102

CHAPTER

II

STA'IE POLICY, CONGRESS CRISIS AND THE BIRTH OF A

NEW IDEOLOGY
I

It becomes absolutely clear from the Fortnightly

Reports for the month of January 1933 that except for a few
stray incidents

am

spurts of enthusiasn here and there the mass

1
The decline in the
Civil Disobedience had almost fizzled out.

1 M;jras: "Civil Disobedience activities contirue to decline

a
the tide has now reached a very low ebb." First half
of Jaruary 1933.
Bihar arxi Orissa: "The fortnight has been generally a
quiet one. One of the Divisional Commissioners reports
that the Congress movenent bas lost its spirit and that
it is running short of men, funds and objectives. This
is the general opinion in the province, and the shortage
of volunteers is noticed in reports fran several districts."
First half of January 1933.
Central Provinces and Berar: "The political situation has
contirued t'""' be quiet, particularly in the south of the
province, w.1ere Gandhi Day activities were very halfhearted." First half of Jaruary 1933.
BanbaE "The various attempts made during Ja.mary to infuse
llfe nto the movement have fallen flat, am Congress
activity is once more at a low ebb." Secom half of
J aruary 1933.
Benganf Poli t1cally the fortnight has been uneventful.
Seco
half of January 1933.

!!....Ea.:

"The efforts of the Congress were concentrated

Clileny on the celebration of Indepemence Day on January
26, but these celebrations were neither very extensive
nor n.zmerous." Secon:l half of Jaruary 1933.
P~n~ab:

"Tt.te ~~lebrat1o~ of "Independence DaY" on the 26th

aruary was an object failure. In Lahore,-- there was
no bartal, no nag hoisting ceranonyL no procession arxi no
meeting." Secon:l half of January 19:>3.
-/-

103

mass movanent was followed by dissenssions and quarrels w1 thin

the Congress. Partly, this was the result of the crystallisation
of two extreme opinions w1 thin the Congress ranks as shown by
the range of reactions to the decisions of the Poona Conference. 2
A section of the Congress had recognised the painful fact that
mass movement had already cane to a halt notwithstanding
scattered incidents. They wanted the Congress leadership to
accept this reali t~ an:i begin the process of finding a way out
of this situation.
Nariman accused sane colleagues in the
Working Canmi ttee of suppression of denocracy ani issued a
pamphlet Withe Congress'? to give publicity to his views. On
(footnote 1 contd.)
N, W.F.P.:

"The fortnight under report has been almost

devoid of incident, and activities of Red shirts have not
been marked," Second half of Jaruary 1933.
H.D.P, File No. 18/1/1933,

A conference of Congressnen was called in July 1933 in

Poona. Though a large section of the delegates asked
for the abandonnent of the mass movement but Gandhi was
not willing to side with them. H.D.P, File No. 4/10/1933.

K,F, Nariman to Nehru, 20 December 1933. Nehru Papers.

Correspondence, vol, 54. Y. F, Nariman, B.C. Roy,
Sa tyamurti, Dr Ansari arxl 1.. Aney were the main proponents
of this opinion within the AICC. Reporting about his
meeting with Nariman, Nehru wrote to Gandhi: "The effect
of my telegram to Nariman was to make him pack up and cane
here. Brelvi also turned up. We had long talks. It was
evident that we had conflicting views about most matters
however much we might seek to cover then in soft lang1age
The only way out was for the AICC to decide an:i it was up
to those who wanted a change of programme to requisition a
meeting. I have suggested to Nariman that those lilbo think
w1 th him should denarxl an AICC meeting am I shall convene
it. It may be that sane of us have cane to the parting of
the ways.; If so let us face it and the consequences."
Jawaharlal Nehru, Se1ected Works, vol, 6, 8 November
1933, p. ~.

104

the other end of the spectrum stood .Jawaharlal Nehru, represen..

ting the militants, especially the left-leaning youth. detennined
to carry on the struggle without any canpranise. MeanwhUe
Gandhi was busy trying to open canmunication w1 th the Goverrment
with the idea of caning to an'oonourable canpranise. 4 If tbe response epi tanised by Nariman am his friends
was tantamount to EAJrrender before a l,iU accanpli the other,
represented by Nehru, symbolised the s1llbbornness and blind
militancy of the radicals. Gandb.i was the only leader trying
to score an important point at this eleventh hour. And tb.at was
to sanehow make the Governnent respond to the Congress
willingness to sit at the negotiation table. The Poona
Conference had requested for an interview with the Viceroy.
But was the Governnent willing to open negotiations and thereby
repeat another 'Gandhi-Irwin' Pact? The bureaucracy was busy
anticipating Gandhi's moves and making as dispassionate an
assessnent of the state of the Congress movement as possible.
Noted the policy makers: "As soon as Gandhi' s fast is over,
it would sean that there woul.d be two obvious alternatives open
to him, either to resume his efforts to open negotiations with
Goverrment, with the object of secuting the release of the
civil disobedience prisoners and of reviving the prestige of
the Congress, or to revive civil disobedience on the ground
that Governnent have rejected his peace offer. " 5 After his
release on 8th May Gandhi made a statement recanmending
suspension of Civil Disobedience movenent for one month or
6
six weeks.
The GoveriJ!lent did not resporrl to this statenent

4 On July 14, 1933, Gandhi sent a telegran to the Viceroy.

The draft in Gandhi's han:i read: "Will His Excellency
grant me interview exploring possibilities of peace.
Kindly wire." Maba1ma Gandhi, Collected Works, vol. V,
p. 309.

5 H. D.P File No. 44/57/33.

6 Maha1ma Gandhi, Collected Works, vol.

~v ,_ P~L_1_5B_.~

as it hardly took it S""riously as a "ges'blre of peace and

reconciliation with the Governnent". 7 For not responding to
the statement the authorities had the following reasons in
8
mim:
(a)

Civil disobedience as a res.1lt of the policy adopted ani

maintained by Goverrment since Jaruary 1932 bas now
manifestly .failed aiXl has practically ceased to function;
In 'suspeming' it therefore Gandhi is doing li ttl.e more
than pressure of circumstances has done independently of
him, and is dEmanding in re'blrn that Governnent should in
effect confer unfettered liberty upon those ...no initiated
movement to build up their influence again w1 th the object
of renewing it or similar activities as soon as they feel
strong enough. This was precisely what happened in 1931.

{b)

A peace which is to be of real value to Goverment would

not consist merely in cessation of Civil Disobedience

activities, but would include. definite detenninat1.on to
substi illte consti "b..ttional for unconsti1utiona1 methods.
There is no reason whatever to suppose fran Gandhi's statement tha~ if civil disobedience prisoners were to be
generally released before expiry of their sentences,
Congress would under his ~idance co-operate in working m1t
new consti"b..ttion on the basis of White Paper. In absence
of such co-operation the only apparant result to Governnent
in acceding to Gandhi's request would be to give Congress
leaders free opportunity to consolidate their forces with
the object of wrecking new constitution as soon as it is
introduced.
The Governnent noted a growing disposition on the part
of many Congressnen to get back to the consti"b..ttional course
until Gandhi intervened "w1 th his ill- tuned proposals for

H.D.P. File No. 44/57/33.

!big.

106

negotiations". 9
In 1931 Irwin's willingness to negotiate with Gandhi
raised Gandhi to the level of a "plenipotentiary on equal terms
with the ViceroY" and he was perceived by the public as "one
who was practically the head of a parallel Governnent". 10
Colonial authorities judged any.proposed course of action "not
so much by its possible effects on the Congress, but by its
probable effects" on their "supporters, officers and men". 11
The experience of the Gandh1-Irw1n Pact had confirmed their
worst fears.
It led people to imagine that the Governnent was
12
.
on the run'.
Colonial autbori ties clearly observed the
fact that in the eyes of their 'allies' Governmen~ s decision
to enter into negot1a tions with Gand h1 betrayed their weakness
and strengthened the impression that final victory of the
Congress was only a matter of time. The calculated advice of
the Secretary of State and the Acting Viceroy that the Governor
of Bengal should refuse an interview to Gandhi in July 1934 was
in stark contrast to Irwin's decision to enter into negotiations
in 1931. In a letter drafted in April 1932 by the Home Manber,
Haig, sent by the Viceroy to the Prime Minister, the abovementioned att1 tude is refiected very clearly: "But while the
movenent is still active life must. I feel, definitely avoid
conversations w1 th Gandhi Wl.ich will inev1 tably be interpreted
as negotiations and will on that account weaken our position
9

Ibid.

10

Lord Willingdon to Lord Zetland, 17.7.1935. Quoted in

B.R. Tomlinson, Thf Indian Nationat Cons:res~ an;i the
Raj, 19?9-42, Maan iian, Britain, 97b,p. 5.

11

H.D.P. File No. 5/45/31 ani K, w. Emerson's Note dated

12 February 1931.

12

Sash1 Joshi, Thf Left ~the Indian National Movement,

19a>-l4, Ph.D. hes s,
, Chapter VI.

