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GERAGOS

& GERAGOS

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
LAWYERS
HISTORIC ENGINE CO. No. 28
644 SOUTH FIGUEROA STREET
Los ANGELES. CALIFORNIA 90017-341 1
TELEPHONE (213) 625-3900
FACSIMILE (213) 625-1600
GERAGOS@GERAGOS.COM

MARK J. GERAGOS
SBN 108325
SBN 277412
BEN J. MEISELAS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - CENTRAL DISTRICT

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SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.),


Executive Director of the State Bar of
California; and WHISTLEBLOWER DOES
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THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;


CRAIG HOLDEN, an individual; and ROES
1 through 50, inclusive,

1. WHISTLEBLOWER LIABILITY
AND RETALIATION CALIFORNIA LABOR CODE
SECTION 1102.5
2.BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Defendants.

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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Plaintiff,

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Case No.

INTRODUCTION
1.

Senator Joseph Dunn (Ret.), the Executive Director of the State Bar of

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California, and Whistleblower DOES 1-7 bring this whistleblower action and demand for

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injunctive relief against the State Bar of California (the "State Bar") based on the State Bar's

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unilateral termination of Senator Dunn's employment on November 7, 2014, immediately

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after Senator Dunn, and other whistleblowers, through counsel, lodged two whistleblower

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notices with the State Bar's Board of Trustees ("BOT") on November 3,2014 and November

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5,2014.

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COMPLAINT

2.

Senator Dunn's whistleblower notices identified senous ethical breaches,

prosecutorial lapses, and fiscal improprieties by State Bar President Craig Holden, certain

BOT members, and Chief Trial Counsel and head of the State Bar's Office of the Chief Trial

Counsel ("OCTC") Jayne Kim, which were being concealed from the public.

3.

The conduct Senator Dunn complained about included (1) the unlawful

intentional manipulation and false reporting of backlog cases, (2) the intentional lack of

prosecutorial efforts to proactively investigate and prosecute "notario" and lawyer fraud as

envisioned by the Legislature in passing Assembly Bill 1159, and (3) the conflicted retention

of a private firm with close ties to a BOT member in violation of State Bar protocol to

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evaluate a complaint against undisclosed targets and, upon information and belief, against

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Senator Dunn.

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outside of established protocol, leading to a bill that is likely in excess of $300,000.00, even

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though a retired California Supreme Court Justice had agreed to provide the same services

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pro bono as a way to give back to the State Bar. Even with this unnecessary and exorbitant

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cost to members of the State Bar, the BOT only decided to terminate Senator Dunn without

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cause.

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Holden, and a small group of BOT members, hired the conflicted firm

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4.

Since becoming the Chief Executive of the State Bar in 2010, Senator Dunn

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received consistent high praise and positive performance reviews in his formal performance

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evaluations from 2011-2013. In fact, Senator Dunn's performance was determined to be so

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excellent by the State Bar that he received bonuses substantially above his yearly salary

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during the years 2011-2013.

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5.

In September 2014, attorney Craig Holden was installed as the new President

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of the State Bar. In May 2014, Holden was the only announced candidate, so it was clear he

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would be elected State Bar President.

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determined "to do something about Dunn," with the clear implication that he was determined

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to have him fired. The events described below gave Holden the pretext to begin a process

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Starting in May, Holden told several people he was

-2-

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COMPLAINT

leading to Senator Dunn's tennination. Finally, after Senator Dunn sent his whistleblower

notice, Holden guided the BOT to tenninate Senator Dunn, but even then only "without

cause."

6.

Defendant Craig Holden was installed as President of the State Bar in

September 2014. Defendant Craig Holden, now a partner at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard &

Smith LLP, is an attorney that has had difficulties in previous law firms and who submitted

irregular expense reports to the State Bar.

7.

Defendant Craig Holden's conduct is part of an effort to usurp executive

authority in the State Bar and has cleared the way for Defendant Holden to assume control

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over the State Bar's executive functions. Employees of the State Bar have been infoffiLed

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that Defendant Holden and Deputy Executive Director Robert Hawley will oversee and

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manage the State Bar in the "interim" period.

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formation of a process to hire a new Executive Director. No previous State Bar President in

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history has assumed executive management authority over the State Bar, as Defendant

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Holden has now done. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Holden has engaged in this conduct

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to ultimately become the State Bar Executive Director.

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8.

In addition to the termination of Senator Dunn, the State Bar has recently

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targeted some of the Whistleblower DOES 1-7 with various degrees of discipline and

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retaliation because they corroborated and identified the same conduct Senator Dunn

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complained of and joined in the whistleblower notices to the State Bar. Under the leadership

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of Holden, the BOT has engaged in an effort to purge the ranks of whistleblowers at the State

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Bar who were aware of and complained about the conduct of the BOT, President Holden,

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and other ROE defendants. That purge of State Bar employees, consolidating power in the

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hands of Holden, is unprecedented in the history of the State Bar.

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9.

On Friday, November 7, 2014, at approximately 5:00 p.m., while giving a

speech for the State Bar in San Francisco, Plaintiff Senator Dunn received a termination
-3COMPLAINT

letter from Defendant President Holden. The termination letter demanded that Senator Dunn

not speak with the press or public if he desired to negotiate a "mutually acceptable

[severance] agreement."

10.

Senator Dunn brings this whistleblower action to protect the public integrity of

the Defendant State Bar, to overturn the illegally motivated decision to terminate his

employment, and to vindicate his rights as a whistleblower.

PARTIES

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11.

Senator Joseph Dunn (Ret.) is a former California State Senator who

represented California's 34th Senate District in Orange County, California. Senator Dunn

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was appointed as Executive Director of the State Bar of California on November 22, 2010.

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Senator Dunn served in this capacity as the State Bar's chief executive officer from

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November 22, 2010 through his termination on November 8, 2014.

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resident of Orange County, California.

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Senator Dunn is a

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"The State Bar of California is a public corporation. Every person admitted and

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licensed to practice law in this State is and shall be a member of the State Bar except while

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holding office as a judge of a court of record." (Cal. Const., art VI, 9.) Under pain of

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criminal punishment, no person may practice law in California unless he is an active member

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of the State Bar. (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6125-6126.) The Board of Trustees of the State

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Bar, upon authorization from the Legislature, fixes and imposes an annual membership fee

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upon members of the State Bar. (ld. 6140.) The fees are paid into the treasury of the State

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Bar, and become part of its funds. (ld. 6144.)

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Trustees of the State Bar of California. The Board of Trustees makes rules of procedure,

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regulates and operates the State Bar. The State Bar office is located at 845 South Figueroa

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Street, Los Angeles, California 90017.

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13.

The State Bar acts through the Board of

Defendant Craig Holden was installed as President of the State Bar in

September 2014 and is also a current partner at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.

-4COMPLAINT

Defendant Holden resides in Los Angeles County, California. Craig Holden is sued herein in

his individual capacity.

14.

ROES 1-50 include trustees and employees of the State Bar who acted in

concert with Defendant Holden as well as certain government employees not employed by

the State Bar.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

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15.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendants because they are

residents of and/or are doing business in the State of California.


16.

Venue is proper in this county in accordance with Section 395(a) of the

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California Code of Civil Procedure because the Defendants, or some of them, reside in this

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county and the injuries alleged herein occurred in this county.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

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Senator Dunn's Appointment as Executive Director

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In 2009, the California Bureau of State Audits conducted a complete audit of

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the State Bar's disciplinary system. The Bureau highlighted the backlog reporting process

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and shined light on the failure of the State Bar to include all backlog cases in the annual

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discipline report. The report called for more transparency in the reporting of backlog cases

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to give stakeholders a clear picture of the State Bar's effectiveness.

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criticized: "By not reporting consistently and including all pertinent information, the State

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Bar is limiting its stakeholders' and the Legislatures ability to measure the effectiveness of

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the discipline system."

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18.

The Audit Report

Senator Dunn was appointed as Executive Director in 2010, in the wake of this

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highly critical audit, with the directive to reform the State Bar by bringing fiscal

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responsibility and transparency to the State Bar's reporting obligations.

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Director functions as the chief executive officer for the State Bar and oversees all employees.

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The Executive Director is the only employee directly hired by the BOT and the Executive

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-5COMPLAINT

The Executive

Director reports directly to the BOT. All other State Bar employees report directly to the

Executive Director, with the exception of the head of the OCTC-responsible for

prosecuting grievances in the State Bar Court-who exercises a quasi-independent function

based on the unique appointment process which requires direct BOT approval and Senate

confirmation. The head of the OCTC is Jayne Kim.

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19.

Senator Dunn succeeded in bringing important reforms to the State Bar. For

example, Senator Dunn brought the investigative backlog on open complaints with the State

Bar to near zero in 2011 after years of criticism from the legislature on the size of the

backlog. Senator Dunn oversaw the purchase, remodel, and move in to the State Bar's new

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home at 845 South Figueroa Street. Working with the Chief Financial Officer, Senator Dunn

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stabilized the State Bar's budget with no new increase in mandatory dues under his

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leadership.

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public protection mission of the State Bar. This includes outreach to other State regulatory

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bodies, law enforcement, the consulate community, religious communities, labor unions, and

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others. Senator Dunn is also credited with substantially improving relations between the

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Legislature and the State Bar including launching joint town halls with other regulatory

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partners through the district offices of legislators.

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working group that met regularly to develop proposals to increase funding for legal services

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in California.

Senator Dunn created an external relations team to proactively advance the

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Senator Dunn also created a small

In all his years as Executive Director of the State Bar, Senator Dunn received

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glowing performance reviews. All of Senator Dunn's formal performance reviews from

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2011-2013 were positive leading the State Bar to award him substantial yearly bonuses in

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addition to his salary.

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Senator Dunn's written employment agreement, initially set for a three year

term, was renewed in 2013 for a subsequent three-year term through 2016.

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-6COMPLAINT

However,

Senator Dunn was given notice of tennination on November 7, 2014, just one year into his

new tenn as Executive Director. The tennination was "without cause."

being committed by BOT members, by Chief Trial Counsel Jayne Kim, and by Holden.

When Senator Dunn raised these concerns with other whistleblowers, which called to task

the State Bar's core functions and competencies, Senator Dunn was targeted by Holden who

has attempted to cover up for the malfeasance that was reported.

"evaluation" of certain executive employees at the State Bar including Senator Dunn and

tasked a private finn, outside of protocol, to investigate Senator Dunn and those executive

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Holden initiated an

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As discussed below, Senator Dunn had learned of egregious improprieties

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Ethical Breaches - Unlawful Removal of Backlog


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Senator Dunn was one of the whistleblowers within the State Bar who reported

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that Chief Trial Counsel Jayne Kim unlawfully removed backlog cases from the official

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reports released to the BOT and the public. This was done to benefit Ms. Kim in her

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upcoming evaluation and to fraudulently inflate the productivity of her office.

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It was uncovered that at Ms. Kim's direction, internal reports were altered to

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unlawfully remove cases from the statutory backlog. Ms. Kim then issued false reports to

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the Regulation Admissions & Discipline ("RAD") Committee of the State Bar, the

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membership of the State Bar, the Legislature and the Governor, and the general public.

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25.

Ms. Kim's conduct did not involve a few isolated incidents but was shockingly

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rampant. In her reports to the RAD Committee on September 30,2013, Ms. Kim unlawfully

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removed 269 cases from the internal reports. She then used the altered internal reports to

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prepare her official quarterly report to the RAD Committee and posted this infonnation on

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the State Bar website for public consumption. The information in the public reports was

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false and misleading due to Ms. Kim's unlawful removal of cases from the backlog reports.

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-7-

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COMPLAINT

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The State Bar server that houses the backlog and case reports left a digital

footprint detailing the changes to the reports made at Ms. Kim's direction. The first run of

the backlog reports shows the accurate number of backlogged files. However, the backlog

report run two hours later removed a certain group of cases to artificially lower the number

of backlog cases. The metadata on the State Bar server exposes the changes and Ms. Kim's

misconduct. The reduction in the State Bar's backlog inventory was not due to increased

productivity but rather due to Ms. Kim's removal of cases from the official backlog reports.

26.

27.

The California Bureau of State Audits is set to conduct its biannual audit of the

State Bar in 2015. Rather than hold Ms. Kim and the OCTC accountable for its actions as

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Senator Dunn encouraged, the State Bar has terminated Senator Dunn and taken adverse

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actions against other whistleblowers for bringing this issue to their attention.

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Upon hearing concerns from Senator Dunn about her performance, Ms. Kim

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attempted to preserve her position by filing a complaint against Senator Dunn. As detailed

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below, an evaluation of Senator Dunn was conducted at an exorbitant expense to the

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membership of the State Bar. Ms. Kim's complaint against Senator Dunn was made shortly

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after the annual review process for her was commenced, and was merely pretextual to avoid

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Senator Dunn's oversight, criticism, and review of her.

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provided a copy or summary of Ms. Kim's complaint to Senator Dunn. What we do know is

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the unilateral decision to terminate Senator Dunn was made "without cause."

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To date, the State Bar has not

Fiscal Improprieties

29.

The BOT, upon receiving Ms. Kim's complaint, decided to conduct an

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"internal evaluation" of Senator Dunn and others and to retain a private firm for that purpose.

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This was despite the fact that a retired California Supreme Court Justice offered to do the

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same evaluation, pro bono. The private firm retained by the State Bar had close personal ties

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with BOT member Miriam Krinsky which ties were never fully disclosed prior to the firm's

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-8COMPLAINT

retention. The retention of the private finn, in addition to being an utter waste of State Bar

membership dues, violated State Bar protocol.

30.

The retention of private counsel by the State Bar is a function of the State

Bar's Office of General Counsel ("OGC"). The protocol for retaining a private finn is

simple: if it is detennined that the retention of a private finn is needed, the OGC is charged

with selecting the appropriate finn based on experience and cost. The OGC protocol that is

in place attempts to secure the retention of a private finn on financially feasible tenns and to

sift out potential conflicts of interest and cronyism with BOT members. Here, that process

was blatantly ignored.

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31.

The selected finn was retained based on the recommendation of BOT member

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Miriam Krinsky. The OGC was never consulted in this process; rather, Holden decided the

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OGC was "conflicted out" from perfonning its functions. Furthennore, this private finn was

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retained at exorbitant rates. Three billing partners from the private finn that were put on the

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"evaluation" each billed in excess of $800 per hour. The current billable hours for the

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services rendered by that private finn likely exceeds $300,000.00.

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BOT member Miriam Krinsky had a close personal and professional

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relationship with the private finn's lead billing partner who was assigned to lead the

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"evaluation." Board Member Krinsky and the lead partner of the private finn had a two-

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decade long relationship beginning when they were co-counsel at the United States

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Attorney's Office in the 1990s through 2010 when Ms. Krinsky shared office space with the

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lead partner while she was the Executive Director of the LA County Citizen's Commission

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in 2010. This was not disclosed to the BOT.

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Legislative Compliance Failures


33.

Senator Dunn has raised concerns that the State Bar BOT and Jayne Kim of the

OCTC were not enforcing the provisions of Assembly Bill 1159.

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-9COMPLAINT

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Assembly Bill 1159 was passed with bipartisan support of the State

Assembly and Senate.

prosecute both lawyer and "notario" fraud, a form of unauthorized practice of law ("UPL")

that preys on California's large immigrant community.

34.

35.

The bill was passed to enhance OCTC enforcement powers to

The bill contained an urgency clause and was therefore effective the date it was

signed into law in October 2013. At or around the same time Ms. Kim was unlawfully

removing the backlog cases from her internal and public reports, she was also not

prosecuting fraud cases pursuant to the legislative will. Ms. Kim's failure to comply with

the legislative mandate was so egregious it prompted the author of AB

1159,

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Assemblywoman Lorena Gonzalez, to send a letter demanding answers concerning the lack

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of enforcement.

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36.

To date, the Legislature's questions about the enforcement of AB 1159 remain

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ignored.

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Whistleblower Notice

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On November 3, 2014, Senator Dunn and a group of other individuals

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employed by the State Bar, through their counsel Geragos & Geragos, APC, submitted an

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anonymous whistleblower complaint to the State Bar BOT outlining a number of the

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concerns addressed above. Thereafter, on November 5,2014, the whistleblowers submitted

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another letter through counsel, providing further information and evidence of the

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improprieties outlined herein. Senator Dunn was identified by the BOT as one of the group

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of whistleblowers.

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38.

Senator Dunn was given notice of his termination on Friday, November 7,

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2014 at 5:00 p.m. while he was giving a speech for the State Bar in San Francisco. Senator

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Dunn received no explanation as to the basis for his termination. Senator Dunn was also

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instructed by Holden that if he wanted to negotiate a severance agreement, he should not

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speak to the public or the press about what had taken place. To date, Senator Dunn has not

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- 10 28
COMPLAINT

been afforded any opportunity to respond to the unilateral notice of his termination or any of

the allegations that may have been made against him.

39.

On November 10, 2014, some of the other whistleblowers that were

responsible for providing information contained in the two whistleblower notices were

targeted with various degrees of retaliation and discipline and believe they are in imminent

jeopardy of being terminated. Like Senator Dunn, the other whistleblowers who have been

loyal, dedicated, and high-level employees at the State Bar for many years received no

explanation for the sudden unilateral retaliation against them by the State Bar.

40.

It is with deep sadness and a heavy heart that Senator Dunn has been

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compelled to bring this action against the State Bar of California, an organization which he

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loyally served for four years. However, given the glaring injustices, unethical conduct, and

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massive cover-up that has crippled the State Bar's ability to function, this action has become

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necessary to restore the public trust and confidence in the State Bar, to restore the integrity of

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the organization, and to vindicate Senator Dunn's rights.

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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

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WHISTLEBLOWER LIABILITY AND RETALIATION --

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LABOR CODE SECTION 1102.5

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Senator Dunn Against Defendant the State Bar of California

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41.

Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of

this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.

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42.

At all relevant times, Plaintiff was an employee of the State Bar.

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43.

On November 3, 2014 and November 5, 2014, Plaintiff made whistleblower

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complaints to the State Bar as detailed above.

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complaints to the State Bar's BOT about the willful failure of the Chief Trial Counsel Jayne

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Kim to prosecute UPL fraud which would protect the immigrant community.

Additionally, Plaintiff made numerous

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COMPLAINT

44.

Director of the State Bar on November 7, 2014 because he was identified as a whistleblower

and because Holden intended to cover up malfeasance in the State Bar and secure his own

agenda in usurping executive authority within the State Bar.

45.

The State Bar has ratified and condoned the acts and omissions of Defendant

Holden, Jayne Kim, and Miriam Krinsky. Specifically, the State Bar has terminated Plaintiff

because he reported the serious malfeasance, illegal conduct, and financial improprieties

described above.

46.

The termination of Plaintiff on account of his complaints about the unlawful

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conduct violates the fundamental public policy against retaliation of whistleblowers in this

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State and the protections afforded under Labor Code section 1102.5.

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Plaintiff was given notice of termination from his employment as Executive

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47.

As a result of the unlawful treatment of Plaintiff which culminated in his

termination, Plaintiff suffered damages.

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section 1102.5.

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49.

Defendants are subject to civil penalties and assessment under Labor Code

Based on the unlawful acts taken by Defendants, Plaintiff has been deprived of

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his position as Executive Director of the State Bar. Pursuant to Labor Code section 1102.5,

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Plaintiff Senator Dunn seeks his immediate reinstatement as Executive Director of the State

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Bar, or alternatively, for the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause regarding why Senator

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Dunn should not be immediately reinstated based on the unlawful termination by the State

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Bar.

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SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

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BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY

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Senator Dunn Against Defendant Craig Holden and Board of Trustee ROES

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50.

Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs of

this Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

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- 12 28

COMPLAINT

1
2
3

Defendant Holden breached his fiduciary obligations by engaging

III

the

conflicted retention of a private firm, condoning and attempting to cover up the unlawful

removal of backlogged State Bar complaints, failing to implement legislation, and

terminating Plaintiff and the DOE whistleblowers for reporting the illegal, improper, and

unethical conduct described above.

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as Executive Director of the State Bar, to DOE Whistleblowers 1-7, and to the public.

conduct described above, including but not limited to, authorizing the out-of-protocol and

10
~ ilJwr~
oOONWO
0::0
I.!l UiOl

At all times, Defendant Holden owed a fiduciary duty to the State Bar, Plaintiff

51.

12

53.

As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has been

injured, in an amount according to proof at trial.


54.

Defendants' conduct was wanton, willful, and malicious giving rise to punitive

damages in favor of Plaintiff.

13
14

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request judgment against the Defendants as follows:

o 0::~!;ul':1

15

On the First Cause of Action:

<D~

16

1.

For general and special damages in an amount according to proof at trial;

17

2.

For pre- and post-judgment interest according to proof;

18

3.

For costs of suit incurred herein;

19

4.

For attorneys' fees;

20

5.

For damages and fees pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5;

21

6.

For injunctive relief reinstating Plaintiff as Executive Director of the State Bar

~6Q::J
zLL 4;
ooWIU

I.!l

0
8CflW
til'<t<.'l
~i'<tZ

e,:,

...J

22

or, alternatively, for an Order to Show Cause why Senator Dunn (Ret.) should

23

not be immediately reinstated based on the unlawful termination and retaliation

24

by the State Bar; and

25

7.

For all other relief as this Court may deem proper.

26
27

- 13 28
COMPLAINT

On the Second Cause of Action:

1.

For general and special damages in an amount according to proof at trial;

2.

For pre- and post-judgment interest according to proof;

3.

For exemplary damages against Defendants;

4.

For costs of suit incurred herein; and

5.

For all other relief as this Court may deem proper.

7
8

Respectfully submitted,

9
10

DATED: November 13, 2014

GERAGOS, APC

....-...........,.A"VI

11
u

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OONWO

o ~1n0l
~

12

By:

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ci d

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c.!i Z::Jlc
wwo

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~ ~G:;;!

MAR . GERAGOS
BEN . MEISELAS
Atto eys for Plaintiff
SENATOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)

13
14

ooWIU

\,2~ui

o "'ow

15

~I'<I"Z

16

~ ~Cf)GJ
>0'<1" (')

c.!i tO~
0

-I

17
18

DEMAND FOR .JURY TRIAL


Plaintiff Senator Dunn (Ret.) hereby demands a jury trial.

19
20

DATED: November 13,2014

........."..." ERAGOS, APC

21
22
23

By:
. GERAGOS
BEN J. EISELAS
Atto ys for Plaintiff
SEN~TOR JOSEPH DUNN (Ret.)

24
25
26
27
- 14 28

COMPLAINT

Case 2:13-cv-00657-JAM-CKD Document 5 Filed 04/09/13 Page 1 of 4

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

DEREK TODD,

11

Plaintiff,

12

No. 2:13-cv-0657 JAM CKD PS

vs.

13

TRILLA BAHRKE, et al.,

14

Defendant.

15

ORDER AND
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
/

16

Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. Plaintiff has requested authority

17

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915 to proceed in forma pauperis. This proceeding was referred to this

18

court by Local Rule 302(c)(21).

19

Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit required by 1915(a) showing that plaintiff is

20

unable to prepay fees and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed in

21

forma pauperis will be granted. 28 U.S.C. 1915(a).

22

The federal in forma pauperis statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss a case if

23

the action is legally frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

24

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

25

1915(e)(2).

26

/////
1

Case 2:13-cv-00657-JAM-CKD Document 5 Filed 04/09/13 Page 2 of 4

A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28

(9th Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

490 U.S. at 327.

In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain

more than naked assertions, labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements

of a cause of action. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other

words, [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

10

statements do not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Furthermore, a

11

claim upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

12

A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

13

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 129

14

S. Ct. at 1949. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be

15

granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200

16

(2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v.

17

Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

18

Plaintiffs 596 page complaint does not set forth a short and plain statement as

19

required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. It is apparent, however, from the complaint and

20

the exhibits attached thereto that plaintiff challenges orders issued by state court judges relating

21

to the custody of plaintiffs daughter. A federal district court does not have jurisdiction to review

22

errors in state court decisions in civil cases. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

23

U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). The district

24

court lacks subject matter jurisdiction either to conduct a direct review of a state court judgment

25

or to scrutinize the state courts application of various rules and procedures pertaining to the state

26

case. Samuel v. Michaud, 980 F. Supp. 1381, 1411-12 (D. Idaho 1996), affd, 129 F.3d 127
2

Case 2:13-cv-00657-JAM-CKD Document 5 Filed 04/09/13 Page 3 of 4

(9th Cir. 1997). See also Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 291-92 (9th Cir.1995) (finding no

subject matter jurisdiction over section 1983 claim seeking, inter alia, implicit reversal of state

trial court action); MacKay v. Pfeil, 827 F.2d 540, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (attacking state court

judgment because substantive defense improper under Rooker-Feldman). That the federal

district court action alleges the state courts action was unconstitutional does not change the rule.

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486. Moreover, claims raised in federal district court need not have been

argued in the state judicial proceedings to be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at

483-84 & n.16. If federal claims are inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment, the

federal court may not hear them. Id. [T]he federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the

10

state court judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly

11

decided the issues before it. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J.,

12

concurring). In sum, a state courts application of its rules and procedures is unreviewable by a

13

federal district court. The federal district court only has jurisdiction to hear general challenges to

14

state rules or claims that are based on the investigation of a new case arising upon new facts.

15

Samuel, 980 F. Supp. at 1412-13.

16

Plaintiff alleges multiple improprieties related to custody proceedings and

17

domestic relation orders. Plaintiff does not raise a general federal challenge to state law. See

18

Branson, 62 F. 3d at 292. Stripped to its essence, this action is one for federal court review of

19

state court proceedings. The court finds the instant action amounts to an attempt to litigate in

20

federal court matters that are inextricably intertwined with state court decisions. Accordingly,

21

the court will recommend this action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under

22

Rooker-Feldman.1

23
1

24
25
26

The domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction bolsters the conclusion that
subject matter jurisdiction in this case is inappropriate. The domestic relations exception
divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (explaining domestic relations exception to
diversity jurisdiction). Even when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear
disputes which would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters. Thompson v.
3

Case 2:13-cv-00657-JAM-CKD Document 5 Filed 04/09/13 Page 4 of 4

1
2

In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs request


to proceed in forma pauperis is granted; and

IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed.

These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

Judge assigned to the case pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

Objections to Findings and Recommendations. Any reply to the objections shall be served and

filed within ten days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file

10

objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order.

11

Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

12

Dated: April 9, 2013

13

_____________________________________
CAROLYN K. DELANEY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

14
15
4 todd657.ifp.57

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 174 (1988); see also Tree Top
v. Smith, 577 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1978) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over habeas petition
seeking custody of child who had been adopted by others). In this circuit, federal courts refuse
jurisdiction if the primary issue concerns child custody issues or the status of parent and child or
husband and wife. See Coats v. Woods, 819 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1987); Csibi v. Fustos, 670 F.2d
134, 136-37 (9th Cir. 1982).
In Coats, plaintiff, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleged that her ex-husband and others
involved in state court proceedings had wrongfully deprived her of custody of her children.
Defendants included the former husband and his current wife, their attorney, the court-appointed
attorney for the children, a court-appointed psychologist, two court commissioners, two superior
court judges, the county, the police department, and a organization called United Fathers.
Plaintiff specifically alleged that defendants deprived her of child custody, thereby depriving her
of a liberty interest, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983, 1985(2), and 1985(3). Because the action
at its core implicated domestic relations issues, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts
decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. Like Coats, this case is at core a child custody
dispute. See id. at 237.
4

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 1 of 13

.,

CRAIG K. MARTIN
35 Grove Street, Suite 110
2. San Francisco, CA 94131
3 i Telephone: (415) 640-4803
!
4' Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN PRO PER
5 .
I

F"ILO
JUL 2 1 2011
elf/CHARD W

NORTHE~~ DUSISTRICT
, DISTR~fcKING
oURT

F
OAKLAN8 CALiFORNIA

6 ii

L~f
.4.Df:(

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

'I

7'

8
9

'I

NORTHERN DISTRICE OF CALIFORNIA

CRAIG K. MARTIN,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff
11

~TATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, OFFICE OF ~


THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL STATE BAR

:: I g~~6:I:~~~T!:~~~~'iEiR~tL
COUNSEL, ALLEN BLUMENTHAL

1145

SUPERVISING TRIAL COUNSEL,


SHERRIE B. McLETCHIE, DEPUTY TRIAL
COUNSEL, WONDER J. LIANG,
'! ASSIGNED DEPUTY TRIAL COUNSEL,
16, JOHN W. MATNEY, INVESTIGATOR,
17' i SUSAN CHAN, DEPUTY TRIAL
COUNSEL, RUSSELL G. WEINER,
18 INTERIM CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL, MIKE
i
A. NISPEROS, JR., CHIEF TRIAL
19, COUNSEL, DONALD STEEDMAN,
SUPERVISING TRAIL COUNSEL,
20, ROBERT A. ENDRIES, DEPUTY TRIAL
21 COUNSEL, JOHN W. MATNEY,
INVESTIGATOR, and Does 1 through 50,
22 inclusive
I.,'

i,i

i
!

23 Ii' '

Defendants.

25 '
26: I

27

l
)
)
)

Case No.

1. 14th Amendment Violations,


2. Conspiracy - 42 USC 1958(3),

3. Violation of Due Process


4. Denial of a Fair Trial,
5. Damages,

6. Prospective Injunctive Relief


7. Plaintiff Demands Trial by Jury

j
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
/

Plaintiff, CRAIG K. MARTIN alleges the following:


JURISDICTION

!
!

Cll- 0360 1

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

)
)

28:
COMPLAINT

- 1-

~
<>(

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 2 of 13

i!
,:

1. Counts in this action arise under 42 U.S.c. section 1983. This Court has original

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.c. section 1343(3).

VENUE

2. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of

California, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. sections 84 and 1391. The events that gave rise to this complaint

occurred in the County of San Francisco, State of California, and the defendant's place of business

is in the County San Francisco, California.

,i

II
9 ,I

INTRADISTRICT ASSIGMENT
3.

10
i

111

The actions that gave rise to this complaint occurred in San Francisco County,

California. Assignment of this action to either the San Francisco Division or Oakland Division of
this Court is appropriate according to Local Rule 3-2(d).

12 :

13'
14

PARTIES

4.

Plaintiff Craig K. Martin is an adult and a resident of the State of

California. At the time of the incident plaintiff Martin was a licensed attorney in the State of
California, in the County of San Francisco. Plaintiff was disbarred by the California Supreme Court

16

on July 22, 20 I O.

17:
18
19

5. Defendant California State Bar is an agency of the State of California, Lucy Armendarz
(State Bar Court Judge), Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California,
Lawrence 1. Dal Cerro, Assistant Chief Trial Counsel, Allen Blumenthal Supervising Trial

201

21
22'
23

Counsel, Sherrie B. McLeychie, Deputy Trial Counsel, Wonder J. Liang, Assigned Deputy Trial
Counsel, John W. Matney, Investigator, Susan Chan, Deputy Trial Counsel, Russell G. Weiner,
Interim Chief Trial Counsel, Mike A. Nisperos, Jr., Chief Trial Counsel, Donald Steedman,
Supervising Trial Counsel, Robert A. Endries, Deputy Trial Counsel.

24

6. Plaintiffs are ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as

25

Does 1 through 100, inclusive, and therefore sue these defendants by such fictitious names and

26

27

capacities. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and based thereon allege that each of the fictitiously
named defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that

28
II

COMPLAINT

-2-

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 3 of 13


1

plaintiffs' injuries as herein alleged were proximately caused by the actions and/or in-actions of said

2i

Doe defendants. Plaintiffs will amend this complaint to include the true identities of said doe

3 I!
4
i

defendants when they are ascertained.

7.

At all times mentioned, each of the defendants was acting as the agent, principal,

II

,I

6 II
7 I!

employee, and/or employer of one or more of the remaining defendants and was, at all times
herein alleged, acting within the purpose, course, and scope of such agency and/or employment for
purposes of respondent superior and/or vicarious liability as to all other defendants.

8.

At all times mentioned herein, the defendants, and each of them, employed, hired,

! I

I'

trained, retained, and/or controlled the actions of all other defendants, and each of them.

10 II,

11

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

9.

12

13i

On January 30, 2009, The State Bar has filed a Notice of Disciplinary Charges against

the plaintiff in Case No. 06-0-10765 [06-010818] proceeding with respect to plaintiffs' handling
oftwo matters.

14 "II

!I

15 i \
161

A. In re: SZETO
(i) The first was a civil action that plaintiff filed on his own behalf against two individuals,
Richard Szeto and Anthony Lincoln (hereinafter "Szeto" matter). In the Szeto matter, the State Bar

17

has alleged that plaintiff willfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(c), by

18

failing to maintain such action, proceedings and defenses only as appear legal or just.

19

(ii) Respondent admits that he filed a civil action against Richard Szeto and Anthony

20'
iI

21 i I

Lincoln (Szeto defendants), San Francisco Superior Court, Case No. 999134, alleging that the

Szeto defendants had slandered him by telling third parties that he was using drugs. The allegations

in said Complaint were accurate and based upon information that Respondent received from his

22

23!
24

mentor, Leonard "Lefty!! Gordon, the popular executive director of the Ella Hill Hutch Community
Center and a force in political, social and economic development campaigns which advanced

25

African Americans. The defamatory statements were made to Mr. Gordon, who informed

26

Respondent of the same.

27
28,

I!
COMPLAfNT

-3-

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 4 of 13

(iii) Unfortunately, Mr. Gordon, who was to be plaintiffs main witness passed away very
2

suddenly and at the same time, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Based upon Mr.

3 II
I Gordon's demise, plaintiff was not able to obtain a declaration from him, opposing the summary

4:I
judgment motion.

5 ii
6
7

Ii

(iv) Following the granting of the motion for summary judgment, the Szeto defendants
requested sanctions in the form of attorney's fees to be paid by the respondent on the grounds that
he acted in bad faith. Respondent filed an opposition to the Szeto defendants' request for attorney

fees. On July 20,2000, the trial court denied the Szeto defendants' motion for attorney fees,

, thereby impliedly finding that there was no bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff in prosecuting the

10 " action against the Szeto defendants.


11

(v) The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court ruling denying sanctions at 94 Cal. App.

12

4th 687.

13

(vi) However, the Supreme Court granted review and the published decision of the Court

14
I

15

of Appeal was depublished by the California Supreme Court. Further, the California Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal, by its unanimous decision in Martin v Szeto

16

(2004) 32 Cal. 4th 445.

17

B.

18

In re: PEREZ
(i) The second disciplinary charge related to plaintiffs handling of a claim by Maria T.

19

Perez against her former attorney, Michael Keck, who had handled the estate of her deceased

20

husband and who apparently allowed estate properties to go into foreclosure. The State Bar alleged

21

that Plaintiff willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-11 O(A) by intentionally,

22

recklessly, or repeatedly failing to perform legal services with competence.

23

(ii) Plaintiff had been retained by Maria Perez to "see what he could do about" getting

24

Michael Keck to respond to Ms. Perez's inquiries, regarding th~ estate of her late husband.

25

Respondent was asked to investigate whether attorney Keck had adequately handled the estate of

26'1
I

27'
I

Maria Perez' late husband. At his death, decedent Joseph L. Perez held title to two pieces of
property, both encumbered but claimed by Ms. Perez to have some remaining equity. Perez had

28
COMPLAINT

-4-

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 5 of 13


asked attorney Keck to assist her in keeping one of the properties, either through the estate

administration or through obtaining a personal loan through the credit union of her labor union.

The building was foreclosed upon while the estate was in probate. For the next several months,

, Plaintiff Martin made attempts to contact Keck in an attempt to obtain the client's file from

5 i, I

attorney Keck. Attorney Keck refused to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the file. After many

7 ! I attempts to obtain a copy of file, Plaintiff finally had to threaten to contact the State Bar to assist
me in receiving the file from Attorney C.L. Keck.

(iii) Plaintiff admits that in or about May 2001, he recommended that Perez file suit
1

, against Michael Keck with regard to the handling of the probate estate of her husband. Keck would

10' I

11
12

not respond to Respondent's attempts to obtain the file. Based upon Perez' allegations and the fact
that Plaintiff reasonably believed that the statute of limitations for filing a lawsuit against an

1
,

attorney was running, Plaintiff recommended that Perez file an action against Keck.

13

(iv) When Plaintiff contacted Michael Keck, he refused to respond to the letters sent to

14 i
15
16

him. The letters were not returned as undeliverable. Prior to December 12, 2001, after Michael
Keck had been served with the summons and complaint, he requested an extension to file a

17 '

181
19,

responsive pleading. On or about December 12, 2001, Michael Keck wrote a letter stating that he
would not be filing a responsive pleading as per CCP 415.20(a).
(v) In early 2002, Maria Perez informed Plaintiff that Michael Keck was responding to her
inquiries and that she was satisfied with the outcome. Maria Perez did not contact Plaintiff, again,

20 Ii until sometime in 2004.


21 i I
(vi) On July 27,2005, a First Amended Complaint was filed in the Perez matter. The First
22!
II Amended Complaint (F AC) stated claims for damages for negligence and for promise made

23: :
without grounds for believing it to be true and willful concealment. At that time, Plaintiff had still
24

not received a copy of the file from attorney Keck and pled the claims as best he could.

25

(vii) On or about August 26, 2005, the defendants filed a motion to strike and a demurrer to

26

the FAC. Plaintiff further admits that the basis for defendants' demurrer was that the FAC failed to

27'

I i state facts which supported each element of the causes of action alleged.

28

11

COMPLAINT

-5-

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 6 of 13

(viii) On or about September 19, 2005, respondent filed a memorandum of points and

authorities in opposition to the demurrer and motion to strike portions of the F AC filed by the

3 I i defendants. In said Opposition. Plaintiff repeatedly pointed out that he did not have the file in the
4
ii
!I

case and needed to review it before allegations could be made with further specificity. Plaintiff
also stated that if the Court believed the demurrer was to be sustained, then it provide, with

6 ,. specificity, the grounds for sustaining the demurrer, so that an amended complaint could be filed.

(ix) The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. However, the Court did

not specify the grounds for doing so. The Order filed on October 28, 2005 simply stated that:

10

"Defendant's Motion to Strike portions of, and Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint
i

pursuant to are GRANTED AND SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; plaintiff having ten

11

days from the date of hearing to file a Second Amended Complaint."

12

13

(x) The FAC stated all facts available to plaintiff at the time. Since the Court did not
I

specify in what respect the FAC was defective, despite a request in the opposition that the reasons

14 i be set forth, Respondent was unable to make further amendments. The Court in sustaining the
15 i
demurrer, failed to set forth the reasons despite being requested to do so in the opposition. In this
16
regard, Code of Civil Procedure sec. 472d provided and continues to provide that:
17
"Whenever a demurrer in any action or proceeding is sustained, the court shall
i

include in its decision or order a statement of the specific ground or grounds


upon which the decision or order is based which may be by reference to

19

appropriate pages and paragraphs of the demurrer."

20

(xi) Plaintiff believed that he had sufficiently stated all facts sufficient to state a claim

21

22,
23'

against Keck. Plaintiff was ready to take the matter on appeal. The client, Maria Perez, did not
however, want to pursue the matter unless Plaintiff could give her a guarantee that the appeal
would be successful. However, Perez did not authorize an appeal and did not wish to advance

24

further costs or fees to prosecute an appeal.

25
I
I

26,

(xii) Plaintiff also filed a motion to set aside all prior sanctions orders based upon his
failure(s) to attend the case management conferences in the Perez case. On or about April 7,2005,

27

281

the court granted the motion to set aside all the previous sanctions issued against Respondent, on a

COMPLAINT

-6-

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 7 of 13


:I

showing of just cause.


(xiii) In Count Two (8) The State Bar alleges that Plaintiff willfully violated Business &

Professions Code, section 6068(m) by failing to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of

4 .
a client.

(xiv) Plaintiff communicated with Ms. Perez mainly by telephone calls. Plaintiff always

responded to Perez' calls and kept her informed of his attempts to obtain her file from attorney

Keck. Plaintiff did not receive either of Perez' letters allegedly sent in July of 2005. Plaintiff is

unaware as to the address to which Perez mailed the alleged correspondence. It should be noted

that when Ms. Perez contacted Respondent in 2005, it was because Michael Keck had once again

10.
I

11

failed to follow through with his commitment to Maria Perez and she wanted Plaintiff to pursue the
action against Michael Keck. Plaintiff pursuant to Ms. Perez's request, filed and served a First

12

Amended Complaint.

13

: I

1411
i

(xv) Had Plaintiff been aware that Perez was seeking a return of the $5,000.00 he
would not have taken steps to file the First Amended Complaint, serve the Summons and

15 I

, Complaint, oppose the demurrer, etc.


16 ':
(xvi) Plaintiff denied that he willfully violated section 6068(m) of the Business and
17 '
Professions Code.
18
(xvii) In Count Two (C), The State Bar alleges that Plaintiff willfully violated Business and
19
Professions Code section 6068(m) by failing to keep a client informed of significant developments
20
in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services.
21
(xviii) Plaintiff denies that he did not notify Perez until March 22, 2006 that the action had

22

been dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that he informed Perez telephonically and asked if she wished to

23

pursue an appeal. Perez was not interested in expending further money or time in pursuing an

24

appeal of the dismissal.

25 :
I

26'

271

(xix) In Count Two (D), Plaintiff denies that he willfully violated Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-700(A)(2) by failing, upon termination of employment to take reasonable steps to
avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to his client. Ms. Perez was concerned about the status of

28
Ii
II

COMPLAINT

-7-

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 8 of 13


1

her late husband's estate. Ms. Perez wanted to know the status of the funds Michael Keck was

reviewing the file and her statements, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, filed a First Amended Complaint,

4'

5
6

, filed opposition to the demurrer to the First Amended Complaint.

,,
:i

Ii

(xx) Plaintiff did not withdraw from Perez' representation. Ms. Perez specifically stated
that she did not want to file an appeal from the sustaining of the demurrer. As set forth in the
previous paragraphs, the Court sustained a demurrer with leave to amend and granted a motion to

strike. Plaintiff believed in good faith that he had set forth all the facts then available to him. The

Court did not set forth the grounds on which the demurrer was sustained despite a request for a

10 i i

11

statement of reasons. Plaintiff believed that he had alleged a claim to the best of his ability, and the
matter would most likely be taken on appeaL However, upon notification, Perez was not interested

12

13

holding. Plaintiff devoted hours greater than the $5,000.00 paid to him by Ms. Perez. In addition to

in incurring the expense, cost and time that would be consumed in an appeal. Plaintiff admits that
1

there may have been a communication problem.

14

(xxi) Attorney Keck refused to release the file so that Plaintiff could analyze any potential

15 i
claims. Plaintiff believed that the properties went into foreclosure because payments could not be

16
I

made by the Estate, and no act or conduct on his part prejudiced Perez. Plaintiff was never in

17 i I
" possession of any of the estate assets that Ms. Perez was concerned about and did not cause any
18
loss to the Plaintift~ other than the fees that she paid to him, for services that were performed.
19,
(xxii) In Count Two (E) plaintiff denies that he willfully violated Rules of Professional
20: I
" Conduct, rule 4-1 OO(B )(3) by failing to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds
21
of the client corning into respondent's possession.
22; ,
(xxiii) In connection with the analysis of the claim against Keck, client meetings, filing of
23
the original Complaint, service of the Summons and Complaint, attempts to retrieve the file from
24
Keck, filing of the First Amended Complaint; research and filing of the opposition to the demurrer
25
to the First Amended Complaint and opposition to the motion to strike, plaintiff had exhausted the
26ii

I'

$5,000 that was originally paid to him. He had verbally notified Perez that the $5,000 paid to him

27, i had been used up, and that more monies would be required to file the appeal. Ms. Perez never
28
COMPLAINT

-8-

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 9 of 13


informed plaintiff that she believed that she was owed a refund of the $5,000 that she had paid nor

did she demand a fee dispute hearing.


i

,i ,i

(xxiv) In Count Two (F), plaintiff denied that he willfully violated Rules of Professional

'

Conduct, rule 4-100(8)(4) by failing to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds

5,

of the client coming into respondent's possession. Rule 4-100(8)(4) requires an attorney to

6 .:
i I "promptly payor deliver, as requested by the client, any funds, securities, or other properties in the

possession of the member which the client is entitled to receive." It is respectfully submitted that
the $5,000 paid by Perez was explained to be a nonrefundable fee and the Agreement with Perez
provided that the $5,000 was a nonrefundable retainer. In the alternative, plaintiff performed

10

services which consumed all of the $5,000 that he was paid by Perez. This rule is inapplicable

11
12

since Perez was not "entitled to receive" any portion of the $5,000 as a refund and did not request a

,I. ! "fee dispute hearing,"

13

(xxv) Basically, plaintiff was disbarred based upon a fee dispute with a client who claimed

14

he had not accounted to her for $5,000.00 (Five Thousand Dollars).

15

10. The defendants' actions were an abuse of discretion and have wrongfully deprived

16

plaintiff of the opportunity to earn a living as an attorney. He has been unable to earn an income

17

since the date of disbarment as an attorney. The trial judge issued her order of immediate

18

suspension from the practice law to take effect three (3) days from the date of issuance. Plaintiff

19

had been practicing law since 1977 and was denied the opportunity to even wind up his affairs. In
i
.

20 I i, every criminal case plaintiff has been involved in both Federal and State Courts, over a 30 year

21

period, a convicted c.kfendant is given time to get their affairs in order.

22 i
23' ;
!

11.

Plaintilr is an African American male, heterosexual, and believes that defendants

ii', treated him harshly and cruelly based upon his race.

24 ~!

: !

25

FIRST COUNT

Title 42 USC 1983,

26

(Deprivation of Civil Rights and Conspiracy Against all Defendants)

27

28

12. Plaintil1 repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding
i

COMPLAINT

-9-

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 10 of 13


I,

II paragraphs 1 through 11, as though set forth funy herein.

13. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that as to all Defendants,
and each ofthem, each was acting pursuant to official, de Jacto policies and in concert with one

3
!I

another when they injured Plaintiff; each was acting in concert with the co-defendants, with the

shared objective to injure the plaintiff The violations included but were not limited to the

6 ii following: denial of due process, and deprivation of civil rights in violation of Title 42 USC section
7

1983.

8!
9

10

14.

The conduct of the defendants, and each of them, deprived plaintiff of the

rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States. The defendants
denied plaintiff a fair trial by refusing to produce exculpatory evidence in their possession. By

11 i: refusing to allow the plaintiff to take the depositions of Jacqueline Carpenter, Larry DeSha and the
12 ' Person Most Knowledgeable (PMK). Plaintiff was denied his right to obtain documents by
l3

subpoena from the State Bar.


15.

14

Each of the acts complained of herein was committed by the defendants, and each

15 i I of them, under the color and pretense of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages
16

of the State Bar of California.


16.

17

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, as alleged herein,

18

plaintiff has been deprived ofthe ability to earn a living. He has suffered physical injuries, fright,

19

shock, pain, suffering, and extreme mental anguish. Accordingly plaintiff has suffered past and

20,

21

future general damages in amounts to be determined by proof at triaL

22

17.

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, the plaintiff lost

income. Plaintiff suffered past and future special damages in amounts to be determined by proof at

23,, triaL

24 ;

Wherefore, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.

I,

!I

25

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

26'

27

(Against All Defendants)

18. Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding

COMPLAINT

- 10 -

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 11 of 13


1

paragraphs 1 through 17, as though set forth fully herein.


19.

Through their abuse of discretion, the State Bar, its employees named herein and

State Bar Court acted unreasonable, willfully, maliciously and oppressively prosecuted plaintiff

41

with a conscious disregard for plaintiffs rights with the sole intent to hann plaintiff. The

5 I!: I defendants and each of them knew or should have known that Plaintiff did not violate Business and
: I

Professions Code section 6068(c) by maintaining an action against the Szeto defendants. The

defendants brought charges against Plaintiff knowingly aware that Plaintiffs action against the

7
II
!I

8 ,: Szeto defendants was appealed to the California Supreme Court and that Plaintiff had prevail on an
unanimous opinion on February 19,2004. The defendants filed their action against plaintiff 20 days
9
1

short of five (5) years.

10

20.

11

As a proximate cause of the defendants' conduct, plaintiff has been deprived of the

opportunity to earn a living and has incurred attorney fees.

12

Wherefore, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth.

13
14

COUNT THREE

15

Prospective Injunctive Relief

21. Plaintiff repeats. realleges and incorporates by reference all of the preceding

16
!I

17:

paragraphs 1 through 20, as though set forth fully herein.


22. Plaintiff alleges that the findings of Judge Armendarz were not supported by the

18

191 i evidence and was an abuse of discretion. Judge Armedarz denied plaintiff a fair trial by refusing to
allow for the taking of percipient witnesses and allowing for the discovery of exculpatory evidence.

20
1

21

The remaining defendants violated plaintiffs civil right by refusing to produce exculpatory

2211

evidence that they have in their possession. The defendants each and all of them knowingly

23

conspired to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutionally protected rights to be free of discriminatory

iI

24 " practices on the part of the State Bar and its employees. The denial of rights resulted in plaintiff
, i

'I

25 II being denied a fair and impartial trial.


26

23. The Defendant State Bar has unconstitutionally disbarred plaintiff from the practice
1

27,

I,

law and deprived plaintiff from earning a living.

28
COMPLAINT

- 11 -

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 12 of 13


24. The State Bar's actions, unless and until enjoined and restrained by an order of this
2 .
court will cause great and irreparable injury to the Plaintiffs in that it will further perpetuate and

continue the unconstitutional denial or plaintiffs civil rights, thereby permanently depriving

4 \11
I,

Plaintiff of his rights in being a licensed attorney.

5 I',I

25. Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law for the injuries currently being

6'

suffered in that money damages cannot be measured, and unless enjoined, defendants and each of

7
II their wrongful conduct, and it will be impossible to determine the precise amount of damages that
8 II
" Plaintiffs will suffer, if defendants' conduct is not enjoined and directed to reinstate plaintiff is good
9 .
standing with the California State Bar..
10
26.
The defendants, and each of them, knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed

1111 among themselves to violate plaintiffs civil rights and deprive him of his right to make a living.
12! !
27

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, as alleged herein,

plaintiff suffered physical inj uries, fright, shock, pain, suffering, and extreme mental anguish.
Accordingly plaintiff has suffered past and future general damages in amounts to be determined by
proof at trial.

1611
17:

Wherefore, plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendants as follows:


Plaintiff demands a Trial by Jury.

18

First Count

19,

(a) Reinstatement as a member in good standing of the California State Bar.

20
I.

(b) Past and future general damages, including, but not limited to, loss of earnings, pain and

21 i I

II suffering, and emotional distress, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial;

22
II

231 !
, I

241

27

(d)

For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.

Second Count

2511, I
26

(c) Costs of suit incurred herein and a reasonable attorney fee if permitted by statute;

(a) Reinstatemelll as a member in good standing of the California State Bar.


(b) Past and future general damages, including, but not limited to, loss of earnings, pain and

suffering, and emotional distress, in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial;

28
II
!I

COMPLAINT

- 12 -

.,

Case 4:11-cv-03601-CW Document 1 Filed 07/21/11 Page 13 of 13

'.
!

(c) Costs of suit incurred herein and a reasonable attorney fee if permitted by statute;
(d)

For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper.

Third Count

4 .

(a) Injunctive Relief and an order directing the State bar to re-instate plaintiff as a member of

5
I,

the State Bar of Cali fomi a, in good standing;


(b) Costs of suil ill.:urred herein;

7 II

8 iI
I,

91:1

(c) Attorney fees if permitted by statute; and


(d) For such oill.:1' and further relief as the court may deem p
Dated: July 21, 2011

lOi'I'
I,

By:

11

17
II

18 ,
19 i

20
21'
22
I

23!

II

24'

251 '
!

26 '
!
27 I
I

28
II
COMPLAINT

- 13 -

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 1 of 25 Page ID #:1

UNITED STATES Dmnuc:r COURT

CENT.RAL DISTRICT OF CA.I.J.FORNIA

v.

A. PREVIOUS LAwsurrs
1. Have you bmugbt my other 1awsWt.s m a federal court while a prisoner.

2.

ifYQ'W:' ~.to

Yes

Jl!U.To

11<1.- is yes. how-many? _ _ _ _ _ __

DeSCIl~ tM lawsait in the space below. (lftbm is mom dum om lawmlt..~ tbe additioml lawsuits on an
~ piece ofpaperusmg the ~ outl.b:Je.)

RECEIVED
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT

fEB I 8 2015
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
B
DepUTY
BY Y '
DEP

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 2 of 25 Page ID #:2

a. Parties to this previous lawsuit:


Plaintiff

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

De~nrumu

____________________________________________________

__________________________________________________
b. COurt ________________________________________________

_____
__
__

~
~

c.

Doc~~~~

__________________________________________________

d. Name of judge to 'Whom case was assigned _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

e. Disposition (For exampJe: Wu the cue dismissed? If so, what wu the basis for dismissal? Wu it
appealed? Is it mIlpendiDg?) _
__
_
__
__
__
___
_
__
__
__
_ __
__
__
"""'-_
_
_
__
__
__
_
_
f.
f.

I;ssuesraised: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
I;ssuesraised: _ _ _- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -_ _ __

g. ApproJtimate date of filing lawsuit: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __


~

A~~damof~s~n

___________________________________________

B. EXHAUSTION OF ADMlNISTR.ATIVE REMEDIES

instinltion where the evenm re'iat:iDg to your cw:rentoomplaint


1. Is them a '
procedure ava.ilable at the imtinltion
occw::red'1. Yes 0 No
2. Have you filed a grievance co~ the:facts:relating to yomcw:rem eomplaim?

riYes

0 No

If yom answer is 00, explain wbyoot _ _


__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
___
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
____

4. Please attach copies ofpapm :related to the grievance procedure.


C. JUlUSDICTION

This complafnt alleges that the civil rights ofpWntiff

:rue \ v A'f"C, t\t:;,

--~~~~~~~~rim~~~Mn~d~W5~m--~~)------------~~~~~~~~~rim~~~Mn~ti~ft)~m-~~)-------------

................
~
who presently resides at--'
at--"........
........~""_~_o".
....---'~...............
~~

were violated by the actions of the defendant(s) Damed below. which actions were directed against plaimiff at
\

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 3 of 25 Page ID #:3

(OlUmll)

NOTE:

You Deed rot ~ more than one defeOOmt Of allele more than o~ cImn. If'you are mmmg more than
five (5) defendaW. make a copy of this page to J)mvide the iDtotm.mon for additioml defeMarats.
_ _ _ _ _ resides orwom at

The defendm: is mOO in bkther (Checlc:

O~ or both): .{~

P.lplain how this ~ was actmg UDdm'ooJof of law:

The defen&mt is sued

in~ (Cldo~ or both): 'indMdml

I.ffidd

capacity.

ExplaWhow this de~ was ~ Wlder oolor ofIaw:

Th.e defendant is mOO mbislher (Check ODe Of both):

iDdividual

ExpJam oow this def~ was ~ WlderoolorofIaw:

II official capacity.

