T

Contents

Volume 42, April 1987

65 Editorial
66 Changing Sides. The Italian Fleet and the Armistice:
1943, by Elio Ando
74 Pride of Poland. The Orzel Class Submarines: Construction
by Przemyslaw Budzbon
83 Minotaur. Before the Battlecruiser, by R A Burt
96 Mothball Fleet. The United States 'Naval Inactive Ships
Maintenance Facilities', by Stefan Terzibaschitsch
106 Ship Trials: Tests Against Cruisers, by D K Brown RCNC

109 Tone: Construction and Characteristics,

by Lengerer, Kobler-Edamatsu and Rehm-Takahara

118 An Analysis of US Submarine Losses During World War II,

by Vernon J Miller
124 Book Reviews
126 As &As
128 Small Ads

Managing Editor: Robert Gardiner

Editor: Andrew Lambert
Art Editor: Mark Stevens

Typesetting and artwork by Witwell Ltd ,

Liverpool.

Printed and Bound in the United

Kingdom by R.J . Acford Company,

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Published quarterly by Conway Maritime

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1987 Conway Maritime Press Ltd

Front Cover
The reconstructed Italian Dreadnought
Conte de Cavour at a fleet review in the Bay
of Naples May 1938. Note the presence of
German officers. Inside this issue Elio Ando
considers this relationship five years on,
when Italy changed sides. CPL.

All articles published in WARSHIP

are strictly copyright and may not be

reproduced or stored in a retrieval system

without the written consent of the

publishers.

ISBN 0 85177 436 9

ISSN 01426222

Warrior Returns to
Portsmouth
he remarkable sevenyear reconstruction of
HMS Warrlor will
reach a vital stage within
the next few months when
she will be towed from
Hartlepool to Portsmouth to
take her place as the largest
attraction in the historic
naval base. The project has
been a massive undertaking,
and its successreflects gteat
credit on all involved.

RTGIJT:
Mersey, the largest
wooden frigate ever built, was
the direct design ancestor of
Warrior. Bst-ow:Only the
white frigate strake of the
wooden ship distinguishes her
from the first ironclad,. CPL.

Battleship or
Frigate?
One problem that remains
for all those who are
interested in the ship is to
find an accurate label for her
elegant structure. Most
commentators term her a
battleship. This is not
accurate. Watiorwas
conceivedas an armoured
frigate: a longer, armoured
vevsion ofthe wooden tigate,
Mersey. Every detail of
Watior,hull form,
machinery, rig and
armament can be traced

directly back to Mersey.Not

one area reflects experience
with the wooden line of
battleships. Even such details
as the size ofthe gunports
relates to those of t}r,eMersey,
which were 11 inches taller
than those of contemporary
battleships in order to provide
greater elevation for combat
at longer ranges. The width of
Warrior's ports was reduced
to improve protection. Yet the
depth was retained. If
Warriorhadbeena
battleship, long-range fire
would have been irrelevant.

Warrior'sRole
Warrior was a direct counter
to the French Gloire, anothet
singledecked ironclad. But
where Dupuy de Lome
designed a ship for the line
of battle, the British
response was a true frigate,
a single-decked ship
configured for action outside
the line of battle. In essence,
the Surveyor, Sir Baldwin
Walker, misunderstood the
design function of Gloire,
confusing terminology with
purpose. Once he realised
this, subsequent ships were

recast to provide more

combat potential, at the
expense of speed and
endurance. The shift away
from the Watior hull form,
after only six first-class
ships had been built, toward
shorter, broad-beamed
models was an admission
that the first thoughts on the
ironclad had been misguided. The first British
ironclad battleship was, in
reality, lhe Bellerophon of
1866.Alongside her, Warrior
was in essencea
battlecruiser: faster, but with
a lower proportion of weight
devoted to annour.
This distinction has been
partially obscured by the
rapid progress of technology
at the time the early
ironclads were being
designed. Too much of the
evolutionary process has
been put down to science,
and not enough to the
design parameters set out by
the Surveyor's Department.
To think otherwise is to give
little credit to the able men
who conceived these ships,
and the equally talented ship
builders who translated
these views into metal.

Andrew Lambert

65

CHANGINGSIDES
TheItalian Fleetand the
Armistice: 1943
Using new material
from recently
released allied
sources Elio Ando
reconsiders the last
months of the Italian
Fleet at war with the
Allies, and their

internment at Malta.
He overturns many

1 July the following large warf\

"
were operational: five
I
fships
\-/
battleships (fth Division, Virtorio Veneto, Littorio and, Roma at La
Spezia, 5th Division, Doria and Duilio at
Taranto); eight light cruisers (7th
Division Eugenio di Sauoia, Duca
d'Aosta and Montecuccoli al La Spezia,
8th Division, Duc degli Abruzzi and.
Garibald.i at Genoa, light cruiser Group
Cadorna, Pompeo Magno, and Scipione
Africano at Taranto). However, the FF
NN1 was practically paralysed and it
could not operate from the strategically
more important harbours of Naples and
Messina owing to the scarcity of oil fuel2,
escort ships and the usual lack of cooperation from Regia Aeronautica for air
cover and reconnaissance. In the last
week ofJune, intense allied air attacks on
Sicily and the collection of amphibious
forces in North African and Maltese
harbours indicated that the Italian
island was the target for invasion,
particularly the south and southeastern
coasts. To be ready to attack any beach
heads the fleet should have been
assembled at Taranto, but Supermarina3
preferred to keep it in the \'rrhenian Sea.
Doria and,Duilio,bothofwhich had been
out of commission since December 1942,
were brought back into service, but trtaly
was not in a position to cover the most
likely point of disembarkation.

66

On the afternoon of the ninth, aircraft

reported the allied convoys at sea. The
fleet was ordered to keep up steam and be
ready to move at 1500on the tenth. It was
intended that the fleet should reach the
west coast of Sicily, wrongly identified as
the target, in 17 hours. Had it sailed, it
would have arrived too late to attack the
beach head at the best time, just as the
Allies were landing. Intervention by

Bridge and forward turrets ofthe cruiser

Eugenio de Sauoia. Author's collcction.

Supermarina, to the disappointment of

the officers and men, leaving only
submarines and torpedo boats to help the
land and air forces. Admiral Bernottia
has written: 'Supermarina expressed the
opinion that in such circumstances the
decision to engage the enemy was
doubtful; but the war had reached a crisis
and the pros and cons could not be
calculated with materialistic brinkmanship. By passively waiting while the
enemy captured part of the country the
fleet remained away from the crucial
battlefield. It had been saved for nothing.
The Italian Fleet was a "fleet in being"
yhich was essentially not committed for
lack of air cover. The indefinite postponement of action was a great blow to naval
morale, at a time when the invasion of
Sicily produced serious political and
strategic consequences'.V Admiral T\rrr5
wrote: 'The Fleet did not interfere when
the initial landings were certain. The
views of Supermarina were corect, the
ships sailing without air cover and with
few destroyers, would have been heavily
attacked before they could reach the
landing site. However, my opinion is that
the Fleet should have risked everything
on a single throw and arrived in the area
off Sicily, even though damaged, to
attack the allied forces and signal the
existence of the Navy. The presence
would have raised the morale of the
garrison'.
These severe words have been forgotten by cunent historiography, because
they are inconvenient.
During July Eugenio remained stationary at La Spezia, apart from a solitary
mission in heavy seasonthe ninth. Aosta
moved to Genoa on the fourteenth to ioin
the 8th Division.

August
After the bloodless fall of Fascism on 25
July it was necessary to presewe the
conlidence of the Germans, to give some
meaning to Prime Minister Badoglio's
proclamation that 'the war continues'. In
spite of a memorandum sent to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff on the second, which
stated that the impossibility of using
Naples, La Maddelena or Cagliari would
prevent any use of the light cruisers,
Supermarina planned two missions for
them on the third. They were entrusted to
the 7th Division, which was to raid
Palermo while the 8th attacked Bone
(Aleeria) at the same time.
This sudden change of heart was
explained by an annotated reflection in
the diary of the liason officer at German
headquarters in Italy: 'the employment of
the Navy for offensive missions was the
minimum proof of goodwill to continue
the war, which the Germans anxiously
sought'. Consequently, orders were
dictated aboard Italia (ex Littorio) by

secret telephone. The first mission began

w}:'en Eugenio (R Admiral Oliva) and
Montecuccoli sailed without destroyers
on the afternoon ofthe fourth. At 1955the
ships were heading west at 27 knols,zig
zagglng. They anchored at 1000 on the
fifth inside the torpedo nets at La
Maddalena. At approximately 2015 the
MetoxT signalled the presence of enemy
aircraft and a submarine. Another
submarine was reported five hours later.
The cruisers went to sea again at 1745.
By 1918they werczigzagging at 2Oknots
steering 107o. They then made for the
island of Ustica from 2100 steering 139o
and increasing speed by one knot. Up
until sunset two fighters provided air
cover. At 1900, Montecuccoli rcported a
submarine to port and both ships hauled
to starboard as two torpedoes passed a
long way astern. Sighting Ustica at 0417
the Division made for Cape Zafferano,
the eastern edge of the Gulf of Palermo,
steering 292o at 30 knots. The cruisers
could almost see the allied ships
anchored in support of the invasion of
Sicily. Between 0428 and 0432, dark
shapes were sighted to starboard, and
were thought to be a coruette leading
torpedo boats. Eugelnio and then
Montecuccoli opened fire. At the same
time an enemy ship displayed two superimposed, white lights and Montecuccoli

ToP: The relief of the Commander in

Chief, Vice Admiral Iachino, by Vice
Admiral Bergamini. Taken aboard the
battleship.Littorio, 5 Lptil 1943.
Author's collection.
Asovr: Anerican trombers attacking the
squadron at La Spezia,S June 1943.
Littorio is in the centre of the picture.
Authors collection.

fired four star shells which R Admiral

Oliva mistook for aircraft flares. In his
report he stated: 'at 0434considering as a
result of the encounter with enemy
torpedo boats and likely air recohnaissance that the surprise on which the
mission depended had been lost (I was 34
miles, or about one hour ten minutes from
the point of engagement) I decided not to
proceed, but to head for the Eolie Islands
as the route for disengagement. I ordered
course 80o, speed 31 knots'.
The cruisers returned to La Spezia
without incident, arriving at 0100 on the
seventh with the destroyers Legionario
and. Orianiwhich had sailedfrom Bastia.
After the war it was learnt that the ships
encountered by the 17th Division were
small support vessels taking supplies to
Ustica. The two cruisers had escaped
from shadows while in a very advantageous tactical situation. This was
desoite the fact that Montecuccolihad a

67

radar and both ships carried Metox. It

was a further failure attributable to the
lack of enterprise and offensive spirit
found so often in the conduct of Italian
Admirals, both at Supermarina and at
sea. The contrast with the conduct of

British,GermanorJapanese
Admiralsin
similar circumstances is a painful one.
However, the influence of traditions of
victory, of Rodney, Howe and Nelson,
and of courts martial and a firing squad
for Admiral Byng must not be overlooked. Moreover, the conduct of the
Admiral might appear justified by the
national situation in so far as negotiations for an armistice had just started.
On the other hand, this was hardly
relevant to a commander at sea with
orders to attack the enemy. As it was the
mission entrusted to him became an
unnecessary cruise, risking men and
ships.
These justifications and extenuating
circumstances had no effect on the
Commander in Chief. A few weeks later
the division was at sea practising against
a simulated night attack by light craft.
Despite the failure of the mission,
Supermarina judged that the true
objective of the cruisers had not been
revealed and decided to repeat the
mission with the 8th Division. Not even
an accident to the lubricating oil pump
aboard the flagship of the Division could
persuade them to alter the decision. The
order was delivered to R Admiral
Fioravanzo accompanied by a letter from
the C-in-C V Admiral Bergamini, doubting the accuracy of the identification of
the ships of Ustica. It was stated that the
cancellation of the mission before
reaching the objective because of
sighting could only be authorised by
Supermarina.
Garibaldi, flagship, and Duca d'Aosta,
left Genoa without destrovers at about
2000 on the sixth. reaching La Maddalena the following morning after a
passage at 26 knots through heavy seas.
The local workshops were able to repair
Garibaldi's machinery, although they
could not guarantee reliability at high
speed.The cruisers sailed at 1835,after a
useless wait of 30 minutes for an urgent
message. At 0230, the German radio
operator intercepted a reconnaissance
plane report that large warships had
been sighted between Ustica and
Palermo. I'his was repeated at 0248 by
Supermarina. At that time visibility was
reduced to about a mile. As neither ship
had radar this was serious. The R
Admiral informed Supermarina that
unless ordered to the contrary he
intended to head north again at 0300. At
0331, another message from Supermarina reported four merchant ships,
which Fioravanzo judged were heading
for Palermo escorted by the warships
sighted previously. He decided to return

68

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Routeof 7th DIVISION(4-6 August)

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'

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at 0400, after informing Supermarina. A

few minutes later he was ordered to
continue the operation, unless he had not
already changed direction. There was no
reply. The homeward leg was only
punctuated by firing at some aircraft at
0740 on the eighth. Legionario and
Carabiniere met the cruisers off the
island of Capraia before entering La
Spezia at 1900.
For breaking off the mission without
Supermarina's consent, when they
considered the four ships sighted were
only merchantmen, Fioravanzo was
removed from command. In fact, he had
saved his ships from almost certain
destruction. The convoy had been
escorted by the US cruisers Philadelphia
and. Sauannah, wit};' two destroyers.

Routes taken by the 7th and 8th

Divisions between 4th and 8th August.

Equipped with radar the two American

ships also mounted 6in guns, like the
Italians, but had 30 of them, in contrast to
18 in the 8th Division. ULTRA gave the
British the direction and time of the
missions; only the object was unknown.
For the first operation there was, in all
probability, no time to react because it
was only revealed after the plan had been
enciphered in a German or Italian
Enigma code machine. This would not
occur when the secret telephone system
was used. It is possible to conclude that
the mission of the 7th Division was

two cruisers to confront the 8th after

precise information via ULTRA. This
might explain why the official Italian
history reports that the enemy ships were
at sea to intercept the cruisers, which had
been sighted by a British reconnaissance
plane.
Garibaldi and Aosta, escorted by the
destroyers Mitragliere
and Gioberti
sailed from La Spezia to Genoa at 1700on
the ninth. At 1925, the Submarine HMS
Simoom attacked the squadron. All the
ships hauled to starboard together,
except Gioberfi, which increased speed,
hoping to out run the torpedo. She was hit
and quickly sank. During the month
Aosta joined,a training mission, while on
the twenty-fourth Eugenio, Montecuccoli
and the destroyers Legionario, Mitragliere, Artieliere and"Fuciliere underwent
a training excercise against torpedo
craft.

September
On 2 September, Eugenio left her
mooring at 1625with thetug Atlantefot a
depth charge drill, trials of smoke
dischargers and battle drill. All the ships
of the squadron altemated drill under the
orders of the Commander in Chief, who
had trained a compact, effective force.
However, he was forced to compromise on
oil in order to keep his bunkers full for the
last war mission. A strange truce
overhung La Spezia. Since the previous
June, there had been no air attacks on the
fleet, although planes regularly overflew,
and the nearby cities had allbeenheavily
bombed at night. In the armistice,
secretly signed at Cassibile, Sicily, on the
third it was stated that the FF.NN should
proceed to allied bases. V Admiral De
Courtene was informed on the same day,
in absolute secrecy, only of the negotiations. On the sixth he received a
memorandum from the Chief of the
General Staff on the movement of the
fleet. The date on which the armistice
came into force was not indicated, but
was presumed to be between the tenth
and fifteenth. This memorandum was
supersededon the morning ofthe seventh
by a request from the Allies to collect the
FF.NN at La Maddalena. On the
afternoon of the seventh, De Courten
summoned the C-in-C of the FF.NN and
the Admirals in command from Supermarina, although he concealedthe events
of the day, assisted by V Admiral
Sasonetti, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff,
who was aware of the situation.
Bergamini and Da Zara, R Admiral
commanding the ships at Taranto, did
not understand the gravity of the situation. Later, Da Zata wrote that the
strain of travelling left him unable to
understand the import of the strange
language used. Only V Admiral Leg-

ed the huth.
The objective of the navy minister was
to conceal the truth from the C-in-C, who
had to continue to believe that combat
was imminent, and remain ready to sail
at six hours notice. De Courten warned
the Admirals to keep an eye on the
Germans, in case they tried to seize the
ships or restore Fascist rule. Therefore,
the fleet should be transferred to safer
harbours. At the same time it was
necessary to fight the Allies.
On the morning of the eighth V
Admiral Bergamini retumed by car to La
Spezia where all the ships were outside
the torpedo nets except -Boma, his new
flagship. Once aboard he was informed
that allied convoys were steaming for the
Italian coast, and that he was to prepare
for battle at first light. Summoning his
captains and admirals, Bergamini told
them that Supermarina's orders were to
continue fighting, or if necessary scuttle
the ships. The fleet was efEcient and
ready for combat as all ships now had
radar, Metox, German radio operators for
liason with air cover and full bunkers. A
powerful force of three modern battleships, eight cruisers and all the available
destroyers, with another two battleships
from Taranto should have opposed the
allied landing.
The allied force included six battleships, 15 cruisers and about 40 destroyers, with seven aircraft caniers. The
troops were able to establish a beach
head, with difficulty, but after the third
day were in danger of being pushed back
into the sea by a powerful German
counter offensive. The Luftwaffe inflicted
heavy damage with radio controlled
bombs. An intervention from the sea
would have been very serious for the
Allies. However, before the fourteenth the
order to sail was delayed, and when food
started to come aboard it became clear
that battle was unlikelv. At 1830 on the

All three of tJ: e Littorio class battleships

at sea. In the foregrotnd Littorio with
Roma andVittorio
Veneto onthe
q:uarten Author's collection.

69

bomber. Author's collection.

fourteenth, allied radio reported the

armistice, and broadcast the proclamation by Admiral Cunningham that
the Italian ships were to proceedto allied
bases. Only at 1945did Badoglio confirm
the armistice.
Aware of the truth, Bergamini was
informed of the terms of the armistice by
Sansonetti. He was to sail for Malta,
hoisting a black pennant and painting
black circles on the forecastle. The C-in-C
could not accept such an end and
prepared for the inevitable scuttling. De
Courten called on him to confirm his
orders. Bergamini, who explained the
attitude of his admirals and officers was
requested to fulfill the tough terms of the
armistice, and inform the crews.
At a meeting aboard Roma willn the
admirals and captains, Bergamini, now
prevented from communicating with
Supermarina, gave his own orders to
proceed to La Maddalena and await new
orders, without the dangers offalling into
foreign hands. If the Germans tried to
take over, the ships were to be scuttled
without resistance. If the Allies did so,
self destruction was only to be the last
resort, if escape, after resistance, was
impossible. The C-in-C confirmed his
plans in a subsequent telephone conversation with the Minister, rejecting the
proposal that he give up command of the
FF.NN. Bergamini ordered the FF.NNto
sail for La Maddalena to wait on events.
He had decided to scuttle the ships,
denying them to everyone. No one can
know what thoughts influenced him, or
what he intended to do ultimatelv.

