1

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 161872

April 13, 2004

REV.
ELLY
CHAVEZ
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

PAMATONG,

ESQUIRE, petitioner,

RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17,
2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to
petitioners Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision,
however, was not unanimous since Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted
to include petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion
for Reconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions,
denied the same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The
COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered
political party with a national constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By
then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly
rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26,
Article II of the 1987
Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can afford to wage a
nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the
COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the
power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying
him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of waging a national
campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity
to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform
of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form for theCertificate of
Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clear and
reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the
candidates bio-data and his program of government.
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.
Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to
opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public
office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows
such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain
language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of
Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting,2 and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access"

2
provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. 4
An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that the provision is not selfexecutory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Article II had read, "The State shall broaden
opportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." 6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario
Davide, Jr. successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase
"ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal
in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would
be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the
government would be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to
accommodate as many people as are also possible. That is the meaning of broadening
opportunities to public service. So, in order that we should not mandate the State to
make the government the number one employer and to limit offices only to what may
be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it, I change
the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that would
accommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment"
indicates the design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy
objective and not reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of
positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its
effective means and reach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be
subsumed under this rubric appear to be entirely open-ended. 8 Words and phrases such as "equal
access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their
inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an
operative but amorphous foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to
limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the
provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No.
645210 dated December 10, 2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu
proprio refuse to give due course to or cancel aCertificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access
clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations
are meant to be borne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar,
there is no showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus
Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed
validity stands and has to be accorded due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26, Article II of the
Constitution is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a
compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards
this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to
mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical
difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral
exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of

3
inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme
Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a
significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its
candidates on the ballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even
frustration of the democratic [process].11
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No.
6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January
2004. As observed in the COMELECs Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for
national positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot
clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in
the Certified List of Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would
entail additional costs to the government. For the official ballots in automated counting and
canvassing of votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000.00).
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a
decent campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim. 12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance
candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for
public office, such as watchers in every polling place, 13 watchers in the board of canvassers, 14 or even
the receipt of electoral contributions. 15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the
formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more
galling. The organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add
into the mix candidates with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would
actually impair the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae
covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance
candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.
Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude
nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer
wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State
interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance
candidacies that distract and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the
Constitution with the administration of elections 16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest elections. 17 Moreover,
the Constitution guarantees that only bona fidecandidates for public office shall be free from any form
of harassment and discrimination.18 The determination ofbona fide candidates is governed by the
statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus Election Code.
Now, the needed factual premises.
However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of
the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The
assailed resolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in
determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this
instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since
such a review would necessarily take into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in
arriving at its decisions.

4
Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing his
credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not
properly pass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor
General appended any document to their respective Comments.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis
of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of
further evidence is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the
government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of
due process.
As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy, suffice it to say that
the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically
enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to
show that the candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as
established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the
COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly
Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this
Court with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-13250 October 29, 1971

THE
COLLECTOR
OF
vs.
ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent..

INTERNAL

REVENUE, petitioner,

Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for petitioner.
Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent.

FERNANDO, J.:
The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the
Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as
may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign
country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe

5
for adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus reversed the
action taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as
administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal
properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier,
Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution promulgated May 30,
1962, this Court on the assumption that the need for resolving the principal question would be
obviated, referred the matter back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of
Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an
order from the Court of Tax Appeals submitting copies of legislation of Tangier that would manifest that
the element of reciprocity was not lacking. It was not until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed
submitted for decision. When the petition for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised
was impressed with an element of novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was
held by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign country" possess an
international personality to come within its terms. 2 Accordingly, we have to affirm.
The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the background facts as follows:
"This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the
deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent
Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum P161,874.95
as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the transfer of
intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella
Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a
Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco
from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among others,
intangible personal properties in the Philippines." 3 Then came this portion: "On September 29, 1955,
petitioner filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria
Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment for state and
inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96
which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed ...
wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as exempted from
taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate
and inheritance taxes in the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of
P469,665.24 ... . In a letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on
the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Hence, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P239,439.49 representing deficiency
estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise
penalties ... . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day,
petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the
intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad valorem penalties ... .
However, respondent denied request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on
May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with
Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent
demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of
P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and compromise
penalties." 4
The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties
regarding the values of the properties and the mathematical correctness of the deficiency assessments,
the principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector
of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122. In ruling
against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: "In fine, we
believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of
the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not
an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon
intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar
exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by
our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122
of our Tax. Code." 5
Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly submitted, but as
above indicated, instead of ruling definitely on the question, this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to

6
inquire further into the question of reciprocity and sent back the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for
the motion of evidence thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads as follows: "While
section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal property' in both
subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes muebles situados en Tanger',
'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger', 'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this Court may
be able to determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions required
by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being, going into the merits of the issues
raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception
of evidence or proof on whether or not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable properties
as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace 'intangible person property', as used in the Tax
Code." 6 In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals admitted evidence submitted by the
administrator petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws of Tangier to the effect
that "the transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including
furniture and personal effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that date
and in said zone, to the payment of any death tax, whatever might have been the nationality of the
deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted in an order of such Court referring the matter
back to us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on September 9,
1963. Respondent presented no evidence." 7
The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the
time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible
person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign
country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from
transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by
citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." 8 The only obstacle therefore to a
definitive ruling is whether or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition of internal
personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country". Deference to
the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance
of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line
with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside
control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a
government
functioning
under
a
regime
of
law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate
society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. 10 It has
been referred to as a body-politic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety
and to promote the general welfare. 11 Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical
personification of the nation." 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is
on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means
of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate
international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government
and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly
would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a
legal order and to enter into international relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international
law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15
Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not
successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January
6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was specifically held by us: "Considering the
State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold,
as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the inheritance tax
on the intangible personal property found in the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as
a state in the American Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it
was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue
Code. 18
What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine
that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did

7
fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the Court by the then Acting Chief
Justicem Bengson who thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity, in Kiene v. Collector
of Internal Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents submitted to it
proof of the laws of Liechtenstein that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift
taxes on intangible property of Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board
declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or inheritance taxes were
collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein when he passed away." 20 Then came this
definitive ruling: "The Collector hereafter named the respondent cites decisions of the United
States Supreme Court and of this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines
belonging to a non-resident foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in
disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such property is admittedly taxable here.
Without the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be
concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an
exemption where conditions are such that demand reciprocity as in this case. And the exemption
must be honored." 21
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26379

December 27, 1969

WILLIAM
C.
REAGAN,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.

