THREAT ASSESSMENT

Prepared by; David Doolittle

Prepared for; Dr. Christopher Merritt
APUS/AMU - INTL434
July 26th, 2016

OVERALL THREAT ASSESSMENT (OTA)

During Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) a series of sequential air campaign friendly fire
incidents against the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) likely will result in improvised
rocket assisted motor (IRAM) and or surface to air missile (SAM) attack(s) by PMF internalized
Shiite militant groups. This attack will be on those held responsible. An IRAM or SAM attack on
a US airbase would be ideal for the adversaries as it is equal in terms of faith justified retaliation
and US friendly fire will be most suspected. June 2015 the US was blamed for a coalition
airstrike in al-Anbar where 10 Shiite militiamen were killed (Hartley, 2015). A spokesperson for
the militia, "All resistance movements will seek revenge in a timely manner... against the
treacherous American aircraft (ibid)." This isolated incident did trigger tensions. It did not
promulgate a retaliatory response. Therefore, this OTA posits a series of incidents in a concise
timeframe would inflame retaliatory sentiment. Possible targets in the threat environment include
indirect fire on a US airbase and or use of a SAM to destroy aircraft as the intent declared.
Post OIR this threat may manifest without friendly fire incident if militia groups decide
Iraq based OIR forces need to withdraw from the region, a PMF junta in Southern Iraq opposed
to western influence takes power, and or as the proxy action of Iranian strategy in Iraq. Shiite
militias within the PMF have been supported consistently from Iranian funding, military training,
and spiritual guidance (Forrest, 2009). Foreign support only accentuates the known capabilities,
while possibly contributing to a self eficial operational aptitude if provoked. Only 15% of the
PMF currently receives US air support possibly due to allegiance issues and history groups have
with coalition forces (Logan, 2016). Having an operational disconnect with the other 85%
increases the chances friendly fire may occur and this threat manifests as described.
HISTORY
Before US collaboration with Shiite Militias, these groups fought coalition forces during
insurgencies in the 2003-2011 Iraq War (Smith, 2014). In 2007 Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the
Shiite Mahdi army, ended hostilities with coalition forces (Stancati, 2010). His concession was
likely seen as caving to international pressure and betraying the Shia resistance.
Several groups splintered off of the Sadrs Mahdi army causing infighting between two
notable groups Jaish al-Mukhtar (JAM) and the Badr Organization (ibid). The Badr
Organization, formerly the Badr Brigades and Corps, was the militant arm of the Supreme
Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) (Forrest, 2009). To become more competitive in
the coalition political process against the Islamic Dawa Party of Iraq the SCIRI abandoned the
revolutionary principles, becoming the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (SICI) in 2003 (Kataib,
2014). As the SICI entered popular politics the militias began operating independently but
continued receiving covert aid from Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force
(IRGC-QF) (Lawson, 2014). Successes for the coalition, such as at Ramadi in 2006, festered
resentment for the US whom were seen as interfering with the possible role Shia Muslims could
have in liberating Iraq (Hosenball, 2016).
JAM, Kataib Hezbollah (KH), and other militias have since denounced the SICI but still
continue following the Wilayat al-Faqih doctrine of political thought (McCauley, 2016). Wilayat
al-Faqih is guardianship imposed by Shia religious leadership (Shia Political Thought, 2016).
Iraq's top SICI Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in 2014 issued a fatwa in response to
the advances of The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levants (ISIL) advances (Hartley, 2016).
Sistani called on Shia Iraqis to defend "their country and their people and their holy places
(ibid)." Three days later prime minister Maliki created the PMF to unify control in an umbrella

