (90) days before a regular election and sixty (60) days before a special
election and furnish copies thereof to the provincial, regional and national central files. Copies of the
certified list, along with a certified list of deactivated voters categorized by precinct per barangay,
within the same period shall likewise be posted in the office of the Election Officer and in the bulletin
board of each city/municipal hall. Upon payment of the fees as fixed by the Commission, the
candidates and heads of registered political parties shall also be furnished copies thereof.
The Board shall also furnish two (2) certified copies for said certified list of voters, along with a
certified list of deactivated voters to the Board of Election Inspectors for posting in the polling place
and for their reference on election day.
Section 31. Sealing of Precinct Book of Voters. The Board shall notify within fifteen (15) days before
the start of the campaign period of all registered political parties and members of the Board of
Election Inspectors to inspect and verify the completeness of the voters registration records for each
precinct compiled in the book of voters.

After verification and certification by the Board of Election Inspectors and party representatives as to
the completeness of the voters registration records in the precinct book of voters, the Board shall
seal the book of voters in the presence of the former at the start of the campaign period and take
custody of the same until their distribution to the Board of Election Inspectors on election day. The
Election Officer shall deliver the sealed precinct book of voters to the chairman of the Board of
Election Inspectors when the latter secures its official ballots and other paraphernalia for election
day.
Section 32. Common Rules Governing Judicial, Proceedings in the Matter of Inclusion, Exclusion,
and Correction of Names of Voters.
a) Petition for inclusion, exclusion or correction of names of voters shall be filed during office
hours;
b) Notice of the place, date and time of the hearing of the petition shall be served upon the
members of the Board and the challenged voter upon filing of the petition. Service of such
notice may be made by sending a copy thereof by personal delivery, by leaving it in the
possession of a person of sufficient discretion in the residence of the challenged voter, or by
registered mail. Should the foregoing procedures not be practicable, the notice shall be
posted in the bulletin board of the city or municipal hall and in two (2) other conspicuous
places within the city or municipality;
c) A petition shall refer only to one (1) precinct and implead the Board as respondents;
d) No costs shall be assessed against any party in these proceedings. However, if the court
should find that the application has been filed solely to harass the adverse party and cause
him to incur expenses, it shall order the culpable party to pay the costs and incidental
expenses;
e) Any voter, candidate or political party who may be affected by the proceedings may
intervene and present his evidence;
f) The decision shall be based on the evidence presented and in no case rendered upon a
stipulation of facts. If the question is whether or not the voter is real or fictitious, his nonappearance on the day set for hearing shall be prima facie evidence that the challenged
voter is fictitious; and
g) The petition shall be heard and decided within ten (10) days from the date of its filing.
Cases appealed to the Regional Trial Court shall be decided within ten (10) days from
receipt of the appeal. In all cases, the court shall decide these petitions not later than fifteen
(15) days before the election and the decision shall become final and executory.
Section 33. Jurisdiction in Inclusion and Exclusion Case. The Municipal and Metropolitan Trial
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of
voters in their respective cities or municipalities. Decisions of the Municipal or Metropolitan Trial
Courts may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Regional Trial Court within five (5) days from

receipt of notice thereof. Otherwise, said decision shall become final and executory. The regional
trial court shall decide the appeal within ten (10) days from the time it is received and the decision
shall immediately become final and executory. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Section 34. Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the List. Any person whose application for registration
has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken out from the list may file with
the court a petition to include his name in the permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time
except one hundred five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy-five (75) days prior to a
special election. It shall be supported by a certificate of disapproval of his application and proof of
service of notice of his petition upon the Board. The petition shall be decided within fifteen (15) days
after its filing.
If the decision is for the inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters, the Board shall place the
application for registration previously disapproved in the corresponding book of voters and indicate
in the application for registration the date of the order of inclusion and the court which issued the
same.
Section 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List. Any registered voters, representative of a
political party or the Election Officer, may file with the court a sworn petition for the exclusion of a
voter from the permanent list of voters giving the name, address and the precinct of the challenged
voter at any time except one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election or sixty-five (65) days
before a special election. The petition shall be accompanied by proof of notice to the Board and to
the challenged voter and shall be decided within ten (10) days from its filing.
If the decision is for the exclusion of the voter from the list, the Board shall, upon receipt of the final
decision, remove the voters registration record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the
order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file.
Section 36. Verification of Registered Voters. The Election officer shall, in order to preserve the
integrity of the permanent list of voters, file exclusion proceedings when necessary, and verify the list
of the registered voters of any precinct by regular mail or house to house canvass.
The Commission may enlist the help of representatives of political parties and deputize nongovernment organizations (NGOs), civic organizations and barangay officials to assist in the
verification and house to house canvass of registered voters in every precinct.
Section 37. Voter Excluded Through Inadvertence or Registered with an Erroneous or Misspelled
name. - Any registered voter who has not been included in the precinct certified list of voters or who
has been included therein with a wrong or misspelled name may file with the Board an application
for reinstatement or correction of name. If it is denied or not acted upon, he may file on any date with
the proper Municipal Circuit, Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court a petition for an order directing
that his name be entered or corrected in the list. He shall attach to the petition a certified copy of his
registration record or identification card or the entry of his name in the certified list of voters used in
the preceding election, together with the proof that his application was denied or not acted upon by
the Board and that he has served notice to the Board.