ETC., petitioner,

Quasha,
Asperilla,
Blanco,
Zafra
and
Tayag
for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Felicisimo R. Rosete,
Solicitor Lolita O. Gal-lang and Special Attorney Gamaliel H. Mantolino for respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
A question novel in character, the answer to which has far-reaching implications, is raised by petitioner
William C. Reagan, at one time a civilian employee of an American corporation providing technical
assistance to the United States Air Force in the Philippines. He would dispute the payment of the
income tax assessed on him by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on an amount realized
by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the United States Marine Corps, the transaction
having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base at Pampanga. It is his contention, seriously and earnestly
expressed, that in legal contemplation the sale was made outside Philippine territory and therefore
beyond our jurisdictional power to tax.
Such a plea, far-fetched and implausible, on its face betraying no kinship with reality, he would justify
by invoking, mistakenly as will hereafter be more fully shown an observation to that effect in a 1951
opinion, 1 petitioner ignoring that such utterance was made purely as a flourish of rhetoric and by way
of emphasizing the decision reached, that the trading firm as purchaser of army goods must respond
for the sales taxes due from an importer, as the American armed forces being exempt could not be

8
taxed as such under the National Internal Revenue Code. 2 Such an assumption, inspired by the
commendable aim to render unavailing any attempt at tax evasion on the part of such vendee, found
expression anew in a 1962 decision, 3 coupled with the reminder however, to render the truth
unmistakable, that "the areas covered by the United States Military Bases are not foreign territories
both in the political and geographical sense."
As thus clarified, it is manifest that such a view amounts at most to a legal fiction and is
moreover obiter. It certainly cannot control the resolution of the specific question that confronts us. We
declare our stand in an unequivocal manner. The sale having taken place on what indisputably is
Philippine territory, petitioner's liability for the income tax due as a result thereof was unavoidable. As
the Court of Tax Appeals reached a similar conclusion, we sustain its decision now before us on appeal.
In the decision appealed from, the Court of Tax Appeals, after stating the nature of the case, started the
recital of facts thus: "It appears that petitioner, a citizen of the United States and an employee of
Bendix Radio, Division of Bendix Aviation Corporation, which provides technical assistance to the United
States Air Force, was assigned at Clark Air Base, Philippines, on or about July 7, 1959 ... . Nine (9)
months thereafter and before his tour of duty expired, petitioner imported on April 22, 1960 a tax-free
1960 Cadillac car with accessories valued at $6,443.83, including freight, insurance and other
charges."4 Then came the following: "On July 11, 1960, more than two (2) months after the 1960
Cadillac car was imported into the Philippines, petitioner requested the Base Commander, Clark Air
Base, for a permit to sell the car, which was granted provided that the sale was made to a member of
the United States Armed Forces or a citizen of the United States employed in the U.S. military bases in
the Philippines. On the same date, July 11, 1960, petitioner sold his car for $6,600.00 to a certain Willie
Johnson, Jr. (Private first class), United States Marine Corps, Sangley Point, Cavite, Philippines, as shown
by a Bill of Sale . . . executed at Clark Air Base. On the same date, Pfc. Willie (William) Johnson, Jr. sold
the car to Fred Meneses for P32,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of sale executed in Manila." 5
As a result of the transaction thus made, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue, after
deducting the landed cost of the car as well as the personal exemption to which petitioner was entitled,
fixed as his net taxable income arising from such transaction the amount of P17,912.34, rendering him
liable for income tax in the sum of P2,979.00. After paying the sum, he sought a refund from
respondent claiming that he was exempt, but pending action on his request for refund, he filed the case
with the Court of Tax Appeals seeking recovery of the sum of P2,979.00 plus the legal rate of interest.
As noted in the appealed decision: "The only issue submitted for our resolution is whether or not the
said income tax of P2,979.00 was legally collected by respondent for petitioner." 6 After discussing the
legal issues raised, primarily the contention that the Clark Air Base "in legal contemplation, is a base
outside the Philippines" the sale therefore having taken place on "foreign soil", the Court of Tax Appeals
found nothing objectionable in the assessment and thereafter the payment of P2,979.00 as income tax
and denied the refund on the same. Hence, this appeal predicated on a legal theory we cannot accept.
Petitioner cannot make out a case for reversal.
1. Resort to fundamentals is unavoidable to place things in their proper perspective, petitioner
apparently feeling justified in his refusal to defer to basic postulates of constitutional and international
law, induced no doubt by the weight he would accord to the observation made by this Court in the two
opinions earlier referred to. To repeat, scant comfort, if at all is to be derived from such an obiter
dictum, one which is likewise far from reflecting the fact as it is.
Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may
be exercised over its entire domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its
limits, its decrees are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and
personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of its
sovereignty.
It is to be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character.
That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, "is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and selfrestriction."7 A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable
competence.

9
Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control. Nor does the matter end
there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional
right over certain portions of its territory. If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become
impressed with an alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under
lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not
and cannot be foreign territory.
Decisions coming from petitioner's native land, penned by jurists of repute, speak to that effect with
impressive unanimity. We start with the citation from Chief Justice Marshall, announced in the leading
case of Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon,8 an 1812 decision: "The jurisdiction of the nation within its
own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by
itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in
that power which could impose such restriction." After which came this paragraph: "All exceptions,
therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its own territories, must be traced up to the
consent of the nation itself. They can flow from no other legitimate source."
Chief Justice Taney, in an 1857 decision, 9 affirmed the fundamental principle of everyone within the
territorial domain of a state being subject to its commands: "For undoubtedly every person who is
found within the limits of a government, whether the temporary purposes or as a resident, is bound by
its laws." It is no exaggeration then for Justice Brewer to stress that the United States government "is
one having jurisdiction over every foot of soil within its territory, and acting directly upon each
[individual found therein]; . . ."10
Not too long ago, there was a reiteration of such a view, this time from the pen of Justice Van Devanter.
Thus: "It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the territory subject to its
jurisdiction includes the land areas under its dominion and control the ports, harbors, bays, and other in
closed arms of the sea along its coast, and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast line
outward a marine league, or 3 geographic miles." 11 He could cite moreover, in addition to many
American decisions, such eminent treatise-writers as Kent, Moore, Hyde, Wilson, Westlake, Wheaton
and Oppenheim.
As a matter of fact, the eminent commentator Hyde in his three-volume work on International Law, as
interpreted and applied by the United States, made clear that not even the embassy premises of a
foreign power are to be considered outside the territorial domain of the host state. Thus: "The ground
occupied by an embassy is not in fact the territory of the foreign State to which the premises belong
through possession or ownership. The lawfulness or unlawfulness of acts there committed is
determined by the territorial sovereign. If an attache commits an offense within the precincts of an
embassy, his immunity from prosecution is not because he has not violated the local law, but rather for
the reason that the individual is exempt from prosecution. If a person not so exempt, or whose
immunity is waived, similarly commits a crime therein, the territorial sovereign, if it secures custody of
the offender, may subject him to prosecution, even though its criminal code normally does not
contemplate the punishment of one who commits an offense outside of the national domain. It is not
believed, therefore, that an ambassador himself possesses the right to exercise jurisdiction, contrary to
the will of the State of his sojourn, even within his embassy with respect to acts there committed. Nor is
there apparent at the present time any tendency on the part of States to acquiesce in his exercise of
it."12
2. In the light of the above, the first and crucial error imputed to the Court of Tax Appeals to the effect
that it should have held that the Clark Air Force is foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax
legislation is clearly without support in law. As thus correctly viewed, petitioner's hope for the reversal
of the decision completely fades away. There is nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends
support to such an assertion. It has not become foreign soil or territory. This country's jurisdictional
rights therein, certainly not excluding the power to tax, have been preserved. As to certain tax matters,
an appropriate exemption was provided for.
Petitioner could not have been unaware that to maintain the contrary would be to defy reality and
would be an affront to the law. While his first assigned error is thus worded, he would seek to impart
plausibility to his claim by the ostensible invocation of the exemption clause in the Agreement by virtue
of which a "national of the United States serving in or employed in the Philippines in connection with

