REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G. R. No. 187512
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

- versus -

YOLANDA CADACIO GRANADA,

Respondent.

Promulgated:
June 13, 2012

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
SERENO, J.:

This is a Rule 45 Petition seeking the reversal of the Resolutions dated 23 January
2009[1] and 3 April 2009[2] issued by the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the
grant by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent.
In May 1991, respondent Yolanda Cadacio Granada (Yolanda) met Cyrus
Granada (Cyrus) at Sumida Electric Philippines, an electronics
company in Paranaque where both were then working. The two eventually got
married at the Manila City Hall on 3 March 1993. Their marriage resulted in the
birth of their son, Cyborg Dean Cadacio Granada.
Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down,
Cyrus went to Taiwan to seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time,
she had not received any communication from her husband, notwithstanding
efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he had asked the relatives of Cyrus
regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus
declared presumptively dead. The Petition was raffled to Presiding Judge Avelino
Demetria of RTC Branch 85, Lipa City, and was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 20020530.
On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to
locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already
dead. However, in an Order dated 29 June 2007, the RTC denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal to elevate the case to the CA, presumably
under Rule 41, Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. Yolanda filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued
that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the
Family
Code,
was
a
summary
judicial
proceeding,
in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and, thus, not
appealable.
In its 23 January 2009 Resolution, the appellate court granted Yolandas
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino,[3] the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding. Thus, judgment
thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied by
the CA in a Resolution dated 3 April 2009.[4]
Hence, the present Rule 45 Petition.
Issues

1.
Whether the CA seriously erred in dismissing the
Petition on the ground that the Decision of the RTC in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not
subject to ordinary appeal
2.
Whether the CA seriously erred in affirming the RTCs
grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death under
Article 41 of the Family Code based on the evidence that respondent
presented

Our Ruling
1.
On whether the CA seriously erred in
dismissing the Petition on the ground that the
Decision of the RTC in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is
immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary
appeal

In the assailed Resolution dated 23 January 2009, the CA dismissed the

Petition assailing the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death of the absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. Citing Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino,[5] the appellate court noted that a petition for declaration of
presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage is a summary judicial proceeding
under the Family Code. Hence, the RTC Decision therein is immediately final and
executory upon notice to the parties, by express provision of Article 247 of the
same Code. The decision is therefore not subject to ordinary appeal, and the
attempt to question it through a Notice of Appeal is unavailing.

We affirm the CA ruling.

Article 41 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.
In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances
set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Codefor the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Clearly, a petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse

for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the
Family Code is a summary proceeding as provided for under the Family Code.
Further, Title XI of the Family Code is entitled Summary Judicial
Proceedings in the Family Law. Subsumed thereunder are Articles 238 and 247,
which provide:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title
shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory.

Further, Article 253 of the Family Code reads:

ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise govern
summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar
as they are applicable.

Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide
that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding,
the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
In Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino,[6] the Republic likewise appealed the CAs
affirmation of the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of her absent spouse. The Court therein held that it was an error
for the Republic to file a Notice of Appeal when the latter elevated the matter to
the CA, to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no
reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because
judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family
Code, supra, are immediately final and executory.
xxx xxx xxx
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the
bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001,
was immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous
for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto.
The Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction over the case, and should have
dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.

Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio Panganiban, who concurred in the result
reached by the Court in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, additionally opined that
what the OSG should have filed was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not a
petition for review under Rule 45.
In the present case, the Republic argues that Bermudez-Lorino has been
superseded by the subsequent Decision of the Court in Republic v. Jomoc,[7] issued
a few months later.

