Author: Angelo J.

Logronio

RELOVA v. LAVAREZ ET AL. (1907)

Petition: Petition for Review of the Decision of the Lower Court
Petitioner: Ruperto Relova
Respondent: Elena Lavarez et al.
Ponencia: CARSON, J.

DOCTRINE:
A servitude was established. It is in line with the proof on record that the
aqueduct and the dam have been in existence for more than 30 years,
during which period the owner of the land in question has always
exercised the right to the reasonable use of the water in the aqueduct
for irrigation purposes
FACTS:
1.) Plaintiff Relova is an owner of a Riceland in La Laguna, cultivated
with water from River Bangcabangca, through an aqueduct which
passes over the land of Defendants Lavarez, et. al.
2.) There was a dam on Defendants land which has a small gate or
aperture on its face which was used to control the flow of water in the
aqueduct.
3.) On May 1905, one of the defendants completely destroyed the dam
which caused the non-flowing of water on the land of Plaintiff.
4.) This occurrence caused the failure of Plaintiff to cultivate his
Riceland with his five cavanes of land.
5.) Due to the aforementioned facts and due to the fact that the disputed
dam had been used by the Plaintiff for more than 30 years through
an easement an injunction was granted by the lower court in favor of
the Plaintiff.
6.) Defendants aver that the evidence on record does not establish the
existence of the servitude as claimed by Plaintiff.
7.) Defendants also aver that Plaintiff suffered no damage because what
Plaintiff cultivated were NOT padagat or rice planted in May, but are
actually binabang or rice planted in August or September.

ISSUE:
W/N there existed a servitude in the land of the defendants in favor of the
plaintiff landowner

RULING + RATIO:
YES, there existed a servitude in the land of the defendants in favor of
the plaintiff landowner

It is in line with the proof on record that the aqueduct and the dam have been
in existence for more than 30 years, during which period the owner of the
land in question has always exercised the right to the reasonable use of the
water in the aqueduct for irrigation purposes (Arts. 527, and 528 of the Old
Civil Code)
It may be that the defendants had a right to open the aperture in the dam to
prevent a destructive overflow of water on their lands but this would not give
them right to stop the flow of water altogether; not does it tend to establish
the Defendants contention that the plaintiff land-owner is not entitled to the
benefit of the reasonable use of the water flowing in the aqueduct, since it
does not appear that such use NECESSARILY involved destructive
overflows from the aqueduct, provided the flow of water therein was properly
regulated by the opening of the aperture in the dam.

DISPOSITION: Judgment affirmed.

Author: Camille Sapnu

RELOVA v. LAVAREZ ET AL. (1907)

Petition: Petition for Certiorari
Petitioner: Solid Manila Corp
Respondent: Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.
Ponencia: Sarmiento, J.

DOCTRINE: Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which

they form part, but they cannot be alienated or mortgaged separately from
the tenement.
FACTS:
1. Solid Manila Corp is the owner of a parcel of land which lies in the
vicinity of another parcel owned by Bio Hong Trading Co., Inc.
2. Bio Hongs title came from a prior owner. In their Deed of Sale, the
parties reserved an easement of way and stated that a portion was
expropriated by the city government (portion is used as the private
alley).
3. Annotated in Bio Hongs title is the stipulation that a private alley with
concrete canals is to be constructed by Bio Hong. The same shall be
maintained by Bio Hong and is to be used by the public.
4. Solid claims that ever since it, as well with other residents of the
neighboring estates, made use of the same and maintained and
contributed to its upkeep until Bio Hong constructed steel gates that
precluded unhampered use.
ISSUE:
W/N the Deed of Sale excluded the alley in question, and that in any event,
the intent of the parties was to retain as an easement notwithstanding the
sale
RULING + RATIO:
NO, because as a mere right-of-way it cannot be separated from the
tenement and maintain an independent existence.
Servitudes are merely accessories to the tenements of which they form
part. Although they are possessed of a separate juridical existence, as mere
accessories, they cannot be alienated from the tenement or mortgaged
separately. It operates as a limitation on the title of the owner of the servient
estate, specifically, his right to use.

Author: Karen Oreo

Cid vs. Javier (1960)
Petition: Certiorari
Petitioners: Laureana Cid
Respondents: Irene Javier, et al.
Ponente: Barrera
DOCTRINE:
Notarial prohibition is required to start the running of prescription.
Also, registration of the servient estate without the annotation of the
easement extinguishes the easement.

servient estate to perform any act which would be lawful without the
easement.
xxxxxxxxx
RULING + RATIO:
NO. The Javiers did not acquire the easement by making a verbal
prohibition.
1. Notarial prohibition is required to start the running of
prescription.
o

The law requires not any form of prohibition, but exacts, in a

parenthetical expression, for emphasis, the doing not only of a
specific, particular act, but a formal act.

That this is the intendment of the law although not expressed in

exact language is the reason for the clarification made in Article
621 of the new Civil Code which specifically requires the
prohibition to be in "an instrument acknowledged before a
notary public".

Easements are in the nature of an encumbrance on the servient

estate. They constitute a limitation of the dominical right of the owner
of the subjected property. Hence, they can be acquired only by title
and by prescription, in the case of positive easement, only as a result
of some sort of invasion, apparent and continuous, of the servient
estate. By the same token, negative easements cannot be acquired
by less formal means. Hence, the requirement that the prohibition
(the equivalent of the act of invasion) should be by "a formal act", "an
instrument acknowledged before a notary public."

