Francisco de Guzman v.

People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 166502 / October 17, 2008 / Justice Velasco, Jr.
Robbery with force upon things (intent to gain)
Facts

Lucia Valdez married Agustin Valdez following the death of

Agustins first wife, Presentatcion. The relationship turned sour and
the two separated Agustin went to the US while Lucia remained in
the couples house in La Union.

An earthquake occurred which prompted Lucia and her children to

move out of the house.

Agustin then learned that Lucia was selling their personal property
which prompted him to ask Ramon Valdez, his son with
Presentacion, to retrieve whatever was left in their house.

Ramon then went to the uninhabited house of Lucia and

demolished the north eastern portion of the kitchen to gain entry.
He then asked help from the neighbors including Francisco de
Guzman to bring the property out.

All of the property was brought to Ramons house (aparador

mortars, frying pan, and bed) but a wooden bench remained in the
house of de Guzman.

A criminal charge of Robbery with force upon things was charged.

Defenses:
Ramon claims that he did not intend to gain from his act and that
he was just following the instruction from his father to take the personal
property belonging to his mother.
De Guzman claims that he merely helped Ramon to bring out the
properties and the wooden bench was temporarily placed at his house
because his house was closer.
RTC: Ramon acquitted; De Guzman convicted of Robbery
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC de Guzman cannot use the
acquittal of Ramon as a defense because the defense is personal
to Ramon
Issue:
WON de Guzman is guilty of Robbery with force upon
things?
Held
NO. To constitute robbery, the following elements must be
established: (1) the subject is personal property belonging to another; (2)
there is unlawful taking of that property; (3) the taking is with the intent to
gain; and (4) there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use
of force upon things.
Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be
established through the overt acts of the offender. The unlawful taking of
anothers property gives rise to the presumption that the act was

committed with intent to gain. This presumption holds unless special

circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.
De Guzman was able to prove that it was Ramon who had wanted
to take the properties form the Lucias house de Guzman merely helped.
The presence of the wooden bench in the house of de Guzman has been
sufficiently explained that owing to the proximity of his house, Ramon had
asked the bench temporarily be left in his house unitl he could transfer it.
Furthermore, De guzman did not falsely claim ownership over the bench
and did not make any effort to conceal the bench showing absence of
intent to gain
DE GUZMAN IS ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE vs. CHAVEZ

G.R. No. 207950 / September 22, 2014

FACTS.
When Peamante (witness) arrived home from work, around 2:45am, he
saw a person wearing a black, long-sleeved shirt and black pants and
holding something while leaving the house/parlor of Elmer Duque aka
Barbie (victim).
There was a light at the left side of the house/parlor of Barbie, his favorite
haircutter, so Peamante was able to see the face of Chavez (accused).
The following day, Barbie was found dead, due to stab wounds, in the
parlor and the place was in disarray.
In a line-up to identify the person he saw leaving Barbies house/parlor that
early morning of October 28, 2006, Peamante immediately pointed to
and identified Chavez and thereafter executed his written statement.
Chavez was charged with robbery with homicide.
LC: Guilty as charged, based on circumstantial evidence.
CA: Affirmed.
ISSUE & RATIO.
Whether or not Chavez is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide. NO.
Robbery
What is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of
robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offenders
intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time
when the homicide is actually carried out. In cases when the prosecution
failed to conclusively prove that
homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused
can be convicted of robbery with homicide.
The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts do not
satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by Chavez to commit
robbery.
At most, the intent to take personal property was mentioned by
Chavezs mother in her statement as follows: Na sinabi niya sa akin na
wala siyang intensyon na patayin [sic] si Barbie kundi ay pagnakawan
lamang. However, this statement is considered as hearsay, with no

evidentiary value, since Chavezs mother was never presented as a witness

during trial to testify on her statement.
An original criminal design to take personal property is also
inconsistent with the infliction of no less than 21 stab wounds in various
parts of Barbies body. The sheer number of stab wounds inflicted on
Barbie makes it difficult to conclude an original criminal intent of merely
taking Barbies personal property.
Homicide All these circumstances taken together establish Chavezs guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide:
1.

2.
3.
4.

The alibi of Chavez still places him at the scene of the crime that
early morning of October 28, 2006. This court has considered
motive as one of the factors in determining the presence of an
intent to kill, and a confrontation with the victim immediately prior
to the victims death has been considered as circumstantial
evidence for homicide.
The number of stab wounds inflicted on Barbie strengthens an
intention to kill and ensures his death.
Peamantes positive identification of Chavez as the person leaving
Barbies house that early morning of October 28, 2006.
The medico-legals testimony establishing Barbies time of death
as 12 hours prior to autopsy at 1:00 p.m., thus, narrowing the time
of death to approximately 1:00 a.m. of the same day, October 28,
2006.

DECISION.
Judgment by lower court is MODIFIED. Chavez is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the separate and distinct crime of HOMICIDE.
People v Arnel Balute
GR 212932 Perlas-Bernabe, J.
Facts:
At around 8 oclock in the evening of March 22, 2002, SPO1 Raymundo B.
Manaois (SPO1 Manaois) was on board his owner-type jeepney with his wife
Cristita and daughter Blesilda, and was traversing Road 10, Tondo, Manila.
While the vehicle was on a stop position at a lighted area due to heavy
traffic, two (2) male persons, later on identified as Balute and a certain Leo
Blaster (Blaster), suddenly appeared on either side of the jeepney, with
Balute poking a gun at the side of SPO1 Manaois and saying putangina,
ilabas mo! Thereafter, Balute grabbed SPO1 Manaoiss mobile phone from
the latters chest pocket and shot him at the left side of his torso. SPO1
Manaois reacted by drawing his own firearm and alighting from his vehicle,
but he was unable to fire at the assailants as he fell to the ground. He was
taken to Mary Johnston Hospital where he died despite undergoing surgical
operation and medical intervention
In his defense, Balute denied having any knowledge of the charges against
him. He maintained, inter alia, that on March 22, 2002, he was at the shop
of a certain Leticia Nicol (Nicol) wherein he worked as a pedicab welder