Section 38. Voters Excluded through Inadvertence or Registered with an Erroneous or Mispelled
Name. - Any registered voter whose registration record has not been included in the precinct book of
voters, or whose name has been omitted in the list of voters or who has been included therein with a
wrong or mispelled name may file with the Board an application for inclusion of his record, or
reinstatement or correction of his name as the case may be. If it is denied or not acted upon, the
voter may file on any date with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court a petition for an order
directing that the voters name be entered or corrected in the list. The voters shall attach to the
petition a certified true copy of his registration record or identification card or the entry of his name in
the list of voters used in the preceding election, together with proof that his application was denied or
not acted upon by the Board and that he has served notice thereof to the Board.
Section 39. Annulment at Book of Voters. The Commission shall, upon verified petition of any voter
or election officer or duly registered political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of
voters that is not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act or was prepared through
fraud, bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation, force or any similar irregularity, or which contains
data that are statistically improbable. No order, ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be
executed within ninety (90) days before an election.
Section 40. Reconstitution of Lost or Destroyed Registration Records. The Commission shall
reconstitute all registration records which have been lost or destroyed by using the corresponding
copies of the provincial or national central files. In case of conflict the Commission shall determine
which file shall be used for reconstitution purposes. If this is not feasible, the Commission shall
conduct a general registration of voters in the affected area: Provided, That there is a scheduled
election before the next scheduled general registration of voters in accordance with the Omnibus
Election Code. All such voters shall retain their voters identification number. Reconstituted forms
shall be clearly marked with the word "reconstituted."
It shall be the duty of the Election Officer to immediately report to the Commission any case of loss
or destruction of registration record in his custody.
The reconstitution of any lost or destroyed registration records shall not affect the criminal liability of
any person who is responsible for such loss or destruction.
Section 41. Examination of Registration Records. All registration records/computerized voters list in
the possession of the Election officer, the Provincial Election Supervisor, and the Commission in
Manila shall, during regular office hours, be open to examination by the public for legitimate inquiries
on election related matters, free from any charge or access fee.
Law enforcement agencies may, upon prior authorization and subject to regulations promulgated by
the Commission, have access to said registration records should the same be necessary to and in
aid of their investigative functions and duties.
Section 42. Right to Information. - The duly authorized representative of a registered political party
or of a bonafide candidate shall have the right to inspect and/or copy at their expense the
accountable registration forms and/or the list of registered voters in the precincts constituting the
constituency of the bonafide candidate or at which the political party is fielding candidates. The

inspection and copying shall be conducted during business hours of the Commission and shall be
subject to reasonable regulations.
Section 43. Computerization at Permanent List of Voters. - A permanent and computerized list
arranged by precinct, city or municipality, province and region shall be prepared by the Commission.
Thereafter, another list shall be prepared consisting of the names of the voters, arranged
alphabetically according to surnames.
The computer print-outs of the list of voters duly certified by the Board are official documents and
shall be used for voting and other election related purposes as well as for legitimate research needs.
The total number of voters in the permanent list shall be the basis for the printing of the official
ballots by the Commission.
Section 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular
city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the
approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or
municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the
original congressional district.
Section 45. Election Offenses. - The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:
a) to deliver, hand over, entrust or give, directly or indirectly, his voters identification card to
another in consideration of money or other benefit of promise; or take or accept such voters
identification card, directly or indirectly, by giving or causing the giving or money or other
benefit or making or causing the making of a promise therefore;
b) to fail, without cause, to post or give any of the notices or to make any of the reports reacquired under this Act;
c) to issue or cause the issuance of a voters identification number or to cancel or cause the
cancellation thereof in violation of the provisions of this Act; or to refuse the issuance of
registered voters their voters identification card;
d) to accept an appointment, to assume office and to actually serve as a member of the
Election Registration Board although ineligible thereto, to appoint such ineligible person
knowing him to be ineligible;
e) to interfere with, impede, abscond for purpose of gain or to prevent the installation or use
of computers and devices and the processing, storage, generation, and transmission of
registration data or information;
f) to gain, cause access to use, alter, destroy, or disclose any computer data, program,
system software, network, or any computer-related devices, facilities, hardware or
equipment, whether classified or declassified;