FACTS:
1. Respondents Irene Javier, et al are owners of a building standing on
their lot with windows overlooking the adjacent lot owned by
Laureana Cid. Both lots are covered by Torrens title.
2. The Javiers made a verbal prohibition to Cid not to obstruct the
light and view which was made before the present Civil Code took
effect, thus the applicable provision is Article 538 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
3. Trial court and Court of Appeals considered any prohibition made by
the owner of the dominant estate, be it oral or written, sufficient
compliance with the law regarding the use of the words formal act.
4. Thus, both courts decided that the Javiers acquired such
easement.
.
ISSUE:
WON respondents, owners of a building standing on their lot
with windows overlooking the adjacent lot, had acquired by
prescription an enforceable easement of light and view arising
from a verbal prohibition to obstruct such view and light,
alleged to have been made upon petitioner's
PROVISION:
Art. 538. Spanish Civil Code
In order to acquire by prescription the easements referred to in the
next preceding article, the time of the possession shall be computed,
... in negative easements, from the day on which the owner of the
dominant estate has, by a formal act, forbidden the owner of the

2. Registration of the servient estate without the annotation of the

easement extinguishes the easement.
o

In both certificates of titles, it does not appear any annotation in

respect to the easement supposedly acquired by prescription which,
counting the twenty (20) years from 1913 or 1914, would have
already ripened by 1937, date of the decrees of registration.
Consequently, even conceding arguendo that such an easement
has been acquired, it had been cut off or extinguished by the
registration of the servient estate under the Torrens System
without the easement being annotated on the corresponding
certificate of title, pursuant to Section 39 of the Land Registration
Act

DISPOSITION: Petition granted.

Author: Earvin James M. Atienza

MAXIMO CORTES v. JOSE PALANCA YU-TIBO

(1903)
Appellant:
Appellee:
Ponente:
DOCTRINE:

Maximo Cortes

Jose Palaca Yu-Tibo

Mapa, J.
Easement of Light and Air; Counting of Acquisitive
Prescriptive Period; Negative Easements;

That the easement of light which is the object of this litigation is of a negative
character, and therefore pertains to the class which cannot be acquired by
prescription as provided by article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting
the time of possession from the date on which the owner of the dominant
estate has, in a formal manner, forbidden the owner of the servient estate to
do an act which would be lawful were it not for the easement
FACTS:
1. Maximo Cortes wife owns a house in Calle Rosario, Manila, herein
described as House No. 65 (alleged dominant estate), where a
window may be found to have been receiving light and air since
1843;
2. Said window is facing an adjacent house described as House No. 63
(alleged servient estate) and found to be the property of Jose Palaca
Yu-Tibo, who later on commenced to raise the roof thereof such that
it covers of the aforementioned window depriving the latter from
the enjoyment of the light and air it previously received;
3. Records of the case show that although Cortes made a demand for
Yu-Tibo to cease from the construction thereof, he nonetheless failed
to prove any prior act of prohibition against the latter in the manner
provided by law (i.e. prohibition acknowledged before a notary
public). Instead, Cortes asserts that he acquired the alleged positive
easement by prescription, while Yu-Tibo counters stating that Cortes
had not followed the requirement of the law for negative easements
as in this case. Hence, the instant appeal on the issuance of an
injunction.
ISSUES:
1. WON the alleged easement is a positive easement.
2. WON Cortes acquired the same through prescription.
PROVISION:

A positive easement is one which imposes upon the owner

of the servient estate the obligation of allowing something to
be done or of doing it himself, and a negative easement,
that which prohibits the owner of the servient estate
from doing something which he could lawfully do if the
easement did not exist. (533)

Art. 616. Easements are also positive or negative.

xxx
Art. 620. Continuous and apparent easements are acquired
either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten
years. (537a)
Art. 621. In order to acquire by prescription the easements
referred to in the preceding article, the time of possession
shall be computed thus: in positive easements, from the day
on which the owner of the dominant estate, or the person
who may have made use of the easement, commenced to
exercise it upon the servient estate; and in negative
easements, from the day on which the owner of the
dominant
estate
forbade,
by
an
instrument
acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of the
servient estate, from executing an act which would be
lawful without the easement. (538a)
RULING + RATIO:
1. No. The easement of light and air are negative easements.
x x x It will be readily observed that the owner of the servient
estate subject to such easement is under no obligation
whatsoever to allow anything to be done on his tenement, nor to
do anything there himself, but is simply restrained from doing
anything thereon which may tend to cut off the light from the
dominant estate, which he would undoubtedly be entitled to do
were it not for the existence of the easement. If, then, the first
condition is that which is peculiar to positive easements, and the
second condition that which is peculiar to negative easements,
according to the definition of article 533 of the Civil Code, it is
our opinion that the easement of lights in the case of
windows opened in one's own wall is of a negative
character, and, as such, cannot be acquired by prescription
under article 538 of the Civil Code, except by counting the
time of possession from the date on which the owner of the
dominant estate may, by a formal act have prohibited the

Author: Earvin James M. Atienza

owner of the servient estate from doing something which it
would be lawful from him to do were it not for the easement.
x x x;
2. No. The counting of the period of prescription must be from the day
the owner of the alleged dominant estate executes a prohibition in a
public instrument.
x x x That, in consequence thereof, the plaintiff, not having
executed any formal act of opposition to the right of the
owner of the house No. 63 Calle Rosario (of which the
defendant is tenant), to make therein improvements which might
obstruct the light of the house No. 65 of the same street, the
property of the wife of the appellant, at any time prior to the
complaint, as found by the court below in the judgment assigned
as error, he has not acquired, nor could he acquire by
prescription, such easement of light, no matter how long a
time have elapsed since the windows were opened in the
wall of the said house No. 65, because the period which the
law demands for such prescriptive acquisition could not
have commenced to run, the act with which it must
necessarily commence not having been performed. x x x;
NOTE: The Court cited various decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court and
commentaries from the Partidas on the proper classification of the easement
of light and air as a result of windows being created for such purpose. Court
distinguished one made by a co-owner in a party wall and one apparently
existing even prior to the sale of the adjacent lots to different owners from
the instant case such that the former situations carried with them the
Doctrine of Apparency while the latter did not.
DISPOSITION: Appeal DENIED. Costs against plaintiff-appellant.