10
the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the bases and residing in the Philippines only by
reason of such employment" is not to be taxed on his income unless "derived from Philippine source or
sources other than the United States sources."13 The reliance, to repeat, is more apparent than real for
as noted at the outset of this opinion, petitioner places more faith not on the language of the provision
on exemption but on a sentiment given expression in a 1951 opinion of this Court, which would be
made to yield such an unwarranted interpretation at war with the controlling constitutional and
international law principles. At any rate, even if such a contention were more adequately pressed and
insisted upon, it is on its face devoid of merit as the source clearly was Philippine.
In Saura Import and Export Co. v. Meer,14 the case above referred to, this Court affirmed a decision
rendered about seven months previously,15 holding liable as an importer, within the contemplation of
the National Internal Revenue Code provision, the trading firm that purchased army goods from a
United States government agency in the Philippines. It is easily understandable why. If it were not thus,
tax evasion would have been facilitated. The United States forces that brought in such equipment later
disposed of as surplus, when no longer needed for military purposes, was beyond the reach of our tax
statutes.
Justice Tuason, who spoke for the Court, adhered to such a rationale, quoting extensively from the
earlier opinion. He could have stopped there. He chose not to do so. The transaction having occurred in
1946, not so long after the liberation of the Philippines, he proceeded to discuss the role of the
American military contingent in the Philippines as a belligerent occupant. In the course of such a
dissertion, drawing on his well-known gift for rhetoric and cognizant that he was making an as
if statement, he did say: "While in army bases or installations within the Philippines those goods were in
contemplation of law on foreign soil."
It is thus evident that the first, and thereafter the controlling, decision as to the liability for sales taxes
as an importer by the purchaser, could have been reached without any need for such expression as
that given utterance by Justice Tuason. Its value then as an authoritative doctrine cannot be as much as
petitioner would mistakenly attach to it. It was clearly obiter not being necessary for the resolution of
the issue before this Court.16It was an opinion "uttered by the way." 17 It could not then be controlling on
the question before us now, the liability of the petitioner for income tax which, as announced at the
opening of this opinion, is squarely raised for the first time.18
On this point, Chief Justice Marshall could again be listened to with profit. Thus: "It is a maxim, not to be
disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in
which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to
control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision." 19
Nor did the fact that such utterance of Justice Tuason was cited in Co Po v. Collector of Internal
Revenue,20 a 1962 decision relied upon by petitioner, put a different complexion on the matter. Again, it
was by way of pure embellishment, there being no need to repeat it, to reach the conclusion that it was
the purchaser of army goods, this time from military bases, that must respond for the advance sales
taxes as importer. Again, the purpose that animated the reiteration of such a view was clearly to
emphasize that through the employment of such a fiction, tax evasion is precluded. What is more, how
far divorced from the truth was such statement was emphasized by Justice Barrera, who penned the Co
Po opinion, thus: "It is true that the areas covered by the United States Military Bases are not foreign
territories both in the political and geographical sense."21
Justice Tuason moreover made explicit that rather than corresponding with reality, what was said by
him was in the way of a legal fiction. Note his stress on "in contemplation of law." To lend further
support to a conclusion already announced, being at that a confirmation of what had been arrived at in
the earlier case, distinguished by its sound appreciation of the issue then before this Court and to
preclude any tax evasion, an observation certainly not to be taken literally was thus given utterance.
This is not to say that it should have been ignored altogether afterwards. It could be utilized again, as it
undoubtedly was, especially so for the purpose intended, namely to stigmatize as without support in
law any attempt on the part of a taxpayer to escape an obligation incumbent upon him. So it was
quoted with that end in view in the Co Po case. It certainly does not justify any effort to render futile the
collection of a tax legally due, as here. That was farthest from the thought of Justice Tuason.

11
What is more, the statement on its face is, to repeat, a legal fiction. This is not to discount the uses of
a fictio jurisin the science of the law. It was Cardozo who pointed out its value as a device "to advance
the ends of justice" although at times it could be "clumsy" and even "offensive". 22 Certainly, then, while
far from objectionable as thus enunciated, this observation of Justice Tuason could be misused or
misconstrued in a clumsy manner to reach an offensive result. To repeat, properly used, a legal fiction
could be relied upon by the law, as Frankfurter noted, in the pursuit of legitimate ends. 23 Petitioner then
would be well-advised to take to heart such counsel of care and circumspection before invoking not a
legal fiction that would avoid a mockery of the law by avoiding tax evasion but what clearly is a
misinterpretation thereof, leading to results that would have shocked its originator.
The conclusion is thus irresistible that the crucial error assigned, the only one that calls for discussion
to the effect that for income tax purposes the Clark Air Force Base is outside Philippine territory, is
utterly without merit. So we have said earlier.
3. To impute then to the statement of Justice Tuason the meaning that petitioner would fasten on it is,
to paraphrase Frankfurter, to be guilty of succumbing to the vice of literalness. To so conclude is,
whether by design or inadvertence, to misread it. It certainly is not susceptible of the mischievous
consequences now sought to be fastened on it by petitioner.
That it would be fraught with such peril to the enforcement of our tax statutes on the military bases
under lease to the American armed forces could not have been within the contemplation of Justice
Tuason. To so attribute such a bizarre consequence is to be guilty of a grave disservice to the memory
of a great jurist. For his real and genuine sentiment on the matter in consonance with the imperative
mandate of controlling constitutional and international law concepts was categorically set forth by him,
not as an obiter but as the rationale of the decision, in People v. Acierto24 thus: "By the [Military Bases]
Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United States
exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or
expediency over the bases as part of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction
over offenses committed therein."
Nor did he stop there. He did stress further the full extent of our territorial jurisdiction in words that do
not admit of doubt. Thus: "This provision is not and can not on principle or authority be construed as a
limitation upon the rights of the Philippine Government. If anything, it is an emphatic recognition and
reaffirmation of Philippine sovereignty over the bases and of the truth that all jurisdictional rights
granted to the United States and not exercised by the latter are reserved by the Philippines for itself." 25
It is in the same spirit that we approach the specific question confronting us in this litigation. We hold,
as announced at the outset, that petitioner was liable for the income tax arising from a sale of his
automobile in the Clark Field Air Base, which clearly is and cannot otherwise be other than, within our
territorial jurisdiction to tax.
4. With the mist thus lifted from the situation as it truly presents itself, there is nothing that stands in
the way of an affirmance of the Court of Tax Appeals decision. No useful purpose would be served by
discussing the other assigned errors, petitioner himself being fully aware that if the Clark Air Force Base
is to be considered, as it ought to be and as it is, Philippine soil or territory, his claim for exemption
from the income tax due was distinguished only by its futility.
There is further satisfaction in finding ourselves unable to indulge petitioner in his plea for reversal. We
thus manifest fealty to a pronouncement made time and time again that the law does not look with
favor on tax exemptions and that he who would seek to be thus privileged must justify it by words too
plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. 26 Petitioner had not done so. Petitioner
cannot do so.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals of May 12, 1966 denying the refund of P2,979.00
as the income tax paid by petitioner is affirmed. With costs against petitioner.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result.