The forward magazines of the battleship

Rorna exploding after being struck by a
'Fritz X' radio controlled glide bomb
at
1555 on 9 September 1943.A uthor's
collection.

tormented as he must have been between

duty and the sense of honour, and
obedience in the naval tradition. To
Captain Bedeschi, his close collaborator,
he said: 'I mean to lead the ships to an
Italian anchorage, or to another one out
of range of foreign interference. I will
never hand over the ships to the enemy. I
fear we will not seeone another again, we
will go to the bottom'. The message'the
fleet may . .. now when the interest of the
nation requires it, go towards the enemy
with flags in the wind'was regarded by
Bergamini as directed to the crews, and
was repeated several times, though it
does not appear in the offrcial account.
The passage west of Sardinia led the
FF.NN to within sight of Asinara Island.
Between 0945 and 1056 three air alarms
were sounded for reconnaissance planes.
The first two were British, the last
German. This revealed that the move-

ments of the squadron were known to

both sides. The absence of black
pennants and black circles was an
unpleasant surprise for the allied
Commanders in Chief, Mediterranean.
The 21 ships represerrted a great danger
to the operations at Salerno. Nevertheless, the route being followed coincided
with that which was expected, so the
ships were not attacked, Concern
increased again when Bergamini turned
east, leaving the route which passed west
of Sardinia towards Cape de Garde
(Algeria), where the allied ships were
waiting. In a long messagefrom Roma at
1340, the C-in-C fixed the mooring
positions for the fleet at La Maddalena, in
line. However, the flagship then received
word that the Germans had taken over
the Sardinian base. The order was then
changed to a 1800turn, which was carried
out in unison at high speed.
Shortly after 1400, aircraft with
German markings appeared over the
squadron, dropping bombs. They retired
when the ships began zigzagglng and,
firing. This is not mentioned in the
official history. In Septem,bre Nero,
n1
I L

Units ofthe Italian fleet proceeding

towards Malta, early on 10 September.
The cruiser.Eugenio and destroyer
Legiona.rioboth
carry the black pennant
at the main top . Author's collection.

72

Trizzinoll reports the evidence of R

Admiral Biancheri (8th Division) that in
spite of their markings these aircraft
were, according to Bergamini, allied. He
had picked them up coming from the
south on the radar. Ttizzino also
contends that the British intended to use
German aircraft captured in T\rnisia.
From British sourcesl2,it is clear that the
British knew of the German project to
take over the Italian ships, through
ULTRA and took iare of the FF.NN.
At 1611, Roma sank after being struck
by a German Fritz X radio controlled
glider bomb. V Admiral Bergamini, his
entire staff and two thirds of the crew
were killed. The C-in-C took with him all
knowledge of his intentions. He was
awarded posthumous Gold medals for
valour by the Kingdom ofthe South, and
the Social Republic of the North, where it
was asserted, for a variety of reasons,
that he intended sailing to intemment in
Spain, or scuttling the ships.
The command devolved onto the senior
Rear Admiral Romeo Oliva of the 7th
Division. He accepted the responsibility
with reluctance. He had no idea of the
fleet orders, and did not have the cipher
books to decodethe signals sent to.Rorzo.
Biancheri, aboard Garibaldi, proposed
returning to La Spezia, but Oliva
reorganised the squadron and headed
west, being attacked four times between
1629 and 1910 by German aircraft. There
was little damage, with only one hit on
the bow of ,Iralla. Orders to head for Bone,
Algeria, reached Oliva at 1840, but the
route remained west. Oliva reported that
it would be maintained until 2100 before
turning south. In face of this prevarication, Sansonetti at Supermarina
transmitted: 'the clauses of the armistice
do not, I repeat, do not, provide either for
the surrender of the ships, or the lowering
of the flag. This message was considered
'disconcerting' by
the Court of Appeal in
'Navie
Milan when trying Tlizzino for
Poltrone'. What it did notreveal was that
the Allies retained the right to determine

how the Italian ships would be disarmed.

In practice, the ships were disabled and
effectively surrendered. This message
decided the course which Oliva now
followed, south. No one could have done
any'thing else, in the face of such
enornous responsibility. Nobody, that is,
except the late C-in-C.
At Taranto, Sansonetti's message
influenced Da Zara, inducing him to
ignore the prevailing sentiment of his
admirals and captains not to sail for
Malta. In the night, the squadron under
Oliva continued on 180otoward Bone. At
0702 Eugenio and the other ships hoisted
the black pennant, but the black circles
were not displayed. At 0838, a British
Naval formation was sighted dead
ahead; Warspite and, Valiant escorted by
seven destroyers, one each being from
FYance and Greece. The Italian ships
waited with their guns loaded. Eugenio
indicated that she was the flagship, and
stopped to allow Captain Brownrigg,
Cunningham's assistant Chief of Staff,
to board with an officer and three
signalmen. The Italian ships, in line
ahead escorted on either side by the allied
destroyers were led by Warspite and
Valiant. Off Bizerta at 1500, HMS
Hambledon, carrying Cunningham and
General Eisenhower, passed on the
opposite course. Eisenhower later ad'shuddered
mitted that he
at the sight of
the powerful Italian Squadron'.
Cunningham signalled to Oliva his
regrets at the death of Bergamini, and
congratulated his old flagship, Warspite,
on leading the enemy into internment. At
1830, the force doubled Cape Bon,
reducing speed to 10 knots to allow
Warspite to stream paravanes. After
passing Panatelleria to port at 2150 the
fleet began to zigzag from 2300, arriving
at Malta the following morning.
Cunningham then announced to the
'My
Admiralty:
Lords, the Italian Fleetis
anchored now under the vigilance ofthe
guns of the fortress of Malta'.
The ships that had remained behind to

cruiser Regolo and the destroyers

Mitragliere, Fuciliere and, Carabiniere,
lost radio contact with the FF.NN. In
order to land the weunded quickly they
made for the Balearics, followed by three
escort destroyers of which Pegaso and.
Impetuoso were scuttled at sea.
Elsbwhere there were acts of dissent,
althodgh they have remained in the
shade. Aboard the battleship Glullo
Cesa,re; whichreached Taranto from Pola
on the thirteenth, some officers and petty
offi.cers, landed and were arrested after
trying to take over the ship, in order to
return, or scuttle her. Rear Admiral
Galati of the light cruiser group prefened
to land rather than lead his ships over to
the old enemy. But aboard a warship the
will of the Captain dominates. Therefore,
while there was opposition to sailing for
allied bases, most ships did sail.
At Malta. R Admiral DaZara arrived
v,ilth Doria and.Duilio and the other ships
from Taranto during the afternoon ofthe
tenth. Being the senior officer he took
commdnd of the FF.NN. Although the
terms of the armistice had provided for
the flag to be kept flying, armed guards
had boarded the Italian ships and
removed the breechblocks, radio equipment, taking the valves and restricting
serviceS aboard the ships. This led to
unrest and numerous protests which were
only checked with difficulty. The resolute
coriduct and protests ofDaTara secured
the removal of the guards, although the
Italians were obliged to hand over the
remaining weapons.

1 . Forze Navali da Battaglia (Naval

Battle Forces) return to the
Squadron ready to fight.
In reality there was enough oil fuel
but it was scattered in numerous
depots along the coast, with
inadequate supply and transport.
3. During the war, Supermarina
interfered continually, always
conditioning the decisions ofthe
Admirals in command at sea.
Bernotti is the author of
Admiral
books on naval strategy
important
and tactics and on thehistoryofnaval
operations in both World Wars.
D.
Admiral T\r, in command of Special
Forces during the war.
6. Battleship Zitforio changed her
nameto ltalia after the fall of
Mussolini.
Germair F\r. Mb L, detector of
impulse of the radar emmissions.
8. Admiral endowed with great
charisma and a combatative spirit;
in command of the 9th Division,
and Vittorio Y eneto, in July
Littorio
194O, insisted on being present in
although his
the battle offCalabrin
ships were not cornbat ready; he
then planned the escort ofconvoys
to North Africa with the old
battleships.
Admiral De Courten, promoted from
Rear Admiral, became Minister of
the Navy in the Badoglio
Government, He resigned from the
cabinet in protest at the partition of
the ships between the victors
dispute the loyalty ofthe navy to the
terms of the armistice.
Legnani
became
10. V i c e A d m i r a l
Minister of the Navy in the Italian
Socialist Republic (ISR) during the
CivilWar.
1 1 . Trizzino, also author of Nauie e
poltrone and Settembr e H er o wr ote

war, was brought into the Law

Court and acquited.
12. Prof A SantprnizIl uerso traditore.

Eugenio, Doria, Duilio

Regolo
anchored
in
Author's collection.

Aosta and, Attilo

Grand Harbour.

IJ

PRIDE OF
POLAND
The OrueIClass
Submarines:
Construction
byPrzemyslaw Budzbon

The advanced class of ocean

going submarineso built in the
Netherlands, which were
role far removed from coastal

the 1933 Geneva Disarmlluring

I fament Conference, the British
'J.JPfime
Minister, MacDonald, put
forward a proposition to lock the existing
tonnage of lesser navies at the level
notified in the 1933 edition of the
Annuaire Militaire. This was stronglyrejected by 14 delegations, among others
the Polish, which announced an intention to order two destroyers and six
submarines in the fiscal year 1933,/4.The
official Geneva declaration made possible the assignment of additional vessels
for the PMW (Polska Marynarka
Wojenna, the Polish Navy). The KierMarWoj (Polish Naval Authority) duly proposed a budget reservation for construction of two destroyers and three submarines and invited tenders from the
French yards for the design and delivery
of these ships.
The specifications issued for the submarine design called for 1000 tons surface displacement, 20 knots surface
speed, main armament of 12 torpedo
tubes and a radius of 144 nautical miles
when submerged. The KierMarWoj was
criticised for its choice ofsuch large boats
for the Baltic Sea, particularly as the
average submarine displacement of the
F7l

other Baltic navies did not exceedaround

600 tons. Top Polish naval officers,
however, were aware that their submarines could count only on themselves
in the case of war with Germany, as the
bases of the PMW would be easy for the
enemy to control and no shelter or maintenance facilities would be available. So
the size of the submarines was increased
to ensure seaworthiness and habitability
in the rough Baltic waters and to provide
proviSions for at least 30 days.
Six submarine designs were delivered
and the Ateliers et Chantiers de la Loire
was chosen for further negotiations. The
selection was influenced by advantageous financial conditions and the widespread reputation of the Chief Designer,
Simonot. Later, however, examination of
this design disclosed a reduction of the
weight introduced to obtain better - on
paper - characteristics. The revelation increasedthe discontent of the KierMarWoj
with French shipbuilders, already aggravated by the protracted progress of the
construction of the Wilk-d,asssubmarines
of the 1925 Programme. So the tenders
were rejected and new tenders were invited late in 1934,but international competition was admitted this time.

Sep on 17 October 1938 prepared for

launching. Workmen removing last
stoppers prior to the release ofthe
launching gear, On the right the
starboard regulating tank ofthe Dutch
submarine O 23 is visible. Rotterdamsche
DroogdohMaatschappi.

75

As the specifications were regarded as

rather extreme for a boat ofsuch tonnage,
the KierMarWoj informed designers that
if it proved impossible to meet all the
original requirements, no objections
would be raised against cutting down the
torpedo armament, reducing the surface
speed to 18 knots and the radius to 100
nautical miles. The final tenders from the
British, Italian, Swedish and US yards
were improved upon by one from the
Nederlands Vereenigde Scheepsbouw
Bureaux (Netherlands United Shipbuilding Bureau) which was able to
comply with the original demands. At
that time the Dutch shipbuilding industry had acquired a good reputation
thanks to reliable workmanship and
excellent design development - in the
case of submarines, boosted by the
German engineering expertise channeled
there after World War I.
The design prepared for the PMW reflected typical features of the boats
hitherto built for the Koninklijke Marine
(Royal Netherlands Navy), but incorporated numerous novel features which
were later introduced on the 0 19 and 0 21

marine design. The most significant

change was the enlargement of the main
dimensions which improved sea-keeping
and accommodation. The pressure hull
had a cylindrical section which enabled
the reduction of scantlings of the light
hull between the MBT (Main Ballast
Tanks) which were built on. The bow torpedo tubes were 'naked', ie, not streamlined within the light hull structure,
which allowed for the shortening of the
forward part of the ship with only a
negligible loss of pressure resistance. Of
equal significance were changes in the
engineering branch. Compact Sulzer
diesels with superchargers were provided
which increased unit power and reduced
fuel consumption - thus increasing both
surface speed and radius. The battery
capacity was also enlarged.
A completion of the Swedish hybrid
'aircraft cruiser' Gotland in 1934 provoked considerable foreign interest. In
1935the private venture design ofa small
two-sea-scout flying boat was authorized
by the PMW, which drew up projects to fit
it aboard ships already on order. It was
proposed to fit the submarines, under
design in the Netherlands, with a small

cylindrical tube is built up to frame 84

with two bottom strakes of the light hull
running forward. Ceiling section ofthe
mid-ship quick diving tank is assembling
with chain hoists. Note external
stiffening ofthe pressure hull and plate
floors of the tar*.Rotterdamsche
Droo g d.ok Maatschappii.

BELow LEFT;Pressure hull ofSep four

months after laying down. The
cylindrical tube is truilt up to frame 1O7
with the flatbulkhead
atframe 1O1 / 2
visible. Stiffenings ofthe light hull are in
position with bulkheads between the
MBT fitted. Just plated out, the port
regulating tank is visible amidships as
well as the escape hatch trunk at frarne
97 and the base ring for 105mm gun.
Ro tt er dann sche Dr o og do h Maat s c hnppii.

BEr,ow: The hull of Sep five months after

laying down. Cylindrical tube is complete
and assembly of a ceiling section above
the forward batter tank is finishing. Note
part ofthe keel and plating out ofthe
light hull advanced well as compared
with previous photograph.
Rotterdannsche Droo g dnk Maats chappii.

77

: - - , : -r . . j

watertight hangar abaft the gun tower to

house the Nikol A2 type flying boat with
folded wings. It could be removed from the
hangar by bringing the submarine to a
half awash condition.
A competing idea proposed fitting a
midget MTB which could attack enemy
units over the horizon or offthe shallow
shores common around the Baltic. The
boat could be carried in a structure built
in the form of an extension of the bridge
superstructure and lowered by a boom
fastened to the gun tower.
Both projects were abandoned, however, as much of the fighting ability of the
submarine would be lost with the accompanying loss of the aft set of twin
central pivot torpedo tubes. Moreover,
stability would be affected and some
accommodation sacrificed.
In November 1935,when contract negotiations began in the Netherlands, there
were seven other warships under construction for the PMW. This put considerable strain on the already stretched resources of the KierMarWoj and made it
impossible for them to orderthe three submarines as hadbeenhoped. Budgetaryresources of the PMW were, however, effectively boosted by a remittance of five
million zlotys (equivalent to f190,000)
delivered by Naval Defence Fund, an
organisation devoted to the raising of a
voluntary public subscription. The idea
of the endowment of a submarine for the
PMW emerged in the autumn of 1926 in
the form of an obligatory subscription

78

Toe: Sep just after launching.Rotterdamsche Droo g dok Maatschappij

Asovn;Orzelabout
12 months after
laying down. The hull is complete with a
prominent gtrn tower and much smaller
conning tower atop. A large part ofthe
hull casing is complete. Note shell
bossing, shaft brackets and stern T'Ts.
Polish Institute and Silmrshi Museum.

a show of loyalty to Marshall Pilsudskis'

coup d'etat in May 1926, had a limited
success.But when in September 1930the
Reichminister. Tleviranus publicly quesfioned the legality of Polish possession of
the Pomerania (the Polish Corridor),
numerous local funds arose to gather
funds necessary for the expansion of the
Navy. All these funds were officially
chanelled in 1933 and by mid 1935 the
first amount was delivered to the KierMarWoj. This money enabled the ordering of two submarines. The third boat
had to be cancelled however.
The contract was signed on 29 January
1935 with the Koninklijke Maatschappij
'de
Schelde' in Vlissingen for the design
and delivery of two 1100-ton submarines
within 30 and 33 months iespectively for
the amount of 21 million zlotys (equivalentto f797.200). The first submarine was
to be built by the leading 'de Schelde'
yard, while the second one was sub*ontracted to the Rotterdamsche Droogdok
Maatschappij, in Rotterdam. It was significant that the contract stated that the
value of Polish components to be incorporated in the submarines should
exceed ten percent of the total value.
Poland had supplied nothing ten years

The midget MTB proposed for Orzel,but

not fitted. It would have been carried in a
small hangar abaft the conning tower.

ter

#!'

.'

..

-,. 9--)-

t_._._.___

llX1

- fii-------------)'t_ - \
--f

+><.i

Midget MTBdesign

-R)a",*J^"-emr-

79

10

20

1 9 8 5 ,P rzemvstow
Budzbon

1 5 7 5 t - Cd e s i g n

,10

,20

Budzbon
01985, Przemystow

2 Oazlr- MTBmrrier desion

Przemyslow
Eudzbon
O 19S5,

3 5zstoesign

meters

the conning tow er. 2. Otzel reconfigtrred

as an MTB carrier. S. The follow on 5751
design.

earlier for the Wilk-class submarines.

On 1 September 1937,when both ships
were well advanced, the second and last
installment was submitted by the Fund
which completed the subscription to the
amount of 8.2 million zlotys. This was
enough to pay for the first of the submarines ordered, without the weapons
which were to be paid forbythe PMW. On
launching, she wps given the name Orzel
(eagle - the national emblem of Poland)
while the second boat was named Sep
(vulture).
The introduction ofnational service in
Germany in 1935 posed problems for the
defence of Poland. Steady economic
growth and political changes had made
the Polish military authorities receptive
to new ideas. In addition, the French
Government, alarmed by German rearmament, decided to contribute ten percent
towards the cost of the modernization of
the Polish Armed Forces. The amount of
4800 million zlotys (equivalent to f,182.5
million) was authorized in 1936 for the
six-year rearmament programme. The
KierMarWoj was promised two and a half
percent ofthe total amount; a quarter ofit
in a form of a French loan. This would
allow two destroyers, three submarines,
two minesweepers and three MTBs to be
ordered for completion by 1942. As the
construction of the destroyers and minesweeperswas to be undertakenin Poland,
the only way for the KierMarWoj to avail
themselves of the French loan was to
order the submarines from France.
Therefore, just as in 1936,the KierMarWoj invited tenders from France for construction of three submarinestothe Orzel
class specifications. Finally, the tender of
the Chantiers et Ateliers Normand in Le
Havre was selected which showed six
variations of the design numbered 5751.
The most interesting feature of one of the
variations was a hugg armament of 14
torpedo tubes, six ofthese to be grouped in
two central pivot sets mounted atop the
pressure hull. The after set was to be
mounted far aft, enabling fire to be
directed dead astern, thus augmenting
the after salvo to seven torpedoes. The
KierMarWoj decided on the more conventional armament of 12 torpedo tubes, but
introduced an unusual distribution ofthe
gun armament. The 105mm gun was removed and the second twin 40mm AA
mounting in the watertight gun tower
was placed forward of the conningtower.
The final design, numbered 5751C, was
approved late in 1938 and the contract

81

The small float plane that competed with

the MTB for sp ace aboard Orzel.

