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47800, December 2, 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be
prohibited from passing along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a
period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The
Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10,1940. The Mayor of
Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulation.
As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but
of the riding public as well.
ISSUE: Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion
of social justice? What is Social Justice?
HELD: No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Persons and property may
be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the
rights of the individual are subordinated.
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the
State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the
adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all
the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community,
constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extraconstitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice
FACTS: Petitioner is resident physician in a hospital in Negros Oriental, who was
diagnosed of a kidney disease. After having her kidney transplant, she filed a workrelated sickness compensation claim with the respondent ECC through the GSIS, which
denied the same, arguing that the disease she contracted is not listed among the
occupational diseases determined by them to be compensable as work-related sickness.
Petitioner appealed contending that the bacteria causing the disease was contracted
while being employed in the hospital since symptoms have already manifested since
1994, and relying upon the theory that her employment poses an increased risk in
contracting the diseases.
ISSUE: Is the contention of the petitioner correct?

HELD: Yes. In determining whether an injury or sickness is work-related or not, what the
law requires is reasonable work connection, not a direct causal connection. It is
observed that the WCL has not ceased to be a social legislation, hence liberality of the
law in the form of the workingman or woman still prevails.


FACTS: While being an employee of the Philippine Ports Authority, respondent was
inflicted with tuberculosis, hypertension and diabetes. He then filed with the petitioner
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) a claim for compensation benefits under
PD No. 626. However, petitioner denied the respondents claim on the ground that the
ailments are not considered occupational diseases, and there is no clear evidence, such
as medical records, showing that he contracted the diseases during his work or his
duties have increased the risk of contracting said ailments. Petitioner rejected
respondent's contention that there is probability of contracting TB with the kind of job
the respondent has.
ISSUE: How should PD 626 be applied with respect to determining compensability of
work-related diseases?
HELD: A social legislation should interpreted liberally. In applying liberality in the
interpretation of Workmen's Compensation Law, the degree of proof required by the law
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept to support a conclusion.
Probability, not certainty, is the touchstone. Any doubt on this matter has to be
interpreted in favor of the employees considering that PD 626 is a social legislation.


FACTS: Mayor Fuguso refused to grant the petitioner and his party a permit to hold a
public meeting at Plaza Miranda, based on a city ordinance which grants the mayor the
discretion to regulate such conduct of public assemblies, as a lawful exercise of police
ISSUE: What is police power? How was it supposed to be exercised by the Manila City
HELD: Police Power is the power of the State to enact laws and prescribe regulations
that will promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety, and general welfare
of the People. However, in the exercise of police power the council may, in its discretion,
regulate the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but cannot suppress them,
directly or indirectly, by attempting to commit the power of doing so to the mayor or
any other officer. The ordinance grants the mayor the power to regulate as to how,
when and where a public assembly should be held, but not the discretion to refuse the

grant of such permit to derogate the right of the petitioner to peaceably assemble and
seek redress against the government.


FACTS: The Department of Labor and Employment issued an order suspending the
deployment of Filipino domestic and household workers, in view of the heightened
abuses committed against OFWs abroad. The petitioner, a local recruitment agency,
petitioned for the invalidation of such order for alleged violation of equal protection
ISSUE: Is the deployment ban a valid exercise of police power? What is police power?
HELD: Yes, the deployment ban of domestic helpers is a valid exercise of police power.
Police Power is the inherent power of the State to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty and property in order to promote the general welfare.


FACTS: Petitioner closed its industrial service unit due to alleged loss and extinct
demand resulting to the termination of the employment of the respondent. The latter
filed an illegal dismissal case but the same was denied by the labor arbiter, and
subsequently by the NLRC contending that the same is part of the management
ISSUE: Has employer the right to close its business even without basis resulting to the
displacement of the worker?
HELD: No. Employers are also accorded with rights and privileges to assure their selfdetermination and independence and reasonable return of capital. This mass of
privileges is called management prerogatives. Although they may be broad and
unlimited in scope, the State has the right to determine whether an employer's privilege
is exercised in a manner that complies with the legal requirements and does not offend
the protected rights of labor.


FACTS: Private respondent Estrada is a member of the respondent labor union. He did
not report for work for 1 month due to a grave family problem as his wife deserted him
and nobody was there to look after his children. He was required to explain. Finding his
reasons to be unjustified, the petitioner terminated him, since according to company
rules, absence for 6 consecutive days is considered abandonment of work.

ISSUE: Should a worker be summarily dismissed relying on some company rules?

HELD: No. While the employer is not precluded from prescribing rules and regulations
to govern the conduct of his employees, these rules and their implementation must be
fair, just and reasonable. No less than the Constitution looks with compassion on the
workingman and protects his rights not only under a general statement of a state policy
but under the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, thus placing labor contracts
on a higher plane and with greater safeguards. Verily, relations between labor and
capital are not merely contractual. They are impressed with public interest and labor
contracts must, perforce, yield to the common good.

FACTS: Petitioners are cashiers of Isetann Department Store who were dismissed for
having accumulated shortages. Petitioners admitted this in their affidavits. The labor
arbiter ruled them having been illegally dismissed. The NLRC reversed the ruling.
ISSUE: Were the petitioners validly dismissed?
HELD: Yes. The failure of the petitioners to report to the management the irregularities
constitute "fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed in them by their employer or duly
authorized representative"--one of the just causes of valid termination of employment.
The employer cannot be compelled to retain employees who were guilty of malfeasance
as their continued employment will be prejudicial to the former's best interest. The law,
in protecting the rights of the employees, authorizes neither oppression nor selfdestruction of the employer.