107

very seriously. n 13 This also becomes quite clear fran the

following lines telegraphed ttl London by Willingion on 25 June
1932: "Anything that looks like negotiation will seriously
upset those wh.o support us and we simply cannot af!ord to shake
the confidence of the army and the police.n 14 Gandhi's request
for an interview, submitted on July 14, 1933, was rurtly refused
on the ground that the Civil Disobedience movanent was "wholly
unconst11lltional, that there can be no compromise with it and
that Goverrment cannot enter into any negotia tiona for its
withdrawal". 15 Government wanted complete surrender while
Gandhi wanted to offer some sort of canpromise. "I would rather
16 The iron heel
be reduced to dust than surrender", he said.
of imperialism had cowed down the people. The masses were not
able any longer to suffer th.e prolonged tor1llre of Ordinance
Rule. Gandhi suggested individual Civil Disobedience' as the
way out. However, Goverment was not willing to lift the
pressure on the Congress as its own assessnent, based on the
reports fran the provinces, showed that its tough policy bad
successfully suppressed the movement. "The great majority of
the Congress supporters recognise that mass civil disobedience
is a dead issue", 17 reported the Governnent of Bihar arxi Orissa.

13

H.D.P. File No. 14/18/32.

14

Willingdon to Hoare, quoted in D. A. Low ( ed.) , Congress

am ttle Raj, p. 178.

15 ViceroY's reply to Gandhi's Telegram of July 14, 1933.

Mahatma Gandhi, ColleR~ Works, vol. LV, p. 264. The
following comment Of
ett reflected the determination
of the policy makers: ". even if Gam hi does undertake
.
a peni tentia1 fast which may result in his death, it appears
to me quite impossible for Governnent to allow themselves
to be coerced by any such action. His death in my view
terrl to increase the "nationalist" spirit but would not
lead to an attack on 'Government for the action taken over
this particular matter such as the refusal of the interview."
H. D.P. File No. 4/10/33. Hallett's note, 31. 7.1933.
16 Ibid., p . 265 .
17

H.D.P. File No. 4/10/33.

108

Fran Banbay, Haig reported gleefully: "It (Poona Conference)

shows clearly how Gandhi's stock has fallen, one might almost
say crashed, even in his O\ot/0 cruntry. " 18 While in U .P.,
"Congress extremists regret that mass movement has been
abandoned More moderate manbers regret that no movenent
towards adoption of a constructive programme has been made."
The prevailing feeling, according to the Madras Governnent, was
of "a general weariness and disg.J.st at the lack of s..tccess of
the tactics till then pursued", am "absence of any very
clearly formed ideas as to what course to adopt". Tendency
towards polarisation was also pointed out by the Central
Provinces: "Congress die- bards do not accept Aneyt s statement
and the moderates are considering the revival of the old
swarajist party and council entry.n 19 The condition of the
Congress as seen by Dr Syed Matmud is worth quoting. That
he was in a position to give a valuable opinion was proved by
the fact that he was one of those alillmoned to meet Gandhi at
Ward ha. In the course of a letter to Nehru he said: a:>
Those of us who honestly think that a postponement
of civil disobedience will bring about a chan~ and
will create an a1mosphere in \'bich they will be
able to prepare for the next struggle are sadly
mistaken. They will never be allowed to do any
,eal work of preparation. When I say this I do not
in any way mean to create the impression that by
continuing we can produce any result whatsoever
in near fu'b.lre. In fact, we will be ridiculed
by our own countrymen if we continue going to
jail. There is no prospect of rousing the people.
But ins pi te of all this we have to continue
The Governnent has beaten us, if I may use the
word, or checkmated us. It is quite true that

18

In a letter to s. Satyanurti ( 17 Novanber 1933), Swami

Govindanand wrote: "We are the Congress. Gandhi is
not the Congress today." H.D.P. FUe No. 4/19/33.

19

Ibid,

a:>

Ib!d.

This letter was intercepted by the police.

109

we are lying prostrate at the manent but it

should not be denied that tbey are also tired
a bit and w1 thin two to three years they will
be so tired that they will be compelled to
treat w1 th us. If we stop now, we s hal.l not
be able to begin w1 thin five years if we can
begin at all. The Goverrment can use much
greater force then and can checkmate us again.
Where is the g.tarantee that at that time we
shall be not lying prostrate w1 thin a year of
martial law rule? The Governnent will know
that they have simply to hold for a year or
two in order to defeat any national movenent.
The spirit of the times i.e. uncertainty and bewildel\ment permeates this letter thoroughly. It brings out clearly
the dUenmas of those nationalists who stood against any
canpromise with British imperialisn.
II
Once the Goverrment had decided to follow the policy
of SJppression ani simultaneously introducing tbe refonns as
soon as possible it had achieved a sense of clarity about its
day to day moves. It was keenly watching the developments
w1 thin the nationalist camp w1 thout dis1llrbing the process of
crystalisation of forces ?long the lines of constitutionalism
versus non-consti1lltional1sn. The policy was, as usual, two
pronged: to create conditions to wean away a section of the
Congressmen to a constitutional path by convincing them of the
.futility of carrying on civil disobedience while, at the same
time, working for a split w1 thin these two tendencies and
always looking towards J awaharlal Nehru am the left- wing to do
this job by adopting an irreconciliable atti1llde towards the
constitutionalist temency and right-wing Congressnen. H. G.
Haig, the master mim behind the Government strategy to contain
the forces of civil disobedience, noted in May 193lc 21

21

Hane Depar1ment (Political), File No. 4/4/1934, A Note

by H. G. Haig, 22. 5.34.

110

A strong movanent has been developing recently

for the rebabili tation of Congress througn the
w1. tb:lrawal of civU disobedience. Many rightwing Congressnen are genuinely anxious to
resume consti1ut1onal course and to make use
of the power offered to then by the councU s;
others who do not believe in council entry,
are equally anxious that the Congress should
be able to resume its other activities parttcularly in the matter of direct approach to
the masses. Apart from this difference in
methods, there is also a clear distinction
between the right-wing, which in my view does
believe in const11llt1onal action and wUl be
prepared to play a consti1llt1onal part under
the new condi t1ons, and the left-wing who may
be regarded as irreconcilable, working for
complete independence to be achieved by mass
movenents, and some of them inclining definitely
to communism.
"We are entering a new phase", said Haig and "it is
clear tba t though the Congress as represented by Mr Gandhi am
Pandi t Jawaharlal are changing their tactics, there is no
dimirn.1t1on in their hostility to Governnent and no change in
their objectives which are definitely revolutionary. n 22 At
the same time there were "obvious differences between Gandhi
and Nehru in regard to methods" and the authorities assessnent
was that Nehru would "maintain close cc >:act with the movenents
that look to violence". 23 The need of the hour was to simplify
the complex of intertwined forces of w.rious ideological ~
persuasions and separate the "revolutionary elenents" which
in 1urn cruld be handled sternly. Therefore,
"TJhe aim of Governnent policy is to penni t
and even encourage the right-wing to resume
const11llt1onal course, while ensuring that the

22

H.D.P. File No. 4/8/1933.

25. 9. 33.

23

!.Q!.g,.

A Note by H. G. Haig,

111

10

activities of the left-wing are not allowed

again to becane a serious menace to the
peace of the country. If the right-wing
are drawn into consti1utional activities,
I doubt myself whether 1 t wuld be possible
to keep the two wings to get her in one
organisation very much longer, particularly
under the new consti1ution. The position
will certainly be simplified if the revolutionary elenents are disentangled am stand
by themselves. 24
Who are being referred to as "revolutionary elements"
here? Those who are not willing to follow a consti1utional
path am are inclined towards mass movements irrespective of
the fact whether their method is violent or non-violent.
Earlier, as Haig had clarified: "Our object should be to
separate those who are prepared to work the constitution from
those who are not. Gandhi and Nehru are clearly in the latter
category. " 25
In practical terms the Governnent reached the
following

~b

conclusio~

notification against the various branches

of the Congress or~isation should be experimentally w1 thdrawn, so that the Congress may
be enabled to carry out its apparent intention
of resuming its position as a consti tutiona.l
party There will be no question of wittnrawing
the notification in force against any organisation
of a revolutionary kind or any that in the opinion
of the local Governments are a danger to the
peace of the country.

24

Hane Depar1ment (Political) FileNo. 4/4/1934. A Note

by H.G. Haig, 22.5.34. Also see last section of
Chapter VI.

25

H.D.P. File No. 4/8/1933. A Note by H.G. Haig, 22.9.33.

Let it be clarified that Gandhi at times, depending upon
the cirOJmstances, supported whole-heartedly the con~
t11utional tendency but he never believed for a manent
. that. India .could win 1 ts freed an lly following_a con~ _
t1 tutional path.

26 H.D.P. File No. 4/4/1934.

112

11
In a discussion among the policy makers it was thought
desirable to indicate more clearly that in the event of Congress, or any branch
thereof attempting to revive civil disob&o
dience in any form either generally or 1n
any loca1 area or to harass by boycott or
other means Governnent servants or Governnent
supporters, action would be taken against
then either by re-issue of the notifications
under the criminal law amendment Act or by
the institution of prosecutions under the
acts now in force. 27
In "this declining phase of the mass upsurge the
perceptions of the various inclinations w1. thin the Congress
were quite different fran the Government' s perception of their
respective perspectives. Though Congressmen were torn by crisis
and were proposing different methods to give a meaningful 1llrn
to the movenent yet in the eyes of the Goverrment they were
united by a common thread, the hostility towards the imperialist
Governnent. 23 Gandhi was undoubtedly the tallest leader of the
movenent but even he could not be equated to the Congress
organisation as a whole. He was dangerous to the extent he
was able to unify the Congressmen on a particular line of
action. 29

2:1

!.!2!.