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 4 of 25 Page ID #:4

4. Defendant

__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
__
_

~~.-.:I..;lIlIl....
~~~.:lIlI-_

resides orwom at
msides

~ividml ~~W
~fficW capacity. ~
,/

T'he defendant .is sued in hislher (Check: one or both):

Explain bow this defendant was acting l.lDder rolor of law:


\

'1

A-rT)l4Nl~

The defendant is sued in hislher (Cleek one or both): Ifl!ldi1fiduial


~ir.adMdual.
Explain bow tb.is defendant was acting under color of law:

VI
P>.I\J.D

TtJrLI\J1'/oNv\L

~F%Ab To

A.~tQf f~"1

;:$1Ae,.tJSHbD

Lt\k)

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 5 of 25 Page ID #:5

citing lepl authority or ~Dt. Be certain you desc~. in separately ~ pm,graphs. enctly what each
DEFENDANT (by:name) did to violate yom right.

o ...

&.......y.;:;.~~........_ _

"'If there is more than one clitim. describe the culdi.tWnaJ. clatm(s) on cmotMr attt;u;W
attachedpiece ofpaper using the St:m'J.(B
outline.

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 6 of 25 Page ID #:6

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 7 of 25 Page ID #:7

L
IN

ANO

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 8 of 25 Page ID #:8

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 9 of 25 Page ID #:9

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 10 of 25 Page ID #:10

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 11 of 25 Page ID #:11

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 12 of 25 Page ID #:12

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 13 of 25 Page ID #:13

4 fI.a 11

It j

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 14 of 25 Page ID #:14

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 15 of 25 Page ID #:15

~----

r\

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 16 of 25 Page ID #:16


I

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 17 of 25 Page ID #:17

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 18 of 25 Page ID #:18

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 19 of 25 Page ID #:19

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 20 of 25 Page ID #:20

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 21 of 25 Page ID #:21

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 22 of 25 Page ID #:22

'?

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 23 of 25 Page ID #:23

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 24 of 25 Page ID #:24

Case 5:15-cv-00293-R-MAN Document 1 Filed 02/19/15 Page 25 of 25 Page ID #:25

"' -

Case
2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 1 of 25 Page ID #:1
,

..,
"

tc,
tS

V",\
",I..

2
3

D14
D1'

FILED
FILEQ
A. Edward Ezof
Plaintiff
201 S. Lake Avenue, Suite 505
Pasadena, CA 91101
Telephone: (626) 568-8098

2UI5
PM I: 06
2UIS DEC 21 PH

4
5

7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

t\las1':- 97 84 :r l/lJ 5 Ut
(fi (j
t\lasl':-

10
11

12

.'

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAG


AND EQUITABLE RELIEF

A. EDWARD EZOR,

13

v.

14
15
16

17
18
19

Plaintiff:
PlaintUI:

DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL

MORGENSTERN;,.JAYNE
ELI DAVID MORGENSTERNAJA
KIM, STATE BAR OF CALIFu:RNJA,
RICHARD A. PLATEL~ DONALD F.
MILFf.iICATIIERINE u. PURCELL,
JUD
EPSTEIN PATRICEE.
McELROY,
SUPREME COURT OF
McELR~YhSppR:BME

DAMAGES EXCEED $ 50,000.00

MILrPiI

CALIFOKNl!\h..~ANI
CALIFO~.tr..~ANI G. CANTILSAKADxg,7
SAKA~.f' MlNG W. CJllN,
KATHRll~ M. WERDEGAR,

21

LEONDRA R.. KRUGER. GOODWIN H.


LEONORA
~Wh~N$OL
~W+.~MOL A. CORRIGAN,
.LVJ.AKlANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR,
MAKlANO-FLORENTINO
and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

22

Defendants.

20

23
24
25
26

COMES NOW Plaintiff, A. EDWARD EZOR ("EZOR"), and alleges as follows:

27
2&
28
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-1-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 2 of 25 Page ID #:2

PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS
1.

Plaintiff is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing

in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. Plaintiff is, and was at all times relevant

hereto, an adult over eighteen years old.

2.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant ELI DAVID

MORGENSTERN ("MORGENSTERN") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual

residing in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and

8
9
10
11

believes, and upon such information and belief alleges, that Defendant MORGENSTERN is, and
was at all times herein mentioned, an attorney duly licensed and authorized to practice law in the
State of California.
3.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant JAYNE KIM

("KIM") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in the County of Los
12

Angeles, State of California. Plaintiff is further advised and believes, and thereon alleges, that
13

Defendant KIM is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an attorney duly licensed and
14
15
16

17

18

authorized to practice law in the State of California.


4.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant STATE

BAR OF CALIFORNIA ("STATE BAR") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a public
corporation established by Article 6, Section 9 of the California Constitution. Plaintiff is further
informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant STATE BAR acts, and at all times

19

herein mentioned acted, as the administrative arm of Defendant SUPREME COURT OF

20

CALIFORNIA ("SUPREME COURT") in matters involving the admission, regulation and

21

discipline of attorneys in the State of California. In addition, Plaintiff is informed and believes,

22

and thereon alleges, that Defendants MORGENSTERN and KIM are, and were at all times herein

23

mentioned, employed as attorneys by Defendant STATE BAR.

24

5.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant RICHARD

25

A. PLATEL ("PLATEL") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in the

26

City of Honolulu, Hawaii. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that

27

Defendant PLATEL is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an attorney duly licensed and

28

authorized to practice law in the State of California. Moreover, Plaintiff is informed and believes,
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-2-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 3 of 25 Page ID #:3


1

and thereon alleges, that Defendant PLATEL committed .,

EZO~ as alleged herein,


unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR,

while an administrative hearing officer or administrative judge of the California State Bar Court.

7.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant DONALD
Plaintiffis

F. MILES ("MILES") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in the

County of Los Angeles, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendant MILES committed, and continues to commit, unconstitutional, wrongful,

8
9

10
11

EZO~ as alleged herein, as an administrative


unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR,

hearing officer or administrative judge of the California State Bar Court.


8.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant

CATHERINE D. PURCELL ("PURCELL") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an
individual residing in the County of Kern, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and

12

believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant PURCELL committed, and continues to commit,

13

unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and


aIid tortious acts against EZOR,
EZO~ as alleged herein,

14

as an administrative hearing officer or administrative judge of the Review Department of the


15

16

17
18

California State Bar Court.


9.

Plaintiffis informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant JUDITH

EPSTEIN ("EPSTEIN") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in the
County of San Francisco, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and

19

thereon alleges, that Defendant EPSTEIN committed, and continues to commit, unconstitutional,

20

wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR,


EZO~ as alleged herein, as an

21

administrative hearing officer or administrative judge of the Review Department of the California

22

State Bar Court.

23

10.

Plaintiff
is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant PATRICE
Plaintiffis

24

E. McELROY ("McELROY") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, an individual residing in

25

the County of San Francisco, State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and

26

thereon alleges, that Defendant McELROY committed, and continues to commit,

27

unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR,


EZO~ as alleged herein,

28

as a pro tern administrative hearing officer or administrative judge of the Review Department of
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-3-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 4 of 25 Page ID #:4

the California State Bar Court.


11.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant SUPREME

COURT OF CALIFORNIA is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a government or judicial

entity established under and by virtue of the California Constitution, and consisting of one Chief

Justice and six Associate Justices thereof. Furthermore, upon information and belief, Defendant

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA's main courthouse and official address are in the City of

San Francisco, State of California. In addition, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

8
9
10

11

12

alleges, that Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA committed, and continues to


commit, unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR, as
alleged herein.
12.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant TAN! G.

CANTIL-SAKAUYE ("CANTIL-SAKAUYE") is, and was at all times herein mentioned, Chief

Justice of Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. Plaintiff is further informed and


13

believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant SAKAUYE is, and was at all times herein

14
mentioned, a resident of the County of Sacramento, State of California. In addition, Plaintiff is

15
16
17

18

informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant CANTI~SAKAUYE committed, and

continues to commit, unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against
EZOR, as alleged herein.
13.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendants MING W.

19

CHIN ("CHIN"), KATHRYN M. WERDEGAR ("WERDEGAR"), LEONRA R. KRUGER

20

("LIU"), CAROL A. CORRIGAN ("CORRIGAN"), and


("KRUGER"), GOODWIN H. LIU ("LID"),

21

MARIANO-FLORENTINO CUELLAR ("CUELLAR") are individuals residing in the County of

22

San Francisco, State of California. Upon further information and belief, said Defendants, and

23

each of them, are, and were at all times herein mentioned, Associate Justices of Defendant

24

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. In addition, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and

25

thereon alleges, that said Defendants, and each of them, committed, and continue to commit,

26

unconstitutional, wrongful, unlawful, unethical and tortious acts against EZOR, as alleged herein.

27

28

14.

Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1

through 10, inclusive, and therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-4-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 5 of 25 Page ID #:5

amend this Complaint to allege the true names and capacities of Defendants DOES 1 through 10,

when this information is ascertained.

15.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the DOE

Defendants participated or acted in concert with the other named Defendants, and each of them.

Said DOE Defendants are therefore responsible and liable in some manner for the acts,

occurrences, and/or omissions alleged herein, and have thereby directly and proximately caused

damages to Plaintiff, as herein alleged.

8
9

10
11

16.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and based thereon alleges, that at all times

herein mentioned, each of the Defendants was the agent, partner, or employee of each of the other
Defendants. In doing the things complained of herein, each of said Defendants was acting within
the course and scope of such agency, partnership, or employment. All acts and omissions alleged
to have been done by Defendants, and each of them, were done with the consent, knowledge and

12

ratification of all other Defendants.


13

15
16

17
18

CORRIGAN and CUELLAR are not being sued in this action for any monetary damages. Said

Defendants, and each of them, are being sued in this lawsuit for only equitable and declaratory
relief for violating Plaintiff's
Plaintiffs constitutional and civil rights, as herein alleged and described.
18.

Plaintiff was duly admitted to practice law in the State of California on or about

19

January 5, 1972. As an attorney, he practiced primarily in the area of probate, estate planning and

20

trusts. During approximately 41 years of practice, EZOR had an exemplary, discipline-free

21

practice and was well-respected by numerous judges and attorneys.

22

19.

On or about August 14,2012, the State Bar filed two disciplinary charges in the

23

State Bar Court of California (Case No. 12-0-10043), accusing EZOR, inter alia, of

24

misappropriating monies from the Estate of Maxine Marx. Ms. Marx was the daughter of the late

25

Chico Marx, a member of the famous Marx Brothers comedy team. EZOR had represented the

26

various interests of the Marx Brothers and their descendants since 1972. EZOR duly filed an

27

Answer to the Notice of Disciplinary Charges, and denied that he had willfully misappropriated

28

any funds. In fact, appropriate funds were paid by EZOR to said Estate following an accounting.
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-5-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 6 of 25 Page ID #:6

The disciplinary case was assigned for trial and pre-trial matters to the calendar of Defendant

PLATEL of the State Bar Court. Defendant PLATEL was a former, long-time State Bar

prosecutor before being appointed as a State Bar Judge.

20.

During the State Bar Court proceedings, Defendant STATE BAR indicated, by

and through Defendant KIM, Chief Trial Counsel of the Office of Enforcement, and Defendant

MORGENSTERN, Senior Trial Counsel, that the appropriate discipline for EZOR was the

draconian measure of his disbarment from the State Bar of California. EZOR and his counsel took

9
10
11

the position that this was manifestly unfair and unwarranted, especially in view of Plaintiff's fine
reputation as an attorney and his discipline-free record for several decades. Settlement discussions
were held before Defendant MILES of the State Bar Court, with no resolution.
21.

On or about January 15,2013, EZOR and his attorney, Dennis V. Greene

("GREENE") appeared before Defendant PLATEL to request a continuance of the January 22


12
and January 23,2013, trial dates. Plaintiff was ill with the influenza virus and unable to stand trial
13

because of his medical condition. In support of EZOR's request, he presented a medical report
14

from his physician, containing his diagnosis, treatment and prognosis. The State Bar Court
15

16
17
18

vacated the aforesaid trial dates and ordered a telephonic status conference on February 28, 2013.
22.

On or about February 28, 2013, GREENE and Defendant MORGENSTERN

appeared before Defendant PLATEL for the status conference. GREENE did so telephonically
from EZOR's Pasadena office. That office on said date had two available telephone extensions.

19

Defendant MORGENSTERN did his appearance physically in Defendant PLATEL's courtroom.

20

Attorney GREENE advised Defendant PLATEL and Defendant MORGENSTERN that EZOR

21

would require afurther trial continuance because EZOR was still ill. At the conclusion of the

22

status conference, EZOR picked up one of the extension lines and heard Defendant

23

MORGENSTERN say "Bullshit", to which Defendant PLATEL replied: "Yeah, I think it's

24

bullshit too, but I'm not a doctor." Case Administrator, Angela Carpenter, upon information and

25

belief, heard this unethical, unsavory exchange. Attorney GREENE also heard this unethical,

26

unsavory exchange after the status conference had concluded. The aforementioned unlawful,

27

shocking and improper ex parte communications between Defendant PLATEL and Defendant

28

MORGENSTERN, falsely accusing EZOR and his physician oflying about his medical
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-6-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 7 of 25 Page ID #:7

condition, demonstrated without question an actual bias, or appearance of bias, by Defendant

PLATEL towards EZOR. Said illegal communications also showed without question

prosecutorial misconduct and unethical, unprofessional actions by Defendant MORGENSTERN

towards EZOR.

23.

On or about April 22, 2013, EZOR filed a legitimate complaint about Defendant

PLATEL's improper ex parte communications with Defendant MORGENSTERN, as

hereinbefore alleged and described, with the Commission on Judicial Performance ("CJP").

8
9

10
11

Plaintiff was justifiably concerned that Defendant PLATEL would be unable to conduct a fair and
impartial trial of EZOR and be fair and impartial with respect to other pre-trial and post-trial
proceedings involving him.
24.

On or about May 15,2015, GREENE informed the State Bar Court that EZOR

had filed the aforesaid complaint with the CJP, alleging, inter alia, improper and unethical judicial
12
conduct by Defendant PLATEL towards Plaintiff and demonstrating Defendant PLATEL' s bias
13
or appearance of bias towards Plaintiff. GREENE also informed the State Bar Court of major
14
15
16
17

unethical, unprofessional and illegal actions taken by Defendant MORGENSTERN, as herein


mentioned and alleged.
25.

On or about May 22,2013, the date that trial was scheduled to proceed,

GREENE provided the State Bar Court with a copy of EZOR's CPJ Complaint. He further made

18

an oral motion to stay the proceedings until the CPJ ruled on said complaint. On or about May 22,

19

PLATEL
2013, Defendant PLA
TEL filed his Verified Answer to Disqualification Motion and Order Re

20

Respondent's Disqualification Motion. Defendant PLATEL denied EZOR's motion to disqualify,

21

despite the clear showing by EZOR and his counsel that that there was a strong basis in fact and

22

law to disqualify Defendant PLATEL.

23

26.

On or about July 10,2015, Victoria B. Henley ("HENLEY"), Director-Chief

24

Counsel for the CJP, sent correspondence to EZOR, determining that no further investigation or

25

further proceedings were warranted with respect to Defendant PLATEL and that the matter was

26

closed. This absurd determination made no sense whatsoever.

27

28

27.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that HENLEY did not

disclose that she had been instructed by Defendant KIM, Defendant CANTIL-SAKAUYE,
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-7-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 8 of 25 Page ID #:8


1

Defendant STATE BAR, the Judicial Council of the State of California, and Defendant

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, among others, to never have the CJP properly

investigate and discipline any State Bar or Review Judge-no matter how adverse the allegations

and evidence-in order to protect and uphold the reputation and sanctity of the California State

Bar Court and its Judges. This illicit modus operandi on the part of HENLEY was also done to

ensure that she would keep her lucrative job, not jeopardize the corrupt state bar disciplinary

system, and curry favor with the power structure of the Administration of the Courts (AOC) and

8
9

10
11
12

Defendant STATE BAR. In exchange for not recommending any judicial discipline of Defendant
PLATEL and other errant, compromised State Bar Judges, HENLEY further benefitted
economically. At all times herein mentioned, upon information and belief, her husband,
MICHAEL BOLLI, an Oakland attorney, got lucrative case referrals from corrupt officials with
the State Bar, such as former, fired senior investigator, THOMAS LAYTON.
28.

On or about July 15,2013,


15, 2013, EZOR sent a letter to HENLEY,
HENLEY. advising her that the

13

PLATEL
TEL was in conflict of the California Code of Judicial Ethics, Canons
behavior of Defendant PLA
14

15
16

2 and/or 3, and requesting a copy of the recording of the proceeding. "'.


29.

On or about August 7, 2015, EZOR again wrote to HENLEY, reiterating his

earlier request for a copy of the recording of the proceeding. ".


0,

17

30.

., . .' :; '.
"

C)

"

u
-If"'' _

~"l

On or about September 3,2013, EZOR filed a motion to disqualify Defendant

18

PLATEL due to his showing of actual bias or the appearance of same by the latter. On or about

19

September 5, 2015, Defendant MILES, Assistant Supervising Judge of the State Bar Court, issued

20

PLATEL.
his Order denying the disqualification motion of Defendant PLA
TEL. In his untenable ruling,

21

Defendant MILES distorted the record and indicated that Defendant PLATEL made the offending

22

comments about EZOR on the record in open court, not after the telephonic hearing. Defendant

23

MILES ruled that EZOR failed to show any factual or legal basis to warrant the disqualification

24

of Defendant PLATEL. Defendant MILES complimented Defendant PLATEL's professionalism

25

because, even if Defendant PLATEL did not believe the substance of EZOR's medical report, the

26

judge nonetheless granted the requested continuance.

27

28

31.

On or about September 13,2015, EZOR filed his Verified Reply to Verified

Answer to Disqualification Motion and Declaration of A. Edward Ezor in Support of


EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-8-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 9 of 25 Page ID #:9

Reconsideration Request of Ruling Denying Motion to Disqualify Judge Richard Platel. In these

documents, EZOR advised Defendant MILES that Defendant MORGENSTERN acknowledged

that the "bullshit" statements were made by Defendant PLATEL and Defendant

MORGENSTERN after the February 28, 2013 telephonic hearing. EZOR further advised

Defendant MILES that the recording of the statements had still not been made available to him,

and requested reconsideration of the disqualification motion.

7
8

9
10
11

32.

On or about September 16,2013, Defendant MILES issued his Order denying

EZOR's Request for Reconsideration of Motion to Disqualify the Hon. Richard Platel.
33.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that it is, and was at all

times herein mentioned, illegal, wrongful and unlawful for Defendant MILES to make any rulings
or Orders with respect to the issue of Defendant PLATEL' s disqualification. Defendant MILES
had previously held a settlement conference or early evaluation conference in EZOR's

12
disciplinary case, and therefore had a conflict of interest and had formed opinions and
13

preconceptions about EZOR's matter beforehand.


14
15
16
17
18

34.

Until in or about December, 2015, furthermore, EZOR was unaware that

Defendant MILES, upon information and belief, has, and had at all times relevant hereto, a
history of unethical, illegal actions, biases and conflicts of interest as a State Bar Judge in other
disciplinary cases. Plaintiff is also informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant
MILES did not disclose at the time of his rulings involving EZOR that he and other State Bar

19

Judges and Review Judges have, and had at all times herein mentioned, an unconstitutional and

20

illegal practice and agreement among themselves of never disqualifying other State Bar and

21

Review Judges in disciplinary proceedings.

22

35.

EZOR's State Bar trial took place on or about September 16 and 17,2013.

23

Defendant PLATEL recommended EZOR's disbarment, among other findings, and placed EZOR

24

on inactive status effective December 6, 2013. EZOR contested same on appeal. The Review

25

Department of the State Bar Court affirmed Defendant PLATEL's decision. EZOR timely

26

petitioned for review before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. On or about

27

September 23,2015, Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA unlawfully and

28

unconstitutionally, without providing EZOR oral argument and written decision on the merits,
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-9-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 10 of 25 Page ID #:10

ordered EZOR disbarred from the practice of law. In law and fact, there was no meaningful and

lawful review by Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, as the sole court of original

the disqualification of Defendant


jurisdiction, ofEZOR's disciplinary case. The issue of
ofthe

PLATEL, the lack of a fair and impartial trial, and the ethical misconduct of Defendant

MORGENSTERN, re: EZOR were not mentioned at all in the Review Department's Opinion on

Review nor in the Supreme Court's Disbarment Order.

8
9

10
11

36.

A true and correct copy ofthe aforesaid Disbarment Order is marked and

attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated by reference herein. Exhibit I is, and was at all
times herein mentioned, unlawful, unconstitutional, unenforceable and against EZOR's civil
rights, since, inter alia, it is not signed with an original, full signature by Defendant CANTILSAKAUYE, as duly required by due process and other applicable law.
37.

Subsequent to the filing of Exhibit 1 by the Clerk of Defendant SUPREME

12
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, EZOR received written notification from Defendant STATE BAR
13

that he owes purported or alleged disciplinary costs in the amount of $ 17,829.39. At all times
14
15
16
17
18

relevant hereto, there was no proper, legal itemization of said costs provided to EZOR by either
Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA or Defendant STATE BAR. Furthermore,
Plaintiff contends in this lawsuit that any alleged disciplinary costs are, and were at all times

relevant hereto, unlawful, unwarranted, against his civil rights and unconstitutional, since his
disbarment from the California State Bar is, and was at all times herein mentioned, illegal, as

19

alleged and set forth herein. Moreover, EZOR was not provided his due process and equal

20

protection rights of contesting the aforementioned alleged disciplinary costs by either a motion to

21

th
tax costs or the right to a jury trial, as required by the 6th
and 14th Amendments and applicable

22

U.S. Supreme Court precedent.

23

38.

At all times herein mentioned, Defendants STATE BAR and KIM were notified

24

by Plaintiff of Defendant MORGENSTERN's breach of ethics and attorney misconduct, as

25

herein alleged. Moreover, Defendants STATE BAR and KIM were fully aware, upon information

26

and belief, of the breach of judicial ethics by Defendant PLATEL. However, despite such

27

awareness, Defendants BAR and KIM, in derogation of their professional and legal duties and

28

responsibilities, made no efforts whatsoever to sufficiently investigate and remedy such unlawful
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-10-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 11 of 25 Page ID #:11

conduct. Indeed, said Defendants, and each of them, condoned and ratified such misconduct. As

Chief Trial Counsel for the Office of Enforcement for Defendant STATE BAR, Defendant KIM

is, and was at all times herein mentioned, required to uphold the public trust and ensure that

judges and attorneys act ethically and legally. Defendant KIM, in taking no corrective actions

against either Defendant PLATEL or Defendant MORGENSTERN, was more interested in

keeping her job, protecting the self-serving interests of her subordinate attorneys, such as

Defendant MORGENSTERN, and preserving her camaraderie with State Bar Court and Review

8
9

Judges, than adhering to ethical duties and responsibilities incumbent upon her as the chief
disciplinary attorney in the State of California.

10

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

11

MOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS)


12

(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)


13

39.

Plaintiff refers to, and incorporates as though fully set forth herein, the preceding

14

Paragraphs and allegations of this Complaint.


15

16
17

18

40.

This is a civil rights complaint for declaratory relief, damages and other

appropriate relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 et seq. Plaintiff's civil rights have been violated, as
set forth and alleged herein.
41.

This Court has jurisdiction in this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. Moreover,

19

Plaintiff is an adult residing in this judicial district where much of the tortious, wrongful and

20

unlawful actions alleged herein took place.

21

22
23

24

25

42.

Plaintiff s constitutional and civil rights were violated as follows, without

limitation, as alleged and described herein:


(i)

EZOR was unlawfully disbarred because he did receive a fair and impartial trial by

Defendant PLATEL.
(ii)

EZOR's rights to procedural and substantive due process and equal protection of

26

laws, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Constitution, the California

27

Constitution and other applicable law, were violated by his not receiving a fair and impartial trial

28

from Defendant PLATEL.


EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-11-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 12 of 25 Page ID #:12

(iii)

EZOR's Disbarment Order is, and was at all times herein mentioned, illegal,

unconstitutional, void, ultra vires and otherwise unsupportable, because he did not receive

meaningful, proper and lawful review, by required written decision on the merits and oral

argument, by Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, Defendant CANTIL-

SAKAUYE, and the other Defendant Associate Justices of said Supreme Court.

6
7
8
9

10

(iv)

EZOR's Disbarment Order is, and was at all times herein mentioned, illegal,

PLATEL
unconstitutional, void, ultra vires and otherwise unsupportable, because Defendant PLATEL
violated his judicial oath to be fair and impartial towards EZOR, had an actual bias or appearance
of bias towards EZOR, and should have disqualified himself.
(v)

Defendant MILES violated his judicial oath to be fair and impartial towards

EZOR, and had an actual bias and conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, towards EZOR,
11

mandating his disqualification and dictating under the circumstances that he not make any Orders
12

or rulings pertaining to EZOR.


13

(vi)
14
15

16
17

Defendants PURCELL, EPSTEIN and McELROY violated their judicial oath to

be fair and impartial towards EZOR by "covering up" the misconduct of Defendants PLATEL
and MORGENSTERN, and each of them, and had an actual bias or appearance of same towards
Plaintiff.
(vii)

Defendants PURCELL, EPSTEIN, McELROY and MILES engaged in and have,

18

and had at all times herein mentioned, an illicit agenda, common practice, unlawful policy and

19

disqualifY a State Bar or Review Judge or hold a


unethical understanding and agreement to never disqualify

20

State Bar prosecutor culpable of misconduct, no matter what the evidence shows or what the

21

allegations of ethical transgressions are.

22

(viii)

Defendants SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CANTIL-SAKAUYE and

23

the named Defendant Associate Justices of the Supreme Court have, and had at all times herein

24

mentioned, an illicit agenda, common practice, unlawful policy and unethical understanding and

25

agreement to not renew administrative contracts of State Bar and Review Judges if they are not

26

pro-prosecution biased and in order that Defendant STATE BAR and Defendant SUPREME

27

COURT OF CALIFORNIA Can


can garner excessive, unwarranted disciplinary costs.

28

(ix)

Defendants KIM and BAR wrongfully knew about, tolerated and accepted

EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-12-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 13 of 25 Page ID #:13

Defendant MORGENSTERN's unethical ex parte communications with Defendant PLATEL,

even though their legal mandate and mission are, and were at all times herein mentioned, to

uphold the highest standards of attorney and professional conduct in California.

(x)

Upon information and belief, Defendant MORGENSTERN has, and had at all

times herein mentioned, a tainted history of filing baseless and/or overblown charges against

attorneys and engaging in unethical conduct and improper, ex parte communications with State

Bar Judges and third parties to affect the outcome of disciplinary proceedings. He did such

8
9
10

malfeasance, upon further information and belief, in order to further his career, climb up the state
bar prosecutor's ladder, and advance his fmancial interests, as well as garner improper, excessive
disciplinary costs against attorneys for Defendant STATE BAR.
(xi)

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that Defendant SUPREME

11

COURT OF CALIFORNIA and Defendant JUSTICES have, and had at all times herein
12

mentioned, an unlawful policy and practice of not even considering or reading any of the briefs
13
submitted by aggrieved attorneys, such as EZOR, in disciplinary
14
15

16
17

18

case~'fber-stamp
case~.ger-stamp the

recommendations of the Review Department of the State Bar Court, and have unconstitutionally
never granted review since its majority, faulty holding in In re Rose (2000) 22 Cal.4th 430
[ROSE DECISION].
(xii)

The alleged disciplinary costs assessed against EZOR were against due process,

without a proper itemization, were assessed without adequate notice to contest same via a motion

19

to tax costs or other procedure, and did not allow EZOR his fundamental right to a jury trial under :,

20

the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.

21

(xiii)

The ROSE DECISION, as applied to EZOR and California attorneys similarly

22

situated, is, and was at all times herein mentioned, void, unconstitutional, unlawful, and ultra

23

vires in its application and usage and against the First Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the

24

Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the United States

25

Constitution. The ROSE DECISION should therefore be declared void as unconstitutionally

26

violating the federally protected rights of EZOR and California attorneys similarly situated.

27
28

43.

Defendants BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN are, and were at all times herein

mentioned, jointly and severally liable, in general damages for their malfeasance and misconduct
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-13-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR

Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 14 of 25 Page ID #:14

towards Plaintiff, as herein alleged. The exact amount of such damages is yet to be ascertained,

but will be set forth at or before trial, according to proof. As state actors, they acted unreasonably

so as to violate EZOR's constitutionally and federally protected rights, as herein alleged and

described.
44.

Said Defendants, and each of them, are subject to monetary liability, because they

acted unreasonably and unlawfully as state actors to harm Plaintiff. As a direct, legal and

proximate result of their misconduct and unlawful, wrongful actions, as hereinbefore alleged,

8
9

10

Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, physical and mental pain and anguish, including
Plaintiffhas
severe emotional distress. As stated above, such general damages sustained thereby will be
ascertained, at or before trial, according to proof.
Defendants BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN, and each of them, in harming and

11

12

injuring Plaintiff as alleged, acted with malice, fraud and oppression. Therefore, Plaintiff is
damages. according to proof, against said
entitled to an award of punitive or exemplary damages,

l3
Defendants and each of them.

14
15

16
17

45.

Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate declaratory and equitable relief, declaring that

his civil and constitutional rights have been violated, as aforesaid, by all the named Defendants,
and each of them. In particular, EZOR is entitled to a finding that his Disbarment Order is, and
was at all times herein mentioned, null and void, since his civil and constitutional rights were

18

violated and continue to be violated. As recited heretofore, Plaintiff is not seeking monetary

19

damages against the named Defendants other than Defendants BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN.

20

Defendant BAR is, and was at all times herein mentioned, liable in damages for the civil rights

21

violations of its agents and employees, Defendants KIM and MORGENSTERN, under the

22

doctrine of respondeat superior. The United States Supreme Court has recently recognized that

23

state entities, such as Defendant STATE BAR, can be sued for antitrust violations and are not

24

immune from suit. North Carolina St. Bd. Of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 574 U.S. _

25

II/
1//

26

/11
/1/

27

II/
1//

28

1//
/1/
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-14-

(2015).

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 15 of 25 Page ID #:15

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(DECLARATORY RELIEF TO DECLARE IN RE ROSE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS

JURY TRIAL)
VIOLATING CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION'S RIGHT TO JURy

(AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CANTIL-SAKAUYE.

CHIN. WERDEGAR. KRUGER, UU,


UU. CORRIGAN AND CUELLAR)

46.

7
8

through 45, inclusive, of the Complaint and any and all allegations contained therein.
47.

10
11

Plaintiff refers to, and incorporates as though fully set forth herein, Paragraphs 1

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and the above-

referenced Defendants, and each of them, concerning their respective rights and duties as to the

following contentions:
(l)
(1)

12

Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that the ROSE DECISION be

declared void, unconstitutional and ultra vires in its application towards EZOR and attorneys
13

similarly situated since 2000 and continuing to the present, because it denies them the right to a
14

jury trial pursuant to Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution.


15
16

17
18

(2)

Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that the ROSE DECISION be

declared void, unconstitutional and ultra vires in its application towards EZOR and attorneys

similarly situated since 2000 and continuing to the present, because it unlawfully assesses a
criminal or penal fine against disciplined attorneys, such as the $ 17,829.39 illegally assessed

19

jury trial pursuant to Article I, Section 16 of


against EZOR, without allowing them the right to aajury

20

the California Constitution.

21

48.

A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the

22
2i

circumstances in order that Plaintiff can ascertain his rights and duties as to the two contentions

23

set forth
forth. in Paragraph 47 above.

24

49.

Plaintiff is entitled to have a judicial declaration that his right to a jury trial has

25

been violated and the ROSE DECISION is void, unconstitutional and ultra vires, as hereinbefore

26

alleged.

27

III
/II

28

//1
III
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-15-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 16 of 25 Page ID #:16

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

(DECLARATORY RELIEF TO DECLARE IN RE ROSE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS VIOLATING CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION'S RIGHTS

TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS)

(AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CANTIL-SAKAUYE,

CHIN, WERDEGAR, KRUGER, LIU, CORRIGAN AND CUELLAR)

50.

through 49, inclusive, of the Complaint and any and all allegations contained therein.
51.

10
11

Plaintiff refers to, and incorporates as though fully set forth herein, Paragraphs 1

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff and the above-

referenced Defendants, and each of them, concerning their respective rights and duties as to the
following contentions:

12

(1)

Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that the ROSE DECISION be

l3
13

declared void, unconstitutional and ultra vires in its application towards EZOR and attorneys
14
15

similarly situated since 2000 and continuing to the present, because it denies them the right to due
process pursuant to Article I, Sections 1 and 7 of the California Constitution.

16
17

(2)

Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that the ROSE DECISION be

declared void, unconstitutional and ultra vires in its application towards EZOR and attorneys

18

similarly situated since 2000 and continuing to the present, because it denies them the right to

19

equal protection of laws pursuant to Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution.

20

52.

A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the

21

circumstances in order that Plaintiff may ascertain his rights and duties as to the two contentions

22

set forth in Paragraph 51 above.

23

53.

Plaintiff is entitled to have ajudicial determination that his rights to due process

24

and equal protection of laws have been violated and that the ROSE DECISION is void,

25

unconstitutional and ultra vires, as hereinbefore alleged.

26

/II

27

/II

28

/II
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-16-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 17 of 25 Page ID #:17

'

.1

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION


(DECLARATORY RELIEF TO DECLARE EZOR'S STATE DISBARMENT

ORDER VOID, ULTRA VIRES AND VOID AD INITIO DUE TO FRAUD UPON THE

COURT OR EXTRINSIC FRAUD AND VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL

CANONS OF ETIDCS)

6
7

(AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA,


PLATEL AND MILES)

9
10
11

54.

Plaintiff refers to, and incorporates as though fully set forth herein, Paragraphs 1

of the Complaint and any and all allegations contained therein.


through 53, inclusive, ofthe
55.

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Plaintiff, and the above-

referenced Defendants, and each of them, concerning their respective rights and duties as to the
12

following contentions:
13

(1)
14
15

16
17

18

Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that Exhibit 1 is, and was at all

times relevant hereto, null and void, ultra vires and void ab initio due to "fraud upon the court" or
"extrinsic fraud"-to wit, unlawful and of no effect in law and fact, because of the actual biases
and conflicts of interest, or the appearance of same, of Defendants PLATEL and MILES, towards
EZOR, as herein alleged.
(2)

Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that Exhibit 1 is, and was at all

19

times relevant hereto, null and void, ultra vires and void ab initio---to wit, unlawful and of no

20

effect in law and fact-because of the failure by Defendants PLATEL and MILES to disqualify

21

themselves, as herein alleged, in derogation of their judicial duties and responsibilities.

22

(3)

Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that Exhibit 1 should be

23

rescinded, set aside and vacated forthwith, because Defendants PLATEL and MILES violated

24

their ethical duties and oath as judges pursuant to the California Code of Judicial Ethics,

25

including, without limitation, Canons 1,2


1, 2 and 3 thereof, to wit, not being fair and impartial to

26

EZOR, acting incompetently and failing to act with integrity.

27

28
28

(4)

Plaintiff contends, and said Defendants dispute, that Defendant SUPREME

COURT OF CALIFORNIA should be ordered to rescind, set aside and vacate Exhibit 1 because
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-17-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 18 of 25 Page ID #:18

of the "fraud upon the court" or "extrinsic fraud" by Defendants PLATEL and MILES and the

latters' breach of judicial ethics, as alleged herein.


56.

A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the

circumstances in order that Plaintiff can ascertain his rights and duties as to the four contentions

set forth in Paragraph 55 above. .


57.

Plaintiff is entitled to have a judicial determination


detennination that his rights have been

violated due to the breach of judicial ethics and extrinsic fraud or fraud upon the court alleged
herein.

9
10

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:

11
12

ON FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS


13
14

1. For appropriate declaratory and equitable relief, and a fmding that Plaintiffs civil

15

rights have been violated by the named Defendants, and each of them.

16

2. For an Order that Plaintiffs Disbarment Order be declared null and void, set aside,

17

rescinded and vacated forthwith and in the interests of justice and equity.

18

3. For general damages against Defendants STATE BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN,

19

and each of them, according to proof.

20

4. For punitive damages against Defendants STATE BAR, KIM and MORGENSTERN,

21

and each of them, according to proof.

22

5. For costs of suit incurred herein; and

23

6. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper and just in the

24

premises.

25

/II

26

1/1

27

/II

28

/II
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-18-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 19 of 25 Page ID #:19

ON SECOND AND THIRD CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS

SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CANTIL-SAKAUYE, CHIN,

WERDEGAR, KRUGER, LIU, CORRIGAN AND CUELLAR


WERDEGAR.

1. For declaratory relief, as prayed.

2. For a judicial determination


detennination of the respective rights and duties between Plaintiff and
Defendants and each of them, as prayed.

7
8

3. For costs of suit incurred herein; and


4. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper and just in the
prerruses.

10

11
ON FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS SUPREME
12

COURT OF CALIFORNIA, PLATEL AND MILES


13

14

15

1.

For declaratory relief, as prayed.

2.

For a judicial determination of the respective rights and duties between Plaintiff and

16

17
18
19

Defendants and each of them, as prayed.


3.

For costs of suit incurred herein; and

4.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper and just in the
prerruses.

20
21

22

Dated: December 17,2015

BY:~~~~~______r-~______
BY:~~~~~------r-r-------

23

Plaintiff

24

25

26
27

28
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-19-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 20 of 25 Page ID #:20

2
3
4

VERIFICATION

6
7

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

9
10
11

I have read the foregoing Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief.
I am a party to this action. The matters stated in the foregoing document are true of my own
knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated on information and belief. As to those
matters, I believe them to be true.

12
Executed on December 17,
17,2015,
2015, at Pasadena, California.

13
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of

14
foregoing is true and correct.
15

16
17

Declarant

18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26

27
28
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-20-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 21 of 25 Page ID #:21

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
EXHIBIT I

8
9
10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
EZOR V. MORGENSTERN

-21-

Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR Document 1 Filed 12/21/15 Page 22 of 25 Page ID #:22

State Bar Court No. 12-0-10043

8227682

IN
OF CALIFORNIA
IN .THE
THE SUPREME
SUPREME COURT
COURT
COURT
" OF CALIFORNIsbPREME
.
lSDPREMECOURT
""

EnBanc
En Bane

. .

FILED

iSEP 2:'
2015
:SEP
2 32015
In re A. EDWARD EZOR on Discipline.- "
Frank A. MoGuire Clerk
-- "
~....
--~'~.:.:.....
"'"""';""-rD~ep::::-uty:f":
Deputy

The petition for review is denied.

,-

The court orders that A. Edward Ezor, State Bar Number 50469, is disbarred from
the practice of law in California and
andthat
that his name is stricken from the roll of attorneys.
A. Edward Ezor must make restitution as recommended by the Hearing
Department of the State Bar Court in its Decision filed on December 3, 2013. Any
restitution owed to the Client Security Fund is enforceable as provided in Business and
Professions Code section 6140.5, subdivisions (c) and (d).
A. Edward Ezor must comply with California Rules of Court, rule 9.20, and
perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40
calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of this order.
Costs are awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions
Code section 6086.10 and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions
Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.
Werdegar, J., was absent and,did not participate.

I.
t. Fnank
F.rank A. McGuire. CleJk of the Supreme Court
oftbe
~ra~ ofCalifomla.
ofCalifomla, do hereby cenify
certify that the
of
tile ~Ia~
preceding IS
J a true copy ofan order ofthis Court as
shown by the records of my office.
Witness my hand and the sea) of the Court this

1:2. dayof

20 ,~
\~

CANTIL-SAKAUYE
ChiefJustice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT


COURT,
CALIFORNIA
DISTRICT OF
Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR
Document
1 CENTRAL
Filed 12/21/15
Page
23 of 25 Page ID #:23
CIVIL COVER SHEET

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS ( Check box if you are representing yourself [8] )

( Check box if you are representing yourself

DEFENDANTS

0 )

A. Edward Ezor
(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff

u.s.

(EXCEPT IN u.s. PLAINTIFF CASES)

of Residence of First Listed Defendant


-------- County
(IN U.S.
u.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number) If you are
representing yourself, provide the same information.

Attorneys (Firm Name, Address and Telephone Number) If you are


representing yourself, provide the same information.

Not Applicable

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an Xin one box only.)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES-For Diversity Cases Only

o 1. U.S. Government

Citizen ofThis State


Citizen ofThis State

[8]3. Federal Question (U.S.


Government Not a Party)

Plaintiff

2. U.s. Government
Defendant

D 4. Diversity (Indicate Citizenship


of Parties in Item III)

(Place an X in one box for plaintiff and one for defendant)


PTF 1 DOEF
DEF Incorporated
POTF
Incorporated or
or Principal
Principal Place
Place
0 1 0 11 of
this State
of Business
Business in
in this
State
Citizen of Another State 0 2 0 2 Incorporated and Principal Place
of Business in Another State
Citizen or Subject of a
3 0 3 Foreign Nation
Foreign Country

IV. ORIGIN (Place an X in one box only.)


'xl 1. Original
D 3. Remanded from
2. Removed from
~
Proceeding
State Court
Appellate Court

.
d
4 Remstate or 0
O .Reopened

V. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT: JURY DEMAND:

CLASS ACTION under F.R.Cv.P. 23:

DYes

[8] Yes

No

5. Transferred from Another


District (Specify)

00

PTF 4

DEF

04

05

06 Of:

6. MultiDistrict
litigation

(Check "Yes" only if demanded in complaint.)

[8] MONEY DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT: $ According to Proof

No

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION (Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.)
28 USC 1983

VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an Xin one box only).


OTHER STATUTES

I
0
0
0

375 False Claims Act


400 State
Reapportionment
410 Antitrust
430 8anks and Banking
450 Commerce/ICC
Rates/Etc.
460 Deportation

o
o
o
o 470
Racketeer Influenced &Corrupt Org.
o 480 Consumer Credit
o 490 Cable/Sat TV
&

0
0
0
0

o
o
o
o

850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange
890 Other Statutory
Actions
891 Agricultural Acts
893 Environmental
Matters
895 Freedom of Info.
Act

CONTRACT

o 110 Insurance
o 120Marine
o 130 Miller Act
0
D
0

140 Negotiable
Instrument
150 Recovery of
&
Overpayment &
Enforcement of
Judgment

151 Medicare Act

152 Recovery of
Defaulted Student
Loan (Excl. Vet.)
153 Recovery of

o Vet.
Overpayment of
Benefits
o 160
Stockholders'
Suits
D
o

1900ther
Contract
19S Contract
Product Liability
896 Arbitration
196 Franchise
REAL
PROPERTY
899 Admin. Procedures
Act/Review of Appeal of D 210Land
Agency Decision
Condemnation
220 Foreclosure
950 Constitutionality of
230 Rent Lease &
&
State Statutes
Ejectment

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:


CV-71 (10/14)

o
o

o
o
o

REAL PROPERTY CONT.

0 240 Torts to Land


245 Tort Product
0 24S
liability
290
All Other Real
0 Property
TORTS
PERSONAL INJURY
0 310 Airplane
315 Airplane
0 Product Liability
320 Assault, libel
Libel &
&
0 Slander
330 Fed. Employers'
0 Liability
0 340 Marine
345 Marine Product
D
0 Liability
0 350 Motor Vehicle
D
355 Motor Vehicle
0 Product Liability
360 Other Personal
0 Injury
/
362 Personal Injury0 Med Malpratice
365 Personal Injury0 Product Liability
367 Health Care/
Pharmaceutical
0 Personal
Injury
Product Liability
368 Asbestos
D
0 Personal Injury
Product Liabilitv

IMMIGRATION
462 Naturalization
Application

PRISONER PETITIONS
Habeas Corpus:

PROPERTY RIGHTS

D
o 820 Copyrights

o
Alien Detainee
o 830Patent
o 463
510 Motions to Vacate
D
o 840 Trademark
Sentence
o S30
D
530 General
SOCIAL SECURITY
D
o S35
535 Death Penalty
iD 861 HIA(1395ff)
ID
Other:
D
o 862 BlackLung
Black Lung (923)
371 Truth in Lending D
o 540 Mandamus/Other o 863 DIWc/DIWW (405 (9
380 Other Personal 0 550 Civil Rights
o 864 SSID Title XVI
Property Damage
o 555 Prison Condition Do 865 RSI (405 (9

4650ther
Immigration Actions
TORTS
PERSONAL PROPERTY
0 370 Other Fraud

0
0

o 385
Property Damage D
o 560 Civil Detainee
Product Liability
BANKRUPTCY

D
0

422 Appeal 28
USC 158
423 Withdrawal 28
USC 157
CMLRIGHTS
CMLRlGHTS
440 Other Civil Rights
441 Voting

Conditions of
Confinement
FORFEITURE/PENALTY
625 Drug Related
D Seizure of Property 21
USC 881
D 6900ther
690 Other

FEDERAL TAX SUITS

o 870
Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or
Defendant)
D
o 871
IRS-Third Party 26 USC
7609

D
o

LABOR
71 0 Fair Labor Standards

Act

o 442 Employment o 720


Labor/Mgmt.
Relations
D
o 443 Housing/
D
o

o
o

Accommodations
445 American with
DisabilitiesEmployment
446 American with
Disabilities-Other
Disabilities-Dther
448 Education

Case Number:
CIVIL COVER SHEET

o 740 Railway Labor Act


D
o

o
o

751 Family and Medical


Leave Act
790 Other Labor
Litigation
791 Employee Ret. Inc.
Security Act

CV15-9784

Page 10f3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT


COURT,
CENTRAL
DISTRICT Page
OF CALIFORNIA
Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR
Document
1 Filed
12/21/15
24 of 25 Page ID #:24
CIVIL COVER SHEET

VIII. VENUE: Your answers to the questions below will determine the division of the Court to which this case will be initially assigned. This initial assignment is
is subject
I the Co U rt'
to change in accordance w'th
wth
rt'sS Genera10rd ers, upon review by t h e Courtof your Compamtor
I '
Nof Iceof Remova I.
QUESTION A: Was this case removed
from state court?

0D

Yes

lEI

STATE CASE WAS PENDING IN THE COUNTY OF:

If "no, " skip to Question B. If "yes," check the


box to the right that applies, enter the
corresponding division in response to
Question E, below, and continue from there.

0D
0D
0D

los Angeles, Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San Luis


luis Obispo
Los

Western

Orange

Southern

Riverside or San Bernardino

Eastern

QUESTION B: Is the United States, or B.1. Do SO%


50% or more of the defendants who reside in
one of Its agencies or employees, a the district reside in Orange Co.?
In this action?
PLAINTIFF in
check one of the boxes to the right

0D

Yes

lEI

-+

No

If "no, " skip to


t o Question C. If "yes," answer
B.1., at right.
Question B.l

B.2. Do SO%
50% or more of the defendants who reside in
the district reside in Riverside andlor San Bernardino
Counties? (Consider the two counties together.)

check one of the boxes to the right

-+

SO% or more of the plaintiffs who reside in the


QUESTION C: Is the United States, or C.1. Do 50%
Co.?
one of its agencies or employees, a district reside in Orange Co.?
DEFENDANT in this action?
check one of the boxes to the right

Yes

ex

INITIAL DIVISION IN CACD IS:

No

-+

No

Ifnno,"
If
"no, " skip to Question D. If "yes,"
"yes: answer
C.1 , at right.
Question C.l,

C.2. Do SO%
50% or more of the plaintiffs who reside in the
district reside in Riverside andlor San Bernardino
Counties? (Consider the two counties together.)

check one of the boxes to the right

-+

QUESTION D: Location of plaintiffs and defendants?

0D

YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Southern Division.


Enter "Southern" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.

0D

NO. Continue to Question B.2.

0D

YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Eastern Division.


Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.

0D

NO. Your case will initially be assigned to the Western Division.


DivisIon.
Enter "Western" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.

0D

YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Southern Division.


Enter "Southern" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.

0D

NO. Continue to Question C.2.

0D

YES. Your case will initially be assigned to the Eastern Division.


Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.

D
0

NO. Your case will initially be assigned to


t o the Western Division.
Enter Western"
"Western" in response to Question E, below, and continue
from there.

A.

B.

C.

Orange County

Riverside or San
Bernardino County

Los Angeles, Ventura,


Santa Barbara, or San
Luis Obispo County

Indicate the location(s) in which 50% or more of plaintiffs who reside in this district
reside. (Check up to two boxes, or leave blank if none of these choices apply.)

[8]
I8l

Indicate the location(s) in which 50%


SO% or more of defendants who reside in t~is
district reside. (Check up to two boxes, or leave blank if none of these chOices

[8]
I8l

apply.)

0.1. Is there at least one answer in


In Column A?
DYes

[8]
I8l

0.2.
D.2. Is there at least one answer in Column B?
B1

No

DYes

[8]
I8l

No

If "yes," your case will initially be assigned to the

If "yes," your case will initially be assigned to the

SOUTHERN DIVISION.

EASTERN DIVISION.

Enter "Southern" in response to Question E, below, and continue from there.


If "no," go to question D2 to the right.

Enter "Eastern" in response to Question E, below.

-+

If "no,"
"no: your case will be assigned to the WESTERN DIVISION.
Enter "Western" in response to Question E, below.

QUESTION E: Initial Division?


Enter the initial division determined by Question A, B,
S, C, or D above:

QUESTION F: Northern Counties?


Countles1

...

INITIAL DIVISION IN CACD

WfL;,fuWfL;,fxn,,"!
trJ

Do 50%
500/0 or more of plaintiffs or defendants in this district reside in Ventura, Santa Barbara, or San luis Obispo counties?

CV-71 (10/14)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

DYes

[8]
No
~No
Page2of3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT


COURT,
CENTRAL
DISTRICT Page
OF CALIFORNIA
Case 2:15-cv-09784-JVS-AGR
Document
1 Filed
12/21/15
25 of 25 Page ID #:25
CIVIL COVER SHEET

IX(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed In this court?

Ig]
~ NO

DYES

If yes, list case number(s):

IX(b). RELATED CASES: Is this case related (as defined below) to any civil or criminal case(s)
case{s) previously filed in this court?

Ig]
~ NO

DYES

If yes, list case number(s):

Civil cases are related when they (check all that apply):

o
o
o C.

A. Arise from the same or a closely related transaction, happening, or event;


B. Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or

For other reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges.

patent. trademark. or copyright is not,


not. in itself,
itself. sufficient to deem cases related.
Note: That cases may involve the same patent,

A civil forfeiture case and a criminal case are related when they (check all that apply):

o
o
o

A. Arise from the same or a closely related transaction.


transaction, happening, or event;
B. Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or

C. Involve one or more defendants from the criminal case in common and would entail substantial duplication of
labor if heard by different judges.

X. SIGNATURE OF AnORNEY
(OR SELF-REPRESENTED LlTIGANn:
L1TIGANn:

__

r--r~~t7~------~~79.~~~~-------~----~~~~~------------~~~~~~~=----

Notice to Counsel/Parties: The submissio of this Civil Cover Sheet is requi


neither replaces nor supplements the filing and service of pleadings or oth
more detailed instructions.
instructions, see separate instruction sheet (CV-071
(CV-07l A).

DATE: December 17,


17. 2015

local Rule 3-1. This Form CV-71 and the information contained herein
law, except as provided by local rules of court. For
apers as required by law.

Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases:


Nature of Suit Code

Abbreviation

Substantive Statement of Cause of Action


All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under TItle 18, Part A,
A. of the Social Security Act, as amended. Also,
include claims by hospitals.
etc. for certification as providers of services under the program.
hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc.,
(42 U.S.c.
U.S.C. 1935FF(b))

861

HIA

862

BL

B63
863

DIWC

All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act,
Act. as amended; plus
all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.c.
U.S.C 405 (g))

863

DIWW

All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as
amended. (42 U.S.c.
U.S.C 405 (g))

864

SSID

All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under TItle 16 of the Social Security Act, as
amended.

865

RSI

All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended.
(42 U.S.c.
U.S.C 405 (g))

CV-71 (10/14)

All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under TItle 4,


4. Part B,
B. of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. (30 U.S.C
U.S.c.
923)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

Page30f3
Page30U

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 1 of 10

EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT A
A

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 2 of 10


_.
/

/~~

STATE BAR OF.CALIFORNIA


OFFICE OF CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
2 . JAYNE KIM, No. t~4614
CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL .
3 JOSEPH R CARLUCCI, No. 172309
DEPUTY CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
4 GREGORY P. DRESSER, No. 136532
ASSISTANT CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
5 ROBERT A. :HENpERSON, No. 173205
SUPERVISrnG SENIOR TRIAL COUNSEL
6 ESTHERJ. ROGERS, No. 148246
SENIOR TRIAL COUNSEL
1 180' Howaid Street : ~
.
S~FrahCisco, California 94105-1639'
8 . , Telephone~ (415) 538-228~

'

1.0 ";.' ,....: ..

. ".

<.'.

..

~.

11

'

. . .......:.

'

....

STATE BAR COURT

HEARING DEPARTMENT - SAN FRANCISCO

12
13
14
15

16

In the Matter of:

.) Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778


)

~OUIS

A. LmERTY,

) NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

No. 147975,

)
)
)

A Member of the State Bar

17
NOTICE - FAILURE TO RESPOND!
18
19

IF YOU FAIL TO FILE A WRITTEN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE


WIT'HIN 20 DAYS AFTER SERVICE, OR IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT
THE STATE BAR COURT TRIAL:

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

(1) YOUR DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED;


(2) YOUR STATUS WILL BE CHANGED TO INACTIVE AND YOU
WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRA.CTICE LAW;
(3) YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN
THESE PROCEEDINGS UNLESS YOU MAKE A TIMELY MOTION
AND THE DEFAULT IS SET ASIDE, AND;
(4) YOU SHALL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL DISCIPLINE.
SPECIFICALLY, IF YOU FAIL TO TIMELY MOVE TO SET ASIDE
OR VACATE YOUR DEFAULT, THIS COURT WILL ENTER AN
ORDER RECOMMENDING YOUR DISBARMENT WITHOUT
FURTHER HEARING OR PROCEEDING. SEE RULE 5.80 ET SEQ.,
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.

'27
28

-1NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 3 of 10

1
2

The State Bar of California alleges:


ruruSDICTION

1. Louis A. Liberty (ftrespondent")


(I'respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of

California on October 12, 1990, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is

currently a member of the State Bar of California.

COUNT ONE

Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778


Business and Professions Code, section 6106
[Moral 'TUrpitude -Misrepresentation]

8.

2. Between in or about February 2011 through in or about August 2011, respondent

10

Stated under penalty of perjury on approximately 180 Deparbnent


Department of Motor Vehicle (''DMV'')

11

forms that he required confidential consumer information in order to represent existing clients,

12

when he had none, and therefore he knew, or was grossly negligent in not knowing, the

13

statements were false, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or

14

corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

15

3. Between in or about February 2011 through in or about August 2011, respondent

16

made misrepresentations in his communications to approximately 180 prospective clients when

17

he stated that his investigation was at "no cost" to each prospective client, when respondent

18

knew or should have known that the prospective client could be responsible for paying the used

19

car dealers' attorney fees and costs if the used car dealers prevailed against the prospective

20

clients, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in .

21

willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

22

COUNT TWO

23
24

Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778


Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a)
[Failure to Comply With Laws - Violation of Vehicle Code section 1808.22]

25

4. Between in or about February 2011 and in or about August 2011, respondent

26

Dep~ent of
violated Vehicle Code section 1808.22
1808,22 when he submitted approximately 180 Depa$ent

27

Motor Vehicle .(''DMV'') forms stating that he requested confidential DMV information on

28

I
I

-2NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 4 of 10

behalf of his 180 clients, when respondent did not actually represent these consumers at that

time, and thereby wilfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by failing .

to support the laws of this state.

COUNT THREE

Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778


Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400
[Improper Solicitation]

6
7

5. Between in or about February 2011 and in or about August 2011, respondent made a

communication, to approximately 180 'prospective clients, concerning respondent's availability

for professional employment which:

10

(a) tended to confuse, deceive and mislead the public, namely by giving t4e impression

11

that: respondent had a relationship with the Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV"),

12

respondent possessed evidence that the prospective clients' recently-purchased used

13

cars were unsafe to drive, the prospective clients would surrender their legal rights if

14

they contacted the dealer before calling respondent, and there would be no cost to the

15

prospective client, when the prospective client could be liable for attorney fees and

16

costs if the used car dealers prevailed, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional

17

nUe 1-400(0)(2);
Conduct, nlIe

\
I

I
I!
I

!1
:

18

(b) omitted to state a fact necessary to make the statement made, in light of the

19

circumstances under which it was made, not misleading to the public, namely that

20

respondent had no personal knowledge that the used car dealers failed to disclose

21

frame damage, that the prospective clients' cars were worth less than 50 percent of

22

righ:
the purchase price, and that each prospective clients sUlTendered
surrendered his or her legal rigb:

23

by contacting the dealer before calling respondent, in wilful violation of Rules of

24

Professicinal Conduct, rule 1-400(0)(3);

25

(c) failed to indicate clearly, expressly, or by context, that the letter was a

26

Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1communication, in wilful violation of


ofRu1es

27

400(0)(4); and

28

-3NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 5 of 10

(d) was transmitted in a manner which involves intrusion, coercion, duress, compulsion,

intimidation, threats, or vexatious or harassing conduct, by sending letters and follow-

up emails with identifying confidential DMV information specific to the recently

purchased used cars, and by implying that each used car dealer sold an unsafe,

defective car to the prospective clients for which only respondent could remedy the

harm, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(D)(5).

COUNT FOUR

Case No. 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778


Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a)
[Failure to Comply With Laws - Violation of Business and Professions Code section 6155]

10

6. Between in or about September 2010 and November 2011, respondent violated

11

secti.on
Business and Profession Code secti.
on Code section 6155 when he entered into a partnership

12.

with William Sutton and Larry Maloney to operate, for the direct or indirect purpose, in whole

13

or in part, of referring potential clients to attorneys and when he accepted and paid for referrals

14

for such clients, without registering the serVice with ~e State Bar, and thereby wilfully violated

15

Business and Professions Code, section 6068(a), by failing to support the laws of this state.

16
17
18
19
20
21

NOTICE - INACTIVE ENROLLMENT!

YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE STATE BAR


B'QSlNESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO B-qSINESS
SECTION 6007(c), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL
THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR CLIENTS OR TO
THE PUBLIC, YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY ENROLLED AS AN
INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR.
YOUR INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT WOULD' BE IN ADDmON TO ANY DISCIPLINE
DISC1PLINE
RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT.

22
23

24
25
26

NOTICE - COST ASSESSMENT!


IN THE EVENT THESE PROCEDURES RESULT IN PUBLIC
DISCIPLINE, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF COSTS
INCURRED BY THE STATE BAR IN THE INVESTIGATION, HEARING
AND REVIEW OF THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6086.10.

27
28
28

II-----------------------------~
________
~~----------------~
NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY
CHARGES
-4-

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 6 of 10

Respectfully
Respectfullysubmitted,
submitted,

11

THE
THE STATE
STATEBAR
BAROF
OF CALIFORNIA
CALIFORNIA
OFFICE
OFFICE OF
OF CHIEF
CHIEFTRIAL
TRIAL COUNSEL
COUNSEL

22
33
44
55

DATED: November?,
November?' 2015
2015
DATED:

By:
~~~
By:
~~
.. Esther
Esther Rogers
Rogers
Senior
Senior Trial
Trial Counsel
Counsel

66

77
8
9

10

11
11
12
12
13

14
14
15

16
16
17
17
18

19
20
20
21
21
22
22
23
23
24
24

25
25

26
26
27
27
28 1I _ _ _ _ _ _~_ _ _ _ _ _ _-5...;;;-5;...-_.........~~~---------+
28
NOTICE
NOTICEOF
OFDISCIPLINARY
DISCIPLINARYCHARGES
CHARGES

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 7 of 10

DECLARATION OF SERVICE
by
U.S. FlRST-ClJ\SS
FIRST-ClJ\SS MAIL I U.S. CERTIFIED MAILI OVERNIGHT DELIVERY I FACSIMIlE-ELEcrRONIC
FACSIMILE-ELECfRONICTRANSMISSION
TRANSMISSION

CASE NUMBER(s): 14-0-00647; 11-0-18778


undersigned, am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action, whose business address and place of employment Is the State Bar of
I.I, the undersigned.
Ca6fomla, 180 Howard Street San Francisco, Caafomia
Canfornia 94105, declare that
- on the date shown below,
below,'I caused to be served a true copy of the within document descnbed as follows:

NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES


~~=-~~----~~---------=
-=~--~~----~~---------=

[g]

o
D

By U.S. RrstClass MaD: (CCP 1013 and 1013(a))

By U.S. Certified Mail: (CCP 1013 and 1013(a))

- In accordance with the PlilcUce


practice of the State Bar of CaDfomla
CaDfornla for cofiec!ion
cofiection and processIng of mall,
mall. ,I deposited or placed for coIIecIlon and maIrmg
malrmg In the City and County,
- of San Franclsoo.

By Overnight Delivery: (CCP 1013(c) and 1013(d))


readBy famiUar
familiar wI1h
Caftfomla's Plilctice
practice for collection and processing of correspondence for overnight derlVery by the United
Unlted Parcel SeMce
- I, am readily
with the State Bar of Califomla's
Service CUPS').
By Fax Transmission: (CCP 1013(e) and 1013(f))
en agreement of the parties to accept service by fax transmission, I faxed the documents to the persons
pelSOns at the fax numbers Dsted herein below. No elTOr was
Based on
reported by the fax machine that I used. The original record of the fax transmission
transmlsston Is retained on me
file and avaUable
avanable upon request

By Electronfc Service: (CCP 1010.6)


Based on a court order or an agreement of the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the documents to be sent to the person(s) at the electronic
addresses listed herein below. I, did not receive.
receive, within a reasonable tlme after tha
the transmission,
transmission. any electronic message or other Indication
indication thal
that the transmission was
unsuccessful.
unsuccessM.

181 {roru.s.
(roru.s. RIII.clns
RlSloCws &fall} In a sealed envelope placed for collecUon and mailing at San Francisco, addressed to: (see below)
be/ow)
(for CUlllied MIll) in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mail,
181 CforCGltlliedMlll)
mall, return receipt requested,
Article No.:

~14 7266 ~~
~~~.
.~.4? ~~~~ .2~..
.2~ . .

......
.... . . at San Francisco, addressed to: (see below)

together with a copy of this declaraUon,


declaration, In an envelope, or package designated by UPS,
UPS.
Tracking No.: .... .. .. ..._......
.. ... .. ......
, .. ......
... .. .......
........
.. .. .. ..... .,.
.. . ....
.. .......
...........
.. .. addressed to: (see below)
((or 0vamIQIIt
(for
0vamIQItt DeI1velyJ
DeI1wlyJ

'~-----P-ers-o'n--se-rv-ed-'--r"'--'--ausmessoReSldentlaJ
s-e-rved-----r.. ----ausrnessoResldentlaJ Address
'~-----P-ers-o-n-

Number
Fax Numbet

~---~~-I--~------------------~---

iI

Louis A. Uberty

",.

553 Pilgrim Dr., Suite A-1


Foster City, CA 94404

Courtesy Copy via regular mall to:

Bectronlc Address

o via Inter-omcemail
Inter-offlce mall regularly processed and maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:
NJA
N/A
State Bar of CaUfomla's
caUComla's pracllce
practlce for coUectlon
coUecUon and processing of correspondence for mailing wi!h
with the United Slates
States Postal Service, and
I am readlIy familiar with the Slate
Service fUPS'). In the ortUnary course of the Slate
State Bar of Cafifomla's
CaUComla's pracllce,
coHected and processed by the State Bar of
overnight de8vety by the United Parcel ServIce
pracflce, correspondence mHected
CaUfomla wPuld be deposited with Ihe
lIle United Slates
States Postal ServIce
Service that same day.
for. with UPS that same
Canfomla
day, and for overnIght delivery, deposited with delivery fees paId or provided for,

day.

thet on moUon of the party served, service Is presumed Invalid


Invand If
cancellation date or postage meter dale on file envelope or package Is more !han one day
I am aware that
if postal cance!laUon
affidavit
.
after date of deposit for maIllng contained In the affldavft

State of CaUfomla,
CaUfomia, that the foregoing
foregoIng is true and correct Executed at San Francisco,
I declare under penalty of perjury. under the laws of the Slate
California, on the dale
date shown be/ow.
below.
..

2, 2015
DATED: November 2,2015

SIGNED:~____-=~~________~___________________________________________
SIGNED:

~D~awn----~VV"l~U~lmn----s--------~---------------------------------------------

Dawn Wtlhams
Declarant

State Bar of California


DECLARAnON OF SERVICE

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 8 of 10

EXHIBIT B

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 9 of 10


tt .. '
STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

FOR CLERK'S USE ONLY:

FILEl1
HEARING DEPARTMENT

NOV - 3 2015
STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE

180 Howard St., 6th Fl., San Francisco, CA 94105-1639

In the Matter of:


LOUIS ALLEN LIBERTY,

14797S
Member No.: 147975

SAN FRANCISCO

11-0-18778-LMA'
Case No(s): 11-0-18778-LMA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND NOTICE OF


INITIAL STATUS CONFERENCE

A Member of the State Bar.

TO ALL PARTIES AND COUNSEL IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER:


PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the above-entitled matter has been assigned to the Honorable. Lucy
Annendariz.
Armendariz. All pleadings filed with the State Bar Court in this matter must be specifically addressed to the
assigned judge's case administrator: Mazie Yip, telephone number (415) 538-2081.
PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that an initial status conference has been set to take place on

December 14, 2015 at 9:30 a.m. at the State Bar Court, 180 Howard St., 6th Fl., San Francisco, CA
94105-1639. Unless otherwise ordered, aU parties and their counsel must appear in-person at the initial

ftrm and failure to appear may result in appropriate sanctions, including


status conference. All court dates are flrm
entry of your default.
These proceedings are governed by the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California and the Rules
'The rules set forth important rights and obligations of the parties, including
of Practice of the State Bar Court. The
time to file answers (Rules Proc. of State Bar~ rule 5.43 [within 20 days of service of initiating document]), time
to request discovery (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.65 [within 10 days of service of answer]), and eligibility

, for the Alternative Discipline Program (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.380 et seq.). The rules are available
online at www.statebarcourt.ca.gov. If you do not have access to the Internet, please c.ontact Administrative
of-the
Services at (213) 765-1121 to obtain a copy of
the rules.

Dated: November 3, 2015

Case Administrator
State Bar Court

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 10 of 10


./

,'.

(
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., 1013a(4)]
IOI3a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen
and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on November 3,2015, I deposited a true copy of the following
document(s):
document(s):
NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT AND NOTICE OF INITIAL STATUS CONFERENCE
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
~

by first
:first~c.lass
..class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal
Service at San Francisco, California, addressed aa
a::; follows:

LOUIS A. LIBERTY
LOUIS A LIBERTY
553 PILGRIM DR SUITE A-I
FOSTER CITY, CA 94404
~

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California
addressed as follows:
ESTHER ROGERS, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on
2015.
November 3,
3,2015.

M~
alle
me Ip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court

.,

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1-2 Filed 01/04/16 Page 1 of 1


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I. (aJ
(a)
PLA
I NTI FFS
(a) PLAINTIFFS
PLAINTIFFS

DEFENDANTS
D
EFENDANTS
The State
State
Bar of
of California,
et ai.
The
Stat
e Bar
et
al.
The
California, et

Louis
A.
A. Li
berty; Michael
Michael Z.
Z. Tun
Tun;
Liberty; Kathy
KalhyDaly,
Daly,
Daly,etet al.
al.
Louis A.
LItjerty;
Tun; ; Annette
Annette Liberty;

(b) County
County
Co
unty of
of
o f Res
Residence
idencc ofofFirst
Listed
Plainti
Plaintiff
ff
(b)
Residence
First
Listed
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.Ran Mateo
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San
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San
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(IN U.S. 1'1.A.1N11IT
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(Firm
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Louis
A. Uberty
Liberty
Louis A.
Liberty
LOUIS LIBERTY
LIBERTY &
ASSOCIATES, aa PLC
PLC
LOUIS
& ASSOCIATES,
553 Pilgrim
Pilgrim Drive,
Drive,
D ri ve, Suite
S
Suite
uit e A,
A, Foster
FFoster
osler City,
94404
553
City, CA
CA 94404
94404

Attorneys(If(IfKnown)
Knowi/)
Attorneys

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COMPLAINT:
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O M P L A I N T:
V
VIlI.
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UDGE

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^ANJOSE I I EUREKA

~~~~~

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 1 of 2

Louis Liberty, SBN: 147975


LOUIS LIBERTY & ASSOCIATES, a PLC

553 Pilgrim Drive, Suite A

Foster City, CA 94404


Tel: (650) 34L0300
Fax: (650) 403-1783

Attorneys for Defendant, Counter & Cross Claimants

6
UNITED

S TAT E S

DISTRICT

COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


8
SAN

FRANCISCO

DIVISION

9
10

In Re:

L O U I S A . L I B E RT Y,
11
12
13
14

Case No.: 16-CV- 2-2-

Respondent.
LOUIS A. LIBERTY, an individual;
MICHAEL Z. TUN, an individual;
ANNETTE LIBERTY, an individual;
KATHY DALY, an individual;

N O T I C E O F R E M O VA L O F A C T I O N

UNDER 28 U.S.C. 1441(a)


[Federal Question]

and, on behalf of all others similarly situated,


15
16
17
18

COUNTER AND CROSS CLAIMANTS,


v s .

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, a

California Public Corporation;


19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

JAYNE KIM, an individual;


JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, an individual;
GREGORY P. DRESSER, an individual;
ROBERT A. HENDERSON, an individual;
ESTHER J. ROGERS, an individual;
SUSAN 1. KAGAN, and individual;
SUSAN CHAN, an individual;
CHRISTINE SOUHRADA, an individual;
AMANDA GORMLEY, an individual;
SYED M. MAHD, an individual;
WILLIAM SUTTON, an individual;
LARRY MALONEY, an individual;

and, DOES 1 through 10, inclusive,

27

COUNTER AND CROSS-DEFENDANTS.

28

NOT
N
O T I ICE
C E OF
O F REMOVAL
R E M O V A L OF
O F ACTION
ACTION

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 1 Filed 01/04/16 Page 2 of 2

TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:


2

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that respondent LOUIS A. LIBERTY hereby removes to this Court

3 the state court action described below.


1.
l.

On November 2, 2015 an action was commenced in the State Bar Court of the State of

5 California, in the San Francisco division, entitled In


[n the Matter of Louis A. Liberty, No.
No . 147975, A
6 Member of the State Bar, as case number 14-000647 & 11-0-18778, attached hereto as Exhibit " A".

2.
2.

The first date upon which defendant received a copy of the complaint was on or about

8 November 5, 2015 when Respondent was served a copy of said complaint/notice to appear from the

9 said state court. A copy of the Notice of Assignment and Notice ofInitial Status Conference is
10 attached hereto as Exhibit "B" .
3.

1I

The first date upon which defendant received documentation that the allegations

12 encompassed Federal Question jurisdiction matters is December 24, 2015 by receiving discovery
u

...J

13 documents which specifically contain "Driver' s Protection Privacy Act" and commentary by Plaintiff

"

~.<
~
. <

<:.> ;.0.:
.B
~

."

. ~ ;:;

COUl1 decision in Maricich v. Spears 133 S. Ct. 2191 , and the Fourth
14 regarding a DPPA U.S. Supreme Court

U "

~~
< 3is
0 ";
~>

~-

15 U.S. Circuit originating case Maricich v. Spears 675 F. 3d 281.

;;
~ :s

3
23
<:.I;;:
u;::

~ -

4.
4.

16

This action is a civil action of which this court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c.

:.3 ~
~

;;g

17 1331 , and is one which may be removed to this Court by Respondent pursuant to the provisions of 28

...J

1441I(a)
(a) in that it arises under The Driver' s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (hereinafter
U.S.C . 144
18 U.S.c.
" DPPA"), currently codified at Chapter 123 of Title 18 of the United States Code (2721 through
19 "DPPA"),
20 2725).

5.
5.

21
22

~:

I am the only defendant in the original state action, and therefore the requirements of

Title 28 U.S. Code 1446(b)(2)(A) have been met.

Dated:

,!~ /;

fa

LOUIS LIBERTY

25
26

By: ~~~~__~___________________

27
28

NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION

Case 5:14-cv-05336-EJD Document 317-1 Filed 05/09/16 Page 1 of 1

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6
7

DANIEL DELACRUZ,

Case No. 5:14-cv-05336-EJD

Plaintiff,
8
v.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

9
10

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,


Defendants.

United States District Court


Northern District of California

11
12
13
14
15
16

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S.
District Court, Northern District of California.
That on 5/9/2016, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said
copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing
said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle
located in the Clerk's office.

17
18
19
20
21
22

Joshua Sigal
5050 Laguna Blvd Ste 112-700
Elk Grove, CA 95758
Raquel Ramirez
709 Meadow Drive
Salinas, CA 93905
Dated: 5/9/2016

23
24

Susan Y. Soong
Clerk, United States District Court

25
26
27
28

By:________________________
Elizabeth Garcia, Deputy Clerk to the
Honorable EDWARD J. DAVILA

Case 5:14-cv-05336-EJD Document 317 Filed 05/09/16 Page 1 of 2

1
2
3
4

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SAN JOSE DIVISION

7
8

DANIEL DELACRUZ,

Case No. 5:14-cv-05336-EJD

Plaintiff,
9

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS


MOTIONS

v.
10
11

Re: Dkt. Nos. 277, 296, 297, 298

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,

United States District Court


Northern District of California

Defendants.
12
13

Plaintiff Daniel Delacruz (Plaintiff) alleges in this action that the defendants violated his

14

civil rights and conspired to deny him the ability to practice law in this state. Federal jurisdiction

15

arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331. Presently before the court are four motions filed by Plaintiff.

16

Dkt. Nos. 277, 296-298. These motions are suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant

17

to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Accordingly, the hearing scheduled for May 12, 2016, is VACATED.

18

Having carefully considered the pleadings, the court finds, concludes and orders as follows:

19

1.

In the first motion (Dkt. No. 277), Plaintiff seeks an order for the recovery of

20

expenses and costs pursuant to a portion of California Civil Procedure Code 425.16(c)(1) which

21

provides: If the court finds that a special motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to

22

cause unnecessary delay, the court shall award costs and reasonable attorneys fees to a plaintiff

23

prevailing on the motion, pursuant to Section 128.5. This motion is misplaced. In the order

24

addressing various motions filed on September 29, 2015 (Dkt. No. 250), the court denied all then-

25

pending 425.16 motions without prejudice after all claims in Plaintiffs complaint were

26

dismissed on other grounds. The court did not reach the merits of the 425.16 motions nor did it

27

find that such motions were frivolous. Accordingly, this motion is DENIED.

28

1
Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS

Case 5:14-cv-05336-EJD Document 317 Filed 05/09/16 Page 2 of 2

The second motion is one seeking partial summary judgment (Dkt. No. 296). This

motion is premature. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows a motion for summary

judgment to be filed at any time, the rule also permits the court to defer considering the motion

or deny it, to allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discovery, or to issue

any other appropriate order. Here, regardless of whether or not Plaintiffs arguments are

meritorious, the defendants are entitled to an opportunity to pursue discovery before responding to

any motion for summary judgment. But since dispositive motions challenging the pleadings

remain under advisement, Judge Lloyds order staying discovery remains in effect. Thus, since

the parties have yet to engage in any meaningful investigation of Plaintiffs claims, the motion for

10

partial summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to being renewed at a later stage.

11
United States District Court
Northern District of California

2.

3.

In the third and fourth motions (Dkt. Nos. 297, 298), Plaintiff moves for an order

12

requiring the Clerk of Court to enter a mandated default against two defendants, Raquel

13

Ramirez and Joshua Sigal. The court finds Plaintiffs arguments unpersuasive. Entry of default is

14

not mandated under these circumstances; to the contrary, proceedings in default are generally

15

disfavored. See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986). Cases should be decided

16

upon their merits whenever reasonably possible. Here, entry of default against Ramirez and

17

Sigal is inappropriate because both have demonstrated an intent to defend this action by filing

18

motions in response to the Amended Complaint. See Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat

19

Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that entry of default is

20

inappropriate if a defendant indicates its intent to defend the action). Consequently, the Clerk

21

correctly declined to enter the defaults. The motions seeking such relief are therefore DENIED.

22
23
24

IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 9, 2016
______________________________________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

25
26
27
28

2
Case No.: 5:14-cv-05336-EJD
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTIONS

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 1 of 73 Page ID #:1

2
3

4
j

ti

7
8

RONALD GOTTSCHALK ESO. SBN 050625


LA W OFFICES OF RONALD GOTTSCHALK & ASSOCIATES
1160 S. Golden West Avenue, Suite #3
An.:auia California 91007
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FAX: 877 284-3067

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PHILIP A. PUTMAN, SBN 51368


LA W OFFICES OF PHlLIP A. PUTMAN
3303 Harbor Blvd., Suite K-ll
Costa Mesa, CA 92626
paputmanlaw@sbcg[obal.net
Tel: 714-848-5297
Fax: 714-963-8035

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Co-counsel for Plaintiff, Ronald N. Gottschalk

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DTSTRTCT OF CALIFORNIA, EASTERN DIVISION

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RONALD N. GOTTSCHALK,

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STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, a


public corporatioq.; THE BOARD OF
GOVERNORS OJ:' THE STATE
BAR OF CALIFORNIA- THE
JUDGES OF THE STATE BAR
COURT, collectively;
CLIENT SECURITY FUND OF
Tt:{E CALIFORNIA STATE BAR;
SCOTT J. DREXEL ChiefTrial
Counsel of the State 'Rar of California
PAUL O'BRIEN, an individual;
GREGORY O'BRIEN, an individual;
JOIINNOONEN, an individual;
TOM LATTON an individual; and
SARAH OVERtON, an indiVIdual,

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Defendants.

o1tSE!0'81 t5 5 SVAP
COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
42 U.S.C. 1983
28 U.S.C. 1331, 1167,2201 02

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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 2 of 73 Page ID #:2

I.