FACTS: Private respondent Silvestre Germane did not report for work because his wife
delivered their first child. He did not however notify his employer, causing a disruption
in the business of the latter. When the respondent returned to work he was surprised
upon knowing that someone has been hired to take his place.
ISSUE: Was there a case of illegal dismissal?
HELD: Yes. It appeared that the respondent was illegally dismissed. While a prolonged
absence without leave may constitute as a just cause for dismissal, its illegality stems
from the non-observance of due process. Applying the WenPhil Doctrine by analogy,
where dismissal was not preceded by the twin requirement of notice and hearing, the
illegality of the dismissal in question, is under heavy clouds and therefore illegal.


FACTS: Respondent filed 2 petitions with the CIR: 1.) to lay off its 44 employees on the
ground that the company is losing its operations, and 2.) to lease its equipment to
certain individuals. Judge Roldan of the CIR, after ocular inspection, approved the
petitions, thereby leaving the petitioners, if not unemployed, having nothing to do
because of absence of equipment in the studios. Petitioner assailed the ruling of the
judge, and appealed to the CIR en banc.
ISSUE: Should the court grant a petition for mass dismissal without hearing the side of
the employees concerned?
HELD: No. A worker cannot be deprived of his job or his wages without due process of
law. The case was then remanded to CIR for proper hearing.

CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986
FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed
the petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with
claim for reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the judgment based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has
already prescribed, since Art. 291 & 292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses
penalized under the Code and all money claims arising from employer-employee
relationships shall be filed within 3 years from when such cause of action arises,
otherwise it will be barred.
ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?
HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is
an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the
Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes
a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation,
however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor
Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime
as defined in the penal law, but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to
those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. The confusion arises over the use
of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an
employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however that
unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes or
lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and

illegal recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself
declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not
categorized as an unlawful practice.

DE LEON v. NLU, 100 PHIL 789

FACTS: The defendant-appellees had been picketing the Dalisay Theater owned by the
plaintiff for the purpose of securing reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater
when it was run and operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises (FTE), then a lessee
of the parcel of land owned by plaintiff on which the theater was erected. The
defendant-appellees lost their jobs upon termination of the lease contract between De
Leon and the FTE, which turned over the rights to the theater back to De Leon, the
owner of the lot.
ISSUE: Has terminated employees the right to strike in this case?
HELD: Yes. Although the employees has no business with the owner of the
establishment, they have nevertheless the right to peaceful picketing which applies also
to cases where employer-employee relationship is absent. The picketing, a form of
freedom of expression, is conducted not to disrupt the business of the owner but to
appeal for a humanitarian consideration, after having been laid off due to the
termination of the business of their previous employer.


FACTS: Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office
space in the Wellington building. Wellington complained that the picketers were
annoyingly blocking the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and
egress being used by the occupants of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as
by their respective employees, clients and customers, so that the picket has caused a
disruption of the business of Wellington as well as the other lessors in the building.
ISSUE: Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful?
HELD: Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of
peaceful picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to
the context of this issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved
in the labor dispute. Thus, they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the
courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally extend the same.








FACTS: The picket held by defendant-appellant union against their employer prevented
herein plaintiff-appellee's truck from loading and unloading of its products inside the
premises of Permanent Concrete Products, where the plaintiff-appellee was occupying
as a sub-lessee. Hence, the latter sought to enjoin the picket.
ISSUE: May a picket be enjoined at the instance of a third party?
HELD: Yes. Peaceful picketing, while being allowed as a phase of freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even in the absence of
employer-employee relationship, is not an absolute right. The courts are not without
power to localize the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the context
of the dispute. Thus the right may be recognized at the instance of an "innocent
bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute if it appears that the result of the
picketing is create an impression that a labor dispute exists between him and the
picketing union.


FACTS: Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under protest" in the
company payroll to object to the P1.0 deduction made by the respondent for allegedly
getting P500 worth of lumber in 1964. The deduction started only in 1969, at the peak
of union activities of the petitioner when several complaints of unfair labor practices
were filed by the union against the respondent.
ISSUE: Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of expression?
HELD: Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers subject to legal
limitation of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus too clear from the
foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the
unauthorized and illegal deductions made by respondent company. By writing "under
protest" on the company payroll, petitioner Ramos was well within the ambit of his
constitutional freedom of expression as well as the right to petition against what was
obviously a calculated undue harassment amounting to unfair labor practice
perpetuated by respondent employer herein.


FACTS: Stepping on the provisions of RA 3350 exempting members of religious sects
which prohibit its members from joining associations, plaintiff-appellee, being of a
faithful of Iglesia ni Cristo, withdrew his membership from the appellant union. The
latter, who have pact a closed-shop provision in their collective bargaining agreement
with respondent company sought the separation of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court

enjoined the supposed dismissal, prompting the union to assail the validity of RA 3350
particularly the provision granting exemption to members of above-mentioned sects.
ISSUE: Does the law infringe the right or freedom of labor to associate?
HELD: No. Freedom of association implies not only the right to join a labor union, but
also the privilege of not joining one, of selecting which union to join, and of disaffiliating
from a union. It is clear that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional
provision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If,
notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign
up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith,
they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither
does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union
compel them to join.