g) failure to provide certified voters and deactivated voters list to candidates and heads of
representatives of political parties upon written request as provided in Section 30 hereof;
h) failure to include the approved application form for registration of a qualified voter in the
book of voters of a particular precinct or the omission of the name of a duly registered voter
in the certified list of voters of the precinct where he is duly, registered resulting in his failure
to cast his vote during an election, plebiscite, referendum, initiative and/or recall. The
presence of the form or name in the book of voters or certified list of voters in precincts other
than where he is duly registered shall not be an excuse hereof;
i) the posting of a list of voters outside or at the door of a precinct on the day of an election,
plebiscite, referendum, initiative and/or recall, and which list is different in contents from the
certified list of voters being used by the Board of Election Inspectors; and
j) Violation of the provisions of this Act.
Section 46. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any Election offense under this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years and shall
not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to
hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported
after the prison term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a
fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) but not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000).
Section 47. Funding. The amount of Two billion pesos (2,000,000,000) is hereby included in the
General Appropriations Act for the fiscal year 1997 to defray the expenses for the registration
activities.
Section 48. Multi-partisan Monitoring and Evaluation Committee. A Monitoring and Evaluation
Committee is hereby created composed of seven (7) members to be based on party representation
of the seven (7) major political parties that fielded presidential candidates in the 1992 synchronized
elections. The Committee is an ad hoc body attached to the Commission but not subject to its
supervision and control.
The task of the Committee is to monitor and evaluate the system, procedures or guidelines prepared
by the Commission for the conduct of the general registration and the continuing system of
registration in accordance with this Act.
The Committee shall prepare two reports outlining the findings and recommendations for immediate
action or institution of corrective measures by the Commission and/or Congress. The first report shall
be submitted to the Commission and Congress three (3) months before the holding of the general
registration. The second report shall be due at the end of the year on the initial implementation of the
system of continuing registration.
The amount not less than Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000) but not more than One hundred million
pesos (P100,000,000) is hereby allocated from the Two billion pesos (P2,000,000,000) allocation

provided in the preceding section for the operations of the Committee. This amount shall be held in
trust by the Commission subject to the usual accounting and auditing procedures.
Section 49. Rules and Regulations. - The Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations to implement the provisions of this Act not later than ninety (90) days before the first day
of registration as provided for in this Act.
Section 50. Separability Clause. - If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other
parts or provisions hereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 51. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 52. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved, June 11, 1996.

G.R. No. L-30187

November 15, 1928

MARCOS YRA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
MAXIMO ABANO, respondent-appellee.
Gregorio Perfecto and Angeles Arabiran for appellant.
Benigno S. Aquino, Cirilo B. Santos and Domingo A. Guevara for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
These are proceedings in the nature of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the provisions of section
408 of the Election Law, as amended, in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan by the petitioner,
Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who challenges the right of the
respondent, Maximo Abano, the municipal president elect of Meycauayan, to the position to which
elected on the ground that the respondent is ineligible. The decision in the lower court, Judge