SUIvlMARY OF COMPLAINT AND BACKGROUND TO STATE BAR

ACTION AGAINST PLAlNllrr

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A.

Summary of Complaint
1.

This complaint seeks to prohibit the State Bar of California

(State Bar) from violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
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Constitution through a mechanism of using unconstitutional statutes in the state's

"statutory procedure to regulate attorney conduct" to quash protected First

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Amendment activity and access to the courts by threatening "involuntary inactive

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status" of attorneys who have not been sanctioned by constitutionally appointed or

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elected judges in "courts of record" and have not been disciplined in the past. The

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may be constitutionally protected speech", causing "others not before the court to

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refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression" and reducing

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existence of these statutes and this conduct has had the effect of "chilling of what

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representation and the ability to obtain representation in the federal and state courts.
2.

This complaint seeks to prohibit further acts by defendants

separately or in concert with others to prejudge and predetennine the outcome of

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any cases involving plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges

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that defendants acted in concert to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of an

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indirect criminal contempt cfl~e in June 2008 And thereafter and threAtened stAte bAr

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case based on such conviction by which plaintiff was to be involuntarily


disembroiled as an active attorney to practice law. None of the defendants had any
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 3 of 73 Page ID #:3

jurisdiction or power to do so or to
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criminal case. All ofthc conduct by

influence the outcome of the indirect

d~fendants

was done sub Rosa by resort to

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unlawful communicatiQns with the judge presiding over the indirect criminal

contempt caSe am! others.

The Chief Justice ofthe California Supreme Court appointed a new judge to

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pre::;ide over the indirect criminal contempt case and thereafter the main civil case

after these acts were discovered on the part ofthe defendants and the disqualified

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judge.
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The indirect criminal contempt case against plaintiff was dismissed with
prejudice August 2008 by the judge appointed by the Chief Justice of the California

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Supreme Court. That successor judge ruled that the orders of Judge Luis R. Vargas

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were void ab initio, that he lacked jurisdiction. Plaintiff showed in his motion to

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dismiss that Judge Vargas had unlawfully and without jurisdiction sought to

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intervene sub Rosa in Federal Court cases and to enjoin plaintifffrom prosecuting

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those cases to redress major fraud and a pattern of racketeering activities by

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corporate counsel and their clients adverse to plaintiff and his clients.

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The plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that after Judge
Vargas was disqualified, defendants had continued to unlawfully interfere sub Rosa
with pending cases in the State and Federal Court, the Probate COllrt, the

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Bankruptcy Court and before the Client Security Fund without any jurisdiction to
do so. In each of these cases, plaintiff should prevail if the defendants were
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 4 of 73 Page ID #:4

enjoined by this Court fro~their unlawful sub rosa activities to assist adverse
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counsel to plaintiff utilizing St<tlt: Bar officials, investigators and monies in cases

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for which thl;;Y have no jurisdiction to irreparably prejudice plaintiff and to plaintiff

hi::; uue process rights.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that members of the
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State Bar Board of Governors have the power to have cases prosecuted in the State

Bar Court at their direction without proper investigation by the State Bar. The

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effect of this is to violate the due process rights of solo practitioners and small firms

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such as plaintiff who are adverse to corporate defense attorneys who have extensive

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relationships with members of the State Bar Board of Governors.

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Plaintiffis further informed and believes and thereon alleges that disqualified

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judges have the power to have cases prosecuted in the State Bar Court at their

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direction without proper investigation by the State Bar. The effect of this is to

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violate due process rights of plaintiff who caused the judges to be disqualified as a
matter oflaw.
These disqualified judges do not have any jurisdiction to demand that cases

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filed against attorneys who successfully brought motions to disqualifY them and to

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circumvent the procedures of the State Bar, sub rosa, and to violate the due process

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rights of an attorney. These disqualified judges and their representatives have no

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jurisdiction to act in connection with civil

CASes,

cases before the State Bar, or

before the Client Security Fund or to assist in the prosecution of these cases adverse
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 5 of 73 Page ID #:5

to plaintiff.
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None of the acts sued upon in this Complaint are sUbject immunity. They are
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non-judicial acts, admi.ni:strative acts and acts totally unrelated to the State Bar's

jurisdiction and were committed in deliberate violation of the ethics rule governing

disqualified judges and attorneys, including, but not limited to, engaging in extra
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j wJicial ex parte communications with judges or their staff in non State Bar Cases.

II.

JURISVlCTIONAL STATEMENT AND VENUE

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3.

II

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C.

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Sections 1331,2201-2 and 1343(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the Fourteenth

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Amendment and Canatella v. State Bar of California, 304 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2002).

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III.

ALLEGATIONS COMMON TO ALL CLAIMS FOR RELIEF


4.

Plaintiff is being threatened with involuntary disenrollment

arising from protected litigation activity. Plaintiff is an attorney who represents the
rights of disadvantaged persons and Plaintiffs in massive fraud cases before the

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Courts of the State of California and the Central District of California, among

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others. As such, Plaintiff frequently takes positions in courtroom advocacy that are

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not consistent with those espoused by corporate defense attorneys or their clients

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who are adverse to the claims of Plaintiff's clients. Because of the action by the

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Bar, and the clear threat of further such actions if Plaintiff continues to strenuOllsly

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advocate his clients' rights and his rights, in the courtroom, Plaintiff has the
legitimate concern, based on the unlawful conduct by the State Bar to date, that
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 6 of 73 Page ID #:6

should he fulfill his obligation to his c]ientS-to espouse positions unp8pular with
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corporate defense attorneys and their clients and insurers, that he will be subjected

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to drastic State Bar discipline. This concern acts to improperly constrain Plaintiff,

and in this action he seeks remedies that will free him from this concern and to

allow him to advocate compliance with State and Federal law for the repayment of
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the huge MediCare and MediCaid super liens in the underlying cases which are

unlawfully being opposed by corporate defense attorneys and those acting in

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concert with them. Accordingly, Plaintiff challenges multiple State Bar statutes and

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rules of professional conduct claiming they are unconstitutional on their face, as

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applied and as administered, especially in connection with the gross misconduct by

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the State Bar to date to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of any case relating

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to Plaintiff, as they did in the indirect criminal contempt case.

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5.

The complaint seeks an order declaring Cal. B&P Code

6007)( 4) unconstitutional on the grounds of lack of notice, denial of due process,

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and violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The complaint seeks

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a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction restraining the

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State Bar of California, its Board of Governors and the Defendants and each of
them from enforcing and applying B&P Code 6007)(4).
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The complaint seeks an order declaring B&P Code 6106

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unconstitutional on the grounds of a violation of the first Amendment to the U.S.


Constitution and vagueness. The complaint seck::; a temporary n::;;tn:l.ining urder,
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 7 of 73 Page ID #:7

preliminary and pennanent injunction restraining the State Bar of California, its
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Buard of Governors and the lJet1mdants and each of them from enforcing and

applying H&P Code 6106.

This Complaint
seeks an order that the use of State Bar .personnel and
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funds against Plaintiff in the indirect criminal contempt case and in any other non

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State Bar case is unconstitutional and constitutes a misappropriation and a misuse

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of State Bar funds and activity.

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This Compliant further seeks an order that based on the spoliation of


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evidence that has occurred to date, including the deliberate destruction of Plaintiffs

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interview tapes with the State Bar and other documents in the possession of the

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spoliation of evidence and that all evidence, including work produce be preserved

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and protected by court order throughout this litigation.

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State Bar that are crucial to this case, that all Defendants be enjoined from further

B.

Background to State Bar Action Against Plaintiff

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7.

Judge Luis Vargas was disqualified by the presiding judge and

by Chief Justice Ronald M. George based, inter alia, on numerous extra judicial ex

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parte communications with State Bar officials and investigators acting in concert

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with him to prejudge and predetermine an unlawful indirect criminal contempt case

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against Plaintiff. The State Bar officials and the investigators agreed with Judge

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Vargas and others to llse the predetermined criminal conviction for indln;;LOl LOriminal
contempt to immediately obtain involuntarily disemollmelll ufPlaintiffas an active
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 8 of 73 Page ID #:8

member of the State Bar to, inter alia, prevent him from litigating RICO act and
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false claims actions to

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the opposing counsel, their clients, insurers and

other:> to repay the huge statutory super liens of MediCare and MediCaid that

existed in the underlying cases and which were intentionally not paid by said

persons and entities, in violation of federal and state law. The State Bar and its

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officials and investigators have actively assisted the corporate defense attorneys and

their clients, a.cting in concert with others, to intentionally avoid the repayment of

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these statutory super liens of MediCare and Medicaid, even though the State Bar

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cases and well established case law and statutory law mandate the repayment of

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those monies to the government insurance program. Plaintiff has potential liability

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in the event that those super liens are not satisfied and was seeking to redress his

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rights and the rights of his clients to defeat this massive fraud scheme that has not

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been abated. The State Bar and its officials has acted in concert with corporate

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defense counsel and others including former attorneys of the State Bar to hinder,

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delay and defraud the MediCare and MediCal Programs from recovering huge sums

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of monies that are due them. The State Bar has determined to turn its back on

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enforcement of the repayment of these super liens of MediCal, MediCare and

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MediCaid and other liens to benefit clients of adverse attorneys, active judges, and

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retired judges and former state bar attorneys who have a vested financial interest in

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the nonpayment of these super liens and the misappropriation of settlement moneys
that were to he utilized to pay these super liens and other liens including the liens of
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 9 of 73 Page ID #:9

Plaintiff.
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8.

The State BW" related defendants all knew that action of

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attempting to criminally prosecute the Plaintiff and to have the State Court judge

prejudge and predetennine the outcome of the indirect criminal case and in a State

Bar prol::eeding to involuntarily disenroll Plaintiff as an active member of the Bar

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I;unstitutes gross misconduct, a patterns of racketeering and an obstruction of

justice. None ofthe activities of defendants is subject to immunity, nor did

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defendants have any power or jurisdiction to commit of these acts aga.inst Plaintiff

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or any other attorney. The defendants also knew that their conduct in actively

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prosecuting Plaintiff criminally in order to claim that Plaintiff engaged in alleged

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1110ral turpitude and to involuntarily disenroll him as an active member of the State
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Bar for violating the First and the Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.

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Constitution. Substantially all of them were previously defendants in the case of

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Richard A. Canatella, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of California; Board of

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Governors of the State Bar of California; President of the State BaT Association; the

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Judges of the State Bar Court; the Office of the Chief Counsel of the State Bat of

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Califomia, Trial Counsel, Defendants-Appellees (9th Cir. 09/09/2002) 304 F.3d


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843 Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of

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California Martin 1. Jenkins, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No. CV-QQ-OII05-MJJ

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(CanatelJa I) in which 9th circuit case stated in an opinion for publication that the
First Amendment encompassed the "MOTHl Turpitude Statute" nmon.gst others.
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 10 of 73 Page ID #:10

Such State Bar related defendants also knew that they maintained a joint defense
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against the First Amendment in such case thereby prejudicing their actions against a

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person's right to pctition the guvernment for a redress of grievances and for

violations of their civ il rights.

9.

Defendants further knew and acted in concert in using the "state

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regulatory statutes" to unlawfulIy attempt to remove Plaintifffrom the practice of

law for the personal benefit of the members of the State Bat Board of Governors

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andlor their clients, disqualified judges, disqualified retired judges, State Bar

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officials and the personal relationships of Paul O'Brien and other defendants, with

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fonner State Bar attorneys, Gregory O'Brien and opposing corporate defense

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counsel in the underlying litigation and others.


10. The speeches of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court
to the California State Bar show that judges are using the Judicial Council and the
California Judges Association to affect free speech in violation of the First

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Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, Article VI, 6 of the California Constitution

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and Cal. Govt. Code 77001 and 77001.5, creating an atmosphere in which any

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person "approved" as a State Bar judge through the statutory screening process
under which they must be approved by the California Supreme Court will he biased
against the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution before their Mme will be

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submitted for selection.

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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 11 of 73 Page ID #:11

II.

PARTIES

DESCRlPTION OF PLAINTIFF
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11.

At all times herein, Plaintiff lived and conducted business in the

Central District of California. Plaintiff has been an active member of the State Bar

of Califurnia since 1972 and has no disciplinary by the State Bar.


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8

DESCRlPTION OF DEFENDANTS

12.

At all times herein, Defendants maintained an office and

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conducted business in the Central District of California.


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13.

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All transactions relevant herein occurred in the Central District

of California. The entire Los Angeles Superior Court was disqualified and judges

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were appointed by the Chief Justice to act as temporary judges of the Los Angeles
Superior Court in connection with the underlying cases of Plaintiff.

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Defendant, State Bar of Cali fomi a (State Bar) is a public

corporation established by Article VI, 9 of the California Constitution and B&P

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Code 6001. Pursuant to B&P Code 6001, it "can sue and be sued", "dispose

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any portion of its income or revenues from membership fees paid or

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payable by its

members" (6001(f)), and has the authority to raise money in

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addition to mandatory dues set by the Legislature pursuant to H&P Code 6140 (

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6001 (g.

The State Bar acts through its Board of Governors (B&P Code

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6008.4, 6010), which makes rules and regulations (B&P Code 6025) and
operates the State Bar (B&P Code 6028-6031) .
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP
Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 12 of 73 Page ID #:12
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15.
2

Defendant Board of Governol's (Board), with the approval of the

California Supreme Court, can formulate and enforce "rules of professional

conduct" (rules) for members of the State Bar (B&P Code 6076) . After approval

by the Supreme Court, the Board has the power to enforce a "willful breach of the

rules" by "reproval, public or private or to recommend to the Supreme Court a


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suspension from practice for a period not exceeding three years" (B&P Code

6077).

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16.

The power of the Board is limited to only recommend

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disbarment or suspension to the California Supreme Court. Pursuant to B&P Code

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6078 the Board was not given the power to order involuntary inactive enrollment

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when hearing an underlying action for disbarment, suspension or other discipline.


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Pursuant to B&P Code 6086.5, the Board created the State

Bar Court to act in its "place and stead" in disciplinary matters.

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The State Bar Court, however, does not have the power to

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impose an involuntary inactive enrollment under B&P Code 6007) or lE)( 4) as

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California Rule of Court (CRC) 9.10 limits the authority of the State Bar Court to

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only impose "ciiscipline" in certain circumstances which specifically did not include
R&P Code 6007) or )(4).
Defendant, The Client Security Fund, is administered by the

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Statc Bar of Cali fomi a separate and apatt frOIll the Stale Bar Court. It is sued
herein for declaratury and injunctive relief because the State Bar Defendants have
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 13 of 73 Page ID #:13

acted in concert with opposing counsel and other to cause fraudulent and fabricated
2

applications for reimbursement from the fund and indirectly from Plaintiffto be

filed with knowledge of the fabricated nature of the application and its

meritlessness. The filing of those fraudulent applications in concert with the State

Bar officials constitutes a ftu'ther act of gross misconduct by the State Bar related
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Defendants in that they knew that the applications are fraudulent and that the

applications were filed to avoid the payment of statutory super liens in their cases

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all other liens including the liens of Plaintiff. The applicants had their cases
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dismissed for willful violation of discovery orders by them which did not involve

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any misconduct by Plaintiff. These court orders dismissing the applicants' cases

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for willful discovery abuse bar the recovery by the applicants from the fund.

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Plaintiff should prevail in each of the underlying actions against applicants and

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their counsel including the claim for Rico Act violations for obstruction of justice.

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The State Bar received documents showing that these applicants were parties to the

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obtaining of fifty-nine (59) orders against them for willful violation of discovery

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orders and did not disclose same to the Client Security Fund when they assi~ted

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these I.'Ipplicants in filing the fraudulent applications to seek obtain collateral


damage over the Plaintiff.

19.

Defendant Scott J. Drexel at all timcs herein mentioned was the

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Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar. DdI;;lIlUi;Ult:s, the j uuge:; uf the State Bi:lf Cuurt,
are IU:lllleu hl;;lrtlin cullectively as a group in order to obtain declaratory and
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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 14 of 73 Page ID #:14

injunctive relief that would be binding on them. The State Bar judges participated
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with Defendants the State Bar and the State Bar Board of Governors in ajoint

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defense in the case of Canatella v. State Bar, 304 F.3d 843 (9th Cir. 2002).
20.

Defendant Paul O'Brien at all times herein mentioned is one of

the principle State Bar officials who engaged in gross misconduct and who has
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actual conflicts of interest which tainted the entire investigational process,

including, but not limited to, spoliation of evidence, relying on manufactured

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evidence and fabricated, unsigned and unenforceable documents, without


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limitation, in violation of Plaintiff's due process rights.


21.

Plaintiff is infonned and believes and based thereon alleges

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that Defendant Gregory O'Brien is a disqualified judge who assisted the other

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Defendants to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of an indirect criminal

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contempt case against Plaintiff by the use of acts of gross misconduct together with

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his brother, Defendant Paul O'Brien of the State Bar. All of the defendants knew

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Gregory O'Brien was a disqualified judge and that Gregory O'Brien could not

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participate directly or indirectly in the indirect criminal contempt case or in any

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other case involving Plaintiff. All disqualified judges were prohibited from
participating directly or indirectly in the indirect criminal contempt case 01' acting in
concert with others to violate Plaintiff's civil and due process rights.

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22.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and bascd thereon alleges that

Defendant Sarah Overton acted with disyualifiedjudges and participated in actions


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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP
Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 15 of 73 Page ID #:15

against Plaintiffto prejudge and predetermine the outcome of the indirect criminal
2

contempt case and other cases against PlaintitI and to act in concert with others to

engage in spoliation of evidence. Defendant Overton resides and has an office in

the Central District of California, Eastern Division, in Riverside, California.

23.

Defendants John Noonen and Thomas Latton are State Bar

investigators who were directed by Paul O'Brien and others to actively assist Judge

Vargas and the State Bar to prejudge and predetennine the outcome of the indirect

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criminal contempt case even though the State Bar had no jurisdiction to do so.
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Defendant Overton also participated in the indirect criminal contempt case without

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jurisdiction. These Defendants and JudgeVargas further violated the Supremacy

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Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment by unlawfully

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acting in concert by interfering sub rosa in Federal court cases and other cases to

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prejudice Plaintiff.

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III.

STANDING

C.

Standing to Bring Complaint for Violation of Lack of Notice, Denial

of Due Process, and Violation of the First Amendment to the

u.s. Constitution

22

23
;24

25

Related to S&P Code 6007)(4)


24.

Plaintiff is directly affected by the action ofthe State Bar acting

in the "place and stead" of the Board pursuant to B&P Code 6086.5, without

26
27
28

jurisdiction. The State Bar prosecutors and investigators cngaged in gross


pro5ecutorial misconduct in concert with others to prejudge and predetenninc the

15

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 16 of 73 Page ID #:16

outcome of a vuid indirect criminal contempt case and attempted State Bar
2

prosecution in connection therewith. Each of the lJetendants knew that Paul

3
4

O'Brien, and its investigators, John Noonen and Thomas Latton, were engaged,

inter alia, in gross misconduct by engaging in spoliation of evidence, coaching of

witnesses to commit perjury, to participate in the submission offabricated and

fraudulent documents and to meet with disqualified judges to prejudge the indirect

criminal contempt case and other cases, without limitation.

10

25. Plaintiff also stands in a representative capacity for all others


II

12

who have been or may be subjected to gross misconduct by the State Bar and its

13

officials and/or who may be affected by those actions of the Hearing Department of

14
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the California Supreme Court related to orders of "Involuntary Inactive

17

Enrollment" entered under B&P Code 6007)(4) and Rules of Procedure of the

18

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20

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the State Bar Court acting in the "place and stead" of the Board and the actions of

21

State Bar, Rule 220), without charges having been filed under B&P Code
6007).
26. Plaintiff has suffered an actual "injury in fact."

Plaintiff was

22
23

unlawfully prosecuted by Judge Vargas in concert with Defendants to prejudge and

24

predetennine the outcome of that case and other cases. Plaintiff incurred

25

substantial damages as a result of being prosecuted maliciously based on the

26
27
2&

predetennined scheme to obstmct justice in the underlying cases. The State Bar
and its officials were also involved in two other major ncts of gross misconduct in
16

., .............

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 17 of 73 Page ID #:17

which they aUtlIIlpttld to involuntarily disenroll or take over Plaintiffs practice in


2

the underlying cases without jurisdiction to do so to, inter alia, benefit the adverse

4
j

corporate attorneys, their clients and insurers and disqualified judges who had
extensive undisclosed relationships with Defendants in the underlying cases prior to
their disqualification.

7
8

D.

Standing to Bring Complaint for Violations of First Amendment,

Vagueness and Due Process Related to B&P Code 6106

10

27. Plaintiff has standing to bring the present complaint. Plaintiff


II

12

shall file an Objection to the jurisdiction of the State Bar Court and its judges.

13

These are based upon the lack of jurisdiction of the State Bar Court under Rules of

14

Procedure of the State Bar, Rule 26l) against the State Bar Court, and against the

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State Bar Court judges for their refusal to disclose information upon which "a

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person aware of the facts might reasonably entettain a doubt that the judge would

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be able to be impartial" as required by CCP 170.1(a)(6)). The objection is

20

further based upon their having been part of the defendant group of "Judges of the

21

State Bar Court" in the case of Richard A. Canatella, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State

22
23

of California; Board of Governors of the State Bar of California; President of the

24

State Bar Association; the Judges of the State Bar Court; the Office of the Chief

25

CounseJ ofthe State Bar of Cali forni ii, Trial Counsel, Defendants-Appellees (9th

26

27
28

Ck 09/09/2002) 304 F.3d 843 Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California Martin J. Jcnkins, District Judge, Presiding D.C. No.
17

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 18 of 73 Page ID #:18

CV-00-OII05-MJJ (Canatella). Plaintiffis in danger of, and nothing prevents the


2

Board, the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar and the judges of the State Bar

3
4

Court from repeating the same misconduct against Plaintiff and other attorneys in

the future, including the gross misconduct to prejudge and predetermine the

outcome of cases for which they had no jurisdiction. The Defendants' concerted
7

activities against Plaintiff violated Plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment

rights and rights conferred with respect the super liens and other liens governing the

10

underlying cases.
11

12

13

28.

Plaintiff also stands in a representative capacity for all others

who also may be affected by those actions of the Hearing Department of the State

14
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Bar Court acting in the "place and stead" of the Board related to orders

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"recommending disbarment" against attorneys for violation of B&P Code 6106

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(Moral Turpitude) for acts of filing cases, appeals, writs, pleadings,

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disqualifications of judges and arguing positions in cases which are protected by

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the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.


29.

Plillntiffhas suffered an actual "injury in fact" when the

22
23

Defendants acted in concert with State Court disqualified judges and opposing

24

counsel to prcjudge and predetermine at least three cases against Plaintift: including

25

the indirect criminal contempt ca:;e. Plaintiff incurred major monetary damages

26
27
28

and injury to hi:,; pnu.:Li.cl::, iucluding the loss of milliol1S of dollars in attorney fees as
a result of the State Bar's gross acts ormisl,;unduct for non-State Dar related
18

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 19 of 73 Page ID #:19

activities and for which there is no immunity and no jurisdiction. Each of tht:
2

Defendants knew that the judges ofthe Los Angeles Superior Court and certain

3
4

temporary judges were disqualified by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme

Court and the presiding judge and still participated with said disqualified judges in

the unlawful acts against Plaintiff, without any jurisdiction.


7

8
9

E.

Bias Exists Making the State Tribunal "Incompetent" to Hear this Case

and Overcoming Abstention

10

(a)

The Bias of the State Bar Court Judges Against the First

11

12

Amendment Encompassing B&P Code 6106 Cases as Shown by Their Joint

13

Defense in the Canatella Case Opposing the First Amendment's Application to

14
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B&P Code 6106 Resulting in a Denial of Due Process by Their Even Attempting

16

to Hear the Matter and Hearing the Matter of a Charge of B&P Code 6106 and

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Activities Protected by the First Amendment.

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31.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that

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the Defendant State Bar Court Judges were part of the defendant group of Judges
of the State Bar Court in Canatella in which they were co joint defendants with the

22
23

State Bar. They were represented by the same counsel as the State Bar Defendants.

24

Canatella challenged the constitutionality ofB&P Code 6106 under the First

25

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution_ The Court stated in Canatella that R&P

26
27
28

Codc 6106 "implicate[d] some protected speech."


32.

The actions of the State Bar Judges in concert with the State
19

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 20 of 73 Page ID #:20

Bar related Defendants show a collusive action to deny due process in violation of
2

the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in B&P Code 6106 cases.

(b)

Bias of All State Bar Court Judges Through Their

Selection Process Obligating Them to Favor the "Positions" Taken by the

California Supreme Court Particularly Against the First Amendment Irrespective of


7
8

the Legality of Such Positions Under the U.S. Constitution and Laws of the United

States.

10

33.

Bias and a denial of due process exists through the selection of

II

12

State Bar Judges in that all State Bar Court judges must be "approved as qualified"

13

by the California Supreme Court irrespective of which entity (i.e. California

14

Supreme Court, Governor of the State of California, Senate Committee on Rules


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16

and Speaker of the Assembly) appoints them. Prior to such "approval" they must be

17

recommended as "qualified" by a seven person committee whose members are

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appointed and directed by the California Supreme Court. The committee, consists

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20

of two members of the judiciary (at least one active), fOLlf members of the State Bar

21

(two of which must be current members of the Board of Governors of the State Bar

,..

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22
23

and all four may be current members ofthe HORrd of Governors of the State Bar)

24

and one member of the public, alI of whom serve "at the pleasure of the

25

[California] Supreme Court" (pursuant to CRC Rule 9.11).

26
27
28

34.

The bias and denial of due process exists because the Califomia

Supreme Court nrbitrarily controls all appointments of State Dar Court judges as
20

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 21 of 73 Page ID #:21

shown by B&P Code 6086.5 (Board of Govemors shall establish a State Bar
2

Court), 6079.1 (Appuintment of Hearing Department judges etc., "(a) The Supreme
3
4

Cuurt shall appoint a presiding judge of the State Bar Court. In addition, five

hearing judges shall be appointed, two by the Supreme Court, one by the Governor,

one by the Senate Committee on Rules, and one by the Speaker of the Assembly,",

7
8

) Applicants for appointment or reappointment as a State Bar Court judge shall be

screened by an applicant evaluation committee as directed by the Supreme Court.

10

The committee, appointed by the Supreme Court, shall submit evaluations and
II
12

recommendations to the appointing authority and the Supreme Court as provided in

13

Rule 961 of the California Rules of Court, or as otherwise directed by the Supreme

I~

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15

Court. The committee shall submit no fewer than three recommendations for each

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available position." (Emphasis added.) ) and 6086.65 (Appointment by the

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California Supreme Court of Review Department judges consisting of Presiding

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Judge and two Review Department judges, etc,).


35.

This selection process allows the California Supreme Court to

limit the candidates to be selected for State Bar judgeships to only those who are

22
23

24

25

willing to comply with the "political opinions and viewpoints" of the California
Supreme Court and manifest such in their actions such as opposing First
Amendment Rights in situations related to the judiciary :'IS shown in Canatella.

26
27

28

36.

This selection process also violates the First Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution :'Ind due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to tll<: U.s.
21

.......\

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 22 of 73 Page ID #:22

Constitution as it is arbitrary and performed "in secret". It also violates Article I,


2

2(a), 3(a) and (b) and 7 ofthe California Constitution.

The California Supreme Court Has Shown Bias Against the

First Amendment to the US. Constitution and Has Violated Article VI, Clause 2 of

the US. Constitution by Not Following the U.S. Constitution and Laws of the
7

United States by Engaging in Acts Against Freedom of Speech and the First

Amendment and Using the Judicial Branch ofthe California Government to

10

Interfere with the Electoral Process and Freedom of Speech.


11

12
13

37.

The speeches of the Chief Justice of the California Supreme

Court show that the California Supreme Court, through the Judicial Council which

14

is an independent governmental body established under Article VI, 6 of the

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15

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California Constitution is actively fighting any attempt to hold judges liable for

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their actions even when such attempts are in the political arena related to initiatives

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and the passage of legislation and the election of judges demonstrating a bias

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19

15
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20

against the First Amendment to the US. Constitution and a willingness to use their

21

official capacity to oppose the First Amendment right of "freedom of speech",

",

22

23

including cases where the judges are acting in a non-judicial capacity for which

,.4

they had no jurisdiction, as is the case with Judge Vargas and the State Bar

25

proseclltors in the indirect criminal contempt case.

26
27

28

38.

The functions of the Judicial Council do not include "political

action" and are set forth in Article VI, 6(d), (0) and (f) of the California
22

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 23 of 73 Page ID #:23

Constitution as follows: (d) To improve the administration of justice the council


2

shall survey judicial business and make recommendations to the courts, make

3
4

recommendations annually to the Governor and Legislature, adopt rules for court

administration, practice and procedure, and perfonn other functions prescribed by

statute. The rules adopted shall not be inconsistent with statute. (e) The Chief

Justice shall seek to expedite judicial business and to equalize the work of judges.

The Chief Justice may provide for the assignment of any judge to another court but

10

only with the judge's consent if the court is oflower jurisdiction. A retired judge

11

12

who consents may be assigned to any court. (f) Judges shall report to the council as

13

the Chief Justice directs concerning the condition of judicial business in their

14

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courts. They shall cooperate with the council and hold court as assigned. (Emphasis
added.)
39.

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Cal. Govt. Code 77001 and 77001.5 also limit the functions.

19

The ]imitations on the activities of a "judge of a court of record" of which the

20

California Supreme Court if: one under Article VI, 1 of the California Constitution

21

are to have no other job than that of a judge or pfltt time teaching position, as set

22
23

forth at Article VI, 17 of the California Constitution.


40.

24

25

pre~eIlliIlg

The requirements that judicial offices be non partisan and for

and passing initiatives and referendums are set forth in Article II of the

26
27
28

California Constitution.

III III II/

23

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 24 of 73 Page ID #:24

41.
2

The position set forth by Cali1"ornia Chief Justice George,

demonstrate that the Iudicial Council is being used to influence the voting process

3
4

and to circumscribe the right of free speech both of which violate the U.S. and

Califomia Constitutions.

42.

The Judicial Council Has Been Used to Violate the First

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by Promulgating California Rules of Court

Which Impair the Right to Petition the Government for a Redress of Grievances by

10

Requiring a Party to File an Appeal Before a Trial Court Has Ruled on a Motion for
11

12

Reconsideration or Lose the Right to Appeal.

13

43.

The Judicial Council has promulgated California Rules of Court

14

(CRC) Rules 8.104(a) and CRC Rule 8.l08(b) and (d) requiring a notice of appeal

til

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to be filed the earlier of 90 days after a motion for reconsideration is filed or 180

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days after the judgment is filed when no time limit is set on the trial court to decide

18

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the motion.

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21

44.
Con~titlltional

These CRC rules are a denial of due process, as they remove the

right to trial in the first instance and the right to have a court hear the

22

23
24

25

matter in the second instance.

(a) The California Supreme Court Is Biased Against the First


Amendment Right to Petition thc Government for a Redress of Grievances and the

26
27
28

Rights Implied by the Due Pruc.:es~ Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution by Prohibiting Judges from Acc.:epling Money from Parties
24

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 25 of 73 Page ID #:25

Appearing Before Them.


7

(b) The California Supreme Court and the State Bar Court

Are Biased in Hearing Cases Involving Documents Filed in Court Cases as CCP

425.16. The Anti Slapp Statute Does Not Exempt the State Bar from Having its

Suits Dismissed as a Violation of the Right to Free Speech When They Relate to
7
8

Documents Filed in Court Cases, and the California Supreme Court Does Not Have

a Mechanism to Guarantee that a CCP 425.16 Motion Will be Heard by the

10

California Supreme Court Who is the Only Court Under Statute with the Power to
11
12

Make a Decision.

13

45.

The jurisdiction of the State Bar and State Bar Court is limited

14

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to bring and hear cases for disciplinary, reinstatement and "regulatory" purposes,

16

and only

make recommendations to the California Supreme Court pursuant to

17

B&P Code

18

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6075,6076,6077,6078, 6079.1(a), 6082 and 6087.

19

CCP

425.16 allows a motion to preclude a suit or "cause" of

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20
21

action based upon a written or oral statement or writing made before or in


connection with an issue under consideration or review by a judicial proceeding.

22
23

The State Bar and the California Supreme Court are not exempt from this motion

24

under CCP 425.16(d). Thus once the State Bar Court recommendation becomes a

25

"cause", it is

subject to a CCP 425.16 motion to strike. CCP 425.16 does not

26
27

28

exempt the State Dar from having its case or cause dismissed under the Anti Slapp
SLaLuLt: if Lht: cast: is bast:d upon documt:nls filt:d inlht: Court. CCP 425.1G(a), (b),
25

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Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 26 of 73 Page ID #:26

(d) and (e) state


2

a~ fulluw~:

425.16. (a) The Legislature finds and declares that

there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid

3
4

exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the

redress of grievances. The Legislature finds and declares that it is in the public

(;

interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and


7
8

that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process. To

this end, this section shall be construed broadly. (b) (I) A cause of action against a

10

person arising i'om any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of
11

12

petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in

13

connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless

14

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the plaintiff will prevail on the claim. (2) In making its determination, the court

17

shall consider the pleadings, and suppOliing and opposing affidavits stating the

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the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that

19

20
21

facts upon which the liability or defense is based. (3) If the court detennines that
the plaintiff has established a probability that he or she will prevail on the claim,
neither that detennination nor the fact of that determination shall be admissible in

22
23

evidence at any later stage of the case, or in any subsequent action, and no burden

24

of proof or degree of proof otherwise applicable shall he affected hy that

25

determination in any later ~tllge of the case or in any subsequent proceeding.

26

27
28

This section shall not apply to any enforcement action brought


in the name ofilie people of the Statc of California by the Attorney General, district
26

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 27 of 73 Page ID #:27

atturney, or city attorney, acting as a public prosecutor.


.2

As used in this section, "act in furtherance of a person's right of

petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in

connection with a public issue" includes: (1) any written or oral statement or

writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other

7
8

official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing

made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,

10

executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (3)
I1

12

any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a

13

public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct

14

in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the

en

15

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constitutional right offree speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of

17

public interest. (Emphasis added.)

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47.

B&P Code 6081 and 6084 have effectively abrogated the

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20

ability to challenge a Board (State Bar Court) recommendation of disbarment, or

21

any other penalty, through an Anti Slapp Motion as the California Supreme Court

22
23

will deny a petition for review of the "recommendation of disbarment", which

24

denial automatically becomes an order of the California Supreme Court under B&P

25

Code 6084(a) and CRC Rule 9.10, thereby precluding any "review" and a "case"

26
27
28

or "cause" oCC':lIrring.
48.

The California Supreme Court has stated that such "denial of

27

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 28 of 73 Page ID #:28

review" is not a "cause" under the Article VI, 14 of the California Constitution
2

requiring that such detenninations be in writing with reasons stated in the case of In

re Rose 22 Ca1.4th 430, 454 (2000). As shown in In re Rose 22 Ca1.4th at 459 the

"independent detennination" of the California Supreme Court is limited to a

petition for review of a recommendation of disbannent or suspension in which the

7
8

California Supreme Court does not consider the CCP 425.16 motion as a

separate item for review under the CRC rules.

10

49.

Justice Brown, dissenting, in In re Rose, supra, explained that

11

12

actual review did not occur at In re Rose 22 Cal.4th at 466-470 as follows in

13

relevant part: ... As the court itself has acknowledged only recently, changes in our

14

own rules made in the wake oflegislative amendments to the administrative


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procedures governing bar discipline proceedings "relieve the court of the burden of

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intense scrutiny of all disciplinary recommendations." (Cal. Supreme Ct., Invitation

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to Comment- Proposed Adoption of Rule 951.5, Cal. Rules of Court (Nov. 23,

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1999) p. 2; see also Cal. Supreme Ct., Practices and Proc. (1997 rev.) pp. 3,18-19,

21

25-26.) Moreover, the matrix of grantable issues identified in California Rules of

Of)

"

22
23
2'1

25

Court, rule 954fn. 1 appears to truncate the scope of our review. And in cases where
no writ is sought, we usually content ourselves with less thAn thAt measure of
"review." Unless, by dint of skill or luck, the issues are framed so they are deemed

26
27
28

to fall within the ambit of rule 954, an. attorney facing suspension or disbarment

from the right to practice her profession gets no hearing, no OPPOliWlity fOI" oral
28

. ..",\

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 29 of 73 Page ID #:29

argument, and no written statement of reasons-from this or any other article VI


2

court. (Cal. Canst., art. VI, 14; hereafter article VI.) Instead, she gets a summary

3
4

denial of review, the one-line order.

*****

An attorney's petition tbr review to this court marks the first and only time in the
7

disciplinary process that article VI judges are asked to enter the case. For that

reason, and for that reason alone, our decision, even if it is a summary denial of

10

review, necessarily decides a cause. The majority makes an able attempt to paper
11

12

over this reality, but in doing so it is compelled to adopt an empty formalism.

13

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Alas, attorneys faced with the loss of their livelihoods must now make do

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with the State Bar Court-an entity performing judicial functions but, despite the

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competence of its members, exercising no judicial powers-and our summary

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20

21

denials, unless the petition can be said to satisfy the criteria of rule 954 ..... In point
of practice, in bar disciplinary cases in which we decline to grant review, we issue a
pro fonna order executing the State Bar Court's "recommended" discipline. (See

22
23
24

25

rule 9S4(a).) In those cases where review is not sought, it is questionable whether
any judicial act of substance takes place ...... Still, we no longer make an individual
dccision on thc imposition of discipline. And the situation is not much improved if

26
27
2~

fl:vil:W

i::; ::;uughl1:lI!l.l ul:llil:d; the ruJe gives us no choice but to impose the

recommended dbcipline. (Ruk 954(b).) At the healt of the majority opinion is the

29

'\

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 30 of 73 Page ID #:30

supposition that review by any other name is still review and passes constitutional
?

muster; that due process is satisfied by any process, however much the decision

3
4

makers may be driven by bureaucratic agendas or political ties. (Emphasis added.)

50.

The combination of the State Bar Proceeding not being a

(i

"cause" under Article VI, 14 of the California Constitution and the refusal of the
7

California Supreme Court to include the CCP 425.16 motion as a ground of

obligatory review, demonstrates the bias of the California Supreme Court against

10

the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and also shows that neither Plaintiff

II

12

nor any other party will receive a hearing on the matter in the California Supreme

13

Court.

14

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Plaintiff was "targeted" by the Defendants. The state bar

15

16

Defendants were engaged in gross misconduct; the state bar spoliated evidence; the

17

state bar deliberately mislead plaintiff, encouraged the submission of fabricated

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documents and witness perjury, coached witnesses to commit perjury. In addition,

S
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20

the State Bar permitted non- parties to write the draft notice of disciplinary action

21

with knowledge of the falsity of the allegations and charges. The Defendants have

22

23
24

25

done nothing to abate the situation in this !lnd in other c!\ses ("inc! c!enied plaintiff his
due process rights.
51.

Each ofthe Defendants knew that Paul O'Brien had an

26
27
2li

actual COilflict of interest and should have been disqualified by the State Bar from

participating in the investigation of PlaintiIT and the alleged misconduct in


30

-~

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 31 of 73 Page ID #:31

connection therewith.
2

Th~

relationship of GregOiY O'Bden i(l Pi:luI

O'Bri~n

and to

Judge Vargas and other relationships has totally tainted the State Bar investigation,

3
4

prejudged the entire case, and denied Plaintiff his due process rights. Such

individual Defendants are not immune for their gross misconduct, actual conflicts

of interest and violations of the California Code of Judicial Ethics and the State Bar

7
8

Rules of Professional Conduct.


52.

No court has monetarily sanctioned Plaintifffor any action

10

related to the underlying lawsuits.


II

12
13

53.

The State Bar is misusing the Moral Turpitude Statute and its

statutory power to regulate the practice of law to emasculate the First Amendment

14

'"

'"
.:

15

right to petition the government for redress of grievances and the Fourteenth

",0

16

Amendment right to due process and to supplant the power of the federal and state

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17

Courts of Record to govern their cQulirooms.

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54.

The challenged statutes and conduct of the State Bar, the Board

20

and the individual defendants are unconstitutional, "unconstitutionally chill

21

.... courtroom speech", violate the First Amendment and due process as applied to

22
23

Plaintiffs activity of filing disqualifications, pleadings and law$llits all of which are

24

truthfil) to strenuously advocate his clients rights as set forth in such

25

disqualifications, pleadings and lawsuits.

26
27

28

FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF AND INJUNCTIVE RTILIEP


55.

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 54 and each ofthelll


31

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 32 of 73 Page ID #:32

as if set forth in full.


2

56.

B&P Code 6007)( 4) is unconstitutional and violates

3
4

due process in that it does not provide any notice prior to invoking the drastic

penalty of ordering an attorney "inactive" in violation of the holding set forth in the

u.s. Supreme Court case ofIn re Ruffalo 390 U.S. 544

(1968) and violates the

8
9

First Amendment to the u.s. Constitution.

57. B&P Code 6007 is an interim expedited proceeding separate

10

from an underlying disciplinary proceeding. B&P Code 6007) states as


11
12

follows: ) (1) The board may order the involuntary inactive enrollment of an

13

attorney upon a finding that the attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of

14
on

"'~

15

harm to the interests of the attorney's clients or to the public or upon a finding based

16

on all the available evidence, including affidavits, that the attorney has not

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17

complied with Section 6002.1 and cannot be located after reasonable investigation.

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20
21

(2) In order to find that the attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to
the interests of the attorney's clients or the public pursuant to this subdivision, each
ofthe following factors shall be found, based on all the available evidence,

22
23

including affidavits: (A) The attorney has caused or is causing substantial harm to

24

the attorney's clients or the pUhlic. (8) The attorney's clients or the puhlic are likely

25

to suffer greater injury from the denial of the involuntary inactive enrollment than

26
27
28

the attorney is likely to suffer if it is granted, or there is a reasonable likelihood that

the hann will reoccur or COlltillUC. Where tho:: evidence o::stablishcs a pattern of
32

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 33 of 73 Page ID #:33

behavior, including acts likely to cause substantial harm, the burden of proof shall
2

shift to the attorney to show that there is no reasonable likelihood that the harm will

3
4

reoccur or continue. ) There is a reasonable probability that the State Bar will

prevail on the merits of the underlying disciplinary matter. (3) In the case of an

enrollment under this subdivision, the underlying matter shall proceed on an


7
8

expedited basis. (4) The board shall order the involuntary inactive enrollment of an

attorney upon the filing of a recommendation of disbarment after hearing or default.

10

For purposes of this section, that attorney shall be placed on involuntary inactive
11

12

enrollment regardless of the membership status of the attorney at the time. (5) The

13

board shall formulate and adopt rules of procedure to implement this subdivision.

14

In the case of an enrollment pursuant to this subdivision, the board shall terminate
V1

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15

16

the involuntary inactive enrollment upon proof that the attorney's conduct no longer

17

poses a substantial threat of harm to the interests of the attorney's clients or the

18

en

19

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public or where an attorney who could not be located proves compliance with

<.)

21

Section 6002. L
58.

The Board did not formulate or adopt rules to have the

22
23
24

25

'\mderlying matter ... proceed on an expedited basis" in the case of "an enrollment
under this subdivision". The Board did fonnulate and adopt Rules ofProeedure of
the State Bar, Rules IOle, 220e and 30Sfimp\ementing B&P Code 6007)(4)

26
27
28

without giving any no lice. ora B&P Coue 6007


Such rules state as follows, respectively:
33

~epari;ite

proceeding or charges.

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 34 of 73 Page ID #:34

Rule 1011;
2

Jfthe State Bar intends to seek the involuntary inactive

3
4

enrollment of the respondent pursuant to Business and Professions Code section

6007), the notice of disciplinary charges should include a statement that upon a

finding that the respondent's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to the

interests of the respondent's clients or the public, the respondent may be

involuntarily emolled as an inactive member of the State Bar. (Emphasis added.)

10

Rule 220c

11

If the Court recommends disbarment, it shall also include in its

]2
13

decision an order that the respondent be emolled as an inactive member pursuant to

14
ill

15

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Business and Professions Code 6007, subdivision )(4). The order of inactive

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enrollment shall be effective upon personal service or three (3) days after service by

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mail, whichever is earlier, w11ess otherwise ordered by the Court. (Emphasis

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21

added.)
Rule 305f
In the event that the Review Department recommends

22
23

disbarment, it shall also include in its opinion an order that the respondent be

24

enrolled as an inactive member pursuant to Business and Professions Code section

25

6007, subdivision )(4). The order of inactive enrollment shall be effective lIpon

26
27
28

personal service or three (3) dAys after service by mail, whichever is earlier, unless
otherwise ordered by the Court. (Emphasis added.)
34

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 35 of 73 Page ID #:35

59.
2

The draft NDC (the "underlying matter") as a matter of policy

does not state that a B&P Code 6007 proceeding was occurring nor does it give

notice that any such B&P Code 6007 charges are being made. Such draft NDC

merely advises at the last page after all counts were pled: NOTICE-INACTIVE

ENROLLMENT! YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE

7
8

STATE BAR COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND

PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6007), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A

10

SUBSTANTIAL THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR

11

12

CLIENTS OR TO THE PUBLIC, YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARIL Y

13

ENROLLED AS AN INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR. YOUR

14

INACTIVE ENROLLMENT WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO ANY DISCIPLINE


ill
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15

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16

RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT. SEE RULE 101), RULES OF

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PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA. (Emphasis in original.)

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60.

Neither Plaintiff when served with a draft NDC nor any other,

'u

19

....'"'

20

person served with a draft NDC or an NDC was given any notice that they were

21

heing charged with AviolAtion ofR&P Cone 6007 in the NnC nor could they

...Jtf)

22
23

24

25

deten"jne such to be the case from reading Rules of Procedure of the State Bar,
Rule 101).
61.

The State Bar knew at all times that this failure to give notice

26
27

28

and to use evidence gained at trial to convict on undisclosed charges was and is
unconstitutional under the case ofIn re Ruffalo 390 U.S. 544(1968) stating at 55035

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 36 of 73 Page ID #:36

552: In the present case petitioner had no notice that his employment of Orlando
2

would be considered a disbann.ent offense until after both he and Orlando had

testified at length on all the material facts pertaining to this phase of the case. As

Judge Edwards, dissenting below, said, "Such procedural violation of due process

would never pass muster in any normal civil or criminal litigation." 3 370 F.2d, at
7

462.

These are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature.

10

Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,33. The charge must be known before the proceedings
11

12

commence. They become a trap when, after they are underway, the charges are

13

amended on the basis of testimony of the accllsed. He can then be given no

14

oppOliunity to expunge the earlier statements and start afresh. 4

ill
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15

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17

How the charge would have been met had it been originally

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included in those leveled against petitioner by the Ohio Board of Commissioners on

19

Grievances and Discipline no one knows.


This absence of fair notice as to the reach of the grievance

20

21

procedure and the precise nature of the charge!'1 deprived petitioner of procedural

22
23
24

25

due process.
62.

The Co.lifomia Supreme Court does not allow 01' provide an

"immediate, independent [plenary] review" of nn order of involuntary inactive

26
27

28

enroLlment. A petition to rev iew an Qrder of inactive involuntary enrollment filed


under B&P Code 6083 is governed by CRC Rule 9.13(d). Review is only
36

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 37 of 73 Page ID #:37

permissive. No rule exists which provides for a petition to reverse such an order.
2

CRC Rule 9.U(d) states as tollows: Rule 9.13. Review of State Bar Court

decisions

**** (d) Review of other decisions

A petition to the Supreme Court to review any other decision

of the State Bar Court or action of the Board ofGovemors of the State Bar, or of
7

any board or committee appointed by it and authorized to make a determination

under the provisions of the State Bar Act, or of the chief executive officer of the

10
1I

State Bar or the designee of the chief executive officer authorized to make a

12

detennination under article 10 of the State Bar Act or these rules of court, must be

13

filed within 60 days after written notice of the action complained of is mailed to the

14

petitioner and to his or her counsel of record, if any, at their respective addresses
,,",

15

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16

under section 6002.1. Within 15 days after service of the petition, the State Bar may

t3~

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serve and file an anSWer and brief. Within 5 days after service of the answer and

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brief, the petitioner may serve and file a reply. I[review is ordered by the Supreme

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19

15r_,

20

Court, the State Bar, within 45 days after filing of the order, may serve and file a

21

supplemel1tal brief. Within 15 days after service of the supplemental brief. the

(-<

22
2J

24
25

petitioner may 'file a reply brief. (Emphasis added.) (Emphasis added,)


63.

The State Bar COllli. hilS recognized that an order ofInvoluntary

inactive enrollment is effective disbarment in In re Phillips No. 94-0-11471, CaL

26

27
28

Bar. Rev. 8/4/99 at paragraphs 16 -17 in which it stated as follows:


When this discipii11luy proceeding was started against
37

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08"\ Page 38 of 73 Page ID #:38

respondent, and prior to January 1997, the State Bar Act authorized an attorney'S
?

involuntary inactive enrollment on a number of grounds. As pertinent here, upon a

3
4

finding that the attorney's conduct poses a substantial threat of harm to the interests

of the attorney's clients or the public, an attorney may be involuntarily enrolled

inactive. (Former * 6007, subd.).) Expedited procedures for this ground of

inactive enrollment have been adopted and are described in Conway v. State Bar

(1989) 47 CaL3d 1107, which upbeld, against a due process challenge, the

10

constitutionality of section 6007, subdivision ) and certain of its implementing


1I

12

procedural rules. Conway noted the right of the accused attorney to request a

13

hearing prior to any decision for inactive enrollment under section 6007,

14

subdivision ). Public protection is a prime consideration in a section 6007,

'"b"'

15

16

subdivision ) inactive enrollment proceeding, and the proceeding may be very

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roughly analogized to a preliminary injunction proceeding in a civil matter. During

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disbarment in an underlying disciplinary matter, created a rebuttable presumption

21

affecting the burden of proofthat the factors warranting inactive enrollment are

such an inactive enrollment proceeding, the effect of any recommendation of

t-<

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22
23
24

25

established. (Fonner

* 6007, subd. )(4).)[17] Effective January 1, 1997, the basic

elements in section 6007, subdivision ) for inactive enrollment on proof of an


attorney's substantial threat of harm were retained but section 6007, subdivision

26
27
28

)( 4) was amended so that inactive el1rOllmcl1t shall be ordered upon filing of a


disbanllent recommendation. The effect ofthe a111clld111ent was to create an
38

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 39 of 73 Page ID #:39

automatic inactive enrollment upon a disbarment recommendation, without any


2

additional hearing. (Emphasis added.)

3
4

64.

The State Bar Court continued at paragraph 20 recognizing that

involuntary inactive enrollment was the same as disbarment as follows: We hold

that the principles of our discussion in Jebbia apply here although this is an inactive
7
8

enrollment proceeding, not one arising from a criminal conviction. The 1997

amendments to section 6007, subdivision )(4) have as dramatic an effect on the

10

legal ability to practice law as the 1997 amendments to section 6102, subdivision
11

12

) had in Jebbia. An attorney enrolled inactive is barred from the practice of law as

13

much as a disbarred attorney. Indeed, involuntary inactive enrollments may become

14
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if)

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15

16

disbarment which traditionally affords thirty days before becoming effective.

17

(Compare rule 220 ), Rules Proc. of State Bar with Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 953

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effective just three days from the order as contrasted to a Supreme Court order of

19

20

21

(a).) (Emphasis added.)


65.

On its face and in its implementation, B&P Code

!l 6007)( 4)

has denied due procM~ and denied the right to petition the government to redress

22
23

24

25

grievances, i.e., the taking of the property right in the license to practice law, hy

denying the ability to access the comts.


66.

Plaintiff seeks an order declaring that B&P Code 60070)(4) is

26

27
28

unconstitutional.
67.

Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining un.iI:1", preliminary and


39

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 40 of 73 Page ID #:40

pemlanent injunction ordering State Bar related Defendants and each ofthem to
2

cease and desist from enforcing, applying or using B&P Code 6007)(4)

Or

any

3
4

regulation or rule implementing such against any member of the State Bar of

California.

6
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF FOR
7

DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE BAR

RELATED DEFENDANTS

10
68.

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 67 and each of

1I

12

them as if set forth in full.

\3

69.

B&P Code 6106 states as follows: The commission of any

14

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16

committed in the course of his relations as an attorney Of otherwise, and whether

17

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act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, whether the act is

a~t

is a felony or misdemeanor or not, constitutes a cause tor disbarment or

suspension. Jf the act constitutes a felony or misdemeanor, conviction thereof in a

20

criminal proceeding is not a condition precedent to disbalment or suspension from

21

practice therefor. (Emphasis added.)

22

70.

D&P Code 6106 is unoonstitutional and violates the First

23
becau~t.'l

24

Amendment

it is unconstitutionally vague in that it does not define the

25

conduct which it seeks to prohibit wilh sufficient dc.finitencss such as a prohibition

26
27

28

against filing disqualitl.cations) pleadings or lawsuits, ami uues 110t establish


minimal guidelines to govem law enforcement.
40

--,

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 41 of 73 Page ID #:41

71.
2

B&P Code 6106 is unconstitutional and violates the First

Amendment's Petition Clause which protects "the right of the people ...to petition

3
4

the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1. The

October 12,

72.

B&P Code 6106 is vague and over broad as nothing in the

language ofB&P Code 6106 specifically precludes these acts or the taking of any

action related to a court case through the filing of complaints, pleadings,

10

disqualifications, appeals, briefs, petitions for writs or other legal documents or


11

12
13

making statements in a courtroom, during the course of a court proceeding.


73.

B&P Code 6106 is vague and over broad as nothing in the

14

language ofB&P Code 6106 precludes activity protected by the First Amendment
til

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17

to the U.S. Constitution.

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....

Plaintiff seeks an order declaring B&P Code 6106

18

21:;';:

74.

21

unconstitutional on the grounds of a violation of the First Amendm.ent to the U.S .


Constitution and vagueness.
75.

Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary and

22

23
24

25

permanent injunction restraining the State Bar Defendants, and eaeh of them, from
enforcing, applying or using B&P Code 6106 against any member of the State
Bar of California with respect to any document fiJed in a court, statement made in a

26

27
2~

court or any right protected by the first and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.s.
Constitution.
------------

._.

41

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 42 of 73 Page ID #:42

nURD CLAIM FOR RELIEF


2

THIRD CLAIM FOR PROSPECTIVE DECLARATORY RELIEF AND

3
4
5

INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE STATE BAR RELATED


DEFENDANTS THAT AS APPLIED AND FACIALL Y THE CALIFORNIA

Ii

STATUTES AND RULES GOVERNING ATTORNEYS SET FORTH


7
8

VIOLATES THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

10

76.

Plainti ff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 75 and each of them

11

12
13

as if set forth in full.

77.

State Bar discipline for the exercise of constitutionally protected

14

court speech on behalf of clients violates the First Amendment. Gentile v. State Bar
if)

'"

15

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1I'i

of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (extrajudicial remarks to press before criminal

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prosecution protected speech). The subject bar statutes and rules are facially

18

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19

overboard and void for vagueness, and as applied to Plaintiff violate the First and

l:J

20

F01lrteenth Amendments. U.S. v. Wunsch, 84 FJd 1110, 1119 (9th Clr. 1996).

21

(Section 6068(c) is unconstitutional fll.cially and as applied in this case.)

22
23
24

25

78.

The State Bar has attempted to wrongfully interfere with

Plaintiff's practice in the past by engaging in gross misconduct without filing any
di::;t.;iplini;lry dl1i1rges against Plaintiff and pursued their activity 'vvithout jurisdiction

26
27

28

to assist opposing counsel to obtain collateral advantage uver Plaintiff. The State
Bar officials then turned over such information and document:; tu adverse counsel
42

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 43 of 73 Page ID #:43

in breach of their duty of confidentiality. The State Bar Defendants acts in concert
?

with opposing counsel to post a bulletin to the court's web site stating that the State
3
4

Bar was going to place Plaintiffs practice in receivership the following week so as

to deprive Plaintiff of his substantial attorney fees and expenses that would accrue

to Plaintiff from settlements of cases that were then pending. The State Bar did not
7
8

take any action against these attorneys for their misconduct and misrepresentation

to the Court and to Plaintiffs. It is reasonable to expect that the State Bar will

10

attempt to discipline Plaintiff in the future based upon the prior gross misconduct
11

12

by the State Bar as set forth above. Defendants have and will continue to interfere

13

with Plaintiffs lawful assertion of claims in litigation and will subject Plaintiff to

14

iil
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15

jurisdiction, litigation and improper attempts to dissuade Plaintiff from making

:::

16

constitutionally protected claims in the underlying litigation and to seek redress for

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failure to pay the statutory super liens to the prejudice of Plaintiff and his clients.

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79.

Section 6068(c) of the California Business and Professions Code

?o

is void for vagueness because the standard for measuring attorney conduct is

21

unintelligible and inevitahly !oluhjective. The RtAtllte provines "It is the nllty of an

22
23
24

25

attorney ... to counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defenses only as


appear to him or her legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a
public offense." Bus. & Prof. Code, 6068(c). The terms "legal" and "just" are not

26
27
28

defied and leave 011e in the dark as to whether any particular action i5 "legal" or
"ju:sl." The;: me;:aning of these tenns depends on a subjective assessment by the one

43

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 44 of 73 Page ID #:44

defining them.
2

80.

The

~landard

"as appear to him (or herr is aiso sUbJective and

3
4

vagu\:: ~ince it requires an inquiry into the attorney's state of mind. The alleged

violator is not given tair warning in language that a person of reasonable

intelligence can understand of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed
7
8
9

and hence the line is not reasonably dear.


81.

The State Bar has previously taken a position that Plaintiff's

10

interpretation of the payment of super liens and other liens is legally correct and
11
12

complies with the State Bar's Rules of Professional Conduct. However, because of

13

the relationship between the State Bar official and his brother, a retired judge, and

14
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16

completely contrary to well established law and are doing so to carry out a corrupt

17

scheme by Defendants and disqualified judges to prejudge and actions against

18

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others adverse to Plaintiff, the State Bar is taking positions in this case that are

19

Plaintiff. The disqualified judges were disqualified by the Chief Justice of the

20

California Supreme Court. There is no meaningful review ofthe misconduct of the

21

Defendants in this case and other similar situated cases except by


. the filing of a
.

22
23

24
25

Complaint in the Federal Court.


82.

Section 6068(c) unconstitutionally chills

courtroom speech and thus infringes upon

in~court

content~based

speech protected by the First

26
27

28

Amendment. Such laws also violate equal protection becausc there is 110 guanmtee
that attorneys similarly situated to Plaintiff will be treated the same way under the
44

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 45 of 73 Page ID #:45

allegedly vague and overbroad discipline statutes.

""'

83.

Section 6068(c) is also constitutionally under inclusive because

3
4

many "lilJlegaI or [unliust" lawsuits brought from "corrupt" motives fall outside the

statute's limited scope and thus belie the State Bar's assertion that it has genuinely

pursued an interest "of the highest order" in disciplining attorneys for such conduct

8
9

(Section 6068(g) is unconstitutional facially and as applied in this case.)


84.

Incorporating the arguments in Section 6068( c), Plaintiff raises

10

facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of Section 6068(g). That


11

12

section imposes a duty "Not to encourage either the commencement or the

13

continuance of any action or proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or

14

interest." The statute is hopelessly vague for all the reasons stated in the challenge

en

15

,,0

16

to Section 6068, subdivision (c). For example, the terms "encourage" and "corrupt

tn~

17

motive of passion or interest" are not defined. The tern1S leave one in the dark as to

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0,",

18

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19

20

that a "motive" is "corrupt" or driven by "passion or interest." The meaning of the

21

statute depends on the subjective assessment of the one defining them. A

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what is required to show "encourage[ment]" or what circumstances demonstrate

22
23
24

25

hypothetical ban on "encourag[ing]" all "actions" from a "corrupt motive" would be


unconstitutional for overbreadth since it would prel'lumahly prevent the attorney
from bringing an action for improper motives even though the claim or defense was

26
27

28

based on reasonable cause.


85.

PlaintitI asserts the in-court actions for which Defendants seek


45

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 46 of 73 Page ID #:46

to discipline him were legal and proper because he had reasonable cause to bring

the actions as well as a constitutional right to vigorously advocate his client's

3
4
5

interests.
86.

Like Section 6068(c), subdivision (g) appears to distinguish

favored from disfavored court speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed.
7
8

Hence the statute is impermissibly content-based and violates the petition clause.

The statute does not further an important or substantial governmental interest

10

unrelated to the suppression of expression, and the resulting limitation on protected


11

12

court speech is greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the

13

govemmental interest of disciplining lawyers for the protection of the public.

14

til
r.......

r....."

15

87.

Like Section 6068(c), subdivision (g) is also under inclusive

16

because many "[ilJ\egal or "[unljust" lawsuits brought from "corrupt" motives fall

17

outside the statute's limited scope and thus belie Defendants' assertion that they

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19

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20

for such conduct. As to Plaintiffs underlying cases, the judges were disqualified

21

for engaging in acts that violated the California Code of .Judicial Rthics and sl'lid

have genuinely pursued an interest "of the highest order" in disciplining attomeys

22
23

disqualification was made by the Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court.

24

Good cause existed for each disqualification. No court imposed any sanction upon

25

Plaintiff for successfully moving to disqualify these judge:;. No discipline should

26
27
28

be allowed by the State Bar against Plaintiff where the judges did not seek any
saw.tiun against Plaintiff in their court. Any attempt to sanction Plaintiff should be
46

.. --...\

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 47 of 73 Page ID #:47

deemed unconstitutional for violation ofthe First and FOUlteenth Amendment of


2

the U.S. Constitution. Certain of the disqualified judges were denied elevation to

3
4

the courts of appeal. (Section 6103 is unconstitutional facially and as applied in

this case.)

88.

Incorporating the arguments with respect to Section 6068(c),

7
8

Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of Section 6103 facially. That section

would reach the failure to timely pay court-ordered sanctions. Based on the prior

10

misconduct of the State Bar and disqualified judges, Plaintiff is reasonably


II

12

concerned that he will be threatened with monetary sanctions ifhe continues to seek

13

the payment of the MediCal, MediCare and MediCaid super liens as mandated by

14

law.
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16

17

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89.

To the extent that Section 6103 does not consider a sanctioned

atto111ey's inability to pay, it is unconstitutional. The legitimate g@vernmental

18

interest in requiring compliance with lawful orders must recognize an atto111ey's

"'u~

19

20

right to collaterally challenge the order on constitutional grounds during

21

disciplinary proceedings, and the attorney's excuse for noncompliance by inability

Cl

22
23
24

25

to pay. Plaintiff also stands in a repre!>entative capacity for all others who may he
affected hy those actions by the State Bar in connection with disciplinary
proceedings.

26

27
28

90.

Section 6103 provides that "willful disobedience or violation of

an order ofthe court rcquiring him (or her) to do or forbear an act connected with or

47

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 48 of 73 Page ID #:48

in the eoursc-efhis (or her) profession, which he (or she) ought in good taithlfLdo
2

or forbear, and any violation of the oath taken by him (or her), or of his (or her)

3
4

duties as such attorney, constitutes cause for disbarment or suspension." (Ibid.)

Section 6103 outlines two (2) separate causes for disbarment or suspension: (1) "[a]

willful disobedience or violation or an order of the court requiring [the attorney] to

do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of his profession, which he

ought in good faith to do or forbear," and (2) "any violation of the oath taken by

10

him, or of his duties as [an] attorney."


11

12
13

91.

The standard "willful" requires an inquiry into the attorney's

state of mind as to what he or she thought "ought" to be done "in good faith" and

14

"'....-0:'"

",0

15

thus is totally subjective and vague. Any attempt to determine Plaintiffs state of

16

mind (i.e., willfulness) infringes upon the First Amendment protected limits for

17

judicial advocacy.

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92.

To the extent that Section 6103 is used to punish the failure to

20

pay court ordered monetary sanctions or collAterally attack the sanctions, it

21

conflicts with the law of California making it perfectly Il'lwf1l1 for an attorney to

22
23

24
25

ignore an order of the court if the attorney believes it unconstitutional. 1 (Section


6106 is unconstitutional facially and as applied in this case.)
93.

Incorporating Ule arguments as to Section 6068(c), Plaintiff

26

27

28

alleges that Section 6106 is unconstitutional facially and as applied to him. That
section provides that "[t]he commission of any act involving moral turpitude,
48

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 49 of 73 Page ID #:49

dishonesty or COlTuption, whether the act is committed i.n the course of his (or her)
:2

relations as an attorney or 1 See Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924,929-930 (9th Cir.

3
4

1992) (under California law attorney may disobey order and challenge order when

punishment sought) otherwise, and whether the act is a felony or misdemeanor or

not, constitutes a cause for disbannent or suspension." The tenns "moral turpitude,
7
8

dishonesty or corruption" are vague and incomprehensible. There are no objective

standards defining what an attorney is required to do or is prohibited from doing.

10

There is also no opportunity to defend against such charges and thus the statute
IJ

12
13

denies fair waming and is unconstitutional.


94.

A review of the California Case law dealing with "moral

14
<Il

15

turpitude, dishonesty or corruption" in the context of litigation conduct or the

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administration of justice fails to reveal a single controlling decision that either

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17

specifically discusses the statute's scope or explicitly limits its applicability to

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courtroom or judicial speech. There are no clearly delineated bounds to the reach of

f-<

21

Section 6106, and it fails to provide "fair notice to those to whom


95.

ritl is directed."

The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause requires a

22

23

statute to be sufficiently clear so as not to cause persons "of common intelligence ...

24

necessarily [to] guess at its meaning and [to] ditTer as to its application[.]" The

25

Statutory language provides insufficient guidance because it contains classic terms

26
27
28

of degree, without settled usage or tradition of interpretation in law.

96.
- - - - - - . _ - _ ..