FACTS: Petitioner bank terminated private respondents for having written and published
a "patently libelous letter tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt not only the
officers and employees of the bank, but also their employer" by demanding the
resignation of the bank president on grounds of immorality, nepotism and favoritism.
CIR ruled that the petitioner's act constitutes an unfair labor practice.
ISSUE: Does the dismissal of employees airing their grievance against their employer
constitute unfair labor practice?
HELD: Yes. Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual capacities when
they wrote the letter, they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in
concerted activity, in the exercise of their right to self-organization that includes
concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, interference with which constitutes
unfair labor practice.
The petitioner should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances as a
mechanism in a collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining... normally takes
the form of negotiation when major conditions of employment to be written into an
agreement are under consideration, and of grievance committee meetings and
arbitration when questions arising from the administration of an agreement are at stake.


FACTS: Petitioners went on strike after their employer SSS failed to act upon the union's
demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed an injunction
contending that the petitioners are covered by Civil Service laws which prohibits
employees of the government from staging a strike. SSSEA on the other hand, argued
that the NLRC has the jurisdiction of the case by virtue of the provisions of the Labor
ISSUE: Does the court have jurisdiction? Do employees covered by the Civil Service
have the right to strike?
HELD: On question of jurisdiction, yes. The RTC, in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction under BP 129, has jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages and for
the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the strike, since the Labor Code do not apply
to government employees.
On the right to strike of government workers, No. The Constitution provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities. On
the other hand, EO 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities in government service shall be observed subject to any legislation
that may be enacted by Congress. Referring to Memo Circular No.6, s. 1987 of the CSC
which states that prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning
strike by government employees, enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all
government officials and employees from staging a strike, demonstrations, mass leaves,
walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service, the court ruled that in the absence of any legislation
allowing government employees to strike, they are therefore prohibited from doing so.

GARCIA v. PAL, GR 164856, Jan. 20, 2009

FACTS: PAL filed an administrative case against Garcia and Dumago after they were
allegedly caught sniffing shabu at the PAL Tool Room. After due notice, they were
dismissed for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline. The petitioners filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioners with an immediate
reinstatement. A writ was issued to such effect pending appeal with the NLRC.
ISSUE: Can the petitioners collect wages on the period of appeal from the Labor
Arbiters order up to the final decision of the higher court?
HELD: Yes. The State forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social
and economic force. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law
itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending
appeal. Therefore, the petitioners can collect wages from the period of the execution of
the decision of the labor arbiter to the time of the final decision of the higher court.

MORTERA v. CIR, GR L-1340, Oct. 13, 1947

FACTS: All laborers of Canlubang Sugar Estate were ordered to return to work
immediately and stop the strike with the admonition that those who will fail to report
will not only lose any concession but the company was authorized by the public
respondent herein to employ new employees or laborers to take the places or positions
of those who fail to report. The public respondent ordered that picketing under any
guise or form, is entirely prohibited considering that the industry was into sugar, a very
important and essential food, lack of supply would mean destruction of sugar centrals of
many provinces.
ISSUE: Was there a denial of the right to strike?
HELD: Yes. The order on prohibition to strike should be understood to cover only illegal
picketing, that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot
be prohibited. It is part of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution.
Petitioners have not shown reasons to annul the order. Petition dismissed.

FELIX UY v. COA, GR 130685, March 21, 2000

FACTS: Petitioners were among the more than 60 dismissed permanent employees of
the Capitol of Agusan del Sur by the newly incumbent Governor Paredes. They
contended that the dismissal was a political vengeance because he hired new
employees. The Governor averred that the dismissal was not illegal because it was due
to the reduction in work force due to lack of funds and it is a valid ground of terminating
the services of the employees. The Merit System Protection Board held the dismissal
illegal and ordered their reinstatement but Governor Paredes refused to abide from the
order. The COA on the other hand affirmed the decision of the MSPB but denied the
motion of the petitioners stating that it is the personal liability of Governor Paredes and
not the Provincial Government of Agusan del Sur.
ISSUE: Can government employees receive backwages and other monetary benefits
from the government?
HELD: Yes. If the MSPB found bad faith on the part of Governor Paredes, it would have
categorically decreed his personal liability for the illegal dismissal of the petitioners. To
be sure, even the petitioners did not proceed from the theory that their dismissal is the
personal liability of Governor Paredes. Familiar learning is our ruling that bad faith
cannot be presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the onus of proving it. In the case
at bar, the decision of the MSPB by itself does not meet the quantum of proof necessary
to overcome the presumption of good faith.


FACTS: The petitioner, a managerial employee who was holding a position of trust and
confidence, was admonished by the latter of her improper handling of a situation
involving a rank-and-file employee. She admitted having read a supposed confidential
letter for the PET directors containing a legal opinion of the respondent's counsel
regarding the status of her employment. As a consequence, she was terminated for
willful breach of trust reposed upon by her employer. She claimed having been denied
of due process.
ISSUE: Was her dismissal justified?
HELD: Yes. The petitioner has given the respondent more than enough reasons to
distrust her. The arrogance and hostility she has shown towards the company her
stubborn uncompromising stance in almost all instances justify the company's
termination of her employment.