from 8:00 oclock in the morning until 10:00 oclock in the evening, and did
not notice any untoward incident that day as he was busy working the
entire time. Nicol corroborated Balutes story, and imputed liability on
Blaster and a certain Intoy.
Issue: WON Balute is guilty of robbery with homicide
Held: Yes. In the instant case, the CA correctly upheld the RTCs finding
that the prosecution was able to establish the fact that Balute poked his
gun at SPO1 Manaois, took the latters mobile phone, and thereafter, shot
him, resulting in his death despite surgical and medical intervention.
This is buttressed by Cristita and Blesildas positive identification of Balute
as the one who committed the crime as opposed to the latters denial and
alibi which was correctly considered by both the RTC and the CA as weak
and self-serving, as it is well-settled that alibi and denial are outweighed
by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by
any ill motive on the part of the [eyewitnesses] testifying on the matter.
This is especially true when the eyewitnesses are the relatives of the victim
such as Cristita and Blesilda who are the wife and daughter of SPO1
Manaois, respectively since the natural interest of witnesses, who are
relatives of the victim, in securing the conviction of the guilty would
actually deter them from implicating persons other than the true culprits.
Eduardo Magsumbol v. People
G.R. No. 207175
Facts:
Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio
Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio Ramirez (Ramirez). vvas charged with
the crime of Theft.
In the morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare
unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned
by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting
down the coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the
felled trees into coco lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men
from cutting down the coconut trees because he was outnumbered.
Instead, Caringal left the site and proceeded toSan Pablo City to inform
Menandro about the incident.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and
Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the
land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut
down on that morning of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a
coco lumber trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees
planted on his lot. Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling
of the coconut trees but merely supervised the same
Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the coconut
treesbut confirmed the presence of Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to
supervise the accomplishment of the work being done thereat. Inanoria

corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the felled
trees were planted inside the lot owned by Atanacio. Inanoria intimated
that Menandro included him in the complaint for theft due to his refusal
to accede to latters request for him to testify against his co-accused in
relation to the present criminal charge
Ruling of RTC: Prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of
all the accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the
defense of denial invoked by the accused in the face of positive
identification by Caringal pointing to them as the perpetrators of the
crime
Ruling of CA: Sustained the findings of facts and conclusions of law by the
RTC and upheld the judgment of conviction rendered against the accused.
Issue: WON MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE
CRIME OF THEFT, ARE PRESENT IN THE CASE AT HAND
Held: To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of
damaged property, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the
accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and,
thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain.
Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses, no concrete and
competent evidence was adduced to substantiate their respective
submissions. In view of such conflicting claims and considering the meager
evidence on hand, the Court cannot determine with certainty the owner of
the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact location of the
coconut trees negates the presenceof the criminal intent to gain. At any
rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within
Menandros land, no malice or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed
to Magsumbol and his co-accused.
Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the
criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to
particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious
responsibility. The exception of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or
indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent, for in
this instance, the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element
ofnegligence and imprudence
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and
his co-accused even sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles
to cut down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad
daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It
defies reason that the accused would still approach the barangay captain if
their real intention was tosteal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides,
criminals would usually execute their criminal activities clandestinely or
through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a crime
or a wrongdoing.

Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied. The prosecution
miserably failed to establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that
Magsumbol, together with his co-accused, damaged the property or
Menandro with malice and deliberate intent and then removed the felled
coconut trees from the premises.

YONGCO AND LANOJAN v. PEOPLE

G.R. Nos. 209373 and 209414 / JULY 30, 2014 / VELASCO, JR., J. / QUALIFIED THEFT /
JSGMANAO

NATURE
PETITIONERS

RESPONDENT

Petitions for review on certiorari

G.R. No. 209373: Joel Yongo and Julieto Laojan
G.R. No. 209414: Anecito Tangian, Jr.
People of the Philippines

FACTS.
Tangian was a garbage truck driver for the city government of Iligan City,
Lanao del Norte. Yongco and Laojan were security guards assigned to
guard the City Engineers Office (CEO). Yongco and Laojan worked at
different shifts; the former at a later time and the latter at an earlier
time.
On April 15, 2005, after the shift of Laojan, he gave 4 gate passes to
Yongco, allegedly covering waste materials withdrawn during the earlier
shift. These gate passes were required as standard procedure in taking
out materials from the CEO premises.
On April 16, 2005, around 1:30 a.m., at the request of Tangian, Pablo
Salodsod, a garbage collector for the city government, accompanied him
to the CEO.
At the garage of the CEO, Salodsod and his fellow garbage collectors were
ordered by Tangian and Yongco, the guard on duty at that time, to load
car parts, which were allegedly waste items, on the truck driven by
Tangian.
After loading the car parts, Tangian and Salodsod went to the Delfin Junk
Store to unload them. Tangian did not give the gate pass required to take
out something from the CEO premises. Yongco did not demand for the
same on the pretext that there was another guard on duty in the guard
house to get the gate pass.
The items were then unloaded in front of the junk store. Before the truck
left the junk store, Laojan, who was at the junk store, gave a thumbs-up
to Tangian. Laojan then covered up the unloaded items with a sack.
The following morning, the brother-in-law of Laojan, a worker at the junk
store, took the items inside the store.
Upon conducting investigations, the stolen items were:
o 1 Nissan transmission;
o 1 unit boom;
o 1 Nissan I-beam; and
o 1 differential of Tamaraw.
RTC: Guilty of qualified theft; ruled that the 4 gate passes were used as
coverup for the actual withdrawal of the stolen items.
Defense: No conspiracy

Yongco: He extended his assistance to Tangian in good faith, upon the

assumption of the lawful order of Laojan.