NikotAZ in 1939

I-trelAdo,Lg[E was signed in October 1938for delivery of

two submarines in 1941. The third one
was cancelled because of shortage of
funds, though it was considered for some
fime that she might be built in Poland.
Both submarines were laid down early
in 1939 but the work slowed down considerably in September and was finally
abandoned on 22 April 1940. The hulls
and part of the equipment were destroyed
by the Germans in June 1940.

To be continued

82

Orzel during speed trials offHorten,

Oslofjord, Norway. 15-28 November

1938. Koninhlijke
Schelde

Maatschappij

d.e

MINOTAUR

Beforethe Battlecruiser
In this majorarticle RABunr,a
leading authority on the
warships of the dreadnought
erarconsiders the origins,
design and service histories oj
the last British armoured
crulsers.
n 5 August 1903 the Controller Sir William H May
sent a letter to the Director of Naval Construction
Philip Watts, asking him to consider a design for an
armoured cruiserwhichcouldbeincludedinthe 1904construction programme.'I should like youtogetoutsketchdesignsfor
the information and decision ofthe Board, and to considerthe
armament of a combination of the following:' 1:9.2in and
7.5in1,2:9.2rnand6in; 3: all 7.5in.
The defensive qualities were to be at leastequal to the earlier
Duke of Edinburgh class. A provisional date of 1 December
1903was given forthedesignstobeready, andWatts,whohad
only been in office a short period, wanted nothing better than
to prove himself. Enlisting the help of the assistant

constructor W H Whiting, a most fastidious worker, Watts

was able to produce a total of 11 sketch designs by 15
December 1903, and these he took along to the controller's
office for discussion. Generally, the Controller was pleased,
and asked only for some modification of the thickness of the
lower deck which he considered inadequate for such vessels.
Afew days later, the sketch designsweresentto the Director
of Naval Ordnance (DNO), C D Macl-eod, for guidance and
approval. After a most meticulous study he reported to the
Controller.
Minotaur:l9l0/ll
as refitted. The funnels have been raised
approximately 15 feet. Note the small circular platform on
the face ofthe bridge.

83

'Iooking
at them in general profile, I think that with the
exception of numbers one, three and four, the position of the
guns appears to be too crowded and closetogether. Iwouldnot
like to see the comparatively low power 6in gun included in
any design, nor the 7.5in (however numerous) made the
heaviest gun mounted, in view of the role quite likely to be
allotted to these high speedprotected vessels.
They may very possibly be subjected to battleship fire in the
extingencies of an action, and find the want ofmore effective
belt piercing ordnance. Upon these conditions, I favour the
two 9.2in and balance of 7.5in as shown innumber one design,
but I would like to seetwo 10in in pairs and balance of 7.5in in
pairs, which could possibly be obtained by reducing the
number of the latter.
The United States vessel (armoured cruiser) will have l0in
guns in pairs, and looking forward to the time when these
vessels will be afloat it may reasonably be expected that the
9.2in which is a 50 calibre piece and has reached its limits for
firing a 3801bshell without going intoinordinate proportional
length, will give place to a 10in gun to obtain greater
penetrative power at gteater ranges.'
This reportwas sentonto Wattswhobythenhadproducedyet
another three sketches. Instructions were passed on to W H
Whiting to produce a further two sketchesbasedon a modified
Duke of Edinbureh and when the Naval Lords discussed
these designs, they had a total of 15 sketches to consider,
based on the same approximate dimensions, but with very
different armament layouts.The general feeling amongst
their Lordships was that the question of money ought not to
stand in the way of having the best design, and the
unanimous decision indicated a preference for a really good
ship even if that meant reducing the number of ships in the
class. Quality not quantity was considered paramount in
this case.
On 18 February 1904, the Controller informed Watts that
the Board had approved sketch design number two, and that
the lower deck armour would be increased to a thickness of
2in from the meagre 3/rin of the original design, even though

84

Minotaur shortly after completion in 19O8, with short

funnels to comply with Admiral Fisher's requirements who
considered that a shorter funnel length gave a squat, heavy
aggressive appearance. The long row ofguns turrets
amidships are highlighted. Note the funnel band on fourth
uptake, which is in fact false. Minotaur was given one band
on the first and fourth funnels in 19O9 when standard funnel
bands were introduced. but the white band as shown above
has definitely been scratched onto the negative. A good clue
to look for in checking a funnel band is that the steam pipes
were very rarely painted the same as the band, (white or red)
and remained grey in colour.

it was realised that this would involve extra weight of 300

tons and an additional cost of f30,000.Watts was asked to
prepare and submit a legend of weights, sheer drawing,
midship section and preliminary drawings for final Board
approval.These were quickly finished and approved by 1
August 1904,providing a design which could be described as
a cruiser edition of the contemporary Lord Nelson
battleships. They marked the end of the cycle in which
arrnoured cruisers carrying mixed calibres were specifically
intended to take their place alongside the battlefleet.
The differences from the preceding Wanior were: an
addition of 1050 tons, increase in length of 13ft 6in (oa),
increase of beam of 1ft, increase of freeboard; straight
funnels and masts instead of raked; twin instead of single
turrets fore and aft, and an extra turret on each beam;
nominal speed increase of 3/,knot.
Until the advent ofthe dreadnought cruisers (Inuincible)
they were the most powedul cruisers ever constructed, but
there is little doubt that the grouping of the 7.5in turrets
along the ships' sides and the resultant wide dispersal of
ammunition during engagements was the major weakness
in an otherwise carefully balanced design, and a fault which
almost certainly caused the instantaneous destruction ofthe
Defence at Jutland when she came under the fire of German
capital ships.

Armament
When their Lordships met on 10 February 1904to discuss the
various armament dispositions of the new vessels,they knew
only too well what was required of them, which was to secure
the best design that would give the heaviest broadside and
the most penetrative power.Throughout the discussions the
whole question of guns mounted in turrets uersus guns
mounted on the broadside or in casemates was considered.
After much debate, the conclusion was one on which all
present were unanimous, and that was the acceptance of
turrets as the best method of mounting guns along a ship's
side. This would overcome the disadvantages ofhaving large
ports or holes cut in the armour upper belts. Furthermore, the
turrets would raise the guns to a height of20 feet above the
lower waterline, compared with 15 feet for the muzzles of any
guns mounted in casemates along the vessel's side.
The type of gun then came under consideration and it was
soon agreed that any modern cruiser to be built for the Navy
should have the 9.2in gun at least. Referencewas made to the
newly constructed battleships Swiftsure and Triumph and.
their Lordships were well aware that these vessels were
armed with the latest 10in guns on a displacement of
approximately the same tonnage as the new cruisers.
Moreover, consideration was given to the DNO's report on
the US cruiser Tennesseewhich was armed with four-lOin,
16-6in,22-l4pdrs, and 12-3pdrs. Figures and gtaphs placed
before the Board showed that the US 10in gun had a muzzle
velocity of 2800ft per second and was capable of piercing
13/9in of Harvey steel plate. The 10in mounted in Swiftsure
had 292M1 per sec mtzzle velocity and pierced 11.3in of
Krupps steel plate at 3000 yards.
The latpst 9.2in 50 calibre then in production and
envisaged for the new ships compared very favourably with
figures of3030ft per sec velocity and 10.1in of Krupps steel
plate which it could pierce at 3000 yards.
The 7.5in layouts were compared with those showing 6in
guns in the secondary battery and, although it was agreed

Quarterdeck of the Shannon: c19O8,/9.Note the l2pdrs on

the turret tops and mounted in the superstructure, These
were fitted after the ship's final legend had been approved,
and replaced the Spdrs ofthe original design which were
considered inadequate for effective anti-torpedo boat work.
Note the battle honours on the capstan.
that it would be possible to have two 6in guns instead of one
7.5in (weight wise), the decision was again unanimous that
the harder hitting power of the larger gun was preferable.
Eventually, a decision had to be made as between design 1
and 2 which when compared showed the following:
1. A broadside of 4x9.2tn and 6x7.5in
Ahead fire: *9.hn and 4x7.5in
Astern firel.%9.hn and 4x7.5in
2. A broadside of4x9.2in and 5xZ5in
Ahead fire: 2x9.2tn and 2x7.5in
Astern ftre %9.2tn and D7.lin
They settled for a modified No. 2, for although in No. 1
there is a heavier fire - on paper, at least - on the broadside,
ahead and astern it was still considered by their Lordships
that having single mounted 7.5in guns outweighed the
advantages of the twin mountings and that, practically, the
rate offire with single turrets would easily equal ifnot exceed
the twin mountings. (T\vin mounted guns are not so rapidly
fired as single.)
The antitorpedo armament was improved in these ships
by the provision of 12pdrs in place of the Spdrs which were
considered quite ineffective against contemporary destroyers.

Armour
Although the armour protection was generally based on the
layout of Watior, the hull armouring was reduced to
compensate for the weight of the extra armament. This was
achieved by suppressing the side arnour above the main
belt, and also omitting the transverse bulkheads closing the
6in belt annour, and reducing the forward extremities ofthe

85

belt from 4in to 3in. This was strongly criticised in ships

which were armed so well, and.made for the major weakness
in the design.
Main deck arnour was abandoned in this class, but to
compensate for this the lower deck was increased in
thickness. There was, however, provision for extra
protection to the machinery spacesgiven in the form ofa box
citadel around the cylinders which comprised of lf2-2rn
plates.
For the first time in any British cruisers, solid bulkheads
were fitted in the machinery spaces, and the engine room
bulkheads had no watertight doors (accesswas achieved by
lifts). The main belt was 6in KC (Krupp Cemented armour)
with the lower edge approximately five feet below the
waterline at load condition, and the upper edge at main deck
level. The belt ran to beyond the forward and aft 7.5in
barbettes, where it then reduced to 4in and 8in forward, and
3in aft. The 4in section forward commenced approximately
125ft from the bow, reducing to 3in at SOft abaft this.
Barbettes were 7in uniform with 3in bottoms. T\rrrets (9.2in)
were given 8in face plates, 7in sides and 8in rears. Those for
the 7.5in were 8in on the face, 6in sides, and 4/rin rears.
Ammunition hoists were 7in above the main deck,
reducing to 2in between the main and lower deck levels. The
conning tower was 10in.
The main armoured deck (lower) was given 2in plates on
ihe slopes throughout the whole length, lfiin on the flat
amidships, and 2in on the flat at the extremities. Extra
protection was afforded behind the main belt armour with
the provision of the coal bunkers, but only abreast the
machinery spaces.

Machinery
At long last, cylindrical boilers were finally abandoned altogether in this class, any opposition to the water tube type
having lost its influence by the time the ships were laid
down. The designed speedwas approximately 3/aknot higher
than Wanior, although the actual performance did not come
up to expectations in service.
The hull ol the Shannon was slightly different from the
others in having one foot more beam and one foot less
draught. lhis was achieved by giving her more hollow lines
rather than the full bodied variety ofpast cruisers. The move
was initiated by the Controller in the design stage who
proposed that the ship would be slightly faster with the same
machinery/shp installation as the two sister ships. In
practice, Shannon was not successful. Although praised by
assistant constructor E L Attwood who attended her trials,
she proved to be the slowest unit ofher class.
Minotaur was fitted wil}' 24large water tubed Babcock
and Wilcox boilers, while the other two were given Yarrow
large tube boilers. The power achieved was the same
(27,000shp) although there were some differences in the
heating and grate surfaces of the boilers. Yarrow claimed
that their boilers developed 20hp per square foot of grate
which compared well with that of Babcock and Wilcox which
generated only 14hp per square foot. The working pressure of
the boilers was 2751bper square inch (PSI) which reduced to
2501bPSI at the engines which were the usual triple cylinder
compound type and ran piston speedsof 100oft per minute at
full power.
The ships were capable of developing considerably more
than the nominal hp, but Minotaur only just made her
designed speed of 23 knots. Tlhe Defence, however, failed to
reach hers, and Shannan failed by almost half a knot.

Appearanceand Modifications
As completed,the three ships were very much alike in
86

Bow view of Slrannon. cl909.This view affords a good look

at the high freeboard at the bows (forecastle deck) and the
lower recessed7.5in gun deck, which in service proved too
low and made the whole 7.5in battery a wet one in all but
calm weather.
appearance and differed only in funnel and rig detail.
Defence and, Shannon were practically identical.
Regarded by many as less handsome then the Watiors,
they nevertheless presented a distinctive, aggressive profile
owing to the long row of turrets fitted along the upper deck
amidships.
They were completed with very short funnels in
accordance with Fisher's ideas, and neither masts nor
funnels had any rake.
Individual differences were:
Large oval funnels with very large caps and
Minotaur:
prominent caging.
Defence and Shannon: Smaller and more circular funnels
with small caps and less conspicuous caglng.
"
Funnel bands: (1909)
1 white on first and fourth funnels.
Minotaur:
Shannon: 1 white on second and.third funnels.
None.
Defence:
Modifications:
1909: Range clocks fitted to face of each control top.
Funnels raised approximately 15ft to clear bridge
l9l2:24in SL removed from foremast, and one pair of 24in
twin mountings added on superstructure before the bridge.
(Defence and, Minotaur only.)

t913/L4: Anti-torpedo nets removed.

L9L4: September. Defence reported to have searchlights
(SL) redistributed and night defence stations added on upper
deck level while at Malta. Grey and white patches
(camouflage) painted up on hull funnels and masts.
1915/t6: One 12pdr AA and one 3pdr AA added. 12 pdr
on superstructure aft, and Spdr extreme aft on quarterdeck.
SL was removed between third and fourth funnels, and
remounted on separate platforms low on mainmast in
Minotaur, and low on foremast in Shannon.
1916/17: Director control for main armament fitted in
Shannon. This control was approved for the other two as
early as 1915, but Defence not fitted at time of loss. (1916)
Short support legs fitted to foremast in Shannon and
Minotaur. Quick firing guns in forward superstructure were
fitted with shields. SL on foremast transferred to mainmast
(Shannon). Bridgework increased in size. Foretopmast
removed and topmast fitted to main. Rangefinder baffles
fitted to funnels and mainmast in Shannon.
l9I7/18:
Director control for main guns fitted in
Minotaur. After control top removed in Shannon. Fu,ll
supportive tripod fitted to foremast in both ships. AA gun on
after superstructure was remounted on forward turret. (9.2in)
SL rearranged in two large platforms on mainmast. (Two
36in lamps in each.) Dazzle camouflage on both. Much
heavier in appearance due to increase in bridge work, and
tripod foremast.

Minotaur

SeruiceHistories

2 Jan 1905:laiddown.
6 June 1906: launchedby the Countessof Crewe.
November 1907: startedtrials.
16 November: when at anchor in Plymouth Sound,an
explosionof coal gas in a bunker injured three serviceand
two dockyardmen.
1 April 1908: commissionedat Devonportfor the 5th
Cruiser Squadron(CS),Home Fleet.
9 June: vith Achilles and four destroyers,escortedRoyal
Yacht Victoriaand Albert fuomKiel to Revaldurine the visit

Shannon seen here during her trial period at Devonport.

Early 19O8.

of the King and Queen to Russia.

15 July: Ieft Portsmouth to escort Ind.omitable canying
the Prince of Wales to Quebec for the tercentenary of that
city. After remaining at Quebec for a week the vessels
returned to the UK.
24 NIarch 1909: Home F leet reorganised. Minotaur joined
lst CS in the 1st Dvision.
12 June: present at the review of the Home and Atlantic
Fleets at Spithead by the members of the Imperial Press
Conference. Took part in the annual manoeuwes during
June and July.
17 to 24 July: Fleet visit to the Ttiames; entertained by
the citizens of [,ondon.
31 July: present at Cowes when the King and Queen
reviewed the Home and Atlantic Fleets.
3 January 1910: paid off at Chatham after a small refit,
but recommissioned the following day to relieve Klng Alfred
as Flagship, China Station.
12 January: proceededto Portsmouth. Hoisted the flag of
the new Admiral on 25 January.
3 July 1914: when war with Germany was imminent she
and a large number of the China Fleet were at Wei hai Wei,
and were ordered to gather at Hong Kong.
6 August: Minotaur, Hatnpshire and Newcastleleft Hong
Kong for Yap the German wireless station in the Pelew
group.
11 August: the squadron captured the German collier
Elsbeth. Though the ships werein need ofcoaltheycouldnot
refuellecause of foul weather. The crew were taken offby
Hampshire which, short of fuel was sent to Hong Kong. The
others went on to Yap.
12 August: the wireless station at Yap was destroyed by
gunfire. No landing was made on the island, and the force
made their way to a rendezvous off the Yangtse River. The

87

Armament of 15 sketchdesignsas layed out

by Philip Wattsand W H Whitins

Dimensions of sketch designs

Sketch1:
Sketch2:
Sketch3:
Sketch4:
Sketch5:
Sketch6:
Sketch7:
Sketch8:
Sketch9:
Sketch10:
Sketch11:
Sketch12:
Sketch13:
Sketch14:

88

Displacement
(tons)
14,150
14,150
13,850
13,850
14,350
14,350
13,900
13,630
14,300
14,300
14,300
74,250
14,250
14,100

Leneth
(feet)
490
490
490
490
490
490
490
490
490
490
490
490
490
4180

Beam
(feet)
75
75
74
74
75
75
74'6u
74
75
75
75
75
75
75

SHP
27,000
27,000
26,500
26,500
27,000
27,000
26,500
26,500
27,000
27,000
27,000
27,000
27,000
26,500

Speed
(knots)
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23
23

l. 4x9.2in guns in pairs, and l%7.lin in pairs.

2. 4x9.2n guns in pairs, and 10x7.5in in singles.
3. b9.2in in singles, and 12x7.5in in pairs.
4. 16x7.5in guns in pairs.
5. %9.2in guns in singles, and 1&<7.5inin pairs.
6. 20x7.lin guns in pafus
7. %.92in guns in singles, and 187.5in in singles.
8. 127.5in guns in singles.
9. 6x9.2in guns in singles, and 12<6in in pairs.
10. 6x9.2in guns in singles, and 6x7.5in in singles.
11. 127.5in guns in pairs, and 6x7.5in in singles.
12. 4x9.2in guns in pairs, <1x6intwin and 14x6in singles.
13. 4x9.2in guns in pairs, and 20x6in in pairs.
t4. &9.2in guns in singles, and 10x7.5in in singles.
15. 6x9.2in guns in pairs, and 10x6in singles.