PANTRANCO v. PSC, GR 47065, June 26, 1940

FACTS: Petitioner wanted to have Sec. 1 of CA 454 be declared unconstitutional or that if
constitutional be declared inapplicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to
its enactment. This arose from the time petitioner applied for ten additional trucks to
comply with his existing certificates of public convenience issued before the enactment
of the CA 454 because he was not agreeable with the conditions set forth by PSC. He
contended that this Act violates the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of
ISSUE: Was the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of obligations and contracts
HELD: No. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the
state of its police power for the control and regulation of public utilities in order to
protect the public. If one voluntarily placed his property in public service, he cannot
complain of the regulation of the State through its police power. A regulation of public
utilities applies not only to future but also to present contracts in operation. Such
statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either impairing the obligation of contracts,
taking property without due process, or denying the equal protection of the laws,
especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be devoted to
a public and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide.


FACTS: Palmeria was employed by private respondent Coca-cola, which later entered
into a contract of service with Lipercon Services. It was made to appear that the
petitioner was an employee of Lipercon, before being dismissed by Coca-cola. Petitioner

was able to prove his employment with Coca-cola, hence sought for reinstatement. The
labor arbiter and NLRC ruled that reinstatement could not be availed of because of the
vehement refusal of the respondent to accept back the petitioner.
ISSUE: Should the petition for reinstatement be granted despite the strained relations
between employee and employer?
HELD: Yes. The importance of the remedy of reinstatement to an unjustly dismissed
employee cannot be overstated. It is the remedy that most effectively restores the right
of an employee to his employment and all its benefits before its violation by his
employer. Yet despite all its virtues, reinstatement does not and cannot fully vindicate
all of an employees injuries for reinstatement no more than compensates for his
financial damages. It cannot make up for his other sufferings, intangible yet valuable
xxx It is a right which cannot be allowed to be devalued by the purchasing power of
employers who are only too willing to bankroll the separation pay of their illegally
dismissed employees to get rid of them.


FACTS: Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged mass
actions on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances against the alleged
failure of the government to implement measures intended for their material benefit.
The Education Secretary issued a Return-to-Work Order but the petitioners failed to
comply. Hence they were charged by the Secretary with several administrative cases
leading to their dismissal from service.
ISSUE: Can government employees engage in a strike?
HELD: No. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like
Memo Circ. No.6 public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work
stoppage against a public employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or
work stoppages public employees was clearly recognized at common law. To grant
employees of the public sector the right to strike there must be a clear and direct
legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation allowing
government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the
exercise of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strike, walkouts and temporary work stoppage like workers in the private sector.


FACTS: During the pendency of the labor dispute between the petitioners and the
respondents, the CIR managed to forge a voluntary agreement which results into a
return-to-work order, and the respondents was prohibited to, among others, lay-off any

of the petitioners. Barely 4 months the contract, petitioners again staged a strike,
violating the condition of the agreement. The latter countered by assailing the Sec 19 of
CA 103, the law upon which the voluntary agreement was based, arguing that the same
results to involuntary servitude.
ISSUE: Should a voluntary agreement with a condition that workers must return to work
be voided upon a ground of involuntary servitude?
HELD: No. An employee entering into a contract of employment voluntarily accepts,
among other conditions, those prescribed in Section 19 of CA 103. The voluntariness of
the employee's entering into it or not--with such implied condition, negatives the
possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.

MABEZA v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118506 April 18, 1997

FACTS: The petitioner and her co-employees were asked by their employer to sign an
instrument attesting to the latters compliance with minimum wage and other labor
standard provision, and that they have no complaints against the management. The
petitioner signed the affidavit but refused to go to the Citys Prosecutors Office to
confirm the veracity and contents of the affidavit as instructed by management. That
same day she was ordered by the hotel management to turn over the keys to her living
quarters and to remove her belongings in the hotels premises. She then filed a leave of
absence which was denied by her employer. She attempted to return to work but the
hotels cashier told her that she should not report to work and instead continue with her
unofficial leave of absence. The management defended upon a ground of loss of
ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the petitioner valid?
HELD: No. The pivotal question in any case where unfair labor practice on the part of
the employer is alleged is whether or not the employer has exerted pressure, in the
form of restraint, interference or coercion, against his employees right to institute
concerted action for better terms and conditions of employment. Without doubt, the act
of compelling employees to sign an instrument indicating that the employer observed
labor standard provisions of the law when he might not have, together with the act of
terminating or coercing those who refuse to cooperate with the employers scheme
constitutes unfair labor practice.


FACTS: Supervisors and managers in petitioner company formed a union separate from
that of the rank-and-file union, petitioned for certification election, and staged a strike
against the petitioner, prompting the latter to seek a permanent injunction.

ISSUE: Are supervisors or managers allowed by law to form a union?