12
Barredo, J., took no part.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 104768

July 21, 2003

REPUBLIC
OF
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN,
MAJOR
GENERAL
DIMAANO, Respondents.

THE
JOSEPHUS

PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
Q.

RAMAS

and

ELIZABETH

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)1 dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037.
The first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the
confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended
Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for
further proceedings allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be
necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this order" and the power "(h) to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order."
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board
("AFP Board") tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.2
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas ("Ramas"). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a
Resolution on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The
relevant part of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St.,
La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area
of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

13
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth
Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by
invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could
not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also
able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army,
stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent. That respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth
Dimaano in Barangay Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces
and kisses respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of
Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income
and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items
seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns
the P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an
intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth. Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been
known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by
the Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not
included, still it was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.
IV. CONCLUSION:
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten
and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 3
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No.
1379") 4against Ramas.
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended
Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines ("petitioner"), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff
and Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano ("Dimaano") as
co-defendant.
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until
1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine
Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The
Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas "acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out
of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property
by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such

14
officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos."5
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. 6 The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist
in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine
Constabulary raiding team.
After termination of the pre-trial,7 the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November 1988.
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for
trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing
to 17 and 18 April 1989.
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order "to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x."8
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state
when petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject
matter of the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner
should proceed to present its evidence.
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.
On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present.
Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already
presented or to change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or
properties subject of the forfeiture.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because
of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage
when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare
for presentation of its additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further evidence.
Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to conform to
its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted
that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under the
circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no
further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60
days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that
failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

15
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino. 9 The Court held in
Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President
Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement
as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of
money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to
which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court
in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan10 and Republic v. Migrino11 which involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted
against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE
CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY,
COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT
RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS
WERE CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE
COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are
clearly not applicable to this case;

16
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was
cured and/or waived by respondents with the filing of their respective answers with
counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they were
filed after commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the petitioner and even
before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS SUCH
AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED
FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE
EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.12
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan13 and Republic v. Migrino.14
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the
filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired. 15 The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on
its findings.16 The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3
of EO No. 1 "to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the
purposes of this order." EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the
following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage
of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of
AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These
are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former
President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking
undue advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; 17 or (2) AFP personnel
involved in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. 18
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore,
Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims
that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably
making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

17
We hold that Ramas was not a "subordinate" of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a "subordinate" as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within
the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the illgotten wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and
close associates both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or
his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents,
or nominees have any interest or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell
& Co, Ltd. vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd
Ed., 203].
[T]he term "subordinate" as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2.
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee
during the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General19 does not suffice to make him a "subordinate" of former President Marcos for purposes of EO
No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close
associate of former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents
or nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either
by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the
deposed President or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of illgotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner
argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board
conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner
asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating
crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former
President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution
begins with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" and RA
1379, as amended, otherwise known as "The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." 20

18
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any
relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves
fatal to petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily
its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a "subordinate" of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and
suggested that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income
without showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President
Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas
accumulated his wealth because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent
Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with
former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not
fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same
and the objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos.
3019 and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a; 21(Emphasis supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a "subordinate" of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG.
EO No. 122 clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind
the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,23 the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the PCGG
pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,24 14,25 14-A:26
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,
including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections
or relationships; and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said illgotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling
under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of
Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman
and other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city
prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state
prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while
the authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General. 27 The
Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 ("RA No. 6770") vests in the Ombudsman the power to

19
conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.28
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence of
a prima facie finding that Ramas was a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. The petition for
forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply
to respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are
violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the
Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained
wealth and graft cases. As stated in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from
proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory
agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers
granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the first
place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs
powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task
is only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. 29 Without these
elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute
their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court
in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed
their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990. Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack
of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. 30 Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in
this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action. 31
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.32 The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject
to prescription, laches or estoppel.33
Second
Issue:
Propriety
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

of

Dismissal

of

Case

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has
only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been
pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint
on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner had almost two
years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time, petitioner still delayed the
presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for postponements and extensions.
Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion
for Leave to Amend the Complaint.34 The motion sought "to charge the delinquent properties (which
comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully
acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x."

20
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since
petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the
Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11
October 1989, giving petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan
issued an Order expressing its view on the matter, to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case
has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of
the government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses,
allegedly upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of
evidence thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its
alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the
developments such as those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in
progress will revert back to the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate action
could have been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.35
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation on
the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379. 36 The PCGG prayed for an
additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this
request and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled
date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG
supposedly conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with
the presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of "what lies ahead insofar as the status of the
case is concerned x x x." 37 Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11
July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended Complaint. 38 The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a
case already pending for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the ReAmended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner
ended the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong
even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against
private respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss
the forfeiture case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on
petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private
respondents. Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if
these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned "Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition." Dimaano was not present during the raid
but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these
items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .
45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure "on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution." 39 Petitioner argues that a

21
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were "taking power in the name and by the will of the
Filipino people."40 Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the
operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the
same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any
constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was "done in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution."41 The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the
1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by
the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March
1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("Covenant") and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato
S. Puno:42
A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established government in any
country or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of
violence." In Kelsen's book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs
whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not
prescribed by the first order itself."
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as
the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime.
This revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an inherent right of a
people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of
government or institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of
making such change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." It has been
said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and from there is
derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government
without regard to the existing constitution."
xxx

22
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as
a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which
was met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet
and other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of
the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had
ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the
Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,43 petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom
Constitution in view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom
Constitution, and later the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders,
thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or "Freedom" Constitution recognizes
the power and duty of the President to enact "measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . .
(r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and
protect the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts."
And as also already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies
the "authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986."
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to
include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse
by Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is
instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the
present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything the
Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister
Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as
an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal niceties, thus
suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts, another word for niceties or
exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection? The
answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process, hence they are
asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but
let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable extrapolation. Hence,
we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me elaborate and give three reasons:

23
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the
same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism.
That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation of due process and rule
of law. The New Society word for that is "backsliding." It is tragic when we begin to backslide even
before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee report
asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening of Congress,
and Congress may even extend this longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee report is
asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of
Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to
think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the
franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument that is
very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and
repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly
disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill of
Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause will be sold. "Open your
Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search and seizure clause. You can keep it in your
private safe."
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom price is
the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something
positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest bidder nor
can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow strong, only if it would
become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary
estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of Section 8
of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is
deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that
what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG
can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not sustained,
however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what
another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas More
said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake." I ask the Commission to give the
devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment excepting
sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,44 Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process under
the Bill of Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum

24
the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article
17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend
it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. 46 Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights 47 of
individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility
for the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution.48 The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the
revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else, aside from
the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some jewelries, land
titles, sir.
Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano.
Do you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not mentioned in said search
warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason why they
also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because the money and other
jewelries were contained in attach cases and cartons with markings "Sony Trinitron", and I think three

25
(3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms,
they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team seized this
money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring along also
the money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most secured if they will bring that
because they might be suspected also of taking money out of those items, your Honor. 49
Cross-examination
Atty. Banaag
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before the
Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby armalite
rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx
AJ AMORES
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your Honor.
Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties or
contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the
communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the application for search
warrant considering that we have not established concrete evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons were in
the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.50
xxx

26
Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how many
ammunition?
A. Forty, sir.
Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals office who
charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
Q. In the fiscals office?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum Receipt in
the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for instance,
jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also the
jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they brought along also these
articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken
because they might get lost if they will just leave this behind.
xxx
Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the search
warrant?
A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be
contained in attach cases.1wphi1 These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols or
other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out to be money. So
the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the
money behind, it might get lost also.
Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding team, like
Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?
A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened. 51
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated. The search
warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own
authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items
could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. 52 Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its
authority when it seized these items.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, 53 and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that
these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

27
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case
to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 146710-15

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH
E.
ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS
AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD
DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
---------------------------------------G.R. No. 146738

March 2, 2001

JOSEPH
E.
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.

ESTRADA, petitioner,

PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges
that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President.
The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues
embedded on the parties' dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the
relationship between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. Some ten (10) million Filipinos voted
for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from life's adversity. Both petitioner and the
respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly
but surely eroded his popularity. His sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur
Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air and accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.1
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto
Guingona, Jr., then the Senate Minority Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech
entitled "I Accuse." He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million in jueteng money from
Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from
Governor Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech
was referred by then Senate President Franklin Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by

28
Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator Renato Cayetano)
for joint investigation.2
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then
headed by Representative Roilo Golez, decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the
other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael Defensor spearheaded the
move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin
issued a pastoral statement in behalf of the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking
petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to govern. 3 Two days
later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the
resignation of the petitioner.4 Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino
also demanded that the petitioner take the "supreme self-sacrifice" of resignation. 5 Former President
Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services 6 and later asked for petitioner's
resignation.7 However, petitioner strenuously held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior
Economic Advisers, resigned. They were Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar
Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip. 8 On November 2, Secretary Mar Roxas II
also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry. 9 On November 3, Senate President Franklin
Drilon, and House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the
ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.10
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House
Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment 11 signed by 115 representatives, or more than
1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused political convulsions
in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President.
Speaker Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella. 12 On November 20, the Senate formally
opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with
Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. 13
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial
started.14 The battle royale was fought by some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing
as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and Representatives Joker
Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan
Libarios, Oscar Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of
private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon
Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former Solicitor General
and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flaminiano, former Deputy
Speaker of the House Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day
to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high
and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic point of
the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI
Bank. She testified that she was one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature
"Jose Velarde" on documents involving a P500 million investment agreement with their bank on
February 4, 2000.15
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it
resumed on January 2, 2001, more bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty.
Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioner's Secretary of Finance took the witness stand. He alleged
that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges
of insider trading.16 Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10 17 the senatorjudges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing
that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and
private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate
President.18 The ruling made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the
streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full
of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.

29
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their
collective resignation. They also filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the
impeachment tribunal.19Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite postponement of the
impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of
resignation of the public prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion. 20
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioner's resignation. A 10-kilometer
line of people holding lighted candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala
Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's
resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their
concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of
persuasion, attracted more and more people.21
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner
informed Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election
for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m.,
Secretary of National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the
armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.22 In the presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and
hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your
Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are
withdrawing our support to this government." 23 A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson
and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning announcement. 24Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their posts. 25 Rallies for
the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage,
petitioner announced he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial
second envelope.26 There was no turning back the tide. The tide had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the
peaceful and orderly transfer of power started at Malacaang'' Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive
Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon Bagatsing, Political
Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the
Presidential Management Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by
now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance Alberto Romulo and now Secretary
of Justice Hernando Perez.27 Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro
and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The
negotiations consumed all morning until the news broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer
the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of
the Philippines.28 At 2:30 p.m., petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.29 He issued
the following press statement:30
"20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President
of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have
strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as
President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our
civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.

30
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in to promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter: 31
"Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting
this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of
law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA"
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m. on January 20. 23 Another copy
was transmitted to Senate President Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00
p.m.33
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the
powers the duties of the Presidency. On the same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in
Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
"A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her
Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on
the urgent request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court,
dated January 20, 2001, which request was treated as an administrative matter, the court
Resolve unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office of Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Philippines, at noon of January 20,
2001.1wphi1.nt
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that may be filed by
a proper party."
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special
envoys.34Recognition of respondent Arroyo's government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On
January 23, in a reception or vin d' honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps,
Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of
respondent Arroyo.35 US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White
House conveying US recognition of her government.36
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of
Representatives.37The House then passed Resolution No. 175 "expressing the full support of the House
of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Philippines."38 It also approved Resolution No. 176 "expressing the support of the House of
Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of
the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations and expressing its support for her
administration as a partner in the attainment of the nation's goals under the Constitution." 39
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. 40 A few days later, she
also signed into law the Political Advertising ban and Fair Election Practices Act. 41