Threat Assessment: Doolittle (July 26th, 2016) 1

organization of the various Shiite militias arising to Sistanis call (ibid). State recognition to
counter ISIL has given the PMF increasing power with every city they help retake. PMF forces
retook several ISIL strongholds which relayed to the Iraqi government their dependence on the
group.
Previous to its 2014 founding elements of the PMF militia, including Kataib Hezbollah
(KH), operated in Syria alongside the IRGC-QF (Smith, 2014). KH have been utilized as
special forces securing the Damascus and Aleppo airport at the onset of the Syrian civil war
(ibid). KH was formed in Lebanon in 2006 (Jeffrey, 2007). KH has operated as: A Syrian
component to Hezbollah (Smith, 2014), in Iraq against US coalition forces (Jeffrey, 2007),
alongside IRGC Quds Force during the Syrian Civil War, and is considered membered in the
PMF (Kataib, 2014). KH exhibits: extensive combat experiences, specialized tactics, and fact
supported foreign support. Although this is the case the OTA is not limited to KH. Shiite militias
in Iraq are thought to be networked on some familial, tribal, and faith based levels (ibid). These
associations amongst another is expanded upon later.
MEMBERSHIP and LEADERSHIP
Today the PMF is comprised of 50 different militias (Hillburn, 2015). Total membership
is thought to be around 120,000 (Tilghman, 2015). The PMF is not a part of Iraqs Ministry of
Defense (ibid). It is led by the Minister of Interior Mohammed al-Ghabban (Hartley, 2015).
Military strategy of the PMF is under Hadi al-Amiri (George, 2014). Amiri is the Transportation
Minister of Iraq (Shia Militias, 2014). Both Amiri and Ghabban are members of the Badr
Organization (Shia Militias, 2014) (Hartley, 2015).
Amiri is thought to occasionally go by the alias Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Hartley, 2015).
An official in the Ministry of Transportation reported, Iran will continue to be his (Amiris)
conscience and his moral leader (George, 2014). Muhandis is a top advisor to IRGC-QF
commander Qassem Suleimani on Iraqi affairs (Hartley, 2015). The two have also been pictured
together praying after a 2015 battle in Tikrit against ISIL (George, 2014). Despite his official
position these shifting allegiances build the case Muhandis, Amiri, can be considered a non-state
actor. He also has a considerable amount of power to change the strategic landscape in Iraq.
Being the minister of transportation he can organize convoys to move forces and supplies. This
position also allows him to circumvent border regulations aiding in smuggling Iranian funding
and weapons into Iraq. Muhandis was thought at one time to be the leader of Kataib Hezbollah
and a senior commander in the Badr Corps (Kataib, 2014) (Hartley, 2015). It's possible the
leadership roles he holds in the PMF are indicative most Shiite militias were led by him before
consolidation.
STRUCTURE and ORGANIZATION
27 percent of Shiite militia respondents reported seeing themselves primarily as citizens
while 62 percent reported seeing themselves primarily as a "member of my religion" (Forrest,
2009). Groups in the PMF have demonstrated subservience to the Shia political power Iran
exhibits through their ardent public support for Iran Supreme Leader Khamenei (Morris, 2014).
Militias obeying Wilayat al-Faqih are required to follow hukm (orders) by the religious jurists
and imams of Shia political leadership (Shia Political Thought, 2016). Shia Islam is currently in
the period of greater occultation where their Imam, a direct connection to God, is missing (ibid).
Instead the will of God is represented by the wali or protector, whom holds the authority to
consult with clerical leadership on hukms (ibid). Retaliation is an acceptable hukm if it is ordered
by the Wali of the Shia Muslim faith and is of equal consequence to the grievance (ibid).
Structurally a threat may originate from the wali or clerical leadership. It would then be