HELD: No. The supervisory employees of petitioner firm may not, under the law, form a
supervisors union, separate and distinct from the existing bargaining unit (BEU),
composed of the rank-and-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. It is
evident that most of the private respondents are considered managerial employees. xxx
The rationale for this inhibition has been stated to be, because if these managerial
employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured
of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also
become company- dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union

2006 Labor Law Case Digests

G.R. No. 158045. February 28, 2005

Facts: Anastacio D. Abad was the senior Assistant Manager (Sales Head) of petitioner Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank now Equitable PCI Bank)], when he was dismissed from his
work. Abad received a Memorandum from petitioner Bank concerning the irregular clearing of PNBNaval Check of Sixtu Chu, the Banks valued client. Abad submitted his Answer, categorically denying that
he instructed his subordinates to validate the out-of-town checks of Sixtu Chu presented for deposit or
encashment as local clearing checks. During the actual investigation conducted by petitioner Bank, several
transactions violative of the Banks Policies and Rules and Regulations were uncovered by the FactFinding Committee. Consequently, the Fact-Finding Officer of petitioner Bank issued another
Memorandum to Abad asking the latter to explain the newly discovered irregularities. Not satisfied with
the explanations of Abad, petitioner Bank served another Memorandum, terminating his employment
effective immediately upon receipt of the same. Thus, Abad instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not awarding of separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for every year
of service to respondent is gross, the same being contrary to law and jurisprudence.

Held: The award of separation pay is required for dismissals due to causes specified under Articles 283
and 284 of the Labor Code, as well as for illegal dismissals in which reinstatement is no longer feasible.
On the other hand, an employee dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the
Labor Code is not, as a rule, entitled to separation pay.
As an exception, allowing the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance to an employee

dismissed for just causes is based on equity. The Court has granted separation pay as a measure of social
justice even when an employee has been validly dismissed, as long as the dismissal was not due to serious
misconduct or reflective of personal integrity or morality.

G.R. No. 154308. March 10, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Benardino A. Caingat was hired by respondent Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc.
(SLRDI) as the General Manager of SLRDIs sister companies, R.S. Night Hawk Security and
Investigation Agency, Inc., and R.S. Maintenance and Services Inc. both organized to service the malls
and subdivisions owned by SLRDI. In connection with this, he was allowed to use 10% of the total payroll
of respondent R.S. Maintenance to defray operating expenses. Later, the Finance Manager discovered that
petitioner deposited company funds in the latters personal account and used the funds to pay his credit
card purchases, utility bills, trips abroad and acquisition of a lot in Laguna. Thus, complainant received a
memorandum stating that upon verification of financial records, it was found that the latter have
misappropriated company funds in the sum of about P5, 000,000.00 and is hereby suspended from his
duties as Manager of the stated companies. Without conducting any investigation, respondent R.S.
Maintenance filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
attachment. Petitioner in turn filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the respondents.

Issue: Did respondents illegally dismiss petitioner?

Held: As firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence as a just cause for
termination of employment is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where
greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly
expected. This includes managerial personnel entrusted with confidence on delicate matters, such as the
custody, handling, or care and protection of the employers property. The betrayal of this trust is the
essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. Managements loss of trust and confidence on
petitioner was well justified. Private respondents had every right to dismiss petitioner. Petitioners long
period of disappearance from the scene and departure for abroad before making a claim of illegal
dismissal does not contribute to its credibility.

Nonetheless, while dismissal may truly be justified by loss of confidence, the management failed to
observe fully the procedural requirement of due process for the termination of petitioners employment.
Two notices should be sent to the employee. The respondents only sent the first notice, gleaned from the
memorandum. There was no second notice.


G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005

Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing Corporation until the latter
terminated their employment because the corporation was in dire financial straits. It is not disputed,
however, that the termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement under Article
283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written notice upon the employees and the Department
of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination. Respondents
filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of service incentive leave
and 13th month pay against JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination illegal
and ordering JAKA to reinstate respondents with full backwages, and separation pay if reinstatement is
not possible. The Court of Appeals reversed said decision and ordered respondent JAKA to pay petitioners
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the proportionate 13th month pay and, in addition, full
backwages from the time their employment was terminated.

Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is dismissed for cause but such
dismissal was effected without the employers compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor

Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents dismissal, i.e., retrenchment, which is one
of the authorized causes enumerated under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that
JAKA failed to comply with the notice requirement under the same Article. Considering the factual
circumstances in the instant case, the Court deem it proper to fix the indemnity at P50, 000.00. The Court
of Appeals have been in error when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month salary for every year of service. In all cases of business closure or cessation of operation or

undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent with
the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording full protection to its rights
as well as its welfare. The exception is when the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to
serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right of affected employees to
separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.


G.R. No. 150478. April 15, 2005

Facts: Hacienda Bino is a 236-hectare sugar plantation located at Negros Occidental, and represented in
this case by Hortencia L. Starke, owner and operator of the said hacienda. The 76 individual respondents
were part of the workforce of Hacienda Bino consisting of 220 workers, performing various works, such as
cultivation, planting of cane points, fertilization, watering, weeding, harvesting, and loading of harvested
sugarcanes to cargo trucks. During the off-milling season, petitioner Starke issued an Order or Notice
which stated, that all Hacienda employees who signed in favor of CARP are expressing their desire to get
out of employment on their own volition. The respondents regarded such notice as a termination of their
employment. As a consequence, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The respondents as
complainants alleged that they are regular and permanent workers of the hacienda and that they were
dismissed without just and lawful cause.

Issue: Whether the respondents are regular or seasonal employees.

Held: The primary standard for determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between
the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. There is no doubt that the respondents were performing work necessary and desirable in the
usual trade or business of an employer. Hence, they can properly be classified as regular employees. For
respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that they perform
work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have been employed only for the duration of one
season. While the records sufficiently show that the respondents work in the hacienda was seasonal in
nature, there was, however, no proof that they were hired for the duration of one season only.