31
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President. 42 The
next day, February 7, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator
Guingona, Jr.43Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and John Osmena voted "yes" with
reservations, citing as reason therefor the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyo's
presidency before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were
absent.44 The House of Representatives also approved Senator Guingona's nomination in Resolution No.
178.45 Senator Guingona, Jr. took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later. 46
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus
officio and has been terminated. 47 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated "for the record" that she
voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the grounds that the Senate had failed to
decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was
still qualified to run for another elective post.48
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyo's public acceptance rating jacked up
from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38% on January 26, 2001. 49 In another survey conducted by the ABSCBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos nationwide accepted
President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is
accepted by 60% in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55%
in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her presidency is accepted by majorities in all social
classes: 58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass class, and 54% among the
E's or very poor class.50
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioner's legal problems appeared in clusters. Several
cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for bribery and graft and
corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on
November 17, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for Government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by
the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong,
et al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property,
plunder, etc.; (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case
No. 0-00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the
charges against the petitioner. It is chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with
the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de
Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to
file his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in
answer to the aforementioned complaints against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No.
146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin
the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting any further proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629,
1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until
after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted." Thru another counsel,
petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming
petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily
unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to
be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution." Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day, February 6, required the
respondents "to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001." On
February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the
filing of the respondents' comments "on or before 8:00 a.m. of February 15."
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing,
Chief Justice Davide, Jr.51 and Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban52 recused themselves on motion of
petitioner's counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag
that they have "compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one side"

32
but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5)
days to file their memoranda and two (2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press
statement for "Gag Order" on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No.
146738, the Court resolved:
"(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring
the office of the President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement
justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of
being cited for contempt to refrain from making any comment or discussing in public the merits
of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent
Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending investigation in his office
against petitioner, Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news
reports that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner
Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on February 15, 2001, which action will
make the cases at bar moot and academic."53
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for
decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a
President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal
prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still
President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial
publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases
At bar involve a political question
Private respondents54 raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and
hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries,
the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo administration." They stress that respondent

33
Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the
14th President of the Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has
been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that these realities on ground constitute the
political thicket, which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the
shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the
courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of
powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of constitutional law. 55 In
the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were
spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case or Baker v. Carr,56 viz:
"x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless
one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for
non justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The doctrine of which we treat
is one of 'political questions', not of 'political cases'."
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer
delineation of the inner and outer perimeters of a political question. 57 Our leading case is Tanada v.
Cuenco,58 where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political
questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to whichfull discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has
narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of
this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.59 Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution
directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. 60 With the new provision, however, courts are given a
greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new
provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this
intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of
these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language to "x x x
review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the
extension thereof x x x."
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A.
Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al. 61 and related cases62 to support their thesis that
since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they
present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are
inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the
result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than
the Freedom Constitution63 declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct
exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, as amended." In is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a
successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically
orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo
is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the oath under the
1987 Constitution.64 In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987
Constitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the
authority of the 1987 Constitution.

34
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA
I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole
government. EDSA II is an exercise ofpeople power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office
of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that
resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the
resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President
are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal
questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the freedom of assembly to petition the
government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one
of the reasons of our 1898 revolution against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion
call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it as among "the
reforms sine quibus non."65 TheMalolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress
in 1898, provided in its Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express
his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of the press or other similar means; (2) of the
right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3) of
the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively." These fundamental rights
were preserved when the United States acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the
Instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President McKinley, it is
specifically provided "that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of
the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances."
The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones
Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.66
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,67 and the 197368 Constitution.
These rights are now safely ensconced in section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
"Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press,
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances."
The indispensability of the people's freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now selfevident. The reasons are well put by Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of
assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing knowledge and
discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of
society; and fourth, it is a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community
of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." 69 In this
sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the "conflict
necessary to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the
society."70 In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 71 this function of free speech and
assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar
Association which emphasized that "the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the
expression of opinion and belief by talk rather than force; and this means talk for all and by
all."72 In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,73 this Court similar stressed that
" it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble
to petition for redress of grievances, all should listen.For in a democracy, it is the people who
count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers."
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for
resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably
section 1 of Article II,74 and section 875 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under
section 1176 of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from
suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As
early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,77 the doctrine has been laid down that "it is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . ."
Thus, respondent's in vocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
II

35
Whether
Resigned as President

or

not

the

petitioner

We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political
question. Indeed, it involves a legal question whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records
of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers
from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
The issue brings under the microscope the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides:
"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the
President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of
death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice President shall have been
elected and qualified.
x x x."
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of
January 20, 2001 when respondent took her oath as the 14 th President of the Public. Resignation is not a
high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must
be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. 78 The validity
of a resignation is not government by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal
effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before
he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his act
and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow
the succession of events after the expos of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon
investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of
Representatives which initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express
speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo
quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and former Speaker Villar defected with 47
representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together with his
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the people's call for his resignation intensified. The
call reached a new crescendo when the eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to
open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of January 16
was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their
number grew exponentially. Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush
fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the
petitioner. The window is provided in the "Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada," the diary of Executive
Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.79 The Angara Diary reveals that in the
morning of January 19, petitioner's loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA,

36
hence, they decided to create an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20
p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence and
exclaimed: "Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has
defected.)"80 An hour later or at 2:30 p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential
election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for
president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had
intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea
of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the
AFP's withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The
seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked
Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of "dignified exit or
resignation."81 Petitioner did not disagree but listened intently. 82 The sky was falling fast on the
petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful
and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would be allowed to go
abroad with enough funds to support him and his family. 83 Significantly, the petitioner expressed
no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never
leave the country.84 At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, "Ed, Angie (Reyes)
guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace." 85 This is proof that petitioner had
reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with
the five-day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara
and requested, "Ed, magtulungan tayo para magkaroon tayo ng (let's cooperate to ensure a) peaceful
and orderly transfer of power."86 There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily
agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly
transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m.
of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition
period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner
and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the
petitioner.87 Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The
petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact.According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he
briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the
reaction of the petitioner, viz:
"x x x
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately
stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the
second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. "Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod
na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I don't want any more of
this it's too painful. I'm tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go."88
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear
when he said "x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit." "Ayoko na" are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following
happened:
"Opposition's deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagal's spokesperson) Rene Corona. For
this round, I am accompanied by Dondon Bagatsing and Macel.

37
Rene pulls out a document titled "Negotiating Points." It reads:
'1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be
effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the
Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning to day, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new
administration shall commence, and persons designated by the Vice President to various
positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with
the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the
Vice President as national military and police authority effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forced of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of
the President and his family as approved by the national military and police authority (Vice
President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged
savings account of the President in the Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the
Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as
follows:
'1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the presidency to Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo.
'2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their
person and property throughout their natural lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his
families are guarantee freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the private
sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the
Chief of Staff, as approved by the national military and police authorities Vice President
(Macapagal).
'3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate sitting as an impeachment court will
authorize the opening of the second envelope in the impeachment trial as proof that the subject
savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
'4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the
'Transition Period"), the incoming Cabinet members shall receive an appropriate briefing from
the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function Vice
President (Macapagal) as national military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the
necessary signatures as affixed to this agreement and insure faithful implementation and
observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor
provided for in "Annex A" heretofore attached to this agreement." 89

38
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted
that during this second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement, which was premised on the resignation of the
petitioner was further refined. It was then, signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General
Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing by
the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara diary narrates the
fateful events, viz;90
"xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to
effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the general clearing all these points with a group he is
with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement.
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation
shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which day the Vice President will assume the
presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20
January 2001, wherein persons designated by the Vice President to various government
positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.
'3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and
security of the President and his families throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the
national military and police authority Vice President.
'4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as
national military and police authorities.
'5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the
impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered as proof that the subject savings
account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex "B"
heretofore attached to this agreement.
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our
side and awaiting the signature of the United opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be sworn in at 12 noon.
'Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (why couldn't you wait? What
about the agreement)?' I asked.
Reyes answered: 'Wala na, sir (it's over, sir).'
I ask him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?'
And General Reyes answers: ' Oo nga, I delete na natin, sir (yes, we're deleting the part).'