An even more stringent vagueness test applies in this caSe


49

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 50 of 73 Page ID #:50

since the law reached a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct,


2

namely, judicial or court speech, and does not sufficiently identifY the conduct tllat

3
4

is prohibited. Accordingly, the law is void for tilree (3) reasons: (l) It punishes

lawyers for behavior that they could not have known was illegal; (2) It invites

subjective enforcement of the laws based on arbitrary or discriminatory


7
8

interpretations by government officers; and (3) It chills vigorous advocacy and the

exercise of First Amendment freedoms through court speech protected by tile

10

petition clause.
11

12
13

Plaintiffs seeks a temporary restraining order, preliminary and


permanent injunction restraining the State Bar related Defendants and each of them

14
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15

from enforcing, applying or using tile above-referenced statutes against any

16

member of the State Bar of California with respect to any documents file witil tile

Ef]tfl

17

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Court, statements made in a Court or any rights protected by the First and

18

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Fourteenth Amendments of tile United States Constitution and to strike down those

l?

20
21

statues as unconstitutional on their face or as applied.

FOURTH CLAIM FOR PROSPECTIVE DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTTVE

22
23

RELIEF AGAINST STATE BAR RELATED DEFENDANTS

24

THAT THE STATE BAR STATUTES AND RULES SETFORTHBELOWARE

25

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS ADMINISTERED.

26
27
28

97.

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 96 and each of

them as if set forth in full.


50

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 51 of 73 Page ID #:51

98.

Rule 213 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar Court

provides that: "In disciplinary matters, the State Bar has the burden to prove

3
4

culpability by clear and convincing evidence." However, it is not possible to prove

an attorney's subjective state of mind or motives as to the application of federal law

to speci'ftc conduct in federal litigation. Nor should bar judges apply specific
7

conduct to federal law by the standard "clear and convincing evidence," since the

determination of culpability in the bar court is made by an administrative law

10

judicial officer (a state bar judge) who lacks jurisdiction to decide federal questions.
II

12

Rather, federal questions are within the original jurisdiction of federal judges under

13

Art. III. Administrative law judges lack jurisdiction to detennine the propriety of

14

interpretations of federal law. It is not possible to prove by "clear and convincing


ill,..

15

u:.U

16

evidence" (or a fortiori by any other standard) that an attorney's subjective

u<

17

interpretation offederallaw violates the statutes which are the subject of this

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Complaint. The state court lacks the inherent jurisdiction to make any

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20

detenninations regarding the propriety of conduct in federal litigation.

21

Defendants' administration of the attorney discipline

22

23
2/1

25

system infringes on the juri sdiction ofthe Attorney discipline system ofthe federal
courts in violation of the Due Process and Supremacy Clause.
99.

The administration of the attorney discipline system by

26
27

28

Defendnnts infringes on thc exclusive jurisdiction of the attorney discipline system


of the federal courts, since federal courts may disciplillC attomeys appearing before
51

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 52 of 73 Page ID #:52

Lhem without regard to state disciplinary rules or procedures. The State Bar is
2

wholly without power to regulate practice before the federal courts because a

3
4

federal court has the undisputed power to control admission to its bar and to

discipline attorneys who appear before it.

()

100.

In order to effectuate the exclusive jurisdiction of the

7
8

federal courts in its power to discipline attorneys appearing before it, and in

furtherance of the salutary purposes of the All Writs Act, the doctrine of collateral

10
11

estoppel gives conclusive effect to orders in federal disciplinary proceedings in

12

subsequent state disciplinary proceedings involving the same conduct. Accordingly,

13

successive state disciplinary proceedings seeking suspension or disbarment for

14
en

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15

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Clause where the State Bar refuses to give collateral estoppel effect to federal

17

disciplinary decisions rejecting both suspension or disbarment.

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conduct disciplined in the federal cou.rts is unconstitutional under the Supremacy

101.

Notwithstanding the doctrine of res judicata and bar of

f-<

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20

successive state discipline proceedings under the All Writs Act, Defendants offer in

21

evidence in State Bar court proceedings federal monetary sanctions orders an.d

22
23

related federal findings and ask the Bar court to give the orders and findings

24

collateral estoppel or preclusive effect. Tn these circumstances, Defendants rely on

25

the doctrine of offen~ive non-mutual collateral estoppel to preclude the target

26

27

28

attorney from relitigating conduct previously sanctioned in federal court. Tbe effe(;l
of the successive State Bar disciplinary proceedings in situatiuns where federal
52

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 53 of 73 Page ID #:53

courts impose monet.ary sanctions is to deny the li:rrget due process because
2

monetary sanctions proceedings in federal cuurts do not afford the sanctioned


3
4

attorney an opportunity to call expert or percipient witnesses or otherwise present

evidence and nrgument 011 the question whether the attomey's conduct runs afoul of

applicablc federal stcmdards of the particular sanctions rule. The doctrine of


7
8

offensive Llun-mutual collateral estoppel improperly pennits the State Bar as a

litigant in state disCipline proceedings, but who was not a party to the prior federal

10

sa[Jction proceeding, to use federal findings and orders "offensively" and thereby
II

12

prevent the target attorney from relitigating the issues before the Bar court On the

13

ground that the issues were purportedly resolved in the federal sanction or

14
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15

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16

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discipline proceeding.

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on-going state or federal litigation violates due process .

18

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Failure to abate discipline proceedings pending resolution of

102.

The challenged discipline statutes contain no procedural

,...

19

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20

safeguards to ensure that the initiation of disciplinary action against attomeys does

21

not interfere with ongoing federal discipline proceedings. In the usual situation

-"C/)

22

23

powerful and (sometimes) politically-co1U1ected opposing parties in ongoing

24

proceedings file complaints with the State Bar against their opponent, the proposed

25

target of discipline. The complaints are routinely investigated hy the State Bar.

26
27
28

While the target is responding to Bar inquiries, the ongoing federal or state
litigation proceeds. Typically, disciplinary charges against the target are filed under
53

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 54 of 73 Page ID #:54

the challenged discipline statutes and the Bar commences discovery against the
2

target, who is embroiled with the complainants in federal and/or state litigation. The
3
4

target then seeks abatement of the charges under applicable rules of procedure, but

the Bar court anu Review department deny abatement and force the target to def1md

the disciplinary charges and respond to burdensome discovery with the intent to

7
8

drive the target from the practice oflaw. This results in denial of the target's right

to constitutional due process.

10

103.

Although the hearing and review procedures in the State Bar

II

12

Court may satisfY due process requirements of notice and a meaningful opportunity

13

to be heard on its face, it is the unconstitutional administration of those procedures

14
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15

by a biased State Bar Court and Review Department that deny due process to

... 0

16

targets like this Plaintiff and similarly situated attorneys. By definition, abatement

;:2(;8

17

of disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of ongoing state or federallitigatio11

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19

would 110t require the Bar court to allocate more time and resources to disciplinary

20

proceedings. Yet, abatement markedly minimizes the risk of an erroneous result in

21

the discipline proceedings because it atIords the target an opportunity to devote his

22

23

24
25

or her full energies to the defense rather than the ongoing litigation from which the
disciplinary charges arise, with the prospect that resolution of the ongoing litigation
may obviate the need for discipline or its legal basis.

26
27

28

104.

Nor would abatement result in an undue burden upon the

Bar court. Rather, abatement reduces considerably resources devoted to the


54

......"\

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 55 of 73 Page ID #:55

attorney disciplinary process, and instead promote:; professionalism, and fosters


2

substantial reliance on the Bar court as a professional administrative ann charged


3
4

with adjudicating cases of atturney discipline. Abatement also serves the public's

interest by cnabling the Bar court to dedicate more of its tinite resOurces to deciding

more pressing issues. In light of the increasing number of matters in which the State

7
8

Bar recommends disbannent or suspension, an abatement requirement would have a

beneficial impact upon the work of the Bar court, the public, members of the Bar,

10

the attorney targeted for discipline and the overall discipline system. Therefore, this

11

12

Court should conclude that, after analyzing and balancing the relevant factors, the

13

due process clause requires abatement of disciplinary proceedings pending

14

resolution of underlying state or federal litigation, because that procedure markedly


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16

minimizes the risk of an erroneous result in discipline proceedings and affords the

17

target an opportunity to devote his or her full energies to the defense of discipline

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18

(rather than the ongoing litigation from which the disciplinary charges themselves

,.

19

20

arise) and allows resolution of ongoing proceedings which may obviate the need or

21

legal basis for disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff is directly affected by the actions

...l",

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22

23

of the State Bar Court and the Client Security Fund in connection with its refusal to

24

abate the State Bar and Client Security Fund proceedings so that Plaintiff can

25

continue to successfully prosecute his cases in the state and federal court.. Plaintiff

26
27

28

should prevail in all of the cases pertaining to the actions that the State Bar and the
Client Security Fund wants to prejudge and predetermine without affording
55

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 56 of 73 Page ID #:56

examine witnesses and pres~nt evidence <:lIS he has in the pending state and federal

3
4

court cases. Plaintiff has already prevailed with respect to a substantial portion of

the litigation against those who filed applications with the Client Security Fund at a

court hearing un May 5, 2008. The action by the State Bar Defendants of colluding

with adverse parties to tile a false and fabricated application to the Client's SecUl'ity

Fund was designed to obtain collateral advantage over Plaintiff who provided the

10

State Bar with substantial documents to show that their claims constituted RICO
II

12

act violations and obstruction with the administration of justice. These applicants

13

were the subject matter of 59 orders against them to dismiss their cases with

14
i2

15

I-

::;

prejudice for willful violation of discovery orders in which they were represented

... u

16

by counsel of their choice.

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17

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of moneys and other consideration in excess of $ 1.25 million if they allowed their

18

These applicants were secretly promised compensation

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19

cases to be dismissed and did not pay the Medicare, Medicaid, and MediCal liens

!-

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20

against them. This conduct constituted unclean hands and fraud on the court as

21

well as fraud against Plaintiff when they did not pay the super liens or any other

22

23

liens from the proceeds of settlement and sought to conceal the settlement.

This

24

court should enjoin the prosecution of any claim before the State Bar Client's

25

Security Fund since there is no avenue of appeal or meaningful participation by

26
27

28

Plaintiff in those proceedings. The claims of the applicants are sham and meritlcss
and were in furtherance of a Rico Act scheme to commit massive fraud against
56

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 57 of 73 Page ID #:57

Plaintift: the judicial system and the government insurance programs such as
2

Medicare, MediCal and MediCaid in concert with corpurate defense counsel and
3
'I

their insurers. Jfthis COUlt docs not abate and stay the proceedings in the Client

Security Fund, the Court should appoint a special master to investigate the fraud on

the part of the applicants in seeking such unlawful compensation and in seeking to
7
IJ

avoid the pi;lyment of super liens and other liens in their cases including the lien of

Plaintiff. The State Bar related Defendants are acting in concert with the applicants

10

11
12
13

to avoid the payment of the statutory super liens, the vendor liens and the liens of

Plaintiff.
Plaintiff is involved in litigation with the applicants in numerous

14

interpleader actions, many of which have already been set for trial. The state and

"'

15

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federal court trials should be held first before the Client Security Fund makes any

gji:R

17

payment to these applicants especially since it is believed that the applicants will

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lose their cases in the court on the basis that they have practiced fraud on the court

f.<

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20

as well as fraud on the state bar. Any and all settlement monies including any

21

potential award to applicants is subject to these liens including the super liens

22

23

which cannot be avoided by the State Bar and the Client Security Fund in concert

24

with these applicants as a matter oflaw and any such agreement would violate

25

Plaintiffs civil and constitutional rights and the rules of the Client Security Fund

26
27

28

would be unconstitutional as applied in this case.


Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and
57

..........

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 58 of 73 Page ID #:58

pennanent injunction ordering defendants and tlach of them to cease and desist
2

from paying any money to applicant:; from the Client Security Fund until all of the
3
4

state and federal CQurt litigation is resolved between plaintiff and applicants.

6
7

105.

Tiltl State Bar has a direct and substantial hidden pecuniary interest in

havillg atturneys publicly diSciplined. As administered, the Bar discipline system

ha~

Cuurt do not have a direct, personal, and substantial pecuniary interest in the

10

i:I

~ystelUic

pecuniary bias. Although the individual judges of the State Bar

outcome of disciplinary proceedings, a systemic bias stemming directly from the

II

12
13

financial benefit resulting from attorney discipline.


106. On the one hand, under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.1 O(a),

14
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15

"[a]ny order imposing a public reproval on a member of the State Bar shaH include

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a direction that the member shall pay costs. In any order imposing discipline, or

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17

accepting a resignation with a disciplinary matter pending, the Supreme Court shall

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include a direction that the member shall pay costs." See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

20

6086.1 O(a) (italics added). The costs required to be imposed pursuant to this section

21

include all of the following: (1) the actual expense incurred by the State Bar for the

22

23

original and copies of any reporter's transcript of the State Bar proceedings. and any

24

fee paid for the services of the reporter; (2) all expenses paid by the State Hllr which

25

would qualify as taxable costs recoverabJe in civil proceedings; and (1) the charges

26
27

28

detennined by the State Bar to be "reasonable costs" of investigation, hearing, and


review. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.1 O(b).
58

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 59 of 73 Page ID #:59

107. On the other hand, in the unlikely event an attorney is


2

exonerated of all charges following a fonnal hearing, he or she is entitled to

reimburselmmt from the State Bar in an amount determined by the State Bar to be

the reasonable expenses, other than fees for attorneys or experts, of preparation for

the hearing. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.1 O(d). Hence, as an institution, the

State Bar is in competition with the attorneys it prosecutes and has a pecuniary

incentive in finding attorney conduct (or, alleged misconduct) worthy of public

10

discipline, in that it Can recover its costs in the preparation or hearing of

II

12

disciplinary proceedings, and costs incurred in the administrative processing of the

13

disciplinary proceeding only when the proceeding results in public discipline.

14

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108. The foregoing illustrates a "possible temptation" to discipline

16

attorneys and renders the State Bar Court a biased forum, which is a factor that

",en

17

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contributes to the unconstitutional administration of the discipline statutes.

'"'"

18

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20

of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators. Although the Bar judges

21

do not receive improper payments th.at might influence attorney disciplinary

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r

I.)

109. The pecuniary bias claim does not challenge the presumption

U
23

24
25

proceedings, a substantial portion of funding for the discipline system has its source
in the fines paid by disciplined attorneys.
110.

Also, the discipline system is in economic competition with

26

27

28

attomeys who are subject to discipline proceedings. First, there is a substantial


economic disparity between what the discipline system recovers from disciplined
59

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 60 of 73 Page ID #:60

aUurn<:y~,

and what it pays out to prevailing attorneys in the same discipline

proceedings. Second, the disparity in what the Bar recovers and what it pays out at

3
4

5
6

the conclusion of discipline proceedings constitutes an economic incentive which


encourages charges against attorneys as well as the imposition of attorney
discipline.

7
8
9

Proof of actual bias is not necessary to establish


unconstitutional administration ofthe discipline statues. Nor do allegations of

10

unconstitutional administration of the discipline statues require the disqualification


1I
12

of every judge of the State Bar Court because either the rule of necessity does not

13

require that the judges be disqualified, or the rule of necessity is inapplicable. See

14

...'"

'""

15

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code section 6079.1(e), which provides that the Supreme Court

16

may appoint pro tempore judges from among the members of the State Bar or

[ltD

17

,.

retired judges to decide matters in the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court

...
0,",

18

...J~

19

lJ

20

appointment of an administrative law judge or arbitrator independent of

21

employment by the State Bar to it in adjudication of disciplinary proceedings.

~U

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u

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...0f-

when a judge of the State Bar Court is unavailable to serve. The rule extends to

22
23
24

25

Plaintiff is inform.ed and believes that said statute is nlrther


unconstitutional because the State Bar seeks to recover retroactively additional
costs and expenses that were originally not l'ISsessed against the attomey when he

26
27
28

was (Hsdplined, including approximately $72 million in payments to the State Btu:

from attomeys who were previously disciplined. Such conduct by thc State Bar
60

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 61 of 73 Page ID #:61

constilutl;:::; a t:x

post facto violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution.

4
5

111.

The use of state bar officials, state bar investigators

and state bar dues of private attorneys to act unlawfully as the investigative arm of

Judge Vargas in conducting an unlawful indirect criminal contempt case against


7

Plaintiff and constitutes an unconstitutional use of state bar officials and

investigators and misappropriation of dues money for the direct benefit of

10

disqualified judges and opposing counsel. The State Bar had no jurisdiction or
II

12

power to aid and abet the disqualified judge in conducting an investigation as part

13

of an indirect criminal proceeding. No criminal discovery was allowed in that case.

14
Vl

"':::5I-

o.U

15

The State Bar investigators unlawfully interviewed witnesses including Plaintiff's

16

own co-counsel and clients without Plaintiff's knowledge and consent in violation

17

of Plaintiff's constitutional and due process rights.

00
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18

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19

This court has authority under the case of Keller v. State

20

Bar, 496US1 (1990) to deem. the unlawful use of State Bar officials and State Bar

21

dues against Plaintiff to be unconstitutional and to enjoin the State Bar from.

22
23
24

25

prosecuting attorneys such as Plaintiff, sub rosa, in civil or criminal cases without
the knowledge that they are participating in such proceedings. The State Bar and
Judge Vargas concealed and suppressed that the State Bar was taking an active role

26
27

28

in the indirect criminal contempt case as the investigative arm of Judge Vargas and
that they were acting in concert to prejudge and predetermine the outcome of that
61

,."...,
Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 \ Page 62 of 73 Page ID #:62

case and any future State Rar case based thereon including to seek involuntary
2

dis enrollment of Plaintiff as a result of a fraudulent conviction of PlaintifI Plaintiff


3
4

seeks a temporary restraining order, prd.iminary and pennanent injunction ordering

the state bar defendants to ceaSt;l and desist from utilizing any ofticial, investigator

or employee from the Stiilt;l Bar in connection with any other civil or criminal case

and to cease paying monies in connection therewith and to declare such utilization

unconstitutiunal.

10

The use of client security fund to gain co.llateral

II

12

advantage over an attorney is unconstitutional as applied where the attorney is

13

deprived of his due process rights to appear at a hearing and cross examine

14
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15

witnesses including the applicants. Moreover, the interpleader cases against the

16

applicants have been filed and many are set for trial in which Plaintiff, MediCal,

17

MediCare, MediCaid and others are entitled to receive payment of their liens.

;:::'<1

0:5

18

":u
,..l.,r,

19

""0

20

is totally fabricated and is contrary to the applicants verified statements,

21

declarations, and complaints which show that they are not entitled to any money,

>~
~:t

f-"

l?

This is especially true in this case where the application

22

23
24

25

whatsoever, and they engaged in a deliberate scheme to obstluct the administration


of justice, committed fraud on the court, and violated federal and state statutes
mandating the payment by them of the super liens of Medicare, Medicaid, and

26
27

28

Medi-Cal.
112. Plaintiff seeks to have this Court deem to he unconstitutional the
62

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 63 of 73 Page ID #:63

posting of complaints against attorneys without the filing of a formal proceeding.


2

There is no provision in the State Bar Rules for an evidentiary hearing or any other
3

hearing to dett:nnine the validity of the complaint before the State Bar can post the

complaint to the State Bar website. Opposing corporate defense counsel could

seriously damage Plaintiff or any other similarly situated attorney by the posting of

7
8

non meritorious complaints against Plaintiffinciuding by the payment of unlawful

compensation to complainant to make false charges as they did in the instant case.

10

113. Plaintiff seeks a temporary retraining order, preliminary and

11
12

permanent injunction ordering defendants and each ofthem to cease and desist

13

from interfering in any court case including by extra judicial ex parte

14
en

r'l
f-<

15

communication with the sitting judge or its staff to improperly influence the court

16

in connection the matters that are before the court. Such provision should equally

"'u"'~

apply to the State Bar, its officials and its investigators.

0(

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00
.

17

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0-,

18

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19

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>-.:
>:c

10.

For a temporary restraining order and a preliminary

F-

l-<

IJ

20

injunction restraining the State Bar related Defendants from filing a Notice of

21

Disciplinary Charges against Plaintiff pending the review ofthe evidence against

22
23

24

Plaintiff by this Court and Plaintiffs evidence and response thereto by a special
master of this Court.

25
26

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

27

FOR DEC LARA TORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST ALL

28
63

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 64 of 73 Page ID #:64

DEFENDANTS
2

114.

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 113 and eueh of

them as if set forth in full.


4

115.

This Court. has authority to provide relieftQ Plailltifffor gross,

misconduct as alleged herein by the State Bur Defendants ami defendants Gregory

O'Brien and Sarah Overton for the tainting of the investigative process that has
8
')

10

damaged these investigations beyond repiiir. Defendants and each of them


participated in the concerted activity to prejudge and predetennine cases against

II

12

\I'J

13

herein, Plaintiff requests this Court to enjoin the Bar investigations that has

14

become

~o

unprofessional and so oppressive that it abusive investigative tactics

15

<

Plaintiff ine.luding the indirect criminal contempt case. For the reasons stated

warrant removal ofinvestigative counsel and the investigator. Plaintiff requests

",0

16

"'u~'"
.u'"

17

this Court to appoint a special master to investigate the conduct of each of the

~;:s

18

lJefendants named in this Complaint in connection with their role in predetennining

00

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19

t-<
H

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20
21
22

and prejudging the mUltiple cases against Plaintiff without jurisdiction.


For a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and permanent injunction
restraining the defendants and each of them from destroying any documents relating

23

24

to Plaintiff, the state bar investigation of Plaintiff, their relationship with

25

disqualified judges including Judge Luis R. Vargas and to preserve and protect all

26

of the documents in their possession, custody or control and that of their agents and

27

28

representatives until this case is finally resolved based on the spoliation of evidence
64

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 65 of 73 Page ID #:65

that has taken place by the State Bar Defendants to dutt:.


2

PRAYER FOR RELIEF


3
4

WHERDl'ORE Pluinliffprays for judgment as follows:


l'IRST CLAIM FOR DECLARATOR AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST

THE STATE BAR RELATED DEFENDANTS

7
8

1.

1'0r an order declaring that B&P Code 6007)(4) is

unconstitutional;

10
11

2.

For a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent

12

injunction ordering Defendants and each of them to cease and desist fr0111

13

enforcing, applying or using B&P Code 6007)(4) or any regulation or rule

14

'"t::

.:

15

.. 0

16

u<

'"

17

e;:1

18

implementing such against any member of the State Bar of California;


SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF

00

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II

19

3.

For an order declaring B&P Code 6106 unconstitutional;

4.

For a temporary restraining order, preliminary and pennanent

20

injunction restraining Defendants, and each of them, from enforcing, applying Or

21

using B&P Code 6106 against any member of the State Bar of Cali fomi a with

2')k
',1

24

respect to any document filed in a court, statement made in a court or any right
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution;

25

THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF

26
27

28

5.

For declaratory or injunctive relief barring Defendants from

disciplining Plaintiff based on in-court statements related to the actions and/or


65

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 66 of 73 Page ID #:66

proceedings, under any of the above bar statutes or rules on the grounds that they
2

are facially overboard and void for vagueness and infringe a substantial amount of

3
4

protected COUlt sp~\;l\;h in violation of the 1:'irst and Fourteenth Amendments.


G.

For declaratory or injunctive relief barring Defendants from

disdplining Plaintiff under the challenged discipline statutes on the ground that

7
8

Plaintiffs expressive conduct is privileged or immunized fTom discipline brought

under any of the challenged bar statutes or rules.

10
11

7.

For declaratory or injunctive relief barring Defendants from

.12

disciplining Plaintifffor actions, proceedings or claims brought in United States

13

Courts, on the ground that as applied to Plaintiff such discipline would violate the

14

<e

'-'<0

15
16

Supremacy Clause and Due Process.


8.

For declaratory or injunctive relief barring Defendants from

00
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17

0:1
>.rf.

18

~O
~~

19

0
0

20

9.

For reasonable attorneys fees and expenses under 42 USC 1988.

21

8.

F or such other and further relief as justice requires.

W;otl

unconstitutionally administering the discipline system in violation of the Due


Process and Equal Protection Clauses.

22

FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

7J
24

25

II.

For a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and pemlRnent

injunction restraining the state bar defendants from enforcing, Rpp1ying or using

26
27

28

any state bar official, investigator or state har dues to aet in concert with others in
the prosecution of any cases or proceedings against Plaintiff.
66

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 67 of 73 Page ID #:67

12.
2

For declaratory or injunctive relil;lfbarring Defendants from

unconstitutionally admin.istering the discipline system in violation of the Due

3
4

Process and Eyual Protection Clauses.

13.

For a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and pennanent

injunction restraining the state bar defendants from paying any monies to applicants

from the Client Security Fund until all the litigation between applicants and

Plaintiffs is resolved including the interpleader actions.

10

14.

F or a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction

11

12

restraining the State Bar related Defendants from filing a Notice of Disciplinary

13

Charges against Plaintiff pending the review of the evidence against Plaintiff by

14

this Court and Plaintiff's evidence and response thereto by a special master ofthis

,..
CI1

;:;"'

15

u.U

16

gjtR

17

Court.

00

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FIFTII CLAIM FOR RELIEF

;;;;,:;
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1::0
0

11

18

19

15.

For a temporary restraining order, a preliminary and permanent

20

injunction restraining the defendants and each of them from destroying any

21

documents relating to Plaintiff, the state bar investigation of Plaintiff, their

22
23

relationship with disqualified judges including Judge Luis R. Vargas and to

24

preserve and protect all of the documents in their possession, custody or control and

25

that of their agents and representatives until this case is fimdly resolved.

26
27

28

16.

For the appointment of a special master in connection with thc gross

misconduct on the part of defendants in this case including thc concerted activitil;ls
67

''"''''''''

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 68 of 73 Page ID #:68

to prejurlge and predetermine the eases agaio:;l Plaintiff.


2

ON ALL CLAIMS FOR REUbI:'


3
4

15. Forreasonable attorneys' fees and expenses under 42U.S.C.l988 to co-

counsel for Plaintiff.

16. For such other and further relief as justice requires.


7
8
9

DATED: November 4, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

10
II

12
13

14
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15
16

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17

C;::J

18

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19

Cl

20

:;:0\1

~5
S

21
22

21
24

25
26
27
28

68

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 69 of 73 Page ID #:69


RONALD N. GOTTSCHALK, ESQ . SBN 050625
GOTTSCHALK & ASSOCIATES

1160 SOUTH GOLDENWE$T AVENUE, SUITE 3


ARCADIA, CALIFORNIA 91007
TELEPHONE: (310) 4763197

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


CKNTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
RONA to N. GOTTSCHALK,

CASE Nl}MaER

J:aTlI'F~

'\1.

."..-

STAT.. BAt( t:lf- all Fat" /II,'Q..,

c..;

_.

U8

- 01568

VAP

~OV~

~---------------------------I

HIA cJ....".A)

SUMMONS
DEFENl)ANT(S).

TO:

DEFENDANT(S): Above-named Defendants


A lawsuit has been filed against you.

Within 20 days after seni"" urlhi~ ~ummons on you (not counting tile day you received it), you
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached I!!f complaint 0
amended complaint
o counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 of the FenerH!. Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer
or motion must be served on the plaintiff's attorney, RONALD N. GOTTSCHALK
, whose address is
1160 SOUTH GOLDENWEST AVENUE, SUITE 3, ARCADIA, CA 91007
. If you fail to do so,
judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file
your answer or motion with the court.

Clerk, U.S.

jgtri.ct Court ,,"


.

'

,
,

, ",

Dated: -~MlUlf1jll..
_ _ __
_~MQ!f1jlL'_~_(_.
_~.-:;(_.

,'.'..7:
(Soul

if the dq(endant is the

60 days hy R"/,, U(a)(3)].

tV-OI" (12/07)

United States 01' a United States agency.

\:'.'

J .-.::.~-

qlth~,.~~'~rt~:., . ~,"<'\:~~>.,/

i"\ "- ,'-~


..
\.
0/' i . an ~fficer 01' employee ;,jf'rW{yIim.!ttSt~~e ... Allowed
....~

fU.. , 60 days

"',

~ ....

~ I ....
~
' ,

\.\."

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 70 of 73 Page ID #:70

ATTACHMENT TO SUMMONS (Form CV-OIA(12/07)

LIST OF DEFENDANTS

STATE BAR OF CALIPORNlA, a public corporation;


THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF TIlE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA;
THE JUDGES OF THE STATE BAR COURT, collectively;
CLIENT SECURlTY FUND OF THE CALIFORNIA STAlE BAR;
SCOTT J. DREXEL, Chief Trial Counsel ofthe State Bar of Califomi a
PAUL O'.BRlEN, an individual;
GREGORY O'BRlEN, an individual;
JOHN NOONEN, an individual;
TOM LATTON, an individual; and
SARAH OVERTON, an individual,

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 71 of 73 Page ID #:71


UNJTED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CI\1L COYER SH1l1
'(3) PLAINTIFFS (Check box if you arc rcprc$C'nting YO\lrsclr~

DEFENDANTS

RONALD N. GOTTSCHALK

SEE ATTACHED LIST

Artorney, (If Known)

(b) Attorneys (Finn Name. Address and Telephone Number. If you arc representIng
yOt.lt'sclf. provide "smc.)
GOTI'CHALK & ASSOCIATES

~t'Jd PUTM.~N

&. AS.SOCIATt!S

1160 SOUTH GOLDENWEST AVENUE. SUng l


ARCADIA. CA 91007
JIl. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES For Diver,ity C.,c, Only

11. RASTS OF .JURISDICTION (Place:ln X in Me b('!;t. Oflly.)

(PI!.\~i::. an

DIU .S. Government Plaintiff

!13 Federal Qucstkm (U.s.


Government Not:l Party)

X in one b()~ for piaintiffand om:: for dr.;:f~ndant,)


rTF Dl>F
Incorporated or Princlpal Place
01 01

Citi:r.cn ofThi~ St{ltc

('If13\l~incs~

0:2 U.S. Government Ocfcndsnt

04 Divcriliry (Tndk,3.tc Citi?:eMhip Citizen of AMthcr St3.tc


ofP~rties

IV. OJUGtN

(PI~cC:;"l1'l

~l OI'igin~1
Pr()~cedit'lf!

X 111. on box

PTF DEF

04

04

in thi!i State

02

02

incorporated and Principal Place 05


off.:h.lsincS(I in Another State

05

Citizen or Subjct ora Foreign Country 03

03

FOfCign Nation

tl6

in (tern III)

06

~~t'lly,)

02 Rcmoved fr(lm
SU~1e C(1)rt

0 3

RCIll~ndod from
Appcllutc Court

04 Reinstated or 0 5 Tt":\llsfcrrcd from ~noth(,':r (listrh~t (specify):


RcoD(!t'lCd

o7

('j Multi~

District

Litigl'l.tion
V. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT,

JURY DEMAND: 0 Yo,

Appeal to Di!ltTict
Jud~c from
Magistrate Judge

(Check 'Ye!l' only if demanded in complaint.)

t:l MONEY DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT: $

CLASS ACTION under F.R.C.P.Z3: 0 y" I!f'No

VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an 'X In one box only,)

OTfn;~R SfAftrt~'" :':

~OO Sl"lcRcapp~rtiQl\';Cl\t"

['] 410 Antitn.1S(


o 430 Bank~ and Banking
U ~~o Commcrce!ILl:
1"14iO R!'I"kf"'.tc~c~r It'lI111c~nr:f"'c!

and Corrupt

Ofg<lrli7.ation~
C<1J1~~lmcr Cl'c(lit

~ :;~ ;:I~I~:~~t~le~ke

U lj!:ll
tlSl}2

n !l:9A
0894

o ~95

rJ 900

0950

,:;.i:'(!~;:':l! ;n:T;~;:::rilTI,~ij~'~Gij?!r::i'i'Ii'}~\:i i;?\i0f1FTi'~(51~tfS;iZiiF!~r:::;::,: '!i]%!;H~~t~~~~iT:h;ii:,;;:-!li:!;C;;!:iHi~;!i;i~~~,R:;!;::':':::';\:1;,:'::':,:::::


PERS()NALINJ1.IRY
PERSONi\L
::' ":'!""PIl1t:r!(<JII'j5',.,/, ',::,.: 0710 Fa" Labor St,ndard,