Digest Author: Dorothy Orial

Abellana, Sr. vs CA (1992)

Petitioner: Concordio Abellana, Sr., et al
Respondent: Hon. Court of Appeals, Municipal Govt. of Talisay, Cebu
Ponencia: J. Grino-Aquino
DOCTRINE:
An easement of right of way is not acquirable by prescription The use
of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a continuous easement
because its use is at intervals and depends upon the acts of man.

FACTS:
1. Petitioners live in the northwestern side of the Nonoc Homes
Subdivision.
2. Respondents constructed a wall around the subdivision, which
deprived the petitioners of the use of a subdivision road, providing
access to the public highway.
3. They sued to establish that they have acquired by prescription an
easement of right of way over such subdivision road, which,
according to the petitioners, used to be a FOOTPATH which they
and their ancestors have been using since time immemorial.
4. Petitioner wishes that the high concrete walls enclosing the
subdivision and cutting off their access to the subdivision road be
REMOVED and that the road be opened to them.
5. Respondents DENIED 2 things:
a. That there was a pre-existing footpath before they developed
the subdivision
b. That Nonoc Subdivision roads are not the shortest way to a
public road for there is a more direct route from the
petitioners land to the public highway
6. Trial Court rendered judgement in favor of the herein petitioners,
ordering respondents to demolish the subject walls at certain areas
at their expense, and to leave them open for the use of the
petitioners and general public.
7. Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court, and denied
the MR of petitioners.
ISSUES: W/N an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription
HELD: NO
PROVISION: Articles 620 and 622 of Civil Code
RULING + RATIO:

a. The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not a

continuous easement because its use it at intervals and depends
upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if a man passes or
puts his feet over somebody elses land. Hence, a right of way is not
acquirable by prescription.
b. Also, the footpaths did NOT acquire the status of public streets, as
petitioners alleged.

DISPOSITION:
No merit in the petition for review, thus DENIED with costs against the
petitioners.

Digest Author: Dorothy Orial

Ronquillo vs. Roco (1958)

Petitioner: Leogario Ronquillo, et al
Respondent: Jose Roco (Administrator of Vicente Roco Y Dominguez), et al
Ponencia: J. Montemayor
DOCTRINE:
Easement of Right of Way may not be acquired through (acquisitive)
prescription) Under Articles 537 and 539, and 620 and 622 of the Old and
New Civil Code, respectively, the easement of right of way may not be
acquired through prescription.

FACTS:
1. For more than 20 years, plaintiffs (Ronquillo, et al) have been using a
road or passage way which crossed the land of defendants (Roco). It
leads to Igualdad Street and the market place of Naga City.
2. (1953) With malice, Jose Roco and other co-defendants started
constructing a CHAPEL in the MIDDLE of the said right of way
(which is on their land), which impeded, obstructed, and disturbed
the continuous exercise of the rights of Ronquillo over it.
3. (1954) By means of FORCE, INTIMDATION, and THREATS, Roco
and new defendants, with the help of their men and laborers, illegally
and violently planted WOODEN POSTS, fenced with BARBED WIRE
and closed the road passage way on their land which prevented
them from going to or from the Igualdad Street and the public market
of Naga City.
4. Ronquillo claims to have acquired the easement of right of way over
the land of Roco thru prescription by their continuous and
uninterrupted use of a narrow strip of land as passage way or road in
going to Igualdad Street and the public market, from their residential
land or houses, and return.
Ronquillo Owner of Dominant Estate
Roco Owner of Servient Estate
ISSUES: W/N an easement of right of way can be acquired thru prescription
HELD: NO, majority decision.
PROVISION: Articles 537 and 539 of Old Civil Code, Articles 620 and 622
of New Civil Code
RULING + RATIO:

Case was dismissed on the ground that an easement of right of way

though it may be apparent is, nevertheless DISCONTINUOUS or
INTERMITTENT, and therefore, CANNOT be acquired through
prescription, but only by virtue of title.
The minority opinion (including the ponente) says that the easement of right
of way can prescribe in favor of Ronquillo based on old code of civ pro,
commentaries of Professor Tolentino, and jurisprudence (Cuaycong vs
Benedicto. But, Majority Opinion must prevail.
DISPOSITION:
The order appealed was affirmed. No costs.

Concurring Opinion by J. B. L. Reyes:

The essence of this easement ("servidumbre de paso") lies in the power of the
dominant owner to cross or traverse the servient tenement without being prevented or
disturbed by its owner. As a servitude, it is a limitation on the servient owner's rights
of ownership, because it restricts his right to exclude others from his property. But
such limitation exists only when the dominant owner actually crosser, or passes over
the servient estate; because when he does not, the servient owner's right of exclusion
is perfect and undisturbed. Since the dominant owner cannot be continually and
uninterruptedly crossing the servient estate, but can do so only at intervals, the
easement is necessarily of an intermittent or discontinuous nature.