Anastasio R. Teodoro presiding, was in favor of the respondent and declared the complaint as
without merit.
Maximo Abano is a native of the municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he
transferred to Manila to complete his education. While temporarily residing in Manila, Abano
registered as a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a member of the bar and after the death of his
father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to live. From May 10, 1927, until the present, Abano has
considered himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections were approaching, he made
an application for cancellation of registration in Manila which was dated April 3, 1928, but this
application was rejected by the city officials for the reason that it was not deposited in the mails on or
before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano presented himself as a candidate for municipal president
of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and was elected by popular vote to that office.
There can be no uncertainly as to the necessary facts. Undoubtedly, the petitioner-appellant would
be the first to admit them. As addressed, however, to the decision of the trial court the facts, the
petitioner-appellant assigns and argues four errors. The first error assigned relates to a technical
matter which is the act of the trial judge in permitting the respondent to retire his second answer.
This, of course, does not constitute either prejudicial or reversible error. Passing the second error for
the moment, the third error assigned is found to assail the eligibility of the respondent because it is
alleged that he had not been a resident of Meycauayan for at least one year previous to the election.
In this connection, it is sufficient to point out that the question of residence is largely one of intention.
At least since May 190, 1927, Abano has been a resident of Meycauayan or more than the one-year
period fixed by the law as a prerequisite to election. The fourth error assigned is a formal one.
As we see it, the issue in the case is suggested by the second error, and centers on the alleged noneligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the reason that he was not a "qualified voter
in his municipality" not a "qualified elector therein." In this connection, it is well to recall that Abano
was registered as a voter in Manila and not in Meycauayan in June, 1928, when the election was
held. Is this sufficient to nullify his election? The Election Law, as amended, in section 404 provides
that "No person shall be eligible . . . for any elective . . . municipal office unless, within the time fixed
by law, he shall file a duly sworn certificate of candidacy. Said certificate shall declare . . . that he is a
resident of the . . . municipality, . . . in which his candidacy is offered; that he is a duly qualified
elector therein, and that he is eligible to the office." The Administrative Code in section 2174, in
giving the qualifications of elective officers, also provides that "An elective municipal officer must, at
the time of the election, be a qualified voter in his municipality and must have been resident therein
for at least one year . . . ." Section 431 of the Election Law prescribes the qualifications for voters,
section 432 the disqualifications. The question before us has arisen in a slightly different form in the
other departments of the Government. In the early days of the Philippine Assembly, the election of
Honorable Fernando Ma. Guerrero as a member of the Assembly from Manila was contested on the
ground that he was not registered in his electoral district. The Committee of the Philippine Assembly
reached the conclusion that the words "qualified elector" meant a person who had all of the
qualifications provided by law to be a voter and not a person registered in the electoral list (Taken
from Villamor'sTratado de Elecciones, 2d ed., p. 156). So also the Executive Bureau has been of the
opinion that the term "qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person
must be a registered voter (Executive Bureau Unnumbered Provincial Circulars, May 19, 1925, May
2, 1925 May 7, 1925, cited in Laurel's The Law of Elections of the Philippine Islands, 1st ed., pp. 32,

33). Senator Jose P. Laurel in his Law of Elections of the Philippine Islands, pages 32, 33,
summarizes the law on the subject in the following language:
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is that he
must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term "qualified"
when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a registered voter.
To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as an elector. It is
sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the
disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an
elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate to be
voted for.
It is not at all easy to disregard the forcible argument advanced by counsel for the appellant to the
effect that when the law makes use of the phrases "qualified elector" and "qualified voter" the law
means what it says. It is contended that it would be an absurdity to hold one a qualified elector who
was not eligible to vote in his municipality. At the same time, the contemporaneous construction of
the law by two departments of the Government one the legislative branch responsible for its
enactment, and the other the executive branch responsible for its enforcement while not
controlling on the Judiciary, is entitled to our respectful consideration. For the orderly and
harmonious interpretation and advancement of the law, the courts should, when possible, keep step
with the other departments.
But we are not without other authority. The law of Kentucky provided that "No person shall be eligible
to any office who is not at time of his election a qualified voter of the city and who has not resided
therein three years preceding his election." One Wood was elected a commissioner of the sinking
fund. His eligibility was protested upon the ground that he was not, at the time of his election, a
qualified voter of the city of Louisville since he had not registered as a voter in that city. The
Supreme Court of Kentucky, considering the law and the facts in the case of Meffert vs. Brown
([1909], 132 Ky., 201), speaking through its Chief Justice, held that under the Kentucky statutes
requiring officers in certain cities to be qualified voters, one's eligibility is not affected by his failure to
register. It was said that "The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of
the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One may be a qualified voter without
exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to
the exercise of the right."
lawphi1.net

It is but fair to say that if the question were strictly one of first impression in this jurisdiction, we would
be more impressed with the potent points made by the appellant. In view, however, of the authorities
herein- before mentioned, we are loath to depart from them, particularly as the language which goes
to make up these authorities, on close examination, is found to rest on reason. The distinction is
between a qualified elector and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified elector and the
respondent is such although not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the exercise of the
right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
It should not be forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be their
local chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be respected.

For all the foregoing, we conclude that the decision rendered in the lower court should be sustained.
Acordingly, it will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.