G.R. No. 157611. August 9, 2005

Facts: Petitioner Alabang Country Club Inc. (ACCI), is a stock, non-profit corporation that operates and
maintains a country club and various sports and recreational facilities for the exclusive use of its
members. Sometime in 1993, Francisco Ferrer, then President of ACCI, requested its Internal Auditor, to
conduct a study on the profitability of ACCIs Food and Beverage Department (F & B Department).
Consequently, report showed that from 1989 to 1993, F & B Department had been incurring substantial
losses. Realizing that it was no longer profitable for ACCI to maintain its own F & B Department, the
management decided to cease from operating the department and to open the same to a contractor, such
as a concessionaire, which would be willing to operate its own food and beverage business within the club.
Thus, ACCI sent its F & B Department employees individual letters informing them that their services
were being terminated and that they would be paid separation pay. The Union in turn, with the authority
of individual respondents, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not the clubs right to terminate its employees for an authorized cause, particularly to
secure its continued viability and existence is valid.

Held: When petitioner decided to cease operating its F & B Department and open the same to a
concessionaire, it did not reduce the number of personnel assigned thereat. It terminated the employment
of all personnel assigned at the department.
Petitioners failure to prove that the closure of its F & B Department was due to substantial losses
notwithstanding, the Court finds that individual respondents were dismissed on the ground of closure or
cessation of an undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is allowed
under Article 283 of the Labor Code. The closure of operation of an establishment or undertaking not due
to serious business losses or financial reverses includes both the complete cessation of operations and the
cessation of only part of a companys activities.


G.R. Nos. 149014-16. February 5, 2004

Facts: Ramon Dujua, his mother Rose, his aunt, Editha Singh, and his uncle, Guillermo Samson were
charged with illegal recruitment in large scale. Only Ramon was arrested. Four testified against Ramon

Dujua. All of them were promised work abroad upon payment of fees but they were not actually deployed.
Ramon pleaded not guilty and denied the allegations that he was a recruiter.

Issue: Whether or not illegal recruitment in large scale was committed by Raon Dujua, et al.

Held: The essential elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are: 1) The accused engages
in acts of recruitment and placement of workers defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited activities
under Article 34 of the Labor Code; 2) the accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment particularly with respect to the securing of a license or an authority
to recruit and deploy workers either locally or overseas; and 3) the accused commits the unlawful acts
against three or more persons individually or as a group.
All three elements were established beyond reasonable doubt.
First, the testimonies of the complaining witnesses satisfactorily proved that Dujua promised them
employment and assured them of placement overseas. All of them identified Dujua as the person who
recruited them for employment abroad. As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the three
complainants, Dujuas mere denials cannot prevail. As long as the prosecution is able to establishthrough
credible testimonial evidence that Dujua has engaged in illegal recruitment , a conviction for the offense
can very well be justified.
Second, Dujua did not have any license or authority to recruit persons for overseas work, as shown by the
Certification issued by the POEA. Neither did his employer, World Pack Travel and Tours, possess such
license or authority.
Third, it has been alleged and proven that Dujua undertook the recruitment of more than three persons.




G.R. No. 146728. February 11, 2004

Facts: General Milling Corporation employed 190 workers. All the employees were members of a union
which is a duly certified bargaining agent. The GMC and the union entered into a collective bargaining
agreement which included the issue of representation that is effective for a term of three years which will
expire on November 30, 1991. On November 29, 1991, a day before the expiration of the CBA, the union

sent GMC a proposed CBA, with a request that a counter proposal be submitted within ten days. on
October 1991, GMC received collective and individual letters from the union members stating that they
have withdrawn from their union membership. On December 19, 1991, the union disclaimed any massive
disaffiliation of its union members. On January 13, 1992, GMC dismissed an employee who is a union
member. The union protected the employee and requested GMC to submit to the grievance procedure
provided by the CBA, but GMC argued that there was no basis to negotiate with a union which is no longer
existing. The union then filed a case with the Labor Arbiter but the latter ruled that there must first be a
certification election to determine if the union still enjoys the support of the workers.

Issue: Whether or not GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice for violating its duty to bargain collectively
and/or for interfering with the right of its employees to self-organization.

Held: GMC is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to negotiate with the union upon its request
for the renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on November 29, 1991. the unions proposal was
submitted within the prescribed 3-year period from the date of effectivity of the CBA. It was obvious that
GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. The refusal to send counter
proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA is tantamount to an unfair
labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
Under Article 252 of the Labor Code, both parties are required to perform their mutual obligation to meet
and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The
union lived up to this obligation when it presented proposals for a new CBA to GMC within 3 years from
the effectivity of the original CBA. But GMC failed in its duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise
a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the union and the status of its membership to prevent any
negotiation. It bears stressing that the procedure in collective bargaining prescribed by the Code is
mandatory because of the basic interest of the state in ensuring lasting industrial peace.
The Court of Appeals found that the letters between February to June, 1993 by 13 union members
signifying their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on the employees.
We agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union
members indicate that GMC interfered with the right of its employee to self-organization.