Author: Mae Bulang

LEOGARIO RONQUILLO v. JOSE ROCO (1958)

Appellant:
LEOGARIO RONQUILLO, ET AL.
Appellee:
JOSE ROCO, as Administrator of VICENTE, ROCO Y.
DOMINGUEZ ET AL.
Ponente:
MONTEMAYOR, J.
DOCTRINE:

PROVISION:
Art. 620, 622, new Civil Code
RULING + RATIO:
1. YES.

An easement of right of way is a discontinuous

easement and thus may not be acquired by prescription.

FACTS:
1. Plaintiffs have been in the continuous and uninterrupted use of a
road or passage way which traversed the land of the defendants and
their predecessors in interest, in going to Igualdad Street and the
market place of Naga City, from their residential land and back, for
more than 20 years;
2. The defendants and the tenants of Vicente Roco, the predecessors
in interest of the said defendants have long recognized and
respected the private legal easement of road right of way of said
plaintiffs.
3. On May 12, 1953, the defendants Jose Roco thru his co-defendants,
Raymundo Martinez and their men with malice aforethought and with
a view to obstructing the plaintiffs' private legal easement over the
property of the late Vicente Roco, started constructing a chapel in the
middle of the right of way which impeded, obstructed and disturbed
the continuous exercise of the rights of the plaintiffs over said right of
way;
4. On July 10, 1954 the new defendants Natividad Roco and Gregorio
Miras, Jr. with the approval of the defendant, Jose Roco and with the
help of their men and laborers planted wooden posts, fenced with
barbed wire and closed hermitically the road passage way and their
right of way preventing plaintiffs from going to or coming from their
homes to Igualdad Street and the public market of the City of Naga.
5. Plaintiffs allege to have acquired the easement of right of way over
the land thru prescription by their continuous and uninterrupted use
of a narrow strip of land of the defendants as passage way or road in
going to Igualdad Street and the public market of Naga City, from
their residential land or houses, and return.
ISSUES:
1. Whether an easement of right of way, though apparent, is
discontinuous or intermittent and, therefore, cannot be acquired
through prescription, but only by virtue of a title. YES.

Discontinuous or intermittent easement cannot be acquired

through prescription but only by virtue of a title. Under old as
well as the New Civil Code, easements may be continuous
discontinuous (intermittent), apparent or non-apparent,
discontinuous being those used at more or less long
intervals and which depend upon acts of man. Continuous
and apparent easements are acquired either, by title or
prescription, continuous non-apparent easements and
discontinuous ones whether apparent or not, may be
acquired only by virtue of a title.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code, old and new, the
easement of right of way may not be acquired through
prescription.
The opinion of the majority must prevail, and it is held that
under the present law, particularly, the provisions of the Civil
Code, old and new, unless and until the same is changed or
clarified, the easement of right of way may not be acquired
through prescription.

Separate Opinions
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
Because possession of a right consists in the enjoyment of that right
and to enjoy a right is to exercise it, it follows that the possession
(enjoyment or exercise) of a right of way is intermittent and
discontinuous. From this premise, it is inevitable to conclude, with
Manresa and Sanchez Roman, that such easement cannot be
acquired by acquisitive prescription (adverse possession)
because the latter requires that the possession be continuous
or uninterrupted.

The Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190) did not change the
situation. Observe that its section 41, in conferring prescriptive title
upon "ten years adverse possession" qualifies it by the succeeding
words "uninterruptedly continued for ten years which is the
same condition of continuity that is exacted by the Civil Code.

DISPOSITION: Appeal AFFIRMED. No cost.

Author: Lim, S.

AMOR vs FlORENTINO
Petition: Petition for appeal of an order of CFI of Albay
Petitioner: Severo Amor
Respondent: Gabriel Florentino
Ponencia: Bocobo, J.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
1. Maria Florentino owned a house and a warehouse in Ilocos Sur
a. The house has 3 windows on the upper storey and a 4th one
on the ground floor
b. Through these windows the house receives light and air from
the camarin/warehouse.
2. Maria Florentino made a will, devising the house and the land on
which it is situated to Gabriel Florentino and to Jose Florentino.
3. The warehouse and the lot where it is situated to Maria
Encarnancion Florentino. Upon the death of the testatrix in 1882,
nothing was said or done by the devisees in regard to the windows in
question.
4. Maria Encarnacion Florentino sold her lot and the warehouse
thereon to Severo Amor, the deed of sale stating that the vendor had
inherited the property from her aunt, Maria Florentino. Amor
destroyed the old warehouse and started to build instead a two-story
house.
a. Florentino filed an action to prohibit petitioner herein from
building higher than the original structure and from executing
any work, which would shut off the light, and air that had for
many years been received through the four windows referred
to.
5. Maria Florentino died in 1892, according to the finding of fact of the
Court of Appeals, Articles 541 of the Civil Code governs this case.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing
said construction?