German force in the Pacific consisted of the armoured

cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenaa, three light cruisers
and a few armed merchant ships. Minotaur and Newcastle
returned from Yap by different routes to try and intercept the
German squadron.
15,216 Seplember: During the night news came of the
crtiser Emden which had slipped into the Bay of Bengal and
sunk two or three merchant vessels. Minotaur and the
Japanese cruiser Ibuki werc immediately sent to the west
coast of Sumatra and the Cocos Islands respectively.
22 September
Enxden appeared off Madras and
Minotaur was ordered to intercept. She was then ordered to
head for Wellington to escort a convoy of New Zealand
iroops.
6 November: Minotaur ordered to leave the convoy and
proceed to Cape of Good Hope in response to Admiral
Craddock's defeat at the Battle of Coronel. Minotaur was
near Table Bay when news was received of the Battle of the
Falklands on 8 December 1914.She was ordered to return to
England. On arrival at Scapa FIow, she joined the Grand
Fleet and became flagship of the newly constituted 7th CS,
then based at Cromarty. Under refit early in 1915,then on
northern patrol.

31 May 1916: presentat Jutland.

1917-18: On patrol in the North Sea. Escort for
Scandinavianconvoysduring summerof 1918.
5 February 1'919:paid off.
May: placedon the disposallist.
March 1920: put on sale list.
April: sold to T W Wards;broken up at Milford Haven.

Defence
22 February 1905: laid down at Pembroke.
27 Apnl 1907: launched by Lady Cawdor.
5 August tr908: left Pembroke for trials at Devonport.
Returned to Pembroke to be completed in September.
3 Fehruary 1909: returned to Devonport, commissioned
on the,9th to relieve Achilles in the 5th CS, Home Fleet.
24 lrdt*ch: the Home Fleet was reorganised and. Defence
became a unit of the 2nd CS of the 2nd Fleet.
May: went aground for about 40 minutes, with little
damage.
12 June: present at the review of the Home and Atlantic
Fleets at Spithead for the Imperial Press Conference.
June and July: took part in the annual manoeuwes.
August; relieved,by Achillbs and transferred to the 1st CS,

89

o o o o .

Mhntaur
Sketch 1, compared
alternative 8x12" armament.

90

with the

Defence prepares for the Coronation Fleet Review in 1911.

Home Fleet and rcplaced Drake.

July 1910: with the rest ofthe squadron she took part in
the annual manoeuvres which lasted the whole of the month,
and ended with an inspection of the Fleet at Torbay by the
King and Queen who spent four days at sea in the Royal
Yacht Victoria and Albert.
4 October: Defence left Plyrnouth for Sierra Leone where
she took over from Duke of Edinburgh as escort to HMS
Balmoral Castle conveying the Duke of Connaught to South
Africa. The two vessels reached St Helena 24 October and
Capetown on 31 October. After the visit, the Duke rejoined
Balmoral Castle at Durban which met up with Defence at
Simontown on 6 December before arriving at Sierra Leone on
15 December and St Vincent on the 18th. 'IIhe escort duties
were taken over by Duke of Edinburgh. Defence returned to
Plymouth on 30 December.
and February
1911: took part with the
January
Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets in excercises off Vigo.
Afterwards, she was paid off on 13 February at Devonport
but recommissioned the following day with the crew of HMS
Sutlej for service with lst CS.
24 June: present at Spithead for the Coronation of HM
King George V. Immediately afterwards she was joined by
other units of the cruiser squadrons for annual manoeuvres.
ll November: Ieft Portsmouth with Nolol, Cochraneand,
Argyll as an escort to HMS Medina, carrying the King and
Queen to India. The five vessels reached Gibraltar on the
14th, Port Said on the 20th, Aden on the 27th and Bombay on
2 December. At the end of the tour of India , Defence detached,
from the squadron to China station to relieve Astrea.
Returned to Plymouth.
March l9L2: I-,eft Plyrnouth and reached Hong Kong on
19 April. The Admiralty made the gesture to supply an
armoured cruiser for the China Station as a New Zealand,
battle cruiser was being built for use in UK home waters.
December: Defence rclieved,by Hampshlre, sailed for the
Mediterranean and joined the 1st CS of that Fleet.

6 January
1913: she became Flagship of the Rear
Admiral.
24 Jane: left Malta and returned to England. Annual
manoeuvres in June and July. Recommissioned at
Devonport in September for further service with 1st CS
(flagship) and four days later returned to the Mediterranean.
August l9I4
Defence was in the Adriatic and was
instructed to search fot Goeben and Breslaureported in the
area. These two ships escaped the Mediterranean Fleet,
making for the Dardanelles. Defence reached the
Dardanelles by 10 August 1914 but was then detached to
reinforce Admiral Craddock's Squadron off South America.
22 Octobev the order to join Craddock's Squadron was
changed and she was to join a newly formed squadron under
Admiral Stoddard. After a mix up, the Admiralty, again
ordered Defence to join Craddock, but when she reached
Montevideo on 3 November Coronel had been fought two
days before. She awaited the arrival of Admiral Sturdee's
force (Inuincible and Inf lexi6le) and met them near Albrohos
Rocks where she transferred her Poulson long-range wireless
gear to Inuincible. Defence then left for Simontown where
she was needed to reinforce the Cape of Good Hope
Squadron.
8 December: the squadron left Table Bay to escort troop
ships. Defence retumed to UK and joined the Grand Fleet.
15 January 1915: hoisted the flag of the Rear Admiral,
lst CS.
1915: patrolling duties.
31 May 1916: Resent at the Battle of Jutland.. Defence
came under the fire of German battleships at close range,
and was hit by two salvoes. An explosion occurred in the aft
9.2in magazine and the flame spread via the ammunition
passages to each 7.5in magazine and then to the forward
9.2in maganne. She blew up almost instantaneously.
One of the crew of Watinr reported:
'The Defence (our Flagship) led the way. We opened fire at

91

10,000 yards and gradually closed with the enemy up to

about 6000yards. It seemedhardly realisable at first that we
were actuallv in action. but presentlv the enemv shells could
be heard striling our armoui plate aird droppin! into the sea,
and the boom ofthe guns and clouds of spr-ayiritimated that
here was the real thing at last.
We devoted our attention to one particular cruiser, and
presently the control signalled "eneniy crippled" and shortly
ift"r*aids
"enemv suik".
We were
thu second vessel of the enemy squadron,
"rrgug,ing
when suddenlv
out of the mist we found ourselves confronted
about three niiles away by five battleships of the German
fleet, who immediately opened fire on us. Then came
disaster.
Ttte Defence which had been fighting some distance in front
of us, was badly hit, and almost immediately afterwards
blew up in a cloud of flame and smoke, and when we passed
over the snot hardlv a trace of the vessel and her brave crew
could be seen.'
Between 893 and.903 were killed, including Rear Admiral Sir
Robert Arbuthnot.

Shannon
2 January 1905: Laid down at Chatham.
20 September 1906: Launched by Lady Carrington.
5 December 1907: whilst lying at her moorings in
Portsmouth Harbour, she was run into by the battleship
Prince George (Majestic class) which had broken ioose on a
strong flood ltde. Shannon's stem pierced Prince George's
side but other than this, there was little damage to either
vessel.
19 March 1908: commissioned at Chatham to relieve
Leuiathan as the Flagship 5th CS, Home Fleet.
2O July: took part in the combined exercises and annual
manoeuvres.
April l9O9: transferred to znd CS, Home Fleet on fleet
organisation.
Shannon: at war. c1918. This photograph shows alterations
and additions as well as dazzle paintwork. Note the heavy
bridgework, new tops, tripod to foremast and searchlight
distribution.

92

L7-24 July:.joined units of the Home and Atlantic F'leets

for a visit to Southend.
1 March 1910: recommissioned at Chatham at Flagship
2nd CS, Home Fleet. In April, shecarriedoutexercisesoffthe
coast of Scotland with units of the combined Home and
Atlantic Fleets.
elanuary 1911: combined exercises off northwest Spain
with the Atlantic Home and Mediterranean Fleets. Annual
manouewes in July of that year, and then visited Torbay in
the same month.
5 March 1912: recommissioned at Sheernessas Flagship
of the 3rd CS (late 5th CS) having been relieved as Flagship
2nd CS by battlecruiser Indomitable.
July: Annual manoeuwes. Shannon relieved Indomitable
as Flagship of 2nd CS, Home Fleet. Present during more
exercises off the northwest coast of Spain during January
1914.
February 1914: she visited Brest with 2nd CS, and lst
BCS.
1O March: recommissioned at Sheerness for the same
service.
4 August: Home Fleet reorganised as Grand Fleet. At 0830
the same day Shannon, with Natal and, Roxburgh, left,
Rosyth to rendezvous with the Grand Fleet at sea in the first
sweep of the war.
9 August: during a rendezvous with the LCS and the 2nd
CS in the North Sea, HMS Binningham rammed and sunk
the first German U-boat of the war.
16-23 October: on patrol off Norway and several times
narrowly missed the German minelaying raider Berlin.
26 November:
bombed, unsuccessfully, by enemy
aircraft during a sweep into the Heligoland Bight. Under
refit at the end of November 1914.
23-24 Jar:luary 1915: rejoined Grand Fleet.
May: fleet was based at Scapa Flow.
31 May 1916: present at Jutland. At 1400 hours, with
other cruisers of the lst and 2nd CS, formed an advance
screen eight miles in advance of the battle fleet. At 1905
hours, endeavoured to take station on the engaged bow ofthe

cross the bows of the battle fleet from port to starboard but
were unable to do so, and remained throughout the action as
a linking squadron with the advanced battleships.
3 June: searched for survivors from the abandoned
Warrior and other missing ships with Donegal,lef| Scapa to
patrol north of the Shetlands on the lookout for the German
raider Moewe.
August: at sea with the Grand Fleet in an attempt to bring
the German High Seas Fleet to action.
11 December 1917l. left Scapa with Minotaur to patrol
convoy route between Lerwick and Norway. At noon on the
12th, news was received of the disaster to the PartridgePellew convoy off Norway. She increased speed to 20 knots
and picked up survivors between 1400 and 1500 hours.
15 December:
with Minotazr escorted the badly
damaged Pellewback to Scapa.
24 Apnl 1918: with the 2nd CS and 2nd BCS and some
destroyers, plus the battleships Hercules and.Agincourt,she
covered the Scandinavian convoy route during the High
Seas Fleet's last sortie.
2 May 1919: paid off, but temporarily attached to training
establishment. Sold to Messers Mclellan on Boness andwas
finally broken up from January 1923.

Final Legend: Minotaur

Length:490ft pp. 519ft oa.
Beam: 74f1, 6in as moulded.
Draught: 25ft, 6in forward; 26ft, 6in aft
Displacement: 14,600tons load.
SHP: 27,000 = 23 knots. Coal: 2100 ton maximum.
Complement:779
Arrnament: 4 9.2in, 10 7.5in, 2 12pdrs, 28 3pdrs, 2 mgs
Armour: Sides: 6-4-3in, Barbettes: 7in, Shields: 8-7in,
Casemates:8-6-41/2in,CT: 10in, T\rbe:6-2in
General equipment: 595 tons
Armament:2065 tons
Armour:2790 tons
Machinery:2530 tons

Length:490ft, 0/6in pp
Bearn:74ft,9fgin
Breakage (distortion) at launch: Longitudinally
in a
distance of 380ft=1%in hog. Tlansverse in a distance of 67ft
8in=None
Draught: l2ft,31/2in forward and 15ft,9in aft.
Becorded weight of kull: 4548 tons.
Total displacement as launched.:6514tons.
Length of boiler rooms: 1 35ft; 2 35ft;3 35ft; 4 35ft; 5 20ft.
E ng ine ro om s : 68f1, 03/
"in

G M and Stability
A Condition: Ship fully equipped with 550 tons coal in lower
bunkers, and 400 tons in upper bunkers. Draught: 25-26ft
mean. GM:3.05ft
B Condition: As above but with 2065 tons of coal on board.
Draught: 28ft hn. GM: 3.25ft.
Range of maximum stability: A Condition: 30o,B Condition:
300;
Stability uanishes at: A Condition:58o, B Condition:60o.
Displacement: 13,400ton in light load. 16,630tons deepload
but excluding oil fuel.

Particulars of Minotaur class as

cornpleted
Construction:
Minotaur: Devonport DY: Laid down 2:1:1905. Launched
6:6:1906.Completedfor trials 11:1907
Defence: Pembroke DY: Laid down 22:2:1905. Launched
27:4:1907.Completed for trials 8:1908.
Shannon: Chatham DY: Laid down 2:1:1905. Launched
20:9:1906.Completed for trials 11:1907.
Displacement: 14,600 tons legend. 16,630 tons deep load.
17,410tons extra deep.

Minotaur:later 1917.Note the searchlight positions on the

fore and mainmasts.

93

Agov.

Shannon as built, with short funnels. CPL

taken near
Rtcll\ Shaurcn (leftl and Mittotaur atCtomarty,
the end of the war. 19t8. Photographs from the author's
collection

Dmensions: Iength: 490ft pp, 519ft oa. Beam: 74ft,6in

(Shannon 75ft,6in). Draught: 26ft mean.
Arrnamcnt: 4 9.2in Mk X1 50 calibre. 10 7.5in Mk 11 50
calibre. 16 12 pdrs. 212pdrs.5 303 machine guns.
TT: 5 18in all submerged; 4 broadside, 1 astern.
Arrnour: Main belt: 6-4-3in.
Barbettes for 9.2in: 7in.
Barbettes for 7.5in: 7in.
Shields for 9.2in: 8in faces, 7in sides and rear.
Shields for 7.5in: 8in faces, 6in sides and 4/2in rear.
Cylinders for all barbettes: 2in
Conning tower: 10in
Tube:6-2in
Deck: Lower: 1$in amidships over flat; 2in over slopes. 2in
on flat and slopes at ends.
Box citadel over machinery cylinders:2in on sides, lfiin on
crown.
Machinery: TWo sets of four cylinder triple expansion
engines driving twin screws.
High pressure cylinder: 405/sindiameter.
Intermediate cylinder: 65[in.
[.ow pressure cylinder: 745/6in.
Stroke: 48in
Boilers: Babcock in Minotaur, Yarrow in other two.
Designed shp: 27,000 for 23 knots.
Fuel and endurance: 1000 tons coal normal (Shannon950),
2060 tons coal maximum plus 750 ton oil and 80 ton patent
oi]. 8150 miles at 10 knots. 2920 miles at 20.6 knots.
Ships boats:2 45ft,staam pinnaces. 1 42ft sail launch. 1 36ft
sail launch. 2 32ft cutters. 1 30ft cutter. 1 26ft cutter. 2 30ft
gigs. t 27ft whale gig. 1 16ft skiffdinghy. 1 13ft, 6in balsa
raft. Extra carried when serving as Flagship: 1 40ft steam
barge. 1 32ft galley. 1 16ft skiffdinehy.
Searchlights:8 36in. Two on bridge, two port and starboard
between first and second and third and fourth funnels.
T\vo port and starboard abaft mainmast.
1 24in signalling SL on foremast, close below control top.
Anchors: 3 115cwt stockless. 1 40cwt stockless. 1 16cwt
stockless.
475 fathoms of 2-9/l6ths inch cable.

94

Complement: 779as designed.

8L9Shannon.1908.
805Minotaur. L908.
802Defence.1908.
825Mirctaur. t909.
842Shannon.t912.
average.
Cosf: f,1,090,000

Steam Trials
Shannon:8-hourfull powertrial. Draught: 24ft 7in forward;
25ft 6in aft. Date:3 December1907.Course:Polperro.
Runs:
I
2
3

Revs:
L215
126.3
t25.r5

IHP:
26,208
26,951
q,7 e,7,

Speed: (knots)

2r.670
22.373
22.324

4
5
6
7
Mean IHP:

128.3
29,644
22.592
128.45
29,433
22.445
727.45
28,144
22.592
t26.r5
28.547
22.228
28,34* 127.59revolutions=22.
49 knots.

Minotaur:8-hour full power trial.

Date:6 December1907.Course: Rame Head.

t28

27,049

23.07

Defence:1/l0ths power. (30 hours)

Date: 19 September 1908.
I

2
J

19,068
19,324
19,196

2t.202
20.693
20.947

95

MOTHBALL
FLEET

',

-:.:

The llnited States

'Naval Inactive Ships
MaintenanceFacilities'
STEFAN
TERZIBASCHITSCH
reports
The recent return to
active service of the
Iowa class

battleships has
highlighted the
tremendous
capabilities of the
USN for preserving

old ships. Other

navies have kept up

reserves in the
past, often for a
decade or two, but
never on such a
scale, or for so long.

96

;*

first American leader to ad7Tltt.

vocate
a reserve fleet was PresiI
L
dent Thomas Jefferson,200 years
ago. He wanted to construct a large dock
in which all the unwanted wooden warships could be dry stored. Congress
rejected his proposal on account of the
estimated cost of $417,000.
In 1945,the United States Navy possessed a large number of surplus warships
and merchant ships. Some were
expended as targets, others were lent or
leased to foreign powers and the oldest
units were broken up. Nevertheless, a
large number of relatively new ships
remained, and these represented the
potential strength to guarantee the USN
retained its position as the leading naval
power.
It was intended that the surplus

warships, still rr:garded as modern,

should be maintained in such a way that,
in the event of a crisis, they could be
immediately reactivated to strengthen
the active fleet. Soon after World War II
suitable methods were developed, and
became incorporabed into a process
known as 'mothb,alling'. Initially, the
'mothball' fleet
warsdismissed as a joke,
but after the large-scale reduction of the
active fleet it beca:mesynony'rnous with
safety. At the time of writing, this stock of
ships has almost disappeared. The long
period of preservation meant that the
combat value of the preserved ships was
greatly reduced. Furthermore, in view of
the United States' recent financial
problems there was no longer the money
available to keep up a large reserve of
obsolete ships. Conr;equently, the number

of ships in the reserve was greatly

reduced.
Before continuing this discussion it
would be wise to clarify what we mean by
reserve fleet, as there are two such bodies
in existence: the Naval Reserve Force
(NRF), and the Naval Inactive Fleet
(mothballed).
The NRF is a training command.
Selected officers and men are trained at
weekends, or once a year, either ashore or
aboard NRF ships. These are commissioned ships, separated from the
active fleet for the NRF. The NRF uses
relatively modern ships ofvarious types;
destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships,
mine warfare vessels and some auxiliaries. At present, there are no NRF
submarines. The crews of NRF ships are
composed of a small number of regulars,

Near the main gate of the Naval Base, the

cruisers Des Moines snd Sal,emhave been
berthed here for 25 years and still belong
to the US Navy's Reserve Fleet. 2 April
1984, Philadelphia.

97

In contrast, MARAD maintains cargo

and transport ships, which are of
stratgic value. Very few Navy ships in
MARAD hands retain a name or pennant
number. MARAD also preserves a large
number of merchant ships. The smaller
number of new ships form the National
Defence Reserve Fleet NDRD. Three
MARAD berths are known at present:
Suisun Bat, California; Beaumont,
Texas, and on the Janes River, Virginia
near Newport News.
This article if concerned with the
NISMF, a detachment of Naval Sea
System Command in Washington.