28

In a telegram to all local Governments it was stated by

the Central Governnent that "it must be recognised "that
Congress though suspending civil disobedience for
tactical reasons are still hostile to the Government."
H.D.P. File No. 4/4/1934.

29

In a letter to Mr Mieville, Private Secretary to the

Viceroy, Harry Haig wrote: "The statenent which he
issued about civil disobedience recently goes to
confinn the view we have always held, that Gandhi is
not able merely by himself to call off civil disob~
dience or bring about a fum amen tal change of policy.
He has beerl: a very useful asset to the Congress but it
does not follow, whatever may be the public 1m pression
they (his followers - BJ) like to create, that he is its
unchallenged dictator. The broad problen we have to face
ls one not merely of dealing w1 th Gandhi, but of dealing

_ /-

113

The most important thine about the British policy

makers was their dispassionate assessment of the objective
factors of reality w1 thout confusing it with their desire to
develop the situation along favourable lines. At any particular
moment the 'favourable factors' were carefully separated from
those ' factors' which stood in the path of achieving desirable
results. Then through a policy move or moves a kind of
'magnetic field' of affinity arrl repulsion was created vi~a.-vis
these factors with the intention of undermining those forces
which were being perceived as more intransigent and strengthening those forces which could be placated. The policy moves
were worked out in a complex manner an:l at many levels. The
Communalist, regionalist and casteist forces were to be
encouraged against the national movement as a whole, consti iutionalists were to be strengthened against non-constitutionalists,
non-violent elements were to be separated from the violent ones,
right-wingers were to be constantly warned against the leftist
threat.
The state apparatus did not only operate with the
permanent digits of 'enemies' and 'friends' but also actively
preferred one enemy vis-a-vis another, one ideological shade
vis-a-vis another and one political position vis-a.-vis another.
Thus constitutional opposition was preferable over nonconstiilltional oppositior 1s a whole and within the non-constitutional opposition the right-wing was preferable over the
left-wing. They even distinguished between the various shades
of the left while devising tactics to tackle then. Gandhi ani
the left-wing were to be countered by bolstering up the rightwing but a strong right-wing was a potentially (!J'aVe threat.
The Goverrment was keen to encourage right-wing Congressmen
to follow the constitutional path but far from anxious to see
them elected. This partiality of atti'b.ldes was conveyed and
established by the above stated approach of creating a 'field'
of af!ini ty and repulsion at various leY'els through sui table
moves. Channels of canmunicatlons were always kept open or
devised accordingly. This kind of canplex atti'b.lde presupposed
w1 th the Congt-ess."

114

that the state appara"bls was willing to accommodate a part of

the opposition' s dsnand by losing a 'bit' of the ground under
its feet, instead of conceding the entire demand, with the hope
of taking the wind out of the sails of the movement by
neutralising a section of the opposition and creating divisions
and diss~nsions in the rest. This also presuppoed the fact
that the state was open to the impression of public opinion
and pressures of the mass movenent and responded accordingly.
This attitude of the state conditioned the nature of the
oppositional politics and also determined to a considerable
extent its inner dynamics. With the clear recognition of Ule
above mentioned circum scribing limits of state policy nationalist
politics had to match it by evolving an equally complex
att1 tude if it was to be effective. It was faced w1 th the
choice of either recovering the ground from the enemy inch by
inch by adopting a strategy of what Gransci called, the 1 war of
O"l,
position'Afacing severe repression and demoralisation by
attempting an insurrection to forcibly seize political power
i.e. follow a strategy of 'war of manoeuvre'. On the one hand
without unduly exposing its forces to repression and destruction
the national movement was duty bound to create a powerful
impression on the policy makers while on the other hand always
be willing to negotiate ar.rl bargain to recover maximum 1 grour.rl'
and 'space' for manoeuvrability. If the s~ te was open to the
impression' of the movement the ranks of the movement were
equally open to the 'impression' made by the state thrrugh its
policies of concession and repression. The existence of one
presupposed the existence of the other.

The political process enveloping both the colonial

state and nationalist opposition mo\ved through a dynamic of
shifting equilibrium. Each time Ule mass movement disturbed
the earlier equilibrium to establish a new one it sapped the
strength of the state to some extent, while the Congress
organisation and the mass movement correspondingly gained a
sense o! strength and power. The very fact that the ..Goverrm.ent
was willing to negotiate at a certain point indicated that the

115

Goveri1nent was forced to recognise the strength of the Congress

and the mass movement it led. To the broad masses, as well as
the forces under the Government hegsnony, it was a clear sign
that the Goverrment was 'on the rtm' and had realised that it
could not crush the Congress. This gave the Congress masses
confidence and encouragsnent and sowed the seeds of consternation among those forces which were opposed to the Congress.
It is only in this framework that the 'meaning' of the GandhiIrwin Pact in the first round of civil disobedience in 1930
and Governnentt s determined refusal even to negotiate during
the second round become perfectly clear. 30 In such a struc1llre
of politics both sides could not but display hardheaded realisn
and to considerable extent they understood each other' s strong
and week points.
Thus the Government approach towards the
national movenent was based upon the finn belief that the
Congress would not artificially carry on the barren politics of
mass civil disobedience once the masses were perceived by the
leadership as nearing exhaustion. It would shift its tactics
to the terrain of constitutional struggle to avoid demoralisation
among its ranks. This would be followed by attempts to revive
the spirit, regrouping and consolidation. This capacity to
choose one enemy vis-a-vis another at a partirular juncture
and willin~ess to concede to this enemy a part of what is
being demanded was an important manifestation of one of the
hegemonic characteristics of the colonial state.
III
When the Congressmen of the left as well as right
inclinations were criticising Gandhi for his Harijan campaign
as a 'non-political' diversion Government understood his
objective differently. M.G. Hallet was of the opinion that

30

For detaUs see Sashi Joshi, The L:ft and the-TndianNatiog:l Movgen~ 19CD-34, Doctor 4fhf!s1s, diS,
JNtl, ew Dei ,934:

116

instead of regarding this programme "as a vague and indefinite

attempt to develop the home-spinning industry" it was necessary
to "probe deeper into (these) proposals and to attempt to
,_ppreciate their implication". 3 1 According to the Governnent' s
under standing Gandhi was confronted w1 th the problan of
extending the ideological influence of nationalisn to much
larger sections of the population to generate a movement strong
enough to pressurise the Governnent: 3 2
In the opinion of the Governnent of India this
new move of Gandhi' s, though ostensibly aimed
at what may be .called broadly rural reconstruction,
is quite possibly a very subtle ani as'b..lte attenpt
to work up, in course of time, a civil disobedience
campaign on a much larger scale than anything we
have had hitherto, and supported to a far greater
extent by the rural population. 33
Ostensibly the new prograrmne of the Congress in 1934
was to be directed towards the encouragenent of village industries and other related measures which were supposed to contribute
to the econanic uplift of the peasant. Govei'IIllent, which talked
of carrying on developmental programmes for the rural population,
could not object to this constructive activity and restrict, at
least theoretically, the movement of Congressmen, in the countryside by using repressive meas.Jres. "These objects would be in

31

H.D.P. File No. 3/16/34 and K.W.

32

H. Williamson, Director Intelligence Bureau seemed to agree

completely: "As is well known, he (Gandhi) has bad for a
number of years a bee 1n his bonnet to the effect that if
sufficient persons are found ready to go to jaU, governnent
must give way. In the last civil disobedience campaign
approximately 100,000 persons were found ready. But
obviously, as Governnent has won, this number was not
sufficient. In Gandhi's opinion 300,000 will suffice and
he hopes that as a result of his Harijan campaign he will
find 100,000 Harijans ready to go to jail. The Harijans
are to be :the spear:point of the next attack."
H.D.P. File No. 4/4/34, dated 16. 2.1934.

33

H.D.P. File No. 3/16/34 and K.W.

117

complete accord with the policy of Government", noted H. D.

Cra1k. 34 This superficial s~ilarity of objects obscured the
real meanings of Gandhi' s move for the left. They did not
understand that these objects could be approached fran two
opposite ideological angles. In the face of Government' s
detennination to carry on the repressive laws on the pretext of
Congress' adherence to civU disobedience programme perhaps
this was the shrewdest move to ensure once again a close touch
between the Congress activists and the rural population once
the mass movement had subsided. But the ever vigilent colonial
authorities did appreciate this specifically Gandhian style of
politics: "Gandhi' s real object, viz., the pranotion of a
spirit of revolt in the rural population generally, wUl no
doubt be kept carefully in tne backgroo.nd. "35 In a letter to
all local Governnents, Secretary of Governnent of India,
M.G. Hallett stated:
A campaign :for development of village industries
would also have the advantage that it would give
employment to those Congress workers who disliked
parliamentary work and were anxious to participate
in a more active policy. The penetration of these
workers into the village on work to which no
exception could be taken would also give them
opportunities of spreading political ideas and of
establishing their infiuence.36
What were the 'hidden' meanings of Gandhi' s programme of All
India Village Industries Association?

socialist

34

~.,

35

Ibid.

dated 6. 11.1934.