PROVISIONS:
Art. 541. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two
estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if
one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue
actively and passively, unless at the time the ownership of the two

estates is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of

either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is
executed.
RULING + RATIO:
1. Yes. Easements are established by law or by will of the owners or by
title. Under Art. 541 (old civil code) there is title by the doctrine of
apparent sign. When two different persons subsequently own the
estate and the service is not revoked in the title nor removed, an
easement is established. Amor cannot invoke the Cortez case
because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 541 is acquisition
by title.
a. When Maria Florentino died ownership of house and lot
passed to Gabriel and Jose while camarin and lot to Maria
Encarnacion Florentino.
b. Neither party mentioned or did anything about the windows
and Gabriel and Jose Florentino continued to exercise the
rights.
c. Easement was created inseparable from estate to which
they pertain.
2. INCIDENTAL QUESTION- W/N art 541 of Civil Code apples to a
division of property by succession YES
a. Amor alleges that Maria Florentino died on 1885 thus the
Law of the Partidas should govern but this issue was brought
up to late. Only brought up in the CA. Also the CA ruled that
she died on 1892 because of a testimony of a Gregorio
Florentino who said he was 58 years old having being born
on 1880 if the death was on 1885 then Gregorio was only 5
years old and he would have not remembered so CA ruled
death was on 1892 when Gregorio was 12 years old.
3. A Positive easement of Light and View and a Negative easement
not to build goes together 2 sides of the same coin
a. There are different modes of establishing easement
i. Established
1. Law
2. Will
ii. Acquisition
1. Prescription
2. Title or equivalent
iii. TITLE
1. Deed of recognition
2. Final judgement
3. Apparent sign between 2 estates ART 541

Author: Lim, S.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.

b. 4 windows were an apparent sign, these 4 windows had the

effect as a title of acquisition of the easement of light and
view.
i. Upon establishment of easement of light and view
the negative easement was also established to the
owner of the Camarin
ii. EASEMENT DID NOT CONTINUE but was created
when the 2 lots were given to different owners.
iii. When Maria Florentino owned both lots she was
exercising her dominion over the lots.
1. You cannot have an easement over your
own property
Cortes vs Yu Tibo Doctrine does not apply.
a. Facts are not the same, facts were clearly distinguished.
i. Cortes owned a house and lot which had windows
ii. Adjoining lot owner raised the roof of their house
of Cortes window covered.
1. SC HELD opening of windows did not create
and easement because it is merely tolerated
by adjoining owner, who may freely build on
his land.
2. Cortes needs to do the procedure for
Negative Easements which he did not do.
iii. Cortes case was acquisition by Prescription and it
mentioned a lot originally owned by 2 different
people NEGATIVE EASEMENT
iv. THIS CASE, acquisition by TITLE and the lots were
ORIGINALLY owned by 1 person. POSITIVE
EASEMENT
Assuming Arguendo that she died in 1885 same results would be
concluded.
a. Based on decisions of Spanish Supreme Court When
Maria died in 1885 the doctrine was already in place
Aside from the reasons mentioned above Respondent also
acquired by prescription seeing as when Maria Florentino died in
1885 or 1892 the case was filed on 1938 more than 20 years only
10 years needed for prescription
Amor not innocent purchaser for value because he is bound to know
the existence of the easements
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
a. When Maria Encarnacion Florentino accepted the land she
accepted both the benefits and the burdens. She cannot
accept just the benefits.

b. During construction of Amor, Jose and Gabriel filed to stop

the work but Amor continued so he cannot now complain if
he is to be forced to remove part of his building
c. Amors duty is to inquire to the significance of the window.

DISPOSITION: The order appealed from is affirmed.

Author: Tiffany Dy
GARGANTOS v. TAN YANON
Petition: Appeal by certiorari
Petitioner: Juan Gargantos
Respondent: Tan Yanon and the Court of Appeals
Ponente: Gutierrez David, J.

DOCTRINE:
While the law declares that the easement is to "continue" the
easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of
either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to
speak of, there being but one owner of both estates
FACTS:

1. The late Francisco Sanz was the former owner of a parcel of land in
Romblon containing 888 square meters, with buildings and
improvements thereon. The lost was subdivided into three and sold to
different persons. One portion was purchased by Guillermo Tengtio
who subsequently sold it to Vicente Uy Veza. Another portion, with the
house of strong materials thereon, was sold to Tan Yanon,
2. The house together with the camarin and small building, after
passing through several hands, was acquired by Juan Gargantos. He
tore down the roof of the camarin after being granted permission by
the Municipal Mayor to demolish.
3. Gargantos asked the Municipal Council of Romblon for another
permit, this time in order to construct a combined residential house
and warehouse on his lot. Tan Yanon opposed approval of this
application.
4. Because both the provincial fiscal and district engineer of Romblon
recommended granting of the building permit to Gargantos, Tan
Yanon filed against Gargantos an action to restrain him from
constructing a building that would prevent Tan Yanon from receiving
light and enjoying the view though the window of his house; also an

action to enjoin the members of Municipal Council of Romblon from

issuing the corresponding building permit to defendant.
5. The case was dismissed ordering plaintiff to pay defendant the sum
of P12,500.00 by way of compensatory, exemplary, moral and
moderate damages.
6. On appeal, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the trial
court and enjoined Gargantos from constructing his building unless
"he erects the same at a distance of not less than three meters from
the boundary line of his property, in conformity with Article 673 of the
New Civil Code." Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Whether the property of respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of

light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos.

PROVISION:
Article 673 of the Civil Code:
Whenever by any title a right has been acquired to have direct views,
balconies, or belvederes overlooking an adjoining property, the owner
of the servient estate cannot build thereon at less than a distance of
three meters to be measured in the manner provided in Article 671.
Any stipulation permitting distances less than those prescribed in
Article 670 is void.
RULING + RATIO:
YES. There is an easement of light and view.
It was Sanz who introduced improvements on both properties. On that
portion presently belonging to Tan Yanon, he constructed a house in
such a way that the northeastern side thereof extends to the wall of
the camarin on the portion now belonging to Gargantos. On said

Author: Tiffany Dy
northeastern side of the house, there are windows and doors which
serve as passages for light and view. These windows and doors were
in existence when respondent purchased the house and lot from
Sanz. The deed sale did not provide that the easement of light and
view would not be established.
The Civil Code provides that the existence of an apparent sign of
easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both,
shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the
easement will continue actively and passively, unless at the time the
ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the
deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear
before the instrument is executed.
The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of
the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and
permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its
existence (Amor vs. Florentino, 74 Phil., 403).
It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the
easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first
time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that
time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of
both estates (Articles 530, O.C.C., now Articles 613, N.C.C).
We find that respondent Tan Yanon's property has an easement of
light and view against petitioner's property. By reason of his easement
petitioner cannot construct on his land any building unless he erects it
at a distance of not less than three meters from the boundary line
separating the two estates.