Laojan: He was not present at the time of the taking; the mere giving
of a thumbs-up does not amount to conspiracy.

Tangian: He merely innocently obeyed the orders of Laojan since the

latter was his superior and was authorized to get rid of the scrap
materials in the CEO premises even without the required gate pass.
CA: Affirmed RTC.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON Yongco, Laojan, and Tangian are guilty of qualified theft.
YES.
Synthesizing Articles 308 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the
elements of qualified theft committed with grave abuse of discretion are
as follows:
1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owners consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things; and
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
As for the first element, the items were taken away from the CEO and
were already under complete and effective control of the persons taking
the same, since they were loaded onto the garbage truck driven by
Tangian and brought to the Delfin Junk Store.
As for the second element, the items stolen belong to the CEO of Iligan
City. Although they were considered "heap of scrap," they have not yet
been declared unserviceable or waste by the proper authority or office,
nor have they been marked for proper disposal. Unless properly disposed
in accordance with Section 379 of the Local Government Code, these
items are still government properties or owned by the City of Iligan.
As for the third element, intent to gain is presumed from the unlawful
taking. Since these items were brought to the junk store, intent to gain
becomes obvious.
As for the fourth element, the taking was without the consent of the CEO
of Iligan City because there was no gate pass issued to that effect.
Yongco did not bother to ask for a gate pass on the pretext that there
was another guard on duty at the gate.
As for the sixth element, the taking of these items was done with grave
abuse of confidence. Yongco, Laojan, and Tangian were guards and
drivers with access to the entrance and exit of the CEO premises. They
enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed on them by their employer to
have access throughout the CEO premises on account of their respective
duties.

2. WON there was conspiracy among Yongco, Laojan, and Tangian.

YES.
Yongco knew of the office procedure that a gate pass is required every
time something is taken out of the CEO premises. The fact that 4 gate
passes were given to him that morning by Laojan should have reminded
him of his duty to demand a gate pass for property leaving the CEO
premises.
Tangian also knew of this procedure from his 16 years of service as truck
driver for the city government. He should also know better than to
assume that Laojan can authorize the withdrawal of items without the
requisite gate pass since Laojans duty, as security guard, is precisely to
prevent the same.
Laojan gave Tangian the "thumbs-up" sign, meaning everything is okay
clear proof of meeting of minds between Tangian and Laojan, and their
collusion to steal the items under the pretext of disposing unserviceable
waste materials.

CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 180016 / APRIL 29, 2014 / PERALTA J. / ESTAFA / AABPAYAD

NATURE
PETITIONER
RESPONDENT

Petition for review on certiorari

Lito Corpuz
People of the Philippines

FACTS.
Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at
the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990.
Tangcoy was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino
players and, upon hearing that Tangcoy had some pieces of jewelry for
sale, Corpuz approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the
following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one
(1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value
of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale,
and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale
or returning the pieces of jewelry. When Tongcoy was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of
the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
A criminal complaint for estafa was filed against Corpuz.
On the prosecution, it was established that Tongcoy and Corpuz were
collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing
business of extending loans to Base employees. For every collection
made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any
business with Tongcoy.

 However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989

for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same
receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him
for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which
he did not even see.
RTC and CA accused is guilty of estafa.
ISSUE & RATIO.
1. WON the demand to return the subject the subject jewelry, if
unsold, or remit the proceeds, if sold, is a valid demand under
one of the elements of Estafa under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC?
YES.
Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific
word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been
made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount
to a demand. As expounded in Asejo v. People:
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that
demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The
appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of
demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the
word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to
include both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about
the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was
tantamount to a demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to
the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that
failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be
established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was
able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private
complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds
of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return
the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite
demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Caveat: Theres a discussion about the penalty for estafa, like need na
daw sya i-amend. But the SC didnt impose the same kasi duty daw yun

ng Congress. Basta, its long kasi kaya I didnt include it here. Check nyo
nalang powz.
DECISION.
Petition denied.
People v Angelita Daud
GR No. 197539 June 2, 2014 J. Leonardo-De Castro
Facts:
Gallemit, Daud , and Hanelita were charged with illegal recruitment in large
scale and estafa. They were said to be consipiring with eachother from
February 5, 2001- August 2001 in Paranaque to represent themselves to
have the capacity to transport Filipino workers for employment abroad.
They were charged with 8 counts of estafa filed by De Guzman et. Al. They
got money from De Guzman for the payment of the allged processing of
their employment abroad however, this did not happen. RTC: Found them
guilty
In the CA: De Guzman claimed that he was introduced by his patient to
Daud. Daud encouraged him to apply for work abroad and convinced him
that she will be able to send him to Korea. She also invited him to visit her
office in Taft Ave. A month later De Guzman together with the other
complainants went to the said office They were shown pictures of Daud
with Korean employees which proved that she sends workers abroad. They
decided to go through with the application and paid Daud several amounts.
Their departure did not happen and when they went to the Korean
Embassy it was said that their visa was fake and the POEA confirmed that
Green Pastures was not registered as an agency licensed to recruit
employees for abroad.
Defense of Gallemit: There can be no Estafa because there is no element of
deceit
Issue: WON there was Estafa
Held: YES. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted
separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to
the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a)of the Revised
Penal Code. He acted in conspiracy with Daud and Hanelita to mislead
private complainants into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a
fee, can deploy private complainants abroad for employment. He gave the
complainants the job order for Korea and encouraged them to apply for
work abroad. The representations made by appellant and his co-accused to
private complainants were actually false and fraudulent, not only because
they were not duly authorized to undertake recruitment for overseas
employment, but also because there were no actual jobs waiting for private
complainants in Korea and private complainants never had a chance to
leave for work abroad.