The Fleet dnd the Berths

After 1945, ihe US Navy maintained
several sites to preserve hundreds of
warships for possible reactivation and
many were, in fact, reactivated.

Top: Bridge and midship details of the

battleship Wineconein.The 40mm AA
guns were removed before the ship
became mothballed. The bridge windows
have been screened. 2 April 1984,
Philadelphia.
ABovE: Close-up ofthe cruiserDes
Moines. Atthe time of preservation all of
the sensors have been disembarked. but
the remaining 3in gun mounts were
preserved including the banels and the
related control gear. 2 April 1984,
Philadelphia.

and reservists. NRF ships spend considerably less time at sea than their
active counterparts.
The mothballed Reserve Fleet, on the
other hand; is composed of decom-

98

missioned, mostly obsolescent ships of all

types. They are preserved and maintained in a suitable condition so that if
required they can be reactivated. Ships in
this group can be subdivided: Those
stored and maintained by the Navy
('Naval Inactive Ships Maintenance
Facilities' (NISMF), forming the Naval
Inactive Fleet); and those stored and
maintained by the Maritime Administration (MARAD) (an organisation of the
Department of Tlansport).
The NISMF controls combat ships and
a limited number of auxiliaries. As a rule,
these ships still belong to the US Navy
and their names are still on the Naval
Vessels Register (NVR). However, there
are exceptions. A ship stricken from the
NVR usually has its pennant number'
painted out, though this is not always the
case. For example, +he Oklahoma City
and,Chicagohave both been stricken. but
the former retains her pennant number
(CG 5) while CG 11 on the latter has been
painted out.

Some aircraft carriers were demothballed, modernised and converted into

command ships in the 1950s and
1960s.

Cruisers were reactivated for the

Korean War. and later converted into
missile ships.

An aged distilling ship was reactivated for the Cuban missile crisis.

Three battleships were brought back

into service for Korea and Vietnam.

Most recently, all four remaining

battleships are being reactivated to
lead Surface Action Groups. (An
article about these last battleships
will appear in Warship 43.)

After World War II, over 2000 ships were

transferred to the Naval Inactive Fleet.
In the early postwar years there were at
least 17 sites.
In the Pacific
Pearl Harbour, Hawaii: San Dego,
California: Columbia River, Oregon: San
Francisco Shipyard, Hunter's Point,
California: Long Beach, California:
Puget Sound, Washington: Tacoma,
Washington: Mare Island shipyard,
including a site at Stockton, California:
Port Hueneme, California.
In the Atlantic
New London, Connecticut: Boston,
Massachusetts: New York City: Orange,
Texas: Philadelphia Shipyard, Pennsylvania: Green Cove Springs, Florida:
Charleston, North Carolina.
There might have been others. In 1950,
the reserve fleets included 2283 ships,
although it is not certain if all were
assembled on Navy sites. Ten years later
only 900 remained. From late 1965, the
author has carried out his own research,

Mothballed ships in the Naual ReserueFleet 1965-1984

l:6:67 15:7:68
eno oI rybD

Type ofships

Aircraft carriers
Submarines
Amphibious ships
Command ships
Battleships
Cruisers
Frigates (DL)
Destroyers
Escort ships - Frigates
Patrol vessels
Mine warfare vessels
Auxiliaries
Total:

1 including

CVL, CVE

l:7;70

16r
37
81

5
22
24

5
24
I4

4
26

4
2l

3
27

147
228

131
772

113
139

7
1
9
51
7
4
24
3
r21
143

59

39
70
488

31
7l
421

42
89
504

NJ

661

which has been made semi official by

publication in the Naval Review edition
of the US Naval Institute Proceedings.
The continued reduction in the number
of reserve ships in the 1970sled many to
predict the eventual extinction of the
reserve fleet, unless further ships were
added. With the decline came the closing
of some sites such as Hunter's Point, New
l.ondon and Tacoma in 1960 and Iong
Beach and Charleston in 1961.
In the early 1970s,it was reported that
92 mothballed ships had been lost in the
previous five years, while only 39
additional ships had been mothballed.
The reserve totalled 570 ships which
employed 229 civilian and 1263 naval
personnel. After Orange, Texas was

7:6:72
9
5
88
2
4
15
3
79
118

9
2
99
2
4
74
3
70
104

l:I:74

1:1:81

mid 1984

5
0
76
2
4
15
1
61
8

6
3
3

5
4

4
2

2
3
fa

td

52
85
460

57
79
453

approximate number of ships still in

the Naval Vessels Register

closed on 30 June 1975 it was reported

that only three facilities would be retained: Bremerton, San Diego and Philadelphia. Later, a site near Portsmouth,
Virginia was added. This remains the
situation at prcsent, although San Diego
holds only three obsolete, stricken,
amphibious dock ships of the Ashland
class (ex LSD 1) which may soon be
expended as targets.
In February 1974, tt.e professional
press declared that the mothball fleet was
obsolete. The reduction in numbers had
created a domino effect. As the number of
carriers had been reduced there was no
need to keep so many escorts, therefore,
the related maintenance and repair
tenders could be scrapped. By the early

23
87
292

2
72
/13

in the Naval Vessels Register

Unlike her sisterships, the already

stricken.Ay'eroport lVeurs - shown here
beside the other cruisers - retained her
antennae during the preservation
process. 2 April 1984, Philadelphia.

qq

ABovE: Also preserved with all antennae

and sensors were the seven destroyers of
the Forrest Sherman/Barry
class, still
belonging to the Reserve Fleet. VDS
SQS-35, ASROC launcher, as well as both
gun control gear have been preserved in
place, unlike the MK 32 TT. This is
Manley. 2 April 1984, Philadelphia.

OpposrrE PAGErop: On the north wall of

the reserve basin, six destroyers ofthe
Sherman class are berthed. as well as the
CB cargo ships Scan, Lahe and Pride,
belonging to the Ready Reserve Force of
MARAD.2 April 1984, Philadelphia.

BELow: At the time that this photo was

taken, the guided missile cruiser Albany
was not yet stricken. She is shown here
at her final resting place in the Norfolk
Naval Shipyard. The SPS-48 antenna has
been disembarked, all other sensors are
on board. One year later you could
observe the ship in the same place, but in
the reverse position, with bows against
land. July 1983, Norfolk.

100

Normally, all antennae and external

sensors must be removed.

All trainable gear and perishable

items removed.

Small gun barrels and searchlights to

be removed and stowed below.

All tube and pipe work cleaned.

All painting done on external areas.

The Preseruationof
Warships

All exposed doors and openings closed

and sealed.

Lack of space prevents a more detailed

survey of the process knoWn as mothballing. However, before a warchip can
be preserved it is placed in the shipyard
with part of the crew still aboard and the
ship is still considered to be 'in
commission. active'. When it moves to the
NISMF for deactivation it becomes 'in
commission, in reserve'. During this last
phase the ship is commanded by an
officer one rank lower than usual. A]most
all the deactivation measures are performed by the crew. Before the ship can be
sealed:

Dehumidification gear brought aboard.

Light metal igloos placed over funnels, open gun mounts and control
geat.

1980s,the Reserve Fleet had shrunk into

insignificance. This had come about
because successive administrations had
not built enough new ships to release the
older vessels to the reserve, because of
budget problems and the demands of
Vietnam. When the Reagan Administration came into office its first priority was
a 600-ship Battle Force. This expansion
made it unlikely that any more ships
would join the reserve.

All log books and reports are concluded and stowed, where applicable,
in the ship's office.

Other documents and classified

material must be removed.

When all this has been done the

commanding officer lowers the flag and
hands over to the NISMF. The ship is
now 'out of commission, in reserve'.
However, the ship still belongs to the US
Fleet, until its name is stricken from the
register (NVR). The interior of the shipis
maintained at a humidity level of 25 to 35
percent, and this is one of the great
secrets of successful preservation. The
other is the installation of cathodic
protection belts around the underwater
body which prevent conosion. After this
had been introduced the intervals
between drydocking increased from five

NISMF; Philadelphia
This is one of the three sites presently in
use. It is alongside the naval shipyard
within the naval base located along the
Delaware River. Earlier photos show that
most of the mothballed ships were
assembled in the reserve basin and the
large ships moored along the Delaware,
the southern area of the naval base.
These berths contained the three mothballed battleships lowa, New Jersey and
Wisconsin. When Neur Jersey was
reactivated in 1967 for Vietnam, the
carier Shangri La f:,lled, her berth. In
1979, only 13 units remained, in contrast
to over 120 in the 1950s.These were:
-

Aircraft carriers: Intrepid (CVS-11),

Shangri Zo (CVS-38).

Battleships: Iowa (88-61), Wisconsin

(BB-64).

Cruisers: Springfield (CG-7), Des

Moines (CA-134), Salem (CA-139),
Newport Neurs (CA-148).

Command ships: Norlfta mpton (CCI).Wrieht (CC-2).

Communication relay ship: Arlington

(AGMR-1).

Submarines: Clarnagore (SS-343),

Albacore (AGSS-569).

Contrary to the usual practice, the

stricken CA-148 and AGSS-569 retained
their pennant numbers.
During the author's visit, on 2 April
1984,he was accompanied by the NISMF
Director, Joe Flaherty. The reserve basin
then held 19 ships. They were:
-

Three heavy cruisers of the Des

Mo,ines class.
Eight destroyers of lhe Fonest
Sherman and Bany class, all decommissioned in 1983.

to 15 years. Missouri has not been

drydocked for 21 years.
The time needed to reactivate a ship
depends on the type and size. Smaller
ships require 30 to 60 days: larger types
take some months. Exact figures cannot
be obtained, because reactivation is
normally combined with modernisation
or conversion.

Three stricken submarines, still

painted black, and bearing pennant
numbers.

Reactiuation Program.mes (No of ships)

1951-3Korea
1956 Suez
1962

Berlin Wall
Crisis

549 ships
reactivated
38 ships
-

33 ships

L962 Cuban
Missile Crisis

12 ships

1965-8Vietnam

50 ships

1982-3theBattleships

The obsolete destroyer tend,er Euerglodes (AD-24), obviously still in the

Naval Vessels Register.

4 ships

The three cargo ships Lake, Scan, and

Pride,belonging to the Maritime type
C3-S-33a.

The cruisers Des Moines and Salem ate

berthed near the main gate of the naval
base, in the condition they were in on
decomissioning in 1959and 1961respectively. They have no external electronics,
although the entire 3in 50 calibre

101

ABovE: Painted black and bearing

pennantnumbers
are three stricken
submarines, Wahoo, Tvout and Albacore,
berthed alongside Manley.2 April 1984,
Philadelphia.
RIGHTTOne ofthe last photographs of
USS Miesouri, still belonging to the
Reserve Fleet, before she went to Long
Beach for reactivation. Behind are the
islands and rnasts ofthree mothballed
aircraft carriers.2S April 1984,
Bremerton.

r02

batteries are preserved aboard. By

contrast, their stricken sister Newport
Nerus still mounts all herradar antennae,
something observed on many recently
stricken ships.
The tender Euerglades appears to be
the headquarters for NISMF Philadelphia. The three C3 cargo ships are part of
the National Defence Reserve Fleet of
MARAD maintained ships. They are
based at Philadelphia in an advanced
state. In a crisis they could be ready to
steam in five days.
T)he Forre st Shennan-class destroyers
are additions since 1983. Jonas Ingram
(ex DD-938) is reported to have been
stricken, although she bears her name
and pennant number. Both 5in Mk 42
guns, as well as ASROC and SQSS5VDS
have been removed. Riding high in the
water, the ship acts as a test platform for

the complicated steam plants of this

class. The other ships of the class
assembled here are; Fotest Sherman
(DD-931), Dauis (DD-937), Manley
(DD-940), Du Pont (DD-941), BiEelow
(DD-942), Blandy (DD-943) and Mullinix
(DD-944). The only active unit of the
class, Eclson, is a NRF training ship at
Newport, Rhode Island. Another sister,
Barry (ex DD-933) has been stricken and
established as a memorial in the
Washington Navy Yard. All reserve
Sh.ermans retain radar antennae, fire
control. ASROC and VDS (where fitted).
Apart from the antennae, these items are
preserved with light metal covers. It
appears these ships could be returned to
service in one or two weeks, although
they lack effective AAW weapons.
Albacore (ex AGSS-569) has probably
been towed to her last berth, at

Toe' Islands, rnasts and the last

rernaining MK37 fire control gear can be
seen here. Bezzington is on the left side,
Orishany onthe right. In the foreground
an aircraft elevator can be observed on
the flight deck of Hornet.Therad,*
screens SPS-6 and -1O, on the right,
belong to the LSD Point Defianpe.2S
April 1984, Bremerton.

Asort: Island and mastoftrIo rnet. An

aircraft elevator has been placed on the
flight deck. The mast in the centre
bearingthe radar antennae SPS-6, and
-10, belongs to theLSD Point Defi.anee.
On the left are the islands of Oriskany
can be seen.23 April
andBenninglon
1984. Bremerton.

103

RIGHT: The guided missile cruisers

Chieago and,Ohlahoma City (left). 23
April 1984, Bremerton.

BEL0WRIGHT: The stricken patrol

gunboats Cann on and. Gallup rnoored in
front of the desfioyet Southerland. On
the extreme right is the forward part of
Banger's (CY -61) island. 23 April 1984,
Bremerton.

Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The other

diesel boats Wahoo (ex 33-565) and.Trout
(ex 55-566) are retained, probably for
transfer to a friendly navy. Ttrkey would
appear to be the favourite.
TIie main attraction at Philadelphia
was lVisconsin, berthed along the
Delaware River and aivaiting modernization with funds provided in the FY 1986
budget. (It is planned that she should be
in service by 1987.) Her cathodic protection gear is inspected daily by NISMF
personnel. The stricken carier Shangri
Za (ex CVS-38) is nolongermooredalongside, but in a separate bay ofthe shipyard.
She appears to be in very poor condition,
and must soon be sold for scrap.
NISMF: Norfolk
The ships assembled south of Norfolk,
Virginia are dispersed over two sites
south of Norfolk Bay Yard on the west
bank of the Elisabeth River. Although
the author did not visit the sites it was
possible to observe them. On 6 April 1984,
the north berth included the guided
missile cruiser Albany (CG-10) with her
bows to the land. Apart from the SPS-48
NISMF Bremerton
radar antenna and satellite antenna, all
sensors were aboard, and all four missile
launchers. The ship was stricken a few This visit took place on 23 April 1984.The
facility is located near the Puget Sound
months later. With her was the auxilliary
Indra (LRI-BD and an old A shland class naval base, one hour's drive from Seattle.
Close up photographs of some ships were
I"SD which could not be identified.
Photographs taken over a period demon- not permitted.
The centrepiece of the visit was the
strate that, as at Bremerton, particular
ships are from time to time towed to battleship Missouri, which was both a
another berth. In August 1984, the LSD reserve and a memorial ship. Twenty-one
days later she went under tow to Long
was replaced by a Guppy III submarine,
Beach for rcactivation and modernwithout pennant number.
The larger berth south of the road isation. Ttre two ships berthed alongside
bridge connecting Chesapeakeand Ports- were also visited, the guided missile
cruisers Chicago (ex GG-11) and Ohlamouth contained:
homa City (ex CG-5). Both cruisers
- Three stricken Asheuille class gunretained most of their sensors, but had
boats PG-84 class) and several vard
been stripped of their missile launchers.
tugs.
The four Esset-class carriers were all
inclined about 1" to starboard, as without
- The former research ship Ellanln still
ballast the weight of the bridge incarrying the ex Argentine pennant
fluences trim.
number Q9.
- Mooring G: Missouri(F/F.-63),Chicago
- The submarine tender Howard W.
(CG-l1), Ohlahorna City (CG-l),
Gilks (ex .4'5-16), the recently decomComstock (LSD-19)
missioned amphibious dock ship
Plymouth Roch (LSD-29) and several - Mooring F: Homet (CYS-12), Point
old merchant type auxiliaries.
Defiance (LSD-31)
'

104

Mooring E: Bennington (CVS-20),

Oriskany (CV-34), Southerland (DD743), Canon (PG-90), Gallup (PG-85).
Also the yard craft YTM-265, -748, r89, -268,-398,YD-149, -231, YSR-29,
and YSD-15
Mooring D: hnne Homme Richard
(CVA-31, John Paul Jones (DDG-32),
Decatur (DDG-31) Turner Joy (DD951), Parsons (DDG-33), HUU (DD945), Growler (SS-577), Salmon (SS573), Sailfish (SS-572),Sphinx (ARL24), as well as the section C belonging
to the floating drydock AFDB-4. The
two Shermans were in similar state to
their sisters at Philadelphia, the
DDGs still embarked all their sensors
and launchers.
Mooring B: Further six sectors of
AFDB-4 were assembed here, filled
'dry'
with the
stowed YTI-583, -422, 435. YM-32. YSR-28.
Mooring A: From a greater distance it
was possible to observe the submarine
tender Nereus (AS-17) and the discarded Polaris boats Theodore

Lrrt: Mooring A, the obsolete submarine

tender.Ay'ereus, and the stricken
submarines -EIolibut, Abr aham Lhwoln
and. Theodore Rooseuelt. lt appears
somewhat strange that thellalibut's
sail
(conning tower) is very high. Either in
the last period ofher active status the sail
has been augtnented, or this does not
represent the.6lalibut. 23 Aptil 7984,
Bremerton.

Rooseuelt(SSBN-600)and Abraharn
Lincoln (SSBN-602)with Halibut
(ssN-587).

Conclusions
1 The small number of ships now
available reflects the low value of
mothballed ships from the last major
building programme, 1939-45.
2 The maintenance of the five .Esserclass carriers, already over 40 years old,
is becoming more and more doubtful.
They could only be reactivated by using
funds which are no longer relevant to the
length of time such a task would require
and the effectiveness of the ships when
complete. They could only be operated in
a very expensive manner as helicopter or
V/STOL carriers. Converting merchant
ships on the ARAPAHO principle would
be quicker and cheaper. Selling the old
ships would save money.
3 Preserving the four battleships was
worthwhile, and the need for gun support
must explain the retention of Des Moines
and Salem. However, their exhausted
sister Neruport News is no longer worth
keeping, especially as only two of her
turrets are operational.

4 Despite the maintenance problems of

their steam plants the 15 recently
decommissioned, Forrest Sherman class
are a useful mobilization asset. If
reactivated, the remaining units could be
improved with ASROC and VDS where
not already fitted.
5 As the US Navyhas more than enough
frigates, the 19 older FFG1, FF-01037
and FF-1040-1098 classes could, for
economic reasons, be placed in reserve.
6 There are hardly enough tank landing
ships for the active fleet, but the six older
ISTs are in MARAD custody; LST-11581160,-1162/65.MARAD also maintains a
large number of cargo and transport
ships (LKA and LPA) which can stow
tanks, and eight newly converted SL7
Ro-Ro and container ships. In a fewyears
the eight Thomaston class (LSD-28) will
be placed in reserve.
7 The difficulty of presewing wooden
hulls will probably mean that the old
Agile class MSOs, 30 years old, will be
discarded when the new MSH and MSM
join the active fleet.
8 The recent consfuuction oftenders should
ensure thatthere is no need to preservethe
40-year old ADs, ARs and ASs.