DISPOSITION:
Appeal decision is AFFIRMED.

VALDERRAMA v. NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO.,

INC (1925)
Plaintiffs-Appellees: Catalino Valderama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra, et al.
Defendant-Appellant: North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.
Ponencia: Villamor, J.
Author: Veron Requejo
DOCTRINE: It is true that the owner of the dominant estate, in making on the
servient estate the necessary works for the use and preservation of the
easement, cannot alter it, nor make it more burdensome, but this does not
mean that the defendant cannot transport in the wagons passing upon the
railroad other cane that of the plaintiffs.
FACTS:
1. Several hacienda owners in Manapla entered into a contract with
Osorio, known as a milling contract, wherein Osorio agreed to install
in Manapla a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons, for
grinding and milling all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda
owners, who in turn bound themselves to furnish the central with all
the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the
execution of the contract, all in accordance with the conditions
specified therein.
2. Later on, North Negros Sugar Co., Inc., acquired the rights and
interest of Miguel J. Osorio in the milling contract aforesaid.
3. Then, plaintiffs, together with Pedro Auzmandi, made with the
defendant other milling contracts identical with the first one with
some new conditions. Lorenzo Echarri later on acquired Santos Urra
his interest in the milling contract executed by them.
4. In view of the fact that the hacienda owners, who were up to that
time customers of the central, could not furnish sufficient cane for
milling, as required by the capacity of said central, the defendant
made other milling contracts with various hacienda owners, in order
to obtain sufficient cane to sustain the central.
5. This gave rise to the plaintiffs filing their complaint, alleging that the
easement of way, which each of them has established in his
respective hacienda, was only for the transportation through each
hacienda of the sugar cane of the owner thereof, while the defendant
maintains that it had the right to transport to its central upon the
railroad passing through the haciendas of the plaintiffs, not only the
sugar cane harvested in said haciendas, but also that of the other
hacienda owners.

6. Defendant alleged that the plaintiffs respectively granted the

defendant, for the period of 50 years from date of the aforesaid
contracts, an easement of way 7 meters wide upon the lands of the
plaintiffs for the construction and operation of a railroad for the
transportation of sugar cane; that said easement of way was
established without any restriction whatsoever, as regards the
ownership of the cane to be transported over the said railroad; that
said contract was then in full force and effect, and have never been
annulled or modified.
7. After hearing the three cases, the trial court entered one single
judgment for all of them, holding that the defendant had no right to
pass through the lands of the plaintiffs of the plaintiffs, described in
their amended complaints for the transportation of sugar cane not
grown from any of the haciendas of the plaintiffs.
ISSUES: Can an easement be for the benefit of the servient estate?
RULING + RATIO: NO.
1. In a contract establishing an easement of way in favor of a sugar
company for the construction of a railroad, which is for the
transportation of sugar cane from the servient estates to the mill, it is
contrary to the nature of the contract to pretend that only sugar
cane grown in the servient estates can be transported on said
railroad, because it is a well-settled rule that things serve their
owner by reason of ownership and not be easement. That an
easement being established in favor of the sugar company, the
owners of the servient estates cannot limit its use to the
transportation of their cane, there being no express stipulation to that
effect.
2. An easement of way is not more burdensome by causing to
pass hereon wagons carrying goods pertaining to persons who
arent owners of the servient estates and at all time the person
entitle to the easement may please, for in such case the easement
continues to be the same.
DISPOSITION: Trial court decision reversed.
NOTE: In Paras book, it stated that the Code Commission believes the ruling
to be wrong, hence, Article 626 was made precisely to PREVENT an
increase in the burden or a different form of exercising the easement.

Author: James Dy

Javellana v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989)

Petitioners: ESTER JAVELLANA, ROLANDO DEMAFILES, CESAR CRUZADA and
ANTONIO SISON, petitioners,
Respondents: HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 4th CIVIL CASES
DIVISION, MARSAL & CO., INC., and MARCELINO FLORETE, SR., respondents.
Ponente: Paras

ISSUE:
1. Which is the Dominant estate, and which is the Servient
estate?
PROVISIONS:

DOCTRINE: owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any manner

whatsoever, the use of the servitude by the dominant estate. In this

case, Marsal cannot unilaterally destroy the dike to the prejudice of
the school.
Dominant Estate L. Borres Elementary School and surrounding lands
Servient Estate Lot 2344 (Owned by Marsal, previously by Florete)

FACTS:
1. Marsal & Co. Inc. (engaged in the business of producing salt) is the
owner of a parcel of land adjoining the Iloilo River up to Lot 2344
beside the L. Borres Elementary School. Marcelino Florete (the other
private respondent) used to be the owner of said land before Marsal.
2. There exists a main canal from the Iloilo River cutting across the
school, and another canal that traverses the school premises going
towards Lot 2344. Private respondents claim that they built and own
the said canal.

a. The canal served as a source for salt water from the

river to the schools fishpond, as well as drainage of
rain water that empties back into the river.
3. Marsal closed then demolished the portions of the dike connecting
the main canal to the canal traversing the school grounds.
a. This demolition caused flooding in the school, which did not
happen before the said demolition (Canal should have
served as an outlet for rain and floodwater)
4. Javellana, the district supervisor, and the other petitioners (school
officials) filed a case, and Marsal was ordered by the RTC to restore
and reopen the dike entrance they demolished, as well as to
demolish any structures in their property which impede the free flow
of water to and from the Iloilo River thru the said canals, as well as to
pay petitioners damages totaling 30K.
5. Marsal appealed to the IAC which reversed the RTC decision and
ordered the petitioners to respect their decision to demolish the
dikes.
6. Petitioners appealed the decision of the IAC.