G.R. No. 145496. February 24, 2004

Facts: On November 2, 1994, Zoilo de la Cruz, president of the Philippine Agricultural Commercial and
Industrial Workers Union (PACIWU-TUCP), sent a letter to Rosario Apacible, treasurer and general
manager of Stamford Marketing Corporation, GSP Manufacturing Corporation, Giorgio Antonio
Marketing Corporation, Clementine Marketing Corporation and Ultimate Concept Phils., Inc. The letter
informed her that the rank-and-file employees of the said companies had formed the Apacible Enterprises
Employees Union-PACIWU-TUCP and demanded that it be recognized. After such notice, the following
three cases arose:
In the First Case, Josephine Julian, president of PACIWU-TUCP, Jacinta Tejada and Jecina Burabod, a
Board Member and a member of the said union, were dismissed. They filed a suit with the Labor Arbiter
alleging that their employer had not paid them with their overtime pay, holiday pay/premiums, rest day
premium, 13th month pay for the year 1994 salaries for services actually rendered, and that illegal
deduction had been made without their consent from their salaries for a cash bond. Stamford alleged that
the three were dismissed for not reporting for work when required to do so and for not giving notice or
explanation when asked.
In the Second Case, PACIWU-TUCP filed, on behalf of 50 employees allegedly dismissed illegally for
union membership by the petitioners, a case for unfair labor practice against GSP which denied such
averments. GSP countered that the BLR did not list Apacible Enterprises Employees Union as a local
chapter of PACIWU or TUCP. Thus, the strike that said union organized after the GSP refused to negotiate
with them was illegal and that they refused to return to work when asked.
The Third Case was filed for claims of the 50 employees dismissed in the second case. Petitioner
corporations, however, maintained that they have been paying complainants the wages/salaries mandated
by law and that the complaint should be dismissed in view of the execution of quitclaims and waivers by
the private respondents.
The Labor Arbiter ordered the three cases consolidated as the issues were interrelated and the respondent
corporations were under one management.
First Case: The dismissal was illegal and Stamford was ordered to reinstate the complainants as well as
pay the backwages and other benefits claimed. It was held that the reassignment and transfer of the
complainants were forms of interference in the formation and membership of a union, an unfair labor
practice. Stamford also failed to substantiate their claim that the said employees abandoned their
employment. It also failed to prove the necessity of the cash deposit of P2,000 and failed to furnish
written notice of dismissal to any complainants. Further, it failed to prove payments of the amounts being

Second Case: The strike was illegal and the officers of the union have lost their employment status, thus
terminating their employment with GSP. GSP is however ordered to reinstate the complainants who were
members of the union without backwages, save some employees specified. It was established that the
union was not registered, and thus had staged an illegal strike. The officers of the union should be liable
and dismissed, but the members should not, as they acted in good faith in the belief that their actions
were within legal bounds.
Third Case: GSP was ordered to pay each complainant their claims, as computed by each individual. All
other claims were dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found petitioners liable for salary
differentials and other monetary claims for petitioners failure to sufficiently prove that it had paid the
same to complainants as required by law. It was also ordered to return the cash deposits of the
complainants, citing the same reasons as in the First Case.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision in the First and Third Cases, but set aside the judgment of the
Second Case for further proceedings in view of the factual issues involved.
On May 14, 1996, a Petition to Declare the Strike Illegal was filed which was decided in favor of Stamford,
upholding the dismissal of the union officers. The officers made no prior notice to strike, no vote was
taken among union members, and the issue involved was non-strikable, a demand for salary increases
On elevation to the appellate court, it was ruled that the officers should be given separation pay, and that
Jacina Burabod and the rest of the members should be reinstated without loss of seniority, plus
backwages. It provided for the payment of the backwages despite the illegality of the strike because the
dismissals were done prior to the strike. Such is considered an unfair labor practice as there was lack of
due process and valid cause. Thus, the dismissed employees were still entitled to backwages and
reinstatement, with exception to the union officers who may be given separation pay due to strained
relations with their employers.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the respondents union officers and members were validly and legally dismisses
from employment considering the illegality of the strike.
(2) Whether or not the respondents union officers were entitled to backwages, separation pay and
reinstatement, respectively.

Held: (1) The termination of the union officers was legal under Article 264 of the Labor Code as the strike
conducted was illegal and that illegal acts attended the mass action. Holding a strike is a right that could
be availed of by a legitimate labor organization, which the union is not. Also, the mandatory requirements

of following the procedures in conducting a strike under paragraph (c) and (f) of Article 263 were not
followed by the union officers.
Article 264 provides for the consequences of an illegal strike, as well as the distinction between officers
and members who participated therein. Knowingly participating in an illegal strike is a sufficient ground
to terminate the employment of a union officer but mere participation is not sufficient ground for
termination of union members. Thus, absent clear and substantial proof, rank-and-file union members
may not be terminated. If he is terminated, he is entitled to reinstatement.
The Court affirmed the ruling of the CA on the illegal dismissal of the union members, as there was nonobservance of due process requirements and union busting by management. It also affirmed that the
charge of abandonment against Julian and Tejada were without credence. It reversed the ruling that the
dismissal was unfair labor practice as there was nothing on record to show that Julian and Tejada were
discouraged from joining any union. The dismissal of the union officers for participation in an illegal
strike was upheld. However, union officers also must be given the required notices for terminating
employment, and Article 264 of the Labor Code does not authorize immediate dismissal of union officers
participating in an illegal strike. No such requisite notices were given to the union officers.
The Court upheld the appellate courts ruling that the union members, for having participated in the strike
in good faith and in believing that their actions were within the bound of the law meant only to secure
economic benefits for themselves, were illegally dismissed hence entitled to reinstatement and backwages.
(2) The Supreme Court declared the dismissal of the union officers as valid hence, the award of separation
pay was deleted. However, as sanction for non-compliance with the notice requirements for a lawful
termination, backwages were awarded to the union officers computed from the time they were dismissed
until the final entry of the judgment.