36 l.bid._ Fran Secretary of Governnent of India to Local

noveranents, 23 November 1934.

118

left-wing of Congress and as soon as Jawaharlal

Nehru is set free, he no doubt wUl interest
himself in this work ThUs it may be anticipated that if Gandhi's scheme meets w1 th any
success, he will be in a position 1x> launch a
three fold attack on Government. Congress
candidates in the Assembly will hamper
Governnent by attack on repressive legislatton
and the reforms proposals; Congress workers in
the villages will establish their influence and
win over to their side a considerable portion
of the masses who will give their support to
Congress candidates at the !irst general election
under the new constitution and may be induced
without diffic:ul ty to launch a further ci v11
disobedience campaign when Gandhi gives the
order. 37
The significant point about the programme was that
it circumvented the repressive laws to place the Congress "WOrkers
once again in touch with the masses without much delay to
minimise the impact of demoralisation, a necessary outcome of
the ebbing away of the mass movement. It also opened the
channels for the left-wing Congressnen to penetrate the rural
areas to carry on a programme which was within the bourxls of
legality. And it was expected that they would instill in the
rural population 11 ideas which may not be in all cases in agreement with those of their leaders". Here an important aspect ot
Gandhian mobL. . isa tion' needs to be emphasized. Only a moderate
programme w1 thin the lirni ts of existing legality cruld rouse
the broadest sections of the people to come forward to defy thQse
very limits. Implenentation of such a programme generates
awareness and forces which invariably fall outside 1he confines
of that existing legality. More radical programmes would lead
only to limited sectional mobilisations. First, the State 'WOUld
place innumerable l'llrdles in the path of such radical
mobilisations. Secondly, such limited mobilizations would
certainly be more militant but they would not be able to
w1 thsta.m suppression and terrorisation by the state apparatus.

37

Ibid.

Emphasis added.

119

Implicit within the Gandhian conception of raising consciousness was the golden rule: in generating social consciousness
the longest route is the shortest distance.
The policy makers took it for granted that the leftwing would lose no time to make use of these openings successfully
warding off the Governnent machinations to isolate them and
thereby reQucing the impact of their intervention to the minimum
possible. Though Jawaharlal Nehru was outside Gandhi's Harijan movement, but his own
movenent is no less dangerrus. His plan is,
and we see signs already of a start being made,
'b:> have in every village two or three residents
patiently poisoning the minis of their covillagers against Government It is obvious
that the Governnent wUl have to be as patient
as Nehru and will have to continue relentlessly
its present policy of refusing to allow
organisations with deClared unlawful objects
to be recognised as lawful. The object of
Nariman, Satyamurthi, etc. is not to bring the
Congress round to constructive consti'bltional
work but at the most to induce Congres9Ilen to
destroy assemblies and councils fran wi Ul.ih,
while Gandhi raises a huge Harijan army and
Nehru a host of stalwart agricul1:urists to be
used as fodder in the next trial of strength
w1 th the Governnent. 38
This analyses of the bureaucracy which anticipated
a two pronged attack from the forces led by Gandhi and Nehru
was exaggerated to the extent that it visualised such an attack
in the immediate fu1ure. But it was sufficiently realistic a
guiding perspective for evolving concrete policy measures to
deal with the various ideological currents w1 thin Ul.e Congress.

38

H.D.P. File No. 4/4/1934.

dated 16 February 1934.

Note by H. Williamson,

120

IV
The Congress Socialist Party held its first All-India
Conference at Patna on 17 May 1934, under the presidentship of
Acharya Narendra Dev. In October 1934 Gandhi resigned fran 1he
Congress w1 th a view to influence it from outside. The Bcxnbay
session of the Congress ( 26-28 October 1934) under the presidentship o~ Rajendra Prasad adopted the idea of a constitu-ent-"
assembly for settling the consti1llt1on of the country. It also
adopted Gandhi's programme for Khadi an:i Village industries.
In this non-upsurge phase Congressnen were groping in three
different directions i.e. council entry, constructive programme
and mobilisation of the masses on econanic denands. As pointed
out in the first chapter council activity was absorbed w1 thin
the Gandhian strategy. It also utilised the talent of a
different kind of Congressman.
There are fighters who fight their very best
in the councils and only their second best
elsewhere. 0 thers fight equally well when
and so long as there is something like a fight
going on; but they cannot breathe their full
anywhere behind the 'front', where reserves
and supplies are stocked and developed, and
where plans and preparations are made and
perfected. For such of then (i.e. the fonner)
we must provide a p~ ;oliamentary Board. 39
Gandhi was not a constitutionalist but gave limited support to
the 'council entry' tendency. He hoped that "the majority
will always remain untouched by the glamour of council work". ll)

39

N.N. Mitra, The Indian Annual Register, January-June

1937, vol. 1, pp. 79=80.
ll)
"In its own place", he wrote, "it will be useful. But
the Congress will commit suicide if its attention is
solely devoted to legislative work. Swaraj will never
cane that way. Swaraj can only cane through an allround consciousness of the masses". Col:~~~ Wo~ks
vol. 58, p. 11. _Also see R.J. Mo()re'- Th
iBfindian
Unity,-- t9l7-19l), Delhi, 1974,. p. 29b.

121

Constructive programme formed an essential part of

the Gandhian strategy, 41 In a letter to Hanson, dated 31
October 1934, Gandhi revealed that through his constructive
programme he would like to bring about a change of mind which
would erode the acquiescence on which the Raj was fouzxied, 42
But Mahatma knew that many a Congressnen did not realise "the
essential connection between the constructive programme and
civil disobedience for swarajrt. This is how he explained this
"connection"~

For such an indefinable thing as Swaraj

people must have previous training in
doing things of all-India interest. Such
work must throw together the people and
their leaders whom they would trust 1mplici tly,
Trust begotton in the pursuit of contirruous
constructive work becomes a trenendous asset
at the critical movement. Constructive work,
therefore, is for a non.- violent army what
drilling etc. is for an army designed for bloody
warfare. Individual c!vil disobedience among
an unprepared people and by leaders not known
to or trusted by them is of no avail, and mass
civil disobedience is an impossibility. 43
The main idea behind the constructive programme was
to prepare the masses for a psychological transfonnation. Thi~
consti'b.lted, what N.N. Mitra, called the "inner side" of the
constructive programme:

41

The pranotion of khadi and village industries, national

education and Hindu-Muslim unity, struggle against
untouchability and boycott of foreign cloth were same
of the elements of constructive programme.

42 B,R. Nanda, Maha"tma

43 M.K. Gandhi

Ganfih1,

p, 370.

Yfunf India, 9 February 1930. Quoted 1n

B.N. Pande ( ed f
Centenary Hts1(9ry ofJhe Iraian ~onal
Congress, vol. I, p, xxiv, T e concep on o cons
etive
programme as a "necessary part of preparation of lll&r was
also emphasized-. by J.,B,. K1rpalan1 in his--speecll a~the -
Lucknow session of the Indian National Congress, See
Zaidi s. G, and A.M. ( ed.), The Encyg].ooae41a of the Indian
National Congress, vol, 10, p, Z8,

122

On the inner side, it means the psychological

education and moral training of the masses
and classes whereby, ( 1) they became conscious
of their individual and group limi ta tiona;
( 2) they feel an urge to outgrow those
limitations, (3) they have an appreciation of
the means and methods by which the limitations
can be outgrown, and ( 4) they create and develop
condi tiona - in -terms of organised ideas,
feelings, character and conduct - favourable
to a successful employment of those means and
methods. 44
On the "oli~ side" the constructive progranme meant the
requisite kind of econanic and social planning. Invariably the
socialists pounced upon this "outer side" and subjected it to a
ruthless criticism.
Expressing its views on the All India Village
Industries Association the Pubjab Goverrment in a letter
( 23 November 1934) to the Central Goverrment remarked: "I>ir
Gandti' s intentions in his rural movement are still obscure,
but the movement is potentially of great danger as he may at
any time resume political activities and make use of the
sympathy and support gained by his rural wrk. n 45 United
Provinces Governnent infonned: "This province, in which an
attempt has already been made to set the tenants again;;;t their
landlords, is likely to be one of the main centres of the new
scheme. In view of the influence of the Congress Socialist
Party the movement is li~ly to be canbined w1 th _the propagation
of the canmunist ideas."
The Assam Governnent likewise saw
in this new programme of Gandhi an attempt to strengthen "his
hold on the masses" and success in this programme will
"certainlY" be used "for political ends". lq

44 N.N. Mitra, The Indian Annyal Register, July-December 1935,

45

vol. 2, p. 54.
.
H~D.P. Ftle Jl16/34 and K.W.

46 Ibid.
LfJ

Ibid.