Art. 629: The owner of the servient estate cannot impair, in any
manner whatsoever, the use of the servitude by the dominant
estate.
RULING + RATIO:
1. The Dominant Estate is the L. Borres Elementary School,
and the adjacent lands, and the Servient Estate is Lot 2344
owned by private respondents.
The main canal had long been existing even before
Florete bought the Lot, all Florete did was to deepen
the main canal to make it reach his lot.
Even if Florete was the one who built the canal, it has
been in continuous use by the school for over 15
years it has been acquired by prescription
A positive easement of water right of way had
been constituted.
Because a positive easement has already been
constituted, the servient estate has no right to
terminate it unilaterally to the prejudice of the
dominant estate by destroying the Dike.
The reason why respondents wanted to destroy the
dike was to pollute the fishpond because the locals
were competing against their salt production business
by trying to produce salt with the use of plastic bags
thru the salt water gathering in the fishpond.
They violated not only the law on easement but also
Presidential Degree No. 296 which enjoins any person,
natural or juridical, to demolish structures or
improvements which tend to obstruct the flow of water
through rivers, creeks, esteros and drainage channels.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed
decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby REVERSED and

Author: James Dy
SET ASIDE and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case
No. 12791 is hereby REINSTATED.
Additional Facts:
-

A young boy almost drowned in the canal

One witness saved a woman who fell into the canal while
picking up shells
2 witnesses took a bath in the canal, 1 when he was still a
child, the other when he was still single
The canal is a source of salt water which is fresh and clean,
while the fishpond has become stagnant and polluted.
Florete planned to bury a 10-inch rubber tube which would
deprive the fishpond of water, and would cause the drainage
canal to stop working.
Canal totals 300 meters:
o For the 1st 100 meters = 3 meters wide
o 200 meters = 2 meters wide
Depth of canal:
o High tide or rainy season = main canal meter;
Canal that traverses school 2 meters
o Ordinary days = no water

Author: Sam Tan

Benedicto v CA (1968)
Petition: Petition to recover land and demand reopening of easement of way
Petitioner: SALVADOR BENEDICTO (deceased). ROBERTO S.
BENEDICTO
Respondent: CA and VICENTE A. HERAS
Ponencia: Castro , J
DOCTRINE: The fact that an easement [by grant] may have also qualified as
an easement of necessity does not detract from its permanency as a
property right, which survives the termination of the necessity.
FACTS:
1. HEDRICK sold a portion of her property to CLARO M. RECTO, and
retained the rest. The sale was described in the Deed of Purchase
and Sale (Escritura de Compra-Venta).
2. The sale to RECTO, as evidenced by the Deed of Sale, was subject
to the following conditions:
a. Both parties are obliged to respect each others use at all
times of the passage for vehicles, about three to four
meters in width situated equally on each of their properties.
This covenant being binding for all who may
subsequently acquire the land
b. That in view of the irregular shape of the property, both
parties agree to make a new survey of the property to fix the
dividing line between the properties of RECTO and
HEDRICK, and this line will be perpendicular to the San
Marcelino street.
3. Recto filed a motion to carry out the new survey plan provided for in
the Deed of Sale. Before this could be acted upon, Recto withdrew
his motion on the ground that the reports submitted by the Chief
Land Surveyor and General Land Registration Office were not in
accord with the Deed of Sale and separate TCTs.
4. Hendrick also obtained a new TCT covering the remaining portions
of the property. The total area of these two lots was 540.4 sq.
meters, but in the new title issued, their total area was made to
appear to be 681.30 sq. meters because it was based on the old
cadaster survey.
5. The properties underwent a series of transfers.
a. Recto Conty Benedicto (petitioner)

b. Hendrick Chow Kwo Hsien General Security and

Investment Co. Heras (respondent)
6. Heras filed a petition to recover a portion of land enclosed and walled
by Benedicto, and to demand the reopening of an easement of way
between his real property and that of Benedicto.
7. Lower courts found that land belonged to Benedicto and also that the
easement of way is located entirely within the property of Benedicto,
contrary to the stipulation in the deed of sale between Hedrick and
Recto that it should be between their properties, with each
contributing an equal portion of his property. (This is why Recto
withdrew his motion)
8. Benedicto appeals the decision claiming
a. Easement of way was established because properties of
Hedrick and Recto were so adjoined each other that the only
way the back portions of the properties could be reached by
their owners from San Marcelino street was through the
passageway.
b. But when Heras demolished his building, the property gained
direct access to San Marcelino street and since then there
has been no need for the passageway
c. Thus, the passageway was no longer in use by Heras
ISSUE:
1. WoN easement of way has been extinguished.
PROVISIONS: Article 631, CC
RULING + RATIO:
1. No the easement of way is not extinguished.
The easement in this case is perpetual in character provided for
in the initial Deed of Sale and was annotated on all the transfer
certificates of title issued in the series of transfers from Hedrick to
Heras
o No agreement between parties or their predecessors-ininterest with respect to the discontinuance or obliteration of
the easement annotated on the titles
o The fact that an easement [by grant] may have also qualified
as an easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanency as a property right, which survives the
termination of the necessity.