0 120 Marinc

0 130 Millcr Act


U 141) i'JOgOil<"1bIO Insttunll1t

Uabltity

0151 Mdicilt' Act


0 152 R\.:(:ovcry ofOefm.lltcd

~~~~~;l~~~oan

0 310 Airplane
0 ~ 15 Ahpl~f'I "roduct
LilJbiliLy
0320 ASS!'ltl1t. Libel &

Sl~t'ldcr
0330 Fed. Employc!'!I'

Overpayment &
P,nt'nrr.f"'.n1rnt nt
Judgment

(ExeL
0153 Rcc(lvery of
B.-.:r.-~~l1P:~
('h,,;orp;\ynir.:lit of
Customcl' Ch(ll1cngc 12
Veteran':;; Benefits
USC 3410
0160 Stockholders'Suits
Othet' Statutory Actions 0 190 Other COfltf1tCt
I\grkllll(Jr~1 A~l
019.5 Contract Product
Economic Stl.lbilization
Liability
Act
0 196 Franchi!le

o R50 ScCllt'itic~/Co1T1moditieM

o S?5
o R90

0' 11'0' InslOranee

0150 Rccoyeryof

R'ltcs/cte.
0460 Deporlation

o 480

::,:<':::':""':<; ;<qm~&~f:i:':~

Cl340 M~rit'lc

0345 Marine Prndlltl

M L\o~ tOo;]r \v\o'hl\I"'c1 ~

Do 3$55
3
,.
produ\;tLiabiiity
0;):00 O1IJ(H P!;l11;onal

Injury
0362 Personal Injury~
Med Ma.lpractice
0 36~ p~rson;11Inj~lry~
Product Liability
0368 Asbestos Pcrsonal

PROPERTY
0 510 Motion,!; to
0 370 Other Fraud
Vacate Sentence
U.l"fl fi'uth in L.C"n(l1tlg
l'rob~l\s corpl,l$
0380 Other PCl'i;ofiill Cl530 Gencral
Property Damage [J 535 DCi.lth P!,)nalty
n j,:;\'i Prnpf'rty n!'lrnR~" 0 'i40 M!'Inrl."Imn<;i
Product Liability
Othcr
!':!:!:::i\;$1i~){tJ:P~~:.!,:A::';:; 0550 Civil Rights
0422 App1.'I128 USC 0555 Pri:!iOIl Condilion
158

423 0~~dr;;aI2R

0444 Welfare
C1445 A1l1cl'ican with
BlwiI'",nITlent5'l1 Mlltten; :,X:::::;;: i,;~Et4:l:J~"pR.6PHRrY::,:::',)'i 'X
Inj1)~ P",,<ll.lot
OiSl'INHti8
Energy AHOl1tiot1 Ad 0210 Land Condemnation
U;:\biHty
mployment
Freedom or Info. Act
0220 Forcc!o!iurc
r,I'i::::::'::':\lMtvH(1~~a)1t1Jt:::i~~n:) 0446 American with
Appc:::\1 of Fcc Detcnni- 0230 Rcnt T..t;:.1SC.[/.;. Ejcct.fI1(!t1t 0462 NatmnlizDtion
Di!)abilitics"
11:'111011 Undcr Equal
0240 Torts 10 Lond
AppllC3tlOn
Other
l\(CCS$ to .Iu~ticc
0145 Tort Product liability 0463 Hnbc"s Corpus~
1!!"440 01~hcr Civ;1
Cl111stitl.ltionmli1yof
0290 All Other Real Property
AI!t:!t1l)etl1iTlce
Right~
SI;Il'~ Sj'("Itlltl':'~
0465 Other Immigration

oS20

0625

0630
06-10
(J 650

0 660

0690

Other Fo;;od &


Drug
Drug Related
Seizure of
Property 21 USC
!!lSI
Liquor La\,",!!
R,R, &. it'1)o;!k
Airline Regs
Occupational
Safety !Health
Other

AI;!iol'l~

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:

ID cv 88

KIilHl.ttQns
0730 T...aborfMgmt.
Roporting &
r1hdn<;11rr Art

0 740 Railway Labor Act


0790 On'lcrLabor
Li1.ig<ltion

f;(t:;,:;/~:?:~!~~:,(i!/:':,if: u 79I ~mp1. Ret. Inc.

0610 Agriculture

:'~:I~::::ijNI!J::::rt1~ttt~::-1:::';:':, 0

0441 Voting
0442 Employment
0443 Housing/Aceo.
mmodatiom

Act
r;1 720 LaborfMgmt.,

:':'<:':"'ijii(JS;~~~:~til,itS? ';:':
0 8'0 ("op)lrishtli

0830 Patent
0840 Trademark.

:rn,i!;i,)!SOOj.~rflisE~ti~IT:Sf;::::':';:'
U tI~1 H1A (i;.i'i:5n)
0862 BI(lck Lung (923)
0 863 DIWCi01WW
(405(8))

0864

ssm Title XVI

:9,,~~.!J\~,,[~~7,~~J~, :.,,~;4':,:"
,I .. ,

::r;"I:;I:"e.:tI..$.l1.-"I,(A;h,:$t:!I"',~"",,

0870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff


or Defendant)
0 871 IRS~Third P('l.rty 21'i
T1.0;:;."-: 7':;09

Ca!'lc Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.

AFTER COMPI~ETlNG!f1E FRONT SIDE OF FORM CY.7l, COMPLETE TIlE INFORMATION REQU"ST"D BELOW.
CV-71 (051O!)

CIVIL COVRR SHEET

Page I of2

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 72 of 73 Page ID #:72


UNITED I!iTAn:S DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFOAAIA
CIVIL COVER SHIlET
VIIl(aJ . OENTICAL CASE'S~ T-las thi~ act.ion been previously filed in this COurt and dismis!;cd, rmandcd or do~cd? [!(No r:J Yos
nU1TIbcr(s): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Ifyc.~.listca$c

,:u

TI01.Vr:;l (lily U~i1Cl:' been previously filed


Try", 1i,1 ,,,so number(I): CV 080466 SOL rOP,)

VUI(b). RELi\ TD CASES;

Civil (:ases are dC(lm"rr ,."Illted if !II

(Check all boxos lhut a.pply)

IX. VF:.N'UE: (When

(a)

o0

pt'~\'iou!'lly

OItd ca.~;: Aud

(h~

1tl this court that arc

rolatd to the present case?

[j No

~Yes

prc:!pcnt C3!je!

~A. Ari!>O from the same or closely rclatcd transactions. happcnillgs. or events; Or
Call for detc1'minution ofthc same or liubstantially rcl~tcd or simil;1r questIons of law and fact'; or
i!1'(" 'Fur other Nasons would cnt1.jJ slibstanti\ll duplical.ion of labor ifhcard by diffcrcntjudgc!;; or
onc ofthc f.,crors identified above in a, b or c also IS present,
D D, Involve the s~mc: patent, trademark Or copyright.!!!ll! one

n.

!:1nmr.-k'~\ns

the following itlF..,rmD.tion,

Ub\J all

a\JtJltlonal ShCCt if necessary.)

namcd plaintiff rcsid(::s,


Uflt 1he County in this Distriet; California County cumide ofthlR District; State ifcther th~n. California; or FQl'I';!i,gn Country, in whieh EAClt named
ChC\; klhcre
d1l:!:okcd.;go
go to it';:lll [L).
lcre if
lC govcl'nlt'lent,
l 'its
Its ;lgcnciell or emplovces
cmp/o'LcS is a nalt'u~t'l pl.l'l'ntif( lfthie bQ7'l j!:; d1l:!:okcd.
ChC\;k
f tthe

Cnunty in

1.)'('ltriet!~
lhl.~ 1.)'('ltrict!~

California County (')u!:.~;dt;,'O ofthi$Oistrict; State, if other than California; (lr Foreign Country

LOS ANGELES

(b) Li.,t lliu C:uUJlly iJ'] this DiStrict; Cal,tbrnin Cmmty Qutsid of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country; in which EACJJ named defendant residcs.
0 Chcck
Chcek here if
the government its
its~gcneiQs
emplOYees ill a '!lamed defen.dant. If this bol'{ is checked, 20 to item
(c),
ifthc
ogcneiQS Or emploYees
itcmj:!,
C(l~lnty itll~i~ District:~
Distriet:~

ClI.lii'()t'tl!:'l Qunty ()ut~idc ofth'ilIo Di~lril<~; 8t.olTC. [fotllet' thim Calltomi\l; or

~SlDb

Foreirpt
Foreirpl Countt'y

Li~t tne County in thIs Dimrict; Califof'M1Q County out!lidc ofthi!1 Dis1:til,;:t; State if other th;1.1i Cahforni.,: or Foreign c.ountry, iii which EACH claim arose,
NQjC
cQ.,demnat'on (!3!iI!!II., IIiII:r
IliI!:.r thll> Il)eMinn
loeM.0 n n('thc trDd
t r ad ()tl.1J.
.
Nl)jC; I
Inn land cQ.,demnatlon
()tl.1J.nd
n d fnV(loI"o::Ll
-'

(C)

County in

thi~ District~'"

Califomia
Califomi:l. County oul~!dc ofthl~ District: SL'l.tt!, ifother than

C!11ifomkt~
C!l1ifomi:1~

(lr
or Foreign Countt;y

RTVERSlDE

Orang.... San BcrnardlM. Riversidc! Ventura! Sant.a Barbars1 or San Luis Obi~po
Nt/;!:' land condemnation I,;:ascs use t e' ation or the tta
nd inv vcd
~ Lo~ A,n~ele.!il

Countle.~

x.
~'GNAT~JR.r:.
OF' A
ATTORNl:lY
Dan! November 4,2008
4; 2008
X. "GNA
TVR" OF
TT01\N!\Y (OR PR.O
P~O PER): _ _
_':lS!!!~~~~!1~~I!~~=_
""--.:::::~:.:.:="=-.::/,'-"H::.'1~';;~::......:::...__ 1>.",

__

Notke to Cmm.~(':l/l"ardQs: Ihe CV 71 (JS-44) Civil Cover Sheet ~nd the infot't'nnti(1n cMI'ained herein Dcithcrrplace
Dcithcrrplaee nor supplement I,h filing and service of"lcadingR
or other papc!'s \IS
\Iii; TCQuil'llld by law. Thil!; thrm, approved by thoJ\ldiciu! Cl'lnf(lronccurtho United Statcs in September 1974, is required I'tJ1':!iuant to Local Rule 3~ 1 is not flk:d
orotncr

initiatil1gtne civil docket ~he/;:t, (FormOI'C detailed instrtlctionll,


instruction$ sheet.)
but IS \lsed by the Clerk ofthc Court for the purpose;: t~f:statiRtics, venue al'ld initiatil1gtnc
inst11.ll.':tionll, sec sopalllte instructions
Key to Sti.ltil>tic.(11 cod!,)::; relating to Soci~' Security Cases:

Nature of Suit Code

Abbrnlatlon

SlIbstanth'c Sh\tcment of Calise of Action

;OJ

HTA

(Modicarc) undorTitlc '8. Part A,


A. of tho Social Secut'ity Act, U
a:mendc(1,
AU claims for health in:mraneo benetlts (Modiearc)
U a:mcndc(1,
Also, itlCltldc claim~ by hospit.."Ils. skilled I1l.lfsing facilities, etc., for (:crtificatiotl ;:'s providers of~crvice$
of~crviee$ l.lOdel' thr.:
pro~ra",.

(42 U.S.C. 19l5FF(b)

862

SL

bcn~fit~ tmder TWo 4, Part B. of


ofthc
1\11 clalnl~ fOt "Black Ll,lng" ben~fit~
the Fc(!oral Coal Mit')o Health and Safety Act of 1969.
U.S.C. 923)
(30 V.S.C.

.13(,:)

orwc

S~~urit.y Act. ali


All claims fiI<:d by ingUNd workets for di~bjlity inl'lur~nc: benefits under Title 2 ortne
of the Social S~\;urit}'
cl:iim,s filed for child'l'I itl$urance
itl$uranec bc.:li~titli basc.:<1 On disability, (42 U.S.C. 405(0))
amended; plus all claims

~(j3

OTWW

All cli:liml'l filod fOT'.... jclw~ or wi(low(;r., iJJ~urO!l1W benefitS baaed Ofl (1lSablllty
(1IS<lblllty und.;:r Title 2 oltho Social Security
Act, WI "",""dod. (42 U.S.C, 405(g)

864

ssm
SSID

I:Ifj.jl.<w S~ci~.l 80wuulilY


All claims for supplcmo-ntal security income N\ymenm ha~crll1pnn (lit5lbll;ty flied Ulld.... r Titl~ 1(, I:Ifjh<w
amenQed,
Act, as amcnQed,

865

RSI

a$ 'ImcndiXI. (42
All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Tit'~ 21)fthc SQc.:iaI Security Act, as
T.T s.c. (I)

CV1T (05108)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

f'i.lge:2 of2

Case 5:08-cv-01556-SGL-OP Document 1 Filed 11/04/08 Page 73 of 73 Page ID #:73

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NonCE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE .WDGE FOR DISCOVERY

This case has been assigned to District Judge Virginia A. Phillips and the assigned
discovery Magistrate Judge is Oswald Parada.
The case nllm her on an documents filed with the Court should read as follows:

EDCVOB- 1556 VAP (OPx)


Pursuant to General Order 05-07 ofthe United States District Court for the Central
District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related
motion.s.

All discovery related motions should be noticed on the calendar of the Magistrate Judge

=====:

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

A copy of this rlOticEi must bEl selVed with the summons and complaint 011 all defendants (if iii remova/llcfion Is
flied, Il copy of this notice must be served 011 all plaintiffs).
Subsequent documents must be filed at the following location:

Western DiviSion

312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-B


Los Angeles, CA 90012

Southern Division
411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053

Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516

[X] Ea$tern Division


3470 Twelfth St., Rm. 134
Riverside, CA 92501

Failure to file at the proper location will result In your documents being returned to you.

CV18 (03/06)

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 28 Filed 02/03/16 Page 1 of 7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

VANESSA HOLTON (111613)


General Counsel
LAWRENCE C. YEE (84208)
Deputy General Counsel
DANIELLE LEE (223675)
Assistant General Counsel
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL
180 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105-1639
Telephone: (415) 538-2517
Fax: (415) 538-2321
Danielle.lee@calbar.ca.gov
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, JAYNE
KIM, JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, GREGORY P.
DRESSER, ROBERT A. HENDERSON, SUSAN I.
KAGAN, SUSAN CHAN, CHRISTINE
SOUHRADA, AMANDA GORMLEY, AND
SYED M. MAJID

12

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

13

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

14
15

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,


Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,

16

v.

17

Louis Liberty, et al.,


Defendants/Counter-Claimants.

18
19
20

Case No. 16-cv-22 TEH


STATE BAR PLAINTIFFS/COUNTERDEFENDANTS REPLY TO COUNTER
AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS BRIEF IN
RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW
CAUSE (ECF #21)
Date:
Time:
Dept.:
Judge:

February 22, 2016


8:30 a.m.
Courtroom 2, 17th Floor
Honorable Thelton E. Henderson

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (State Bar),

21
JAYNE KIM, JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, GREGORY P. DRESSER, ROBERT A.
22
HENDERSON, SUSAN I. KAGAN, SUSAN CHAN, CHRISTINE SOUHRADA, AMANDA
23

GORMLEY, and SYED M. MAJID (State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants) submit this

24
reply in accordance with this Courts ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: JURISDICTION;
25
ORDER VACATING BRIEFING AND HEARING SCHEDULES dated January 13, 2016.
26
(ECF #21.)
27
28
1
STATE BAR PLTFS./COUNTER-DEFS. REPLY TO COUNTER/CROSS-DEFS.
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21)

Case No 16-cv-22 TEH

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 28 Filed 02/03/16 Page 2 of 7

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REMAND THE ACTION TO STATE


BAR COURT

2
3

After improperly removing his attorney disciplinary proceedings, Respondent Liberty,

when faced with this Courts Order to Show Cause why the case should be remanded based on

lack of jurisdiction simply responds that he does not oppose having his attorney disciplinary

proceeding remanded. The case should be remanded immediately.

As this court correctly pointed out, attorney disciplinary proceedings are not civil actions

within the meaning of the removal statute. They "are sui generis, neither civil nor criminal in

character." Yokozeki v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 436, 447 (1974); see also In re Rose, 22 Cal. 4th

10

430, 440 (2000). As such, they may not be removed to federal court pursuant to the general

11

removal statute. See Alaska Bar Assoc. v. Dickerson, 240 F. Supp. 732, 734 (D. Alaska 1965)

12

("The complaint before the Grievance Committee clearly discloses that it is simply a disciplinary

13

proceeding wherein it is alleged that respondent's conduct violated certain rules of the Alaska

14

Bar Association. As such, it is not a civil action within contemplation of the federal removal

15

statute."); see also In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 484 (D.N.M. 1992) (remanding an action

16

removed under 28 U.S.C. 1442-which allows for removal of a "civil action or criminal

17

prosecution" brought against a federal officer or agency-and stating: "In light of the regulatory

18

function of a disciplinary proceeding, which federal courts have consistently left in state hands,

19

the Court finds this disciplinary proceeding is not a 'civil action' against nor a 'criminal

20

prosecution' of John Doe."); see also Razatos v. Colorado Supr, Ct., 746 F.2d 1429, 1435 (10th

21

Cir. 1984) (disciplinary action not a civil proceeding); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 469, 475 (7th Cir.

22

1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) Civil Rights (disciplinary proceeding not a criminal

23

prosecution); In the Matter of John Doe, Esq., 801 F.Supp. 478, 48184 (D.N.M.1992)

24

(disciplinary action neither civil nor criminal in nature). The court should remand the action

25

forthwith.

26

///

27
28
2
STATE BAR PLTFS./COUNTER-DEFS. REPLY TO COUNTER/CROSS-DEFS.
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21)

Case No 16-cv-22 TEH

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 28 Filed 02/03/16 Page 3 of 7

1
2

II.

THE ALLEGED COUNTER-CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS WELL


Because Respondent Liberty improperly tried to remove his attorney disciplinary

proceeding, which is not a civil action within the meaning of the removal statutes, the alleged

counter-claims must be dismissed as well. This Court is required to remand claims not coming

within its diversity, federal question, or supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1441(c); see also

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 563 (2005) (district court has

original jurisdiction of a civil action for purposes of 1441(a), as long as it has original

jurisdiction over a subset of the claims constituting the action).

Counter-claims arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the

10

opposing partys claim and does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot

11

acquire jurisdiction. Fed Rules Civ. Proc. 13(a)(1)(A), (B). Courts look to a number of factors,

12

including, inter alia, whether there is a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim.

13

Underwriters at Interest on Cover Note JHB92M10582079 v. Nautronix, Ltd., 79 F.3d 480 483,

14

fn. 2 (5th Cir. 1996) (an affirmative answer to any of the four factors indicates the claim is

15

compulsory).

16

A logical relationship exists when the counterclaim arises from the same aggregate set

17

of operative facts as from the initial claim, in that the same operative facts serve as the basis of

18

both claims or the aggregate core of facts upon which the claim rests activates additional legal

19

rights otherwise dormant in the defendant. In re Pegasus Gold Corp., 394 F.3d 1189, 1195-

20

1196 (9th Cir. 2005); (emphasis added) Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., 705 F.3d 1108,

21

110 (9th Cir. 2013).

22

Here, there is no such relationship between the alleged counter-claims against the State

23

Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants and Libertys attorney disciplinary proceeding. The attorney

24

disciplinary proceedings against Liberty create no rights for another other individual. See

25

Mattice v. Meyer, 353 F.2d 316, 318 (8th Cir. 1965) (private citizen does not have standing to

26

initiate formal disciplinary proceedings against an attorney), Akinaka v. Disc. Bd. of Hawaii

27

Sup. Ct., 91 Hawaii 51, 59, 979 P.2d 1077 (1999) (individual who files complaints against

28
3
STATE BAR PLTFS./COUNTER-DEFS. REPLY TO COUNTER/CROSS-DEFS.
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21)

Case No 16-cv-22 TEH

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 28 Filed 02/03/16 Page 4 of 7

attorneys does not have standing to bring suit to compel the disciplinary board to initiate

disciplinary proceedings because to hold otherwise, would usurp the discretionary authority of

the disciplinary body).

With no judicially cognizable interest at issue, Defendants/Counter-Claimants cannot

raise a federal question for this court to adjudicate with regard to the State Bars prosecution of

attorney disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Liberty:


It is not for this Court, except within the narrow limits for review open to this
Court, as recently canvassed in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S.
252, 77 S.Ct. 722, and Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 77
S.Ct. 752, to sit in judgment on Louisiana disbarments, and we are not in any
event sitting in review of the Louisiana judgment. *.*.*.* The two judicial
systems of courts, the state judicatures and the federal judiciary, have autonomous
control over the conduct of their officers, among whom, in the present context,
lawyers are included.

7
8
9
10
11
12

Theard v. U.S., 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957). The court should dismiss the alleged counter-claims

13

against the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants because they are not valid counter-claims to

14

the attorney disciplinary proceeding. To the extent that they believe they can state a claim for

15

relief against the State Bar, they should do so in an independent proceeding.

16

III.

ALLOWING THE COUNTER-CLAIMS TO REMAIN WOULD BE FUTILE

17

Allowing the counter-claims to remain would be futile for myriad reasons. The Eleventh

18

Amendment bars suit against the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. Pennhurst State Sch.

19

& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). The State Bar has repeatedly been held to be

20

immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Hirsh v. Justices of the Supr.

21

Ct. of Cal., 67 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 1995); Lupert v. Cal. State Bar, 761 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th

22

Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 916 (1985); MacKay v. Nesbett, 412 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1969);

23

Will v. Mich. Police Dept, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

24

Additionally, as stated above, the Counter-Claimants lack standing to sue any State Bar

25

Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants in the context of an attorney disciplinary proceeding.

26

///

27
28
4
STATE BAR PLTFS./COUNTER-DEFS. REPLY TO COUNTER/CROSS-DEFS.
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21)

Case No 16-cv-22 TEH

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 28 Filed 02/03/16 Page 5 of 7

The State Bar and its officials and employees, moreover, are not persons within the

meaning of section 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71. Counter-Claimants, moreover, fail to state a

plausible conspiracy pursuant to section 1983. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U. S. 662, 664-665 (2009).

Nor do the State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants actions amount to state action for the

purposes of a federal right deprivation. Chaney v. State Bar of Cal., 386 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir.

1967), Margulis v. State Bar of Cal., 845 F.2d 215, 216-17 (9th Cir. 1988), and Giannini v.

Commn. of Bar Examiners, 847 F.2d 1434, 1435 (9th Cir. 1988).

State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants also have judicial immunity for their actions in

attorney disciplinary proceedings. Peterson v. Jensen, 371 F.3d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2004);

10

Chappel v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 1960); Hirsh, 67 F.3d at 714-15; Levanti v. Tippen,

11

585 F. Supp. 499, 504 (S.D. Cal. 1984); Clark v. Wash., 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966);

12

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Harvey v. Waldron, 210 F.3d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.

13

2000).

14

State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants have statutory immunity under state law as well.

15

Cal. Govt. Code 821.6; Lebbos v. State Bar, 165 Cal. App. 3d 656, 666 (1985); Greene v.

16

Zank, 158 Cal. App. 3d 497, 508-512 (1984). Miller v. Filter, 150 Cal. App. 4th 652, 668 (2007)

17

(quoting Ingram v. Flippo, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1280, 1292 (1999)).

18

The State Bar and its employees also have statutory licensing/regulatory immunity. Cal.

19

Govt. Code 818.4 and 821.2; Rosenthal v. Vogt, 229 Cal. App. 3d 69, 75 (1991); Engel v.

20

McCloskey, 92 Cal. App. 3d 870, 878, 881 (1979).

21

Defendants/Counter-Claimants also failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims.

22

Cal. Govt. Code 940.4; Engel, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 881; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6094(a); Cal.

23

Govt. Code 811.2, 811.4, 900.4 and 940.4; Dilts v. Cantua Elem. Sch. Dist., 189 Cal. App. 3d

24

27, 32 (1987); Jamison v. Cal., 31 Cal. App. 3d 513, 518 (1973); Cal. Govt. Code 945.4; City

25

of San Jose v. Sup. Ct., 12 Cal. 3d 447, 454 (1974); see Bohrer v. Cty. of San Diego, 104 Cal.

26

App. 3d 155, 160 (1980); Taylor v. Mitzel, 82 Cal. App. 3d 665 (1978).

27
28
5
STATE BAR PLTFS./COUNTER-DEFS. REPLY TO COUNTER/CROSS-DEFS.
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21)

Case No 16-cv-22 TEH

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 28 Filed 02/03/16 Page 6 of 7

Defendants/Counter-Claimants state claims are also barred by the litigation privilege

Cal. Civ. Code 47(b); Hagberg v. Cal. Fed. Bank FSB, 32 Cal. 4th 350, 360 (2004); Silberg v.

Anderson, 50 Cal. 3d 205, 212 (1990); Rusheen v. Cohen, 37 Cal. 4th 1048, 1057 (2006);

Hagberg, 32 Cal. 4th at 360. See, e.g., Kemmerer v. County of Fresno, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1426,

1439 (1988); King v. Borges, 28 Cal. App. 3d 27, 32-33 (1972).

Defendants/Counter-Claimants claims for injunctive relief are improper as well. See

Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671 (1950); Sires v. State of Washington,

314 F.2d 883, 884 (9th Cir. 1963). See, e.g., Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the

Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

10
11
12

IV.

CONCLUSION
For each of the foregoing reasons, State Bar Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants respectfully

requests that the Court remand this action and dismiss the counter claims as invalid.

13
14

Dated: February 3, 2016

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL

15
16
17

By:

s/ Danielle Lee
Danielle Lee
Assistant General Counsel

18
19
20
21

Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants


THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, JAYNE
KIM, JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, GREGORY P.
DRESSER, ROBERT A. HENDERSON, SUSAN I.
KAGAN, SUSAN CHAN, CHRISTINE
SOUHRADA, AMANDA GORMLEY, AND
SYED M. MAJID

22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
STATE BAR PLTFS./COUNTER-DEFS. REPLY TO COUNTER/CROSS-DEFS.
BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21)

Case No 16-cv-22 TEH

Case 3:16-cv-00022-TEH Document 28 Filed 02/03/16 Page 7 of 7

PROOF OF SERVICE

I, Lisa Ramon, hereby declare: that I am over the age of eighteen years and am not a

party to the within above-entitled action, that I am employed in the City and County of San

Francisco, that my business address is The State Bar of California, 180 Howard Street, San

Francisco, California 94105.

On February 3, 2016, I electronically filed STATE BAR PLAINTIFFS'/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS'fCOUNTER-

DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO COUNTER AND CROSS-CLAIMANTS' BRIEF IN

RESPONSE TO ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE (ECF #21) with the Clerk of the Court of the

United States District Court for the Northern District of California, by using the CMfECF
CMIECF

10
11
12
13

14
15
16
17

18
19
20
21

system. Participants in the case who are registered CMlECF


CMfECF users will be served.
Louis A. Liberty
LOUIS LIBERTY & ASSOCIATES, PLC
553 Pilgrim Drive, Suite A
Foster City, CA 94404
Tel: (650) 341-0300
Fax: (650) 403-1783

See the CMlECF service /ist.

Glenn M. Goffm
Goffin
GLENN M. GOFFIN, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW
553 Pilgrim Drive, Suite A
Foster City, CA 94404
Tel: (415) 845-8556
ggoffm@glenngoffinlaw.com
Email: ggoffin@glenngoffinlaw.com

By

u.s. MAlL
MAIL

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the

foregoing is true and correct.

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PROOF OF SERVICE

Case No 16-cv-22 TEH

",'"

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Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 1 of 20

Jeffrey A. Dickstein
E-mail: jdlaw47@yahoo.com
3263 S Erie Ave
Tulsa OK 74135
Telephone: (918) 271-3374
Facsimile: None

4
5

'

'

Jeffrey A. Dickstein, Plaintiff


appearing Pro Se

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
v.
)
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, a public
)
corporation, THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF
)
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE
)
STATE BAR COURT OF THE STATE BAR OF )
CALIFORNIA, and THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF )
TRIALCOUNSELOFTHESTATEBAROF
)
)
CALIFORNIA, collectively~ Joann M. Remke,
)
in her individual and official capacity; Judith A.
)
Epstein,; Catherine D. Purcell, in her individual
and official capacity; Lucy Armendariz,
Annendariz, in her
)
)
individual and official capacity; Patrice E.
McElroy, in her individual and official capacity;
)
Richard A. Honn, in his individual and official
)
)
capacity; Richard A. Platel, in his individual and
official capacity; Donald F. Miles, in his individual )
and official capacity; Jayne Kim, in her individual )
)
and official capacity; Joseph R. Carlucci, in his
individual and official capacity; Charles A. Murray; )
in his individual and official capacity; William
)
Todd, in his individual and official capacity; THE )
)
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT~ Tani Gorre
Cantil-Sakauye, in her individual and official
)
capacity; Joyce L. Kennard, in her individual and )
official capacity; Marvin R. Baxter, in his
)
)
individual and official capacity; Kathryn M.
Werdegar, in her individual and official capacity; )
)
Ming W. Chin, in his individual and official
capacity; Carol A. Corrigan, in her individual and )
official capacity; and Goodwin Liu, in his
)
individual and official capacity;
)
Defendants.
)

JEFFREY A. DICKSTEIN,

QASE }02
ChSE}o2

44. @7
@7 6

COMPLAINT FOR PROSPECTIVE


INJUNCTIVE AND
DECLARATORY RELIEF

E-filing
E-fiIing

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 2 of 20

Comes now Plaintiff Jeffrey A. Dickstein (hereinafter referred to as "Dickstein") who, for
causes of action against the herein above named defendants, alleges as follows:

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JURISDICTION AND VENUE


1.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1331; 28

U.S.C. 1343(a)(3), 28 U.S.c. 2201, and 42 U.S.C. 1983.


2.

Venue is properly set in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b).

PARTIES

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9
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3.

Dickstein is an individual person resident in the State of Oklahoma. Dickstein has

not been resident of the State of California since approximately 1981.


4.

Defendant, State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to as "State Bar"), is a

11

public corporation with principal office located at 180 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105

12

within the above said judicial district. The State Bar is the administrative arm of the California

13

Supreme Court regarding the discipline and membership of attorneys who are admitted and

14

licensed to practice law in California. Defendant State Bar also bills and collects membership

15

fees and disciplinary fees.

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5.

Defendant Board of Trustees of the State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to

17

as "Board of Trustees") governs Defendant State Bar. The main office of the Board of Trustees is

18

located at 180 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105. Defendant Board of Trustees create the

19

Rules (hereinafter referred to as "State Bar Rule") that govern Defendant State Bar, including the

20

rules of procedure that govern proceedings in Defendant State Bar Court.

21

6.

Defendant State Bar Court of the State Bar of California (hereinafter referred to as

22

"State Bar Court"is an administrative court established by the Board of Trustees to act in its

23

place and stead in the determination of disciplinary proceedings. The main office of the State Bar

24

Court is located at 180 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105.

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7.

Defendants Joann M. Remke, Judith A. Epstein and Catherine D. Purcell are the

26

three judges comprising the Review Department of the State Bar Court (hereinafter referred to as

27

"Review Department"), are residents of the State of California, and are sued herein in their

28

individual and official capacities.

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 3 of 20

8.

Defendants Lucy Annendariz and Patrice E. McElroy are the two judges

comprising the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court (hereinafter referred to as "Hearing

Department") in San Francisco, California, are residents of the State of California, and are sued

herein in their individual and official capacities.

9.

Defendants Richard A. Honn, Richard A. Platel and Donald F. Miles are the three

judges comprising the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court in Los Angeles, California, are

residents of the State of California, and are sued herein in their individual and official capacities.

8
9
10
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10.

Defendant the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California

(hereinafter referred to as "OCTC") is an office created by delegation of Defendant Board of


Trustees. The main office of the OCTC is located at 180 Howard St, San Francisco, CA 94105.
11.

Defendants Jayne Kim, Chief Trial Counsel, Joseph R. Carlucci, Deputy Chief

12

Trial Counsel, Charles A. Murray, Acting Assistant Chief Trial Counsel, and William Todd,

13

Deputy Trial Counsel are all agents and/or employees of Defendant State Bar, are residents of the

14

State of California, and are sued herein in their individual and official capacities.

15

12.

Defendant California Supreme Court is an entity created by the Constitution of the

16

State of California, with principal place of business located at 350 McAllister Street, San

17

Francisco, CA 94102-4797. The California Supreme Court has final authority over the admission

18

and discipline of attorneys admitted and licensed to practice in California.

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13.

Defendants Tani Gorre Cantil-Sakauye, Joyce L. Kennard, Marvin R. Baxter,

20

Kathryn M. Werdegar, Ming W. Chin, Carol A. Corrigan and Goodwin Liu are judges of the

21

California Supreme Court, are residents of the State of Californ 1a, and are sued herein in their

22

individual and official capacities.

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FACTS COMMON TO ALL CAUSES OF ACTION


14.

Defendant California Supreme Court asserts The State Bar Act, Cal. Bus. & Prof.

25

Code 6000 et seq. did not delegate to the State Bar, the Legislature, the Executive Branch, or

26

any other entity its inherent judicial authority over the admission and discipline of attorneys.

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15.

On December 22, 1976, a Clerk of Defendant California Supreme Court sent

Dickstein a document stating he was admitted as an attorney and counselor at law, has taken an
3

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 4 of 20

oath as required by law, and is licensed as such attorney and counselor to practice in all the

Courts of the State.

16.

Article 6, Section 9 of the California Constitution provides that "The State Bar of

California is a public corporation. Every person admitted and licensed to practice law in this

State is and shall be a member of the State Bar except while holding office as ajudge of a court

of record."

17.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6067 provides that ,. Every person on his admission

shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the

State of California, and faithfully to discharge the duties of any attorney at Jaw to the best of his

10

knowledge and ability. A certificate of the oath shall be indorsed upon his license."

11
12

18.

that has a "certificate of [his] oath indorsed upon" it.

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15

At no time has Dickstein ever received a document denominated as a "license"

19.

Dickstein did not have the funds to pay State Bar membership fees for the year

20.

During a four month period prior to January 22,2011, Dickstein requested from

2011.

16

Defendant State Bar the form to voluntary resign from the State Bar, which form was only

17

available by requesting it from Defendant State Bar.

18

21.

When after four months Dickstein did not receive the form, he sent a certified

19

letter of resignation to the State Bar notifYing Defendant State Bar that his resignation was

20

effective immediately.

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22.

Dickstein received a "Final Delinquent Notice" regarding nonpayment of

membership fees, dated March 9,2011.


23.

On May 5, 2011, Dickstein received a final reminder e-mail stating Defendant

State Bar had not received Dickstein's membership fees.


24.

On May 17,2011, Dickstein responded bye-mail stating that he had resigned and

asking Defendant State Bar to adjust its membership records accordingly.


25.

On or about May 26,2011, Dickstein received from Defendant California

Supreme Court an order of suspension for nonpayment of membership fees.


4

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 5 of 20

26.

On or about June 3, 2011, Dickstein received from Defendant State Bar a Notice

of Entry of Order for Suspension for Nonpayment of Fees. That letter stated Dickstein would be

subject to continually accruing penalties and/or costs.

27.

On June 24, 2011, and under duress of being charged accruing penalties and/or

costs, and because Defendant State Bar and Defendant California Supreme Court refused to

acknowledged Dickstein's resignation, filed an Application for Transfer to Inactive Membership

Status and a 2011 Fee Waiver Application Form.

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28.

Dickstein's under duress Application for Transfer to Inactive Membership Status

and Fee Waiver Application was accepted, and Dickstein was placed on inactive membership
status.
29.

Throughout the course of communication with Defendant State Bar, Dickstein

12

asserted his being compelled to be a member of Defendant State Bar, and being forced to pay

13

membership fees, non-payment of which subjected him to additionally accruing penalties and/or

14

costs, violated his United States Constitution First Amendment right of freedom of association,

15

citing to Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625,69 L.Ed. 1138 (1925); Roberts v.

16

United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984); Boy Scouts of

17

America, et al. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554(2000); and

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Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1,4-5, 11 0 S.Ct. 2228, 110 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990).

19

30.

Despite having been advised of their violation of the First Amendment to the

20

United States Constitution, Defendants, and each of them, relying upon State Bar Rules 2.37

21

(regarding voluntary resignation) and 5.420 (regarding resignation with charges pending), based

22

upon Cal. Rules of Court (which are promulgated by Defendant California Supreme Court)

23

9.21(b), continue to assert: 1) Dickstein is a member of Defendant State Bar; 2) Dickstein has no

24

Federal Constitution First Amendment Right not to be a member of the Defendant State Bar; 3)

25

Dickstein continues to be subject to the jurisdiction of Defendants, and each of them; 4)

26

Dickstein can be compelled to pay Defendant State Bar membership fees even if he does not

27

have the funds to do so, no longer practices law in any jurisdiction, State or Federal; 5) Dickstein

28

is subject to accruing penalties and costs ifhe does not pay membership fees for each year such

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 6 of 20

membership fees are billed to members of Defendant State Bar; and 6) Dickstein can be forced to

pay costs of disciplinary proceedings even though he has resigned and there is no need for

disciplinary proceedings "to ensure that the public, the courts, and the profession are protected

against unsuitable legal practitioners" the reason stated by Defendant California Supreme Court

as the purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings.

31.

Disciplinary costs, including costs to resign with charges pending are penalties

under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.10 and 6086.13 and State Bar Rule 5.129. Said statutes

and rule authorize Defendant State Bar to receive thousands of dollars from a member of the

State Bar if it prevails, but only allows the member to receive a few dollars if the member

10
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prevails.
32.

During the course of providing representation to Claudia and Mark Hirmer in the

12

criminal case of United States v. Hirmer, et al., Case No. 3:08-cr-00079-MCR (U.S.Dist.Ct.,

13

N.D. Fla), Dickstein was required by Local Rule to continue to provide representation even ifhe

14

was not paid legal fees.

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33.

Dickstein went broke representing the Hirmers through completion of the trial.

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34.

After the trial, but before sentencing, Dickstein filed a motion to be relieved as

17

counsel on the grounds, among others, that he could no longer afford to practice law, having to

18

give up his apartment, telephone and internet service, did not have the money to continue to

19

represent the Hirmers, including paying for a trial transcript, flying to Florida to attend

20

sentencing; and paying the appellate filing fee and costs of preparing a brief, all of which

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Dickstein was required to pay under the Northern District of Florida's local rule.

22

35.

When that motion was denied and the Court sua sponte appointed Dickstein under

23

the CJA, Dickstein filed a motion for reconsideration, raising issues that arose subsequent to the

24

filing of his motion to be relieved as counsel, including, but not by way of limitation, a conflict

25

of interest.

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36.

As a direct and proximate result offiling said documents, Dickstein was charged

27

in In re Dickstein, Case no. 3: 10-mc-00063-MCR (U.S.Dist.Ct., N.D. Fla) with committing a

28

misdemeanor criminal contempt under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 401(3).


6

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 7 of 20

37.

On November 24,2010, Dickstein was found guilty of said misdemeanor criminal

contempt and was sentenced to serve 90 days in custody, said sentence to be stayed pending

appeal.

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38.

On August 9, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Dickstein's

misdemeanor criminal contempt conviction.


39.

Dickstein was incarcerated in the Santa Rosa County Jail, Santa Rosa, Florida

between November 28,2011 and February 24, 2012.


40.

During Dickstein's incarceration, Defendant State Bar charged Dickstein

membership fees for the year 2012, which fees were paid by Dickstein's son in order to avoid

10

accruing penalties andlor costs, as Dickstein had no access to telephone, letters, or legal ability to

11

contest being charged said fees due to his incarceration in a Florida County Jail.

12

41.

On or about April 21, 2011, Defendant OCTC filed with Defendant State Bar

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Court in In the Matter ofthe Conviction ofJeffrey Alan Dickstein, No. 70638, A Member of the

14

State Bar, Case No. 10-C-7932 (hereinafter referred to as "In re Dicktein") a "Transmittal of

15

Records of Conviction of Attorney (Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102; Cal. Rules of Court, rule

16

9.5 et seq.)".

17

42.

On June 1,2011, Defendant State Bar Court, Review Department, operating "In

18

Bank," issued its order acknowledging Dickstein's misdemeanor criminal contempt conviction,

19

but took no action at that time.

20

43.

On or about December 8, 2011, Defendant OCTC filed with Defendant State Bar

21

Court in In re Dickstein, a "Supplemental Transmittal of Records of Conviction of Attorney

22

(Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.5 et seq.)".

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44.

On January 17,2012, Defendant State Bar Court, Review Department, operating

"In Bank," issued its order as follows:


This case is referred to the hearing department under the authority of California
Rules of Court, rule 9.1 O(a), for a hearing and decision recommending the
discipline to be imposed in the event that the hearing department finds that the
facts and circumstances surrounding the misdemeanor violation of 18 United
States Code section 401(3) (criminal contempt), of which Jeffrey Alan Dickstein
was convicted, involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting
discipline. [Emphasis added.]

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 8 of 20

45.

On January 27,2012, Defendant State Bar Court, Hearing Department, issued and

caused to be served on Dickstein a "Notice of Hearing on Conviction (Bus. & Prof. Code,

6101,6102)" to which was attached Defendant State Bar Court Review Department's order of

January 17, 2012. Said proceedings have continued from said date to the present.

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46.

Proceedings under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102 are known as

"Conviction Proceedings."
47.

Section 6101(a) provides that an attorney convicted ofa felony or a misdemeanor

involving moral turpitude can be disbarred or suspended.


48.

Section 6101(b) commands California district attorneys, city attorneys, or other

10

prosecuting agencies to notify the Office of the State Bar of California of the pendency of an

11

action against an attorney charging a felony or misdemeanor immediately upon obtaining

12

information that the defendant is an attorney.

13

49.

Section 610 1(c) commands any California clerk of a court in which an attorney is

14

convicted of a crime to, within 48 hours after the conviction, transmit a certified copy of the

15

record of conviction to the Office of the State Bar. Thereafter, the Office of the State Bar is

16

commanded to, within 5 days, examine the record of conviction to determine if the conviction

17

involves, or may involve moral turpitude, and if so, to transmit within five days the record of

18

conviction to the Supreme Court with such other records and information as may be appropriate

19

to establish the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. If a clerk of court fails to perform its duty, or the

20

conviction, as in this case, was had outside of California, the State Bar of California has

21

discretion to procure and transmit the record of conviction to the Supreme Court.

22

50.

Section 610 1(d) commands that proceedings to disbar or suspend an attorney on

23

account of such a conviction shall be undertaken by the Supreme Court pursuant to the

24

procedures provided Section 6101 and Section 6102 upon the receipt of a certified copy of the

25

record of conviction.

26

51.

Section 6102(a) requires the Supreme Court, upon the receipt of the certified copy

27

ofthe record of conviction, to review it to see if it appears therefrom that the crime of which the

28

attorney was convicted involved, or that there is probable cause to believe that it involved, moral
8

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 9 of 20

turpitude or was a felony. If the Supreme Court so concludes, it is commanded to suspend the

attorney until the time for appeal has elapsed, if no appeal has been taken, or until the

judgment of conviction has been affirmed on appeal, or has otherwise become final, and until the

further order of the court.

52.

Section 61 02(b) defines what is and is not a felony under the laws of California

with respect to proceedings under the authority of Sections 6101 and 6102. Section 61 02(d)

defines what is and is not a felony under the laws of a jurisdiction other than California.

8
9

53.

Section 6102(c) identifies the procedure to be followed after a conviction of a

crime that involves, or may involve moral turpitude, or is a felony, becomes final. The Supreme

10

Court is commanded to summarily disbar the attorney if: 1) the offense is a felony and an

11

element of the offense is the specific intent to deceive, defraud, steal, or make or suborn a false

12

statement; or 2) involved moral turpitude.

13

54.

Section 6102(e) describes the procedure to be followed ifthe Supreme Court

14

determines the felony conviction did not contain an element of specific intent to deceive,

15

defraud, steal, or make or suborn a false statement or involved moral turpitude. The attorney

16

must be given a hearing after adequate notice and opportunity to be heard. If the Supreme Court

17

determines after the hearing that the crime of which the attorney was convicted, or the

18

circumstances of its commission, involved moral turpitude, the Supreme Court is commanded to

19

enter an order disbarring the attorney or suspending him or her from practice for a limited time. If

20

the Supreme Court does not determine the crime, or the circumstances of its commission

21

involved moral turpitude, the Supreme Court is commanded to dismiss the proceedings.

22

55.

Section 61 02(f) gives the Supreme Court the discretion to refer the proceedings or

23

any part thereof or issue therein, including the nature or extent of discipline, to the

24

State Bar for hearing, report, and recommendation.

25
26
27
28

56.

Section 61 02(h) commands the Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the practice

and procedure in proceedings conducted pursuant to Sections 6101 and 6102.


57.

Section 61 02(i) provides that no other provision providing a procedure for the

disbarment or suspension of an attorney is applicable to a conviction proceeding unless expressly


9

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 10 of 20

made applicable.
2

58.

Defendant California Supreme Court has promulgated Court Rules. Title 9 of

those rules, consisting of Rules 9.l - 9.61, pertain to Law Practice, Attorneys, and Judges. The

only one of those Rules pertaining to Section 6101 and 6102 conviction proceedings is Rule

9.10(a) which states:

12

The State Bar Court exercises statutory powers under Business and Professions
Code sections 610 1 and 6102 with respect to the discipline of attorneys convicted
of crimes. (See Bus. & Prof. Code section 6087.) For purposes of this rule, a
judgment of conviction is deemed final when the availability of appeal has been
exhausted and the time for filing a petition for certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court on direct review of the judgment of conviction has elapsed and no
petition has been filed, or if filed the petition has been denied or the judgment of
conviction has been affirmed. The State Bar Court must impose or recommend
discipline in conviction matters as in other disciplinary proceedings. The power
conferred upon the State Bar Court by this rule includes the power to place
attorneys on interim suspension under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 6102,
and the power to vacate, delay the effective date of, and temporarily stay the effect
of such orders.

13

59.

7
8

9
10
11

Rule 9.1 O(a) explicitly confers jurisdiction to Defendant State Bar Court to

14

exercise the statutory powers set forth in Bus. & Prof. Code Sections 6101 and 6102, citing to

15

Bus. & Prof. Code section 6087. Section 6087 gives Defendant California Supreme Court

16

discretion to delegate to the State Bar the requirement of Section 61 02(h) to prescribe rules for

17

the practice and procedure in proceedings conducted pursuant to Sections 6101 and 6102.

18

60.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section 6086 gives Defendant Board of Trustees the

19

discretion to provide by rule the mode of procedure in all cases of complaints against members.

20

Section 6086.5 commands the Board of Trustees to establish a State Bar Court, to act in its place

21

and stead in the determination of disciplinary and reinstatement proceedings and proceedings

22

pursuant to subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 6007 to the extent provided by rules adopted by

23

the Board of Trustees. Section 6086.5 contains a delegation of authority to the State Bar Court to

24

exercise the powers and authority vested in the Board of Trustees. Furthermore, for the purposes

25

of Sections 6007,6043,6049,6049.2,6050,6051,6052,6077 (excluding the first sentence),

26

6078,6080,6081, and 6082, "board" includes the State Bar Court. Finally, under Section 6086.5,

27

the State Bar Court is precluded from adopting rules of professional conduct or rules of

28

procedure, but the Executive Committee ofthe State Bar Court may adopt rules of practice for
10

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 11 of 20

the conduct of all proceedings within its jurisdiction, which rules may not conflict with the rules

of procedure adopted by the board, unless approved by the Supreme Court.

61.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6086.7 (a)(l) commands a court to notify the State Bar

of a final order of contempt imposed against an attorney that may involve grounds warranting

discipline under Chapter 4 of the Business and Professions Code, consisting of sections 6000-

6238. Paragraph (c) of Section 6086.7 commands Defendant State Bar to investigate any matter

reported under this section as to the appropriateness of initiating disciplinary action against the

attorney.

62.

Said State Bar investigation is delegated, by State Bar Rule 2101, from Defendant

10

State Bar to Defendant OCTC, the delegation consisting of "exclusive jurisdiction to review

11

inquiries and complaints, conduct investigations and determine whether to file notices of

12

disciplinary charges in the State Bar Court."

l3
14
15

63.

Defendant Board of Trustee's State Bar Rules pertaining to Defendant OCTC

investigations are State Bar Rules 2401 through 2410.


64.

Rule 2401 limits the purpose of investigations to the issue of whether there is

16

reasonable cause to believe that a member of the State Bar has violated a provision of the State

17

Bar Act or the Rules of Professional Conduct and if there is sufficient evidence to support the

18

allegations of misconduct.

19

65.

Rule 2409 requires Defendant OCTC, prior to filing a Notice of Disciplinary

20

Charges, to notify the member in writing of the allegations forming the basis for the complaint or

21

investigation.

22

66.

The State Bar Rules promulgated by Defendant Board of Trustees regarding

23

"Conviction Proceedings" are set forth in Title 5 (Discipline), Division 6 (Special Proceedings)

24

Chapter 2 (Conviction Proceedings) of the State Bar Rules of Procedure, Rules 5.340 - 5.346.
State Bar Rule 5.340 states:

25

67.

26

Rule 5.340 Nature of Proceedings


These rules apply to proceedings that result from a member's criminal conviction
and are held under Business and Professions Code 6101 and 6102, California
Rules of Court, rule 9.10, and these Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.

27
28

11

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 12 of 20

68.

State Bar Rule 5.341 provides that conviction proceedings are initiated in the

Review Department of the State Bar Court when the Office ofthe Chief Trial Counsel files a

certified copy of the record of conviction.

69.

State Bar Rule 5.342 pertains to interim suspension. Paragraph A requires the

Review Department to examine the record of conviction and gives it the discretion to interimly

suspend the member until a further order of the Review Department or until final disposition of

the conviction proceeding, but only if any ground for suspension set forth in Business and

Professions Code 6102(a) is present. Paragraph B authorizes either party to, within 10 days

after the initial record of conviction is filed, to file a brief addressing whether grounds for

10

interim suspension under 6102(a) are present. Paragraph C pertains to misdemeanor

11

convictions. It provides that in cases involving misdemeanor convictions, the Review

12

Department, on its own or on motion of any party, may direct the Hearing Department to conduct

13

a hearing for the sole purpose of resolving factual issues as to whether there is probable cause to

14

believe that the conviction involved moral turpitude, and if found, to make a recommendation

15

whether interim suspension should be imposed. Paragraph D provides for motions filed in the

16

Review Department to vacate, delay the effective date of, or temporarily stay the effect of an

17

order of interim suspension.

18

70.

State Bar Rule 5.343 pertains to summary disbarment. The rule authorizes

19

Defendant OCTC to file a motion for the member's summary disbarment under Business and

20

Professions Code 61 02(c).

21

71.

State Bar Rule 5.344 pertains to Final Convictions not subject to summary

22

disbarment. It directs the Review Department to refer the case to the Hearing Department to hear

23

the case and decide the issues in the order of referraL

24

72.

State Bar Rule 5.345 pertains to the proceedings in the Hearing Department.

25

Paragraph A requires the Clerk to file and serve under State Bar Rule 5.25 a notice of hearing on

26

conviction. Paragraph B pertains to the filing by the member of a response. Paragraph C pertains

27

to what happens if the member does not file a response. Paragraph D defines what documents

28

constitute the State Bar Record.


12

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 13 of 20

73.

State Bar Rule 5.346 provides that all rules of procedure apply except rules that by

their tenns apply only to other specific proceedings and do not apply in conviction proceedings,

and Rules 5.80-5.86 (default) apply as modified by these conviction proceedings rules.

74.

No conviction proceedings under Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102 have been

filed in Defendant California Supreme Court, and to date, Defendant California Supreme Court

has issued no orders regarding Dickstein's misdemeanor criminal contempt conviction.

75.

No proceedings regarding interim suspension under State Bar Rule 5.342 took

place. Defendant State Bar Court Review Department did not interimly suspend Dickstein (State

Bar Rule 5.342(A)); Defendant OCTC did not file a brief addressing whether grounds for

10

interim suspension under 6102(a) are present (Rule 5.342(B)), nor did Defendant State Bar

11

Court Review Department make a referral to the Hearing Department on the sole issue of

12

whether Dickstein's conviction involved moral turpitude (Rule 5.342(C)).

13
14

76.

Defendant OCTC did not file a motion for Dickstein's summary disbarment

under Bus. & Prof. Code 6102(c) (Rule 5.343).

15

77.

Defendant OCTC did not commence an investigation under Bus. & Prof. Code

16

Section 6086.7 to determine the appropriateness of initiating disciplinary action against

17

Dickstein based upon his final conviction of contempt.

18

78.

Defendant OCTC did not provide Dickstein with a Rule 2409 notice.

19

79.

Defendant OCTC did not file a notice of disciplinary action.

20

80.

Pleadings that have been filed on behalf of Defendant OCTC in the Bus. & Prof.

21

Code 6101-6102 conviction proceeding currently pending against Dickstein list Defendants

22

Jayne Kim, Joseph R. Carlucci, Charles A. Murray and William Todd as counsel for Defendant

23

OCTC.

24

81.

Dickstein's conviction being a criminal misdemeanor, the sole issue before

25

Defendant State Bar Court is whether the conviction, or the circumstances surrounding the

26

conviction, involved moral turpitude.

27
28

82.

In the absence of a finding of "moral turpitude" in either the conviction itself or

the circumstances surrounding the conviction, the conviction proceedings must, as a matter of
13

COMPLAINT

'.

1
2
3
4

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 14 of 20

law, be dismissed pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 61 02(e).


83.

Required dismissal of the conviction proceedings precludes having a hearing on

the issue of "other misconduct warranting discipline."


84.

Defendant State Bar Court Review Department has no statutory nor delegated

authority to make a referral to Defendant State Bar Court Hearing Department regarding "other

misconduct warranting discipline." The referral of the Review Department, the proceedings on

that portion of the referral in the hearing department, and prosecution of that referral by OCTC,

being in the absence of jurisdiction, denies Dickstein both substantive and procedural due

process in violation of Federal Constitution Fourteenth Amendment proscriptions.

10

85.

Despite having been made aware of its lack of jurisdiction and violation of due

11

process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution regarding the "other

12

misconduct warranting discipline" referral, Defendants Board of Trustees, State Bar Court, Joann

13

M. Remke, Judith A. Epstein, Catherine D. Purcell, Lucy Armendariz, Patrice E. McElroy,

14

Richard A. Honn, Richard A. Platel, Donald F. Miles, OCTe, Jayne Kim, Joseph R. Carlucci,

15

Charles A. Murray, and William Todd all contend they have jurisdiction and that their process

16

does not violate due process of law.

17

86.

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6068, and State Bar Rules 5.100, 5.81(A) and 5.82

18

mandate not only that Dickstein appear in Defendant State Bar Court in Los Angeles for the trial

19

of his conviction proceedings, but command that ifhe fails to appear, Defendant State Bar Court

20

must enter his default, which default will result in Dickstein being deemed to have committed a

21

crime involving moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline, and Defendant State

22

Bar Court must recommend Dickstein's disbarment.

23

87.

Said Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code and State Bar Rules make no accommodation for

24

member attorneys who live out of state and do not have the funds to travel or for lodging and

25

meals while away from home.

26

88.

Said Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code and State Bar Rules discriminate against indigent

27

litigants and constitute a suspect classification that violates the Federal Constitution, Fourteenth

28

Amendment.
14

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 15 of 20

1
2

89.

Dickstein has notified Defendants State Bar Court and OCTC of his lack of funds

to attend trial by filing an Affidavit of Financial Status.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. 1983

5
6
7

90.

Dickstein realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 89 of this complaint.


91.

In committing the acts complained of herein, i.e., refusing to allow Dickstein to

voluntarily stop associating with Defendant State Bar, Defendants and each of them acted, and

continue to act, under color of state law to deprive Dickstein of his U.S. Constitution, amend. I

10

11

right of freedom of association, and its corollary right of freedom not to associate.
92.

To the extent Defendants, and each or any of them, contend their conduct is

12

authorized by state statute or state bar rule, said state statute or state bar rule violates U.S.

13

Constitution, amend. 1.

14

93.

The conduct of Defendant State Bar in charging Dickstein yearly membership

15

fees, including subjecting him to accruing penalties and costs for their nonpayment, in collusion

16

with Defendant California Supreme Court, have taken place in the past and will continue to take

17

place each year in the future, in that said conduct constitutes the official custom and policy of

18

Defendants. Accordingly, there is a genuine threat that in the immediate future Dickstein will be

19

sent a membership fee statement requiring him to pay membership fees, thereby continuing to

20

violate Dickstein's rights secured under U.S. Constitution, amend. 1.

21

94.

Defendants, and each of them, have been notified of the unconstitutionality of

22

their conduct, and therefore their conduct in refusing to recognize Dickstein's right to associate,

23

and his corollary right, freedom not to associate, is knowing, intentional and wilful.

24
25

95.

The violation of Dickstein's federal civil rights will continue unless and until

Defendants, and each of them, are enjoined by this Court.

26

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

27

Declaratory Relief Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 2201

28

96.

Dickstein realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations set forth in
15

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 16 of 20

paragraphsl through 95 of this complaint.


2
3
4

97.

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Dickstein and

Defendants concerning their respective rights and duties.


98.

Dickstein contends so long as he no longer practices law under the authority of his

State issued license, having retired from the practice of law, and no longer holds himself out as

authorized to practice law in any court of the State of California, or elsewhere, and having

surrendered his license to practice law, and having notified Defendants of the surrender of his

license to practice law, he is by definition no longer a member of Defendant State Bar, and

therefore Defendants, and each of them, are violating his rights under U.S. Constitution, amend. I

10

by refusing to accept Dickstein's surrender of his license, by continuing to charge him

11

membership fees, and continuing to exercise jurisdiction over him as a member of Defendant

12

State Bar.

13

99.

Defendants, and each of them, contend that they can force Dickstein to be a

14

member of Defendant State Bar, to pay membership fees and be subject to their jurisdiction for

15

as long as Defendant Supreme Court, in its sole authority, dictates.

16

100.

Dickstein desires ajudicial determination and a declaration as to his U.S.

17

Constitution, amend. I right not to associate and not to be a compelled member of Defendant

18

State Bar, and under the continuing jurisdiction of Defendants.

19

101.

A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the

20

circumstances because Defendants, and each of them, are engaged in a continuing course of

21

conduct designed to coerce and extort money from Dickstein in the guise of membership fees,

22

penalties and costs, and disciplinary fees in the form of penalties, all under asserted color of state

23

law and the exercise of jurisdiction Defendants no longer possess with respect to Dickstein.

24

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

25

Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. 1983

26
27
28

102.

Dickstein realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 89 of this complaint.


103.

In committing the acts complained of herein, i.e., asserting jurisdiction over


16

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 17 of 20

Dickstein regarding "other misconduct warranting discipline" in a "Conviction "Proceeding"

under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6101 and 6102, and Rule of Court 9.1O(a), Defendants State

Bar, Board of Trustees, State Bar Court, OCTC, including the agents and employees of said

entities, are each acting outside of their statutory and delegated jurisdictional authority, and

therefore are violating Dickstein's rights to equal protection of the law and due process oflaw

under U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV.

104.

Defendants, and each of them, have been notified of the unconstitutionality of

their conduct, and therefore their conduct in refusing to recognize Dickstein's rights to due

process and equal protection under U.S. Constitution, amend XIV is knowing, intentional and

10
11

wilful.
105.

The acts of said Defendants, and each ofthem, in asserting jurisdiction in a

12

conviction proceeding of "other misconduct warranting discipline" is ongoing in the case of In re

13

Dickstein, so there is a genuine threat that said defendants will continue to act without

14

jurisdiction, and will continue to violate Dickstein's civil rights unless enjoined by this Court.

15

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

16

Declaratory Relief Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 2201

17
18
19

106.

Dickstein realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 102 through 105 of this complaint.


107.

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Dickstein and

20

Defendants concerning the jurisdiction of Defendants State Bar, Board of Trustees, State Bar

21

Court, and OCTC, including the agents and employees of said entities to proceed in a Conviction

22

Proceeding authorized under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6101-6102 and Court Rule 9.1O(a) to

23

inquire into whether Dickstein engaged in "other misconduct warranting discipline."

24

108.

Dickstein contends that, having been convicted of a misdemeanor criminal

25

contempt, the only authority/jurisdiction ofthe named Defendants under applicable statutes and

26

delegated authority is to enquire if the crime, or circumstances surrounding the crime, involved

27

moral turpitude, and if not, the conviction proceedings against him must be dismissed pursuant to

28

Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 6102(e).


17

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 18 of 20

109.

Defendants, and each of them, contend that even if the misdemeanor crime, or

circumstances surrounding the crime, of which Dickstein was convicted did not involve moral

turpitude, they can ignore the mandatory requirements of Bus. & Prof. Code 61 02(e) to

dismiss, and may proceed to determine if Dickstein engaged in some non-specified "other

misconduct warranting discipline" without the necessity of first conducting an investigation by

the OCTC, notifying Dickstein of the investigation and giving him an opportunity to respond,

and filing a separate disciplinary proceeding which identifies the state statute or rule allegedly

violated by Dickstein, all of which is required under the California statutes and State Bar Rules

identified herein above.

10

110.

Dickstein desires a judicial determination and a declaration as to his U.S.

11

Constitution, amend. XIV right not to stand trial in the absence of jurisdictional authority and

12

therefore in violation of his rights to equal protection and due process of law under said U.S.

13

Constitution, amend. XIV.

14

111.

A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the

15

circumstances because Defendants, and each of them, are currently engaged in a continuing State

16

Bar Court proceeding designed to coerce and extort money from Dickstein in the guise of

17

disciplinary fees in the form of penalties, under the color of state law, and in the absence of

18

statutory or delegated jurisdictional authority.

19

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION

20

Violation of Civil Rights Pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. 1983

21
22
23

112.

Dickstein realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 1 through 89 of this complaint.


113.

In promulgating and enforcing State Bar Rules that deny Dickstein access to the

24

State Bar Court to defend himself based solely upon his indigent status, Defendants, and each of

25

them, are violating Dickstein's rights to equal protection of the law and due process of law under

26

U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV.

27
28

114.

Defendants, and each of them, have been notified of Dickstein's indigent status,

but nonetheless contend that if he does not personally appear at a trial fourteen hundred miles
18

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 19 of 20

from his residence, applicable statutes and rules require he be held in default and subject to

summary disbarment and the imposition of disciplinary costs in the form of penalties.

115.

The acts of said Defendants, and each of them, in denying Dickstein access to the

State Bar Court based on his indigency is ongoing in the case of In re Dickstein, trial being

currently set to commence on October 30,2012, and there is a genuine threat said conduct will

continue unless enjoined by this Court.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION

Declaratory Relief Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. 2201

9
10
11

116.

Dickstein realleges and incorporates herein by reference the allegations set forth in

paragraphs 112 through 115 of this complaint.


117.

An actual controversy has arisen and now exists between Dickstein and

12

Defendants concerning the federal constitutionality of the statutes and state bar rules requiring

13

Dickstein to be held in default and subject to summary disbarment and imposition of disciplinary

14

costs in the form of penalties based solely upon Dickstein's indigency.

15

118.

Dickstein contends that having established his indigency by uncontested affidavit,

16

he can not be denied access to the State Bar Court to defend charges against him because he lacks

17

funds to travel from Oklahoma to Los Angeles, California, and to pay for lodging and food while

18

away from his home, and the statutes and Defendant State Bar Rules to the contrary discriminate

19

against him, and others similarly situated, based on the suspect classification of financial

20

indigency.

21

119.

Defendants, and each of them, contend said statutes and State Bar Rules are not

22

discriminatory, do not violate Dickstein's rights to due process and equal protection under U.S.

23

Constitution, amend. XIV.

24

120.

Dickstein desires ajudicial determination and a declaration as to his U.S.

25

Constitution, amend. XIV right to access to the State Bar Court to defend the allegations against

26

him in an ongoing State Bar Court conviction proceeding.

27
28

121.

A judicial declaration is necessary and appropriate at this time under the

circumstances because Defendants, and each of them, are currently engaged in an ongoing State

19

COMPLAINT

Case 3:12-cv-04676-MMC Document 1 Filed 09/06/12 Page 20 of 20

Bar Court proceeding with trial scheduled to commence on October 30, 2012.
2

WHEREFORE, Dickstein moves this Court for ajudicial declaration that the defendants,

and each of them, are violating Dickstein's rights under U.S. Constitution, amends. I and XIV,

and for prospective injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants, and each of them, from violating

Dickstein's rights under U.S. Constitution, amends. I and XIV, and for such other and further

relief as is proper under the circumstances, including the granting of his costs and attorney's fees

as a private attorney general as authorized under California Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5 or

other applicable law.

Dated: August 22, 2012.

10

11
12

13
14

15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23
24

25

26
27

28
20

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 1 of 55 Page ID #:1

FILED
- I\ -H----'F)-HC"'H
HA'---*'AR
~
DIF-.FINt FfMc ----

2
3
4

CHARD I. FIMc-- _ - - -itlCMARD


Prisoner ID # 1824367
c/o
clo Men's Central Jail
441 Bauchet Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012

--~-~------ -----

- -- - - --

--

2010 JAN -5 PH I: 4"


CLEiH(,
Ji1 :,~.TRIC
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CL
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RIC T
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OF CALIf.
CEtH RA L DIS
DISii.
i . Of
CALIF.
LOS ANGElES

BY
5

- - - -- - -

tL---tA----'.
~-.- --

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA, WESTERN DIVISION

CVI0-000
48:T
.... C
V10 - 000 48
4 8 :fW
(C<fJ\
CV10-00D
:T W(C(fJ\
W(C(/J\

10
II

RICHARD I. FINE,
Plaintiff,

Case No.
VERIFIED CIVIL RIGHTS
COMPLAINT
CO:MPLAINT TO VOID AND
ANNUL CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT ORDER OF
DISBARMENT,
DISBAlUv1ENT, AND PRECEDING
STATE BAR ORDER OF
INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT, FOR FRAUD
UPON THE COURT

vs.

12
13

14

15
16
17

18
19

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;


BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA;
SCOTT DREXEL, Chief Trial
Counsel of the State Bar of California;
and THE SUPREME COURT OF
CALIFORNIA (only as a necessary
party);
Defendants.

42 U.S.c. 1983
DEMAND FOR JURY
JURy TRIAL

20
21

22
23
24

I.

Summary of Action
1.

Plaintiff RICHARD 1. FINE seeks an order voiding and annulling the

25
26

27

State Bar Hearing Department's October 12, 2007 Order of Involuntary Inactive
Enrollment, effective October 17, 2007, entered by State Bar Court Judge

28

Richard A.
A. Honn, which was not affIrmed in the denial of a Petition for Review

-1-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 2 of 55 Page ID #:2

.------------------------------------------------------------------

--1

1/5/2818 2:82:51 PM Receipt #: 129287

Cashier : KPAGE [LA 1-1]


Paid by: RICHARD I. FINE
2:CV10-08048
2:CVI0-08048
2010-0&6988
2018-066980
5 - Civil Filing Fee(l)
Fee(1)
Amount:
$60.88
$68.88
2:CV18-00848
2818-510888
2810-510888
11 - Special Fund F/F(I)
F/F(I}
F/F(1}
Allount
AlIIount :
$198.88
2:CVI8-8a848
2:CV18-8a848
2818-886488
2018-086488
Filing Fee - Special(l)
Special(1}
Amount :
$108.88
$108.00
Cash PaYMent:
PaYlLent:
358.88

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 3 of 55 Page ID #:3

-_._.,
-"

.--__ .--

__ ...
._ . ---_-_- - ...

-I+----\V-tfte--alifomia
----the-- alifomia Supreme Court,
GOOft;--and--an- order

1I --I+--nv-tfte-alifomia
.1.
Supreme--6tlft;--and-an--I"lo~rd"ke""'r'---voidin~mfl~mH+f-t-l't-{J---1IhP~~r-j-
~<H'ffl-1'1~M'tt'~t'\ftfi-H-tn-u--th;-""r-tm1"'+
-and---an--6fder--Vft1idtrlf!--:mtJr-armtltltr~the----stMe-j
-by
2

Reco.mmendatio.n of
o.f Disbarment
Bar Review Department's September 29, 2008 Recommendation
3
4

the Califo.rnia
California Supreme
effective No.vember
November 29, 2008, which became an order
o.rder of
o.fthe
Co.urt
fo.r Review and Rehearing was
Court effective March 25, 2009 after a Petitio.n
Petition for

7
8

denied pursuant to B&P Code 6084.

2.

The reason
reaso.n for
fo.r the complaint
co.mplaint is that the Chief Trial Counsel
Co.unsel of
o.f the

10
11
12

atto.rneys in the office


o.ffice of
o.f the Chief Trial Counsel
Co.unsel of
o.f the State
State Bar and the attorneys
alo.ng with other
o.ther officers
o.fficers of
o.f the Court
Co.urt on
o.n the Board
Bo.ard of
o.f Governors
Go.verno.rs and in the
Bar, along

State Bar, committed


upon the Califo.rnia
California Supreme Co.urt
Court in bringing and
co.mmitted fraud UPo.n

13

14

15

No.tice of
pursuing the Notice
o.f Disciplinary Charges against Fine for
fo.r "moral
"mo.ral turpitude",
ordering
o.rdering the involuntary
invo.luntary enrollment
enro.llment and recommending
reco.mmending the disbarment.

16

17
18

3.

At all times they knew that the charges were false, that the charges

violated
vio.lated the First Amendment to
to. the U.S. Constitution,
Co.nstitutio.~ that the charges did no.t
not

19

co.nstitute
pro.secuted
constitute "mo.ral
"moral turpitude", that the charges were being bro.ught
brought and prosecuted
20

21

22

fo.r the perso.nal


o.f members of
o.f the Board
Bo.ard of
o.f Governors
Go.verno.rs who
who. were either
for
personal benefit of
to. Fine's clients' litigation
litigatio.n or
o.r themselves were
representing parties adverse to

23

24
25

adverse to.
to Fine's clients in litigatio.n
litigation and that the charges were being brought
bro.ught in

collusion with and aiding and abetting the judicial officers and judges of the Los

26

27
28

from Lo.S
Los Angeles
Superio.r Court
Co.urt who
who. were receiving criminal payments fro.m
Angeles Superior
County.
before such judges and judicial officers.
Co.unty. LA County was a party befo.re
o.fficers. Fine

-2-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 4 of 55 Page ID #:4

and California Constitutions in federal civil rights lawsuits, and had challenged
3
4

the judges presiding over cases where LA County was a party.

6
7
8

II. Jurisdiction, Venue and Standing


4.

Jurisdiction exists under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of the rights

protected under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and for the

9
10

11

extrinsic fraud of an officer of the Court upon the Court resulting in an adverse
state court decision.

(See Kougasian v. TSML,


TSML. Inc.., 359 F.3d 1136 (9

th

Cir.

12
13

14

2004).)
5.
5.

Venue exists in the Central District, Western Division, in that Fine

15

resides there, the defendants maintain offices there and all events occurred there.
16

17
18

6.

Standing exists in that the State Bar has obtained an Order of

Disbarment and a Judgment against Fine for costs as part of the disbarment, and
Disbatment

19

20
21

seeks to enforce the disbarment through civil and criminal court action if Fine
attempts to "'practice law" or "'hold himself out to practice law" in California, and

22
23
24

25

has contacted other states and judicial forums seeking to have them disbar Fine,
including but not limited to the U. S. District Court for the Central District of
California, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the

26
27

District of Columbia.
Columbia.

28
28

-3-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 5 of 55 Page ID #:5

7.

The plaintiff (Fine) has practiced law for over 42 years. He received

3
4

a B.S. from the University of Wisconsin (1961), a Doctor of Law from the
University of Chicago Law School (1964), and a Ph.D. in international law from

6
7
8

the University of London, London School of Economics and Political Science


(1967). He has practiced in London with Coudert Bros., an international law

9
10
11

12

frrm; been a member of the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, in


Washington D.C.; been the Special Counsel to the Governmental Efficiency
Committee of the LA City Council; founded the Antitrust Division for the LA

13

14

15

City Attorney's office, the fIrst municipal antitrust division in the country; and,
since 1974, has been in private practice in his own firm engaged in both U.S. and

16

17

18

international cases.
8.

Fine has received

VarIOUS

certificates of recognition for his

19

20
21

22

contribution to society through his legal work, including "Lawyer of the


Decades."
9.

Fine

IS

known

for

fighting

government

corruption

and

23

24

25

misappropriation of funds by state, county and municipal governments. As of the


present time, Fine has been responsible for the return and saving of almost $1

26
27
28

billion dollars for California taxpayers through lawsuits brought against


governments engaging in illegal acts. Fine also won the 2003 lawsuit in the

-4-- ----

~ ~---~----+----~

------

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 6 of 55 Page ID #:6

budget, it cannot pay anyone. This stopped the Governor and legislators from
3

getting paychecks during a budget crisis while the rest of the state suffered. At
the outset of the case in 1998, Fine obtained an injunction which closed down the

7
8

California government. This angered government employees, including judges,


for interfering with their paychecks.

9
10
11

10.

In the last ten years, Fine has been active m fighting judicial

corruption.

12

11.

Since late 1995, Fine has also been the Honorary Consul General of

13
14
15

Norway in Los Angeles and Southern California.


12.

Fine has been held in "coercive incarceration" since March 4, 2009

l6
17

18

for challenging LA Superior Court Judge David P. Yaffe's presiding over a case
involving LA County while taking criminal payments from LA County.

19

20
21

22

13.

Defendant State Bar of California is a public corporation established

by the California Constitution. Its members are those individuals admitted to


practice before the California Supreme Court.

It can sue and be sued.

It is

23

24
25

managed by a board of governors.


14.

Defendant Board of Governors of the State Bar (Board) is a group of

26
27

State Bar members elected at various intervals, and non-members appointed by

28

-5- - - - - - - - - + - - - - - -- --

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 7 of 55 Page ID #:7

responsibility for all actions of the State Bar.


3
4

15.

Defendant Scott Drexel at all times was the Chief Trial Counsel of

the State Bar. He was appointed by the legislature and serves "the pleasure of the

6
7
8

Board." He reports directly to a committee of the Board. He supervises the


Office of Chief Trial Counsel (OCTC),

which conducts disciplinary

10

11
12

investigations, and brings and pursues disciplinary cases styled as Notices of

Disciplinary Charges (NDC).


(NDe).
16.

Defendant Supreme Court of California is a defendant herein only as

13
14

15

it is a "necessary party." It has sole control over the right to practice law in
California.

16

17
18

IV. Common Allegations

A.

Role of the State Bar in disciplinary proceedings

17.

attorneys. The frrst is by a


California has two methods to discipline attorneys.

19

20

21

record. However, an inactive enrollment, suspension or disbarment may


court of record.

22
23
24

25

only be ordered by the Supreme Court, even if the case started in a court of
record. The second is to use the State Bar as the "administrative arm" of the

Supreme Court. Under this method, the Chief Trial Counsel and OCTC initiate

26

27

action by filing a NDC in the "State Bar Court."

28

-6---------+'I-----------------+1--+1-- -- -- ------- -- ~-------------------- - -.----------------------- --

---- ------------- -.- ------------------~.~----.------ - - - - - ------ -------- -- ----......


---- - -- ----.- ---/---+-~
-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 8 of 55 Page ID #:8

record"; i.e.,
i_e., it is not in the California Constitution. It also is not a "court," nor is
3
4
5

it an "administrative agency."
agency" subject t.o
t-O administrative law protections. The State
Bar Court is a group of individuals designated as state bar judges under the State

7
8

Bar Act (B&P Code 6079.1 and 6086.65).

They are appointed by the

California Supreme Court, the Governor or the legislature for specific terms.

10
11
12

They are divided into a Hearing Department and a Review Department. Their
salaries are set by statute but they are paid by the State Bar, who also sets their
other compensation, such as "benefits."
"benefits." Under statute, they are not responsible

13
14
15

for their decisions as they sit in the "stead" of the Board. See B&P Code
6079. 1 and 6086.65.

16
l6

17

18

19.

Neither the State Bar nor the State Bar Court has the power to impose

any discipline on an attorney.

(See Lebbos v. State Bar, 53 Cal.3d 37, 48

19

(1991).) They can order a person "involuntary inactive," but only subject to the
20
21

22

immediate, independent review of the Supreme Court.

They can only

recommend disbarment. Only the Supreme Court can order a lawyer inactive if

23
24
25

he seeks review, and only the Supreme Court can order a person disbarred. With
respect to the disbarment,
disbannent, B&P Code 6084 provides that if the petition for

26

27

28

review is denied, the Review Department's recommendation is filed as the


Supreme Court'
Court'ss order.

- -+4-- - - - -- ..- -- --.-----+1--

--

--

--

-77.-----~-------------- _11__- ---

---- --- -

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 9 of 55 Page ID #:9

2
3
4
5

State Bar Court from considering federal constitutional claims. (See Hirsch v.

Justices of the Supreme Court of the State of CalifOrnia, 67 F.3d 708 (1995)
("Opportunity to present Federal claims - The California Constitution precludes

the Bar Court from considering constitutional claims. See Calif. Const. Art. III,
Sec. 3.5.")

10

B.

Criminal payments from LA County to LA Superior Court


judges and other counties to judges called "judicial benefits".

21.

In the late 1980s, LA County commenced paying LA Superior Court

11
12
13
14

judges 'Judicial benefits" in addition to their state salaries. LA County knew that
under Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution, only the state

15
16

17

legislature could prescribe the compensation of the judges and that this duty
could not be delegated. They also knew that no statute allowed the payments. In

18

19

20

2000, California Supreme Court Chief Justice Ronald M. George stated that the
payments were wrong and may be unconstitutional in a September speech to the

21

meeting of the California Judge Association in San Diego.


22
23

24

22.

The payments were held to violate Article VI, Section 19, of the