ABovE: The NISMF Norfolk; a look atits

assembly near the Jordan bridge, very
close to the Portsmouth. Va Naval
Shipyard. Pictured from left to right are:
an unidentified cargo ship, the tank
landing P ly mo uth Ro c h (LSD- 29, another
unidentifred old LSD belonging to the
Aehland class, t}l.e Fort Snelling (LST 30), three auxiliarytugs,
three patrol
gunboats of the Asheuille class, the
FRAM I destroyet William C Lawe (DD763), the fleet tugs ATF-159 and -160, as
well as some small yard craft. Outside of
the picture's frame the submarine tender
(AS-16) is located. This
HowardGilmare
cornposition is equal to the status of 12
July 1986.

All photographs
eollectinn

are from the author's

105

cruiser Emerald was used to determine the effects

7T\tr.
of shock from non-contact, underwater explosions on
I
Ia ship constructed with a double bottom. In particular, it was intended to find the distance at which
explosions of different sizes would cause failure in: the outer
bottom; both inner and outer bottoms; both bottoms and
transverse bulkheads. The shock effect in terms of
movement imparted to items of equipment such as
machinery, guns and torpedo tubes was also studied.
The ship was docked before the trial and most of the
superstructure removed to reduce top weight leaving her
with a metacentrig height of 5.6fft. Sighting boards were
installed along ihe length to indicate the whipping
deflections of the hull following an explosion and special,
instrumented weights were installed to measure acceleration
due to shock.
The trials were carried out in Loch Striven in 225ft ofwater
during 1947 and were completed on 24 October when the ship
had to be beached due to uncontrollable flooding. The
charges were suspended from a buoy held in position at
different distances from the ship by bridles. Altogether 33
shots were fired: 12 Mk XI depth charges, (180 lbs torpex);
and 21 Mk IX A mines (1080 lbs torpex).
The first sequence involved a series of four explosions in
which shock factor (W 1fD-) was gradually increased at
constant orientation. This was followed by anothersequence
of shots at constant shock factor and different orientation. In
both sequences the effects were studied with the double
bottom spaces full and empty. The earlier tests were limited
to a shock factor of 0.2 but the last three were at 0.4. 0.5 and

0.8.
Emerald was not in good condition and the inner bottom
was rusted through in several inaccessible places. After the
last shot, flooding spread through the inner bottom and
bulkheads damaged earlier until three boiler rooms were
flooded and the lower deck was awash. She was beached and

106

then refloated in June 1948 to be docked for examination of

the damage.
For a given shock factor, the maximum velocity on the
inner bottom was always less than that on the outer bottom
and was reduced by a further one-third when the inner
bottom was empty. Equipment mounted on the transverse
bulkheads suffered from much ]ower acceleration than
similarly mounted equipment in destroyers. Much of the
flooding was due to leakage at rivetted joints and, in
particular, at E strake, which was an inner strake and
unsupported by a longitudinal.
Ernerald was one of several ships which sank and had to
be salvaged for scrapping. A brief account of the problems
involved will illustrate the problems faced in such cases by
the trials team.
The last shot to be fired against her had to be postponed for
24 hours due to problems in the instrument vessel and hence
the trial was carried out one hour after high tide instead of
three to four hours before as intended. When flooding spread
after the test she was beached but at a time four to five hours
before the next high tide. This refloated her and she drifted
into deeper water finally sinking on an even keel off the
North bank of Kames Bay near Rothesay. Nothing was done
during the winter of 1947/8 except to carry out a rough
survey.
It was found that the primary cause of sinking was that the
seams ofthe strake ofplating just above the bilge keel had
split in two places over lengths of 25ft and 10ft on the port
side of B and X boiler rooms. There was also damage to the
inner bottom in the same area. These leaks could not be
repaired with the ship lying in the mud. It was estimated that
the holes in the bottom had a total area of three square feet
and that, with a 20ft head, some 11,000tons of water an hour
could enter.
The ship itseli in trials condition, weighed 6500 tons and
contained 19,150 tons of water when fully flooded. The

compartments believed to be intact while sealing off

openings through which more water could enter these
compartments. Ventilation openings etc were closed with
steel plates or cement boxes.
For the final operation a considerable force of salvage
vessels was assembled - Uplifter, Succour, Barlake,
Barsound and two tugs. The upper deck was awash for some
hours each tide and the first step was to pump out spaces
above that deck. Some of the structure had to be made
watertight to prevent water coming in while other parts had
to be pierced to allow flood water to be drawn into the pump
suctions. Emerald's stability in trials state was good but
even so she neededcareful watching with so much water free
to move.
Strength was of even more concem since most of the
buoyancy was to be regained by pumping out the ends,
leaving the centre flooded. The deflection was measured and
as long as it was less than that measured during the
explosion trials all should be well.
Lnrtr Emerald stripped out for the
explosion trials. John M aber
BELow:Orion under the impact of 1060lbs
of Torpex. Auf hor's collection

pumping took place the day before. At 0400, a battery of

pumps, some of which could shift 800 tons per hour, were in
action. By the time the tide fell below the level of the upper
deck most of the forecastle was clear. Smaller pumps were
used to clear pockets of water inside coamings etc. The lower
deck was clear by 0800 and the engine rooms had been
partially pumped out but the suction of the mud was still
holding the ship down. Uplifter and the tugs worked their
screws to break the suction and at about 0930 Ernerald
floated clear. There was still much work to be done and the
pumps were kept running until she was docked at Govan on
27 June. After inspection and repairs she was towed to Tloon
for breaking up.
Orion
The trials with Orion were a continuation of those against
Emerald with the same objects. Two main shots were fired,
both with 10901bcharges. hior to each of these explosions, a
non-damaging 1871bcharge was exploded to calibrate the
instrumentation.
The first big charge was opposite B Boiler room and caused
minor damage to the outer bottom only. Orion was docked
after this shot for examination. The second big charge was
exploded closer and opposite the middle of the forward

r07

eng:ine room. This shot flooded four main machinery

compartments very quickly and two more somewhat more
slowly' Most of the strength of the ship was lost since abrittle
fracture extended right across the upper deck amidships and
down through the sheer strake on both sides.
Orion wasbeached and temporary repairs were carried out
by RN divers under the direction of J C Lawrence RCNC.
kaks were stopped with wood and canvas patches and a
team from Rosyth Dockyard welded girders across the
fracture in the deck. The repairs were good enough to get her
to the dock at Govan where a suwey was carried out to
identify the damage. She was also made seaworthy enough
to tow to Tloon for breaking up.
It was clear that the two shots, whose distance from the
hull only differed by 10ft, straddled the critical damage
radius for that weight of explosive. The inner bottom did not
have any great effect on reducing flooding from serious
damage but did keep out water coming in from leaky rivets
and damaged sea tubes. The connection of watertight
bulkheads to the hull proved a weak point and the
importance of good detailed design was again emphasised.
The fracture of the upper deck was initiated at a point
where welding had been carried out on an unsuitable steel,
an almost inevitable teething problem with early welding
such as that on Orion. Recorders showed that the upper deck
fractured some one to one and a halfseconds afterthe second
hogging deflection. Shock levels on equipment were similar
to those measured on Ernerald.

Motor TorpedoBoats
Six boats were allocated for trials ofnon contact explosions.
These were: British Power Boat 71'6"'class, nos 454,472 and,
484; and Fairmile D, nos 702, 745 and 774. However, 702
foundered in bad weather before the trials started and was
not replaced.
The trials were held in Ioch Striven in March, May and
December 1947 using Mk XI depth charges with 187lbs
Torpex. Shots were fired against the 7l'6" craft at depths of
108

Anotherviewof&merald.duringthetrialsperiod.JohnMaber

20ft and 50ft causing rupture at distances of 41ft and 60ft

respectively. Shots at 100ft depth only caused damage if
undemeath. The Fairmiles were also tested against charges
at 20ft and Soft and failed by breaking at the petrol tank
compartment at 28ft and 53ft respectively.

Craft

No of shots

Depth (ft)

484

t19

t)

b(,

454
745
774

100

DU

20

Tobecontinued.

20

Tone refloated.after

the war, anchoredin Kureharbour, October 1945, before being scrapped. Thedominatingforwardturrets,pagoda
bridge and trunked funnels are emphasised. USN Officiat

In this feature the

authors discuss the
design of Tone and

Chihurna,
in the context of
Japanese strategic
planning.
109

Navy C,eneral Staff require/Tln"

indicated that the Tones
ments
I
J.
should not be rcpeat Mogamis.
After experience with that class it was
clear that the desired qualities could not
be obtained on a displacement of 8450
tons. The reduction in speed of one knot
indicated that an increase in displacement was anticipated. The basic design
was drawn up by Captain (shipbuilding)
Iwakichi Ezaki under the leadership of
Captain (shipbuilding) Fujimoto, already
responsible for the Mogami class.
Orders for both ships were placed at
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nagasaki.
The keel of No 5 middle class cruiser (Dai
Go Go Chu-Gata Junyokan) was laid on
1 December 1934 as yard number 600. It
was followed exactly ten months later,
1 October 1935,by yard number 670,which
had been delayed by the lack of available
building docks, No 5 became Tone,No 6
Chikuma. Both names had been carried
before by light cruisers. Tone, built in
1910, was the forerunner of the modern
Japanese light cruiser and was stricken
1 April l93L Chihuma, built in 1912,
was stricken at the same time.
The ilvestigation of stabilityin Japanese warships after the Tomozuruineident
(the torpedo boat capsized in heavy seas
on 12 March 1934) revealed that the
Mogamis were deficient in this respect.
Anticipating the outcome of the enquiry,
the plans of Tone were altered. The main
armament was reduced by one tunet, and
concentrated on the forecastle. This left
the quarterdeck free for aircraft and
torpedoes, to suit the stratgic and
tactical requirements of leading the
reconnaissance (advanced fotce) during
the decisive encounter with the Americans. Consequently, the Tone class
(basic design C-38) were completely
different from their predecessors. The
concentration of the main armament
forward was also intended to counter a
serious dispersion of shot. This had been
a problem since the Myoho class, which
the reduced distance between the fore and
aft barbettes inthe Tahao class had been
less effective in curing than the connection of C and X barbettes with the
superstructure deck in the Mogamis.(See
Warship 26 p88-9). Besides reducing
dispersion, the new arrangement was
also intended to act as an experiment for
lhe Yamato class.
When the Fourth Fleet was struck by a
typhoon during the autumn manoeuwes
on 26 September 1935 the hulls of the
latest ships showed signs of weakness,
particularly the welded joints. Aboard
Mogami and,Mikuma, welded seams tore
open and plates were dented. The
problem of inadequate hull strength and
poor welding had been noted during the
March 1935.As a result,
Mogamitialsin
the Naval Arsenal Kure investigated the
Fourth Fleet Incident and issued a

110

Tone atspeed, making full use ofher

extremely fine hull form. Author's
collection

statement in January 1936. The use of

welding was to be limited to well
supported structures and exclude all
strength members. This new construction policy was only partly adopted
in Tone, but for Chikuma riveting was
used almost throughout.
In 1936,the Navy General Staff altered
its requirements which are given below.
The earlier characteristics are given in
parentheses.

(standard
12,500tons
TriaI
8450 tons)
d,isplacement
36 knots
Speed
Power plont 150,000hp
(10,000nm,z18
8000 nm/18
Cruising
knots)
distance
knots
Twelve 15.5 cm (Fifteen 15.5
Armament
guns in four tri- cm guns in
ple turrets
five triple
turrets)
Ten 12.7 cm HA (Eight 12.7 cm
guns in five
HA guns in
four twin
twin mounts
mounts)
TWo catapults
(Four aircraft)
Six aircraft

The 15.5cm guns were nominally

retained for political reasons. In fact, by
1936 the construction of Tone was so far
advanced that such alterations would
have been almost impossible; the design
change had been carried out around the
time she was laid down. When the Naval
limitation treaties were abrogated on 31
December 1936 the Navy General Staff

ships as the night battle force) in the

interception of the American scouting
force as it crossed the Pacific. This was a
force of carriers and heavy cruisers,
which the Japanese intended to defeat in
order to gain the strategic advantage for
the night action preceding the decisive
daylight battle. These strategic plans
explain why the Japanese wanted to
maintain parity in heavy cruisers.

Technical Description of
the Hull

decided to fit them with 20.3cm guns at

once. Therefore, the ships were built as
heavy cruisers, not converted like the
Mogamis. The Staff also cancelled the
fifth 12.7cm AA twin mounting which
was to have occupiedthe centreline on the
quarterdeck, and replaced the original
20mm with 13mm and 25mm guns.
These alterations affected construction
time. Tonewas launched on 21 November
1937 and completed on 20 November
1938. It had been intended that she
complete in March t938. Chikuma was
launched on 19 March 1938 and handed
over on 20 May 1939, 14 months late.
Further delays had been caused by the
large amount of work required to improve
hull strength in the wake of the Fourth
Fleet Incident and the modernisation of
the existing capital ships. This delayed
many vessels of the Second Naval
Armament Replenishment kogramme.
The Tone class included all the lessons
learnt in the 1934and 1935disasters, and

during the construction of lhe Mogami

class. Consequently, they were the most
successful of all the Japanese heavy
cruisers, and very popular with the fleet.
Completing th e Tones and converting the
Mogamis gave the Japanese parity with
the Americans in heavy cruisers when
the Pacific War broke out. Both sides had
18. The four Takaos formed CruDiv 4; the
thtee Myokos formed CruDiv 5; and the
Furutaha/Aobo classesformed CruDiv 6;
the Mogamis CruDiv 7 and, the Tones
CruDv 8. These formations would link up
with Destroyer squadrons (DesRons) to
form night battle groups to attack the
American battle line after the outer
defences had been breached by the guns
of BatDiv 3, consisting of t}:'e fot:lr Kongo
class reconstructed fast battleships and
the torpedoes of CruDv 4.
Placing the Tones last indicated that
their primary task was not night action.
They were to act as the eyes of the
advanced force (essentially the same

The characteristic wave-like upper deck

line of the Far utaka to ?a&ao clas3eshad
been less marked in t}r,'eMogamis and,
was finally given up in the ?ozes. Only
the sharp rise ofthe bow recalled the lines
of earlier cruisers. This was necessary to
retain sufficient freeboard for seaworthiness and a reserve of displacement in the
event of damage. The shape of the bow
was typical, almost S-shaped with a
heavily cut stem and relatively strong
flared frames. This form was selectedbecause the ships might run into a Japanese
minefield of No l mines, Iaid in frontofthe
American fleet. Unlike the earlier heavy
cruisers, the hull outer skin was verticalin
the area of the armour belt. At the stern
they were slightly inclined. These lines
were similar to Suzuya and Kumano.
Below the waterline, the hull was bulged
outwards to form a small expansion space
to reduce the bursting effect of a torpedo.
The earlier patched bulges were abandoned. So the beam at the waterline was
18.5m while the maximum beam was
19.4m.
To improve stability, the draught was
increased - 6.225m against 5.50m in
Mogami.
HULL RATIOSAND COEFFICIENTS
(11.077\
Length/ Beam
10.21
( 2.955)
Beam/Draught
296
(
Depth/Drawht
1.75
?)
(
Length/Depth
18.16
?)
( 0.0306)
Depth/Length
0.0314
( 0.735)
Waterline Coefficient
0.726
( 0.863)
Midship Section
0.8922
Coefficient
( 0.545)
Block Coefficient
0.543
( 0.631)
Pisrnatic Coefficient
0.6082
(The data in parentheses are the average
values for Japanese cruisersfrom
Yubari
and. Oyodo)

111

The Superstructure
The modified design forced the superstructure to be concentrated amidships.
The fore funnel was stepped out from the
back of the bridge a modified version of
Mogami's), which had been built over the
forward boiler room. It was trunked aft
with the second funnel in a common
cover. .Alongside the funnels were the
boiler room ventilators, those to starboard for Nos 4 and 6, to port for Nos 3
and 5. Above them were spare wings for
the floatplanes to starboard, for miscellaneous equipment to port. Behind the
ventilators were the ready rooms for the
L2.7cm gun crews, and further aft spare
wings and floats. The fore tripod had a
spreader, signal yards and a short
topmast. Alongside were the boat davits
for a 9m cutter (not in wartime). The
forward searchlight platforms were over
the gun crew ready rooms; the third
platform was behind the funnel on the
centreline; and in between them was a
platform for two twin 25mm machine
guns. Aft of the deckhouse was the
mainmast which had a large topmast.
The vertical leg was also the crane post.
Alongside were another pair of the twin
25mm double mounts. The ship's boats
were arranged on both sides of the fire
control. To port one Dia San Go
Hyotekisen (Target ship No 3) (Chikuma
only), one 8m launch (Tone only) one
target ship No 3(Chikumaonly), one 12m
motor launch, one 1lm motor boat. The
starboard boats were partly secured one
above another, one 12m motor launch,
one 12m motor boat, one 6m traffic boat
(Tone only), one 9m cutter and one 6m
motor launch (Chihuma only).
Besides these features there were other
detail distinctions. At the time of completion the direction finder on the
foremast was higher aboard Chikuma,
while the signal lamp (2kw)was to the left

SKIZZE 21

11q

I J N ,C A T O N E

LANGSSCHNITI

Gun

Item

15.5cm

20.3cm

Maximumrange (vert.)
Firing rate

27,400m
7 roundsper min
(effective5)
55.8ftg
75rpm= 4.190kg
(105rpm= 5.835ke)

29,300m
5 roundsper min
(effective3)
125.85kg
30rpm= 3.776kg
(50rpm= 6.293ks)

Shell weight
Broadside weight (15 15.5)
(10 20.3)
(at theoretical
firing rate)

(r2 r5.5)

Penetrationin
NVNC

General arrangements
Michael Wunchmann

60rpm= 3.352kg
(84rpm= 4.693kg)
( 8 20.3)
108mm
15,000m
2O,OOOM 10Omm

ofthe heavy crtiser

Tone. Drautn by

24rpm= 3.020kg
40rpm= 5.034kg)
150mm
125mm

ladder to the direction finder control room

was also to the left on Chihumaand the
opposite side on Tone. Aside from the
boats, these features were concentrated
on the foremast.