123

What was being suggested by the policy makers, \!bich

was obviously not clear to the Congress left, was an umbilical
link between the "constructive programme" and the advancement
of certain political ends. Inherent in Gandhi's constructive
work was a deeper dimension which could be easily labelled as
subterranean pol1 tical activity. This was designed to inspire
the rural masses to cane in touch with Congress workers without
suspicion or distrust. When in 'the Central Legislative Assenbly
Henry Craik constantly pointed out the political motives behind
Gandhi's constructive programme G.B. Pant remarked:
And what after all is poli tied? Is the
eartt.quake work in Bihar an economic, a
t:umani tarian or a political network for
entangling people and entrapping them inside
the Congress fold so that the Congress may
have power in Ule land? If the service of
the people by itself is considered an offence
because 1. t would tend to strengthen the
position of Congressnen in this country,
then pray, who is ac'b.lally biased am ac'b.lated
by political motived? Is it we who want to
serve the people or is it they who want to
stand in the way of service lest that growing
influence should sane day culminate in the
extinction of the existing vicious system of
Government in this coontry'? lB
To most of the militants, especially the leftists,
any shift from the mass movement to consti1l.l tional activity
meant abandonnent of the goal of swaraj. Irrespective of the
junc'b.lre the logic of uncanpranising militancy always ran as
follows:
The Indian masses were ready for a bold lead and a
militant plan of action. It was the leaders '~tho were weak.kneed. In a political fi ght you either go f orwa.rd or you go
under. Even if the Congress was crushed by the Governnent for

ll3

Ibid.

124

the time being. the left-wingers would much rather face that
contingency, than accept a position of compromise with the
Goverrrnent. lea For the le:t't, the masses were always ready to
go forward, to ceaselessly struggle till victory was
achieved.
To an audience at Atmedabad, Sardar Patel argued
differently:
We have not given up tile fight for freedcm~
we have merely changed the mode of our fi t.
It is no use now going to jaU or conduct g
a n~ tax campaign. We have to fight against
our own weakness without caning into conflict
with the Governnent so that we may acquire the
strength for the fight when it is resumed. 18
This belief that the Congress could spread its influence
among the rural population w1 thout coming into conflict w1 th the
Governnent and then after an interV'al again enter into a conflict
to tap that influence did not make any sense to the left. Only
the period of mass upheaval, when Congress openly declared
confrontation w1 th the colonial state, was seen by them as a
phase of struggle. Since the leftists were trying to umerstand
an::l intervene into the anti-imperialist struggle through the
paradi8D of insurrection' it was quite logical for them to see
the abandonnent of mass movement as the abandonnent of struggle
itself. Even temporarily to give up mass movement was to give
up the goal of Swaraj itself. The logic of their paradi@711
created expectations from the mass movement which it simply
could not fulfil. ns rising rurve was always expected to
move upwards, consistent and uninterrupted towards 1 ts logical
finale 1. e. insurrection. Its disintegration and decline
could not but be an anti-climax, something which defied
reason' or 'logical grasp'. Given their paradign the decline
48a

For details see Chapter": VI and VII.

49

H.D.P. File 3/16/34 and K.W.

125

of a mass movement could not be grasped rationally and hence it

was the product of a 'betrayal'.
The socialists/communists took it for granted that
those ~o were oppressed or exploited already possessed the
readiness am will to struggle against their si"b.lation. They were
firmly convinced that where there is oppression there will be
opposition or to put 1 t another way, the greater the degree of
exploitation, the greater the radiness to revolt against that
exploitation. Perhaps they had too 'physicalist', and therefore
simplistic, a notion of the awakening of the first stirrings of
human consciousness. They did not pay much attention to the
significant aspect, which Gandhi never ignored, that long
standing oppression, poverty and misery dehumanised the
oppressed by benumbing their desires and dreams of a normal
human life. Such a population lived their day to day life by
accepting their situation as their fate. Myraid theories
provided the rationale of these inner shakles. The tradition of
all the dead generations weighed like a nigh1mare on the mim
of the living. Only human beings having a sense of di~i ty
and shame could muster the courage to awaken to their surroundings.
Only such human beings could believe that through struggle they
could change their position in society. Econanic programmes
whether of moderate or radical na'b.lre could make sense only to
such truman beings. The 'psychological world' of sub- tunan
existence could not be allured to the "would be worlds" of the
radical economic pgorammes. Built into the programme of the
socialists was the belief that once you preach a programme of
economic welfare of the masses they would automatically be
attracted to you. The more radical the programme the wider
the participation and mobilisation of the poor. The point which
we want to emphasize is that the task with which the socialists
were faced in colonial India was much more gigantic than it was
ac'b.lally defined and assessed by "then. And not only that, it was
--Of .a qualitati.vel.y_ ..di!ferent na"b.lre 1. e .. of tran~:(9nn_i!lg :the

126

'psychological-world' of subhuman existence of a vast population

and developing in them the capacities to dare, desire an:i drean
a different life i.e. to develop the conviction that 1hey must
struggle to change their position and way of life. And those
like Gandhi, who realised the vastness of this task without
getting overwhelmed, could not help seeing socialists as
individuals who were in too much of a hury.
Among the Indian population two processes were going
on simultaneously: the process of 'psychological transformation'
an:l process of ' social transformation'. The latter presupposed
the earlier and only those could absorb radical economic
programmes who had already covered a fairly long distance of
their journey in the first process.
If India had to pass through a series of massive
upsurges before it could win its indeperxlence then the
dissipation and w1 thdrawal of such mass movements was as na1llral
as their building up to a crescendo. As there must be somebody
who initiates these movements, becomes their central symbol and
chief rallying point, similarly sanebody must take the responsibility to decide their halt and calling off after they are
perceived to be petering out. In Gandhi's own words:
An able general always gives battle in his own
time on the ground of his choice. He always
retains the initiative in these respects ani
never allows it to pass into the hands of the
enemy A wise general does not wait till he
is ac"tllally routed; he w1 thdraws in time in an
orderly manner from a position which he knows
he would not be able to hold. In a satyagraba
campaign the mode of fight and the choice of
tactics, e. g. whether to advance or retreat,
offer civil resistance or organise no~violent
strength through constructive work are detennined
according to the exigencies of the si mation. ~

Nirmal Kumar Bose, Selections ~Jiaom Gandhi, Navjivan

. Publ1s_h1ng_H_ouse. ___Atntfidabad, 1
, p. a:> 2.

127

Acceptance of the bitter fact that carrying on the

civil disobedience struggle was no longer possibel and beneficial
could not but produce emotional upheaval am a sense of shock
among a section o:t the movement and its sympath1sers. In such
circumstances it seems quite na'blral that a section of the
movement should have become disheartened and demoralised while
another section drew upon its deepest reserves to exhibit
characteristics of tenacity and militancy.
On 8th May 1933, Gandhi suspended the Civil Disobedience movement for six weeks. Like thousands of other youn8men, Nehru, lodged in jail, felt exceedingly irritated. "I am
afraid I am drifting further and further away from him (Gandhi)
mentally, in spite of my strong emotional attactment to him
What a trenendous contrast to the dialectics of Lenin & Co.
More and more I feel drawn to their dialectics, more and more I
realise the gJ.lf between Bapu am me I want to break fran
this lot canpletely- I want to place our ideal crystal clear
before the people", 51 he noted 1n his Diary. Nehru was trying
to settle down with this mood when he was released on 30 Au gist
due to his mother' s illness.
On the very day of his release he stated in an
interview:
It is noteworthy that there is a struggle
between Fascism and Communism for capital and
power in f!!Very indepement country. This is
the inevitable result of the failure of
capitalism which has created more wealth but
left no purchasing power in the hands of the
consumers as the result of great unenployment. 52

51

J awaharlal Nehru, Sflected Works, vol. 5, Orient Lon8Dan,

1973, pp. 478-9. R am getting more and more certain

that there can be no further political cooperation between

Bapu and me. At least not of 'tile _kind that bas existed.
We had better go our different ways.". p. 489.
52 I bid,, p.

~ 5,

30 August 1933.

128

Ttus for Nehru, the struggle in India against

British imperialisn was to be a part of the communist forces
struggling against capi talisn on a world scale. But let it
not be misunderstood, the struggle in India was not against
capi talisn and for socialisn. In a new context he was only
repeating what he bad been saying since 1928. 53 He frankly told
his countrymen, especially-the youth which had gone through 'the
fire of Civil Disobedience, that he was convinced that the days
of capitalism and the privileged classes were over and a new
struc1llre of society was inevitable. "Not necessarily on the
Russian model, but on the general lines of the Russian
conception", he enphasized. 54 Once out of jail he realised the
lull in political activities of the nation. But he knew that
lulls serve a very necessary purpose in a nation s development
by teaching the masses many a lesson. "They help in making us
think clearly about the ideology that should govern our
action. Out of it will be born a mightier movement w1 th
clear direction. u 55 Ttus the question of ideological clarity
was uppermost in his mind. It must precede the next wave of
political action and the minds of the youth must be equipped
with this new found ideology, In a letter to Bhagwan Das he
wrote:
For a practical politician the problem always
is how to work with the human material he has
to deal with, how to fit in his programme w1 th
existing objective facts. It is so easy to lay
down a beautiful theoretieal programme which no
body listens to. We have tws to canbine a
correct ideology w1 th facts as they are. 56

53

Sashi Joshi, "Nehru am the Emergence of the Left Bloc,

1927-29", in Bipan Chan:ira ( ed.), The Indian Left,
Vikas, 1~3.