California Constitution and were held to be not delegable by the legislature in the

25
26

27

case of Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles, 167 Cal.App.4 th 630 (2008) rev.
denied Dec. 23, 2008. Sturgeon was decided on October 10, 2008, which was

28

-8-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 10 of 55 Page ID #:10

effective.
3
4

23.

In re-sponse to the Sturgeon decision, the Judicial Council of

California drafted, the legislature passed and the Governor signed Senate Bill

7
8

SBX2~11,

which was enacted February 20,2009, effective May 21,2009. Senate

Bill SBX2-11 gave retroactive immunity from criminal prosecution, civil liability

10
11

and disciplinary action to every "officer or employee of a government entity


[judge or judicial officer] because of benefits provided to a judge under the

12

official action of a governmental entity prior to the effective date of this act on
13
14

15

the grounds that those benefits were not authorized by law." The criminal acts
encompassed misappropriation of funds, obstruction of justice and bribery,

16

17
18

amongst others.

C.

Fine's history of challenges to the criminal LA County payments.

24.

In or about 2000, upon becoming aware of the LA County payments

19

20
21

to judges and judicial officers, Fine began challenging the correctness of judges

22
23

24

presiding over cases where they had received money from LA County. These
challenges occurred at the moment that Fine became aware of the payments. The

25

challenges occurred in appellate briefs in 2000-2002 against Judge Chalfant and


26
27

28

Justice Doi Todd in the case of Silva v. Gareetti; in 2002 against Judge Lewin in
the federal civil rights case of LACAOEHS v. County orLos Angeles and Lewin;

-9~--~-~

- - -

- - - - - - -

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 11 of 55 Page ID #:11

Doi Todd in the federal civil rights case of Silva v. Chalfant, et aI; CCP 170.3
3
4
5

objections against Judge Hubbell, Judge Bruguera and Commissioner Mitchell in


various cases in 2004; CCP 170.3 objection against Judge Bruguera in the case

7
8

of Coalition to Save the Marina. et al. v. County orLos Angeles. et ai, (four

consolidated cases) and Writ of Mandate, followed by appellate brief; 2008 CCP

10
11

170.3 objection in the case of Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners

Association v. County orIos Angeles followed by writ of habeas corpus.

12

D.

The criminal County payments to the judges show that the counts
in the NDC are a sham.

25.

The NDC originally contained 22 counts of "moral turpitude." Each

13

14

15
16

17

count was based solely upon a document filed in a court. This violates the First
Amendment unless a false statement is proven.

After the completion of the

18
19

20

Review Department hearing, all but eight counts in the NDC had been dismissed.
The Review Department had reinstated two counts (4 and 19) which the Hearing

21

Department had dismissed and the OCTC had not appealed.

The Review

22
23
24

Department had done this without notice or hearing, in violation of State Bar
Rule of Procedure Rule 305 and due process. (See In Re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544

25
26
27

(1968).)
26.

The eight remaining counts were Counts 1, 5, 6, 8-9, 14, 16, 18 and

28

20-22. The judicial officers who took the criminal payments were Mitchell -

10-----+l----'------------------------

-----

-----

- - - - - - - ----

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 12 of 55 Page ID #:12

,--,L." ..u

...

ger

and Dukes - Counts 20-22.


20-22 . Boren and Nott, who concealed Doi Todd's actions,
3
4

were in Counts 18 and 20-22, and Honn, who took payments from Orange
County, was in Count 8-9. Lewin is in Count 17.

E.

Six California Supreme Court Justices are involved with the


County criminal payments.

27_
27.

Five California Supreme Court Justices received criminal


crimina) payments

9
10

while they were Superior Court judges, based upon a review of their official

11
12

biographies.

These are Chief Justice George and Justices Chin, Corrigan,

13

Kennard and Moreno. Further, Chief Justice George and Justice Baxter are on

14
15
16

17

the California Judicial Council that drafted Senate Bill SBX2-11.


28.

These six denied Fine's Petition for Review and refused to recuse

themselves. The U.S. Supreme Court case of Aetna Lite Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475

18

19
20

U.s. 813 (1986) held that due process was violated by an Alabama Supreme
U.S.
Court justice who cast a deciding vote against an insurance company while he

21

22
23

was the lead plaintiff in a nearly identical case. In Count 18 of the NDC, Fine
was held to have committed "moral turpitude"
turpitude~~ for filing the Silva case, a federal

24
25
26
27

civil rights defendants class action suit seeking to enjoin the LA County
payments to LA Superior Court judges on the grounds that they violated Article
VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution, the First Amendment and the

28

-11 -11-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 13 of 55 Page ID #:13

that Fine was correct in his charges in the Silva case.


3

On December 8, 2009, Fine submitted a motion to the California

29.

Supreme Court to "set aside and void disbarment." The California Supreme

Court refused to file the motion.

F.

10
II
11

I2
12
13

14
15

30.

The State Bar's concealment of:


a) Mitchell as the complaining witness;
b) The fact that Mitchell was not a judicial officer in the De
Flores case;
c) The void California appellate case of Fine v. Superior Court;
d) Mitchell's distribution of $2,550,600 from the De Flores
settlement fund in violation of the final judgment;
e) Mitchell's financial and other acts against the interests of class
members.

In response to Fine's motion to dismiss the NDC before the State Bar

16

Hearing Department, OCTC lawyer Gerald E. Magnuson stated in a declaration


17
18
19

that the State Bar initiated the investigation against Fine which resulted in the
NDC.

This statement was proven to be false when LA Superior Court

20
21

22

Commissioner Bruce E. Mitchell (Mitchell) unexpectedly appeared as a hearing


spectator over a year later and stated that he was the "complaining party." (State

23

24

25
26

Bar Transcript, Vol. 4, pp. 60-6l.)


60-61.) The State Bar had never revealed Mitchell's
identity, even though he was involved in every case upon which the NDC was
based but the LACAOEHS
LACAOEHSv.
v. Lewin case (the "Lewin"
~'Lewin" case), and had received

27
28

criminal payments from LA County.

-12-

-1-1--1+------

- - - - - ---------- --- -.. .-------------- -------.--- .-------------..-- -- ----- --- -- ---~ ~ - ---~-.-- --

- - ~-- -

------

---- -

---

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 14 of 55 Page ID #:14

se premlse
2

was a judicial officer and the "temporary judge" for post-judgment proceedings
3
4
5

in the case of De Flores, et ai, v. EHG National Health Svcs., et ai, LASe case
no. BC150607 (the "De Flores" case). This false premise affected Counts 1, 5,

7
8

14 and 20-22. The true fact is that Mitchell never was a "temporary judge" for
post-judgment proceedings in the De Flores case as no one executed a stipulation

9
IO

11

as required under Article VI, Section 21, of the California Constitution, and CCP
259( d). This fact was further emphasized on August 21, 2002 when Mitchell,

12

acting as the LA Superior Court, voided and annulled the September 24, 2001
13

14

15

Order and Judgment of Contempt in which he claimed he was a "temporary


judge" for post-judgment proceedings. He (the LA Superior Court) took action

16

17
18

in response to an August 12, 2002 order to show cause re granting immediate


habeas corpus relief without hearing in the federal case of Fine v. Superior Court,

19

20
21

22

US DC case no. CV -02-464 7.


32.

This August 21,2002 order also voided and annulled the case of Fine

v. Superior Court, 97 Cal.App.4 th 651 (April 2002), which affirmed the now void

23
24

25

and annulled September 24,2001 order and judgment of contempt. (A void order
is void ab initio; Valley v. Northern Fire and Marine Co., 254 U.S. 348 (1920).

26

27
28

No court has the lawful authority to validate a void order; US. v. Throckmorton,
98 U.S. 61 (1878). All orders based on void orders are themselves void; Austin v.

-13-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 15 of 55 Page ID #:15

judgment based on it is also void."). Any action taken by Mitchell was void.
3
4
5

Any action that relied on an action taken by Mitchell was void. This removed
Counts 1, 5, 14 and 20-22 of the NDC. It also removed Count 4, which had been

unlawfully reinstated.
33.

The De Flores stipulation of settlement, which was approved by the

9
10
11

stipulated order of judgment (fmal judgment), provided for the disbursement of


the $7.86 million settlement fund at Section 5, paragraph 5.2(a)-(d).

In the

12

summer of 1999, Mitchell moved the $7.86 million from Wells Fargo Bank to
13
14

15

Bank of America, where his Form


Fonn 700 fmancial interest statement showed that he
had personal loans. In 2000, he spoke of using the De Flores settlement fund to

16
17

18

pay attorneys in the case to defend against an appeal of his actions by Fine.
Mitchell was no longer a "temporary judge" after August 28. 1999. In 2005.

19

20
21

22

Diane Goldman, Marc Brauer and the ftrm Gelfano and Gelfano applied for fees
for such defense and were paid in 2006.

This payment violated Section 5,

paragraph 5 .2(b) of the stipulation of settlement. It also showed that Mitchell

23
24

25

"misappropriated" funds for his defense of the 2000 appeal, making Count 4 of
the NDe false and a sham.

26
27
28

34.

On April 1, 2005, Mitchell approved a stipulation of settlement and

mutual release under which the settlement class in the De Flores case would

-14-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 16 of 55 Page ID #:16

me agains
agams
ine
2

Court, Bruce E. Mitchell and other judicial officers" for $80,000, paid by the De
COurt,
3
4

Flores settlement fund. Such purchase violated Section 5, paragraph 5.2(b) of


the stipulation of settlement. Mitchell then paid John Moe III and Peter Leeson

7
8

IV of the frrm
fum
fIrm of Luce, Forward $300,000.00 from the De Flores settlement fund
to defend such purchase. Mitchell then, on July 26, 2006, awarded lawyers in the

9
10
11
12

De Flores case $1.6 million in fees in violation of Section 5, paragraph 5.2(a) of


the stipulation of settlement on the condition that they would "hold back" 34%,
or $566,684.65, to further pay to defend the purchase.

The total amount

13
14

15

unlawfully paid for the purchase and the related attorney's fees from the De

Flores settlement fund was $1,980,000, in violation of Section 5, paragraph

16

17
18

5.2(a) and (b) of the stipulation of settlement. (See Appendix to July 26, 2006
Order in the De Flores case for the above expenditures and State Bar joint trial

19

exhibit 180.) U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Sheri Bluebond also approved the April 1,
20
21

22

2005 settlement and mutual release agreement knowing that it violated the
stipulation of settlement and mutual release settlement in the De Flores case and

23

24

25

was an unlawful taking of funds from the De Flores settlement fund.

U.S.

District Court Judge Ann Marie Stotler was also made aware of the violation of

26
27

the stipulation of settlement and the unlawful taking of funds from the De Flores

28

-15-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 17 of 55 Page ID #:17

mg over the settlement agre


2

mutual release. She did nothing.


3

35.

Mitchell unlawfully paid out approximately $567,000 of other

monies from the De Flores settlement fund in violation of Section 5, paragraph

502(b) of the stipulation of settlement. The recipients were: Byron Moldo, for
acting as "receiver," "notice giver" and "attorneys work" - estimated $510,172,

9
10

11

12

he was employed only to be a "disbursing agent," i.e. check writer; Diane


Karpman of Karpman & Associates - estimated $55,980, as an "ethics expert" to

assist "plaintiffs attorneys"; Bernard George Investigations - estimated $10,146

13

14

15

as an "investigator" to investigate Fine; Tovar &


& Cohen - $800 to hire a medical

expert for court when no court appearance was contemplated as the stipulation of

16

17
18

settlement provided for a private judge to decide the value of each class

member's claim;
claim~ and $768 to purchase a scanner for an unstated purpose. These

19

unlawful expenditures were part of an accounting presented by the disbursing


20
21

22

agent for a March 13, 2006 hearing in the De Flores case before Mitchell. (See
State Bar joint trial exhibit 180.)

23
24

25

36.

The total monies paid out by Mitchell in the De Flores case was

approximately $2,550,600, in violation of Section 5, paragraph 5.2(a) and (b).

26
27

28

37.

In the case of McCormick v. Reddi-Brake Supply Corp.! et aI,

Mitchell upset a settlement of a $20 million judgment and a right to collect

-16-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 18 of 55 Page ID #:18

agamst a
2

later settled for $1.5 million without Fine. In the case of Churchfield v. Wilson,
3

Mitchell decertified the class because Fine was class counsel. The case died. A
previous identical class action case had settled against the State of California with

6
7
8

Fine as class coWlsel and each claimant received 100% of their loss. In the case
of Debbs v. Calif Dept. ot Veterans Affairs, Mitchell decertified a class of

10
II

thousands of veterans, who had been overcharged on Cal Vet home loans,
because Fine was class counsel. In the case of PSO v. Sony. Sharp and Toshiba,

12

Mitchell refused to certify a class because Fine would be class counsel after Fine
13

14
15

had won the certification issues on appeal. Previously, before another judge, 25
other consumer electronics and computer companies had settled the class action

16

17
18

19
20

21

22

case. In the case of Shinkle. et aI, v. City otLos Angeles (the "Shinkle" case),
Mitchell denied class certification on substantive grounds instead of certification
grounds. This violated the holding of Linder v. Thrifty Oil, 23 Cal.4th 429 (2000).
In the De Flores case, Mitchell removed Fine as "class counsel" even though

there was not a class counsel for the settlement class set forth in the stipulation of

23
24
25

settlement, approved in the final judgment.

substance of the final judgment. Under CCP 473d, he was prohibited from

26
27

Mitchell was trying to alter the

doing such.

28

-17-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 19 of 55 Page ID #:19

certification in the Shinkle case in 1999, followed by the removal as "class


3
4

cOWlsel" in the De -Flores case in 2000, followed by the decertification, etc.,


cowsel"
etc.; in

2000-2001, based upon his action in the De Flores case.

7
8

39.

frrst action to remove Fine as a class COWlsel,


Prior to Mitchell's flfst

Lewin had denied Fine attorney's fees after Fine had prevailed in the case of

10
11

12

Amiadi and LACAOEHS v. LA County Board of Supervisors. In this case, Fine

stopped the COWlty


County
COlmty from taking approximately $45 million per year of
environmental fees and putting such in the general fund. Fine won an injunction

13
14

to establish a "special fund" and place the money in it.

$11 million was

15

immediately taken from the general fund and placed in the "special fund." All

16

17
18

new environmental fees were frozen until the $11 million was expended. The
environmental fees in the "special fund"
fimd" could only be used for special purposes.

19

20
21

22

As of the present time, the special fund has probably collected $500 million.
40.

Judge Lewin concealed the fact that he was receiving payments from

LA County. LA County Counsel also concealed that fact. Lewin denied Fine

23
24

25

attorney's fees. Fine challenged Lewin as biased for his anti-union position and
appealed. Fine later found out about the concealed LA County payments and
appealed.

26

27

filed the Lew in federal case.

28

--1818---- --- - - - --

-----------_._------

._----_.-------_ .

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 20 of 55 Page ID #:20

Garcetti to obtain $14 million of child support monies for women and children
3
4
5

that the LA County District Attorney had illegally-held


illegally
heldfor over six
six months. The
ilIegallyheldforover
LA County District Attorney admitted to the violation. At the end of the trial,

7
8

Judge Chalfant dismissed the case.

Chalfant concealed the fact that he was

receiving payments from LA County. The LA County Counsel concealed the

9
10
to

11
II
12

fact that LA County was making the payments. When Fine found out, he raised
the issue in the appeal.
42.

During the same time, Mitchell, who was also receiving payments

13
14

15

from LA County and concealing such, began acting against Fine as set forth
above.
above.

16

17

G.

The LA Superior Court and the State Bar join forces against
Fine.

43.

After the LA County payments became an issue raised by Fine,

18

19

20

James A. Basque, the then- or former presiding judge of the LA Superior Court,

21

22
23

filed a complaint against Fine with the State Bar. Basque had fought to stop the
legislature from removing the law allowing local courts to pass rules to accept

24

County payments, even though the 1997 Lockyer - Isenberg Trial Court Funding
25

26
27

Act required the state to pay all trial court costs. Fine did not know Basque and
had never appeared before him. A sham NDC was filed in April 2003 by the

28

-19-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 21 of 55 Page ID #:21

furtherance of justice" after Fine had filed a motion to dismiss.


3
4

44. _By 2003, Fine had filed:

A. LACAOEHS v. County of Los Angeles and Lewin and Silva v.

Chalfant, et al- both federal civil rights cases alleging that the LA

County payments to the LA Superior Court judges violated Article

VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution:

10

B. Arguments in appellate briefs against Judge Chalfant and Justice

11

12

Doi Todd for having taken LA County payments, concealed such


13

and judged LA County cases, and against Justices Boren and Nott

14
15

for having concealed Judge Doi Todd's actions; and

16

C. CCP 170.3 objections and motions to recuse LA Superior Court

17
18

judges based upon the LA County payments issue.

19

45.

In May of 2004, Fine commenced filing a series of four cases

20

21

22

challenging the leases of LA County land in Marina del Rey, California, to


developers to develop private apartment complexes, boat slips and businesses as

23
24

25

an unconstitutional gift of public property to private individuals. The cases were

consolidated under Coalition to Save the Marina and Marina Tenants

26

27
28

Association. et al. v. County of Los Angeles. et aI, LASC case no. BS089838.
Fine filed a CCP 170.3 objection against Judge Bruguera, based upon her

-2020-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 22 of 55 Page ID #:22

LA County. Judge Bruguera "struck" the objection and denied the motion. Fine
3
4

took writs to the-Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. These were
summarily denied.
denied.

6
7
8

46.

In September 2006, Fine was informed in a letter from Itzel Berrio,

Asst. General Counsel of the California State Bar, that a complaint had been filed

9
10

11
12

against him in September 2004 and that such complaint was the basis of the NDC
filed February 2, 2006.
flied

As stated above, Mitchell identified himself as the

"complaining party". At all times, the State Bar concealed Mitchell's identity.

13

14

The Berrio letter further stated that the State Bar researched 30 cases in which

15

Fine had participated in order to bring its charges, from which it selected five

16

17
18

main cases. Four involved Mitchell. Four involved LA County payments in


some form. Two counts of the NDC challenged the filing of the Lewin and Silva

19

20
21

22

cases as "moral turpitude." The NDC also alleged that the filing of the federal
civil rights lawsuit of Fine v. Mitchell in 2003 constituted "moral turpitude" as it .pursued the same claim for relief as in Lewin and Silva.

As shown above,

23
24

25

Sturgeon, supra, and the retroactive immunity provided by Senate Bill SBX2-11

dispels any question of Fine's conduct, much less "moral turpitude" for CCP

26
27

28

170.3 objections against Mitchell in the Debbs, Churchfield, McCormick and


PSG cases.

Mitchell never answered or struck the

--+t-----~-+t--._._-_.. ~
_ -~ -_.....
. -. -_ .. -..
- -- .0
.

-21-

objections~

he responded

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 23 of 55 Page ID #:23

Superior Court orLA County, 198 Cal.App.3d 1101 (1988); PBA, LLC v. KPOD,
3
4

Ltd., 112 CaLAppA th 965 (2003).) Mitchell was disqualified under CCP
CCPCCP- -
I 70. 3(c)(4). Mitchell's responses were legally void.
170.3(c)(4).

H.

Two successive State Bar presidents and a "public member" of


the Board are on adverse sides to Fine in cases.

47.

In 2004,
2004~ Fine fued the case of Coalition to Save the Marina, et al.
ai, v.

10

County orLos Angeles challenging LA County's "seaworthy ordinance." In May

II
11
12
13

2005, the case was answered to include Marina Pacific Association (MPA),
(MPA), a
lessee in Marina del Rey who was evicting boaters. The local general partner for

14

15
16

MPA
MPA was the Epstein Family Trust. The trustees were Jerry B. Epstein and Pat

Epstein. One of their attorneys was Sheldon H. Sloan, a member of the Board,

17

and President of the State Bar in 2006-2007. On July 7, 2005, MPA filed a
18
19

20

counterclaim for breach of the boat slip lease which the California Court of
Appeal later commented could not succeed as it did not allege failure to pay rent,

21

22
23

did not show damages and showed that the boat slip lease was replaced with a
temporary moorage contract. Sheldon H. Sloan and his client, Epstein, had an

24

25
26

27

interest in removing Fine from practice.

48.

In January 2006, Fine was retained by the Marina Strand Colony II

Homeowners Association to oppose an Environmental Impact Report (EIR) for

28

the redevelopment of the Del Rey Shores apartment complex in Marina del Rey,
22-22- - - - - - - - - - - --------- - ------ +--------------------------- -------+--- - - ----- - -- ----+----

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 24 of 55 Page ID #:24

ey
2

Shores Joint Venture and Del Rey Shores Joint Venture North (Del Rey Shores).
3

The local general partner of Del Rey Shores was the Epstein Family Trust. The
trustees were Jerry B. Epstein and Pat Epstein.

6
7

49.

As part of the Del Rey Shores development, the Epsteins negotiated

an option for a lease extension with LA County. This was a requirement in the

9
10

II
11

12

EIR to show fmancial benefit to LA County. The documents showed that LA


County was represented by Munger, Tolles and Olson. Jeffrey Bleich was a
partner with Munger, Tulles and Olson. He was also a member of the Board and

13

14
15

succeeded Sheldon H. Sloan as the President of the State Bar for 2007-2008. He,

his firm and their client had an interest in removing Fine from practice.

16

17
18

.,

50.

During the year 2006, Jerry B. Epstein, Pat Epstein and David B.

Levine (of the office of Jerry B. Epstein) contributed $4,600 to LA Supervisors

19

20
21

22

Antonovich, Burke and Knabe. In April 2007, contributions in excess of $4,700


were given to LA Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe by the Epstein interests.

On May 15, 2007, four LA Supervisors, including Antonovich and Knabe, voted

23
24

25

to certify the EIR for the Del Rey Shores redevelopment.

The votes of

Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe were illegal as they had received

26

27

28

contributions from an interested party (the Epsteins) of greater than $500 within
twelve months of the vote. (See BreakZone Billiards v.
v. City of Torrance, 81

- H
-1+--1+
--- -- --

--------- --------
---. --- ---. ..
-- - ----

-23-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 25 of 55 Page ID #:25

two qualified votes; three were needed for lawful passage.


3

In June 2007, Fine filed suit against LA County to void the EIR in

51.

Marina Strand Colony II Homeowners Association v. County of Los Angeles,

LASC case no. BS 190420. The case was before LA Superior Court Judge David
P. Yaffe. Judge Yaffe received illegal payments from LA County but did not

10
II
1I

disclose such in violation of California Code of Judicial Ethics Canons 2A and B,

3B(5), (7) and (8), 4A(l) and (3), and 4D(l)(a)


4D(I)(a) and (b). Additionally, since the

12

payments were criminal under Senate Bill SBX2-11's retroactive immunity, he


13

14
15

should have recused himself. (See Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)
- " a judge receiving a bribe from an interested party over which he is presiding

l6
17
18

does not give the appearance of justice." Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610

(1960) - "justice must have the appearance of justice."

19

In 2006, Fine was retained by the Grassroots Coalition to enforce a

52.
20
21
22

writ of mandate against the City of Los Angeles in the case of Aetna v. City of

Los Angeles and Playa Vista Capital Corp., LASC case no. BS073182. Laura

23
24

25

Chick was the City Controller for the City of Los Angeles. During 2006-2007,
she was appointed to the State Bar Board of Governors as a public member.

26

53.

27

28
28

On or about June 5, 2007, Laura Chick, through her office, made a

favorable report regarding the Building Department inspections at the Playa Vista

-24- - ---1f+---

- - - - --

------ ---- - - - - - -- -- -

----- - -

------ - --- ------- ----

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 26 of 55 Page ID #:26

m er name to a canty
e est was gIven
gIVen ill
2

by Latham & Watkins, the attorneys and lobbyists for Playa Vista Capital Corp.,

4
5

the developers for Playa Vista. A "behest"


"behest" cannot be given without the prior

approval of the office holder. The comment period for the report was still open

7
8

when the "behest" was given. Fine raised the issue in the Playa Vista lawsuit that

the "behest" was illegal. Laura Chick had an interest in removing Fine from

10

practice.

12

Laura Chick had been a LA City Councilperson during the time of

54.

11

the Shinkle case. The Shinkle case was one of the cases in the NDC. Fine

13

14

15

brought the case against the City of Los Angeles to reduce the sewer service

charges and to obtain damages for the residents who had been overcharged by the

16
17
18

City of Los Angeles. After the suit was brought, the LA City Council voted to
reduce the sewer service charges as set forth in the suit. However, due to the

19

unlawful action of Mitchell in denying class certification, and a later granting of


20
21

22

summary judgment in the individual case, only the injunctive relief was obtained
by the City Council vote. Laura Chick had an interest in the counts in the NDC

23
24

25

relating to the Shinkle case as such reflected on the conduct of the City of Los
Angeles while she was a councilperson.

26

55.

27
28

The State Bar Act makes it a misdemeanor for a Board member to

not disclose a conflict. Since neither Sloan, Bleich, nor Chick have been charged

__-

.-

-_
--...._.- -

- -

- - _ . _ -_
--

.....

_._

..

_------

-25-

--

- ---_... ... _ . . _ -_.._... _--_._ . _ ..._.._--_... .

.-

._--

. ..

_-

_.

.._-_.

.. ..

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 27 of 55 Page ID #:27

2
3
4

ocrc and the State Bar Court knew of their conflict.

None of these entities

disclosed-such
disclosed
such conflict to the California Supreme Court in any document filed

with the Court.

I.

Continued retaliation against Fine by LA Superior Court judges.

56.

In 2007, the LA Superior Court judges further retaliated against Fine

9
10

11

through the actions of Judge John P. Shook.

In the case Winston Financial

Services Inc. v. Fine, et aL a judicial foreclosure case, Winston and his attorney

12
13
14

Goe and Forsythe (Robert P. Goe and Marc C. Forsythe) admitted in court papers
in 2007 that they had committed a false foreclosure on Fine's residence.
residence. They

15

admitted that Winston, who purported to be the beneficiary of a trust deed on


16

]7
17
18

Fine's residence, was not the real beneficiary and had committed the false
foreclosure. When Fine brought a motion to overtmn
overturn the lawsuit based upon
foreclosure.

19

20
21

Winston's fraud upon the Court, Judge Shook denied the motion.
J.

State Bar Court Hearing Department Judge Richard A. Honn did not

22
23
24

25

disclose that he was on the Board of Governors of a charity (the Southern


California Special Olympics) that received $30,000.00 from LA County while he

decided Fine'
Fine'ss case. 57. State Bar Court Hearing Department Judge Richard A.

26
27

28

Honn sat on the Board of Governors of the Special Olympics - Southern


case.
California during the time he presided over Fine's case.

-26- -- --

----

- - - - ----------

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 28 of 55 Page ID #:28

e same tune peno ,

at LA

County contributed $30,000 to the charity. Honn did not disclose the
3
4

contributions nor his membership. The NDC included -numerous counts charging
Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing lawsuits alleging that the LA County

6
7
8

payments to the LA Superior Court judges violated the U.S. and California
Constitutions, and for filing CCP 170.3 objections to judges regarding such

9
10

II
12

payments. Honn held Fine guilty on all seven counts.


59.

Honn was under a duty to recuse himself under Code of Judicial

Ethics Canons 2A and 2B, and 4A(l) and (3).

He has also destroyed the

I3
13
14
15

"appearance of justice" and denied due process like the mayor in Monroeville,
supra, who was not paid to be a judge, but the [mes
fmes he assessed went into the

16

17
18

town "fisc.", which, as mayor, he managed. Although Honn did not get money
he
personally from LA County, as a member of the Board of Governors, be

19

managed the money that was given to his organization. He was still benefitting.
20
21

22

K.

Judge Honn and Review Department Judges Remke, Epstein and

Stuvitz had pre-decided that Fine's court filings were not protected by the First

23
24

25

Amendment and that the moral turpitude statute did not violate the First
Amendment, even though Article 3.5 of the California Constitution precluded

26

27

them from doing such.

28

-27-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 29 of 55 Page ID #:29

2
3
4

considering federal constitutional claims. (See Calif. Const., Art. III, Section
3.5.) Fine had moved to dismiss the NDe in the Hearing Department. Honn
denied the motion.

7
8

61.

Fine again moved to dismiss on First Amendment grounds in the

Review Department.

The OCTC responded that it was not challenging the

9
10
11

statements in Fine's papers, Fine's rhetoric or Fine's speech. There was nothing
left in the case, as each count in the NDC referred to a document filed in court.

12

Judges Remke, Epstein and Stovitz refused to consider any constitutional claim
13
14

15

by falsely claiming that it had not been raised in the trial court. Such action
violated Article III, Section 3.5, which prohibits them from even deciding a

16
17

constitutional issue.

18

Amendment issues.

They were bound to refrain from "deciding" the First

19

20
21

22

62.

They had previously opposed the argument that the "moral turpitude"

law was unconstitutional in the cases of Canatella v. State Bar of California, et


al, 304 F.3d 843 (Ninth Cir. 2006) and Canatella v. Stovitz, et ai, case no. 05-

23
24

25

15447~

213 Fed. Appx 515 (2006) (appellate opinion, not for publication).

63.

In both cases, the Chief Trial Counsel was also a defendant, as was

26
27
28

the President of the State Bar. This shows a unity of interest on these issues and
pre-decision in Fine's case.

-28-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 30 of 55 Page ID #:30

2
3

4
5

before the Court, i.e. the Pledge of Allegiance to the flag, Justice Scalia recused
himself.

(See Elk Grove Unified School Dist; v.Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301

(2004).) Judges Honn, Remke, Epstein and Stovitz violated Code of Judicial

Ethics Canons 2A and B.

L.

The Money Trail - The connections between the criminal


payments to the judges, the contributions to the Supervisors, the
$30,000 contribution to Honn's charity and the State Bar's action
for Fine's "involuntary enrollment" and disbarment.

65.

Since the late 1980s, LA County has been making criminal payments

10
11

12
13

to LA Superior Court judges. In 2007, as shown in the Sturgeon case, these

14
15
16

payments were approximately $46,436 per year in addition to the judge's state
compensation. Their state salary, excluding benefits, was approximately

17

$178,800 per year. The LA County payments were approximately 27% of their
18
19

20

state salary.

Their total compensation, including state benefits, was

approximately $249,000 per year. LA County was paying $21 million per year to

21

22
23

the judges.
66.

LA County Counsel Annual Litigation Reports for FY 2005-2006

24

25
26

27

and 2006-2007 showed that no person won a case against LA County when a
Superior Court judge made the decision. This was in contrast to the opponents
winning before a jury. For FY 2007-2008, it could not be determined if two

28

winning cases were jury verdicts or judicial decisions as the reports did not
-29-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 31 of 55 Page ID #:31

2
3
4

decided against LA County by a judge.


67.

The LA Superior Court flrst came to the State Bartbrough Judge

Basque, a then-presiding or recently presiding judge of the LA Superior Court, to

7
8

file a complaint against Fine. Fine had been challenging the LA County payments
to the LA Superior Court judges. A NDC was flIed in April 2003 and dismissed

9
10
11

by the State Bar "in the furtherance of justice" on February 2,2004 after Fine had
moved to dismiss.

12

68.

In September 2004, the LA Superior Court again complained to the

13

14
15

State Bar through Mitchell, who had been a defendant in the Silva case. Mitchell
had received criminal LA County payments while sitting as a "temporary judge"

16

17
18

assigned to the Eminent Domain Department of the LA Superior Court.

The

State Bar never disclosed Mitchell's identity. Mitchell filed his complaint after

19

20
21

22

Fine had flIed a CCP 170.3 objection to Judge Bruguera in the consolidated
cases of Coalition to Save the Marina and Marina Tenants Association. et al. v.

County of Los Angeles. et al. The objection was based upon the LA County

23
24

25

payments to Judge Bruguera. Fine had moved to transfer the cases out of Los
Angeles. Judge Bruguera "struck" the motion. Fine flIed writs. She denied the

26

27

motion to transfer.

Ultimately, she dismissed the cases.

28

-30-

The LA County

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 32 of 55 Page ID #:32

2
3
4

which they should have received if the cases had prevailed.


69.

The-State Bar investigated thirty cases in which Fine was involved,

seeking reasons to bring charges which were different from those dismissed in

2004. Those took until February 6, 2006, when the NDC was fIled. The State
Bar stretched back to 1999 and 2000 for actions relating to Mitchell, which were

10
11

beyond the five-year statute of limitations, in addition to not being violations.


69.

In late 2004, Fine filed the Coalition to Save the Marina v. County of

12

Los Angeles case, testing the constitutionality of the LA County's "seaworthy


13

14

15

ordinance." In March 2005, Marina Pacific Associates was added as a defendant.


On July 7, 2005, MPA filed a meritless counterclaim based upon a boat slip

16

17

18

lease. One of the attorneys for MPA was Sheldon H. Sloan, a member of the
Board of Governors and State Bar President in 2006-2007. The local managing

19

Partner of moa was the Epstein family trust whose trustees were Jerry B. Epstein
20
21

22

and Pat Epstein.


71.

In January 2006, Fine was retained by the Marina Strand Colony II

23
24

25

Homeowners Association to oppose the EIR for the redevelopment of Del Rey
Shores.

The co-applicants were LA County and Del Rey Shores.

Del Rey

26

27

28

Shores' local managing partner was the Epstein Family Trust, whose trustees
were Jerry B. Epstein and Pat Epstein.

-31-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 33 of 55 Page ID #:33

extension with Del Rey Shores as part of the EIR was Munger, Tolles and Olson.
3
4

One of their partners, Jeffrey Bleich, was a member of the Board of Governors of
the State Bar and succeeded Sheldon H. Sloan as President for 2007 - 2008.

7
8

73.

On May 15,2007, the LA County Board of Supervisors approved the

EIR on an illegal 4-1 vote. Two of the votes, Antonovich's


Antonovich' s and Knabe's, were

10
II

illegal because they had received contributions of greater than $500 from the
Epsteins and their employees within 12 months prior to the vote.

12

74.

In June 2007, Fine filed the case of Marina Strand Colony II

13
14

15

Homeowners Association v. County of


Los Angeles to void the EIR due to the
orLos
illegal votes. LA Superior Court Judge David P. Yaffe did not void the EIR.

10
16

17
18

75.

On January 8, 2008, long after Fine left the case, Judge Yaffe,

without prior notice to Fine, issued an unlawful order for Fine to pay attorney's

19

20
21
22

fees and costs to LA County and Del Rey Shores, then held Fine in contempt and
ordered him jailed under "coercive incarceration" while Fine fought the question:
''whether the trial court judge [Judge Yaffe] should have recused himself' by a

23

24

25

writ of habeas corpus.

Fine has been imprisoned in the LA County Jail since

20,2008,
2008, to taking LA County
March 4,2009. Judge Yaffe admitted, on March 20,

26
27

28

payments, was disqualified on April 7, 2008, and refused to leave the case. On
December 22, 2008, Yaffe testified at the contempt trial that he received the LA

-32-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 34 of 55 Page ID #:34

County payments, that he dId not report them on his Form 700 Statement of
2

Economic Interests, that he did not have any employment agreement or


3
4
5

arrangement for services with LA County and that he could not remember any
case in the last three years that he decided against LA County.

7
8

76.

In 2006, Fine was retained by the Grassroots Coalition to enforce a

Writ of Mandate against the City of Los Angeles in the case of Aetna. et al. v.

10
11

City of Los Angeles and Playa Vista Capital Corp. LA City Controller Laura
Chick had an illegal "behest" given in her name by Latham & Watkins to a

12

charity the day after she issued a report favorable to Playa Vista Capital Corp.
13

14
15

Latham & Watkins was the law frrm in the litigation and the lobbyist for Playa
Vista Capital Corp.

16

17

18

77.

On February 6, 2006, when the NDC was flIed, it was assigned to

Hearing Department Judge Richard A. Honn. Honn presided over the case until

19

20
21

22

October 31, 2007, when he denied the post-trial motion. During such time, he
was a member of the Board of Governors of the Special Olympics -- Southern
California. Documents from LA County show that, during such time, LA County

23
24

25

contributed $30,000 to the Special Olympics -- Southern California. Honn found

Fine guilty of almost all counts in the NDC. He did not find Fine guilty of

26
27
28

making false statements, which were Counts 2, 4 and 17.


78.

The money trail is as follows:

-33-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 35 of 55 Page ID #:35

Superior Court judges and court commISSIOners sitting as


33

judges";
"temporary judges"~

44
5

b.

The LA Superior Court judges and "temporary


''temporary judges" decide

cases in favor of LA County;

7
8

c.

LA Superior Court judges and "temporary judges" also decide

cases against Fine (who had challenged such LA County

10

payments) and his clients;

11
12

d.

The LA Superior Court, through its presiding judge or "former

13

presiding judge," and a commissioner "temporary judge"

14

15

complain about Fine to the State Bar:

16

17

e.

18

The complaint targets Fine's challenges to the LA County


payments to the judges;

19

20
20

f.f

Epstein and his employees make contributions to LA County


m the
Supervisors Antonovich and Knabe which result ill

21

22

unlawful approval of an illegal EIR;

23
23

24

g.

25
25

LA County criminal payments are made to Judge Yaffe, who


does not void the EIR and incarcerates Fine;

26
26
27
27

28
28

h.

Sloan and Bleich, lawyers for Epstein and LA County, are


Board members
Bar;
the State Bar;
members and
and successive presidents
presidents of the

-34-34-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 36 of 55 Page ID #:36

1.
2

is filed and during the proceedings;


3

J.

4
5

Honn's charity receives $30,000 from LA County while he


presides over Fine's case. Honn decides that Fine's filing cases

challenging the LA County payments to LA Superior Court

7
8

judges is "moral turpitude."

10
11

79.

In summary: Epstein contributed to the LA County Supervisors, the

Supervisors illegally decide for Epstein; LA County makes criminal payments to

12

LA Superior Court judges, the LA Superior Court judges decide for LA County,
13
14

15

the LA Superior Court complains about Fine to the State Bar; lawyers for Epstein
and LA County are on the Board of Governors and become two presidents of the

16
17
18

State Bar; the State Bar files an NDC; Chick becomes a public member of the
board; LA County contributes

$30~OOO

to the charity where the Hearing

19

20
21

22

Department judge who is presiding over the case is a member of the Board of
Governors; Fine is convicted of "moral turpitude" and disbarred for challenging
the LA County payments to the judges and challenging the judges and judicial

23
24
25

officers who took the criminal payments.


80.

The money trail reaches the California Supreme Court as the official

26

27

biographies show that Chief Justice George and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Kennard

28

----++-------------- + + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---------

-35-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 37 of 55 Page ID #:37

Superior Court judges.


3
4

M.

First Cause -of


o
off Action for violation of civil rights based upon
extrinsic fraud upon the
tbe Court.

81.

Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1 through 80, and each of them, as

6
7

if set forth in full.

9
10

82.

Defendants

have

violated

the

First,

Fifth

and

Fourteenth

Amendments to the U.S. Constitution by committing extrinsic fraud upon the

11

Court. Such extrinsic fraud consisted of the filing of a NDC on February 6, 2006,
12
13
14

knowing that such was false and a sham; not dismissing the NDC and allowing
the October 12, 2007 Hearing Department Order of Involuntary Inactive

15
16

17

Enrollment and Recommendation of Disbarment to proceed while knowing such

was a sham and unconstitutional, and not dismissing the NDC and allowing the

18

19
20
21

September 28, 2008 Review Department Recommendation of Disbarment to


proceed to the California Supreme Court while knowing that the remaining
counts in the NDC were false, a sham and unconstitutional.

22

23
24

83.

At all times the State Bar defendants knew that Fine had not made

any false statements in any pleadings set forth in the NDC. This was particularly

25

26
27

true for Counts 2, 4 and 17, which alleged false statements and were dismissed
for such having not been proved by the Hearing Department Judge. The State

28

Bar did not appeal such dismissal. The State Bar defendants committed fraud

-36-

H--- - -- -

----- --- ..
- - - - - - - - - - - -- .-

--

--

__ _

.
. .--- -----_.----. .

__ _

__

---_.
..._. .__. .-------. . -_._ ...
----- --- - .- .-- -.-. . --------- ------

------

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 38 of 55 Page ID #:38

upon the Supreme Court by allowing the Review Department's illegal


2

Recommendation overturning the dismissal of Counts 4 and 17 in violation of


3

State
State Bar Rule of Procedure-Rule
Procedure Rule 305 and without notice of hearing in violation
of due process as set forth in Ruffalo, supra, and knowing that such counts were

false and a sham. The Supreme Court was deceived.


84.

Count 4 of the NDC alleged that Fine made a false statement when

9
10

11

12

he charged in an appeal that Mitchell "misappropriated" monies from the De

Flores settlement fund. The truth is that the State Bar defendants knew from the
De Flores accounting documents and the 2005 petitions for attorney's fees that

13
14
15

Mitchell had misappropriated monies from the De Flores settlement fund in


violation of Section 5, paragraphs 5.2(a) and (b) to pay the attorneys to defend

1(;
16
17
18

him in the 2000 appeal. The State Bar defendants did not disclose such to the
California Supreme Court. The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court,

19

deceived the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.


20
21

22

85.

Count 17 charged Fine with making a false statement because he

paraphrased Judge Lewin's statement that it was "bad for County unions to sue

23

24

25

the County" as the reason for Judge Lewin not awarding attorney's fees, instead
of reciting Judge Lewin's other reasons. The statement was made in the Lewin

26
27

complaint charging Lewin with violating Article VI, Section 19, of the California

28

37-37-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 39 of 55 Page ID #:39

Ethics for taking payments from LA County.


3

86.

The truth is that the State Bar defendants knew that CQUllt 17 was

false because they knew that the reasons that Lewin had given, other than the fact

7
8

that LACAOEHS was an employee union, were false and that Lewin was being
paid money from LA County during the case and not dismissing it.

They

10
11

particularly knew from the Amjadi case and Fine's victory that Lewin was
making false statements when he stated that the suit had not conferred a benefit

12

when it created a $45 million fund and froze environmental fees, that the union
13

14
15

did not show a necessity for the suit when the suit stopped LA County from

stealing $45 million a year from environmental purposes and unnecessarily

l6
17

18

raising fees, and that the suit was brought as part of a labor dispute and giving
fees would encourage this type of conduct, for which there was no proof The

19

20
21

22

State Bar defendants concealed this information, as it did with Count 4.


87.

The State Bar defendants knew that, as to all other counts in the

NDC, disciplinary rules can not punish activity protected by the First

23

24
25

Amendment. (See Matter of Dixon, Review Dept. (1999) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct.

Rptr. 23, 30 (1999).) They knew that the First Amendment encompassed the

26
27

right to petition the government to redress a grievance, the freedom of speech,

28

-38-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 40 of 55 Page ID #:40

and ''the right of a citizen to severe y criticize

e per onnance 0

e government

and the courts is beyond cavil." (Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).)
3

88.

the NDC, all


all other counts were
Removing Counts 4 and 17 from theNDC,

founded in statements made in pleadings filed in courts. All were truthful. The

6
7

State Bar defendants knew that disciplinary charges could not be brought against
any such statement and that all such statements were protected by the First

10
11
12

Amendment. They also knew that Fine was correct in the underlying law.
89.

In response to Fine's First Amendment argument, the OCTC stated in

its Respondent's Brief in the Review Department that it was not prosecuting Fine

13
14

15

for the content of his statements, his rhetoric or his speech. By allowing the
Review Department decision to go to the Supreme Court, the State Bar

16
17
18

defendants, as officers of the court, deceived the Court. The Supreme Court was
deceived.

19

90.

After the decision of the Review Department, only Counts 1, 5, 6, 8-9

20
21

22

(treated as one), 14, 16, 18 and 20-22 (treated as one), remained.


91.

All of those counts involve Mitchell, the "complaining party" whom

23
24

25

the State Bar defendants never disclosed.

The State Bar defendants colluded

with Mitchell to hide the fact that he was not a "temporary judge" for post-

26
27

28

judgment proceedings in the De Flores case, that he unlawfully approved the


taking of approximately $2,550,600 from the De Flores settlement fund, of which

-39-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 41 of 55 Page ID #:41

and other judicial officers" by purchasing all claims Fine had against them and
3
4
5

defending the purchase, and that he had received criminal judicial payments from
LA County while acting as a "temporary judge" in the Eminent Domain Dept. of

6
7
8

the LA Superior Court.


92.

The State Bar defendants were colluding with Mitchell against Fine,

10

11
12

who had reported his conduct to the Commission on Judicial Performance. (See
State Bar trial joint exhibit 180), to intimidate Fine by bringing the NDC.
93.

This action was done by the State Bar defendants as officers of the

13
14

15

It deceived the Supreme Court.

Court to deceive the Supreme Court.

The

Supreme Court was deceived.

16

17
18

94. The State Bar defendants knew at all times that the "complaining party"
faIse.
was Mitchell and that the Gerald E. Magnason Declaration was faIse.

By

19

concealing such information


infonnation from the Supreme Court, they deceived the Supreme
20
21

22

Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.


95.

The State Bar defendants were colluding with and aiding and abetting

23
24

25

the LA Superior Court, who had received criminal payments, to file and
prosecute a false and sham NDC against Fine, who was challenging the criminal

26
27

LA County payments to LA Superior Court judges.

28

-40-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 42 of 55 Page ID #:42

e
2
3
4
5

Supreme Court. It did deceive the Supreme Court.


97.

The State Bar defendants acted against Fine for


for their personal

financial gain and the fmancial gain of their clients by filing and prosecuting a

7
8

NDC. In doing so, they acted as officers of the Court to deceive


false and sham NDe.
the Supreme Court. They did deceive the Supreme Court.

10
II
11

98.

The State Bar defendants knew that Count 1 was false and a sham.

Count 1 charged Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing "frivolous" CCP 170.3

12

objections against Mitchell in the De Flores case after the final judgment was
13

14
15

entered. The State Bar defendants knew that Mitchell was not a judicial officer
in the De Flores case after the fmal judgment was entered, therefore the basis of

16
17
18

the Count (that he was a judicial officer) was false. The State Bar defendants
knew that the California appellate case of Fine v. Superior Court,
Court. which had

19

20
21
22

referred to nine challenges as frivolous, was voided and annulled when Mitchell,
acting as the LA Superior Court, voided and annulled the underlying contempt
proceedings on August 21, 2002, along with the claim that he was a "temporary

23
24

judge" in the De Flores case. They knew the Mitchell had defrauded the Court

25

by claiming to be a "temporary judge" in the De Flores case in 2003, but such

26
27

28

effort failed when Judge Czuleger did not respond to a CCP 170.3 objection.
(See State Bar joint trial exhibit 180). They knew that Mitchell's
Mitchell ' s responses to the

-41-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 43 of 55 Page ID #:43

alternative answer", which is neither a striking nor an answer. They knew such
3
4

was void under law.


law . .-

The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court, deceived the

99.

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.

100.

The State Bar defendants knew that Count


COWlt 5 was false and a sham.

10
II
11

12

Count 5 charged Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing an appeal after a status
conference in the De Flores case before Mitchell. Here, again, the State Bar
defendants knew that Mitchell was not the "temporary judge" in the De Flores

13

14

15

case. They also knew from reading the documents in the appeal that the status

conference order which was being appealed did not "re-litigate" an earlier

16

17
18

removal of Fine as "class counsel" for the settlement class. They knew from the
stipulation of settlement and fmal judgment that there was not any "class

19

counsel", thus none could be removed. They knew that Mitchell later stated that
20
21

22

any lawyer that represented an individual class member was a "class counsel".
They knew that this is a different definition
defmition from "class counsel" for a certified

23
24

25

class and different from trying to remove Fine from representing a certified class.

They knew that Mitchell was trying to change the substance of a fmal judgment.

26

27

This is unlawful and prohibited by CCP 473d.

28

-42-

--_ .

--

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 44 of 55 Page ID #:44

e
2

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.


3
4

. 1-02.

Count 6 was false and a sham. Count 6 charged Fine with "moral

turpitude" for filing a second CCP 170.3 objection against Mitchell in 2000 in

the Shinkle case.

The State Bar defendants argued that the case had been

transferred to Judge Horowitz after Mitchell had denied class certification. They

9
10
lO

11
II
12

ignored the fact that Mitchell did not deny that he still was a "temporary judge"
for class purposes.

Additionally, Mitchell's denial of class certification on

substantive grounds was subject to the California Supreme Court case of Linder

13

14
15

v. Thrifty Oil, 23 Cal.4th 429 (2000), which was decided while the Shinkle case
was still in the trial court.

decisis on the Shinkle case and


This was stare decisiS

16

17

18

emasculated Mitchell's order, sending the case back to him for the class
certification issue.

He was thus temporary judge as he acknowledged, and

19

20
21

22

subject to the CCP 170.3 objection.


103.

The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court, deceived the

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived. The State Bar defendants

23

24
25

knew that Counts 8-9 (as one count) were false and a sham. Counts 8-9 charged
infonn the Court of Appeal that the trial
Fine with "moral turpitude" for failing to inform

26

27
28

judge had illegally changed a judgment after a writ had been filed by Fine,

changing the substantive language of the judgment. The State Bar defendants

-43-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 45 of 55 Page ID #:45

under CCP 473d. They also knew that, under CCP 916, after an appeal is
3

4
5

filed or writ is filed in .aa case, appealing CCP 170.3 determinations, the trial
court loses jurisdiction to make changes. Here, the change was made after the

7
8

petition for writ of mandate was filed.


104.

The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court, deceived the

10
11

12

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.


105.

The State Bar defendants knew that Count 14 was false and a sham.

Count 14 charges Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing "frivolous" CCP 170.3

13
14

15

objections against Mitchell in the Debbs, Crutchfield, McCormick and PSO cases
from December 1999 to May 2001. No Court of record held any of the CCP

16

17
18

170.3 objections to be "frivolous."

Once again, Mitchell filed an unlawful

response of "striking or in the alternate answer" which was legally void. Mitchell

19

was therefore disqualified under CCP 170.3(c)(4). State Bar defendants knew
20
21

22

this, and knew that they had a false and sham count.
106.

The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court, deceived the

23
24

25

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.


107.

The State Bar defendants knew that every act committed before

26

27
28

February 6, 2001 was beyond the five-year statute of limitations. The NDC was
filed on February 6, 2006. The statute of limitations is five years. The State Bar

-44-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 46 of 55 Page ID #:46

e exemptIOn

ar

investigation, as it is now known that Mitchell was the "complaining party." No


3

4
5

count in the NDC alleged a "continuing concert of action. "

The statute of

limitations, irrespective of the falsity of the counts, eliminates all CCP 170.3

7
8

objections in Counts 1 and 14 (which may leave one or two in each count), all of
Count 5, all of Count 6, all of Count 8-9 and all of reinstated Count 4.

to
11

108.

The State Bar defendants, acting as officers of the Court, deceived

the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.

12

109.

Count 16 was false and a sham. Count 16 charged Fine with "moral

13
14

15

turpitude" for filing a motion for leave to file a first amended complaint in the

Lewin case and substitute the proposed complaint in the Silva case. The State

16

17

18

Bar defendants knew that the case of Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293 (9 th Cir. 1996)
sets forth the

u.s.

Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit policies to allow an

19

amendment to a complaint. Further, the amended complaint cured the problem


20
21

22

perceived in the Lewin case as it followed the directions of the Court.


110.

The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court, deceived the

23

24

25

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.


Ill.

Count 18 was false and a sham. Count 18 charged Fine with "moral

26

27
28

turpitude" for filing a "frivolous" federal complaint; i.e., the Silva case.

The

Silva case alleged that the LA County payments to the LA Superior Court judges

-45-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 47 of 55 Page ID #:47

Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.

The State Bar defendants

3
4
5

Sturgeon, -supra, -held that the -LA


knew that Sturgeon;
LA County payments to the LA -Superior
Court judges violated Article VI, Section 19, of the California Constitution

7
8

before the Review Department decision became [mal.

They also knew that

Senate Bill SBX2-11 giving retroactive immunity to the judges was enacted

9
10

11

12

before the Supreme Court decision became [mal.


fmal. At all times they knew that no

law passed by the legislature "prescribed" the payments.


112.

The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court, deceived the

13
14
14
15

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.


113.

Counts 20-22 (as one count) was false and a sham. Counts 20-22

16

17
18

charged Fine with "moral turpitude" for filing a "frivolous" action, the Mitchell
case. The Review Department characterized the Mitchell case as pursuing the

19

"same claims as in the Lewin and Silva matters." In the Mitchell case, Fine
20
21
22

sought various orders based upon Mitchell having committed a fraud upon the
Court by claiming to be temporary judge n the De Flores case when he was not.

23
24

25

The State Bar defendants knew of the fraud upon the Court by Mitchell, they
knew that fraudupon the Court is an exception to the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine,

26
27

28
28

they knew that the Mitchell case was dealing with no administrative actions as
distinguished from judicial decisions in some parts, they knew that the Mitchell

-4646

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 48 of 55 Page ID #:48

Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Unc. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), seeking to
3
4

enjoin unlawful proceedings relating to contempt proceedings against Fine). In


Fine v. Czuleger, et aI, USDC case no. CV -04-0078, the Court held that the

7
8

claims were identical to those in the Mitchell case and stated that the Mitchell
case should be amended. Fine v. Czuleger was a civil rights "habeas corpus"

9
10
11

12

proceeding, brought after incarceration. In the Mitchell case, the Court held that
it had jurisdiction over habeas proceedings. The State Bar defendants knew all of
these facts.

13
14
15

114.

The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court, deceived the

Court. The Court was deceived.

16

17
18

115.

The State Bar defendants knew that no act allowed in Counts 1, 5, 6,

8-9 and 20-22 was "moral turpitude." The State Bar defendants knew that the

19

standard for moral turpitude was an act "contrary to honesty and morals." (See
20
21
22

Kitsis v. State Bar, 23 Cal.3d 857, 865 (1979).) The State Bar defendants knew

that no act in any of the aforementioned counts violated "honesty and good

23
24
25

morals." The State Bar defendants knew that no court of record had sanctioned
Fine for any act alleged in the aforementioned counts, with such action not being

26

27
28

voided.

The State Bar defendants knew that none of the acts in the

aforementioned counts were held to be "frivolous" by any court of record.

-47-

In

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 49 of 55 Page ID #:49

Superior Court was void under U.S. Supreme Court precedent, which California
3
4

5.5

judges are bOWld to follow. (See Article 6, Cl. 2 of the U.S. Constitution and the
oath of office.) The State Bar defendants knew that Judge Czuleger's 2003

6
7

judgment of contempt was void due to Mitchell's fraud on the court and
Czuleger's disqualification under CCP 170.3(c)(4). The State Bar defendants

9
10
11

12

knew that the State Bar Court is not a court of record in the California
Constitution, and any published opinion rendered by such a court is not law.
116.

The State Bar defendants, as officers of the Court,


Co~ deceived the

13

14
15

Supreme Court. The Supreme Court was deceived.

117.

The effect of the deception upon the Supreme Court was that the

16

17

18

Supreme Court denied Fine's Petition for Review on the Hearing Department's
Order of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment, nor does such occur under law when a

19

petition for review is denied, and the Supreme Court denied Fine's Petition for
20

21

22

Review of the Review Department's Recommendation of Disbarment. This


Recommendation of Disbarment became the order of the Supreme Court Wlder
under

23
24

25

B&P code 6084 when the denial of review became effective on March 25,
2009.

26
27

28

-4848
- - - _ ..

_-_.. . -

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 50 of 55 Page ID #:50

of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment without showing that it was not affrrmed by


3
4
5

.the Supreme Court.


119.

The State Bar defendants published the Review Department Opinion

and Recommendation, and list Fine as "disbarred" on the State Bar website.

Prayer

10
11
II
12

Wherefore plaintiff prays:


1.

The Court issue an order voiding and annulling the October 12, 2007

13

14
15

decision of the State Bar Court Hearing Department and Order of Involuntary
Inactive Enrollment;

16

17

18

2.

The Court order the State Bar to remove the October 12, 2007

Decision and Order of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment from its website and

19

records, and inform all persons and entities whom they had informed of such
20
21
22

decision, and order that such decision and order has been ordered to be voided
and annulled by the Court;

23

24

25

3.

The Court order the California Supreme Court to void and annul the

disbarment of Richard Isaac Fine and to restore his name as an active member of

26
27

the Bar as if no disbarment had occurred, without the payment of any back dues,

28

-49-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 51 of 55 Page ID #:51

levied against him by the Supreme Court or the State Bar;


3

4.

The Court order the State Bar to remove the Review Department

Opinion from its website, restore Richard Isaac Fine to the active list of State Bar

members as of October 12, 2007, pay all


aU costs of the State Bar proceeding
including transcript costs, copying costs and Supreme Court filing fees to Fine,

10
11

12

and to contact all persons and entities whom they informed of the disbarment and

inform them that the disbarment has been voided and annulled by this Court;
5.

For costs of suit herein;


For

6.

For reasonable attorney's fees; and

7.

For
F
or such further relief as the Court deems fit.

13
14

15
16

17
18

Dated: January 5, 20
2010
I0

Respectfully submitted,
submittecL

19
20

BY:
~
BY:~
---'ru"c:::.ue...,p.HAHARD~-I-.
F-INE--,
--'ru'-ue~HAHARD;"""'="'-I-.
P-INE--,iUHARDiFINE,

21

22

In Pro Per

23
24
25
26
27

28

-50-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 52 of 55 Page ID #:52

I, Richard I.
1. Fine, declare:
3

4
5

I am the plaintiff herein. I have read the above complaint and know the facts
alleged therein to be true to my personal knowledge.

6
7

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of
America.

10

Executed this 5th day of January, 2010, at Los Angeles, California.

11

BY:~

12
13

RICHARD 1.
I. FINE,
In Pro Per

14
15
16

Demand For Jury Trial

17
18

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.

19

20
21

Dated: January 5, 2010

Respectfully submitted,

22
23

BY:

~
RICHARD I. FINE,
In Pro Per

24
25
26

27
28

-51-

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 53 of 55 Page ID #:53

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 54 of 55 Page ID #:54

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION
312 North Spring Street, Room G-8 Los
Angeles, CA 90012
Tel: (213) 894-7984
Tel:

DIVISION
411 West Fourth Street, Suite 1053
Santa Ana,
Ana , CA 92701-4516
92701 -4516
(714) 338-4570

TO'<

EASTERN DIVISION

TERRY NAFISI

34 70 Twelfth Street, Room 134


Riverside , CA 92501
Riverside,
(951) 328-4450

District Court Executive


and Clerk of Court

Tuesday, January
Jan u ary 05,
OS , 2010
OS,
20 1 0
RICHARD I. FINE
1824367
441 BAUCHET STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90012

De ar Sir
Dear
Sir/Madam:
/Madam::
/Madam
a int for
f or Civil
Ci v il Rights
Ri g h ts wa
f il ed today on
o n your
yo ur bbehalf
beh
a lf and assigned
ass i g n e d civil
civ i l case
A Complaint
Comp llaint
wass filed
e half
c ase number
CVIO - 48
4 8 JFW
(CW)
CV10
J FW (CW)

A
A

Motion fo
forr Extens
Ex te n s i on of Time to
t o File
Fil e Habeas Corpus Petition
Pet ition was fi
filed
led today on your
y ourr beha
behalf
lf and
--~ Motion
Extensi
you
as signed civil case number
numbe r
assigned

o this
communications.
Pl ease refer tto
t hi s case number in al
a lll future
fu t u re communications
communi cat i o n s .
Please

Plea se Address
Please
Add r ess
Addre
ss all co rresponden
rr espon dence
ce to the
t he att
attention
e ntion of tthe
h e Courtroom
Cou rtr oom Deputy for:
f or :
District
Di strict
st r ict Court Judge
J u dge
X Magistrate
Magis trate Judge
J u dge

Carla Woehrle

t h e fol
l owing address:
add r ess
at the
f ol lowing
addre
ss :

u. S .
u.s.

District
Di st rict Court
Spring
St reet
3122 N. Spri
31
Spr
ing
ng Street
Civil
Ci vi l Section
Sect ion,, Room
Room G-8
Los Angeles
900 12
Ange l es , CA 90012

Ro nalld
Rona
l d Reag
Reaga
Reagan
a n Federal
Fe dera l
Buildi
Building
Bui
ldi ng and U.S. Courthouse
Cou rt house
Wes t Fourth St.,
St .,, Suite
Su i t e 1053
1 053
411 West
St.
10
53
Santa
San t a Ana,
Ana , CA 92701-4516
9270 1- 4516

u.S. District
Dist ri ct Court
3470
3 4 70 Twelfth
34
Twel fth Street
Stree t
Room 134
134
Room
Riverside , CA 92501

The Court
n ot if
ified
fifteen
If
I f mail
Cou rt must be notified
ied within
wit hin fi
ft een (15) days
d ays of any address
a ddre ss change
c h ange..
mai l directed
di rected to your
address of record
r ec ord is
i s returned
r e t u rned undelivered
u ndel ivered by
b y the
t he Post Office
Office,
Offi ce , and if the Cou rt and opposing
oppo sing co unsel
are not
no t notified
notifie d in
i n writing
wr i ting within
wi thin fi
fifteen
fte en (15) days
d ays thereafter
thereaft er of your current
cur rent add ress,
res s , the Court
Cou rt
r t may
d i smi ss the case with
wi th or without
witho u t prejudi ce for want
wa n t of prosecution.
prosecut i on .
dismiss
prosecution

Sincerely
Sinc erely ,
U.SS . Distr
Dist rict
Cou
rt
Clerk,
Cle
rk, U.
ict Court
Co
urt

By:
By :

AGRAGERA
Deputy Clerk
Cle rk
rk

CV- 19
1 9 (04/0
(04/01)
1)

LETTER re FILING CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-00048-DOC-CW Document 1 Filed 01/05/10 Page 55 of 55 Page ID #:55


Name & Address:
Address:

rr ("/

\;/)"~'):r.
'" E..
.
k:~ ;iCc \t/)-~')I.
\;-1~'):r. I Iv
f~ljO!..II~ 1::0~
f~/jOf..li~
ftLljCf..li~
::Z::O~ / fz4Jt:

;c

44'1'III

l);IIVCI+ft,
s 7n.r..F--7'
l)4 V CI+it,
CI+ft7" S7n.r..F--7'
loS /jNtALfi:.5,
/jNtALA.5, CII yt'Oj 2.

U TED STATES DISTRICT COURT


CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CASE NUMBER

CV10-00
CV10-00048
<Jf~((~1
048 ~f~((~1
SUMMONS

TO:

------------------,~~~f--------DEFENDANT(S): ------------------,........-:'Ikt"'"f---------

A lawsuit has been filed against you.

servi~

st\)\\O
st&,\O
$t0\\~
()~~\Cl
\\
O~~\ct ~
.

Within 2.
2.)
2..)J days after servii O\\s summons on you (not counting the day you received it), you
~ complaint 0
amended complaint
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached Jgj
o counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The answer
or motion must be served on the plaintiffs attorney, tsl'-ltaRQ
tsl'-..ftc1RQ
t<1~ttar<Q I. FtfV/~
Fitv)::
FifV)~ 1;2
If2 Y317
yJ 17 ,whose address is
Ljlfl
Bt9UCit';I S,tz.54r
S,tz,VE.T Cia
CjGyTDIH 5ffiJ<.
'-14'
Bt2UCit';I
clc IM.Sv{
/M.Sv{ CyTDltl
ChIn""
. If you fail to do so,
Lj<t' BOuCit,;,
S,t?.5fi,.1
judgment by default will be entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file
your answer or motion with the court.

sTfi"

Clerk, U.S.
U. S. District Court

Dated:

J11\J

2.010
2. e'l Q
2."/Q

[Use 60 days if the defendant is the United States or a United States agency,
agency, or is an 0
60 days by Rule J2(a)(3)}.

CV-OIA (12107)
(12/07)

SUMMONS

of the United States.


States. Allowed
A /lowed

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 13

Filed 04/12/10 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:51

----- .UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Plaintiff,

9
10
II

12

13
14

v.
Vicki Kurpinsky, A.K.A. Vicki Castellanos,
Debra Murphy Lawson,
Djinna M. Gochis,
Roes 1-25
Individually and in their official capacity as
State Bar of California employees, Jointly,
Jointly and Severally,
Defendants.

15

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: 10-cv-00413lO-cv-004I3- UA (RC)


PLAINTIFF PAUL HUPP'S REPLY TO THE
DIS-HONORABLE ROSEL YN M.
CHAPMAN'S MARCH 24, 2010 ORDER TO
SHOWCAUSE

16

I.
17

18
19

20
21

Plaintiff Paul Hupp's Replv To The Dis-Honorable Roselyn M. Chapman's March


24,2010 Order To Show Cause
Plaintiff Paul Hupp ("Plaintiff') hereby files this response to the dis-honorable Roselyn
M. Chapman's ("Chapman") Order of March 24, 2010 to show cause.

II.
Background Facts

22

This case is about as simple a case as one can be which involves due process violations
23

by a state agency, specifically the State Bar of California ("Bar"), but apparently it is too
24

complex for the pea sized brain of Chapman to comprehend or understand, so Plaintiff will try to
25

break it down into baby steps for Chapman.

-1-

PaulHupp
Paul Hupp
Order To Show Cause Response

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 13

Filed 04/12/10 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #:52

In July 2005 Plaintiff filed a request for an extension of his positive determination of
2

moral character with the Bar. Plaintiff has NO criminal record/convictions of any kind

whatsoever, nor any other obstacles that would legitimately prevent him from receiving a

positive background clearance. Plaintiff had his original background clearance approved in 2003.

After nearly two (2) years of getting jerked around by the Bar Plaintiff told the Bar to

start following their written rules for the background check. This included giving written updates

as required under the Bar's rules.

8
9
10

The Bar denied Plaintiff a positive determination on his character clearly under pretext
reasons and Plaintiff appealed that decision to the State Bar Court ("Bar Court") for review.
The Bar Court refused to hear ANY portion of the case because Plaintiff did not pay a

II

"filing fee". Plaintiff did not have the money to pay the filing fee and the Bar Court offered no

12

Plaintiffs case reviewed.


other alternative to have Plaintiff's

13
14
15

Courts cannot block due process of law based on inability to pay "filing fees". That is
clearly established law going back decades.
Plaintiff then filed suit in this court ("Hupp 1"),
!"), EDCV 07-0620 (RC). Chapman, with her

16

first of many ridiculous and unsupported rulings, claimed that the court did not have "subject

17

matter jurisdiction" because only the California Supreme Court ("CSC") could deny a

18

background clearance. According to Chapman, until the CSC denied Plaintiff's


Plaintiffs background there

19

were no "damages". Apparently Chapman thinks that blocking access to the courts-and DUE

20

PROCESS OF LAW- does not cause damages.


damages. So by Chapman's bizarre line of thought the Bar

21

Court could drag Plaintiff's


Plaintiffs background clearance out for 20 or 30 years and there would be no

22

damages because the CSC had not actually denied Plaintiff's


Plaintiff s background clearance. Only the

23

simpleton mind of a progressive surrender monkey could come up with such nonsense.
nonsense. Of course

24

Chapman dismissed this complaint without hearing, without a chance for Plaintiff to counter her

25

preposterous claims, and without a chance to anlend.


amend. Since Plaintiff had not "petitioned" the

-2-

Paul Hupp
Response
se
Order To Show Cause Respon

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 13

Filed 04/12/10 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #:53

CSC, Chapman claimed there were no damages. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the 9th Circuit,
2

who denied the claim. Plaintiff then appealed the denial by the 9th to the United States Supreme

Court ("SCOTUS") who denied issuing a writ of certiorari.

Plaintiff had his case and his livelihood put on hold for over two (2) years at this point

and filed a second claim in this court "Hupp II"), EDCV 07-0728 (RC for willfully and

intentionally DELAYING his background (because Plaintiff spoke out about the Bar and their

refusal to follow their own rules and due process) for violation of the First Amendment, as well

as due process. And once again Chapman made a conclusory and unsupported claim that the case

was "frivolous" without ANY supporting statutes, case law or support of any kind whatsoever in

10

dismissing that case, which would become part of a pattern and practice for Chapman.

11

Plaintiff "petitioned" the CSC to clear his background in 2007. The CSC took no action

12

of any kind, including even acknowledging the "petition" itself. Since Chapman had claimed in

13

her original ruling in Hupp I that Plaintiff could bring "all his claims" once the CSC had denied

14

his "petition" there should have been no problem with essentially the same case that was

15

originally filed in 2007 (Hupp I). So Plaintiff yet AGAIN filed in this court to have his case

16

heard "Hupp IIr') EDCV-09-1S97 UA- (RC. Of course no one can take anything Chapman

17

says at face value, Chapman's two faced lying runs rampant in her garbage decisions-and that

18

proved to be the case in Hupp III.

19

And once again, true to form, Chapman made another one of her unsupported, conclusory

20

rulings that had no legal authority to back it up whatsoever, just another one of her preposterous

21

and conclusory rulings. In fact Chapman seems to be under the impression that if she says a case

22

does not have "subject matter jurisdiction" then she can just say that and that is the end of the

23

matter. No need for support or authority, if Chapman says it, then it must be true.

24

25

Chapman does not need to give any reasons why a case does not have "subject matter
jurisdiction", after all she is a magistrate judge-and has apparently been relegated to that role for

-3-

Paul Hupp
Order To Show Cause Response

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 13

Filed 04/12/10 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #:54

20+ years. Not a big surprise Chapman has never been promoted to a District Court judgeship2
3

4
5

she is lacking common sense and a fully developed legal mind.


And once again Chapman dismissed the complaint without hearing, without a chance for
Plaintiff to counter her preposterous claims, and without a chance to amend. Hey, big surprise.
Plaintiff appealed Hupp III to the 9th Circuit and filed a fee waiver within one (I) week of

filing his appeal. That fee waiver was either lost in the mail or lost by the 9th Circuit clerk

because a request came from the 9th Circuit two (2) months later for Plaintiff to file a fee waiver.

Plaintiff filed a second fee waiver, and unbeknown to Plaintiff, the 9th Circuit clerk also seems to

have lost the second fee waiver too, but no notice was sent to Plaintiff.

10

Plaintiff filed his appellate brief and a month later received a letter from the clerk of the

II

9th Circuit that his case was dismissed for failure to file a fee waiver (or pay the filing fee of

12

$455- which Plaintiff did not have).

13

Plaintiff notified the 9th Circuit by two (2) motions that his fee waiver had been filed two

14

(2) times before, and to be safe filed a third fee waiver. Following their pattern (and Chapman's

15

pattern) of providing political cover for the Bar, and violating clearly established Constitutional

16

protections, the 9th Circuit refused to hear Hupp III and dismissed it without prejudice.

17

Now, let's make this very clear so even Chapman can understand the issues. #1)

18

Chapman had no legal authority to block Hupp III from the district court, none whatsoever.

19

Chapman's ruling had no authority backing it up, just more of her conclusory, baloney claims.

20

#2) the 9th Circuit dismissed Hupp III without prejudice because they LOST the fee waiver-not

21

on the merits of the case. #3) Hupp III was NOT dismissed with prejudice, so it could be

22

refilled at ANYTIME.

23

Which now brings us to the filing of"Hupp IV", (("Hupp IV") EDCV-IO-0413 VA-

24

(RC)), which is no different than the original claim filed more than three (3) years ago-a

25

violation of, among many violations, due process rights. And once again Chapman has made a

-4-

Paul Hupp
Order To Show Cause Response

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 13

Filed 04/12/10 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #:55

ruling that is not supported by any facts, statutes or case law whatsoever, just the same old
2

conclusory and unsupported baloney claims Chapman has used in the past.
III.
Points And Authorities

3
4

5
6

The notion that this case does not have "subject matter jurisdiction" is complete and total
bullshit. Chapman knows that, Plaintiff knows that and any 3rd grader would know it.
bulishit.Chapman
ANY violation of the Constitution gives the federal courts jurisdiction. Last time I

checked the due process clause of the 14th Amendment was still valid. Maybe Chapman knows

ifshe
she
something the rest of the world doesn' t know, and if that is the case I would appreciate it if

10

shared her vast knowledge of the law with the rest of us.

II

Established case law from the United States Supreme Court made this very clear;

12

"A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state and a denial of that right is a
controversy. When the claim is made in a state court and a denial of the right is
made by judicial order, it is a case which may be reviewed under Article III of the
Constitution when federal questions are raised and proper steps taken to that end in
U.S. 561,568 (1945). Bold added.
added.
this Court." See In Re Summers, 325 U.S.

13
14

15

16

17
18

The United States Supreme Court ruled on due process requirements as they relate to
law licenses more than 48 years ago;
"The requirements of procedural due process must be met before a State can exclude
v. Committee On Character, 373 U.S.
a person from the practice of law". See Willner v.
96, 102 (1963). Bold added.
added.

19

Well Chapman, why don't you try to explain that case away with your nonsensical legal
20

reasoning. The CSC, under California case law, has also ruled that the practice of law requires
21

FULL due process protections and that:


22
23
24
25

"In any event, opinions of the United States Supreme Court and of our court which
characterize claim for admission to the bar as a claim of right is entitled to the
protections of procedural due process." See Hallinan v. CBE, 65 Ca1.2d
Cal.2d 447 (1966).
Bold added.
Hey Chapman, try to your head out of the Bars
Bar's ass long enough to read this case;

-5-

Paul Hupp
Order To Show Cause Response

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 13

"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment". See Schware v.
v. Board of Bar
232,238-239
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232,
238-239 (1957). Bold added.

2
3

I found all this is just a basic day of research, but somehow Chapman can't figure it out,

5
6

7
8

Filed 04/12/10 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #:56

or more likely Chapman is engaging in a political cover for the Bar. That clearly shows what a
little chicken shit Chapman really is. No backbone or ethics to uphold the Constitution and law
of the land, just a little chicken shit federal judge providing political cover for a dirt bag state
agency, political cover that encourages the Bar to engage in even more Constitutional violationswith impunity.

IV.

10

Conclusion

II
11

Chapman, why don't you pull your pea brained head out ofthe Bar's ass and for ONCE

12

13

do the right thing, which is to uphold the Constitution and laws of this country, you goddamned

14

slime ball piece of shit.


It is because of surrender monkeys like you that the Bar pulls this kind of bullshit-because

15

16

spineless jellyfish like you play politics with peoples livelihoods- instead of holding a dirt bag

17

state agency responsible for their Constitutional violations. You're a disgrace to the federal

18

bench.

19

20

And I will be happy to repeat anything I have said in this brief to your face-name the
time and the place and I will be there.
Dated this 7th day of

21

22

Paul Hupp
965 Hidden Oaks Drive
Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona

23

24
25

-6-

Paul Hupp
Order To Show Cause Response

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 21

2
3

Filed 06/29/10 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #:81

Paul Hupp
965 Hidden Oaks Drive
Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona

4
5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7
8

Paul Hupp,

Plaintiff,

v.

10
11

12
13

14

Vicki Kurpinsky, A.K.A. Vicki Castellanos,


Debra Murphy Lawson,
Djinna M. Gochis,
Roes 1-25
Individually and in their official capacity as
State Bar of California employees, Jointly,
Jointly and Severally,
Defendants.

15

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.: IO-cv-00413 UA (Re)


(RC)
Case No.: 10-cv-00790 UA (RC)

PLAINTIFF PAUL HUPP 'S


' S REPLY BRIEF
TO JUDGE
ruDGE MARGARET M. MORROW'S
JUNE
ruNE 17,2010 ORDER DENYING
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY
ruDGE ROSEL YN MERLE CHAPMAN
) JUDGE
)
)
)
)
I,
I.

16

Introduction
17

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Paul Hupp, In Propria Persona,


Persona, now files hi

18
19

20

reply brief to Judge Morrow's June 17, 2010 Order denying to disqualifY Judge Chapman fo
cause.
II.
Argument

21
22

23
24

25

Judge Morrow fal sely states Judge Percy Anderson has declared Plaintiff a vexatious
litigant. There is no foundation, nor evidence, in the record to support such a claim, just extra

judicial hearsay.

-1-

Paul Hupp's Reply Brief To Judge Morrow's June 17,


2010 Order Denying To Disqualify Judge Chapman For
Cause

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 21

Filed 06/29/10 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #:82

How such a finding would have any relation to this case whatsoever is not explained, and
2

for good reason, there is no connection. It was just a way for Judge Morrow to try to slime the

Plaintiff with non-relevant claims. To the extent Percy Anderson may have issued such an order,

relevant.
it would not be a final order until all appeals have been exhausted, and still not relevant.

Judge Morrow makes more unsupported claims by stating Plaintiff was convicted of
6

contributing to the delinquency of a minorl


minor'.. Plaintiff has never been convicted of any crime,
7

including contributing to the delinquency of a minor


8

Hupp 111
III was not dismissed because plaintiff failed to pay the docketing fees.
tees. Hupp III

10

was dismissed because the Court of Appeals lost two (2) applications to proceed In Forma

II
\I

Pauperis ("IFP"). Hupp 111


III was not dismissed on the merits, but technical issues that the Court of

12

Appeals themselves created and refused to remedy. Hupp III was not dismissed with prejudice,

13

so Plaintiff was free to refile it at any time.

14

In addition, Hupp III could not be properly appealed because Judge Chapman's proposed

15

order, falsely claimed to be "attached" to the IFP denial, was NOT attached to the IFP denial
denial,, so

16
17

Plaintiff had no idea of the reasons for the denial. The clerk confirmed this fact when Plaintiff
called the clerk and asked if the clerk had simply left off the "attachment". There was no

18

attachment per the clerk's own statement.


19

Plaintiffs motion to disqualify Judge Chapman was based on her perjury, Chapman's
20

claim that Plaintiff did not "petition" the California Supreme Court to clear his background,
21

22

prior to filing the actions in Hupp III and Hupp IV, not any assertion that he was seeking just a

23

24
25
1I See

Morrow 's
' s Order, P:3-L7-8

-2-

Paul Hupp's Reply Brief To Judge Morrow's June 17,


2010 Order Denying To Disqualify Judge Chapman For
Cause

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 21

Filed 06/29/10 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #:83

2
Plaintiff's
waiver of his state court filing fee, as Judge Morrow has falsely stated
statecf.
Plaintiffs motion to

thi~;
disqualify clearly states this\

"Plaintiff then "petitioned" the California Supreme Court to have his background
cleared, or alternatively to allow him a hearing to be heard over the issue. The California
Supreme Court took no action whatsoever.,,4 Bold in original. Italics and underline added.

Judge Morrow's claim by Plaintiff that Chapman"ignored his petition to the California
6

Supreme Court to waive filing fees ... " is therefore just a straight up lie, and not supported by