Armament
The main armament consisted of eight 50
calibre 20.3cm guns, third year type No 2
in four twin mountings type E3 on the
forecastle. The second turret superfired
over the first and third. In order to reduce
the stem dead angle, turrets 3 and 4 bore
aft. The fire arcs are visible on the deck
plan. T\rrrets 2 and 4 were fitted with an
8m range finder.
The E3 gun mount allowed 55o
elevation for AA fire. The replacement of
the original 15.5cmguns was regretted by
some. The 15.5cm third year type aboard
Mogami had a smaller dispersion than
the 20.3cm and earned an excellent
reputation in the fleet.
With a greater rate of fire and more guns
the 15.5cm could deliver a larger
broadside weight than the 20.3cm.
Armour penetration at 20,000m was
adequate to defeat the protection of
existing American cruisers. Later ships,
Brooklynandeven more so the Baltimore
class, were more heavily armoured. Their
belt, barbettes and part of their turrets
could resist the smaller shells, justifying
the decision to convert to 20.3cm.

heavy and six light mounts. The 40 cali

bre type 89 l2.7cm guns were mounted in
1
four twin type A1 modification
mountings; two on each side amidships.
Elevation was -8o to +80o.The maximum
range with the 23kg heavy shell was
14,000m horizontal and 9500m vertical.
The 60 calibre 25mm type 96 guns were
installed in six twin mounts.
The 20.3cm guns would engage aircraft
out to 20,000m;the 12.7cmunder 10,000m,
and the 25mm inside 3000m. In fact, the
effective range of the 25mm did not
excede 1500m. This explains why Japanese AA fire was less effective than the
American, which relied on the longer
ranging and more powerful 40mm
Bofors.
The torpedo armament consisted of
four triple type 90 modification 1 mounts
and24'long lance'type 93 torpedos. Two
mounts were on the upper deck, one
abreast the mainmast, the other aft. They
could be swung outboard electrically or
manually through large openings in the
superstructure. They were further aft
than in t}:re Mogamis. Between the two
openings was a third for loading torpedoes.
The 20.3cm guns were controlled by the
most modern fire control in Japanese
service; the type 94. It consisted of a 6m
rangefinder on the bridge, two 8m
rangefinders in the turrets, two low angle
type 94 fire directors (94 Shiki Hoiban
Shdjun S6chi) and a main director on the

(Shaeekit6 1 Gata) atop the bridge. There

was an auxilliary tower on a stanchion
between the funnels and mainmast, with
a target speedand course follower type 92
(92 Shiki Sokutekiban) and type 92 low
angle computer (92 Shiki Shagekiban).
This system was used for fire control
aboard battleships and cruisers. There
were two type 92 low angle computers,
one specifically designed for the 15.5cm
guns aboard Mogami. This equipment,
Modification 1, had been delivered for
Tone in 1937, but as the ships were
completed with 20.3cm guns, the older
type had to be installed. The Modification
1 included facilities for measuring target
speed and angle, requidng only the
inclination angle to complete the gunnery picture. It even measured range
conections made neccessary by wind
along the line of fire. The unmodified type
92 lacked these features, requiring a
separate apparatus, called a target speed
and course follower, which looked like a
director. It was manufactured by the
Aichi Clock company of Nagoya.
The 12.7cm AA guns were controlled by
two High Angle systems, type 94 (94
Shiki Kosha Sochi). This was the first
time ithad been installed aboard a heavy
cruiser. The system included the director
(Koshaki) with a 4.5m stereoscopic
rangefinder and the type 94 the high
angle computer towers (Kosha Shagekibab). The high angle fire control towers
(Kosha Shageki Sochi, Shageki-to) were
installed on supports either side of the
bridge to control the mounts on that side.

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seen from starboard. 4. The bridge and head view. Drawiby
Michael Wuuachntann

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1 Firedirectortype94(94shiki 1 gata
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DrawingNo 2
2 6m rangefinfler
DrawingNo 3
3 Signallingdevice
4 Signallantern
DrawingNo 4
5 magneticcompasstype93
6 repeater(compass)
T l2cmbinocular
8 18cmbinocular
9 positionlights
1O Torpedocomputertype93
11 Torpedof ire directortype 9'l model(91
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15 Devisefor signalflags
DrawingNo 5
16 Firedirectortype95for25mm MG
17 1.5mrangefinder
18 Air bearingplatetype 13 No 1
19 8cm binocularwith transmittingdevice
1eAA gunsand MG
20 6ocmsignalsearchlight
21 12cmbinoculartype3 for air search
22 Searchlightdirectortype94 and air
lookoutoosition
23 Devicefor signalflags
24 Stowagefor signalflags
DrawingsNo 6
25 Surfacebearingplatetype 13 No 1
'1
26 .5m rangefinder
27 Containerfor gunnerydepartment
28 Containerfor varioussubjects

K meanssteeringengineroom
DrawihgNo 7
29 25mm MG in twin mount
30 ReadyammunitioncontainernearMG
31 Containerfor variousreserveoartsof
the MG
32 AA fire detectortype 94
33 4.5mm rangefinder
DrawingNo 8
34 Supportfor M fire directortype 94
35 Ventilationopeningfor secondboiler
room
36 Ventilationopeningfor third boilerroom
37 Coverof funel
38 2 and4funnelopenings
39 1 and 3 funnelopenings

115

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showing armour scheme, bulge and

frl:nnel. A uthor' s Collection.

This was a fully techyrnetric system, the

director being tri-axial with the computer
in the plotting room below deck
incorporating a spherical resolver for
deck tilt. As a development of the type 91
it retained many of the features of the
earlier system, polar co-ordinates depending on accurate slant range. These
provided accurate solutions for diving
and climbing targets.
Both high and low angle systems relied
on the 'follow the pointer' system,
information
being transmitted to the
turrets for elevation and deflection. For
the t2.7cm guns, fuse settings were also
sent. The 25mm needed no such system.
Each pair of mounts was directed by a
type 95 fire control (Shiki Kiju Shageki
Sochi) through remote control by Wardkonard selsJms. T'his was the standard
short range systm, and the only one
suitable for remote control. The aiming
device was based on the French Le Prieur
sight (LPR Shiki Shojunki). In all
multiple mounts, the elevation and training motors were interconnected by
selsyns to prevent them getting out of
synchronisation. The fire control for the
25mm guns was installed on a platform
in front of the bridge, and two systems on
a platform aft of the 20.3cm fire control.
The torpedo fire conl4rl consisted of
two type 91 model 3 directors (91 Shiki
H6iban 3 Gata), two target course and
speed followers, type 93 (93 Shiki
Sokutekiban), one type 93 computer (93 Shiki Shahdban) and one fire command
computer type 92 (92 Shiki Haasahashikiban). The last was mounted in the foretop.
The target followers were on either wing of
the compass bridge.
Because the torpedo was vital in the
Japanese strategy, the fire control had
been subjected to considerable attention.
American investigators found it 'well
constructed and accurate. The Japanese
approach to the torpedo problem for
above water launching is surprisingly
complet and comprehensive, provision
having been made for introducing into
the computing unit almost every conceivable constant and variable pertaining to
the problem. Torpedo fire control
contains the only example of automatic
inputs using electrical follow-up gear
which have been found in Japanese fire
control of any kind. Use has been made of

reversible motor through a magnetic type

hunter switch.'
The type 92 fite director was a
relatively simple mechanism, using an 8
or 12cm binocular sight with several
annular rings to introduce the firing
corrections. Because Tone was equipped
with target speed and course followers
and computers, these were only used to
track the target and provide bearings for
other instruments. These were used to fix
target course and speed after fixing ship
course and speed, with bearing and
range. This equipment increased the
potential range of torpedo fire, especially
useful after the introduction ofthe type 93
oxygen 24in model. However, it did not
allow for the continuous calculations of
target course and speed necessary for
blind firine. This was only corrected in
the Sokutekiban type 3 and onlyinstalled
in a few destroyers later in the war. The
type 93 computer allowed a limited
continuous calculation of speed and
course, using theoretical gyro angles.
In front of the fire control computer was
the circular direction finding aerial,
higher on Chikumathan Tone. The lines
from this led to the measuring room
halfway up the foremast.
Around the funnels, three 110cm type
93 searchlights were installed on stanchions, controlled by type 94 directors,
similar to the type 93 25mm director.
These were installed on the bridge. One
60cm signal light was installed on either
side ofthe signal bridge.

Aircraft and Facilities

The Japanese Navy was early to appreciate the value of aircraft. FromFurutaka
on, all cruisers had one catapult near the
mainmast. After the modernisation of the
Myokos they had two, like the Takaos
and Mogarnis which were fitted vrith
them from the first. Room for these had to
be made between the aft superstructure
and the aft turrets. In each case blast
pressure from the guns hampered flying
operations. If either aft turret was in
action no seaplane could be placed on the
catapults or launched. Blast also
damaged aircraft standing on the deck
uncovered. In order not to restrict the arcs
of fire. aircraft had to be launched before
a gunnery duel. This was also a fire
prevention measure, but it reduced the
combat effectiveness of the ships. The
primary task of the heavy cruisers'
seaplanes was reconnaissance. They
would shadow the American battlefleet,
wearing down the crews bydayandnight
attacks, often in concert with other
Japanese warships. Their role as
gunnery spotters was secondary.
lhe seaplanes were also to be used
during the night battle. For this role they
had to be able to take off during a
gunnery action. This could not be done on

quarterdeck reserved for aircraft operations, allowing them to escapethe effects

of the blast. This also allowed more
aircraft to be stowed. The actual
equipment was identical to that of
Mogami, but with a broader stern and
more space. The main deck and superstructure decks were connected by a
transport rail on the centreline. This had
a turntable on the main deck, which gave
access to parking rails on both sides. At
the stern, another rail allowed two twoseater type 95 seaplanes to be stowed
(Kakajime E8N1). In all, four could be
berthed on the main deck. The superstructure was lengthened aft on both
sides of the transport rail and on each
side a turntable and berthing rails were
fitted for one three-seater type 94
seaplane (Kawanishi E7K2). There were
five turntables with corresponding connecting rails on the superstructure deck.
The 19m gunpowder propelled Kure
type 2 Model 5 catapults (Kure Shiki 2 G6
Shashutu 5 Cata) were fitted on sponsons
on the superstructure deck. They could
fire a seaplane of up to four tons at 28
miles per second (2.7 g. acceleration). The
crane was primarily for embarking the
seaplanes. Launch and recovery operations were controlled from a platform on
the mainmast. This equipment was little
different from that of the other heavy
cruisers.
During the Pearl Harbour operation,
there were doubts whether the seaplanes,
inadequately covered with canvas, could
be used after a long voyage through cold
waters. Unlike the Japanese, both American and Royal Navies used hangars.
These were originally in the mid body,
clear of blast. However, they were agrave
fire risk and in the Brooklyn and later
ships the Americans placed their aircraft
on the quarterdeck with a hangar below.
The Royal Navy retained the central
position, but by 1944few cruisers carried
their planes. The Japanese used hangars
aboard Yamato and the light cruiser
Oyodo. Originally, the firstfourclasses of
20.3cm cruiser had a small hangar, but
this was removed to increase stowage
and keep the planes ready. In return,
blast and maintenance problems affected
availability.
After completion, the air arrangements
were tested aboard Chikurna. It was
ascertained that a maximum of four type
94 and four type 95 could be embarked. It
had been intended to carry six in total,
four type 95. In practice, no more than
five were carried. By 1941,the shortage of
personnel ensured that only two ofeach
type were carried. Later, these old types
were replaced by the three-seater type O
(Aichi E13A1) and the two-seater type O
(Mitsubishi F1M1).
To be continued.

r77

WORLDWARII
Vernon J Miller

continuerni;l;;;lt;i;r';i'us

118

in in" Pucific
submarineLosses

119

usco (ss-290)

Cisco (SS-90)Photo Date: May 1943.Notionol Archiues

Negatiue 19-N-47193

CDR James W Coe. All 86 crew lost.

Last Transmission Date: Never heard from after
departing Port Darwin 19 September 1943 for first patrol.
Loss Cause: Probably depth charged, bombed, and sunk 28
September 1943 in Sulu Sea, west of Iloilo, Panay Island, at
09o,47'N, 1210,44'E,by Japanesenaval aircraft of 954th Air
Group and Japanese gunboat Karatsu (ex-USS Luzon).
Japanese auxiliary minesweepers Choun Maru No /8 and
Korei Marudropped additional depth charges 1 October 1943
at scene-of attack.
Supporting Euidence: Japanese claim Karatsu originally
detectedarea of 'leaking oil' at 10o,30'N, 121o,55'E, and
made initial depth charge attack at this point. Japanese
reported that'oil continued to gush out even on 10
October'. Area where attack was reported is only slightly
north and east of Cisco's expected position on date of
attack.

coBvrNA(ss-216)
CDR Roderick S Rooney. All 82 crew lost.
Last Transmission Date: Never heard from after
departing Johnston Island 6 November 1943 for first
patrol.

torpedoes were fired at 0020hrs on 16 November, and two

hits were observed one minute later. Japanese claim these
resulted in 'a great explosion sound'. Large quantity of oil
was discovered on the surface when I-176 surfaced at
003Ohrs.
DARTEB (SS-227)
CDR David H McClintock. All 81 crew survived.
Last Transmission Date: on 24 October 1944 after
departing Port Darwin 10 September 1944 for fourth
patrol.
Loss Cause: Grounded at 0005hrs on 24 Oclober 1944 on
Bombay Shoal, off Palawan, South China Sea, while
running surfaced at 17 hrots speed.
Analysis: Partial destruction carried out by gunfire from
Dace (SS-247) and,Nautilus (55-168) to prevent possible
enemy utilisation after the demolition charges aboard
Darter failed" to go off properly. Dace hit Darter with 2I
4in hits and Nautilus with 55 6in hits. Wreckage still
extant in 1962.
DORADO (SS-248)
LCDR Earle C Schneider. All 76 crew lost.

Loss Cause: Torpedoed and sunk 16 November 1943 while

running surfaced south of T!uk, Caroline Islands, at 05o,
05'N, 151o,1OE, by Japanese submarine I-176 (LCDR
Kosaburo Yamaguchi).

Last Transmission Date: Never heard from after

departing New London 6 October 1943 en route to
Panama Canal.

Supporting Euidence: Coruina was originally detected at

22l2hrs at range of about 8000m on 15 November. As
range was closed, Coruina submerged at22l6hrs, but was
again observed at 2357hrs at a range of 2500m. Three

Loss Cause: Several loss possibilities exist; none with

sufficient evidence to permit any definite conclusion.
1. Loss usually attributed to being depth charged in error at
2051hrs 13 October 1943in Caribbean Sea, at 15o,21'N, 73o,

r20

Coruinn (33-226) Photo Date: 9 May 1943 at Groton, CT.

Launch, Photos ofcompleted ship have not been located and
probably do not exist..Alational Archiues Negatiue 8O-G44985
ToP RIGHT:Dorter (SS-227)Photo Date: 6 June 1943 at
Groton, CT. Launch. Photos ofcomplete ship prior to
stranding photos have not been located and probably do not
exist. National Archiues Negatiue 8O-G-7 263O
MTDDLE RTGHTDARTER (SS-227) Photo Datez Aftet 24 Oct
1944, showing wreckage aglound on Bombay Shoal, offSW
Palawan. US NaualHistorical
Center Phatograph NH63699, eopiedfrom US Subrnarine Losses, WWII
BoTtoM RrcHT: Dorado (SS-248) Photo Date: 23 May 1943 at
Groton, CT. Launch. Photos ofcompleted ship have not been
located and probably do not exist. US.Ay'ouolHistorical
Center Photograph,
courtesy of D M McPherson
13'W, by US naval PBM-3 aircraft

assigned to Guantanamo,

Cuba.
2. Possibly sunk by one of 15 mines laid by German
submarine U-214 (Kptll. Rupprecht Stock) 8 October 1943
near Colon, about three miles off entrance to Panama
Canal.
3. Possibly sunk 15 October 1943 by one of two EMS mines
laid by U-214 on 13-14 October east of Antilles.
4. Possibly operational or loss unreported enemy attack.
Supporting Eui.dence:
1. Aircraft under command of LT CIg)D t Felix, detected
surfaced submarine at 2047hrs. Dorado at 2030hrs was
reported at 15', 30N, 72, 4O'W, about 48miles away, bearing
100o and steering on course 243o trre. Detected submarine
was steering 310o, on an intercept course with convoy GAT
92. Submarine clearly seenby aircrafb crew, was described as
having characteristics of a minelayer.
Aircaft at 2051hrs dropped three Mk 47 depth charges
and one Mk 4 Mod 4 demolition bomb. One depth charge
and the bomb were duds, and no-one aboard plane heard
or saw any explosion from other two depth charges. On
second sweep with flares released to observe results of

attack, nothing was seen except a large patch of white

water and bubbles, which would indicate diving
submarine.
Second contact was made by the same plane at 2240tlls.
Attempts to exchange recognition signals by Aldis lamp
resulted in submarine firing upon plane while taking
evasive action. When plane emerged from rain squall,
submarine could not be detected. Extensive search by
plane and escort vessel PC-1251 did not locate sub or
debris.
Patrol report ofU 2I4 does not mention first attack. Since
there were no explosions, it is possible the Commanding
Officer was not aware ofthe attack. The patrol report

t27

'bright,
does mention two instances of sightings of a
yellow flash of light'. The first of these could have been
flares dropped by the PBM-3, and the second may have
been flares from search vessels and aircraft. These
possibly may also have been seenby Dorado, which dived
probably and vacated area as quickly as possibie.
2. Dorado was in vicinity almost immediately after these
mines were laid and when they offered the greatest
hazard. First of these mines was not detected until 16
October. For next three weeks nine minesweepers lifted 10
mines. Remainder were never found.
3. U2l4laid one EMS mine at 0025hrs 13 October and the
other at 0402hrs 14 October. On 15 October, U 214 heard
heavy explosion, followed by eight other explosions,
between 1648 and 170?hrs. This could have been the
contact with the mine by Dorado. No other vessels were

t22

lost in this areaat this time to explain the seriesof

explosions.
4. While operationalloss is always possible,possibility of
loss to unreportedenemyattack is considerednil. Other
U-boatsin area were U-123,U-218,U-516,and U-518.All
returnedsafely to port, and none mentionedany attack
on a submarine.Apparently, none wereinvolved in
minelaying activities.
ESCOLAR(SS-294)
CDR Wtliam J Millican. All 82 crewlost.
Last TransrnissionDate: On 30 September1944aft,er
departingMidway 23 September1944for first patrol.
Percft.(SS-313)was in contact vmthEscolaruntil 17

Groton, CT. Civilian workers

putting on finishing touches
after launch. The only other
photo located in official files.
National Archiue s Negatiu e
80-G-468485

Lnw rEseolar (SS-294) Photo

Date: 18 April 1943 at Cramp
ShipbuildingCo,
Philadelphia, PA. Launch;
Photos ofcomplete ship have
not been located and probably
do not exist. National
Archiue s N egatiu e 8O-G 77167

BELow: .Flier (SS-250) Photo

Date: 20 April 1944 at Mare
Island, CA. Cr edit N ationnl
Archiues Negatiue 7 9-N65327

October 1944, at which time Escolar was at 33o, 44'N,

127",33'F',enroute to position 33', 44N, 129o,06'E.
Loss Cause: Possibly mined about 17 October 1944 in
Yellow Sea somewhere between the two indicated
positions.
Supporting Euidence: In June 1943 three lines of Type 93
influence mines were laid in southern part of Yellow Sea
by auxiliary minelayers Koei Maru, Shinko Maru, and
Saigon Maru. Additional mines were laid in September
1943 by minelayer Nasami and still more were laid in
January t944 by minelayer ltsukushima.
Efforts by Perch (SS-313) and Croaker (55-246) to contact
Escolar after t7 October were unsuccessful.
Analysis: Other attacks listed in Japanese records as
possible loss causes,none of which is considered feasible, are
as follows:
1. Possibly depth charged and sunk 18 October 1944 near
Sasebo,by Japanese patrol-escort vessel CD 34.
Immediately after leaving Sasebo, CD 34 claims to have
'attacked submarine' with 'obscure results'.
2. Possibly depth charged and sunk 19 October 1944in
the Sasebo Sea area by Japanese patrol-escort vessel CD
38 which claimed detection of submarine at 1600hrs, with
about 30 depth charges being dropped. Japanese report

'oil and numerous inside warship articles floated

states
up' and that'sinking certain'.
3. Possibly depth charged and sunk 22 October 1944
north and Ukushimo in the North Goto Islands by
Japanese patrolescort vessel CD 30 which claims to have
'sunk submarine'while on patrol.
',
'
While Japanese records do not give specific positions for
these attacks, each was in the Sasebo area and were just
south ofthe position to which Escolar was enroute.
FLIEE (SS.25O)
CDR John D Crowley. 78 crew lost, 8 survivors.
Last Transrnission Date: On 12 August 1944 after
departing Fremantle 2 August 1944 for secorrd patrol.
Loss Cause: Sank within 30 seconds while still making 15
knots following violent explosion estimated to have been
on starboard side abreast of forward battery while
surfaced; believed caused by contact mine at 2200hrs, 13
August 1944, at approximately 9o, 00'N, 117o, 15'E, about
6700 yards off Comiran Island, Balabac Strait, south of
Palawan, South China Sea. Mine probably was laid by
Japanese minelayer Tsugaru.
Supporting Euidence: Tsugaru laid numerous mines in .
Balabac Strait area in March 1944ta strenghen original
field laid in March 1943.