39
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is
already moot and academic. Within moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the
documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel, to Nene Pimentel and
General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the
other side, as it is important that the provisions on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will
administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The President is too stunned for words:
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as president of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The president is having his final meal at the presidential Residence with the few friends and
Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only
the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since the police and military have already withdrawn their
support for the President.
1 p.m. The President's personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada family's
personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronnie Puno mentions that the president needs to release a final statement before
leaving Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve o'clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While along with many other legal minds
of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity
and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this
country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. I leave the
Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our
country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!"'
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his
leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oathtaking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to

40
begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind
inability and that he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears: (3) he
expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President (4) he assured that he will
not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has
given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioner's valedictory, his
final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the part tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave dated January
20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again,
we refer to the said letter, viz:
"Sir.
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting
this declaration that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my office. By operation of
law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting president.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada"
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery. 91 The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the
cases at bar did not discuss, may even intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither
did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during the oral argument. It
strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the
petitioner during the week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when
he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him to tell the Filipino people in his press release
that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to
respondent Arroyo for the time bearing. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot
negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner
clearly as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press released, still, it commands scant
legal significance. Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing
caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the resignation is the result of his reputation by the people.
There is another reason why this Court cannot given any legal significance to petitioner's letter and this
shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not
resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminals
or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under this Act or under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA
No. 3019 originated form Senate Bill No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the
Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now stands. However, in his
sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, "reserved to propose during the
period of amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under
prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is under administrative investigation, shall be allowed
to voluntarily resign or retire."92 During the period of amendments, the following provision was inserted
as section 15:
"Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an
investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense
under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.

41
The separation or cessation of a public official form office shall not be a bar to his prosecution
under this Act for an offense committed during his incumbency." 93
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second
paragraph of the provision and insisted that the President's immunity should extend after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section
15 above became section 13 under the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision
mainly focused on the immunity of the President, which was one of the reasons for the veto of the
original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a
public official with pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent
of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of resignation or retirement from being used by a
public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or administrative
case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery
under the Revised Penal Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would
be a violation of his constitutional right. 94 A public official has the right not to serve if he really wants to
retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing administrative
or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of
the criminal or administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to
avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records
show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the
Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-00-1758. While
these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary
investigation of the petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune
from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for
it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under
section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an
impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative
proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process
already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second
envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation
of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability
claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same day to Senate President
Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of
the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that
"Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is
incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of article VII." 95 This
contention is the centerpiece of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent
Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers

42
and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume
the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of the
Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall
convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without
need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session,
within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now, the operative facts:
1. Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate
President and Speaker of the House;
2. Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January
20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
3. Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representatives passed on January 24, 2001
House Resolution No. 175;96
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17697 which
states:
"RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE
ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATION'S
GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine
National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their
recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national
healing and reconciliation with justice for the purpose of national unity and development;

43
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is
divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of the House of Representatives as an
institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people,
the House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and
therefore must remove all obstacles to the attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify
the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to heal social and political wounds, and to be an
instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various
segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrending its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing,
for the House of Representatives to extend its support and collaboration to the administration of
Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in nationbuilding, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office
by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, to
extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the Nation's goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
Speaker

FELICIANO

BELMONTE

JR.

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.)
Secretary General"

ROBERTO

P.

NAZARENO

On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 17898 which
states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF
SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of
such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority
Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity,
competence and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and
patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship,
having served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Senator of the Philippines qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice
President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it

44
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of
Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
Speaker

FELICIANO

BELMONTE

JR.

This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.)
Secretary General"

ROBERTO

P.

NAZARENO

(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioner's letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the
Senate signed the following:
"RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful
change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity
of purpose and resolve cohesive resolute (sic) will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in
unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge and overcome the nation's challenges." 99
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82100 which states:
"RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO'S NOMINATION OF SEM.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the
Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of
such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from among the members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority
Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position of Vice President of the Republic of the
Philippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence
and courage; who has served the Filipino people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statemanship, having
served the government in various capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice,
Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the
Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.

45
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
AQUILINO
President of the Senate

Q.

PIMENTEL

JR.

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.)
Secretary of the Senate"

LUTGARDO

B.

BARBO

On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83101 which
states:
"RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court
is functus officioand has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court on Monday, January 15, Tuesday,
January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001 be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the "second envelope"
be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for proper safekeeping and preservation in
accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only
upon written approval of the Senate president.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
AQUILINO
President of the Senate

Q.

PIMENTEL,

JR.

This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.

(Sgd.)
Secretary of the Senate"

LUTGARDO

B.

BARBO

(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 "certifying to the existence of vacancy in
the Senate and calling on the COMELEC to fill up such vacancy through election to be held
simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the Senatorial candidate garnering the
thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jr.'
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as
President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any
sector of government, and without any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to govern is only
momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada. Is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of

46
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as president of the Philippines. Following Taada v.
Cuenco,102 we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power or this is an issue "in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative xxx branch of the government."
Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,103 there is a "textually demonstrable or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon
petitioner's claim of inability to discharge the power and duties of the presidency. The question is
political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political
issue, which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation of
powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully
claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern
temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be
reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.
Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings
against him; andsecond, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioner's contentions, a revisit of our legal history executive immunity will be most
enlightening. The doctrine of executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In
the 1910 case of Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crosfield,104 the respondent Tiaco, a Chinese
citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. J.E. Harding and
C.R. Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for
damages for allegedly conspiring to deport him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
" The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no
authority to touch the acts of the Governor-General; that he may, under cover of his office, do
what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny, under
the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person
and of property, wholly free from interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean,
either that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under the law has
n remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the governorsgeneral, like the judges if the courts and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally
mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the performance of his
official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the mater is properly presented to
it and the occasion justly warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and
place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been deprived his liberty or his
property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever
country, when his personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority
of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the Governor-General personally
in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more than it can a
member of the Philippine Commission of the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally
sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to perform as such official. On the contrary, it
clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the
liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General,
that the latter is liable when he acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and authority that
he can not be said to have exercised discretion in determining whether or not he had the right to
act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only
when he acts within his authority, but also when he is without authority, provided he actually
used discretion and judgement, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had