7

willIe
the record. Judges are not free to cherry pick the complaint, and include parts they like, while
8
9

excluding others they do not agree with. That is not how our court system works.
Plaintifrs
The facts are clear, the petition to the California Supreme Court was to have PlaintifPs

10

II

back ground c1eareds, or alternatively to waive the State Bar Court filing fee so he could have a

12

hearing on the issue, as required under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution

13

and United States Supreme Court case law. Furthermore, Judge Morrow falsely states that the

14

"State Bar6" found he was not of good moral character. This is completely false; the State Bar

15

has made no such finding. The State Bar has a "committee" on moral character examination that

16
17

makes suggestions, but the State Bar itself does not make any findings-as Judge Morrow has
falsely stated. And they are only suggestions, the committee has no authority to deny anything,

18

only the California Supreme Court has the authority to deny a moral character determination.
19

Judge Morrow further lies about Plaintiff s complaint by stating;


20

"Plaintiff has not alleged that he sought review of his moral character determination, but
''.
only of a request to waive his filing fee'
fee 7".

21
22

23
24
25

2 See

Morrow's Order, P:4-Ll9-20

See Plaintiff's Motion


Molion To Disqualify, P:2;L:9-11
4 See Plaintiff's Motion
Molion To Disqualify, P:2;L:9-11
P:2 ;L:9-11
3J

Plainliffhas
, Plaintiff
has NIlVER
NEVER petitioned
petilioned Ihe
the California Supreme Court 10
to "review" his background clearance; he has asked
Ihe
the California Supreme Court 10
to CLEAR his background.
6 See Morrow's Order, P:3-L5-6
7 See Morrow's Order, P:6-Ll7-18

-3-

Paul Hupp's Reply Brief To Judge Morrow's June 17,


2010 Order Denying To Disqualify Judge Chapman For
Cause

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 21

Filed 06/29/10 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #:84

Judge Morrow seems to be affected by the same perjurious condition that Judge Chapman
2

is afflicted by. So let Plaintiff repeat exactly what his complaint alleges;

"Plaintiff then "petitioned" the California Supreme Court to have his background
cleared, or alternatively to allow him a hearing to be heard over the issue. The California
Supreme Court took no action whatsoever."s Bold in original. Italics and underline added.

4
5

Only a perjuring liar would claim that Plaintiff had not sought to have his background

reviewed in light of such clear and concise language.


7

Perjury is certainly
certainiv grounds for disqualifYing a dirty judge. Judge Chapman has clearly
clearlv
8
9

committed perjury by claiming Plaintiff did not petition the State Bar to clear his background.
Judge Chapman's statement is not correct, but a perjured lie. Plaintiff never claimed

10
II

fee,,9, and that is


Chapman denied his IFP based on a petition for the State Bar to "waive a filing fee,lI,

12

clear.

Judge Morrow stating falsehoods repeatedly in her decision is not going to change the

13
14

facts, or the fact that Chapman committed perjury. Let Plaintiff once more point out the law

15

of due process for denial of law licenses, because this court and the judges in it seem to not have

16

a very clear understanding of that law;

17

"A claim of a present right to admission to the bar of a state and a denial of that right is a
controversy. When the claim is made in a state court and a denial of the right made
by judicial order, it is a case which may be reviewed under Article III of the
Constitution when federal questions arc
are raised Imd proper steps taken to that end in
this Court." See In Re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 568 (1945). Bold added.

18

19
20
21

"The requirements of procedural due process must be met before a State can exclude
a person from tbe practice oflaw". See Willner v. Committee On Character, 373 U.S.
96, 102
(1963). Bold added.
\02 (\963).

22

23

24
25

See Plaintiff's Motion To Disqualify, P:2;L:9-11


P:2;L:9- 11
See Morrow's Order, P:6-Ll7

-4-

Paul Hupp's Reply Brief To Judge Morrow's June 17,


2010 Order Denying To Disqualify Judge Chapman For
Cause

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 21

2
3
4

Filed 06/29/10 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #:85

"A State cannot exclude a person from the practice oflaw or from any other
occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment". See Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-239 (1957). Bold added.

"In any event, opinions of the United States Supreme Court and of our court which
characterize claim for admission to the bar as a claim of right is entitled to the
protections of procedural due process." See Hallinan v. CBE, 65 Cal.2d 447 (1966).
Bold added.

Maybe ifthe judges of this court read this over a few hundred times they may be able to

grasp the law and the due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution. I know it is asking a lot,

but if the judges try real hard anything is possible.

10

III.
Conclusion

II
12

This Court, and the judges that comprise it, better learn to stop committing perjury, to

\3

stop violating the Constitution and to stop violating the Due Process rights guaranteed to the
14

people under the Constitution. The poor and middle class are not going to stand by idly while
15

judges engage in perjury and other misconduct.


16
17

18

Failure to heed these warnings is going to result in civil unrest. The days of dirty judges
violating the Constitution with impunity are over. There is too much at stake for the innocent and

19

the poor to allow dirty judges to violate their rights with impunity. And that civil unrest is going

20

to start at the doorsteps of the dirty, slime ball judges who lie, commit perjury, and conspire with

21

others to violate those Constitutional protections under color of authority.

22

You're on notice.

23

24
25

-5-

Paul Hupp's Reply Brief To Judge Morrow's June 17,


2010 Order Denying To Disqualify Judge Chapman For
Cause

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 21

Filed 06/29/10 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #:86

Respectfully submitted.
Dated this 24th day of June, 2010

2
3

lsi Paul Hu
Paul Hupp

965 Hidden Oaks Drive


Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona

6
7
8

9
10
11
II

12
13
14

15
16
17

18
19

20
21

22
23

24
25

-6-

Paul Hupp's Reply Brief To Judge Morrow's June 17,


20
I 0 Order Denying To Disqualify Judge Chapman For
2010
Cause

--,. -

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 3

Filed 04/08/10 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:27

,,

33

Paul Hupp
965 Hidden Oaks Drive
Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
(951)769-1268
Paulhupp@GmaiLcom
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona

..

r:;
Ct ERr.

. h LF[:- - U!S lH 'C T .

us-

APR

efN

COiJl{

82010

-;- --:-;--- ..__

. ~ ___

OANI
..E. "::PU J

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7
8

Plaintiff,

10
II

12
13
14

)
)
)
No.: 1O-cv-004I31O-cv-00413- UA (RC)
) Case No.:
)

Paul Hupp,

v.
Vicki Kurpinsky, AKA.
A.K.A. Vicki Castellanos,
Debra Murphy Lawson,
Djinna M. Gochis,
Roes 1-25
Individually and in their official capacity as
State Bar of California employees, Jointly,
Jointly and Severally,
Defendants.

15
IS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

PLAINTIFF PAUL HUPP'S


HUPP 'S MOTION TO
DISQUALIFY JUDGE ROSALYN M.
CHAPMAN FOR CAUSE; MEMORANDUM
OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES AND
DECLARATION OF PAUL HUPP IN
SUPPORT THEREOF

1.
l.
16

Motion To Disqualify Chapman For Cause


17
18

19

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff Paul Hupp, In Propria Persona


Persona,, now moves thi
Court to have the Dis-Honorable Rosalyn M.
M. Chapman disqualifY herself from presiding ove

20

this case and to have another judge assigned to hear this case pursuant to Title 28 of the Unite

21

States Code 144 and 455(b)(1).


455(b)(I).

22

This motion is made upon the grounds that the Dis-Honorable Rosalyn M.
M, Chapman has

23

personal bias or prejudice against Plaintiff Paul Hupp, and in favor of The State Bar ofCaliforni

24

("Bar") and it's employees, as set forth in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities and th

25
25

Declaration of Paul Hupp as outlined below.

-1-

Paul Hupp
Motion To Disqualify Chapman

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 3


,

Filed 04/08/10 Page 2 of 4 Page ID #:28

.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities

2
3
4
5
6

7
8

9
10
\I
II

12

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21

1. Judge Chapman Is Clearly Violating The Constitution And Due Process Of Law By
Blocking Paul Hupp's Right To Enforce Due Process On The State Bar Of California
And It's Employees
Plaintiff originally filed this case three (3) years ago after the Bar refused to clear
plaintiffs background (after two (2) full years of investigation) to become a licensed attorney in
the state and then further refused to give a hearing on the matter. Mr. Hupp appealed that

decision to the State Bar Court ("Bar Court") who refused to allow plaintiff to argue his case
before the Bar Court. Plaintiff is entitled to due process of law under the Constitution and laws 0
the United States, as well as and clearly established case law from the United States Supreme

Court. This is not a new or novel area oflaw, in fact it goes back centuries.
Yet despite this being clearly laid out in language even an untrained circus chimp could
understand, Chapman continues making her wild, nonsensical and unsupported rulings, like she
did on her August 28, 20 I 0 ruling where Chapman made one of her nonsensical and unsupported
rulings with nothing more than a conclusory statement;
"No subject matter jurisdiction. See attached"
Of course there was NOTHING ATTACHED, as this was just another garbage ruling

from a judge who either has the brainpower of a circus chimp, or who is knowingly, willfully
and intentionally violating the Constitution and BLOCKING due process rights of the poor.
poor.
Which one of the two (2) Chapman falls under is open to debate.
For the record, violations of due process rights GIVES SUBJECT MATTER

JURISDICTION, despite the crazy, ridiculous and unsupported ramblings of Chapman.

22
23

24
25

-2-

Paul Hupp
Motion To Disqualify Chapman

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 3

Filed 04/08/10 Page 3 of 4 Page ID #:29

I.

In fact the United States Supreme Court made that fact crystal clear more then 48 years
2
3
4

5
6
7

ago;

"The requirements of procedural due process must be met before a State can exclude a
person from the practice oflaw". See Willner v. Committee On Character, 373 U.S. 96,
102 (1963).
" ...
.. .the Appellate Division held no hearings on its own to determine petitioners
character ... it cannot escape the requirements of due process ... " Willner at 103-104.
Based on the 14th Amendment and clearly established case law we can see Chapman was

either sleeping through Constitutional Law when she attended law school or is flat out lying on

behalf of, and covering for, the Bar.

10

One of the reasons the Bar is engaging in these constitutional violations is because they

II
II

are getting cover from judges like Chapman, who are allowing it to go on with impunity. For a

12

federal judge to allow this type of unconstitutional conduct is the absolute bottom of the barrel.

13

Chapman is a disgrace to the federal bench and needs to be retired.

14

II.

15

Conclusion

16

The prejudice to plaintiff Paul Hupp resulting from Judge Chapman's ridiculous,

17

unsupported and nonsensical rulings violates Paul Hupp's rights to due process. Based on such

18

facts, fair dealing and substantial justice requires Judge Chapman to be disqualified for cause.

19

III.
20

Declaration Of Paul Hupp


21

22
23

24

I.

I filed this case on March 13,


13,2010
20 I 0

2.

Judge Chapman blocked my access to the court by denying the IFP applicationwhich she has done on virtually every case she has ruled on from me.

25

-3-

Paul Hupp
Motion To Disqualify Chapman

Case 5:10-cv-00413-UA-RC Document 3

Filed 04/08/10 Page 4 of 4 Page ID #:30

j.

3.

1h
28'h,
20 10 IFP denial, making a
Judge Chapman gave no reasons for her August 28
, 2010

conclusory and nonsensical statement that there was "No subject matter

jurisdiction. See attached." There was no "attachment" and there were no

4
5

authorities listed.
4.

Judge Chapman misstated material facts and law in denying my IFP and is now

further trying to block my right to due process by blocking me from filing


7

legitimate causes of action against a state agency, thereby violating the right to
8

due process and the United States Constitution.


9
10

5.

rebuttals to her preposterous, unsupported and nonsensical rulings.

II
12

Judge Chapman has refused to give any oral argument or allow me to make any

6.

I have no criminal convictions of any kind, and the sole reason the Bar refused

13

to grant my background clearance is because they are trying to block my right

14

to free speech-for specifically telling the Bar to follow the law and their own

15

rules.

16
17

VERIFICATION

I, Paul Hupp, am the plaintiff in this action and declare under penalty of perjury under the

18

laws of the United States and the State of California that I am informed and believe that all
19

matters stated herein are true and correct.


20
41h day
Dated this 4'h

21

Of~'

2010

iI;1

22

Paul H~pp
j{~pp
965 Hidden Oaks Drive
Beaumont, CA. 92223
(951) 769-1268
Paulhupp@Gmail.com
In Propria Persona

23

24

25

-4-

Paul Hupp
Motion To Disqualify Chapman

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

.~S~
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Filed 08/05/10 Page 1 of 75 Page ID #:1

DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK


PLAINTIFF PRO SE
4265 MARINA CITY DRIVE, SUITE 407W
MARINA DEL REY, CA 90292
TELEPHONE: (310) 867-1289
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CALIFORNIA
CENTRAL
CENTRAL DISTRICT
DISTRICT OF
OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK,

)
)

Plaintiff,

CASE

27

)
)
vs.
)
)
RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R.
)
)
MORENO, JOYCE L. KENNARD,
KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR,
)
MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R. BAXTER, )
CAROL A. CORRIGAN, SUPREME
)
)
COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE
)
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD
F. MILES, STATE BAR COURT,
)
BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE
)
BAR OF CALIFORNIA, JOANN M.
)
REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL,
)
JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W.
)
)
STOVITZ, PATRICE E. McELROY,
)
RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY
).
ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN,
)
BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G.
HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE,
)
)
HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI,
CANADY, F
ALK & RABKIN,
FALK
)
SCOTT DREXEL, A. HOWARD MATZ, )
GARY A. FEESS, R. GARY KLAUSNER, )
MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE )
H. WU, VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREy)
B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, )
and DOES 1 through 10, Inclusive,
)
Defendants.
)

28

------------------------)

10

11
12

13

14
15

16

17
18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25

26

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

...

.5 VLV

0 5 8 2 0 .4,
N'V 1 05

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES


AND EQUITABLEIDECLARATORY
RELIEF, TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION

..:1-1-

A TION OF RIGHTS UNDER


1. DEPRIV
DEPRIVATION
COLOR OF STATE LAW
(CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, TITLE 42 U.S.C.
SECTION 1983)

2. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE
WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
3. FRAUD

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

..

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 2 of 75 Page ID #:2

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2313-886909
AMount :
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Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 3 of 75 Page ID #:3

1
2

COMES NOW Plaintiff Pro Se, DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK, an

individual, and alleges as follows:

5
6

PRELIMINARY ALLEGATIONS

1. Plaintiff, DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK ("DYDZAK"), is, and at

all times herein mentioned was, an adult over eighteen years old

10

and a resident of the County of Los Angeles, State of

11

California.

12
13

2. At all times relevant hereto, until on or about May 12,


20~0,

DYDZAK was a licensed California attorney and member of

14

the State Bar of California. He actively practiced law in the

15

State of California, in both state and federal courts, for over

16

two decades.

17
18
19

20

3. On or about August 10, 2008, DYDZAK received written


notice in the mail that he was placed on inactive status by
unlawful, biased, fraudulent and unconstitutional Decision of
the California State Bar Court dated August 5, 2008 and

21
effective August 8, 2008. Said Decision recommending the

22

23

24

-2-

25
26

27
28

YDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 4 of 75 Page ID #:4

1
2
3

draconian, unlawful and uncalled for measure of disbarment

against DYDZAK was written by State Bar Judge, Defendant DONALD

F. MILES

("MILESH).

6
7

other post-trial motions in the Review Department of Defendant

STATE BAR COURT. In particular, DYDZAK discovered that there

were valid and legitimate legal and factual grounds to

4.

Thereafter, DYDZAK appealed the Decision and filed

10

disqualify State Bar Judge MILES in his matter and set aside

11

MILES' Decision. Notwithstanding same, on or about December 3,

12

2010, the Review Department, in an Opinion and Order on Review

13

by Defendants, Review Judges, JOANN REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL

14

and JUDITH EPSTEIN, unlawfully, unconstitutionally and

15

wrongfully supported MILES' Decision, recommending DYDZAK's

16

disbarment to the California Supreme Court.

17
18
19

20
21

5.

DYDZAK timely filed a Petition for Writ of Review in

the California Supreme Court on numerous legal, constitutional


and factual grounds, challenging the unlawful and wrongful
recommendation of disbarment. On or about May 12, 2010,
the Supreme Court of California summarily, unlawfully,

22

23

24
25

26
27
28

YDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 5 of 75 Page ID #:5

1
2
illegally, unconstitutionally and against DYDZAK's civil rights

3
4

denied the Petition, without sufficient and detailed

explanation. Said Supreme Court further ordered that DYDZAK be

disbarred, removed from the roll of attorneys in the State of

California, and pay vague, unconstitutional and unsubstantiated

disciplinary costs in excess of $ 15,000. Contrary to the

Supremacy Clause of the u.S. Constitution, the Due Process and

10

Equal Protection Clauses of the California Constitution, and

11

other applicable law, DYDZAK was not provided oral argument and

12

written decision on the merits by the highest court in

13

California. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

14

alleges, that the aforesaid disbarment Order became effective on

15

or about June 11, 2010. As a proximate, direct and legal result

16

of the unlawful actions of the Supreme Court of California, as

17
18
19

20
21

herein alleged, the aforesaid disbarment Order of the Supreme


Court of California was and is, unquestionably, void, voidable,
illegal, unconstitutional and against DYDZAK's civil rights.
6. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges,
that Defendant, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA ("BAR"), is, and at

22

23

24
25
26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 6 of 75 Page ID #:6

i
2

all times herein mentioned was, a public corporation, with two

offices in the City of San Francisco and City of Los Angeles,

State of California, and responsible for administratively

supervising all attorneys licensed in the State of California.

7.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendant, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE STATE BAR OF

CALIFORNIA ("BOARD"), is, and at all times herein mentioned was,

10

an entity comprised of individuals who manage, operate,

11

supervise and otherwise direct all activities of Defendant BAR,

12

with two offices in the City of San Francisco and City of Los

13

Angeles, State of California.

14

8.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

15

alleges,
~lleges,

16

times herein mentioned was, a public corporation duly organized

17

and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of

18
19

20
21

that Defendant STATE BAR COURT ("COURT") is, and at all

California. Upon information and belief, said COURT is, and was
at all times relevant hereto, set up to oversee disciplinary
matters involving attorneys licensed in the State of California,
with a Hearing Department and Review Department in Los Angeles

22

23

24

25
26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 7 of 75 Page ID #:7

and San Francisco, California.

9.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendants JOANN M. REMKE, RONALD W. STOVITZ,

PATRICE E. McELROY, DONALD F. MILES, RICHARD A. PLATEL, JUDITH

EPSTEIN, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN and CATHERINE D.

PURCELL, are, and at all times herein mentioned were, residents

of the State of California. Plaintiff is further informed and

10

believes, and thereon alleges, that the aforementioned

11

individual Defendants are, and at all times herein mentioned

12

were, members and judges of Defendant COURT and/or the Review

13

Department thereof and acting or purportedly acting with the

14

authorization, permission and consent of Defendants COURT, BAR,

15

BOARD, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, and the other individual named

16

Defendants, and acting in concert with the said Defendants, and

17

each of them, to commit the unlawful activity and conduct

18
19

20
21

alleged herein.
10.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that the individual Defendants referenced and named


herein are, and were at all times herein mentioned, agents,

22

23

24

-t-

25

26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 8 of 75 Page ID #:8

2
3

employees and/or officers of Defendant BAR, STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

or the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

11.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA is, and at

all times herein mentioned was, a governmental entity or public

corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of

the laws of the State of California.

10

12.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

11

alleges, that Defendants, RONALD M. GEORGE ("GEORGE"), CARLOS R.

12

MORENO ("MORENO"), JOYCE L. KENNARD ("KENNARD"), KATHRYN MICKLE

13

WERDEGAR ("WERDEGAR"), MING W. CHIN ("CHIN"), MARVIN R. BAXTER

14

("BAXTER")and CAROL A. CORRIGAN ("CORRIGAN") [hereinafter

15

collectively "CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES"}, are, and were

16

at all times herein mentioned, justices and members of the

17
18
19

20
21

current Supreme Court of California. On or about May 12, 2010,


Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, made the illegal,
unconscionable and unconstitutional Order to disbar DYDZAK, as
herein alleged and described.
13.

Defendant GEORGE is shortly retiring as Chief Justice

22

23

24

-7 -

25
26

27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 9 of 75 Page ID #:9

1
2

of Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, to a large extent

under a cloud of misconduct and ethical and judicial violations,

due to his wrongful and unlawful actions towards DYDZAK and for

other reasons, as hereinafter alleged. Said Defendant GEORGE, in

his blatant and unfair cover-up of the misconduct of State Bar

8B

Judge MILES and other State Bar officials and State Bar Court

judges, has conspired with the other Defendants, MORENO,

10

KENNARD, WERDEGAR, CHIN, BAXTER and CORRIGAN, to deprive DYDZAK

11

of his civil and constitutional rights and earn a living

12

practicing law, to DYDZAK's extreme prejudice.

13

14.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

14

alleges, that Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,

15

are, and were at all times herein mentioned, residents of the

16

City and County of San Francisco, State of California.

17
18
19

20
21

15.

Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES,


are acting, and at all times herein mentioned were acting, with
the authorization, permission and consent of Defendants BAR,
BOARD, and the other Defendants herein in doing the unlawful,

22

23

24

-8-

25

26
27
28
2B

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 10 of 75 Page ID #:10

2
3
4

unconstitutional and wrongful acts herein alleged.


16.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendants, BERNARD A. BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN,

and SEAN M. SELEGUE (collectively "HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS"), are,

and were at all times herein mentioned, attorneys duly licensed

by the State Bar of California to practice law in said state.

17.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

10

alleges, that 'Defendants,


Defendants, HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS, are, and were

11

at all times herein mentioned, residents of the City and County

12

of San Francisco.

13

18.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

14

alleges, that Defendant, HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK &

15

RABKIN ("HOWARD, RICE"), is, and at all times herein mentioned

16

was, an establishment law firm, with numerous Fortune 500

17
18
19

20
21

clients, with its head office in the City of San Francisco,


State of California.
19.

Plaintiff is unaware of the exact legal status or

capacity of HOWARD, RICE, whether it is a professional


corporation, limited partnership, an association or other such

22
23

--,-,-

24
25

26
27
28

DYDZAK
DYD
ZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAI
NT
COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 11 of 75 Page ID #:11

1
2

l e gal entity. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint


legal

to set forth such exact legal status or capacity of HOWARD, RICE

when same is ascertained, before or at time of trial

20. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendants, A. HOWARD MATZ, GARY A. FEESS, R. GARY '

KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU, VIRGINIA A.

PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS and ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, are, and at

10

all times herein mentioned were, United States Judges or

11

Magistrates for the United States District Court of the Central

12

District of California.

13

21. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

14

alleges, that Defendant SCOTT DREXEL is, and was at all times

15

herein mentioned, former Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of

16

California. Plaintiff is further informed and believes, and

17
18
19

20
21

thereon alleges, that said Defendant is, and was at all times
herein mentioned, a resident of the County of San Francisco,
State of California.
22.

Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities

of Defendants sued herein as DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, and

22

23

24
-(0-l()-

25

26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT
COMPLAI NT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 12 of 75 Page ID #:12

2
3

therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names.

Plaintiff will amend this Complaint in order to allege their

true names and capacities when same are ascertained.

23.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants is

responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged,

and that Plaintiff's damages herein alleged were proximately

10
11

caused by their conduct.


24.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such

12

information and belief alleges, that at all times herein

13

mentioned each of the Defendants was the agent, servant and

14

employee of each of the remaining Defendants, and, in doing the

15

acts hereinafter alleged, was acting within the purpose, course

16

and scope of such agency, service and employment, and with the

17

permission and consent of each of the other Defendants.

18
19

20
21

25.

DYDZAK was admitted to the practice of law in the

State of California on December 17, 1985A In or about August,


2006 and January, 2007, the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
("OCTC") filed Notices of Disciplinary Charges against DYDZAK

22

23

24
- 1(-

25

26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 13 of 75 Page ID #:13

2
3
4

and DYDZAK filed appropriate responses to same.


26.

DYDZAK believed and found out that the alleged charges

were politically motivated, because he had filed in the Los

Angeles Superior Court on behalf of clients a major lawsuit

against a former State Bar President and establishment lawyer,

one Alan Rothenberg. Mr. Rothenberg had political connections

with Defendants BAR, BOARD and COURT and knew Defendant DREXEL,

10

the then Chief Trial Counsel, and other members of the Board of

11

Governors. The filing of the NDC charges coincided with DYDZAK's

12

litigating and attempting to settle the case involving Mr.

13

Rothenberg. Rothenberg indeed threatened DYDZAK at the time of

14

his deposition in said litigation that he was "going to get

15

him," referring to his connections with Defendants BAR, BOARD

16

and COURT.

17
18
19

20
21

27.

DYDZAK is informed and believes, and thereon alleges,

that Defendant DREXEl, maliciously, unethically,


unprofessionally and in conspiracy with Rothenberg, communicated
in person and telephonically with said attorney between in or
about August, 2006, and continuing throughout 2007 and 2008,

22

23

24

-Il-

25

26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 14 of 75 Page ID #:14

2
3

about pursuing disciplinary charges against DYDZAK, despite the

lack of merit to said charges and the weakness of the

disciplinary allegations against DYDZAK.

28.

In so doing, Defendant DREXEL, to enrich himself,

preserve his employment and be influential in the state bar

hierarchy, was improperly currying favor with politically

connected, establishment attorneys, such as Rothenberg. Such

10

attorneys are well known to contribute monies to the Foundation

11

of the State Bar of California and are and were on the Judicial

12

Council headed by Defendant George as Chief Justice. Rothenberg

13

was previously associated with high-powered L.A. law firms,

14

Latham, Watkins and Manat, Phelps, Rothenberg & Tunney.

15

29. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges,

16

that Defendant DREXEL's contract of employment as Chief Trial

17

Counsel was several months ago not renewed, in large measure

18
19

20
21

because said Defendant abused his position and was shown through
his office to unfairly target practicing attorneys, mostly sole
practitioners, on even the most trivial of matters.
30.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

22
23

24
25

26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 15 of 75 Page ID #:15

2
3

alleges, that Defendant GEORGE, as a former long-time prosecutor

with a conservative, pro-government bent, turned a blind eye to

any misconduct by Defendant DREXEL because he met with DREXEL

weekly to discuss the administration of the courts in California

and state bar matters. Defendant DREXEL was, at all relevant

times hereto, either a member of Defendant BOARD and the

Judicial Councilor closely aligned and involved with and

10

influential in affecting its decisions. Defendant DREXEL's

11

agenda was to increase the size and importance of the bloated,

12

fiscally irresponsible State Bar bureaucracy and his office of

13

enforcement, no matter what ill treatment was meted out to

14

practicing attorneys.

15

31.

DYDZAK contested the alleged disciplinary charges,

16

which he believed did not have merit, were politically motivated

17

and were defensible. Moreover, during Defendant DREXEL's tenure

18
19

20
21

as Chief Trial Counsel, Defendant DREXEL and other state bar


attorneys earned reputations as being uniair,unethical and
targeting sole practitioners and Plaintiff's attorneys.
32.

One of the State Bar attorneys assigned to DYDZAK's

22

23

24
25

26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 16 of 75 Page ID #:16

2
3

disciplinary proceedings, ELI MORTGENSTERN, even advised and

4
5
6

admitted to DYDZAK that his hands were tied to resolve the


disciplinary matter involving DYDZAK, because he had marching

meritless, insubstantial or untenable any client complaint

8B

against DYDZAK was.

orders to seek disbarment against DYDZAK, no matter how

33.

On or about August 5, 2008, Defendant DONALD F. MILES,

10

the State Bar -hearing


hearing judge in Los Angeles, issued an unfair,

11

unlawful and draconian Decision recommending


recorrunending that DYDZAK be

12

disbarred and placing him on inactive status as of August 8,

13

2008. Defendant MILES took over 200 days to render said

14

decision, making it improbable to conclude that DYDZAK posed a

15

serious, immediate
irrunediate risk of harm to the public after DYDZAK had

16

practiced law more than twenty years with distinction in the

17

State of California.

18
19

20
21

34.

Shortly after this decision was filed, DYDZAK

discovered that Defendant MILES has, and had at all times herein
mentioned, an actual bias, prejudice or conflict of interest, or
the appearance of same, because DYDZAK was suing on behalf of

22

23

24

-15-

25
26
27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 17 of 75 Page ID #:17

2
his prior client, SHANEL STASZ, in Los Angeles Superior Court

3
4

MILES' former partner and long-time friend of 17 or more years,

Defendant BERNARD A. BURK, a partner/director with Defendant

HOWARD, RICE as well as defendants such as Charles Schwab and

Charles Schwab & Co., long-time clients of said law firm. Prior

to his inactive status, DYDZAK was attorney of record for STASZ

in LAse
LASC Case Nos. BC383161 and BC383162, which litigation

10

involved major HOWARD, RICE clients and exposed said law firm

11

and its partner, Defendant BURK, to major liability.

12

35.

In August and September, 2008, accordingly, DYDZAK

13

filed various motions to disqualify Defendant MILES and set

14

aside the State Bar decision. Defendant MILES unethically,

15

unlawfully and improperly ruled on his own disqualification and

16

would not disqualify himself, unlawfully striking the motion

17

from the record. Defendant REMKE, as the presiding judge,

18
19

20
21

improperly delayed ruling, violating DYDZAK's due process and


civil rights, and then transferred the disqualification matter
to Defendant McELROY. Defendant McELROY, who was the original
judge in the proceedings and should not have ruled because of

22
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25

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27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 18 of 75 Page ID #:18

2
3

this conflict of interest or the appearance of same, denied the

disqualification motion,
mo tion, without any written reasoning or oral

argument. Such unethical and wrongful action was done to protect

Defendant MILES, at the expense of DYDZAK's legal career and

professional standing.

8
9

36. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon alleges,


that Defendant McELROY, presently the supervising judge of

10

Defendant COURT, is in another disciplinary case presently under

11

investigation and scrutiny for taking a bribe and spoliation of

12

evidence.

13

37.

Not surprisingly, given the developing legal storm and

14

cover-up to "protect the troops at any cost," Defendant Judges

15

REMKE, STOVITZ and EPSTEIN of the Review Department summarily

16

denied DYDZAK's Petition for Review, focusing primarily on the

17

issue of MILES' disqualification, on or about September 25,

18
19

20
21

2008. Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, unfairly,


the.. cover-up, denied
wrongfully and unethically aiding in the
DYDZAK's interlocutory Petition For Review on or about November
12, 2008, concerning the disqualification of Defendant MILES.

22

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-\7-

25
26

27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 19 of 75 Page ID #:19

This denial Order patently showed that Defendants, SUPREME COURT

OF CALIFORNIA and CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, were not

interested in upholding the Rule of Law, but instead favored the

illegal and biased actions of state bar court judges who they

helped appoint and personally knew. Said Order also showed said

Defendants cared not one iota about the individual civil and

constitutional rights of "politically" targeted and unfairly

10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17

maligned sole practitioners, such as Plaintiff DYDZAK.


38. During the time-frame of the fall of 2008, Defendants,
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, including Defendant GEORGE,
were well aware that a case involving Defendant HOWARD, RICE,
which Defendant SELEGUE was arguing, was before said Court for
argument and ruling, to wit, Schatz v. Allan Matkins Leek Gamble
& Mallory, LLP. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon
alleges, that the ruling in said litigation was reached on

18
January 26, 2009. In derogation and violation of their ethical

19

20
21
22

23

duties and responsibilities, and raising an undeniable conflict


of interest, or the appearance of same, Defendants, CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, including Defendant GEORGE, failed to
reveal at any time to DYDZAK that their consideration of this

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28

-I~DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 20 of 75 Page ID #:20

2
3

case would or reasonably could prejudice their review and

adjudication of his interlocutory writ in or about November,

2008. DYDZAK was making serious allegations about the misconduct

of Defendants HOWARD, RICE, BURK and MILES, yet Defendants,

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, with bias, illegally and

unfairly chose to hear Schatz on the merits and provide written

decision and oral argument, while flushing DYDZAK's aforesaid

10

interlocutory writ into the judicial toilet. Denial of said writ

11

sacrificed DYDZAK's legal rights and ability to earn a living,

12

13
14
15
16
17

placed him in destitute state, ruined his reputation, and


jeopardized his marriage.
39. In the fall of 2008, and at all other times relevant
thereto, San Francisco-based Defendant HOWARD, RICE bragged in
its marketing that several cases it handles or has worked on are
routinely before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

18
Defendant HOWARD, RICE has, and had at all relevant times

19

20
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22

23

hereto, a

politically correct status and reputation for clients

as an influential, establishment law firm which could be called


upon to represent their legal interests before Defendant SUPREME
COURT OF CALIFORNIA and Defendants, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT

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28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 21 of 75 Page ID #:21

2
3

JUSTICES. It is clear from the illegal cover-up for Defendant

MILES, a former clerk with Defendant SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA, that the latter and the justices thereof favor

judges and big, well-connected

attorneys, small law firms and sole practitioners.

40.

law firms over Plaintiff's

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendant HOWARD, RICE regularly makes monetary

10

contributions to the California State Bar Foundation and that

11

certain of its _partners/directors have been or are appointed

12

members of the Judicial Council headed by Defendant GEORGE.

13

Furthermore, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

14

alleges, that in the Bay area Defendants, HOWARD RICE ATTORNEYS,

15

and other attorneys employed by Defendant HOWARD, RICE are so

16

socially and in legal circles intimately connected to Defendant

17
18
19

20
21

GEORGE and the other Associate Justices of Defendant SUPREME


COURT OF CALIFORNIA, that this interaction clearly affected,
influenced and prejudiced the latter's r-eview of DYDZAK's
disciplinary case.
41. In his state bar court case, DYDZAK filed subsequent,

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-Jp-

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28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 22 of 75 Page ID #:22

2
3

numerous and bonafide motions in the Review Department of

Defendant COURT and approximately five interlocutory petitions

for review before Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA. These

included but were not limited to the issue of disqualifying

Defendant MILES and the Review Judges and setting aside his

decision of August 5, 2008, as void or voidable due to bias,

prejudice or conflict of interest, or the appearance of same.

10

The Supreme Court denied the Writs summarily, not ruling on the

11

merits. The Review Judges, in particular, Defendants REMKE,

12

PURCELL and EPSTEIN, continued to wrongfully and unethically

13

rule on their own disqualification and strike key pleadings and

14

evidence from the state bar record. They willfully perjured

15

themselves by falsely claiming they did not know about being

16

formally investigated by the Judicial Performance Committee of

17
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19

20
21

the State of California (which investigation was ongoing at that


time), being served with motions, and being sued in federal
court by Plaintiff, a case which was dismissed without prejudice
on or about January 26, 2010 by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals on procedural grounds. A subsequently refiled lawsuit is

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-2/-

25

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27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 23 of 75 Page ID #:23

3
4

now pending before the Ninth Circuit.


42.

In or about October, 2008, DYDZAK found out that two

partners/directors with Defendant HOWARD, RICE, Defendants

HAUSMAN and SELEGUE, had illegally gained access to Defendant

MILES' tainted bar decision and attached it with a sworn and

dated Declaration as an Exhibit in one of the Staz LASC cases on

or about September 27, 2008. Said attorneys never duly and

10
11
12

13
14
15
16

17

properly paid for or ordered same from the Clerk's Office of


Defendant COURT. Since said decision was not posted on the
internet until January or February, 2009, this "smoking gun"
factor proved that Defendant MILES and/or agents/employees of
Defendant COURT had impermissibly and unlawfully communicated
with Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and other HOWARD, RICE
personnel and lawyers about DYDZAK's bar disciplinary
proceeding. This evidenced an actual bias, prejudice and/or

18
19

20
21
22

conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, by Defendant


MILES, mandating his disqualification and the setting aside and
reversing of his decision dated August 5, 2008.
43. To date, despite demand therefor from DYDZAK, neither

23

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25
26
27

28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 24 of 75 Page ID #:24

2
3

Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN nor HOWARD RICE have produced

credible evidence that they, or any of them, properly received a

copy of MILES' decision lawfully. Plaintiff is informed and

believes. and thereon alleges, that Defendant MILES in or about

July, August . and September, 2008, had improper telephonic

communications with Defendants BURK, SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and other

HOWARD, RICE personnel concerning and affecting DYDZAK's

10
11

12

13

14
15

16
17

disciplinary case and the disqualification issues of Defendant


MILES thereto. Defendant MILES has failed and refused, and
continues to fail and refuse, to produce his telephonic records
during this time frame which would prove he did

communicate

with the aforesaid individuals.


44.

On or about December 3, 2009, the Review Department of

Defendant COURT, despite a flagrant and disturbing pattern of


numerous acts of bias, prejudice and conflict of interest (or

18
19

20
21
22

the appearance of same), and numerous constitutional and civil


rights violations by Defendants MILES, REMKE, PURCELL, STOVITZ,
EPSTEIN, McELROY and ARMENDARIZ and the other Defendants, as
herein alleged, affirmed and modified Defendant MILES' tainted,

23

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25
2S
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27

28

DYDZAK V.

GE
ORGE
GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 25 of 75 Page ID #:25

2
3
4

biased and unlawful decision by issuing an Opinion and Order on

Review recommending DYDZAK's disbarment. Defendants REMKE,

EPSTEIN and PURCELL had no jurisdiction to issue such an Opinion

and Order On Review on the aforesaid date since there was a Writ

pending before the California Supreme Court.

45.

10

court clerk

11

Bar Administrator, were directed by Defendants REMKE, PURCELL

12

13

14
15
16

17

On or about January 25, 2010, Charles Nettles, a deputy


w~th

Defendant COURT, and Michelle Cramton, a State

and EPSTEIN of the Review Department to transmit its unfair,


unlawful, and biased recommended decision of disbarment to the
California Supreme Court. Upon information and belief, on or
about January 27, 2010, Mr. Nettles and Ms. Cramton unlawfully
and unconstitutionally served notice of said Transmittal of
State Bar Court Recommendation, despite the fact that the Review

18
19

20
21
22

23

Judges should have disqualified themselves and DYDZAK had not


duly exhausted
e xhausted his post-decision remedies before petitioning
Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.
46.

On or about January 27, 2010, Defendant BAR, by and

through the Office of Chief Trial Counsel, and Mr. Nettles

24

25
26

27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

11

COMPLAINT
COMPLAI NT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 26 of 75 Page ID #:26

also served by mail a certificate of costs in DYDZAK's state bar

4
5

disciplinary case, Case No. 04-0-14383, 06-0-10960. This

and excessive "base charge" assessment and other alleged costs

totaling $ 1?,209.31
15,209.31 which are being sought against DYDZAK. The

base assessment in question evidences that Defendants COURT, BAR

and BOARD and Defendant JUDGES and employees/agents have a

10
11
12

13
14
15

included an unconscionable, unlawful, vague, unconstitutional

biased incentive and agenda to prosecute attorneys such as


Plaintiff to reap an unjust windfall for themselves and
perpetuate the Bar bureaucracy. In DYDZAK's disciplinary matter,
the Defendant Judges could and cannot be fair and impartial when
there is, and was at all times herein mentioned, a clear-cut
economic incentive for them to discipline attorneys.

16
17
18
19

20
21

22

47.

At all times relevant hereto, and continuing to the

present, a series of internet articles at the Leslie Brodie blog


and other easily accessible world-wide web sources have exposed
numerous instances of misconduct and unfortunate judicial
corruption by State Bar Court Judges. For instance, former State
Bar Judge, Defendant STOVITZ,

continued to make rulings as a

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26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 27 of 75 Page ID #:27

Judge Pro Tern when he had no judicial mandate to do so from the

Supreme Court of California. In another matter, Review Judge

EPSTEIN used her influence to obtain a favorable disciplinary

resolution for a former associate of her defunct law firm.

8
9

48.

Community activist and actor, PERRY F. CARAVELLO, has

lodged a formal complaint on or about July 26, 2010, with the

10

Committee on Judicial Performance of the State of California

1111

concerning misconduct by Defendant GEORGE. For instance,

12

13
14
15
16

17

CARAVELLO alleges that Defendant GEORGE flagrantly and


unethically received illegal payments from Los Angeles County
of approximately $ 30,000 per annum while he was a Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge and did not report such payments on
required Form 700. Defendant GEORGE continued to turn a blind
eye to said illegal payments when he was appointed to the

18
19

20
21
22

23

Supreme Court of California. Such actions resulted in California


taxpayers being defrauded of more than $ 300 million dollars
over a twenty-year period. This situation has been documented in
the well-known case of incarcerated Richard Fine, a disbarred
attorney who exposed said bribery and corruption and claims he

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27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 28 of 75 Page ID #:28

3
4

is being politically persecuted for his stance.

COLLINS and ROSENBERG, beginning November 25, 200S,


2 00S, and

continuing to the present, violated DYDZAK's civil and

constitutional rights by conspiring, individually and in

concert, to protect the Defendant Judges of the State Bar Court

and Review Department, as well as certain bar officials and

10
11

12

13

49. Defendants MATZ, FEESS, KLAUSNER, MORROW, PHILLIPS, WU,

agents, from liability and a finding that DYDZAK's civil and


constitutional rights were violated, as herein alleged. Said
federal judges and magistrate engaged, without limitation, in
the following unlawful and wrongful conduct:

14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22
23

(i)
al.
ale

In federal lawsuits, DYDZAK v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA et

(CV OS-7765-VAP-AGR), DYDZAK v. REMKE et al.


ale

(AGR), and DYDZAK v. REMKE et al.


ale

28

not

grant appropriate declaratory and injunctive relief, and obtain


DYDZAKIs indigent status in
a waiver of the filing fee due to DYDZAK's
order to protect the State Bar and State Bar Court Defendants
named herein, particularly state judges and state officials;
(ii) Falsely claiming that the cases were barred by the

25
2S
27

AHM(AGRx)
(CV 10-1297- AHM(AGRx

allowing DYDZAK to prosecute said cases, conduct discovery,

24
26

(CV 10-S2S-UA

DYDZAK
DYD
ZAK V. GEORGE
GE ORGE

COMPLAI NT
COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 29 of 75 Page ID #:29

3
4

doctrines of federal abstention and quasi-judicial and judicial

Defendants named herein, particularly state judges and state

officials;

immunity, in order to protect the State Bar and State Bar Court

(iii) Unilaterally taking the case of DYDZAK v. REMKE et al.

(CV 10-1297) from fair and principled United States District

Judge, PERCY ANDERSON, who discharged an OSC and properly ruled

10
11

12

13
14
15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22

23

that the case was not barred by res judicata and presented
triable issues not barred by federal abstention;
(iv) Unilaterally and illegally not allowing principled and
fair U.S. District Judge PERCY ANDERSON to issue appropriate
declaratory and injunctive relief to DYDZAK by "politicallyH
reassigning Case No. CV 10-1297, by senior judge Defendant
FEESS,

to U.S. District Judge, Defendant MATZ and Defendant-

Magistrate ROSENBERG. The latters' proven track record and


biased modus operandi are, and have been at all times herein
mentioned, to rule against DYDZAK, no matter what the facts and
evidentiary record are, to ensure that he was disbarred to
protect the illegal actions and conduct of Defendants herein.
(v) Defendant COLLINS, as chief judge of the United States

24

)$-

25
26
27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 30 of 75 Page ID #:30

District Court for the Central District of California,

repeatedly condoning the pattern of misconduct and violation of

DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights engaged in by certain

federal judges in her judicial district, notably Defendants

PHILLIPS and ROSENBERG; further denying access by DYDZAK to the

Central District Court by illegally denying him a waiver of a

filing fee despite his clearly indigent status on bogus,

10
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18

deliberately misstated legal grounds.


(vi) Violating DYDZAK's due process and equal protection
rights guaranteed by the 5 th and 14TH Amendments, and other
applicable law, so that DYDZAK could not have his day in court,
a trial on the merits, thereby depriving DYDZAK of practicing
law and unfairly and illegally leading to his disbarment at
present.
(vii) Denying DYDZAK oral argument, a trial on the merits
and appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief, because of

19

20
21
22

23

their bias, inability and reluctance to rule against any judge


in the California judiciary and uphold the Rule of Law.
(viii) Striking key pleadings from the record, issuing
certain rulings without jurisdiction, not disqualifying

24
25
26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 31 of 75 Page ID #:31

2
3

themselves despite a showing of bias or appearance of same, and

deliberately misstating the evidentiary record, rulings and

pleadings.

6
7

not allowing DYDZAK a waiver of the filing fee for Case No. CV

10-828-UA (AGR) to retaliate against DYDZAK for exposing the

bias and prejudice of Defendants ROSENBERG and PHILLIPS before

(ix)

Intentionally delaying and making adverse rulings and

10

the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and Associate Justice Stephen

11

Breyer of the United States Supreme Court.

12

13

14
1~
15
16
17
18

(x) Chief United States District Judge, Defendant COLLINS,


willfully and intentionally condoning the unlawful actions of
certain Judges of the United States Central District as well as
the named Defendants, by on February 11, 2010:

(a) falsely

ruling in Case No. CV 10-828-UA (AGR) that the case failed to


state a claim for relief and that judges and clerks enjoyed
immunity;

(b) refusing a waiver of the filing fee despite

19

20
21

22

DYDZAK's indigent status against his due- process rights.


(xi) Chief United States District Judge Defendant COLLINS
willfully and intentionally trying to intimidate DYDZAK by

23

24

)-

25
26
27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 32 of 75 Page ID #:32

2
3
having an U.S.
u.s. Marshall contact him telephonically in or about

4
5

March, 2010. Said Marshall at COLLINS' insistence falsely

claimed that DYDZAK had allegedly mistreated federal court

staff when he had not. DYDZAK had instead simply exercised his

First Amendment Right of Expression when politely talking to

said staff.

10

(xii) The aforesaid federal judges except on one occasion

11

violating the California and U.S. Constitutions, and DYDZAK's

12

civil rights, by repeatedly not allowing DYDZAK to make an

13

evidentiary record through oral argument. So the politics of

14

15
16

17
18

the sensitive subject matter of this litigation can be hidden


from the press and public at large, DYDZAK has been refused
without justification oral argument for any dispositive motion
before any U.S. District Judge, against his constitutional
and civil rights.

19

20
21
22

23

50. Beginning on or about August 5, 2008, and continuing to


the present, the State Bar and State Bar Judge Defendants, and
each of them, violated DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights,
including but not limited to a fair trial and post-trial

24

c3\~I-

25

26

27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 33 of 75 Page ID #:33

1
2

proceedings, by the following, without limitation:


(i)

Defendant MILES and then the Review Judges not

setting aside Defendant MILES' decision of August 5, 2008,

contrary to the 5 th and

since same is void and/or voidable due to bias, prejudice,

conflict of interest or the appearance of same;

(ii)

14th

Amendments and other applicable law,

Not providing DYDZAK a fair trial and post-trial

10

proceedings as guaranteed by the 5 th and

11

other applicable law;

12

(iii)

14th

Amendments and

Not disqualifying Defendant MILES due to his actual

13

prejudice, bias and conflict of interest against DYDZAK or the

14

appearance of same;

15
16

17
18
19

(iv) Improperly upholding Defendant MILES' ruling on his


own disqualification;
(v)

Defendant MILES willfully perjuring himself as a

judicial officer in violation of the Canons of Ethics, falsely


claiming in his decision that he was notnot served with

20
21
22

23

disqualification pleadings when he was as required by statute;


(vi) Not reinstating DYDZAK to active status
retroactively as a licensed attorney, knowing that his

24

J~
~....
c::
....

25
26

27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 34 of 75 Page ID #:34

4
5

constitutional and civil rights have been violated;


(vii) Placing DYDZAK on inactive status without a proper

hearing against his civil, constitutional and due process

rights;

8
9

(viii)

Defendant REMKE improperly ruling as part of the

Review Panel even though she was the presiding judge and had an

10

actual or inherent bias, prejudice or conflict of interest or

11

of same;
the appearance Df

12

(ix) Defendant COURT conspiring among its individual

13

Judges to not disqualify Defendant MILES for political reasons,

14

in order to uphold the purported integrity and reputation of the

15
16
17
18
19

State Bar Court and the Review Department, when Defendant COURT
and its individual judges knew that it was unlawful,
unconscionable and against DYDZAK's civil and constitutional
rights to do so;
(x)

Defendant BAR and BOARD improperly, "politically"

20
21
22

23

and unlawfully pursuing disciplinary charges against Plaintiff


during the time DYDZAK was suing for prior clients former State
Bar President, Alan Rothenberg, and the latter's Century City

24
25

26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 35 of 75 Page ID #:35

DYDZAK's professional work primarily as a Plaintiff's attorney.


(xiv)

Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and writing

a biased decision against DYDZAK when this judge knew or was

aware that DYDZAK represented Shane 1 Stasz in two pending LASC

lawsuits, which exposed his long-time friend and prior partner,

Bernard Burk, former law firm, HOWARD, RICE, as well as

prominent clients such as Charles Schwab & Co., Charles Schwab

10

and the Hugo Quakenbush Trust and Estate to major multimillion

11
12

13

14
15
16
17

dollar liability.
(xv) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and writing a
biased decision against DYDZAK when a sworn Declaration from
Sean Selegue, Esq. dated September 26, 2008, provides
irrefutable evidence of contacts and communications of attorneys
SELEGUE and HAUSMAN obtaining key pleadings from Defendant COURT
without ordering or paying for same. Defendant SELEGUE had

18
19

20
21
22

physical possession of the Miles' decision dated August 5, 2008,


many months before it was posted on the internet and did not
order or pay for same. Defendants SELEGUE and HAUSMAN were

intimately familiar with DYDZAK's disciplinary proceedings,

23

24

35-

25
26

27
28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 36 of 75 Page ID #:36

which shows that this information was provided to them by

Defendant MILES and

his control or supervision.

agents/employees of Defendant COURT under

(xvi) Defendant MILES having an actual conflict of interest,

prejudice or bias, or the appearance of same, and improperly,

unethically and unlawfully ruling on his own disqualification.

The Motion for Disqualification in question was filed on August

10

11
12

13
14
15
16

17

15, 2008. Judge MILES illegally ruled on his own


disqualification on August 20, 2008, in derogation of his duties
and responsibilities as a judicial officer.
(xvii) Defendant MILES' very act of ruling on his own
disqualification and unlawfully and unethically striking
DYDZAK's meritorious disqualification motion from the record
shows he had and has an actual bias, prejudice or conflict of
interest, or the appearance of same. Such conduct violated

18
19

20

21
22

23

DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights as well as Section


106(e) (4) of the State Bar Rules of Procedure, C.C.P. Section
170.1(a) (6) and Canon 3C(1) of California's judicial ethics.
(xviii) Presiding and Review Judge REMKE and Supervising
Judge McELROY unconstitutionally and unlawfully taking more than

24

25
26

27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 37 of 75 Page ID #:37

two weeks

disqualification issue of Defendant MILES.

(until September 5, 2008) to act on the

(xix) Defendant McELROY violating her judicial duties and

unethically and unlawfully acting in ruling on the

Reconsideration Motion concerning Judge MILES' disqualification

and the striking of his disqualification motion. Defendant

McELROY had an actual and inherent conflict of interest,

10

prejudice and bias, or the appearance of same, because (1) she

11

was specifically requested in writing n~to rule on same because

12

13
14
15

16

17

she was the original trial judge; and (2) she was the original
trial judge who transferred the case to Judge MILES, and as such
had preconceived conceptions and ideas about DYDZAK and the
MILES' decision which would not allow her to be impartial and
unbiased.
(xx)

On or about September 25, 2008, Review Department

18
Judges ruling en banc on the disqualification of Defendant

19

20
21
22

MILES, summarily denying same. This action was biased, violated


DYDZAK's civil rights and was unconstitutional for a number of
reasons:

(1) There was an unnecessary and improper 40-day delay

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25
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27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 38 of 75 Page ID #:38

1
2

against due process;

the State Bar of California to brief the disqualification issue;

(3) DYDZAK was not afforded oral argument;

Department did not issue a sufficiently detailed decision to

explain itself;

member of the Review Department, because of her inherent and

actual conflict of interest and bias, or the appearance of same,

(5)

(2) The Review Department did not require

(4) The Review

Presiding Judge REMKE should not have been a

10

being both the Presiding Judge and the Review Judge.

11

REMKE should not have ruled on behalf of the Review Department,

12

13
14

15
16

17

(6) Judge

because of her extensive involvement in the disqualification


matter at the hearing department stage.
(xxi)

The Review Petition for Interlocutory Relief re the

Disqualification of Defendant MILES

was impermissibly

intercepted and reviewed by Supervising Judge McELROY and this


delayed the filing thereof.

18
19

20
21
22

23

(xxii)

Judge MILES perjured himself in a court pleading

denying the disqualification and striking the disqualification


motion by falsely claiming that he was not served with
disqualification pleadings, even though his clerks have always
accepted all disqualification pleadings for him per statutory

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25
26
27
28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 39 of 75 Page ID #:39

requirements and as attested to by Anthony Rogell in sworn

Declarations which are part of the record.

(xxiii)

The Notice of Disciplinary Charges involving DYDZAK

6
7

did not properly notify him in writing that he could be placed

violation of his civil rights and procedural and substantive due

process.

10

11
12

13
14
15
16
17

on inactive status with no Order to Show Cause hearing, a

(xxiv) DYDZAK was denied his right to a fair trial and in


post-trial proceedings concerning the disqualification of
Defendant MILES and the reversing or setting aside of MILES'
decision dated August 5, 2008. Actual bias and the facts
surrounding such disqualification mandated recusal of State Bar
Judge MILES. The Stasz litigation, the timing of Defendant
MILES' decision, his relationship with Bernard Burk, his law
firm and their clients, Judge MILES' dishonesty re service and

18
ruling on and striking his own disqualification more than met

19

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21
22

23

the state and federal law standard for disqualification.


(xxv)

Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and setting

aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK, despite


knowing about Stasz' litigation (LASC Case Nos. BC383161 and

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]-

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26
27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 40 of 75 Page ID #:40

BC383162) whereby:

Bernard Burk, was being sued for millions of dollars in damages

and implicating HOWARD, RICE in major malfeasance and

corruption; and (2) both cases involving the Estate and/or Trust

of Hugo Quakenbush, the latter being the late co-founder of

Charles Schwab & Co. and one of the law firm's,

MILES' long-time clients. MILES' decision was reached on August

10

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12

13
14
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16
17

(1) his long-time friend and former partner,

Burk's and

5, 2008, during the period of service on Burk.


(xxvi) DYDZAK being denied procedural and substantive due
process and equal protection contrary to his civil rights and
the 5 th and 14th Amendments by being put on inactive status by
Defendants MILE~and COURT without a hearing or OSC.
(xxvii) Defendant MILES not disclosing at any time prior to
his decision of August 5, 2008, his professional relationship
and friendship with attorney Bernard Burk.

18
(xxviii) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and

19

20
21
22

setting aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK,


despite being aware of the STASZ litigation prior to DYDZAK's
inactive status and that Bernard Burk, Esq. was displeased STASZ

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28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 41 of 75 Page ID #:41

was pursuing legal claims against Burk and HOWARD, RICE clients.
(xxix)

Upon receiving the original disqualification motion,

Defendant MILES improperly did not give that motion to another

State Bar Judge to rule upon as required by state bar rules of

procedure, the canons of ethics and other applicable law.

(xxx) Defendant MILES not disqualifying himself and setting

aside his decision of August 5, 2008, against DYDZAK, despite

10

being a party to a federal lawsuit involving Plaintiff and the

11

subject of a formal investigation of which he is and was aware.

12

13
14
15
16

17
18

(xxxi) Defendant MILES falsely and perjurously claiming that


he was not duly served with disqualification pleadings when
Anthony Rogell has provided sworn and dated Declarations that
service was effectuated on said judge or his clerk, as required
by statute, with regard to all such pleadings.
(xxxii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and
PURCELL have refused to disqualify themselves in DYDZAK's

19

20
21
22

disciplinary case despite being formally- investigated and being


parties and sued in a federal lawsuit involving Plaintiff.
(xxxiii)

Defendant MILES showing his bias by leaving out

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27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 42 of 75 Page ID #:42

key evidence and exculpatory factors in his decision of


of August

5, 2008 against DYDZAK, including failing to properly grant a

dispositive motion to dismiss the LaFlamme count in the Notice

of Disciplinary Charges.

(xxxiv) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and

PURCELL have perjured themselves by falsely claiming they were

unaware of being sued in federal court, formally investigated,

10

and served with disqualification and other motions in DYDZAK's

11

disciplinary case.

12

13
14

15
16

17
18

(xxxv) Defendant MILES and agents and employees of Defendant


COURT having unlawful and improper communications and contacts
with HOWARD, RICE attorneys, Sean Selegue, Kenneth Hausman and
Bernard Burk, concerning DYDZAK's disciplinary case.
(xxxvi) Defendant MILES and agents and employees of
Defendant COURT unlawfully and improperly providing information
and pleadings to HOWARD RICE attorneys, Sean Selegue, Kenneth

19

20
21

22

23

Hausman and Bernard Burk, concerning DYDZAK's disciplinary case.


(xxxvii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN
and PURCELL unlawfully striking key motions, including
disqualification motions, from the record in DYDZAK's

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25

26
27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 43 of 75 Page ID #:43

1
2

disciplinary case, showing actual bias, prejudice and conflict

of interest, or the appearance of same.

(xxxviii) At all relevant times, Defendant ARMENDARIZ

wrongfully and unethically refusing to disqualify herself in

DYDZAK' disciplinary case, and further wrongfully and

unethically striking the disqualification motion concerning

herself from the record in DYDZAK's disciplinary case.

10

11
12

13
14

15
16

17
18

(xxxix) On or about February 9, 2009, Defendants and State


Bar Review Judges REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL wrongfully "hiding"
an Order denying their disqualification in duplicity and
conspiracy with Case Administrator, ROSALIE RUIZ. The subject
Order was filed on February 9, 2009, but not properly served on
DYDZAK. Plaintiff was deliberately left off the service list.
The Order with the doctored proof of service was sent to
DYDZAK's former counsel, Edward Lear, but not DYDZAK. Only when
DYDZAK filed a request for a ruling did he finally obtain the

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22

23

Order with two proofs of service affixed- thereto.


(xxxx) At all relevant times, the Review Judges improperly,
unlawfully and deliberately did not rule on a second extension
request by DYDZAK to pay for the reporter's transcript while

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26

27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 44 of 75 Page ID #:44

2
3

subject to disqualification review by the California Supreme

Court. They further unlawfully refused to disqualify themselves

or refer the matter to the California Supreme Court or Judicial

Council.

(xxxxi)

In taking the actions herein described, DYDZAK's

civil rights were violated as well as the 5 th and 14th Amendments

as well as Article 1, Section 7(a) of the Constitution of the

10
11
12

13

14
15
16

17
18

State of California.
(xxxxii)

In taking the actions herein described and not

disqualifying themselves due to their actual bias, prejudice,


conflict of interest, or the appearance of same, Defendants
MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE, STOVITZ, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL
violated DYDZAK's civil rights.
(xxxxiii)

In delaying ruling numerous times on DYDZAK's

motions, as herein alleged, Plaintiff's civil rights were


violated as well as Rule 1013 of the Rules of Procedure of the

19
State Bar Court.

20
21
22

23

(xxxxiv)

In not deciding and adjudicating matters fairly,

correctly and efficiently, Defendants MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE,


STOVITZ, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL violat~DYDZAK's civil

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28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 45 of 75 Page ID #:45

rights as well as Rule 1015 of the Rules of Procedure of the

4
S
5

State Bar Court.

escribed, Defendants MILES, ARMENDARIZ, REMKE, STOVITZ, EPSTEIN,

cELROY and PURCELL did not perform the duties of their office

(xxxxv) In acting unfairly and unlawfully, as herein

8 'mpartially and diligently. Such conduct violated DYDZAK's civil


9 ights and Canon 3 of the California Code of Judicial Ethics.
10
(xxxxvi)
The unlawful actions of Defendants MILES,
11
12

13
14
15
16
17
18

RMENDARIZ, REMKE, EPSTEIN, McELROY and PURCELL, in ruling on


heir own disqualification and not reinstating DYDZAK, have
ffected his career, standing in his former profession, his
bility to earn a living, his former clients' cases, upcoming
ourt proceedings and appearances, and contributed substantially
o the demise of his marriage, now ending in divorce.
(xxxxvii) The unlawful non-service of the February 9, 2009
rder for over a month violated DYDZAK's civil rights, due

19

20
21
22

23

rocess and equal protection, and constituted judicial politics,


nfairness and bias towards DYDZAK.
(xxxxviii) Placing DYDZAK on inactive status before all
ppellate remedies were pursued, and without an Order to Show

24
25
26
27

28

DYDZAK v, GEORGE

-15
COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 46 of 75 Page ID #:46

3 Cause hearing, violated DYDZAK's civil rights as well as Business

4
5

and Professions Code, Sections 6077 (4) and 6083.


(xxxxix) DYDZAK was unconscionably, unlawfully and

unconstitutionally assessed $ 15,209.31 for alleged costs of

prosecution in his disciplinary case. Such assessment

8B demonstrates that Defendants COURT, BAR, BOARD, and the


9 Defendant Judges, as well as Defendant Bar officials, employees
10

and agents, have a predisposed economic incentive and bias to

11

pursue disciplinary proceedings against attorneys such as

12

13

14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21

22

23

DYDZAK, particularly sole practitioners and Plaintiff's


attorneys, because of their pro-government political slant,
desire to raise revenue for

Defendan~BAR,

perpetuate a bloated Bar bureaucracy.


(xxxxx)

In inordinately delaying ruling on motions involving

his disciplinary case, DYDZAK's civil rights were violated as


well as his due process right to reasonable and speedy
adjudication contrary to the 5 th ,

th
6 th and -14
14th Amendments.

(xxxxxi) At all relevant times, Defendant RUIZ engaged in


preparing, dating and signing fraudulent proofs of service on
behalf of Defendants COURT, REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL, in order

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28

COURT and BOARD, and

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 47 of 75 Page ID #:47

2
3

that DYDZAK would not receive pleadings timely and to prejudice

his rights.

(xxxxxii) Defendants, COURT, REMKE, PURCELL and EPSTEIN,

unlawfully and against procedural and substantive due process,

held oral argument in DYDZAK's disciplinary case when they had

no jurisdiction to do so, by virtue of their being pending Writs

to the California Supreme Court and their being subject to

10

disqualification.

11

(xxxxxiii) . At all relevant times, CHARLENE FOSTER, an

12

employee of Defendant BAR, in conspiracy and duplicity with BAR

13

attorney, Danielle Lee, Esq. perjured herself on a proof of

14 service, so that DYDZAK wouid be prejudiced in his receipt of


15 opposition papers filed in his prior federal lawsuit.
16

(xxxxxiv)

In or about December, 2009, and January, 2010,

17 and on other previous occasions, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and


18 PURCELL struck major motions and evidence from the record in
19 DYDZAK's disciplinary case, as well as improperly and unlawfully

20
21

22

ruled on their own disqualification, showing their outright bias


and hostility towards DYDZAK.
(xxxxxv)

23

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25
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27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

The pattern of delaying ruling by Defendants

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 48 of 75 Page ID #:48

1
2

MILES, REMKE, EPSTEIN, PURCELL, STOVITZ and McELROY, violated

DYDZAK's civil rights and to be reinstated as an active member

of the State Bar of California so that he could earn a living.

(xxxxxvi)

The Orders and decisions of Defendants COURT,

MILES, REMKE, EPSTEIN, PURCELL, STOVITZ and McELROY, demonstrate

bias, prejudice and conflict of interest, or the appearance of

same, to such an extent that they are void or voidable and

10
11
12

13
14
15

18
16
17

violate DYDZAK's constitutional and civil rights.


(xxxxxvii) , The State Bar Rules of Procedure and State Bar
Act violate DYDZAK's constitutional rights, and are
uneonstitutional on their face,
unconstitutional

insofar as the Presiding Judge

has adjudicatory functions over both the Hearing Department and


Review Department. As Presiding Judge, Defendant REMKE received
pleadings, papers, letters and other authority at the Hearing
Department stage concerning the disqualification of Judge MILES.

18
19

20
21

22
23

It was consequently improper and unlawful for her to be a member


of the Review Department in ruling against DYDZAK. Defendant
REMKE had an actual prejudice, conflict of interest or bias, or
the appearance of same, as a direct, proximate and legal result
thereof.

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27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 49 of 75 Page ID #:49

1
2

(xxxxxviii) At all relevant times, Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN

and PURCELL unlawfully issued Orders and the Opinion on Review

and Order on December 3, 2009, when they had no jurisdiction to

do so as Writs were pending before the California Supreme Court

and had not

8
9
10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17

~een

51.

adjudicated.

In summarily disbarring DYDZAK, without written

decision on the merits and not affording DYDZAK oral argument


and briefing, Defendants SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA and
CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUSTICES violated DYDZAK's civil and
constitutional rights, including but not limited to violating
the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the due
process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. and California
Constitutions. Furthermore, in not disclosing their relationship
with HOWARD RICE and SELEGUE, and not respecting the Rule of Law
towards DYDZAK, said Defendants, and each of them, unlawfully

18
19

20
21
22

covered up for the corruption of the California Judiciary and


certain State Bar Court and Review Judges, particularly the
misconduct and malfeasance of Defendant MILES, as hereinbefore
alleged.

23

24

25
26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 50 of 75 Page ID #:50

1
2

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAN)

(AGAINST ALL NAMED DEFENDANTS OTHER THAN

HOWARD, RICE, BURK, SELEGUE AND HAUSMAN)

8
9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16
17

52. Plaintiff refers to and incorporates, as though fully


set forth herein, the preceding Preliminary Allegations and
Paragraphs of the Complaint, including Paragraphs 1 through 51,
inclusive.
53.

This is an action for deprivation of constitutional

rights under color of state law brought pursuant to the


recodification Section 1979 of the Civil Rights Act of 1971,
Title 42 United States Code, Section 1983, for remedies for
Defendants' deprivation of Plaintiff's civil rights. Through
this action, Plaintiff seeks all legal and equitable relief to

18
which he may be entitled, including, but not limited to

19

20
21
22

23

compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees and costs,


prejudgment interest, and injunctive relief against the
aforementioned Defendants and each of them.
54.

Defendants, and each of them, have engaged in the

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25
26

27
28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 51 of 75 Page ID #:51

2
3

unlawful and wrongful conduct and acts herein alleged, and

thereby violated his civil rights.

55. At all times herein mentioned, Plaintiff was, and now

6
7

is, a resident of Los Angeles County, State of California.

them, acted under color of their authority as such in doing all

the things herein mentioned and taking the actions herein

10

11
12

13
14
15
16

17

56.

At all times herein mentioned, Defendants, and each of

alleged.
57. ' In taking the actions herein alleged, Defendants
acted, and continue to act, under color of and pursuant to the
laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs, and usages of
the State of California, the State Bar of California, and the
the State Bar Court and pursuant to the official policies and
practices of said Defendants.
58.

By reason of the aforesaid conduct of Defendants and

18
19

20

21
22

each of them, Plaintiff was deprived of rights, privileges, and


immunities secured to him by the Constitution of the United
States and laws enacted thereunder in that the unlawful,
wrongful and oppressive conduct herein alleged amounted to an

23

24

25
26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 52 of 75 Page ID #:52

1
2

proof at or before trial.


61. As a direct, legal and proximate result of the

Defendants' actions and conduct, Plaintiff has also incurred

special damages and medical expenses, in an amount according to

proof at or before trial.

8
9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16
17

62. The above-recited actions of Defendants, and each of


them, in depriving Plaintiff of his constitutionally protected
rights were done with evil motive and intent, maliciously and
with reckless or callous indifference to Plaintiff's rights.
Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an award of exemplary or
punitive damages, according to proof.
63.

Plaintiff is informed and believes, and thereon

alleges, that Defendants will continue in their unlawful


conduct, unless and until restrained by the Court. If Defendants
are not restrained, as specified below, Plaintiff will sustain

18
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, and damage in that
19

20

21
22

Plaintiff will continue to experience and suffer from the fear


of additional, unwarranted scrutiny and will continue to suffer
humiliation and indignity, as well as great physical and mental

23

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-3)-

25
26

27

28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 53 of 75 Page ID #:53

1
2

pain and suffering, resulting from Defendants' ongoing

deprivation of his rights, including but not limited to his

right to practice law as an active member of the State Bar of

California.

64.

Plaintiff has duly exhausted state law remedies

available to him prior to filing suit, including approximately

five Writs of Review to the California Supreme Court which were

10

11
12

13

14
15
16
17

~enied without prejudice and without a hearing on the merits.

65. Therefore, Plaintiff requests the following injunctive


relief, equitable relief, declaratory relief and other legal
relief against Defendants and each of them, to wit:
1.

That it is adjudged and decreed that DYDZAK's

constitutional rights and civil rights were violated, and


continue to be violated, by Defendants, and each of them, as
herein alleged, particularly due to the failure by Defendant

18
19

20
21
22

MILES, Defendant COURT and the individual Defendant Judges of


the State Bar Court and Review Department to disqualify
Defendant MILES and set aside his decision of August 5, 2008;
2.

That the decision of August 5, 2008, by Defendant

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25
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27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 54 of 75 Page ID #:54

2
3

government misconduct, bias, prejudice and conflict of interest

or the appearance of same, by Defendants and each of them.

5.

That the Order entered on or about May 12, 2010, or

any other Order by Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA and

7
8

Defendants CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT JUDGES, disbarring DYDZAK

costs, and striking his name from the roll of attorneys be set

from the practice of law in California, imposing disciplinary

10

aside, stricken or reversed based upon violation of DYDZAK's

11

civil and constitutional rights, and based upon DYDZAK's showing

12

13
14

of unclean hands,

bias, prejudice and conflict of interest or the appearance of


same, by Defendants and each of them.

15
16
17

judicial misconduct, government misconduct,

6.

That DYDZAK be restored to active status

forthwith and retroactively as of August 5, 2008, as a member of


the State Bar of California due to the aforesaid wrongful and

18
unlawful conduct and violation of his civil and constitutional

19

20

rights;
That the State Bar Court and Review Department,

21
22

and any of the named Defendant Judges of said Court and Review

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24

25
26
27

28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 55 of 75 Page ID #:55

1
2

Department, be prevented, disqualified and enjoined from ruling

on any legal matters involving the discipline of DYDZAK

retroactively, presently and in the future due to their past and

ongoing civil and constitutional rights violations towards him;

7.

That this Court issue appropriate injunctive

relief in the form of a Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary

Injunction or Permanent Injunction, or whatever similar

10
11

equitable relief it believes is appropriate and legal to protect


Plaintiff's civil, legal and constitutional rights;

12

13
14
15

16
17

8.

That this Honorable Court appoint an independent

federal judge or other appropriate body outside the State Bar


Court and Review Department to adjudicate, hear, settle and
resolve any disciplinary matters involving DYDZAK due to the
past and ongoing violation of his civil and constitutional
rights by Defendants and each of them.

18
9.

19

20

21
22

That the entire Chief Trial Counsel's Office and

Office of General Counsel of the State Bar of California,


including but not limited to Eli Mortgenstern, Scott Drexel,
Augustus Hernandez, Janet Hunt, Victoria Malloy, and Danielle

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24

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27
28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 56 of 75 Page ID #:56

1
2

Lee, be enjoined and disqualified from being involved in any

disciplinary matters involving DYDZAK because of their past and

ongoing violation of DYDZAK's civil and constitutional rights

and clear bias, prejudice, conflict of interest and animosity

towards him, without foundation.

10.

That there be a declaration that Plaintiff's right

to a fair trial and post-trial proceedings were violated along

10

with other civil, legal and constitutional rights by Defendants

11

and each of them.

12

13
14

15
16