Threat Assessment: Doolittle (July 26th, 2016) 2

adjudicated by Shia jurists in Qom Iran, then broadcast through Iraqi Shia clerical leadership
such as SICI Sistani.
50 separate militias may also be an illusion. The Shiite Militias in Iraq were trained
partially by Mohsen Chirazi, an IRGC al-Quds Force commander responsible for Irans efforts
with the Lebanese Hezbollah (Jeffrey, 2007). Early in the Lebanese Civil War, Chirazi had
Hezbollah utilize many different names for various operational organizations (ibid). During
insurgencies the militias in Iraq have gone by multiple organizational names despite having
many base level networked connections (Smith, 2014). In both Iraq and Lebanon this was done
to create plausible deniability of Irans covert efforts, but also force multiplication and confuse
adversaries (ibid).
JAM became known as Saraya al-Salam and the Badr Brigades (Corps before 2003) now
is the Badr Organization since incorporation into the PMF (Hartley, 2015). Kataib Hezbollah
(KH) has taken many forms to assimilate into the PMF including: Kataib Imam Ali, Kataib
Sayyid al-Shuhada, and Harakat al-Nujaba (ibid). KH claims its organizational structure is based
on how Imad Mughniyah, a senior Hezbollah commander, directed the Lebanese Hezbollah
(Kataib, 2014). Imad Mughniyeh was a chief of staff to Hezbollah before being martyred (ibid),
which may indicate KH may structuralize itself as the organizational body to its assimilated
groups. However, the single common organizational factor of Shia groups in the PMF is the
Wilayat al-Faqih (McCauley, 2016). Despite their organizational differences they are all
resoundingly bonded to its authority. Therefore, any threat structured and organized for a
retaliatory strike against friendly fire incidents always has commonality of possibly being a
Wilayat al-Faqih hukm. It is difficult to determine whom may act on the threat as the
organizational structure creates multiple threat vectors with similar capabilities.
CURRENT GOALS and MOTIVATION
The Iraqi Shiite community has a long history of resistance then revival. Shiite militias in
Iraq now seek to enter from the resistance to revival phase yet again (Forrest, 2009). The last
successful transition of resistance to revival was the Islamic revolution of Iran in 1979, before
that the Safavid empire in the 16th century. The Shia revival is built upon three pillars:
empowering the Shia majority in Iraq, rising Iran up as a regional leader, and empowerment of
Shias across dar al-Islam (the world of Islam) (ibid).
Outside of those consistent goals the Shia Muslims in Iraqs history is filled with
oppression motivating the population to action. The Baathist party was extremely biased towards
directing domestic problems at their Shia minorities (Giovanni, 2014). Historically Shia Muslims
have also been the oppressed minority of the Islamic faith by Sunnis (McCauley, 2016). Saddam
allying with Sunnis has created a victim complex by the Iraqi Shia for any foreign support to
Sunni Muslim communities (ibid). Reprisal killings after ISIL invaded Iraq against Sunnis were
reported (Giovanni, 2014). One Shia militia commander when clearing out a village declared any
Sunni Muslim left was considered ISIL (ibid). A broad consensus in the PMF is the US secretly
supports ISIL because of their alliances with other Sunni nations (Tilghman, 2015).
Special groups in the PMF may already be motivated to carry out a retaliatory strike if
asked to do so. Members of the PMF have threatened to resume hostilities with the United States
if government policy designates the Peshmerga and Sunni tribal forces as independent nations of
Iraq (Hartley, 2015). Doing so would separate the Iraqi government into competing interests and
give Sunni tribes more influence in the political process, something Shia Muslims are historically
conditioned to resist (McCauley, 2016).
TACTICS and CAPABILITIES