TRIA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 204755 / September 17, 2014

FACTS.
Meneses is a Cash Custodian of Seven Sphere Enterprises (Seven Sphere)
while the accused-petitioner Tria was one of the consignees.
On March 8, 2000, the petitioner received on consignment from Seven
Sphere 22 pieces of jewelry valued at P47,440 subject to the condition
that she will remit the proceeds of the sale thereof and return any unsold
pieces within 6 days.
The petitioner returned 8 unsold pieces of the jewelry valued at P16,380,
leaving a balance of P31,060. To cover the balance, the petitioner issued
4 Banco Filipino postdated checks, which were dishonored by the issuing
bank for the reason: account closed.
Petitioner returned 3 pieces of jewelry valued at P7,684.50 thus leaving the
unpaid balance of P23,375.50.
Despite receipt of the letter of demand, however, the petitioner failed to
pay.
RTC: petitioner guilty of estafa, under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC, for
misappropriating the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry consigned to her
by Seven Sphere.
CA: Affirmed.
ISSUE & RATIO.
Whether or not Tria is guilty of estafa, under Article 315(1)(b) of
the RPC. YES.
The elements of estafa under this provision are:
1. That the money, good or other personal property is received by the
offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the
same;
2. That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice
of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
The first, third and fourth elements are immediately discernible from
the Receipt of Goods on Consignment, showing that the petitioner
received pieces of jewelry on consignment from Seven Sphere with the
obligation to return the unsold pieces or remit the sale proceeds of the sold
items. xxx Seven Sphere was prejudiced in the amount of P23,370.00 after
the petitioner failed to return the remaining eleven (11) pieces of jewelry
consigned to her or their value.
The second element, misappropriation or conversion, is deducible from
the petitioners failure to return the last eleven (11) pieces of jewelry
entrusted to her.
Neither can we lend credence to the petitioners claim that her failure
to account for the jewelry subject of this indictment was because she sold
the same on credit. Such act directly contravenes the explicit terms of the
authority granted to her because the consignment transaction with Seven

Sphere prohibited her from selling the jewelry on credit: the consignee
shall have no right or privilege to sell the goods on credit. By selling the
jewelry on credit, the petitioner used the property for a purpose other than
that agreed upon. The words convert and misappropriate connote an
act of using or disposing of anothers property as if it were ones own or
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
DECISION.
CA decision AFFIRMED.
Leonora B. Rimando v. Spouses Aldaba and People of the
Philippines
G.R. No 203583 / October 13, 2014 Justice Perlas Bernabe
Estafa / B.P. 22
Facts

Leonora Rimando enticed Spouses Aldaba to invest in her business

under the assurance that it will earn 8% monthly interest. Aldaba
agreed and gave a check worth P 500,000 as investment. Rimando
then gave 3 post-dated checks for one for P 500,000 and two
P40,000 and made them sign an investment contract with Multitel
International Holding Corporation.
The checks bounced due insufficient funds which prompted
Rimando to file a case for Estafa and violation of B.P. 22.
Rimando, on the other hand, claims that she did not entice the
spouses but merely referred the to to Multitel.
RTC: Acquitted Rimando due to lack of the element of deceit as
Spouses Aldaba were fuly aware that they would be investing the
money but Rimando is liable civilly for P 500,000.
Rimando brought the case to the CA saying that her acquittal and
exoneration from civil liability in the B.P. 22 case should have
barred Aldaba from claiming civil liability in the estafa case.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue
WON Rimando is still civilly liable in the estafa case despite her
acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases?
Held
YES. Rimandos acquittal and subsequent exoneration in the BP
22 cases had no effect in the estafa case, even if both cases were founded
on the same factual circumstances. In Nierras v. Judge Dacuycuy, the Court
laid down the fundamental differences between BP 22 and estafa, to wit:
What petitioner failed to mention in his argument is the fact that deceit
and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2-d) Revised Penal
Code, but are not required in Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Under the latter
law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the
presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the
same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under

the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the
following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 even if he had issued the same for a preexisting
obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such
circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties
are imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime
against property, while violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 is principally
a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking
system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in
se, while those of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 are mala prohibita.
Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an
identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action,
which, under the law, are considered "separate, distinct, and independent"
from each other. Therefore, both cases can proceed to their final
adjudication both as to their criminal and civil aspects subject to the
prohibition on double recovery. Perforce, a ruling in a BP 22 case
concerning the criminal and civil liabilities of the accused cannot be given
any bearing whatsoever in the criminal and civil aspects of a related estafa
case, as in this instance.

PEOPLE vs. TIBAYAN

G.R. No. 209655-60 / JANUARY 14, 2015 / PERLAS-BERNABE J. / SYNDICATED ESTAFA /
AABPAYAD

NATURE
PETITIONER
RESPONDENT

Appeal
People of the Philippines
Palmy Tibayan and Rico Z. Puerto

FACTS.
Tibayan Group Investment Company, Inc. (TGICI) is an open-end
investment company registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on September 21, 2001.
Sometime in 2002, the SEC conducted an investigation on TGICI and its
subsidiaries. In the course thereof, it discovered that TGICI was selling
securities to the public without a registration statement in violation of
Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation
Code, and that TGICI submitted a fraudulent Treasurers Affidavit before
the SEC. Resultantly, on October 21, 2003, the SEC revoked TGICIs
corporate registration for being fraudulently procured.
Prosecution: Private complainants Hector H. Alvarez, et. al. were enticed to
invest in TGICI due to the offer of high interest rates, as well as the
assurance that they will recover their investments. After giving their
money to TGICI, private complainants received a Certificate of Share and
post-dated checks, representing the amount of the principal investment
and the monthly interest earnings, respectively. Upon encashment, the
checks were dishonored, as the account was already closed, prompting
private complainants to bring the bounced checks to the TGICI office to
demand payment. At the office, the TGICI employees took the said
checks, gave private complainants acknowledgement receipts, and
reassured that their investments, as well as the interests, would be paid.