17

11.

That Defendants MATZ, FEESS, KLAUSNER, MORROW, WU,

PHILLIPS, ROSENBERG and COLLINS be enjoined from hearing and


adjudicating any issue and aspect of the within action due to
their bias, prejudice, and conflict of interest, or the
appearance of same.
12.

That DYDZAK be granted appropriate declaratory relief,

18
in order to protect his civil and constitutional rights and

19

20
21

remedy the unlawful actions and conduct alleged herein, and


allow him to practice law forthwith in the State of California.

22
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

23

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27

28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 57 of 75 Page ID #:57

3
4

(INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS)


(AGAINST DEFENDANTS BURl{, SELEGUE AND HAUSMAN)

66.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates by reference

herein Paragraphs 1 through 65, inclusive, of this Complaint, as

though fully set forth herein.

67.

On August 8, 2008, and at all other relevant times

10

hereto, there existed an economic relationship between DYDZAK

11

and SHANEL STASZ by virtue of their attorney-client agreement

12

13
14
15
16

17
18

whereby DYDZAK agreed to represent STASZ in her LASC litigation,


as hereinbefore alleged and described.

STASZ agreed that

DYDZAK would receive as attorney's fees 1/3 of any gross


recovery, either by judgment or settlement, in her LASC
litigation.
68. At all times herein mentioned, and continuing to the
present, DYDZAK has enjoyed cordial relations with Ms. Stasz,

19

20

21
22

and previously represented her in a number of legal matters


while licensed as an attorney. In the past, he has benefited
financially from representing Ms. Stasz and received

23

24
25
26

27
28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 58 of 75 Page ID #:58

professional fees.
69.

On or about August 8, 2008, and at all times relevant

hereto, Defendants HOWARD, RICE, HAUSMAN, SELEGUE and BURK were

well aware of the existence of the economic relationship between

DYDZAK and Ms. Stasz. Attorney Burk knew that DYDZAK represented

STASZ on a number of legal matters and communicated with DYDZAK

on legal issues involving STASZ in or about July, 2008.

10
11
12

13
14
15

16
17

70.

In unlawfully communicating with Defendant MILES, and

agents and employees of Defendant COURT, about DYDZAK's


disciplinary proceedings, and in improperly and illegally
gaining access to the MILES' decision directly through
contacting MILES, or his agents and employees thereof,
Defendants BURK, HAUSMAN and SELEGUE, individually and on behalf
of Defendant HOWARD RICE, persuaded and influenced MILES to put
DYDZAK on inactive status and recommend his disbarment. This

18
19

20

21
22

23

unlawful conduct was done, so that HOWARD RICE clients and


Defendant BURK's legal interests could be protected from major
liability and expense.
71.

As a direct, legal and proximate result thereof,

Plaintiff has sustained general pain and suffering, severe

24

-0-tD-

25
26

27

28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 59 of 75 Page ID #:59

emotional distress and anguish, loss of earnings and earning

capacity,

~oss

k~
~~

of good will and reputation, incurred substantial

loans which" has been unable to repay to date, and further

incurred considerable
c onsiderable storage and moving costs, all to his

general damage, according to proof at or before trial.

8
9

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

10

(FRAUD)

11

(AGAINST DEFENDANT SELEGUE)

12

13
14
15

72.

Plaintiff refers to and incorporates, as though fully

set forth herein, Paragraphs 1 through 71, inclusive, of the


Complaint.

16
17
18
19

20
21
22

23

73.

In a sworn Declaration dated September 26, 2010, in the

STASZ litigation against Defendant BURK, submitted in connection


with a Motion to Quash Service, Defendant SELEGUE falsely
represented under oath that he obtained access to the MILES'
decision by traveling to Los Angeles, California, to obtain
same.
74. This representation was in fact false,

24

-b/-

25
26
27

28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE
GE ORGE

COMPLAINT

fraudulent and

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 60 of 75 Page ID #:60

1
2

misleading. The true facts were that Defendant SELEGUE willfully

perjured himself on this point and thereby committed a felony;

never traveled to Los Angeles to obtain the MILES' decision;

unlawfully and illegally obtained MILES' Decision directly from

MILES and/or an agent or employee of Defendant COURT; tortiously

interfered with the attorney-client relationship between DYDZAK

and STASZ by illegally and unethically communicating with

10

Defendant MILES; conspired with Defendant MILES and other

11
12

13
14

15
16
17

members of his law firm to destroy DYDZAK's ability to practice


law and represent STASZ in her LASC cases; influenced and
persuaded MILES in conspiracy with Defendants HAUSMAN and BURK
to have DYDZAK disbarred; had not properly ordered nor paid for
MILES' Decision dated August 5, 2008, affecting DYDZAK; intended
by his dishonest and fraudulent Declaration to gain a tactical
advantage in litigation against STASZ; and intended to

18
19

20
21
22

maliciously and permanently injure DYDZAK's career, reputation


and livelihood by the aforesaid actions and by virtue of his
fraudulent and dishonest Declaration.
75.

Had DYDZAK known the foregoing on or about September

23

24
25
26

27

28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 61 of 75 Page ID #:61

1
2

26, 2008, or before said date, and had he further known about

the misconduct of Defendants SELEGUE, HAUSMAN and BURK, on or

before September 26, 2008, as herein alleged, he would have

advised STASZ to immediately report,

to the State Bar of California for ethical and professional

violations, including but not limited to Defendant SELEGUE

committing perjury, a felony and crime of moral turpitude.

10

11
12

13
14

15
16
17

SELEGUE and HOWARD, RICE

DYDZAK further would have moved before Defendant MILES made his
fraudulent and unethical Decision against him for an Order
disqualifying Defendant MILES from making a decision due to the
jurist's prejudice, bias and conflict of interest or the
appearance of same.
76.

As a direct, legal and proximate result of the fraud

perpetrated by Defendant SELEGUE, and the aforementioned false


representation, Plaintiff has suffered general damages, in an

18
19

20
21
22

amount not yet ascertained. Plaintiff will seek leave to amend


the Complaint in order to set forth such-amount when it is
determined, according to proof.
77.

In taking the actions herein alleged, and making the

23

24

/J-

25
26
27
28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 62 of 75 Page ID #:62

misrepresentation herein described, Defendant SELEGUE acted

maliciously, oppressively, and fraudulently, in conscious

disregard of Plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff is, therefore,

6 entitled to an award of exemplary or punitive damages, according


7

to proof.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment as follows:

ON FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

10
11

1.

For general damages in the amount of $ 10,000,000;

2.

For special damages and medical expenses, according to

For punitive damages, according to proof;


For injunctive relief as set forth herein;
For reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to Title 42 of

16

the United States Code, Section 1988(b);

17
18
19

20
21
22

6.

For costs of suit incurred herein;

7.

For a dismissal of any alleged disciplinary charges

against DYDZAK due to the violation of his civil, legal,


equitable and constitutional rights;
8.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

23 just and proper in the premises;

24

25
26

27

28

DYDZAK V.

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 63 of 75 Page ID #:63

1
2

9.

Setting aside and declaring void or voidable Defendant

MILES' unlawful, unconstitutional, biased, and illegal State Bar

Decision dated August 5, 2008 against DYDZAK, and any other

unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal rulings, orders, opinions

and decisions of the State Bar Court and Review Department

referenced herein and pertaining thereto;

9
10

11
12

13
14
15
16

17

10.

Setting aside and declaring void or voidable the

unlawful, biased, unconstitutional, and illegal


Opinion On Review and Order filed December 3, 2009, by
Defendants REMKE, EPSTEIN and PURCELL against DYDZAK, and any
other unconstitutional, unlawful and illegal rulings, orders,
opinions and decisions of the State Bar Court and Review
Department referenced herein and pertaining thereto;
11.

Enjoining, setting aside and declaring void or

voidable the transmittal of the State Bar Court Recommendation,

18
19

20
21
22

Imposition of Costs, and Proposed Order to the California


Supreme Court against DYDZAK, as alleged- herein;
12.

Setting aside and declaring void or voidable the

unlawful, biased, unconstitutional, and illegal Order of the

23

24
25
26
27
28

DYDZAK V. GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 64 of 75 Page ID #:64

Supreme Court of California entered on or about May 12, 2010,

disbarring DYDZAK, assessing unlawful and vague disciplinary

costs, and illegally removing him from the roll of attorneys

admitted to practice law in the State of California.

For _ any injunctive relief as allowed by Federal Rules


1_ _ _- - - - - - - - - - -
of Civil Procedure, Rules 57, 65, and other appropriate Rules

therein as well as 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 et seq. ;

10
11

13.

14.

For appropriate declaratory relief and judgment by

virtue of 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 et seq.

12

13

14
15

ON SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION


1.

For general damages, according to proof;

2.

For costs of suit incurred herein;

3.

For such other and further relief as ordered by

16

17
18

this Honorable Court and warranted in the premises.

19

20
21
22
23

ON THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION


1.

For general damages, according to proof;

2.

For punitive damages, ac


according
c ording to proof;

3.

For costs of suit incurred herein;

24
25
26
27
28

DYD ZAK V.

GEORGE
GE ORGE

COMPLAI NT
COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 65 of 75 Page ID #:65

3
4

4.
4.

For such other and further relief as ordered by this

Honorable Court and warranted in the prem'ses.

Dated: August 4, 2010

DANIEL D.

Plaintiff Pro Se

9
10

11
12

13
14

15
16

17
18
19

20
21
22

23

24
25
26
27

28

DYDZAK

v,

GEORGE

COMPLAINT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 66 of 75 Page ID #:66

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY

This case has been assigned to District Judge Stephen V. Wilson and the assigned
discovery Magistrate Judge is
tV e.,
e.,.
.

Me)

The case number on all documents filed with the Court should read as follows:

CV10- 5820 SVW


Pursuant to General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related
motions.

All discovery related motions should be noticed on the calendar of the Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
A copy of this notice must be served with the summons and complaint on all defendants (if a removal action is
all plaintiffs).
filed, a copy of this notice must be served on al/
Subsequent documents must be filed at the following location:

[X] Western Division


312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-8
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Southern Division
411 West Fourth St., Rm. 1-053
Santa Ana, CA 92701-4516
927014516

Eastern Division
3470 Twelfth St., Rm . 134
Riverside, CA 92501

Failure to file at the proper location will resull


result in your documents being returned 10
to you.

CV-18 (03/06)

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE FOR DISCOVERY

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 67 of 75 Page ID #:67

Name & Address:


DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK
Plaintiff Pro Se
4265 Marina City Drive, Suite 407W
401W
Marina del Rey, CA 90292

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT


CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK,

CASE NUMBER

CV10

PLAlNfIFF(S)
PLAINIlFF(S)

v.
RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R. MORENO,
JOYCEL. KENNARD, [ATIACHMENT A]

SUMMONS
DEFENDANT(S).

TO:

A lawsuit has been filed against you.


Within
::; f days after service of this summons on you (not counting the day you received it), you
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached,,(j
attache4] complaint 0
.
amended complaint
o counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil ocedure. The answer
. tifrs
L I)~ v
.", /R,q
m..Qtjpn m~st be served on the
tiffs attorney, PA,*, I t/
t.!L-I)~
ti?~ .. It)
/lJ k:.
Jt=: whose address is
o m..Qt!$>n
U . . , I)0-1111-11.
.~ 'f'(
tJ
. If you fail to do so,
,It
rt. ()()
~
t)
judgment by default will be entered against you for the re ief demanded in the complaint. You also must file
your answer or motion with the court.

"''I.

----A...It~-_r_~{~_
Dated:_tv---_r~{
b_

Dated:

By: ______
~~----~~--~---________
~------_+--------~ ~ ~~j W~

li t ~.~.

:-!!,c>.

~~:dil ~J ,l,~
[Use 60 days if the defendant is
;s the United States or a United States agency, or is an officer or employee of the United States. AI/awed
Allawed
2(a)(3)j.
60 days by Rule J12(a)(3)).

CV-OIA(12/07)

SUMMONS

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 68 of 75 Page ID #:68

ATI'ACHMENT
ATTACHMENT A

2
3 KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR, MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R BAXTER, CAROL A.
CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNI4. DONALD
4 CORRIGAN, SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.

5 F. MILES.
MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS QF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
6 JOANN M. REMKE. CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVITZ,
7 PATRICE E. McELROY,
McELROY. RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY ARMENDARIZ.
ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN,
8 BERNARD A. BURK,
BURK. KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE,
SELEGUE. HOWARD, RICE,
9 NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK & RABKIN,
RABKIN. SCOTI
SCOTT DREXEL, A. HOWARD MATZ.
MATZ, GARY A

10 FEESS, R GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU,


11 VIRGINIA A.
A PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through
12 10, Inclusive,
13

14

15

16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

CV127 (09-09)
CV-127

PLEADING PAGE FOIt


FOil A SUBSEQUENT DOCL'MENT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 69 of 75 Page ID #:69

Name & Address:


DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK
Plaintiff Pro Se
1)" , ' '~":" , ~~
4265 Marina City Drive, Suite 407W '\ '/C';.
'c: ~" ",
~
Jj (~,,i"
It,
Marina del Rey, CA 90292
..t.

UNITED STATES DISTRICf


DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK,

CASE NUMBER

CV10 582.0

PLAlNTIFF(S)

v.
RONALD M. GEORGE, CARLOS R. MORENO,
TIACHMENT A]
JOYCE L. KENNARD, [ATfACHMENT

SUMMONS
DEFENDANT(S).

TO:

A lawsuit has been filed against you.


Within ~ d days after service of this summons on you (not
(oot counting the day you received it), you
must serve on the plaintiff an answer to the attached.Jcomplaiot
.'
amended complaint
attached.Jcomplaint 0
o counterclaim 0 cross-claim or a motion under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil oq;dure. The answer
or motion must be served on e pl~intiff's attorney,
AI
AlJGL..
JGi.- 7) 1I;
if;
II
fOJt
I) Jt whose address is
1...0 ~
:f1:t. f>[
If you fail to do so,
1.0
:f!:t.
l>[ W
judgment by default will e entered against you for the relief demanded in the complaint. You also must file
your answer or motion with the court.

Clerk, U.S. Di

,sr;--- to

Dated:

~"
(~f;'
iF y.f ~_~:.
~;\:
~':~t
,;

.~, " , Y
if

~::,
,.'

\ . . :/ . ':

!" '!.'
~,

l'
l'

'Z..

:~
~:

~--

,:~
:~ , i',j,:'
':,
\,
~'

;""

~~__
______
By: ______~~-~~--__~~
-----

.i

~\al'I<o;~.i

, '\ :',,\

f "{

,J- ~ <

. ~.., ..'

,J

'!I.,,.,i

[Use 60 days if the defendant


defendant;s
is the United States or a United States agency, or is an officer or employee ofthe United Slates. Allowed
60 days by Rule 12(a)(3)}.

CV-OIA (12 /07)

SUMMONS

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 70 of 75 Page ID #:70

ATTACHMENT A

2
3 KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR, MING W.
W . CHIN, MARVIN R. BAXTER, CAROL A.
CORRIGAN. SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD
4 CORRIGAN,
5 F. MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
6 JOANN M. REMKE, CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVITZ,
ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN,
7 PATRICE E. McELROY, RICHARD A. PLATE!., LUCY ARMENDARIZ.
8 BERNARD A.
A BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE, HOWARD, RICE,
9 NEMEROSKI, CANADY, FALK &
& RABKIN, SCOTT DREXEL, A.
A HOWARD MATZ, GARY A.
IO FEESS,
FEESS. R GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU,
It
II VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS.
PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through

12 10, Inclusive,
13

14
15
16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25
26

27
28

CV-127 (09-09)

PLEADING PAGE FOR A SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 71 of 75 Page ID #:71

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALlFORNIA


CALIFORNIA
ClVlL
CIVlL COVER SHEET

I (a>
<a) PLAINTIFFS (Check box if you are representing yourself !!!I)
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK

DEFENDANTS
RONALD M. GEORGE.
GEORGE, CARLOS R.
JOYCE L. KENNARD.
KENNARD,
R. MORENO,
MORENO. lOYCE
[ATTACHMENT Al

Name, Address and Telephone Number. If you are representing


(b) Attorneys (Finn Name.
yourself, provide same.)
yourself.

Attorneys (If Known)


A LEE.
DANIELLE A
LEE, ESQ.
STREET, SAN FRANCISCO.
FRANCISCO, CA 94105
180 HOWARD STREET.
TELEPHONE: (415) 538-2339

DYDZAK, PLAINTIFF PRO SE.4265


SE,4265 MARJNA
MARINA CITY
DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK.
DRlVE.
REY. CA 90292
DRlVE, SUITE 407W.
407W, MARINA DEL REY,
(310)
TELEPHONE: (3
to) 867-1289

m.

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an X in one box only.)

o I U.S. Government Plaintiff


02 U.S. Government Defendant

ti3
"3 Federol Question (US.
(U.S.
Government Not a Party)

CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES - For Diversity Cases Only


(Place an X in one box for plaintiff and one for defendant.)

~t

~F

02

02

Incorporated and Principal Place 05


of Business in Another State
Slate

05

Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country 0 3

03

Foreign Nation

06

Slate
Citizen of This State

04 Diversity (Indicate Citizenship Citizen of Another State


of Parties in Item
Itern III)

Incorporated or Principal Place


of Business in this State

PTF DEF
04 04

06

IV. ORIGIN (Place an X in one box only.)

~I Original
Proceeding

02 Removed from
State Court

03 Remanded from
Appellate Court

V. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:
CLASS ACTION under F.R.C.P. 23: 0 Yes

04 Reinstated or
Reopened

(specify):
05 Transferred from another district (specifY):

o6

Multi0 7 Appeal to District


District
Judge from
Litigation
Magistrate Judge

o No (Check ' Yes' only if demanded in complaint.)


III'MONEY DEMANDED IN COMPLAINT: S 10,000,000

VI. CAUSE OF ACrION


ACTION (Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing and write a brief statement of cause. Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity.)
ACTION, TITLE 42 US.C.
U.S.C. SECTION 1983; FRAUD; INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH
WlTH ECONOMIC RELATIONS
CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION.
VII. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an X in one box only.)
OTHER STATUTES
OTHERSTA
TUTES
0400 State Reapportionment
0410 Antitrust
0430 Banks and Banking
0450 CommercelICC
ComrnercelICC
Rates/etc.
0460 Deportation
0470 Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt
Organizations
o 480 Consumer Credit
o 490 Cable/Sal
Cable/Sat TV
0810 Selective Service
Securities!Commodities!
0850 Securities/Commodities!
Exchange
0875 Customer Challenge 12
USC 3410
0890 Other Statutory Actions
0891 Agricultural Act
0892 Economic Stabilization
Act
0893 Environmental Matters
Act
0894 Energy Allocation Aet
0895 Freedom of Info. Act
Deterrni0900 Appeal of Fee Dctermination Under Equal
Access to 1Justice
ustice
0950 Constitutionality of
State Statutes

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY:

CONTRACT
Insurance
Marine
Miller Act
Negotiable Instrument
Recovery of
Overpayment &
Enforcement of
ludgment
Judgment
0151 Medicare Act
0152 Recovery of Defaulted
Student Loan (Excl.
Veterons)
Veterans)
0153 Recovery of
Overpayment of
Veteran's Benefits
0160 Stockholders' Suits
0190 Other Contract
0195 Contract Product
Liability
o0196
196 Franchise
REAL PROPERTY
0210 Land Condemnation
0220 Foreclosure
0230 Rent Lease & Ejectment
0240 Torts to Land
0245 Tort Product Liability
o 290 All Other Real Property

OlIO
Olto
0120
0\30
0130
0140
0150

TORTS
PERSONAL INJUR Y
0310 Airplane
0315 Airplane Product
Liability
0320 Assault, Libel &
Slander
0330 Fed Employers'
Liability
0340 Marine
0345 Marine Product
Liability
0350 Motor Vehicle
chicle
Vehicle
0355 Motor V
Product Liability
Per.;onal
Other Personal
0360 other
Injury
Personal Injury0362 Per.;onai
Med Malpractice
Personal Injury0365 Pcr.;onal
Product Liability
0368 Asbestos Personal
Inj ury Product
Liability
IMMIGRAnON
IMMIGRATION
Naturalization
0462 NaturaIization
Application
0463 Habeas CorpusAlien Detainee
0465 Other Immigration
Actions

TORTS
PERSONAL
PROPERTY
0370 Other
OtherFnwd
Fraud
0371 Truth in Lending
0380 Other Per.;onal
Personal
Property Damage
0385 Property Damage
Product Liability
BANKRUPTCY
0422 Appeal 28 USC
158
Withdrowal 28
0423 Withdrawal
USC 157
CIVIL RIGHfS
RIGHTS
0441 Voting
0442 Employment
Acc()o
0443 Housing!AcC()o
mmodations
0 444 Welfare
0444
0445 American with
Disabilities Employment
0446 American with
Disabilities Other
11'440 Other Civil
Rights

PRISONER
PETITIONS
0510 Motions to
Vacate Sentence
Habeas Corpus
0530 Generol
0535 Death Penalty
0540 Mandamus!
Other
0550 Civil Rights
o 555 Prison Condition
FORFEITURE
F~REII
PENALTY
061.0 Agriculture
0610
0620 Other Food &
Drug
0625 Drug Related
Seizure of
Property 21 USC
881
0630 Liquor Laws
0640 R.R. & Truck
0650 Airline Regs
0660 Occupational
Safety !Health
0690 Other

LABOR
0710 Fair Labor Standards
Act
0720 LaborlMgmt.
Relations
0730 LaborlMgmt.
Reporting &
Disclosure Act
0740 Railway Labor Act
Other Labor
0790 OtberLabor
Litigation
0791 Empl. Ret. Inc.
Security Act
PROPERTY RIGHI'S
0820 Copyrights
0830 Patent
0840 Trademark
SOCIAL SEcURITY
0861 HlA (I 395ft)
0862 Black Lung (923)
o 863 DlWCIDIWW
D1WCIDIWW
(405(g
(405(g)
XV]
0864 SSID Title XVI
0865 RSI (405(g
FEDERAL TAX SUITS
0870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff
or Defendant)
IRS-Third Party 26
0871 IRS-Third
USC 7609

Case Number:
Number: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

AFTER COMPLETING mE FRONT SIDE OF FORM CV-71, COMPLETE THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BEWW.
CV-7l
CV-71 (05/08)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

Page 1I of2

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 72 of 75 Page ID #:72

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA


CIVIL COVER SHEET
V]II(a).
VUI(a). IDENTICAL CASES: Has this action been previously filed in this court and dismissed, remanded or closed? '!fiNo 0 Yes
If yes,
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If
yes, list
list case
case number(s)
number(s) :: _
_
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VIII(b). RELATED CASES: Have any cases been previously filed in this court that are related to the present case? 0 No
If
rfyes,
yes, list case number(s): CV-08-7765-VAP-AGR;
CY -08-7765-YAP-AGR; CV
CY 1O-1297-PA and AHM (AGRx)

~Yes
IiYes

Civil cases are deemtd


filtd case and tbe present case:
deemed related if a previously filed
(Check all boxes that apply)

ffiA. Arise from the same or closely related transactions, happenings, or events; or
~

o B.
B.
o C.
o D.

Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or
For other reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges; or
Involve the same patent, trademark or copyright, and one of the factors identified above in a, b or c also is present.

IX. VENUE: (When completing the following information, use an additional sheet if necessary.)
(a)
0

this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named plaintiff resides.
List the County in this District; California County outside of
ofthis
Check here if the~overnment,
government, its al1.encies
agencies or employees is a namedplaintiff.
named plaintiff. If this box is checked, 11.0
go to item (b).

thiss District:
County in thi

California County outside of this District; Slate,


State, if other than California; or Foreign Country

Plaintiff DANIEL DAVID DYDZAK

Los Angeles County, State of California

(b) List the County in this District; California County outside of this District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH named defendant resides,
resides,
11.0 to item (c).
0
Check here if the government, its agencies
al1.encies or employees is a named
narned defendant. If this box is checked, KO
(c t
State, if other than California; or Foreign Country
California County outside of this District; Slate,

County in this District:'


District:"

Defendant RONALD M. GEORGE


Defendant
CARLOS R. MORENO
DerendantCARLOSR.
Defendant JOYCE L.
L KENNARD [Attachment For Other Defendants]
(c)

San Francisco COWlty,


County, State of California
San Francisco COWlty,
County, State of California
San Francisco COWlty,
County, State of California

List the County in this District; California County outside ofthis District; State if other than California; or Foreign Country, in which EACH claim arose.
Note In.lan.d
tnct of land involved.
i8volved
In land coademaation
co.demaation cases, use !be
the location of the Inet
California County outside of this District; State, if other than California; or Foreign Country

County in this District:"


District:'

fLOS ANGELES COUNTY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA

* Los Angeles, Orange, Sao Bernardino, Riverside Ventun,


Venton, Santa Barbara, or San
Note: In land condemnation cases use the location of
land invo

X.
X SIGNATURE
SIGNATURE OF
OF ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY (OR
(OR PRO
PRO PE
PE (::::::!.~~~~~~~j::!::~~!.t~'-:;;L~~
Notice to CounsellParties:
CounscllPartics: The CV -71 (JS-44) Civil Cover Sheet and the information ontained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings
to Local Rule 3-1
3- 1 is not filed
or other papers as required by law.
law, This form,
fonn, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required pursuant 10
sheet (For more detailed instructions, see separate instructions sheet.)
bul
but is used by the Clerk of the Court for the purpose of statistics, venue and initiating the civil docket sheet.
Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases:

Nature of Suit Code

Abbreviation

Substantive Statement of Cause of Action

861

filA

All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended.
Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the
program (42 U.S.c. 1935FF(b))
1935FF(b)

862

BL

1969,
All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.
(30 USc. 923)

863

DIWC

All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as
405(g))
amended; plus all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.c. 405(g

863

DIWW

All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security
US,C, 405(g))
Act, as amended. (42 US,c,

864

ssm

All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security
Act, as amended,

865

RSI

All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended, (42
U.S.c.
US.c. (g)

CV-71 (05108)

CIVIL COVER SHEET

Page 2 of2

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 73 of 75 Page ID #:73

ATTACHMENT A

2
rnRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR.
3 KA
KATHRYN
WERDEGAR, MING W. CHIN, MARVIN R BAXTER, CAROL A.
4 CORRIGAN, SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA, STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, DONALD
MILES, STATE BAR COURT, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,
5 F. MILES.
6 JOANN M. REMKE. CATHERINE D. PURCELL, JUDITII
JUDITH EPSTEIN, RONALD W. STOVlTZ,
7 PATRICE E. McELROY, RICHARD A. PLATEL, LUCY ARMENDARIZ, RICHARD A. HONN,
8 BERNARD A.
A- BURK, KENNETH G. HAUSMAN, SEAN M. SELEGUE, HOWARD, RICE,
A- HOWARD MATZ, GARY A.
A
9 NEMEROSKl, CANADY, FALK & RABKIN, SCOTT DREXEL, A.

10 FEESS, R GARY KLAUSNER, MARGARET M. MORROW, GEORGE H. WU,


11 VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS, AUDREY B. COLLINS, ALICIA G. ROSENBERG, and DOES 1 through

12 10, Inclusive,
13

14
]5

16
17
18
19

20

21
22
23

24
25
26

27
28

CV-127
(09-{)9)
CV127 (09-00)

PLEADING PAGE FOR A SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 74 of 75 Page ID #:74

ATTACHMENT FOR OTHER DEFENDANTS

2
3 Defendant KATHRYN MICKLE WERDEGAR

San Francisco County, State of California

4 Defendant MING W. CHIN

San Francisco County, State of California

5 Defendant MARVIN R. BAXTER

San Francisco County, State of California

6 Defendant CAROL A. CORRIGAN

San Francisco County, State of California

7 Defendant SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco County, State of California

8 Defendant STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco County, State of California

9 Defendant DONALD F. MILES

Los Angeles County, State of California

10 Defendant STATE BAR COURT

Los Angeles County, State of California

11 Defendant BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF


12 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

San Francisco County, State of California

I3 Defendant JOANN M. REMKE


13

Los Angeles County, State of California

14 Defendant CATHERINE D. PURCELL

Los Angeles County, State of California

15 Defendant JUDITH EPSTEIN

Los Angeles County, State of California

16 Defendant RONALD W. STOVITZ

Los Angeles County, State of California

17 Defendant PATRICE E. McELROY

Los Angeles County, State of California

18 Defendant RICHARD A. PLATEL

Los Angeles County, State of California

19 Defendant LUCY ARMENDARIZ

Los Angeles County, State of California

20 Defendant RICHARD A. HONN

Los Angeles County, State of California

21 Defendant BERNARD A. BURK

San Francisco County, State of California

22 Defendant KENNETH G. HAUSMAN

San Francisco County, State of California

23 Defendant SEAN A. SELEGUE

San Francisco County, State of California

24 Defendant HOWARD, RICE, NEMEROSKI

San Francisco County, State of California

25 CANADY, FALK & RABKIN


26 Defendant SCOTT DREXEL

San Francisco County, State of California

27
28

CV127 (09-09)

PLEADING PAGE FOR A SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENT

Case 2:10-cv-05820-SVW Document 1

Filed 08/05/10 Page 75 of 75 Page ID #:75

ATTACHMENT FOR OTHER DEFENDANTS (Page 2)

3 Defendant A. HOWARD MATZ

Los Angeles County, State of California

4 Defendant GARY A. FEESS

Los Angeles County, State of California

5 Defendant R. GARY KLAUSNER

Los Angeles Count County, State of California

6 Defendant MARGARET M. MORROW

Los Angeles County, State of California

7 Defendant GEORGE H. WU

Los Angeles County, State of California

8 Defendant VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS

Riverside County, State of California

9 Defendant AUDREY B. COLLINS

Los Angeles County, State of California

10 Defendant ALICIA G. ROSENBERG

Los Angeles County, State of California

II
11
12
13

14

15
16
]7
17

]8
18
19

20
21

22

23

24
25

26
27
28

CV-127
(09~9)
CV127 (09'{)9)

PLEADING PAGE FOR A SUBSEQUENT DOCUMENT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

1
2
3
4
5

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 1 of 14

Edith J. Benay, S.B.N. 98747


Law Office of Edith J. Benay
345 Franklin Street
San Francisco, CA 94102
Telephone:
(415) 241-7286
Facsimile:
(415) 252-8048
Attorney for Plaintiffs

6
7
8
9

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11
12
13

JUDITH CHOW and SCOTT WILLIAMS


Plaintiffs

14
15

v.

16
17
18
19

JUDITH JOHNSON, ROBERT HAWLEY,


ELYSE COTANT, STARR BABCOCK
and PEGGY VAN HORN
Defendants

20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
COMPLAINT FOR
VIOLATION OF RACKETEERING
INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT
ORGANIZATION ACT
18 U.S.C. 1961 ET SEQ.
JURY DEMAND

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 2 of 14

I.

JURISDICTION

3
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by 28 U.S.C. 1331 and by the equitable

4
5
6
7
8

powers inherent in the courts of the United States.


2.

This is an action for violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations

Act 18 U.S.C. 1961 et.seq.


3.

Venue of this action is appropriate in this district under the provisions of 28

9
U.S.C. 1391.
10
11
12

4.

Plaintiffs have standing to bring this action.

5.

All causes of action arose in San Francisco County, California.

13

II.

14

PARTIES

15
16

6.

Plaintiff JUDITH CHOW is a resident of the State of California. She has been

17

employed at the State Bar of California, (State Bar), in San Francisco California, for

18

approximately twenty years and has been a Member Billing Technician since in or around 1998.

19

Since in or around 2002 and continuing she has reported financial defalcations in the Member

20

Billing Department to Defendants, which defalcations amount to extortion and mail fraud under

21
22

federal law. Defendants are Directors and Executive Staff of the State Bar. Since Plaintiff

23

CHOW first made those reports, and continuing, Defendants have conspired to subject her to

24

witness tampering in violation of federal law. Together, the extortion, mail fraud and witness

25

tampering constitute a pattern of racketeering activity which, within the past four years, has

26
27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

1
2

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 3 of 14

proximately caused Plaintiff damage to her property and business.


7.

Plaintiff SCOTT WILLIAMS is a resident of the State of California. He has been

3
employed at the State Bar in San Francisco California, for approximately fifteen years and has
4
5

been a Member Billing Technician since in or around 2000. Since in or around 2002 and

continuing he has reported financial defalcations in the Member Billing Department to

Defendants, which defalcations amount to extortion and mail fraud under federal law.

Defendants are Directors and Executive Staff of the State Bar. Since Plaintiff WILLIAMS first

9
made those reports, and continuing, Defendants have subjected him to witness tampering and
10
11

have conspired to subject him to witness tampering in violation of federal law. Together, the

12

extortion, mail fraud and witness tampering constitute a pattern of racketeering activity which,

13

within the past four years, has proximately caused Plaintiff damage to his property and business

14

8.

Defendant ROBERT HAWLEY is a resident of the State of California and is

15
16
17

Deputy Executive Director for the State Bar.of California.


9.

Defendant Elyse Cotant is the former Director of Member Billing and the former

18

Director of Member Services for the State Bar. Plaintiffs are informed and believe and on that

19

basis allege that Defendant COTANT has been a Special Advisor, Member Service Center for

20

the State Bar since her separation from the State Bar in or around 2005.

21
22
23
24
25

10.

Defendant PEGGY VAN HORN is a resident of the State of California and the

Senior Executive, Finance, for the State Bar.


11.

Defendant STARR BABCOCK, is a resident of the State of California and the

Special Assistant to the Executive Director and Senior Executive, Member Services, for the

26
27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 4 of 14

State Bar.

12.

Defendant JUDITH JOHNSON is a resident of the State of California and the

3
Executive Director of the State Bar.
4
13.

Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that each of the

Defendants was acting as the agent of each of the other Defendants, and in doing the acts alleged

herein, was acting within the course and scope of such agency and aided, abetted, cooperated

with and or conspired with one another to do the acts alleged herein.

9
10

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

11

(Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations)

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

14.

Plaintiffs incorporate all of the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13

as if set out at length herein.


15.

Defendants JUDITH JOHNSON, ROBERT HAWLEY, ELYSE COTANT,

STARR BABCOCK and PEGGY VAN HORN are persons, as defined at 18 U.S.C.
1961(3).
16.

The State Bar is an enterprise affecting interstate commerce, as defined at 18

U.S.C. 1961(4), in that the multi-state scope of this entitys membership, programs and dues
arrangements make possible a flow of funds that substantially affects interstate commerce.
17.

Defendants, ROBERT HAWLEY, ELYSE COTANT, STARR BABCOCK,

PEGGY VAN HORN and JUDITH JOHNSON, are all Directors or former Directors and
members or former members of the Executive Staff of the State Bar. Since in or around 1998,
and/or since their employment with the State Bar, Defendants, acting in their individual
capacities and in their official capacities, have participated directly or indirectly in conducting

26
27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 5 of 14

the affairs of the State Bar enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of

18 U.S.C. 1962 ). This pattern of racketeering activity consists of the combination of extortion,

mail fraud, wire fraud and tampering with witnesses with the intent to prevent them or attempt to

prevent them from testifying in official proceedings about the extortion, mail fraud and wire

fraud, and to prevent or attempt to prevent them from reporting it to law enforcement and judges

of the United States. This pattern of racketeering activity has continued for a period of years

since in or around 1998 and presents a threat of open ended continuity.

18.

Since in or around 1998 and/or when employed by the State Bar, Defendants

ROBERT HAWLEY, ELYSE COTANT, STARR BABCOCK, PEGGY VAN HORN and

10

JUDITH JOHNSON have associated in fact as an enterprise affecting interstate commerce in

11

that the multi-state scope of the State Bar membership reached by this associated in fact

12

enterprise makes possible a flow of funds that substantially affects interstate commerce as

13

defined at 18 U.S.C. 1961(4). This associated in fact enterprise has a common or shared purpose

14

to increase the State Bars General Fund and to increase contributions to the Conference of

15

Delegates and the State Bar Foundation, also known as the Cal Bar Foundation which benefits

16

the State Bars General Fund. This common or shared purpose is to Defendants benefit.

17

19.

Defendants, acting in their individual capacities and in their official capacities,

18

have participated directly or indirectly in conducting the affairs of this associated in fact

19

enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962). This

20

pattern of racketeering activity consists of the combination of extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud

21

and tampering with witnesses with the intent to prevent Plaintiffs or attempt to prevent them

22

from testifying about the extortion, mail fraud and wire fraud in official proceedings and to

23

prevent them from reporting it to law enforcement and judges of the United States. This

24

associated in fact enterprise has continuity of structure and personnel and an ascertainable

25

structure distinct from that inherent in the pattern of racketeering.

26
27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

20.

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 6 of 14

Since on or about 1998 and continuing to the present Defendants have conspired

to violate 18 U.S.C. 1962 ( c) , in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), by conspiring to commit

federal violations constituting predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. 1961, including but not limited to

the federal violations described below.

21.

Defendants pattern of racketeering activity and conspiracy to engage in a pattern

of racketeering activity includes but is not limited to a pattern of mail fraud and wire fraud

(credit card payments, use of internet for credit card payments) defined by 18 U.S.C. 1341 and

1343, as devising schemes or artifices with the specific intent of using the United States mails or

wires for obtaining money by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, and for the purpose of

10

executing such schemes or artifices or attempting to do so. Mail fraud and wire fraud are

11

predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. 1961 of RICO. Such schemes or artifices for mail fraud and

12

wire fraud were devised by Defendants with the specific intent of defrauding members into

13

paying more to the State Bar, the Conference of Delegates and/or the State Bar Fund/Cal Bar

14

Fund than required or authorized. Defendants schemes or artifices for mail fraud and/or wire

15

fraud began in or around 1998 and are continuing. They include but are not limited to the

16

following:

17

a. Between in or around 1998 and 2004-2005 Defendants have intentionally used the

18

mail and conspired to use the mail to misrepresent their obligation to pay inactive fees and to

19

defraud inactive members age 70 or over into paying inactive fees that they were not required to

20

pay. Those payments were commingled with the State Bars General Fund and used by the State

21

Bar. Refunds of payments made as early as 1998 did not begin until 2004, if at all.

22

b. Since on or about 1998 and continuing Defendants have intentionally used the mail

23

and/or wires, and/or conspired to use the mail and/or wires, to defraud members who believed

24

they were sending money to the State Bar for donations to the Conference of Delegates or the

25

State Bar Fund/Cal Bar Fund, into making additional payments to the State Bar General Fund

26

purportedly for penalties of which the member was never informed and had no opportunity to

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

1
2

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 7 of 14

question or protest or pay without diminishing their contribution.


c. Since on or about 1998 and continuing Defendants have intentionally used the mail

and/or wires and conspired to use the mail and/or wires to defraud members who believed they

were sending money to the State Bar to pay for sections into making additional payments to the

State Bar General Fund purportedly for penalties of which the member was never informed and

had no opportunity to question or protest or pay without diminishing payment for sections.

Under normal circumstances, payments for sections do not go to the General Fund.

8
9

d. Since on or about 1998 and continuing Defendants have intentionally used the mail
and/or wires and conspired to use the mail and/or wires, to defraud members who believed they

10

were sending money to the State Bar for a specific purpose, into making unauthorized

11

contributions to the Conference of Delegates and/or the State Bar Fund/Cal Bar Fund, by using

12

overpayments to make unauthorized contributions.

13

e. Since on or about 1998 and continuing Defendants intentionally used the mail and/or

14

wires and conspired to use the mail and/or wires to defraud members, law firms and government

15

agencies into making multiple payments, which Defendants commingled with the General Fund

16

and used as revenue. These multiple payments were made when the initial payments were not

17

credited to members accounts because errors in the payment made it difficult to allocate, when

18

posting of the original payment was delayed or when malfunctions in the internet method of

19

payment and/or the credit card method of payment caused multiple payments to be recorded.

20

Defendants intentionally avoided refunding any part of these multiple payments, in some cases

21

for as long as five years, if at all.

22

f. Since on or about 2002 Defendants intentionally used the mail and/or wires and

23

conspired to use the mail and/or wires to defraud members who believed that a portion of their

24

dues or inactive fees were being used to support the Lawyers Assistance Program (LAP).

25

Instead, each year since 2002 between 53% and 21% of the LAP budget has been donated to

26

the State Bar for use in State Bar General Fund programs.

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 8 of 14

g. In 2000 Defendants intentionally used the mail and conspired to use the mail to defraud

certain members who made voluntary payments in 1998 and 1999 to cause them to lose the

opportunity to request that their voluntary payments be refunded or credited to their future dues

or fees. Refunds and credits had to be expressly requested by a certain date, otherwise the

voluntary payments would automatically default to a contribution to the State Bar. Defendants

intentionally failed to research correct addresses for about statements allegedly returned as

undeliverable until after the deadline passed and it was too late to request a credit or refund.

8
9

h. Since on or about 1998 Defendants have intentionally used the mail and conspired to
use the mail to defraud certain members into paying more for dues than they owe by omitting

10

subtotals on the annual statement and designing the statement so that it is difficult to determine

11

that members have credits on their accounts.

12

I. Defendants have intentionally used the mail and have conspired to use the mail to

13

attempt to defraud certain members and former members as to the amount they owe in

14

reimbursements to the Client Security Fund by duplicating charges and including the cost of

15

collection in what they owe.

16

k. At various times since on or about 1998 Defendants have intentionally used the mail

17

and have conspired to use the mail to misrepresent the requirements for fee scaling on the annual

18

statement and defraud certain members into paying more for dues than they were required to

19

pay.

20

22.

Defendants pattern of racketeering activity and conspiracy to commit a pattern

21

of racketeering, includes but is not limited to a pattern of extortion, defined by 18 U.S.C. 1951

22

as the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by a wrongful use of fear

23

or under color of official right.

24

Defendants acted with specific intent to extort funds from members over a period of years

25

beginning in or around 1998 and continuing. Defendants intentional acts of extortion include

26

but are not limited to the following:

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Extortion is a predicate act under RICO, 18 U.S.C. 1961(1).

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 9 of 14

a. In or around 1998, using fear of suspension from the STATE BAR and, under color

of official right to receive payments of inactive fees, Defendants intentionally redesigned the fee

statement and conspired to re-design the fee statement with specific intent to mislead inactive

members over the age of 70 into paying the $50 inactive fee which they were not required to

pay. Defendants commingled those payments with the General Fund and used those payments as

revenue, conspiring to not refund those payments until about 2004/2005, if at all, and if cash

flow permitted and if the member could be located..

b. Since on or about 1998, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and/or under color

of official right to receive money intended to pay for sections Defendants have intentionally

10

used certain members sections payments and conspired to use these sections payments to

11

pay purported late penalties to the General Fund, without seeking or receiving authorization from

12

the member. Under normal circumstances, payments for sections do not go to the General Fund.

13

c. Since on or about 1998, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and/or under color

14

of official right to receive donations intended for the Foundation of the State Bar of California,

15

also entitled Cal Bar Fund, Defendants have intentionally used some of those donations and

16

conspired to use some of those donations to pay purported late penalties without seeking or

17

receiving authorization from the member and without informing the member that their tax

18

deductible donation was reduced.

19

d. Since on or about 1998, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and/or under color

20

of official right to receive payments from members, Defendants have intentionally used, and

21

conspired to use, all or part of members excess payments as donations to the State Bars

22

Conference of Delegates, donations to the Foundation of the State Bar, also known as the Cal

23

Bar Foundation, and in some cases to the State Bar itself. Prior to 2002 the Conference of

24

Delegates was part of the State Bar but since 2002 it has been a separate non-profit trade

25

association under IRS 501(c)(6), enabling it to engage in advocacy, lobbying and ballot measure

26

activities. These donations have been made without authorization from the member and instead

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 10 of 14

of getting authorization, instead of refunding the money to the member and instead of

crediting the money to the members State Bar account. The remainder of the excess payment,

if any, is kept in the General Fund, used by the State Bar and may or may not have been carried

as a credit on the members account.

e. Since on or about 1998, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and/or under color

of official right to receive payments from members and from law firms and government agencies

making payments on behalf of members, Defendants have intentionally retained and used and

have conspired to retain and use multiple payments, These multiple payments were made

when the initial payments were not credited to members accounts because errors in the

10

payment made it difficult to allocate, when posting of the original payment was delayed or when

11

malfunctions in the internet method of payment and/or the credit card method of payment caused

12

multiple payments to be recorded. Defendants have intentionally commingled those funds with

13

the State Bars General Fund and have intentionally avoided refunding any part of those multiple

14

payments, in some cases for as long as five years, if at all.

15

f. Using fear of suspension from the State Bar and under color of official right to

16

receive payments from members for late penalties, Defendants JOHNSON, HAWLEY,

17

BABCOCK and VAN HORN have intentionally held and have conspired to hold members 2007

18

payments of unnecessary penalties, without refund. These payments have been held since early

19

February, 2007.

20

g. Each year since 2002, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and under color of

21

official right to use a certain portion of each members dues or inactive fees to support the

22

Lawyers Assistance Program (LAP) Defendants have intentionally taken and have conspired to

23

take between 21% to 53% of the LAPs budget for use by State Bar General Fund programs.

24

h. Under color of official right to bill attorneys and former attorneys who are required to

25

reimburse the Client Security Fund for payments made to their former clients, Defendants have

26

intentionally over billed and have conspired to over bill those members or former members

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

1
2

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 11 of 14

including but not limited to billing them for costs of collection activities.
I. In 2000, using fear of suspension from the State Bar and fear of loss of State Bar

services and/or under color of official right Defendants JOHNSON, HAWLEY and COTANT

intentionally kept and conspired to keep voluntary payments made during the 1998 and 1999

fiscal crisis, as donations to the State Bar, by intentionally causing and conspiring to cause

certain members to lose the opportunity to request that their voluntary payments be refunded or

credited to their 2000 dues or fees. Refunds and credits had to be expressly requested by a

certain date, otherwise the voluntary payments would automatically default to a contribution to

the State Bar. Defendants intentionally failed to research correct addresses for statements

10

allegedly returned as undeliverable until after the deadline passed and it was too late to request

11

a credit or refund.

12

j. Using fear of suspension from the State Bar and under color of official right to receive

13

payments from members, Defendants have conspired to send confusing and misleading

14

statements, including but not limited to the omission of subtotals, causing members who have

15

credits on their accounts to be misled and to continue paying the full amount of their dues,

16

without using the credit, which remains in the General Fund and is used as revenue.

17

k. Using fear of suspension from the State Bar and under color of official right

18

Defendants have intentionally misrepresented and have conspired to misrepresent, the rights and

19

procedures for dues scaling thereby causing members who were entitled to scale their dues to

20

remit the entire dues payment instead.

21

23.

Defendants pattern of racketeering activity and conspiracy to commit a pattern

22

of racketeering activity includes but is not limited to a pattern of tampering with witnesses

23

and/or potential witnesses as defined by 18 U.S.C. 1512 , for the purpose of attempting to

24

prevent Plaintiffs from testifying about the above described federal violations in official

25

proceedings and/or reporting the above described federal violations to law enforcement or a

26

judge of the United States. This tampering with witnesses has continued since on or about 2002

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

10

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 12 of 14

and is likely to continue. Defendants tampering with witnesses includes but is not limited to the

following:

a. Since on or about 2002, when Plaintiffs began reporting some of the above described

federal violations to Defendants, and continuing, Defendants have intentionally demonstrated

hostility and have conspired to demonstrate hostility to Plaintiffs amounting to threats of

physical force and attempted intimidation, on occasion leaving Plaintiffs physically shaken, in

fear of physical injury and/or suffering physically.

8
9

b. Since on or about 2002, when Plaintiffs began reporting some of the above described
federal violations to Defendants, and continuing, Defendants have intentionally caused others to

10

demonstrate hostility to Plaintiffs and have conspired to cause others to demonstrate hostility to

11

Plaintiffs, amounting to intimidation.

12

c. In 2005 Defendant Peggy Van Horn threatened to reduce the salary grade for the three

13

remaining Billing Technicians, two of whom were Plaintiffs.

14

withdrawn and Plaintiffs job duties are being reduced and transferred to a different

15

department(s). The third Billing Technician in 2005 has also been transferred to a different

16

department.

17

That threat has never been

d. Plaintiffs performance evaluations have deteriorated since first reporting the above

18

federal violations and in 2005 Defendants ELYSE COTANT, STARR BABCOCK and PEGGY

19

VAN HORN , rated Plaintiffs Communication/ Collaboration/Teamwork/Interpersonal Skills as

20

needs improvement which is the lowest possible rating. and generates the possibility of

21

discipline up to and including termination. In 2006 Defendant VAN HORN again rated

22

Plaintiffs Communication/ Collaboration/Teamwork/ Interpersonal Skills as needs

23

improvement.

24

e. In or around 2006 Defendant PEGGY VAN HORN, threatened Plaintiff CHOW with

25

discipline up to and including termination for saying that the State Bar was misappropriating

26

member funds .

27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

11

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 1

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 13 of 14

f. In or around 2006 Defendant PEGGY VAN HORN threatened Plaintiff WILLIAMS

with discipline up to and including termination for identifying what she referred to as over

$1,000,000 in accounting errors in the Client Security Fund.

g. In or around 2004 Defendant STARR BABCOCK told Plaintiff CHOW to stop

writing memos and he told Plaintiff WILLIAMS that he would never get promoted if he kept

writing memos. Shortly thereafter BABCOCK personally participated in at least two hiring

procedures in which he took wrongful action to assure that WILLIAMS would not be promoted.

h. Since in or around 2002 and continuing Defendants have wrongfully prevented

9
10

Plaintiffs from receiving training despite their skills and qualifications and since in or around
2004 Defendants have wrongfully prevented Plaintiffs from receiving promotions.

11

I. In 2002/2003 Defendants COTANT , HAWLEY and JOHNSON conspired to provide

12

false information to auditors and to conduct a limited audit based on false information in order to

13

corruptly persuade and mislead Plaintiffs and/or to attempt to corruptly persuade and mislead

14

them with the intent of influencing, delaying or preventing Plaintiffs testimony about the above

15

Federal violations of extortion and mail/wire fraud, in any official proceeding or reporting those

16

Federal violation to law enforcement or a judge of the United States.

17

24. Within the past four years, Defendants have intentionally and wrongfully deprived

18

Plaintiffs of promotions with the specific intent of attempting to intimidate, harass, corruptly

19

persuade and mislead them into not testifying about Defendants extortion and mail/wire fraud in

20

official proceedings and not reporting Defendants extortion and mail/wire fraud to law

21

enforcement or judges of the United States. Defendants furtherance of their pattern of

22

racketeering activity is the direct and proximate cause of this injury to Plaintiffs business and

23

property. Such injury was the direct target of Defendants pattern of racketeering activities and

24

their conspiracy to conduct a pattern of racketeering activities

25
26
27
28

25.

As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants conduct Plaintiffs

have lost salary and other employment benefits, constituting damage to business and property,
COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF
RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

12

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Filed 08/29/2007

Page 14 of 14

to which they are entitled, in an amount to be proven at trial.

2
3

Document 1

26.

. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.1952. Plaintiffs are entitled to treble damages for business

and property losses.

27.

As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of Defendants pattern of

racketeering activity Plaintiffs have incurred and will continue to incur costs and attorney's

fees.

7
8

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

9
10

THEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS PRAY AS FOLLOWS:

11

1.

For judgment against all defendants;

12

2.

For treble damages to property and business;

13

3.

For Costs and Attorneys Fees; and

14

4.

For all other damages the court deems just and proper.

15

Dated: August 29, 2007

//Edith Benay//

16

__________________________________

17

Edith J. Benay
Attorney for Plaintiffs

18
19
20
21

JURY TRIAL DEMAND


Plaintiffs demand, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure, a trial

22

by jury of all issues properly triable to a jury.

23

Dated: August 29, 2007

// Edith Benay//

24
25

Edith J. Benay,
Attorney for Plaintiffs

26
27
28

COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATION OF


RACKETEERING INFLUENCED
AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT

13

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 1 of 16

1
2
3
4
5
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

8
9

JUDITH CHOW and SCOTT WILLIAMS,

10

Plaintiffs,

11
12
13

No. C-07-4478 CW

v.
JUDY JOHNSON, ROBERT HAWLEY, ELYSE
COTANT, STARR BABCOCK and PEGGY VAN
HORN,

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION
TO DISMISS AND
GRANTING LEAVE TO
AMEND

14
Defendants.
15

16
17

Defendants Judy Johnson, Robert Hawley, Elyse Cotant, Starr

18

Babcock and Peggy Van Horn move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

19

Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the first amended complaint (FAC)

20

against them.

21

motion.

22

request, the parties submitted additional briefing after the

23

hearing.

24

on the motion, the Court grants Defendants' motion and grants

25

Plaintiffs leave to amend.

Plaintiffs Judith Chow and Scott Williams oppose the

The motion was heard on January 24, 2008.

Having considered the parties' papers and oral argument

26
27
28

At the Courts

BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are two member-billing technicians employed by the
State Bar of California.

FAC 6,7.

Their amended complaint

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 2 of 16

alleges that since 1998 Defendants, current and former State Bar

employees1, acting in their individual and official capacities,

"have participated directly or indirectly in conducting the affairs

of the State Bar enterprise through a pattern of racketeering

activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c), a provision of the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

17.

is based on three types of predicate acts, extortion, mail and wire

fraud and tampering with witnesses with the intent of preventing

10

them from testifying in official proceedings about the extortion

11

and mail and wire fraud.

12

Id. at

Plaintiffs allege that the pattern of racketeering activity

Id.

Plaintiffs claims are based on financial defalcations in the

13

Member Billing Department to Defendants, which defalcations amount

14

to extortion and mail fraud under federal law.

15

Further, Plaintiffs allege that since 2002, when they began

16

reporting these defalcations, Defendants have subjected [them] to

17

witness tampering and have conspired to subject [them] to witness

18

tampering in violation of federal law.

19

Id. at 6, 7.

Id.

According to Plaintiffs, the RICO enterprises purpose is to

20

increase the State Bars General Fund and to increase contributions

21

to the Conference of Delegates and the State Bar Foundation, also

22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Hawley is the Deputy


Executive Director; Defendant Cotant is the former Director of
Member Billing and former Director of Member Services and has
continued to act as a Special Advisor to the Member Service Center
since her separation from the organization in 2005; Defendant Van
Horn is the Senior Executive, Finance; Defendant Babcock is the
Special Assistant to the Executive Director and Senior Executive,
Member Services; and Johnson is the Executive Director. FAC 812.
2

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 3 of 16

known as the Cal Bar Foundation, which benefits the State Bar.

Id. at 18.

the mail to misrepresent fees due to members in various ways.

at 21.

for inactive members over the age of seventy in order to defraud

those members into paying fees that they were not required to pay.

Id. at 21a.

received any refunds at all.

members to pay unspecified penalties when those individuals were

10

trying to make contributions to the State Bar Fund or to join one

11

of the State Bars sections.

12

Plaintiffs it was impossible for members to avoid these penalties

13

without reducing the amount intended to go to the fund or toward

14

membership in a section.

15

used the mail and/or wires to induce members, firms and government

16

agencies to make multiple payments and then intentionally avoided

17

refunding any part of these multiple payments.

18

Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used


Id.

For example, Defendants have misrepresented the fee waiver

These members had to wait years for refunds if they

Id.

Id.

Defendants have also misled

Id. at 21b,c.

According to

Further, Defendants purposefully

Id. at 21e.

Plaintiffs extortion allegations are based on the same acts

19

as their mail and wire fraud allegations.

20

Plaintiffs, Defendants were able to achieve and benefit from the

21

alleged misrepresentations by using fear of suspension from the

22

State Bar and acting under color of official right to receive

23

payments while using those payments for purposes not intended by

24

the members.

25

Id. at 22.

According to

Id.

Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants tampered with

26

witnesses and/or potential witnesses in violation of 18 U.S.C.

27

1512, attempting to prevent Plaintiffs from testifying about

28

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 4 of 16

federal violations including, but not limited to, the allegations

of mail fraud, wire fraud and extortion described above.

23.

complaining about the acts described above, Defendants have

intentionally demonstrated hostility and conspired to demonstrate

hostility to Plaintiffs amounting to threats of physical force and

attempted intimidation, on occasion leaving Plaintiffs physically

shaken, in fear of physical injury and/or suffering physically.

Id.

Id. at

Plaintiffs allege that since 2002, when they began

Plaintiffs support this allegation by claiming that Defendants

10

have, among other things, intentionally caused others to intimidate

11

Plaintiffs, threatened to reduce Plaintiffs salary grade, reduced

12

Plaintiffs job duties and transferred those duties to other

13

departments, rated Plaintiffs as needs improvement in their

14

performance evaluations, threatened Plaintiffs with discipline up

15

to and including termination, told Plaintiffs that they would not

16

be promoted if they continued to report the defalcations,

17

wrongfully prevented Plaintiffs from receiving training and

18

wrongfully deprived Plaintiffs of promotions.

19

Id.

Over a year before filing this complaint, Plaintiffs filed a

20

complaint in San Francisco Superior Court against the State Bar

21

alleging retaliation for whistleblowing under California Labor Code

22

1102.5.

23

See Defendants Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. A.2

Defendants now move to dismiss the complaint, arguing that

24
2

27

Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of


the state court complaint and amended complaint and the complaint
in this case is granted (Docket No. 13). The pleadings are not
subject to reasonable dispute and are capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned. See Fed. R. Evid. 201.

28

25
26

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 5 of 16

Plaintiffs have failed to state a RICO claim.

Defendants move to strike certain allegations from the complaint.

In the alternative,

DISCUSSION

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Document 36

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must

contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief."

need not set out in detail the facts upon which it bases its claim;

however, the plaintiff must "give the defendant fair notice of what

the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds on which it rests."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

A plaintiff

10

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); see Bell Atlantic Corp.

11

v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007).

12

in the complaint, "even if doubtful in fact," are assumed to be

13

true, id., and are construed in the light most favorable to the

14

plaintiff.

15

1986).

16

All material allegations

NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F. 2d 896, 898 (9th Cir.

When granting a motion to dismiss, the court is generally

17

required to grant the plaintiff leave to amend, even if no request

18

to amend the pleading was made, unless amendment would be futile.

19

Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911

20

F.2d 242, 246-47 (9th Cir. 1990).

21

I.

22

RICO Enterprise
A violation of 1962(c) . . . requires (1) conduct (2) of an

23

enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.

24

Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).

25

racketeering activity is a term of art meaning at least two acts

26

of racketeering activity (predicate acts) within ten years of each

27
28

A pattern of

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 6 of 16

other.3

predicate acts are related (relatedness requirement), "and that

they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity"

(continuity requirement).

Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989) (emphasis in original).

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Document 36

Id. at 1961(5).

The plaintiff must allege that these

H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.

As discussed above, Plaintiffs have alleged three types of

predicate acts, mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

1341 and 1343, extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.

1951, and witness tampering in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1512.

10

The injury that Plaintiffs allege is lost salary and employment

11

benefits.

12

The Supreme Court has held that the definition of relatedness

13

can be found in other parts of Title 18 of the United States Code.

14

H.J., 492 U.S. at 240.

15

pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar

16

purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission,

17

or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and

18

are not isolated events."

19

Therefore, "criminal conduct forms a

Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3575(e)).

Here, the alleged criminal acts serve two different purposes.

20

The alleged mail and wire fraud and extortion serve to allow

21

Defendants to collect payments on behalf of the State Bar to which

22

it is not entitled.

The alleged witness tampering serves to

23
3

24
25
26
27
28

RICO defines racketeering activity as "any act or threat


involving" specified state law crimes, any "act" indictable under
various specified federal statutes, and certain federal "offenses"
("predicate acts"). 18 U.S.C. 1961(1). Predicate acts include,
among other things, mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, wire fraud, 18
U.S.C. 1343, and "any act which is indictable under . . . title
18, United States Code . . . section 1512 (relating to tampering
with a witness, victim, or an informant). Id.
6

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 7 of 16

prevent Plaintiffs from disclosing Defendants wrongful acts.

victims of the fraud and extortion are the State Bar members while

the victims of the witness tampering are Plaintiffs.

are able to defraud the State Bar members by misleading them about

the requirements of membership.

Plaintiffs from reporting this wrongdoing by means of threats and

employment retaliation.

predicate acts need not be the same, they must at least be

similar.

Defendants

Defendants attempt to prevent

Although the characteristics of the

The purposes, victims and methods of commission in this

10

case are not.

11

predicate acts do not meet the relatedness requirement.

12

The

Based on these differences, the Court finds that the

Further, Plaintiffs concede that they have not been

13

proximately harmed by the alleged fraud and extortion.

14

in a civil RICO action only has standing if, and can only recover

15

to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property

16

by the conduct constituting the violation.

17

496.

18

was "proximately caused by at least one of the predicate acts in

19

the pattern of racketeering activity."

20

support, Plaintiffs cite dicta from various cases.

21

A plaintiff

Sedima, 473 U.S. at

Plaintiffs argue that they need only allege that their injury

Opposition at 5.

In

First, Plaintiffs cite a footnote in Sedima, which quotes the

22

definition of pattern discussed above.

23

(quoting 18 U.S.C. 3575(e)).

24

requirement that the predicate acts have the same or similar

25

victims clearly establishes that the predicate acts which form a

26

pattern of racketeering activity, need not all have the same

27

victims.

28

Opposition at 15.

473 U.S. at 496 n.14

Plaintiffs argue that the

However, as discussed above, this


7

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 8 of 16

definition relates to the issue of whether predicate acts are

related, not to proximate cause or standing.

Similarly, Plaintiffs quote an Eleventh Circuit case which

states that one or more of the predicate acts must not only be the

but for cause of the injury, but the proximate cause as well.

Williams v. Mohawk Indus., 465 F.3d 1277, 1287 (11th Cir. 2007)

(quoting Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 341

F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003)).

dicta proves that only one of the disparate predicate acts must be

Plaintiffs argue that this

10

the proximate cause of their injuries.

11

Green Leaf are distinguishable from this case because the alleged

12

predicate acts in those cases all had the same intended results.

13

For example, the Williams plaintiffs alleged three predicate acts,

14

violations of:

15
16
17
18
19
20
21

However, both Williams and

(1) 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(3)(A), which makes it a federal


crime to "knowingly hire[] for employment at least 10
individuals with actual knowledge that the individuals
are aliens" during a twelve-month period; (2) 8 U.S.C.
1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), which makes it a federal crime to
"conceal[], harbor[], or shield from detection, or
attempt[] to conceal, harbor or shield from detection"
aliens that have illegally entered the United States;
and (3) 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), which makes it a
federal crime to "encourage[] or induce[] an alien to
come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing
or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming
to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of
law.

22
465 F.3d at 1283.

All of these acts were directly related to the

23
defendant employers alleged efforts to hire and harbor illegal
24
workers in an effort to keep labor costs as low as possible.

Id.

25
at 1281.

Similarly, in Green Leaf, the plaintiff alleged mail

26
fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1341; wire fraud, in violation
27
28

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 9 of 16

of 18 U.S.C. 1343; obstruction of justice, in violation of 18

U.S.C. 1503; and tampering with witnesses, in violation of 18

U.S.C. 1512 as predicate acts for their RICO claim.

1306.

overall allegations that the defendant had engaged in a massive

scheme of perjury, falsification of evidence, and fraudulent

concealment of evidence to induce themselves and other Benlate

plaintiffs to settle their claims for less than the claims' fair

value.

341 F.3d at

Again all of these alleged acts related to the plaintiffs

Id. at 1296.

According to the plaintiffs allegations,

10

each of the predicate acts was directed at the plaintiff or its

11

attorneys in the underlying litigation with the purpose of inducing

12

the plaintiff to settle.

13

Plaintiffs also cite a Tenth Circuit case where the plaintiffs

14

alleged forty-one predicate acts, only eight of which involved the

15

plaintiffs.

16

In holding that the Gilmor plaintiffs had RICO standing, the Tenth

17

Circuit noted that the plaintiffs allege[d] several predicate acts

18

directed toward them and such acts damaged them by reducing the

19

development potential (and thus the value) of their property.

20

Id. at 797.

21

suggest that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a RICO

22

claim based on the acts that were not directed toward them.

23

court stated, Although many of the acts constituting an alleged

24

pattern of racketeering activity involve non-parties, as noted

25

above, Landowners also allege several predicate acts directed

26

toward them.

27

addressing the threshold question of standing before reviewing the

28

Gilmor v. Thomas, 490 F.3d 791, 797 (10th Cir. 2007).

However, those statements, when read in context,

Id.

The

Further, the Gilmore court was only briefly

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 10 of 16

district courts grant of summary judgment to the defendants based

on a finding that the plaintiffs could not prove any predicate act.

None of the cases cited by Plaintiffs supports a finding that

they have plead a RICO claim when they have plead two types of

predicate acts with the purpose of fraudulently taking money from

State Bar members and one type of predicate act with the purpose of

keeping Plaintiffs from disclosing the first two predicate acts.

8
9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

Document 36

Further, the very test laid out by the Ninth Circuit for
establishing whether a RICO plaintiff has statutory standing

10

demonstrates the mis-match between Plaintiffs theory and the

11

statutes purpose.

12

standing, [t]he key task is to determine whether th[e] injury was

13

by reason of the [] alleged violations, a requirement the Supreme

14

Court has interpreted to encompass proximate as well as factual

15

causation.

Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1168 (9th

16

Cir. 2002).

In the Ninth Circuit, courts examine

17
18
19
20
21
22

In determining whether a plaintiff has RICO

three nonexhaustive factors in considering


causation, that is whether the injury is "too
remote" to allow recovery: (1) whether there are
more direct victims of the alleged wrongful
conduct who can be counted on to vindicate the law
as private attorneys general; (2) whether it will
be difficult to ascertain the amount of the
plaintiff's damages attributable to defendant's
wrongful conduct; and (3) whether the courts will
have to adopt complicated rules apportioning
damages to obviate the risk of multiple
recoveries.

23
Id. at 1169 (quoting Ass'n of Wash. Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip
24
Morris Inc., 241 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2001)).
25
It is not possible to apply the Ninth Circuits test to the
26
scheme Plaintiffs allege because the various predicate acts
27
28

10

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 11 of 16

targeted different individuals and, as Plaintiffs admit, caused

different harms.

pattern are the State Bar members.

as true, Plaintiffs became collateral victims of the scheme when

they decided to complain of Defendants wrongdoing.

words, Plaintiffs losses were not caused by the alleged scheme,

but by their decision to object to the scheme.

other cases cited by Plaintiffs, each of the predicate acts at

issue caused the same harm to the plaintiffs, even if they were

The primary victims of the alleged scheme or


Taking Plaintiffs allegations

In other

In all of the

10

not the proximate cause of the harm.

11

not proximately harmed by the alleged mail fraud, wire fraud or

12

extortion, they do not have standing to assert a RICO claim based

13

on those acts.

Because Plaintiffs here were

14

Defendants next argue that, without the allegations of mail

15

and wire fraud and extortion, Plaintiffs RICO claim necessarily

16

fails because two of their three predicate acts have been

17

eliminated.

18

meet the requirement that a RICO violation be supported by two or

19

more predicate acts.

20

or more types of offenses.

21

allege multiple acts of witness tampering.

22

Therefore, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot

However, this element does not require two


Plaintiffs complaint appears to

However, as Defendants also argue, Plaintiffs witness

23

tampering allegations fail to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. 1512

24

because there is not even a suggestion of a potential federal

25

investigation in which Plaintiffs were prevented from

26

participating.

27

enough to support Plaintiffs theory would allow any plaintiff

28

As Defendants note, a reading of 1512 broad

11

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 12 of 16

alleging a pattern of retaliation for internally reporting

activity he or she believed to be a federal offense to bring a

RICO claim for witness tampering.

statute specifically provides that an official proceeding need

not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the

offense.

Plaintiffs counter that the

18 U.S.C. 1512(f).

However, Plaintiffs do not cite and the Court is not aware of

any case in which the witness tampering provision was applied to a

situation in which there was no potential for a federal

10

investigation.

11

910 (9th Cir. 2002) (involving witnesses to a government

12

investigation of defendant by the Social Security Administration);

13

United States v. Harris, 498 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2007)

14

(involving threats to an individual to prevent her from contacting

15

local law enforcement regarding the sale of illegal drugs in her

16

neighborhood); United States v. Perry, 335 F.3d 316, 319 (4th Cir.

17

2003) (involving the report of false and misleading information to

18

local law enforcement).

19

intent to report Defendants actions outside of the workplace.

20

See, e.g., United States v. Khatami, 280 F.3d 907,

Further, Plaintiffs have not alleged any

Defendants argue that the RICO claim based on the predicate

21

acts of witness tampering should be dismissed with prejudice.

22

However, it is possible that Plaintiffs can allege facts

23

sufficient to amount to two or more acts of witness tampering

24

within ten years.

25

with leave to amend.

26
27
28

Therefore, the Court dismisses the complaint

In doing so, Plaintiffs should be mindful that their


allegations of 1512 witness tampering violations require that
12

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 13 of 16

they have knowledge of the commission or possible commission of a

Federal offense in the first instance.

Here, Plaintiffs allege that they had knowledge that Defendants

were violating the federal mail and wire fraud and extortion

statutes.

allegations regarding these federal offenses do not provide a

basis upon which even a possible commission of a federal offense

can be found.

9
United States District Court
For the Northern District of California

Document 36

18 U.S.C. 1512(b)(3).

However, as discussed at the hearing, Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs suggest that Defendants billing statements sent

10

via the U.S. mail and the internet misled State Bar members and

11

caused them to make overpayments.

12

allegations about what the statements say, how they are misleading

13

or whether State Bar members have relied or could reasonably rely

14

on those statements to their detriment.

15

Plaintiffs have not plead a witness tampering claim that involves

16

the possible commission of mail and wire fraud.

17

However, Plaintiffs make no

Absent those facts,

Plaintiffs rely on the same allegations to establish

18

Defendants commission of extortion, arguing, Because members can

19

lose their right to practice if they are suspended or disciplined

20

by the State Bar, using billing statements from the State Bar makes

21

this conduct a violation of the federal extortion statute.

22

Opposition at 2.

23

the possible commission of a Hobbs Act violation because, even

24

taking Plaintiffs allegations as true, Defendants were acting to

25

get the excess fees from State Bar members for the benefit of the

26

State Bar, a government organization.

27

recently noted, The importance of the line between public and

28

As Defendants argue, these acts do not constitute

13

As the Supreme Court

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Document 36

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 14 of 16

private beneficiaries for common law and Hobbs Act extortion is

confirmed by our own case law, which is completely barren of an

example of extortion under color of official right undertaken for

the sole benefit of the Government.

2588, 2605 (2007).

indication from Congress, it is not reasonable to assume that the

Hobbs Act (let alone RICO) was intended to expose all federal

employees . . . to extortion charges whenever they stretch in

trying to enforce Government property claims.

Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct.

The Court explained that without some other

Id.

Therefore, the

10

Court held that the Hobbs Act does not apply when the National

11

Government is the intended beneficiary of the allegedly

12

extortionate acts.

13

federal government entity, the same reasoning applies.

14

Court reasoned, It is not the final judgments, but the fear of

15

criminal charges or civil claims for treble damages that could well

16

take the starch out of regulators who are supposed to bargain and

17

press demands vigorously on behalf of the Government and the

18

public.

19

cannot be alleged on this theory to support witness tampering

20

predicate acts.

21

II.

22

Id.

Id.

Although the Bar is a state rather than


As the

A potential federal investigation of extortion

Qualified Immunity
Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified

23

immunity.

24

plead does not contain sufficient factual allegations on which to

25

base a qualified immunity inquiry.

26

affirmative defense of qualified immunity, Plaintiffs must include

27

in their amended complaint specific, nonconclusory factual

28

The Court notes that Plaintiffs complaint as presently

14

Because Defendants raise the

Case 4:07-cv-04478-CW

Filed 02/05/2008

Page 15 of 16

allegations that establish improper motive causing cognizable

injury.

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring in judgment)).

demonstrate the acts taken by and the improper motive of the

individual Defendants named by Plaintiffs.

United States District Court


For the Northern District of California

Document 36

Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 598 (1998) (quoting

Those specific allegations must

To establish Defendants improper motive with respect to the

witness tampering claims, Plaintiffs must allege facts to

demonstrate not only that Defendants took steps to stop Plaintiffs

10

from reporting Defendants scheme but also that Defendants believed

11

that their scheme constitu