Threat Assessment: Doolittle (July 26th, 2016) 3

Militia groups within the PMF have matured use of improvised rocket assisted mortars
(IRAM) but are still limited to short ranges (0-10km) (Shia Strength, 2011). Used in past indirect
fire attacks on US military bases, establishes this continual capability. Militias can also likely
carry out short range surface to air missile (SAM) attacks on non-combat aircraft if access to
equipment occurs. The PMF began using advanced missile systems against ISIL in 2015
(Binnie, 2015).
In 2016 General Dynamics (GD) contracting personnel working on implementing cloud
computing systems were kidnapped (Hosenball, 2016). The kidnappers may have sought to
obtain information advantages over force communication systems being applied overseas. The
United States Government received 35$ million in funding towards developing a new Warfighter
Information System - Tactical (WIN-T) communications system (Defence Authorization, 2004).
The WIN-T under partial development by General Dynamics is a cloud based computing system
to sort out the fusion of data necessary for a consolidated picture of friendly forces, hostiles, and
airborne projectiles in a given AO (ibid). US Officials already comment this is an existing
problem in defending US assets in Iraq perpetrated by consistent IRAM attacks on US bases
(Erwin, 2006). Reportedly the contractors whom were kidnapped were testing a cloud based
communication system with Iraqi SOF (Shorrock, 2016). Critical knowledge of how the system
operated would give the adversaries planning for a retaliatory strike a preemptive edge over base
defense systems from low flying projectiles such as an IRAM or SAM.
The most common shells compiled for an IRAM has been a 107 or 122 mm groupings
(Shia Strength, 2011). 107 mm artillery rockets were found in Shiite caches with Iranian Defense
Industries Organisation (DIO) lot numbers and production in 2007 (ibid). Militias could have
acquired these on the Iraqi black market but the close nature of lot and production numbers
indicated they were factory made close to the date they were found (ibid). It is also possible
Shiite militias are producing their own rockets. Iranian munitions support to Hezbollah began
with exporting the physical munitions to Lebanon, then transitioned to helping the group
construct munition factories in mutual allied Syria (Binnie, 2015). More recent use of IRAMs in
Iraq indicates this may now be the case. The Badr Organization version of the Al-Muntaqim, a
truck bed launched IRAM, has the same structural form and name as the Lebanese Hezbollah's
system (ibid). This suggests at the least these systems used by various Iraqi Shia militias are
produced using the same manufacturing methods. More than likely though the same IRGC-QF
support which helped build Syrian rocket factories has assisted the Iraqi Shia.
IRAMs are notoriously inaccurate but the Iraqi Shiite militias using IRAMs have
integrated capabilities enhancing accuracy of the system. These include: timer mechanisms, GPS
devices, US military 1: 250,000 maps, spirit levels for accurate sighting (Shia Strength, 2011),
and launching large barrages to blanket areas if strikes are still inaccurate while simultaneously
confusing target countermeasures (Kataib, 2014). Militia IRAM volleys have grown larger from
finding launch rails with only a dozen rockets to over 50 closer to the 2011 US withdrawal (Shia
Strength, 2011). Adversaries evolved IRAM positioning tactics, placing volley rails in
preemptive attack locations such as rooftops or in multiple fire locations surrounding the target
(ibid).
In 2015 an unknown party in the PMF began using Iranian Fajr-5 SAM systems against
ISIL (Binnie, 2015). Militias may also use various weapon systems as part of the retaliatory
strike and are suspected of having access to them previously in various actions against coalition
forces. These systems include: Iraqi produced IRAMs (107 122 mm shell groupings, AlMuntaqim system), Chinese QW-1 (Shia Strength, 2011), Iranian Fajr-5, Herz-9 (Richardson,

Threat Assessment: Doolittle (July 26th, 2016) 4

2014), Misagh-1 (Shia Strength, 2011), Russian licensed Konkurs (AT-5)/ Metis (AT-13) (ibid),
and the Toophan-3 (copy of US TOW) anti-tank systems (ibid).
FUNDING and CONNECTIONS
When the primary funding source for many of the PMF militias in Iraq is the Iranian
Bank Saderat (Forrest, 2009), it can be consensus Iran provides considerable financial support to
Iraqi Shiite militias. Saderat has several locations throughout Southern Iraq, and recently has
expanded to KRG territory (Mohammed, 2014). Several times during the Iraq War Shiite
insurgencies US forces found Iranian rial on person of militiamen (Giovanni, 2014). IRGC-QF
financiers hand payment to abis whom disperse payroll to groups in Iraq (Shia Strength, 2011).
US forces in 2008 found an equivalent of 60,000 US and Iranian currency, explosive
components, IRGC-QF trainers, and an Iranian financier of Kataib Hezbollah (KH) in a
residence (Coalition, 2008). Iran is easily able to smuggle weapons munitions and explosives
across the Iraqi border (Kataib, 2014). Many of the militias whom levy tolls in the provinces of
Maysan and Wasit are Shia, and tied to KH (ibid). The Minister of Transportation is Amiri,
whom is already established to have substantial ties to Iran and influence at the border. Once
across the border funding and weapons passes along from handlers, to safe houses, then to
banking or arms caches (Shia Strength, 2011). Support to most militias, such as the Badr
Organization, is facilitated through the IRGC-QF (Forrest, 2009). A DIA report in 2010 linked
QF support also to KH (Kataib, 2014). Infact Iran supports everybody because they are not
sure which party will emerge (Defense Department, 2006). The same source estimates Iran has
funded JAM millions of dollars (ibid). Considering JAM is a small militia a larger organization
such as the Badr Organization or KH likely receives more funding. Iran will likely decrease
support for Iraqi Shia militias if the civilian population were not threatened by Sunni opposition
(Forrest, 2009). The advance of ISIL into Iraq then would be perceived as a direct threat from a
powerful Sunni group, and likely would prompt a deepening of existing connections. This is
already present in more public appearances of Quds Force commander Soleimani with Shiite
militias around Iraq (Kataib, 2014) and the nonnative tongue of Farsi being spoken at militia
bases (Morris, 2014).
LOCATION SCOPE and MAGNITUDE (LSM)
On 21 November 2013, Kataib Hezbollah launched mortars targeting a border post near
Hafr al-Batin in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province (Kataib, 2014) and in 2015 the Badr
Organization threatened open conflict with Turkish troops north of the Iraqs Nineveh (Badr,
2015). Escalating transnational nature threats means all personnel and property affiliated with the
OIR air campaign are suspect in possible retaliatory strikes. Bases outside of the Iraqi AO which
may be targeted would likely require more covert application of known capabilities to evade
detection. As result these strikes would be more precise than a show of overwhelming force. An
example would be instead of using a large volley of IRAMs in indirect fire against a single US
airbase, a concealable SAM attack against a transportation or logistic aircraft may occur. Current
airbases the US uses in OIR in this expanded scope of the assessment include: Incirlik in Turkey
(Lawson, 2014), Ali al-Salem Air Base in Kuwait (Binnie, 2016), Al-Udeid Airbase in Qatar
(Ripley, 2014), and others OIR public affairs would not reveal due to the sensitive nature of
operations. Within Iraq the previous primary locations IRAM attacks frequently occurred by
suspected Shiite militias were: bases along Expressway 1 between Al-Diwaniyah and Al-Hillah,
Basrah air station, Baghdads international zone, US facilities near Baghdad International
Airport, FOB Kusla, FOB Loyalty, and a US base in Badrah (Shia Strength, 2011). Geography