In Jomoc, the RTC granted respondents Petition for Declaration of

Presumptive Death of her absent husband for the purpose of remarriage. Petitioner
Republic appealed the RTC Decision by filing a Notice of Appeal. The trial court
disapproved the Notice of Appeal on the ground that, under
the Rules of Court,[8] a record on appeal is required to be filed when appealing
special proceedings cases. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. In reversing the CA,
this Court clarified that while an action for declaration of death or absence under
Rule 72, Section 1(m), expressly falls under the category of special proceedings, a
petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code
is a summary proceeding, as provided for by Article 238 of the same Code. Since
its purpose was to enable her to contract a subsequent valid marriage, petitioners
action was a summary proceeding based on Article 41 of the Family Code, rather
than a special proceeding under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. Considering
that this action was not a special proceeding, petitioner was not required to file a
record on appeal when it appealed the RTC Decision to the CA.
We do not agree with the Republics argument that Republic v.
Jomoc superseded our ruling in Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino. As observed by the
CA, the Supreme Court in Jomoc did not expound on the characteristics of a
summary proceeding under the Family Code. In contrast, the Court in BermudezLorinoexpressly stated that its ruling on the impropriety of an ordinary appeal as a
vehicle for questioning the trial courts Decision in a summary proceeding for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code was intended
to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and the bar.
At any rate, four years after Jomoc, this Court settled the rule regarding
appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code
when it ruled in Republic v. Tango:[9]
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of
judgments rendered in summary proceedings under the Family Code and
accordingly, refine our previous decisions thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern
summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural
rules in this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code

requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided

in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the
rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall
likewise govern summary proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51,
69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are applicable. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary
proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it
follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the
Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent with the
RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not
sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision of
the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is
because the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are
merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for
certiorari with the CA on the ground that, in rendering judgment thereon, the trial
court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. From
the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Evidently then, the CA did not commit any error in dismissing the Republics
Notice of Appeal on the ground that the RTC judgment on the Petition for

Declaration of Presumptive Death of respondents spouse was immediately final

and executory and, hence, not subject to ordinary appeal.
2.
On whether the CA seriously erred in
affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death under Article
41 of the Family Code based on the evidence
that respondent had presented

Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had
not adduced the evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her absent
spouse was already dead, as expressly required by Article 41 of the Family Code.
Petitioner cites Republic v. Nolasco,[10] United States v. Biasbas[11] and Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Alegro[12] as authorities on the subject.
In Nolasco, petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the CAs affirmation of
the RTCs grant of respondents Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of his
absent spouse, a British subject who left their home in the Philippines soon after
giving birth to their son while respondent was on board a vessel working as a
seafarer. Petitioner Republic sought the reversal of the ruling on the ground that
respondent
was
not
able
to
establish
his well-founded belief that the absentee is already dead, as required by Article 41
of the Family Code. In ruling thereon, this Court recognized that this provision
imposes more stringent requirements than does Article 83 of the Civil Code. [13] The
Civil Code provision merely requires either that there be no news that the absentee
is still alive; or that the absentee is generally considered to be dead and is believed
to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of
the Civil Code. In comparison, the Family Code provision prescribes a wellfounded belief that the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of
presumptive death can be granted. As noted by the Court in that case, the four
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under the Family Code are as
follows:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.

In evaluating whether the present spouse has been able to prove the
existence of a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead, the Court
inNolasco cited United States v. Biasbas,[14] which it found to be instructive as to
the diligence required in searching for a missing spouse.

In Biasbas, the Court held that defendant Biasbas failed to exercise due
diligence in ascertaining the whereabouts of his first wife, considering his
admission that that he only had a suspicion that she was dead, and that the only
basis of that suspicion was the fact of her absence.
Similarly, in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Alegro, petitioner Republic
sought the reversal of the CA ruling affirming the RTCs grant of the Petition for
Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse on the ground that the
respondent therein had not been able to prove a well-founded belief that his spouse
was already dead. The Court reversed the CA, granted the Petition, and provided
the following criteria for determining the existence of a well-founded belief under
Article 41 of the Family Code:
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the
preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been
absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead
before the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage. The law does not

define what is meant by a well-grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that es