Author: Sam Tan

Art 631 cant be applied because no indubitable proof of

nonuser
o Benedicto merely assumes that the passageway in question
had not been in use because of the demolition of Heras
o Prescription period has not lapsed.
10 years should be counted from time Benedicto
built a fence obstructing the passageway

Presumptive Renunciation cannot be inferred.

o Heras started the construction of an apartment building on
his parcel of land after the demolition
o The obvious need for such passageway to the rear portion of
the projected apartment building negates any presumptive
renunciation on the part of Heras.

DISPOSITION: The decision appealed from is affirmed

Digest Author: Tan, Dandan

TANEDO V BERNAD
Petitioner: EDUARDO C. TAEDO
Respondent: HON. JUANITO A. BERNAD, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch
XXI, Cebu City; Spouses ROMEO SIM and PACITA S. SIM;
and Spouses ANTONIO CARDENAS and MAE LINDA
CARDENAS
Ponencia: PADILLA, J.:
DOCTRINE: An easement continues by operation of law.
Alienation of the D and S estates to different owners is not
a ground for extinguishment of easements absent a
statement extinguishing it.
FACTS:
Antonio Cardenas (Respondent) is the original owner of 2
parcels of land (7501-A and 7501-B). He constructed an
apartment building in Lot A and in Lot B, he constructed an
apartment, house, bodega and a septic tank for the common
use of the occupants of the two lots
Cardenas sold Lot A and mortgaged Lot B to Eduardo Tanedo
(Petitioner). He also agreed that should he decide to sell Lot B,
he would sell it to Tanedo. However, Cardenas sold Lot B to
Spouses Sim (Respondents). Sim blocked the sewage pipe
connecting the building on Lot A to the septic tank. He also
asked Tanedo to remove that portion of his building
encroaching Lot B.
Tanedo filed an action for legal redemption and damages
against Respondents. Cardenas admitted that he agreed to

sell the lot to the Petitioner and claimed by way of cross claim
against Spouses Sim that the Deed of Sale he had executed
was only intended as an equitable mortgage. RTC dismissed
the complaint and the cross claim.
ISSUES:
WoN the right to continue the use of the septic tank
ceased upon the subdivision of the land and its
subsequent sale to different owners.
RULING + RATIO: NO!
The alienation of the dominant and servient estates to different
persons is not one of the grounds for the extinguishment of an
easement. On the contrary, use of the easement is continued
by operation of law as provided in Article 624 because no
abolishment or extinguishment was provided in the deed of
absolute sale. Nor did Cardenas stop the use of the drain pipe
and septic tanks before he sold the lots. Accordingly, the
spouses Sim cannot repair, in any manner, the use of the
servitude.
DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, the Orders complained of are hereby

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent judge or
another one designated in his place is directed to
proceed with the trial of this case on the merits. With
costs against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Author: Patrick V. Arcellana

Alcantara v Reta Jr
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari
Petitioner: Edilberto Alcantara et al
Respondent: Cornelio Reta Jr
Ponencia: Pardo, J
DOCTRINE: Construction of a house on the land of another to facilitate the
gathering of fruits would constitute a personal easement under article 614 of
the CC.
FACTS:
1. Alcantara filed a case for the exercise of right of first refusal under PD
1517 in RTC with Reta Jr as defendant
2. He contends that they were tenants in the land and that it has been
converted to a commercial center. They said that they were threatened to be
ejected and asserts their right to first refusal in accordance with the said PD
as legitimate tenants.
3. They said that the amicable settlement of Reta and Roble was void in
violation of PD 1517. However Reta contends that the land is beyond the
reach of PD 1517 since it has not been proclaimed as an Urban Land reform
zone.
4. RTC dismissed the complaint and ordered the plaintiffs to pay Reta. Thus
the appeals.
ISSUE:
1. WON petitioners have a right of first refusal under PD 1517
PROVISIONS: Article 614, CC

Servitudes may also be established for the benefit of a community, or

of one or more persons to whom the encumbered estate does not
belong
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO.
The area has been proved not to be proclaimed an ULRZ. In fact,
petitioners requested that the land they are occupying be declared as such.
The request was referred to the General manager of the National Housing
Authority and then to the mayor of Davao City. The request would not have

been necessary if it was already an ULRZ. Given this, they cannot claim any
right over it.
The three requisites to be able to avail of these rights are:
1. A legitimate tenant for 10 years or more
2. Must have built his home on the land by contract and
3. has resided continuously for the last 10 years.
Those not complying with the said requisites cannot be deemed legitimate
tenants and are therefore not entitled to the right of first refusal. Reta allowed
Roble to use 62 coconut trees for gathering Tuba. This arrangement is in the
nature of a usufruct which gives a right to enjoy the property of another with
the obligation of preserving its form and substance.
Roble was also allowed to construct his house to facilitate the
gathering of the tuba and this is in the nature of a personal easement under
article 614 of the CC. Regardless of the validity of the amicable settlement,
the conclusion would still be the same since the agreement was of a
usufruct. Roble thus is not a legitimate tenant under PD 1517.

FALLO: The court denies this petition and affirms the decision of the CA and
the resolution denying reconsideration.