Threat Assessment: Doolittle (July 26th, 2016) 5

created by connecting these locations should be considered a higher magnitude area of threat.
The opportunities resources and established capabilities this geography provides may allow for a
comparably overwhelming show of force to the threat being carried out in a foreign AO. Shiite
militias carried out at the apex of hostilities many as 40 to 50 multiple type rocket attacks a
month on a single US base around the Baghdad area (ibid). Assuming the same magnitude attack
cannot be repeated in a similar AO is errored by not accounting for the significant improvements
to funding, training, and capabilities these militias have had since with IRGC-QF as well as
incorporation into the PMF
Since former prime minister Maliki created the PMF, Shiite militias have become
extremely visible in Baghdad (Shia militias, 2014). Militias control non-government authorized
checkpoints into Baghdad and perform policing work (ibid). The PMF is quickly becoming a
non-state power the Iraqi government may not be able to control before and after defeating ISIL.
This threat may become more legitimate if Sunni islamist rebels overtake the Assad government
(Al-Assam, 2015). Its thought if Damascus falls Iran would take an even more active role in
Iraqs government (ibid). This could be Iranian support for a coup by the PMF against prime
minister Abadis government or IRGC-QF forces temporarily seizing the Iraqi government to
secure the buffer state Iraq provides for Iran.
COUNTERING THE THREAT
The deciding factor in the OTA is friendly fire. It would be rational then to address the
issues CAOC has with confirming fire orders, and find imaginative ways to highlight all non
ISIL actors in OIR. Infrared (IR) trackers given to potential adversary Shiite militias may help
prevent confusion in fire orders but if the US forces have to counter a future PMF threat with air
support it may give the adversary an operational tool. IR trackers may also be seen to militias as
a way air support could target them if desired. Since the paranoia exists of US forces by Shia
militias any IR tracking program would need to remain in the sole control of US forces.
If the Win-T system in Iraq was compromised by Shia militias espionage efforts, then it
needs to be taken out of service and reengineered. While this may be costly, the adversary having
advanced knowledge of communications and countermeasures procedures gives a decisive
advantage in a retaliatory strike. It may be impossible given the political environment in Iraq to
get security forces to reassert their control over the borders when opposed by Amiri in the
Ministry of Transportation. For this reason, Shiite militias may still acquire more advanced
weaponry, funding, and human resources from Iran. Through attaches the current PMF armament
can be assessed by engaging leadership diplomatically. It then may be possible with future
comparisons of additional advanced weapon systems added to the armament to tie foreign
governments as the supplier. This type of evidence could be carefully used as leverage to get Iran
to pull back support, lessening the chance during a retaliatory strike a more advanced weapon
system would be employed.
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