However, the TGICI office closed down without private complainants

having been paid and, thus, they were constrained to file criminal
complaints against the incorporators and directors of TGICI.
Defense: Accused-appellants denied having conspired with the other TGICI
incorporators to defraud private complainants. Particularly, Puerto
claimed that his signature in the Articles of Incorporation of TGICI was
forged and that since January 2002, he was no longer a director of TGICI.
For her part, Tibayan also claimed that her signature in the TGICIs
Articles of Incorporation was a forgery, as she was neither an
incorporator nor a director of TGICI.
RTC: guilty of simple estafa
CA: guilty of syndicated estafa
ISSUE & RATIO.
2. WON the accused-appellants were guilty of syndicated estafa
YES.
The elements of Syndicated Estafa are: (a) Estafa or other forms of
swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b)
the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more
persons; and (c) defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys
contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
samahang nayon(s), or farmers associations, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
In this case, a judicious review of the records reveals TGICIs modus
operandi of inducing the public to invest in it on the undertaking that their
investment would be returned with a very high monthly interest rate
ranging from three to five and a half percent (3%-5.5%).43 Under such
lucrative promise, the investing public are enticed to infuse funds into
TGICI. However, as the directors/incorporators of TGICI knew from the start
that TGICI is operating without any paid-up capital and has no clear trade
by which it can pay the assured profits to its investors,44 they cannot
comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their
investors money. Thus, the CA correctly held that accused-appellants,
along with the other accused who are still at large, used TGICI to engage in
a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the defraudation of the TGICI investors.
In this light, it is clear that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa,
committed through a Ponzi scheme, are present in this case, considering
that: (a) the incorporators/directors of TGICI comprising more than five (5)
people, including herein accused-appellants, made false pretenses and
representations to the investing public - in this case, the private
complainants - regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with
TGICI in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission
of fraud; (c) relying on the same, private complainants invested their hard
earned money into TGICI; and (d) the incorporators/directors of TGICI
ended up running away with the private complainants' investments,
obviously to the latter's prejudice.
DECISION.

Petition denied. CA ruling affirmed.

Lim v People
G.R. No. 190834 / November 26, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814,
dated June 30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in
the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (PI00,000.00) for each
check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor as his campaign donation
to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor who
ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to
pay for the same. Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too
late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue a "Stop Payment" order for the
two checks.
Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank because of said order and
during trial, when the bank officer was presented on the witness stand,
he admitted that said checks were drawn against insufficient funds
(DAIF). Private complainant Magna B. Badiee sent two demand letters to
petitioner, dated July 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998 and, subsequently,
private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office
of the Prosecutor.
After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters,
and after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor,
petitioner issued a replacement check dated September 8, 1998 in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Private
complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement
check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had
paid the amount of the bounced checks, two Informations were filed
against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC)
Issue: Petitioner posits that jurisprudence dictates the dismissal
of the criminal case against him on the ground that he has fully
paid the amount of the dishonored checks even before the
Informations against him were filed incourt. Petitioner mainly
relies on Griffith v. Court of Appeals.
Held: The CA found Griffithin applicable to the present case, because the
checks subject of this case are personal checks, whilethe check involved in
Griffithwas a corporate check and, hence, some confusion or
miscommunication could easily occur between the signatories of the check
and the corporate treasurer. Although the factual circumstances in the
present case are not exactly the same as those in Griffith, it should be
noted that the same kind of confusion giving rise to petitioner's mistake
very well existed in the present case. Here, the check was issued by
petitioner merely as a campaign contribution to Castor's candidacy. As
found by the trial court, it was Castor who instructed petitioner to issue a
"Stop Payment" order for the two checks because the campaign materials,
for which the checks were used as payment, were not delivered on time.

Petitioner relied on Castor's word and complied with his instructions, as it

was Castor who was supposed to take delivery of said materials. Verily, it is
easy to see how petitioner made the mistake of readily complying with the
instruction to stop payment since he believed Castor's wordthat there is no
longer any valid reason to pay complainant as delivery was not made as
agreed upon. Nevertheless, two monthsafter receiving the demand letter
from private complainant and just several days after receiving the
subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, accused issued a replacement
check which was successfully encashed by private complainant.
While we agree with the private respondent that the gravamen of violation
of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon
their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws
mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with
the purpose of and reason for the law. Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex.
(When the reason for the law ceases, the law ceases.) It is not the letter
alone but the spirit of the law also that gives it life. This is especially so in
this case where a debtors criminalization would not serve the ends of
justice but in fact subvert it. The creditor having collected already more
than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of
rentals, viaauction sale, we find that holding the debtors president to
answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection is
no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.
In sum, considering that the money value of the two checks issued by
petitioner has already been effectively paid two years before the
informations against him were filed, we find merit in this petition. We hold
that petitioner herein could not be validly and justly convicted or
sentenced for violation of B.P. 22.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should
be well differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is
perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In
said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the essential elements of the
offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud. In
such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the
accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the
crime but not the criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the
imposition of penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid
the amount of the dishonored checks six (6) months before the filing of
Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in keeping with
justice and equity.
Ong v People
G.R. NO. 190475 : April 10, 2013 C.J. Sereno