G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003

Facts: Captain Virgilio Tolosa was master of the vessel M/V Donna owned by Quana-Kaiun, and was hired
through its manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc. (Asia Bulk). During channeling activities upon
the vessels departure from Yokohama on November 6, 1992, Capt. Tolosa was drenched with rainwater.
Subsequently, he contracted fever on November 11 which was later on accompanied by loose bowel
movement for the succeeding 12 days. His condition was reported to Asia Bulk and the US Coast Guard

Headquarters in Hawaii on November 15. However, before he could be evacuated, he died on November
18, 1992.
Evelyn Tolosa, the widow, filed a complaint before the POEA for damages against Pedro Garate, Chief
Mate of the vessel, Mario Asis, Second Mate, Asia Bulk and Quana-Kaiun. The case was transferred to the
NLRC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the widow, awarding actual damages plus legal interest, as well
as moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor
Arbiter was vacated and the complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended. Sustaining the NLRC, the CA ruled that
the labor commission had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. Her
cause did not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasi-delict or tort. Under Article 217
(a)(4) of the Labor Code which allows an award of damages incident to an employer-employee relation,
the damages awarded were not proper as she is not an employee, but merely the wife of an employee.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over petitioners action.
(2) Whether or not the monetary award granted by the Labor arbiter has already reached finality.

Held: (1) The Court affirmed that the claim for damages was filed not for claiming damages under the
Labor Code but under the Civil Code. The Court was convinced that the allegations were based on a quasidelict or tort. Also, she had claimed for actual damages for loss of earning capacity based on a life
expectancy of 65 years, which is cognizable under the Civil Code and can be recovered in an action based
on a quasi-delict. Though damages under a quasi-delict may be recoverable under the jurisdiction of labor
arbiters and the NLRC, the relief must be based on an action that has reasonable casual connection with
the Labor Code, labor statutes or CBAs. It must be noted that a workers loss of earning capacity and
backlisting are not to be equated with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor
benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of earning capacity is a relief or claim
resulting from a quasi-delict or a similar cause within the realm of Civil Law. In the present case, Evelyn
Tolosas claim for damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor statutes, or
CBAs. She cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code, which does not grant or
specify a claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same
Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. It is not the NLRC but the
regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is
merely incidental, and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as
a tort.

(2) On the finality of the award, the Court ruled that issues not raised in the court below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. Thus, the issue being not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals first,
this cannot be considered by the Supreme Court. It would be tantamount to denial of the right to due
process against the respondents to do so.



G.R. No. 146118. September 29, 2003

Facts: Samuel Samarca was employed as a laborer by Arc-Men Industries, Inc. On September 26, 1993,
petitioner filed an application for an emergency leave of absence on account of his sons hospitalization.
Upon his return for work, petitioner was immediately served with a notice of respondents order
suspending him for 30 days. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal suspension against
respondent and its owner. During the pendency of the complaint, petitioners 30-day suspension ended.
Consequently, respondent, in a letter, directed petitioner to report for work immediately. However, he
refused, prompting respondent to send him a Notice to Terminate, directing him to submit, within 5 days,
a written explanation why he should not be dismissed from the service for abandonment of work. For his
part, petitioner submitted a letter-reply explaining that because of the pendency of his complaint for
illegal suspension with the Labor arbiter, he could not report for work. Respondent, finding the
petitioners written explanation insufficient, decided to terminate his services via a Notice of Termination.
Consequently, petitioner filed an amended complaint for illegal dismissal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner abandoned his work.

Held: To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur: (1) The failure to report for work or
absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt acts. Mere absence is not sufficient. It is the employer who has the
burden of proof to show a deliberate and justified refusal of the employee to resume his employment
without any intention of returning.
The above twin essential requirements for abandonment to exist are not present in the case at bar.
Petitioners absence is not without a justifiable reason. It must be recalled that upon receipt of the Notice
to Terminate by reason of abandonment, petitioner sent respondent a letter explaining that he could not

go back to work because of the pendency of his complaint for illegal suspension. And immediately after he
was dismissed for abandonment of work, he lost no time to amend his complaint to illegal dismissal. This
alone negates any intention on his part to forsake his work. It is a settled doctrine that the filing of a
complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent with the charge of abandonment, for an employee who takes
steps to protest his dismissal cannot by logic be said to have abandoned his work.


G.R. No. 158693. November 17, 2004

Facts: Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of selling and
installing ornamental and construction materials. It employed petitioner Virgilio Agabon and Jenny
Agabon as gypsum board and cornice installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they
were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissal illegal. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the
decision because it found that the petitioners had abandoned their work and were not entitled to
backwages and separation pay. The Court of Appeals in turn ruled that the dismissal of the petitioners was
not illegal because they had abandoned their employment.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.

Held: The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs
to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and
instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did
not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the
law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held
liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process.
When the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or
render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of
his statutory rights.