54 Jawabarlal Nehru, Selected Works, vol. 5, p. 507.

55 ' Ibid. '-

nP.~.

,2_1_!

56 Ibid., P 542.

1"'29

Nehru noted that despite the fact of a certain demo-

ralisation among many people the influence of the Congress among

the masses had never been so great. Once out of jail and in
touch w1 th reality there was obvious change in his mood once
again. His free am frank disrussions w1 th Gandhi on the
question of vested interests helped him to regain a proper
assessnent of the forces at work. He remarked in an intel"view:
There is not the slightest difference between
Gandhiji and myself. As a matter of fact, our
recent conversations made 1 t perfectly clear
that there is a fundamental unity in regard to
our line of action. In all important matters,
as before, Gandhiji is the only possible leader
of the Indian struggle, and I am happy to be
one of his numerous soldiers. 57
Increasingly, he felt the urge to develop his views
on economic and social problens in the Press. "Briefly they
are socialistic", he explained in one of his letters, "and my
interpretation of history is what is commonly called the Mar-...{ist
view. That view limits private property but of course some
private property still remains". 58 Later on these views were
published under the title Wither Inc1ia? as a series of articles
in the Indian Press on 9, 10 and 11 October 1933 and were also
reprinted as a pamphlet. 59 In his articles Nehru insisted that
politics must be tr~ated as a science. Reformulating Lenin's
famous dictun, he said, "Right action cannot cane out of nothing;
it must be preceded by thought. nCo Squarely facing the central

57 Ibid., p. 538.
58

Ibid,, p. 541.

Letter to Bhagwan Das, 23 September 1933.

59

Wi 'W:~ I~fi~ Was translated into Malayalam and published

In a~ fijlni, .13-14 October 1933. Gopalan Kutty, The
Rise ~Oinmuniat Party in Kerala, Ph.D. Thesis, JNU,
New Deihl.

(0

Op. ci~, vol. 6, p. 1.

130

question, he

~ots

Whose freedan are we partirularly striving

for, for nationalisn covers many sins and
.includes many a conflicting elements? There
is the feudal India of the princes, the India
of the big zamindars, or snall zamindars, of
professional classes, of the agrirul'b.lrists,
of the industrialists, of the bankersL of the
lower middle class, of the workers. 'lnere are
the interests of foreign capital and those of
bane capital, of foreign services and hane
services. The nationalist answer is to prefer
hane interests to foreign interests but beyond
that it does not go. It tries to avoid disfl.u:bing the class division or the social sta1lls
quo. It imagines that the various interests
will sane how be accanmoda ted when the country
is free. 61
Nehru went on to say that nothing was more absurd
than to imagine that all the interests in the nation can be
fitted in w1 thout injury to any. At every step sane had to be
sacrificed for others. But nationalism did not make us realise
the inherent and fundamental conflict between economic interests
within the nation. There was an attempt to cover this up am
avoid it on the ground thB t the national is sue must be settled
first. Appeals were issued for unity between different classes
and groups to face the ~ommon national foe, and those wbo
pointed out the inherent conflict between landlord and tenant,
or capitalist and '..,rage labourer were criticised. "We cannot
escape", he stressed,
having t("'' answer the question now or later:
for the freedom of which class or classes in
India are we especially striving foJ!? Do we
place the masses, the peasantry and the workers
first, or some other small class at the head of
our list? Let us give the benefit of freedom

61

Ibid., pp. 4-5;

13~

to as many groups and classes as possible,

but essentially whom do we stand for, and
when a conflict arises whose side must we
takE!? To say that we shall not answer that
question now is itself an answer and taking
of sides for it means that we stand by the
existing order, the sta'b.ls quo.
Tracing the history of capitalism, its d~elopment
into imperia~ism and laying bare the logic of its internal
contradictions he located the causes of poverty and misery of
India's teeming millions under colonialisn and projected
socialism as the only possible solution of these problems. In
this specific junc'b.lre of history when capi talisn was passing
through its death throes ani victory of socialisn was
inevitable nationalisn could not but take a new orientation.
"A country under alien domination", he explained,
must inevitably think first in tenns of
nationalisn. But the powerful economic
forces working for change in the world
today have influenced fuis nationalism to
an ever increasing extent and everywhere
it is appearing in socialist garb. Gradually
the nationalist struggle for political freedan
is becoming a social struggle also for econanic
freedom. Independence and the socialist state
become the objectives, w1 th varying degrees of
stress bein_- laid on the two aspects of the
problem. As political freedom is delayed the
other aspect assumes greater importance, and
it now seems probable, especially because of
world conditions, that the political and social
emancipation will cane together to some at
least of the countries of Asia. 62
Nehru not only enphasized the primacy of the antiimperialist struggle but also pointed out the organic links
between the perspective of nationalisn am socialism.

62

Ibid., P 12.

Till

colonialism lasted the struggle was to be for indepemence

(political revolution) though it would increasingly, depending
upon the forces involved, touch sane of the econanic issues
(social revolution). What was happening in India concretely in
terms of ideological cha.ngerfl The Indian scene was characterised
with confusion and perplexion as large sections of the national
movenent were caught in the painful process of "crossing over
to a new ideologyt'. 63 "Old nationalist ideology" was struggling
with as well as absorbing within itself the "new econc:mic
ideology" in order to forge a new canplex. If an indigenous
Government took the place of the foreign Government and kept
all the vested interests intact, this would not even be the
shadow of freedom. The achievenent of freedan thus became a
question of divesting the vested interests.
This lengthy statement was important not for its
content, for there was nothing new in this survey of history,
but for the fact that it was being said by sc:mebody who was
s~,d. to none but Gandhi as one of the leaders of the
national movement. For the first time, it directed the
public mind, especially the large sections of the youth, to
certain basic problems which were seldom considered in India
with the seriousness they really deserved. It helped thousands
of youngnen 1Nho carried the Civil Disobedience movement on
their back to think along novel lines. For the first time
socialisn caught the imagination of the youth in a big way.
To a considerable extent this intervention of Nehru laid the
ideologicai foundations for the rise of left-wing within the
Congress. The ideological thrust of the new ideas propounded
by Nehru was so forceful that literally there was no opposition
to it at the level of argument. Nehru renarked that the
opponents of socialism in India at that time were extremely
backward - to the extent of not even having a sufficient

63

Ibid., P 12.

13 3

introduction to the "accepted canmonplaces of history an:i

economics and modern thought". 64 The elan of 1he ideology of
socialism was on the ascendency. The national movement had
entered a new phase- the phase of the socialist "thirties".
There was a great deal of loose thinking among Congress and no
clear ideas as to what system or society they were driving at.
Sane Congressnen, indeed, did not think of changing the existing
system of GoveriJnent much, but simply of replacing the British
by the swadeshi brand.

v
The process of social consciousness beglns not by
providing answers but by posing questions. It was mainly the
youth which was in the forefront of the civil disobedience
movement. 65 Radicalisation of the Congress movanent in the fire
of Civil Disobedience brought these youngnen face to face with
new questions. The impact of the Russian revolution, the
execution of B hagat Singh and his comrades, statements of the
Meerut Trial prisoners and militant strike movement of the
working class formed the backdrop of this process of radicalisation. Luxury and canfort for the few, mud, filth, tnmger
and disease for the many. Power and wealth for same, sl~ve~y
and oppression for the rest. Millions of children born to be
denied of all opportunities for no fault of their own and
condenned to poverty, disease and ignorance, "Are we fighting
for their perpetuatiort? . Are they products of British rule alone
and will they disappear when freedom is wort?" 66 These were the
fundamental questions. Echoing the thoughts of many youngaen

64

Ibid,, p. 19.

65

Sashi Joshi, op. cit,

66

S811'_yayaqi,_", India of th~ Fu mre, J:-g~___19_3~_.__p_p._J~_19,

zeroxed copy of "this boo is available in Archives on
Contanporary History of India, JNU, New Delhi,
11

Jai Prakash Narayan wrote:

It is my firm belief that most of us who are
fighting for complete independence are doing
so not only because foreign subjection l'Dlrts
our sense of self-respect and national dignity,
but also because we have a vision of a glorious
fu1llre for India - a better . juster, more
prosperous, more cultured, heal their, happier
India. Take that vision away ani the will to
fight, that beautiful spirit which takes us
through suffering and travaU, would disappear,
would "turn to dust. fJ7
All these youngnen drew a great vision before themeel ves - a vision of tireless striving stretching its arms
towards perfection. This was the well spring of their energy
am passion for struggle. But these youngnen were not romantic
poets who could remain satisfied with noble visions. They were
dete-rmined to face them with ac1llali ties and give them definite
lines and clear-rut forms. Above anything else primarily they
were soldiers tho were possessed by a powerful drive to battle
w1 th and for realities. How to immolate want and tnmger,
disease and ignorance, cruelty and injustice? Wrote young
J ai Prakash:
I must try to understand why things are so
bad and I must try to discover what must be
done to better them, to change them, to
destroy 1hsn.
And it was in doing this that I became a
socialist. I cane to believe that things
are bad, not only because of the domination
of British imperialisn but also because our
society itself is constructed on wrong lines.
I came to believe that there is inequality of
wealth and power because the sources of wealth
- the gifts of na1ure - instead of being shared
by all, are monopolised by few; because the
factories and workshops, the banks and great

- 67 .Jai Prakash Narayan, "Why Am I a Congress Socialis-t?"

