Summary on the Flixborough Disaster

The explosion took place in a chemical plant in Flixborough, UK. The reaction was cyclohexane
with air under the existence of catalysis to produce a mixture of cyclohexanone and
cyclohexanol. The reaction took place in six reactors (vessels). A crack was observed on the
reactor no.5 (made of mild steel) due to which a leak of cyclohexane was noticed. The reactor
was removed for inspection and any production was stopped. Upon examination of the crack, it
was deduced that the cause was due to the spraying of water (high in nitrate) to dilute and
disperse small leaks and this lead to nitrate stress corrosion cracking of the mild steel. Since it
couldn't be repaired, the operators decided to install a temporary bypass pipe, made of stainless
steel, between reactors no.4 and no.6. The temporary pipe had two bends since the reactors were
mounted on a stair-like base. The diameter of the bypass pipe connecting the two bellows, was
smaller than that of the expansion joints, also made of stainless steel, . The temporary pipe
worked satisfactorily. After two months, a new leak was observed followed by many others.
After they were repaired, it was noticed that there was a slight rise in pressure (from 0.85 MPa to
0.89 MPa) which caused a bending moment in the bypass pipe (V-shape) as a result to which the
joints were torn by shear stress. Cyclohexane vapour escaped from the holes to form a massive
cloud which in turn caused the explosion to occur. Calculations were made only for the capacity
of the assembly needed for the required flow. They neglected whether the pipes and bellows
would be able to withstand the force that would be exerted and no such calculations were carried
out. Also, the workers did not work according to any standards. The only drawing of the pipe
done was in chalk on the floor. The support upon which the pipe rested was a temporary structure
and it was not fastened. This is why this scaffolding structure could not resist the stress. After a
site investigation was done, it was revealed that a split occurred in the bend of the bypass pipe.
This was due to the two loose bolts on the non return valve in respect to which a leak occurred.
The latter generated an intensification of oxidizing residues in the lagging. Consequently,
electrostatic charges gave rise to combustion and a flame directed into the bend. There was a
high temperature inside the pipe resulting in zinc embrittlement and creep cavitation. According
to a metallurgical investigation, zinc embrittlement on austenitic stainless steel could occur in a
pipe at high temperatures (9000C) under a certain stress within a few seconds. The sources of
zinc were the galvanized staircase and the wire securing the lagging. [Sir Fredrick Warner, 1975]