menester que su creencia sea firme se funde en motivos racionales.
Belief is a state of the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt
act. It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may
tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination
probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,
habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually
control the conduct of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it
tends to explain or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their
intentions, competence [sic] evidence on the ultimate question of his death.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to
goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse
and whether the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse
present
acted
on
a
well-founded
belief
of
death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great
many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent
spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present spouse.
(Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out
that respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent
husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having inquired about
the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these relatives were not
presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly
not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she
would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance
from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also
utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these
omissions.
The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to
deny the Petition.
The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her
well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of
the Petition to declare him presumptively dead is already final and can no longer
be modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled in law than that when a

judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The
same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.[15]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
EDWARD V. LACSON, G.R. No. 150644
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
MAOWEE DABAN LACSON
and MAONAA DABAN Promulgated:
LACSON, represented by their
mother and guardian ad-litem,
LEA DABAN LACSON, August 28, 2006
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Petitioner Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters Maowee Daban
Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson and husband of their mother and guardian adlitem,Lea Daban Lacson, has come to this Court via this petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to seek the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision[1]dated July 13, 2001 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
60203, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of October 18, 2001 denying his motion for
reconsideration.

From the petition and its annexes, the respondents reply thereto, and
other pleadings, the Court gathers the following facts:
The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate
daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea
Daban Lacson. Maoweewas born on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less
than a year later. Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal
home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children to seek, apparently
for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas
mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with her
brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later
to the house of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their
mother, from 1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from
one dwelling place to another not their own.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her
husband Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in
a note dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned
out, however, Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts
towards having him fulfill the same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward
occasionally gave their children meager amounts for school expenses. Through the
years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave
small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom
eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in Iloilo City. In the early part of
1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward
for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was
about to graduate.
In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended,[3] docketed as Civil Case
No. 22185, Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father
Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable

lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to
years of Edwards failure and neglect, their mother had, from time to time,
borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she would later testify, Lea had
received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00.
In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to
meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the
unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at
times to give regular support. He also blamed financial constraint for his inability
to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the complaint.
As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters
Maowee and Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the
schedule of payment and other conditions set forth in the courts corresponding
order of May 13, 1996.[4]
Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the
plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court,
following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant
father Edward to pay them a specific sum which represented 216 months, or 18
years, of support in arrears. The fallo of the trial courts decision[5] reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1)

Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs support in

arrears in the amount of TWO MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED NINETY-SIX THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00)
PESOS from which amount shall be deducted ONE
HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS that
which they received from defendant for two years and that
which they received by way of support pendent lite;

2) Ordering defendant to pay TWENTY

(P20,000.00) PESOS as attorneys fees; and
3)

Pay costs.

THOUSAND

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed as CAG.R. CV. No. 60203.
Eventually, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001,
[6]
dismissed Edwards appeal, disposing as follows;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED
and the appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Double costs against the defendant appellant [Edward Lacson].
SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)

In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the
appellate court in its equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2001.[7]
Hence, Edwards present recourse on his submission that the CA erred I.

XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN

ARREARS FROM 1976 TO 1994.

II.

XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT

BY RESPONDENTS UNCLE NOEL DABAN.

III.

XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IF

PETITIONER IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING
THE SAME TO RESPONDENTS.

IV.

XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT

TO XXX RESPONDENTS EVEN IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION
TO PROVIDE SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY
SATISFIED BY THE PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS
EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WHICH WERE ALL APPROPRIATED BY
THE RESPONDENTS.

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents,
Maowee and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not
be made to pay support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous
extrajudicial, let alone judicial, demand having been made by the respondents. He
invokes the following provision of the Family Code to complete his point:
Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the
time the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for
maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
extrajudicial demand.