Congress Socialist. vol. 1, no. 7, 6 January 1935.

(e

Ibid.

133

trading houses are in private hands and are

run not in the interest of the canmuni ty but
for the profit of a few. This to my mind is
the central cause of all "the social evils we
suffer fran. And I came to believe Ulat by
establishing democracy in the ec:onanic field,
by placing the entire econanic system in the
hands of community, by socialising banks and
factories, lands and mines, transport and trade,
by abolishing rank and privileges ani classes,
it would be possible to create in this country
a society, really prosperous, happy, free and
cul 'blred - the society, in fact, of my vision. 69
These youngnen wanted to redefine freed an - "freed an
meant renoval of all econanic inequalities - that freedan means
the right to food, education, 011 ture and unrestricted growth in short freedom means justice ani perfect equality". 70 Together
they wanted to sound the clarion call of this new freedan. Anned
with this new gospel they wanted to go amidst their suffering
countrymen. They ardently believed that these countrymen were
eagerly waiting for this 1 new truth' And once they conveyed
the troth of their discovery to these millions:
It will rouse the village peasant, the to~
-worker, the wanenfolk- it will awaken all

69 Similarly "Samyavadi" observed:

"The acceptance of
Independence by the Indian people as iheir goal indicates
that they have decided to be the makers of their own
destiny. But it indicates nothing more. It throws no
light on the question as to the fonn of the Indian state
after the overthrow of the foreign yoke in India. The
people who strive for freedom and die for it, want,
however, to have clearer and more definite conception of
the goal Does independence imply merely withdrawal of
British civil officers am military fran India and a
substitution of Indians in the vacancies caused thereby'?
Will the land terure systen remain as it iS? Will there
be any material improvement in the condition of the masses
after swaraj is established? If the indeperxient Indian
state of the future does not stand for a radical solution
of all the problems indicated above, if swaraj does not
--stand for canplete e:.ancipation from bondage am- tnequa11:'eyof every kind, what is the value of that so-called freedom?"
Samyavadi, op. ci:t., pp. 18-19.
70 Ibid., p. 3).

13 "'6

the latent revolutionary elements in our

society. And out of this titanic awakening
there will rise the strength which will
break the shackles of centuries and there
will burst forth the light which will flood
the world with life and joy. 71
Nehru had been at liberty for five and a half months
from Aug.~st 1933 to February 1934. 72 After his release he gave
special attention to the fonnulation and dissenination of ideas
which woold rapidly advance economic development and social
change. He addressed meetings of youth, workers and peasants. 73
After his release informal meetings were held at the residence
of Nehru at Allahabad on October 10, 11 and 12. About 80
Congress workers attended these meetings. 74 The meetings were
strictly secret. The lectures were held on "Econcxnic Problens",
"Socialisn" and "problens of future". The meetings deprecated
"all attempts to divert the people' s attention to other
activities involving a weakening of the freedom struggle nd
partial cooperation with imperialisn". 75 Another resolution
stated that "political freedan must be accanpanied by social
and econanic freedcxn of the exploited masses". The meetings

71

~.,

72

Nehru was released from jail on ?0 August 1933. On

16 February 1934 he was once again sentenced to 2 years'
1m pri sonm ent.

73

In a letter to Gandhi he wrote:

"I have recently had a
full share of work which has given me no breathing time,
meetings, consultations, workers caning, peasants etc.,
an::l there is a tuge correspondence without any staff to
deal with it." 2J November 1933.

74

Some of the important persons were: Sri Prakasha, P .n.

Tandon, V.N. Tiwari, Raft Atmed Qidwai, Professor Narendra
Deo, Ram Saran Das, Harish Nath Shastri, Mohan Lal Gautam,
Dr Murari Lal and Abdul Ghani Khan.

75

H.D.P. F-i-le No. 4/9/33.

p. 2:>.

137

also highlighted the idea of Constituent Assenbly. 7 6 As for

the immediate political si1llation the meetings called upon "the
people of the province (U.P.) to carry on the programme of
individual civil disobedience so that the struggle might again
gather momentum and develop into a mass civil disobedience
such civil disobedience should take the form of work principally
in the rural areas".77
During this period Nehru's main activity was propagation of 'new ideology'. Initially the bureaucracy did not
realise the full import of the fact that 'a good word is a good
deed'. "Possibly his paper campaigns do not do much harm, too
many replies from his opponents are published", they concluded.78
However, Nehru' s word was considered dangerous when addressed to
a youthful audience. The call to action was expected to fin:l a
response "in the entrusiasn of youngnen" and by producing
"decidedly bad effects on the youngnen" do "quite incalrulable
damage". 79 Frenzied crowds greeted Nehru on the Railway station
when he reached Delhi on December 12, 1934. A speech at Delhi
on the same day to a predominantly student audience was

76

"The proper method of drawing up a consti1ll tion arrl s"'ttling

the fonn of Government for a free India is for a Cons ,i tuent
Assembly, elected on an adult franchise, and fully representative of the people of India, to be convented for the
purpose. Such a consti 'blent Assembly, which can only
function when the nation has gained sufficient strength,
will also settle the problem of the minorities to the
satisfaction of all groups concerned." Ibid.

77

78
79

Ibid.
H.D.P. File No. 4/1/1933. Director Intelligence Bureau,
Williamson's Note 14.12.1933.

Home Secretary, Hallet to Local

Goverments, 22.12.33; Haig' s Note, 21. 12.33; Delhi Chief
Commissioner' s Note, 18. 12. 33.

11. D.P. File No. 4/1/34.

considered to have sown "the seeds of future mischief" by

"rallying the hot headed extremist youths of the countrY". 80
Regarding the Delhi speech the police comment was:
"It was
partirularly noticed that most of the you1hs were conspicuous
by their absence in the meeting addressed by Gandhi on 10th
instant whereas they had taken part in this meeting. n81
Everywhere in his speeches as well as in his letters to
individuals Nehru amplified the analysis contained in his
articles Wither India? and stressed the appropriateness of
socialism as the goal. In his speech to the All India Trade
Union Congress on 23 December 1933, peasants and labourers were
given a call for a general strike to remove British Imperialism
from India. The speech gave the British Bureaucracy "a very
frank exposition" of Nehru's "attitude am aims". "His object
is to overthrow by the force of mass revolutionary movement the
existing British Governnent. The whole speech is a violent
attack on what he calls Angrezgn Ka Samra.jya which has got to be
destroyed and driven out of India. "82 In his three speeches
in Calcutta on 17th and 18th January 1934, Nehru urged the
youth of Bengal to desist from terrorist activities and follow
the path of mass revolution. 83 Socialism was the only possible
solution of India's many problens. "I think there is no other

80

~lli

81

H.D.P. File No. 4/1/3~.

82

Ibid.
-Bengal
Government shared Governnent of India' s assessment

83

Delhi Chief Commissioner' s Note, 18. 12. 33;

ett to Local Governments, 22.12.33.

of Nehru's threat. "We have always looked upon Jawahart.!

as an extremely dangerous individual and we know that
since his visit to Russia some years ago, al tOO'Ugh he
has never been inclined to accept Russian dictation he
has always been in favour of their methods." Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, to Chief Secretary,.
Ben~al Goverll".ent, 19 January 1934.
H.D.P_._ File No .

4/1/34.

1~

solution and the socialist solution is bourxi to come sooner

or later; and so long as that solution does not come, you will
find no political solution of these problems either in India
or in the larger world outside .13 4
As pointed out earlier, British efforts to wean
away a section of the Congress towards consti1utionalism, by
pennanently splitting the Congress between constitutionalists
ani non-constitutionalists, was perceived by different currents
in the Congress differently. Gandhi did not doubt the patriotism
of the current articulating council entry and its genuine desire
to fight for the cause of emancipation of the country. As
during the period of mass upsurge this current was willing to
follow Gandhi's method of mass movement, during the period of
non-upsurge Gandhi accepted the method of cruncil entry as a
legitimate fonn of struggle. In Gandhi's conception, and this
was recognised by the 'right-wing', mac.s movenent in India
needed both the methodS of struggle without being counterposed
to each other. And which method should be brought in the
forefront was a rna tter of tactics flowing fran the analyses of
concrete si"tllation. Gandhi was the only leader among the top
leadership 'toho without being a constitutionalist stood for the
unity of the entire Congr _~ ss arourrl one fonn of struggle
depending upon the fact whether the mass movement had fizzled
out or it was going to be started. The crucial difference, and
this was not understood by the left including Jawaharlal, was
that British Bureaucracy wanted both the currents to follow
mu1llally exclusive me1hod i.e. the mefuod of pennanent
const11lltionalism or permanent non-consti1lltiona1isn. However,
the councU entry current was wUling to foresake the

84

Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works, vol. 6, p. 100.