Facts:
Ong was charged with Violating the Anti-Fencing Law. Private complainant
owned 44 firestone truck tires and they have serial numbers. The tires
were also marked by the private complainant with chalk. The tires were
then stored in the warehouse of his relative Guano and Cabal was the
caretaker of the warehouse thus he was in charge of the tires. 36 tires were
stolen from the warehouse and they reported the robbery. Private
complainant scoured for the tires and he chanced upon Jongs marketing
which was owned by Ong. There he found the stolen tires. A buy bust
operation was conducted and Tito Atienza was appointed as the poseur
buyer.
Ongs Defense: he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling
tires for twenty-four (24) years and denying that he had any knowledge
that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing. Go was the one who sold
the tires to him.
Issue: WON Ong violated the Anti-Fencing Law
Held: YES. The elements of Fencing were established. The accused knew
or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
The words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable
prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his
duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such
fact exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the
past twenty-four (24) years, ought to have known the ordinary course of
business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go approached
Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask for
proof of ownership of the tires.
Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section
6 of P.D. 1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the
buying and selling of any good, article, item, object or anything else of
value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof to secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the
Integrated National Police in the town or city where that store,
establishment or entity is located before offering the item for sale to the
public. In fact, Ong has practiced the procedure of obtaining clearances
from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this
particular transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman
who should have exercised prudence.

PEOPLE v. GARCIA
G.R. No. 138470 / APRIL 1, 2003 / YNARES-SANTIAGO, J. / CARNAPPING / JSGMANAO

NATURE
PETITIONER
RESPONDENTS
FACTS.

Appeal
People of the Philippines
Artemio Garcia y Cruz, Jr. and Regalado Bernabe y Orbe

Ferdinand Ignacio leased his Toyota Tamaraw FX to Joselito Cortez for 2

days at P2,000.00 per day. Said vehicle was then rented to Garcia and
Bernabe for P4,000.00 per day, to be paid upon their return from Bicol.
Wilfredo Elis, driver of Cortez, accompanied Garcia and Bernabe to leave
for Bicol.
After 4 days, however, Garcia and Bernabe did not return.
On the other hand, the Tarlac Police went to Anao, Tarlac to confront 2
suspicious looking persons, thereafter identified as Garcia and Bernabe,
who were selling a Tamaraw FX for a mere P50,000.00 therein. Upon their
arrival, however, the two had already left for Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija.
The Nueva Ecija Police, coordinating with the Tarlac Police, saw Garcia and
Bernabe, and asked them to present documents evidencing their
ownership of the Tamaraw FX. Due to their failure to present such
documents, they were brought to the police station in Moncada, Tarlac.
Garcia and Bernabe admitted to the Moncada Police that they attempted to
sell the Tamaraw FX of Ignacio. When Cortez visited the two in detention,
Garcia admitted that they had stabbed Elis because the latter did not
want to coordinate with them, and dumped him along the highway in San
Rafael, Bulacan; Bernabe, on the other hand, did not deny nor affirm the
admission of Garcia.
RTC: Guilty of carnapping with homicide.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON Garcia and Bernabe are guilty of carnapping with homicide.
YES.
The elements of carnapping are:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;
and
4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the
taking was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.
Unlawful taking is the taking of a vehicle without the consent of the
owner, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things. Although the possession of Garcia and Bernabe
of the Tamaraw FX was initially lawful, the unlawful killing of Elis for the
purpose of taking the vehicle, since the latter refused to join the former
in their plan to appropriate the vehicle, radically transformed the
character of said possession into an unlawful one. This undoubtedly
satisfied the element of unlawful taking through violence.
The duration of the lease of the Tamaraw FX, whether for an indefinite
period as contended by the defense, or only for 4 days, as claimed by
the prosecution, has no bearing on the culpability of Garcia and Bernabe;
what is decisive here is the purpose of the two in killing Elis.
In crimes of unlawful taking of property through intimidation or violence,
it is not necessary that the person unlawfully divested of the personal

property be the owner thereof; what is simply required is that the

property taken does not belong to the offender.
Furthermore, a person in possession of a stolen article is presumed guilty
of having illegally and unlawfully taken the same unless he can
satisfactorily explain his possession of the thing. Bernabe and Garcia,
however, were unable to give a plausible explanation why they still had
the Tamaraw FX in their possession. Bernabe claims that they went to
Nampicuan, Nueva Ecija to have the dent on the vehicle repaired; Garcia,
on the other hand, testified that there was no such damage.
2. WON Bernabe conspired with Garcia. YES.
While there was no direct evidence to prove such conspiracy,
circumstantial evidence of the same was proven, namely:
That Garcia and Bernabe, through Cortez, hired the Tamaraw FX of
Ignacio for their trip to Bicol;
That they left for Bicol on board the Tamaraw FX driven by Elis;
That two suspiciously looking persons, who turned out to be Garcia and
Bernabe, were offering to sell a brand new Toyota Tamaraw FX in Anao,
Tarlac; and
That the two were finally apprehended with the vehicle.
3. WON there was admission of Bernabe to Cortez. YES.
Bernabe cannot invoke his silence during this crucial moment as his
right. He ought to speak; in failing to do so, his silence weighs heavily on
him. Thus, it was not Garcias admission that prejudiced Bernabe, but
rather his own silence when it was such as naturally to call for action or
comment if not true. Duress employed on Bernabe was also not proven.
People v. Bustinera
G. R. No. 148233. June 8, 2004
Facts:

Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC

Transport hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive
a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was agreed that
appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after
which he would return it to ESC Transports garage and remit the
boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day.
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and
drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was
supposed to.
On January 9, 1997, appellants wife went to the garage of ESC
Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned in
Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not
return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he was short of the
boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi but
actually returned it on January 5, 1997; and that on December 27,

1996, he gave the amount of P2,000.00 to his wife whom he

instructed to remit the same to Cipriano as payment of the
boundary fee and to tell the latter that he could not return the taxi
as he still had a balance thereof.
Brushing aside appellants claim that he returned the taxi on
January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid the total amount of
P4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of qualified theft