To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the
filing of Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said
that an effective demand for support was made upon him.
Petitioners above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it conveniently
glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before
the elder of the two could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner
could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go through
the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their
mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period material to get in touch with
him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made
sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of
a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by
legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was,
however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support
owing to the urgency of the situation is no less a demand because it came by way
of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an
award of support in arrears had been made in this case and said so in its decision,
thus:

From 1976, [respondents] mother now and then went to their [paternal]
grandmothers house by their father and asked for support; this
notwithstanding their fathers commitment for this purpose which the
latter embodied in a note dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-one
years that they needed support, [petitioner] complied with his obligation
for only two (2) years.
xxx xxx xxx
Last December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of
his children, the [respondents] herein but failing, plaintiffs mother asked
extrajudicially for her childrens support since 1976, when she went to
her mothers house. .[8] (Words in bracket and underscoring added.)
The appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle, formulating the
same in the following wise:
We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture
of trying to evade his responsibility to give support to his daughters
simply because their mother did not make a formal demand therefor
from him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a formal demand from his
wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment of and
commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own
handwriting. Said note [stating that he will sustain his two daughters
Maowee and Maonaa] also stated as requested by their mother thus
practically confirming the fact of such demand having been made by
[respondents] mother. The trial court thus correctly ruled that
[petitioners] obligation to pay support in arrears should commence from
1976.[9] (Words in bracket added).

The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the
petitioner to secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound
appellate practice, factual findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality,
save for the most compelling and cogent reasons.[10] Not one of the well-recognized
exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of factual findings appear to obtain in this
case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the petitioners plea for a review of the
CAs findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an award of support in
arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had been made on the petitioner as
evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the

jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, is generally limited to

correction of errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule that the
Court is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already
considered in the proceedings below,[11] except when, as earlier indicated,
compelling reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions drawn from such
evidence.
Petitioners second specification of error touches on the CAs affirmatory holding
that respondents uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for their support. Again,
petitioners lament on the matter is a veritable call for review of factual
determinations of the two courts below. It need not, accordingly, detain us long.
Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their close relatives, the respondents
appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel Daban. Noteworthy also is
the fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and Maonaa token
amounts for schooling when support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education,[12] or, in short,
whatever is necessary to keep a person alive. Logically, the sisters would, thru their
mother, turn to their uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance and education when
petitioner failed to give the same, a failing which stretched from their preschooling days to their college years. Since such failure has been established, it is
not amiss to deduce, as did the trial court and the CA, that Noel Daban who, owing
to consideration of kinship, had reasons to help, indeed lent his sister Lea money to
support her children.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact
reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision reads:
When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to
give support when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may
furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support.

Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship
between the petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract,[13] an equitable principle
enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the
absolute figures arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be
reasonable and proper. Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the final
numbers cannot plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of the CA, and the trial court
before it, considering that they fixed such amount based on the varying needs of
the respondents during the years included in the computation and to the financial
resources of the petitioner, as proved by the evidence adduced below. As a matter
of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship isgenerally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.[14]
Petitioner closes his petition by urging the Court, as it did the CA earlier, to
consider a transaction that transpired after the trial court had rendered judgment.
We refer to the sale by Lea of half of what petitioner claims to be his exclusive or
capital property. As the petitioner would have this Court believe, Lea and the
respondent sisters appropriated the P5 Million proceeds of the sale for themselves.
Pressing on, he alleged that the amount thus received from the sale is more than
enough to fully satisfy thus release him from complying with- the underlying
judgment for support, assuming ex gratia argumenti his obligation to pay support
in arrears.
Petitioners above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together. For
firstly, it assumes as a fact that what was sold for P5 Million was indeed his
exclusive property. But, as the CA aptly observed, there is no showing whether the
property subject of the transaction mentioned by [the petitioner] is a conjugal
property or [his] exclusive property, as in fact [respondents] mother asserts that she
and [petitioner] had separately sold their respective shares on said property.[15]
Secondly, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned.
Petitioners suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them
and may be set off for what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is
unacceptable, being at best gratuitous and self-serving.
Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to
provide respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At
bottom, the sisters have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic

necessities in life as if it is their fault to have been born. This disposition is thus
nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong done the herein respondents
who are no less petitioners daughters.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision
and resolution are AFFIRMED.