Address to the students of Bengal at the Albert Hall,
Calcutta, 18 January 1934.

140

constitutional fonn of struggle and join the mass upsurge led

by Gandhi at critical times. B5 If the British were disgusted
with the militants for not precipltating a split in the Congress
the militants represented by Nehru were dis(?J.lsted '\tli th the
council entry current yet were wary of breakine; away. Both,
the colonial authorities and the current represented by Nehru,
wanted clear cut' si 'b.lation of being face to face with each
other.
Throughout this period, till his arrest on 12
February 1934, the entire rangeof Nehru's reactions were
confused and contradictory: the Congress had arrived "at a
certain stage of historical growth" arxl this was an "inevitable
and desirable development". Arrl when "a national movement
grows it reaches a stage when it must cease to be a const11lltional movenent, in the limited and governnental sense of the
word, and cane into conflict with various laws made to slippress
it. Having arrived at that stage it cannot go back except by
rendering itself wholly ineffective". 86 In other words, he
envisaged the desirability of 'a permanent movement' ,.n. thout
any halt. On the other han:i he accepted the reality of mass
movements following a rhythimic crurse:
"Every mass movement'',
85

As opposed to the Congress constitutionalists who wanted

to use council entry as a tanporary strategy after the
mass movement had fiviled out liberals consti ruted a
truely constitutionalist current. On 18th April 1934
the council of the vlestern India Liberal Association
issued a statement to the Press urging the abandonnent
of Civil Disobedience arrl claiming that the liberals who
have always stood for const11u tional methods have
consistently adhered to the policy laid down by the
pioneers of political agitation in the cruntry.
18/4/34F.R. (ii).

86

Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works, vol. 6, p. 74.

28 November 1933.

141

he observed, "goes up and down. You cannot keep up a mass

movement at a certain pitch forever, it cannot be done. n 8 7
Although he was fully aware that there was a great deal of
political depression in the country and there was "exhaustion
today both among the workers and the peasantry and little can
be done immediately to rouse them up even on an issue that
effects them L'llmediately. n88 However, such observations were
always accompanied with a rider: "but essentially the national
fight must continue." He f!JiVe vent to his finn conviction
"that a withdrawal of civil disobedience would be a blunder of
the first magni wde". 8 9 He pointed towards the favourable
international situation arrl argued that "we must carry on the
struggle agressivelyft because "winding up of "the fight will
bring utter demoralisation". 90 But the author of satyagraha
would argue patiently:
"Quick disorganisation and defeat are
bound to be the fate of bolstered up cases and artificial
agitations, if the battle is fought with satya.graha weapons. n9 1
Moreover denoralisation was a sign of "inner weakness" and lack
of finn faith 11 an unshakable mountain like faith that flinches
from nothing". 92 In the process of guiding the mass move"Tlent
Gandhi was constantly called upon to wade through contradictions.
Like a first-rate dialectician he would -.... startM with the
general principles leading up to concrete and vice-versa:
"Life

87

Ibid,, p. 106. Speech at the Albert Hall, Calrutta,

18 January 1934.

88

Ibid,, 15 October 1933, p. 46.

89

Ibid., 12 October 1933, p. 43.

9J

I bid, , p. 45.

91

Young In4ia, 23 June 192Jr in Ninnal Kumar Bose,

Selections frqn Gand,hi, Annedabad, 1948, p. 162.

92

I bid, , p.

1 61.

142

is governed by a multi "b.lde of forces. It would be a snooth

sailing, if one could determine the course of one' s actions
only by one general principle whose application at a given
moment was too obvious to need even a manent' s reflection. But
I cannot recall a single act which could be so easily dete~
mined.n9 3 Hence a wise general leading the armies of satyagraha
"does not wait till he is ac"b.lally routed; he withdraws in time
in orderly manner from a_position which he knows he would not
be able to hold". 94
But Nehru' s perspective of 'permanent mass movenent',
and this he shared w1 th other socialists/ communists, was derived
from the classical marxist perspective rooted in a conception of
crisis periods and dual power, of the crucial importance of
timing and revolutionary seizure of the state power. His
objective assessnent was that given the international si ruation
India was entering into a pre-revolutionary si 1llation- a
situation which he tried to capture through the conception of
"dual power": 95
If you fight for the citadel of poweri if you
fight for the real thing and not mere y for
some shadow of power, then there can be no
getting of power in bits. If suppose, you are
marching on to a citadel or fortress which is
occupied by an other anny, well, do you conceive
of bits of the citadel or fortress falling in
your h.arxls and for the rest living in amity and

93

Ibid., p. 1 fs.-

94

Ibid,, p. a:>2.

95

Trotsky develops this conception at length in the context

of various revolutions in a chapter on 'Dual Power' in
his History of the Russian Revolution. Leon Trotsky,
HBatory
th~Ru~sian Reyolution, Sphere Books, vol. I,
C pter X
e ook was first published in England in
1932-33. It seens that Nehru had read this account.

oj

143

friendship with the eneny ann)'l That does not

happen. The more your strength increases, the
more you approach the citadel of power, the
more fierce is the fighting going to be. Indeed,
the day before you seize power and get into the
citadel, that evening your condition will be the
worst of all. To think in tenns of getting two
annas or four annas of the possession of 'the
fortress is really to misunderstand history and
lulman nature completely. It is possible, I can
conceive of a ccmpranise coming between one
group which desires to go forward and the group
in the fortress, the compromise being that the
group in the fortress allows the other group
the possession of the area outside. But if it
is a question of your taking possession of the
citadel, there is not tw annas or four annas either one will prevail or the other. Two powers
cannot exist in the same country an::l at the same
time. Of course, you may have dual authority
during the transition period when power is shifting
from one party to other. 96
He consistently hammered at the idea that the growth
of the national movement had now reached a historical stage
when it was likely to be "pennanent and intensive conflict with
imperialism". This notion of the "historical stage" was central
to his understanding of the contenporary si 1l.lat1on. 97 If 1 t
was a correct assessment, and Nehru believed it to be so, then
within the Congress it was also "a conflict between those who
can only work on constitutional and legal lines and those who
have come to the conclusion that it is impossible to go ahead
,.n thin the framework of the existing political order". 98 Nehru
expected that as the struggle grew more intense the weaker
elements would fall away. The "corpse of constitutionalism"
could not be revived even by 1he National Congress. The only

96 Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected Works, vol. 6, pp. 104-5.

97

!.!2.!!!,

pp. 70, 74, 77-78, 94, 101-3 and 105.

98 Ibid., p. 70.

144

way out was to struggle through to the otherside. "Carry on

the struggle for freed em without canpromise or going back or
faltering." He concluded his speech in Calrutta with the
following remark
You cannot stop half-way, because today the
two forces in India - imperialisn and nationalism
have came to close grips we are today in the
midst of a historic struggle, which all nations
have to face at a partirular time and fran that
there is only one escape - victory of one side
or the other. 99
If the British Bureaucracy wanted the Congress to
tread the path of pennanent constitutionalism Nehru and the
militants wanted it to stick to the path of pennanent nonconst1 tutionalism. Both were against the Congress for following
the path of 'dual tactics', though fran different angles.
Nehru' s assessnent of the processes of ideological transfo~
mation w1 thin the Congr- ss - 11 growing out of a narrow and
purely nationalist ideology" - \'fclS correct and gave an edge to
his interventions at the ideological plane. But the strategy
which he advocated for the Congress inthis declining phase of
Lmovsent the ma!UY'uprising was unrealistic am doctrinaire. This made
and not
him unable to comprehend the relationship between constiilltional
activity and the mass move:nent within Gandhi's strategy.
Nehru also enphasized the idea of organising the
peasantry because "any big mass movement must fumamentally be
a peasant movement in this countrY". 100 Like all socialists/
canmunists Nehru wished the working class to develop the most
advanced ideology and to take the lead both of the peasantry and
the freedom movement. But he did not confuse his wishes w1 th
objective social reality and pointed that "at the present
manent in India the industrial workers have no such influence

99-

Ibid., p.'. 94.

100

Ibid., p. 101~

145

.
101
over the rest of 1he country".
He put forward the prognosis
that "the next step will be influenced very greatly by the
atti1llde of the peasantry". 102 He also emphasized the
necessity to organise nuclei of Congress workers in all
provinces who were ready for a sustained and prolonged
fight. 10 3 Ideologically Nehru prepared the ground for the
emergence of the .forces of contending hegemony inside the
Congress and political perspectives popularised by him during
this period were absorbed by a large section of the youth 'fbo
later on organized the Congress Socialist Party.

101

Ibid p. 125.

102

Ibid, pp. 125, 119-2:> and 137-38.

103

"That is exactly what we have been doing in our province.

We have discussed very fully with our provincial workers
and district leaders the prese~t position in India and
the world and we ha.ve asked them to have similar
discussions in each of their districts. I am sending
you a copy of the resolutions passed by us."
To
Nabakrushna Chaudtruri, p. 44.