Issue: WON THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING

WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAS
INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS
GARAGE.
Held: Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle.
However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,
by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT
PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
When statutes are in pari material or when they relate to the same person
or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same
specific or particular subject matter, or have the same purpose or object,
the rule dictates that they should be construed together interpretare et
concordare leges legibus, est optimus interpretandi modus. Every statute
must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking
of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of
qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall
within the exceptions mentioned in the anti- carnapping law.
While the nature of appellants possession of the taxi was initially lawful as
he was hired as a taxi driver and was entrusted possession thereof, his act
of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and
against the owners consent transformed the character of the possession
into an unlawful one. Appellant himself admits that he was aware that his
possession of the taxi was no longer with Ciprianos consent as the latter
was already demanding its return.
Appellant assails the trial courts conclusion that there was intent to gain
with the mere taking of the taxi without the owners consent. He maintains
that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit the
boundary fee, his earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there
was no intent to gain since the taking of the taxi was not permanent in
character, he having returned it. Appellants position does not persuade.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. The term gain is not merely
limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any

other sense may be derived or expected from the act which is performed.
Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the owners
consent constitutes gain.
Jaime Guinhawa v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 162822 / August 25, 2005 / Justice Callejo, Sr.
Other Deceits
Facts

Jaime Guinhawa was engaged in the business of selling brand new

cars as Guinrox Motor Sales. He purchased a Mitsubishi L-300 versa
Van from union Motors Corporation. Olayan, Guinhawas driver,
dorve the van from Manila to Naga City but had a heart attack
causing the van to go out of control and fall into a canal.
The van was damaged and the front left tire was replaced. The van
was then placed in the showroom.
Ralph and Josephine Silo wanted to buy a new van for their
garment business. They went to Guinhawas office and Azotea, the
general manager, showed the L-300 van on display. The couple
inspected the interior but not underneath the chassis because they
believe that the van is brand new.
They bought the van and were given the Service Manual.
When they were driving the van home, they kept hearing a
persistent squeaking sound. When the van was inspected it was
discovered that some parts of the van was welded. Silo then
requested Guinhawa to change the van with two Charade
Daihatsu. Guinhawa initially agreed but changed his mind.
This prompted the couple to repair the left front stabilizer of the
van. The couple then discovered that the van was not brand new
and figured in a vehicular accident. This prompted them to file a
case for other deceits.
Guinhawa, on the other hand, claims that the van was brand new.
RTC and CA convicted Guinhawa.

Issue
WON Guinhawa is guilty of other deceits?

Guinhawa made no direct and positive representation that the van

is brand new but it should be noted tah representation may be in the form
of words or conduct resorted to by an individual to serve as an advantage
over another. It is true that mere silence is not in itself concealment.
Concealment which the law denounces as fraudulent implies a purpose or
design to hide facts which the other party sought to know. Failure to reveal
a fact which the seller is, in good faith, bound to disclose may generally be
classified as a deceptive act due to its inherent capacity to deceive.
Suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to
disclose is equivalent to a false representation. Moreover, a representation
is not confined to words or positive assertions; it may consist as well of
deeds, acts or artifacts of a nature calculated to mislead another and thus
allow the fraud-feasor to obtain an undue advantage.
Fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent concealment are of the same
genre. Fraudulent concealment presupposes a duty to disclose the truth
and that disclosure was not made when opportunity to speak and inform
was presented, and that the party to whom the duty of disclosure, as to a
material fact was due, was induced thereby to act to his injury.
In the present case, the petitioner and Azotea knew that the van had
figured in an accident, was damaged and had to be repaired. Nevertheless,
the van was placed in the showroom, thus making it appear to the public
that it was a brand new unit. The petitioner was mandated to reveal the
foregoing facts to the private complainant. But the petitioner and Azotea
even obdurately declared when they testified in the court a quo that the
vehicle did not figure in an accident, nor had it been repaired; they
maintained that the van was brand new, knowing that the private
complainant was going to use it for her garment business. Thus, the
private complainant bought the van, believing it was brand new.
The petitioner is not relieved of his criminal liability for deceitful
concealment of material facts, even if the private complainant made a
visual inspection of the vans interior and exterior before she agreed to buy
it and failed to inspect its under chassis. Case law has it that where the
vendee made only a partial investigation and relies, in part, upon the
representation of the vendee, and is deceived by such representation to his
injury, he may maintain an action for such deceit.

Held
YES. For one to be liable for other deceits under the law, it is
required that the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:
(a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in the
preceding articles; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must
be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.
It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation
constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private complainant
to part with her property.

CANTA vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 140937 / February 28, 2001 / Cattle Rustling

FACTS.
At 5 oclock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, caretaker Gardenio Agapay
took the cow to graze in the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay
Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However, when he came back
for it at past 9 oclock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found
the cow gone. He found hoof prints which led to the house of Filomeno
Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had taken the
animal.

 Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the animal. They were informed
that petitioner had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino Canta,
barangay captain of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte.
Maria recognized the cow upon seeing it.
Petitioner told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day so that
they could talk the matter over with his father. However, petitioner never
called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police of
Malitbog, Southern Leyte.
Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it
was lost on December 3, 1985. He presented two certificates of
ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and another dated February 27,
1985, to support his claim. These were later proved to be falsified.
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986,
signed by the municipal treasurer, in which the cow was described as two
years old and female. On the reverse side, certificate is the drawing of a
cow. All four caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same one
they had taken care of, based on the location of its cowlicks, its sex, and
its color.
RTC: Petitioner guilty of cattle rustling.
CA: Affirmed.
ISSUE & RATIO.
Whether or not Canta is guilty if Cattle Rustling. YES.
P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as the taking away by
any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser,
of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or
whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things. The crime is committed if the following
elements concur:
1. A large cattle is taken;
2. It belongs to another;
3. The taking is done without the consent of the owner;
4. The taking is done by any means, methods or scheme;
5. The taking is with or without intent to gain; and
6. The taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation
against person or force upon things.
First, there is no question that the cow belongs to Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioners only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith
and in the honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost.
Second, petitioner, without the consent of the owner, took the cow
from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that
he knew all along that the latter was holding the animal for the owner,
Narciso.
Third, petitioner falsified his Certificate of Ownership of Large
Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make it appear
that he owned the cow in question.
Fourth, petitioner adopted means, methods, or schemes to
deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to
gain.

Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons or force upon

things attended the commission of the crime.
DECISION.
CA decision AFFIRMED.

MERIZ v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 134498 / NOVEMBER 13, 2001 / VITUG, J. / BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22 /
JSGMANAO

NATURE
PETITIONER
RESPONDENT

Appeal
Celia Meriz
People of the Philippines

FACTS.
Celia Meriz was engaged in the business of manufacturing garments for
export using the name and style of "Hi-Marc Needlecraft."
During the course of her business undertakings, Meriz obtained loans from
Amelia Santos and Summit Financing Corporation. She then issued 4
Pilipinas Bank checks in favor of Santos, all amounting to P188,400.00.
The checks, however, were later returned, with the notation "Insufficient
Funds" tamped on the dorsal portion of each check by the depositary
bank.
On December 15, 1988, Santos sent a telegram warning Meriz to settle the
account of the latter with the former in 3 days, and the institution of
criminal action in failure thereto. This warning, however, was ignored by
Meriz.
On January 12, 1990, another demand letter was sent to Meriz, giving her 7
days to settle said account and warning her of legal action upon failure
thereto; Meriz then sent a reply to Santos, requesting for more time.
Meriz, however, never settled the account.
RTC: Guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22.
CA: Affirmed RTC.
Defenses:
The checks were issued only as a condition for the grant of loan in her
favor; thus there was an absolute lack of consideration for the checks.
The requisite element of notice was also not complied with.
ISSUE & RATIO.
1. WON Meriz is guilty of violating BP 22. YES.
The essential elements of the offense penalized under BP 22 are:
(1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or
for value;
(2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."

As for the first element, although Meriz contends that the heck were only
issued as conditions for the loan grant, the cause or reason for the
issuance of the check is immaterial in determining criminal liability under
BP 22. Once a check is presented for payment, the drawee bank gives it
the usual course whether issued in payment of an obligation or just as a
guaranty of an obligation. Hence, a check issued as an evidence of debt,
although not intended for encashment, has the same effect like any
other check and must thus be held to be within the contemplation of BP
22.
Knowledge under the second element involves a state of mind that
obviously would be difficult to establish Hence, Section 2 of BP 22
creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge on the insufficiency of
funds or credit when the check is presented within 90 days from the date
of the check, unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within 5 banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee. In this case, neither
exception was present since Meriz never paid nor made arrangements
thereto.
As for the third element, the argument of Meriz that the notice of
dishonor is inaccurate is of no merit, since there is nothing in the law that
prescribes the contents of a notice of dishonor except that the same be
in writing as opposed to a mere oral notice. The telegram and demand
letter sufficed as notice of dishonor, to which Meriz even acknowledged.
People v Edna Malngan
GR 170470 Chico-Nazario, J.

of arson, simple or destructive. The prosecution need only prove, that the
burning was intentional and that what was intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling.
Notes: Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order
to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson,
murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of
the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person
who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means
to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if
the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender
has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the
killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed
homicide/murder and arson.
Jaime Alferez v People
G.R. No. 182301 / January 31, 2011 / J. Nachura
Facts:
Jaime Alferez bought construction materials from Cebu ABC Sales
Commercial. He then issued 3 checks for payment but it was dishonored
for having been drawn against a closed account. He was charged with 3
counts of violation of BP 22. Alferez filed a demurrer of evidence and
claims that he did not receive the notice of dishonor. The MTCC denied his
petition and found him guilty.
Issue: WON he is guilty of BP 22

Facts: On January 2, 2011, Edna, hired as a housemaid was accused of

setting fire the house of her employer Roberto Separa that resulted in the
death of six people (Separas family) and destruction of their house.
Moreover, seven adjoining residential houses were also razed by fire. She
was apprehended by the Barangay Chairman and was brought to the
Barangay Hall for questioning. Edna was then identified by a neighbor who
saw her hurriedly leaving the house at 4:45 am while 30 minutes later
Separas house was already on fire. She was asked why she did it and
answered that when she told Virginia Separa (Robertos wife) that she will
go home to her province, the later shouted at her na Sige umuwi ka,
pagdating mo maputi ka na. Sumakay ka sa walis, pagdating mo mpauti ka
na. She was also asked how she burned the house, Ednas statement was
Naglukot ako ng maraming diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at
hinagis ko sa ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay
Issue: WON Malngan is guilty of Arson with multiple homicide
Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is no complex crime of
Arson with mulitiple homicide. In the crime of arson, the identities of the
victims are immaterial in that intent to kill them particularly is not one of
the elements of the crime. The killing of a person is absorbed in the charge

Held: No. In this case, the first and third elements of the crime have been
adequately established. The prosecution, however, failed to prove the
second element. Because this element involves a state of mind which is
difficult to establish, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 creates a presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds. The prosecution merely presented a
copy of the demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the return
card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no attempt to
authenticate or identify the signature on the registry return card. Receipts
for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove
receipt; they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of
the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor. It is not enough for the
prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of
the check. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice,
because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt
of such notice of dishonor by the drawee of the check. The burden of
proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Ordinarily,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to prove notice. B.P. Blg. 22 cases,
there should be clear proof of notice. Moreover, for notice by mail, it must
appear that the same was served on the addressee or a duly authorized
agent of the addressee.