123

SUBMARINE _
CAPITAL SHIP OF
TODAY
JohnMarriott
Ian Allan, 120pp,
illustrated
ISBN 0 711015953

f11.95

Designed to explain in semi

technical terms how modem
submarines and their
weapons function, the author
also discussesthe different
types of submarine to be
found in the world's navies
and their strategic and
tactical deployment.
Although a knowledge of
electronics is useful to enable
the reader to follow, in depth,
such chapters as that on
navigation the author,
nevetheless, has succeededin
writing a very useful
reference book for a wider
public.
The chapter dealing with
communications, for
example, is probably as up-todate as any publication can
be with today's rapidly
changing technology.
However, as the author points
out, basic principles do not
change and the reception of
Very Low Frequency Radio
signals by the use oftrailing
antenna from a submarine at
depth is a case in point. The
early experiments in
submerged reception in
1916-17used a similar
technique and the'Fish'
Hydrophone of 1917-18 was
the forerunner of today's
towed arrays for passive
sonar. The computerhas
revolutionised virtually every
aspect of the submarine's
systems, with weapons and
sonar achieving degreesof
sophistication undreamt of in
1945.
Each major function of
today's submarine is clearly
identified and described with
accompanying diagrams and
some excellent photographs,
well-chosen to illustrate the
text.

The chapter dealing with

submarine roles should be
required reading for any
politician mystified by the
arguments for and against a
nuclear submarine deterrent.
The author takes up no
position - he merely sets out
the facts of the nuclear
missile deterrent forces
employed by Russia and the
Western allies, as well as
clearly explaining the roles
'attack' (SSN) boat.
of the
One addition which could
usefully have been included
in a book of this type is a
glossary of terms and
initials. Most of the latter
are translated when they
first appear in text (SOSUS,
SUBROC, SINS, etc) and
indeed some will be familiar
to those readers who are
generally acquainted with
the subject of underwater
warfare. However, it would
have been useful to have a
list of acron5rms for the less
well-versed the next time a
particularly elusive set of
initials appeared.I would
also have liked an index.
The chapter devoted to
Soviet submarines is, of
necessity, lacking in the
same detail as those dealing
with NATO forces. but the
author has assembled a good
deal of information and
provided some logical
guessesaimed at filling in
the blank spaces. In
particular, he analyses the
Soviet's massive submarine
fleet and its strategic roles in
the European and Pacific
areas, in such a way as to
convince the reader that.
formidable threat though it
is, the balance has not
swung irretrievably against
NATO.
Any book ofthis type
must also deal with
submarine rescue - the
subject beloved of
dramatists. Mr Marriott puts
the facts clearly and simply,
emphasizing the big
advance made in the past 10
years, both in terms of deep

sea rescue and from the

shallower waters of the
European Continental Shelf.
The British Navy has made
an outstanding contribution
to the latter whilst their
American counterparts have
concentrated on the recovery
of men at depths which were
unimaginable 20 years ago.
However, it is interesting to
learn that fhe famous
McCann.RescueChamber,
(which made headlines in
1939,not 1937as noted by
Mr Marriott), with its rescue
of survivors from the USS
Squalus) is still in use.
The depressing fact that
emerges is that even the
Americans are unable to
afford funds to build more
than two DSRVs (Deep
Submergance Rescue
Vessels) out ofthe original
plan for six, ie, always one
in the vicinity of the main
submarine operating areas.
Britain cannot afford anv
DSRVs and relies on the
generosity of the US if an
emergency arises. No facts
are known about the
Russian methods of
salvaging sunken
submarines or rescuing their
crews, although the
Kommuna which was built
as a submarine salvage
vessel in 1913 was reported
to be still in service in 1982.
Finally, Mr Marriott does
not neglect the men who
man today's submarines. A
perceptive chapter detailing
the different lifestyles
necessary for those who
serve in SSBNs, SSNs, and
SS boats indicates the need
for careful selection of
personalities as well as
professional competence. The
parallel between the bomber
crew and fighter pilot seems
to be reflected in the
different attitudes required
for the missile and attack
submarine crews. However,
the author does leave the
impression that the three
nuclear submarine navies of
the West are manned by

volunteers - not, I think,

totally accurate.
Overall, this is a very
readable book. It dwells little
on the past but in time will
itselfform a valuable
addition to submarine
history. Would that such a
book had been written at
previous stages in the
development of the
twentieth-century's
underwater battlefleets. Mr
Marriott has sensibly
avoided indulging his own
opinions to the exclusion of
the facts. His interpretations
of East-West submarine
strategies and tactics are
lucid and well-balanced and,
although not a submariner
himself, he has clearly made
the best of the opportunities
provided him by the British
and American Submarine
Commands in writing a
book which is essentially
aimed at updating the
landsman and the
submariner of yesteryear.
Brian Head

THE POSTWAR
NAVAL
REVOLUTION
Norman

Friedman

Conway Maritime Ress

280 x 216mm, 240pp, 150
photographs
ISBN 0 8577144 8, f18.00
In this major book Norman
Friedman turns his unique
combination of talents to
illuminate the first ten years
of naval policy making post
1945, primarily from a
British perspective. His
insights into the altered
needs ofthe fleet. and the
perceived enemy strengths
are based on recently
declassified material.
Further points on the new
technology suggest that too
much was attempted too

development programmes,
poor performance and early
obsolescence.The first
generation of ship-to-air
missiles provide an excellent
example. They dominated
the cruiser/destroyer designs
of the period, and yet added
little real power to the ships
they graced. High
performance guns, the US
3in 70 being the worst
offender, were equally
troublesome, as were high
pressure boilers in US
escorts of the 1950s.All
these efforts proved to be a
maintenance nightmare,
which did not improve the
manning problems, or reduce
the need for ever more
technicians.
At a time when Britain
appears to be taking on a
role outside NATO, albeit a
small one (Falklands and
Persian Gulf), the decline of
conventional strength, rising
costs and over concentration
on nuclear war tasks of the
period under review should
serve as a timely warning.
The difference between the
high-tech ships ofthe 1960s
and the gunboat duties they
were called on to fulfill made
for embar"rassing choices
(pointed out by James
Cable). There has been a
reaction since 1982 and it
could go further if Tlident is
cancelled. On that issue the
author claims that the
selection of Polaris did. doorn
the carrier replacement
programme. It is a moot
point if Polaris alone has
deterred anything. It relies
on the American deterrent to
remain credible. New
carriers would have deterred
Argentina. Seapower must
be flexible if it is to be
credible, and this book
points out earlier errors.
They should not be repeated.
My only regret is that we
shall have to wait a long
while before the material is
released for Norman
Friedman to write a followon.

THE ROYALNAVY:
1973-1900.
MansellW P Gossett
240 x 160mm 155pp
ISBN 0 72t0 t8t6 6 f19.95
A fascinating compilation of
incidents from a provoking
angle. This chronological
sequenceincludes several
unlucky names; fle Rangers
and four Jaspers were lost in
the period. The hazards of
blockade and cruiser warfare
between 1793 and 1815 were
replaced by negliegence,
mishap and eventually a
rash of old wooden ships
catching fire while serving
as training ships. No-one
who reads this book will be
in any doubt that the
Napoleonic wars at sea were
more likely to prove fatal
through storm and
shipwreck than enemy
action. Precious few ships
were captured. To {inish off
there is an index to the
relevant courts martial that
will assist those interested in
a particular ship.
.:

SHIP:HMS
WARSPITE.
Ross Watton
Conway Maritime hess
260mm x 245mm 120pp,
heavily illustrated
ISBN 0 851774121f14.00

AND
STRENGTHS
LIABILITIES

editedby Watson and

Watson

ArmsandArmourPress
235mm x 155mm 333pp,
illustrated
ISBN08536872r8f19.95

Following the successof his

first book, dealing with HMS
Belfast, Ross Watton has
prepared this excellent study
of the most famous of all the
British Dreadnoughts.
Among the liberal supply of
photographs is one ofthe
ship in dock after Jutland,
and an even more striking
one of the grand old vessel
limping into Malta after the
glider bomb attack. A
synopsis of Warspite's
origins, career, modifications
and reconstruction precede
the main element of the book
- a superb collection of
drawings. A book for all
battleship enthusiasts.

An in-depth study of the

Soviet fleet, command,
personnel, ships and
aircraft , capabilities,
operations and a wellbalanced prognosis provide
all the information required
for any assessment of the
Red Navy. Work like this is
the product of a large-scale
Soviet watching industry in
the USA, and reflects an
obsession. The only pity is
that the Soviets do not
publish their assessment of
the USN. It would doubtiess
make interesfing reading.

Illustration of the Bridge

Structure taken from
Warspite.

725

Reinforcing the
Eastern Fleet
I thoroughly enjoyed the
article'Reinforcing the
Eastern Fleet', and on the
strength of this article I
hope Mr Willmott may
become a regular contributor
to your excellent publication.
Note 3 comments on the
unhappy experience of
combining fleet and escort
carriers for Councillor and
observes that the only other
such operation was
undertaken in the Pacific.
Between April and August
1944. the Home Fleet
launched a series ofair
strikes against Tirpitz in
KAfjord. Barracudas from
the fleet carriers were
accompanied by fighters
from escort carriers which
also contributed to the air
and anti-submarine defences
of the fleet. I have never
heard that this combination
was considered a failure,
although it may be that the
circumstances (the distances
involved, fighter opposition,
etc) were not such as to
admit direct comparison
with Councillor. The Tirpitz
raids may also have a
bearing on the following
point.
Mr Wilmott accounts for the
non-availability of a British
fleet carrier to reinforce the
Eastem Fleet and mentions
that Atheling and. Begum
had served only in the A/S
role and lacked fighters. He
is doubtless also aware that.
in the ferry role, their decks
would have been so littered
with parked aircraft as to
make even training flights
difficult, if not impossible. It
is probable that many, or
most, British CVEs were
equipped and trained
primarily for A,/S warfare at
this time. On the other hand,
some escort carriers were
available to operate fighters
and four such earriers flew
Wildcats and Hellcatis in
support of Operation
Tungsten against Tirpitz on
3 April 1944. (There was
probably a trend towards
fighter CVEs - by August
1944 no less than seven RN
escort carriers were available

726

to put up Wildcats, Hellcats

and Seafires in support of
Anvil alone.) Some reports
suggest that the RN's Mark
II version of the formidable
Chance Vought Corsair had
had its wingtips shorn by
16in in order to be operable
from escort carriers,
although this drastic method
of reducing the overall
height of the aircraft (with
wings folded) may also have
been necessitated by the
limited hangar dimensions
of the older armoured
carriers.
I suspect that, even
allowing for the problems of
tropicalising vessels for
service in the Far East, a
decision must have been
taken not to divert fighter
CVEs. Maybe, with Overlord
coming rp, Tirpitz was given
higher priority as a target
than the fleet in Singapore.
If Mr Wilmott has
discovered any reference to
such a debate in the course
ofhis researches, I should be
interested to learn of it.
A Clayton

Although the two Beaufort

squadrons were employed on
patrol sorties they were at
all times assigned to antishipping duties - there were
simply no targets. In fact,
they formed the best-trained
and most highly skilled
torpedo strike force the RAF
ever possessed.The crews
flew A/S patrols to give
them something to do
between training. The
powers that were did, of
course, use that dual
capability as an excuse for
not providing dedicated A/S
squadrons.
With regard to the
boncentration of superior
Japanese forces, were the
IJN's old battleships really
more battleworthy than the
'R's?
Roger Hayward.

u35
This picture was taken at
Blyth shortly after the 1918
Armistice. L20 (Lt Cvril
Coltart) is alongside the
surrendered German U-Boat
U35 with Gl and G2
inboard. U35 was one of
Germany's most famous
submarines. When in the
Mediterranean under the
comrirand of l-othar von
Arnauld de la Peridre, U35
sank 54 vessels between 26th
July and 20th August t916;
a total of 91,150tons of

shipping. This still stands as

a record for any submarine
c.o. Before he left U35 von
Arnauld had accounted for
195 sinkings, including two
warships, an armed
merchant cruiser and five
troopships. Launched in
1913, U35 was scrapped in
1919.
It is interesting to compare
the background of this
picture with presentday
Blyth; the seaward approach
to Blyth harbour is still
clearly recognisable.
Brian Head

NEWBOOKSFROMCONWAY
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New,Secondhand
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WARRIOR:
RESTORINGTHE
WORLD'S FIRST
IRONCLAD
Andrew Lambert
This is both the story of a momrmental
restoration effort and a detailed
discussionof the obiectof that effort a nineteenth century ironclad.
Launched in 1860Warrior was the first
ever iron-hulled, seagoing armoured
ship. For a number of years she was
the most power{ul warship in the
world; now, in 1987, she is to be put
permanentlyon display in
Portsmouth.
254x 195mm(10"x 71/2"),
L92pages,150
photographs,40
linedrawings.
ISBN0 85177
411-3. f1.5.95Published
16April 1987

THE CONSTRUCTION
AND FITTING OFTHE
SAILING MAN OF
WAR L650-1850 I
Peter Goodwin
This book is a companion volume to
|ames Lees' Masting and Rigging and
does for the hull and its fittings what
thatbookdid for sparsand rigging. It
is a highly detailed discussion of every
aspect of the building process of
wooden warships and destined to
becomethe classicbook on the subject.
295x 248mm(111/2"
x 9y4'),288pages,100
ISBN0 85177
photographs,
300linedrazoings.
27 May 1987
3265. f,30.00Published

ANATOMY OF THE
SHIP: THE L00-GUN
SHIP VICTORY
lohn McKay
The latest in this highly successful
series looks at probably the best
designed and most successful ship of
the eighteenth century. Victory is one
of the most famous ships of all time,
with a fighting career spanning half a
century. The ultimate sailing warship,
she is preserved at Portsmouth.
240x 254mm(91/2"
x 10") landscape,
120pages,
26 photographs,
300line drawings.ISBN0
444X. f14.00Published
21.Mav 1987
851.77

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NEXT ISSUE
In Warship 43 we will be looking at the
reactivation ofthelowaClass battleships
while the Leopard-Chesapeake incident
of 1807 is discussed by Harvey Strum.
There is a Warship pictorial which
features the destruction of the French
fleet at Toulon in 1942 and Andrew
Lambert writes on Russian and Soviet
seapower. We continue our features on
Tone and Orzel and look at more ship
trials and further US submarine losses.
and main stockist for Sirmar 1:96 modern
warship hulls and fittings . listl. 75 inc p
& p. Also warship plans. MARITIME
MODELS, 7 Nelson Road, Greenwich,
London SElO. Tel: 01-858 5661.
RoBERT AND SUSAN PYKESecond hand and
antiquarian maritime booksellers, large
wide-ranging stock. Free catalogues. 2
Beaufort Villas, Claremont Road, Bath.
Tel: 0225 311710.
NATIONAL MARITIME MUSEUM The History
of the Sea in a Palace bytheRiver Romney
Road , Greenwich , London SElO. Tel: 01
8584422.
MOTOR BOOKS NAVAL section stocks
CONWAY's publications together with
thousands of others. We also specialise in
MOTORING, RAILWAYS, AVIATION &
MILITARY. MOTOR BOOKS, 33 St
Martins Court, London WC2N 4AL. Tel:
01 836 6728 / 5376.

BACK COVER: The Polish submarine Orzel leaving

Rosyth for a North Sea Patrol. CPL.

THE MARY ROSE SHIP HALL AND

EXHIBITION See Henry VIII's warship in
her new dry dock and the new exhibition
featuring fascinating displays of the
historical 'treasures' of the ship - the
everyday objects she carried on aJuly day
in 1545.
Open every day from lO:30-5:oo. HM
Naval Base, Portsmouth POI 3LX. Tel:
07057505211839766.
JULIANS FOR NAUTICAL BOOKS. Send for
our catalogue of secondhand books
covering all aspects of the sea and ships:
RN, MN and yachts. 35 Venn Grove,
Hartley, PLYMOUTH PL3 5PH. Tel: 0752
701740.
CHATHAM HISTORICDOCKYARD

MEDWAY

Visit Kent's Georgian Royal Dockyard

and enjoy Britain's largest concentration
of scheduled ancient monuments. See its

unique traditional ropery in action.

April- October open Wednesday- Sunday
lO - 6. Admission free.
IMPERIAL WAR MUSEUM

WELCOME ABOARD HMS BELFAST

the friendliest museum afloat!

Explore all seven decksofthismajesticold

cruiser and discover what life at sea was

really like during World War II.
Open 7 days a week from 11am.
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RoYAL NAVAL MUSEUM HM Naval Base,
Portsmouth, Hampshire POI 3LR. Tel:
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The Entire History of the Royal Navy
from Tudor Times to the South Atlantic
Campaign of 1982. Special Display on the
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John R. Haynes
FINE SHIP MODELS
The specialist modelmaker for the construction/restoration of warship models from 1860
onwards. Ships restored for the Imperial War Museum, constructed for the MoD. Science
Museum, Fleet Air Arm Museum and private collectors in the UK and USA.

Meadowrise, Overhall lane, Ashdon, Saffron Walden, Essex CB1 0 2JH

Telephone: 0799-84 357

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