47
authority to act or not. In other words, in determining the question of his authority. If he decide
wrongly, he is still protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men,
reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ; but he s not protected if the lack of
authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In
such case, be acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and as such must
answer for the consequences of his act."
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity
from suit, viz"xxx. Action upon important matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief
executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of one of the highest
officials of the state and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder resulting in a way,
in distrust as to the integrity of government itself."105
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity.
Then came the tumult of the martial law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the
1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the amendments involved executive
immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
"The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall
lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII
of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco professional Chair lecture entitled, "Presidential Immunity and All The
King's Men: The Law of Privilege As a Defense To Actions For Damages," 106 petitioner's learned counsel,
former Dean of the UP College of Law, Atty. Pacificao Agabin, brightened the modifications effected by
this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
"In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying
the absolute immunity concept. First, we extended it to shield the President not only form civil
claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so that it
would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we
broadened its coverage so as to include not only the President but also other persons, be they
government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can be
said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense
syndrome)."
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive
immunity in the 1973 Constitution. The move was led by them Member of Parliament, now Secretary of
Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos
violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a return to the
anachronism "the king can do no wrong."107 The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People
Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987 Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the
executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The following explanation was given by
delegate J. Bernas vis:108
"Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the Committee's omitting in the draft proposal the
immunity provision for the President. I agree with Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did
very well in striking out second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on immunity
from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a
restoration of at least the first sentence that the President shall be immune from suit during his
tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might be
spending all his time facing litigation's, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing
litigation's almost daily?

48
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present
jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973
Constitution was to make that explicit and to add other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I think the Commissioner for the clarifications."
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument
that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment
proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the
prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the
Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 "Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus
Officio."109 Since, the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand
that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for
it will place him in a better situation than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the debates
in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become
moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed
against him, viz:110
"xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the
President, for example, and the President resigns before judgement of conviction has been
rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment
proceeding? Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his
resignation would render the case moot and academic. However, as the provision says, the
criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts."
This is in accord with our ruling In Re: Saturnino Bermudez 111 that 'incumbent Presidents are immune
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure" but not
beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner
has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a
condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the
impeachment proceedings. His reliance on the case of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan 112 and related
cases113 are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
Petitioner cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and
wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and conditions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials
are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
footing as any trespasser.114
Indeed, critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to
expand the privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a
right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon, 115 US President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was
subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aids and
advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixon's associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct

49
Justice and other offenses, which were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National
Headquarters in Washington's Watergate Hotel during the 972 presidential campaign. President Nixon
himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground, among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be
impeached and removed from office before he could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The
claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that "when the ground for asserting privilege
as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in
confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair
administration of criminal justice." In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 116 the US Supreme Court
further held that the immunity of the president from civil damages covers only "official acts." Recently,
the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones 117 where
it held that the US President's immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts
is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in
our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public
trust.118 It declared as a state policy that "the State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruptio." 119 it ordained that "public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives."120 It set the rule that 'the right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by
prescription, latches or estoppel."121 It maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court. 122 It
created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers, among which is to
"investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust improper or
inefficient."123 The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal autonomy. 124 These constitutional
policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity
from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner
Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the
investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He
submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set file the criminal cases
violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of
unrestrained publicity during the investigation and trial of high profile cases. 125 The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and
stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat. 126 The American approach
is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on
the right of an accused to a fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this
issue, i.e., substantial; probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood, clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or
annul convictions in high profile criminal cases.127 In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,128 later reiterated in the
case of Larranaga vs. court of Appeals, et al.,129 we laid down the doctrine that:
"We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive
publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible
reporting enhances accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has
always been regarded as the criminal field xxx. The press does not simply publish information
about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors,
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.

50
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself
prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality.
For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other offcourt publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system
brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These
news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a
fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not
installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose there
impartially. xxx xxx xxx. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on-camera performances of parties to litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to
the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et
al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test
of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might
be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at a bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellants as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of
the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity, which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.'
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon,
etc.130 and its companion cases, viz:
"Again petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while
undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation
considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and
oftentimes, its excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the
telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity
of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts
and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still bombard the
public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal
actors in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have
participated in this media blitz. The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial
notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. In the
seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was
xxx
a. The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice
demonstrates conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted,
criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving
assurance that the proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging
perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias or partiality. In
addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized
when a shocking crime occurs a community reaction of outrage and public protest often
follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion. To work
effectively, it is important that society's criminal process satisfy the appearance of
justice,' Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L ED 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be
provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted
history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded
that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this

51
Nation's system of justice, Cf., e,g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989,
80 S Ct 1038.
b. The freedoms of speech. Press and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First
Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on
matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedom such as
those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that
the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from
summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time
the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant,
having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to augment
the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which the draftsmen
deliberately linked it. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally and
representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence
historically has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
c. Even though the Constitution contains no provision which be its terms guarantees to the
public the right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly
guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated
rights. The right to attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have exercised for
centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et
al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they
might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will
prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically
unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is
a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by
the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and
the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well
of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member
of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity."
(emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman.
Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof. 131 He needs to
show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to
render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the petitioner are still
undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the respondent
Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the
members of this special panel have already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial
publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court
cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.1wphi1.nt
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To
quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been influenced by the barrage of
slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed at him by the
mobs."132 News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has
already prejudged the cases of the petitioner133 and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating
the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.

52
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the
news reports referred to by the petitioner cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court
especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice and the
presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor
can we adopt the theory of derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of
respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, give investigation prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and
recommendations albeit they are reviewable by their superiors. 134 They can be reversed but they can
not be compelled cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors
should not be treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves
to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that the findings of probable cause
against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the "hooting throng." The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different
dimension and then move to a new stage - - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from
the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth of the minority will
be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the
State to prosecute the guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been
categorized as the "most fundamental of all freedoms." 135To be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to
do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce
calls "the impatient vehemence of the majority." Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob
whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights necessarily resolved by the
power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the
definition of the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it
has respected the right of the minority to convince the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of
multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to man's progress from the cave to
civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some people's prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R No. 187167

August 16, 2011

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY
C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA
BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL
BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA
BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN
MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY
LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN
HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK
TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA,
NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE

53
TORNO,
MARIA
ESTER
VANGUARDIA,
and
MARCELINO
VELOSO
III, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR.,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 95221(RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime
of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) 2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the
Philippines as an archipelagic State. 3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), 4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of
States parties over their "territorial sea," the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.
Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved
futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation
passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The
change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), 5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February
1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of
archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline,
optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent
territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as "regimes of islands"
whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as "citizens,
taxpayers or x x x legislators,"9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two
principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of
the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, 10 embodying
the terms of the Treaty of Paris 11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters
landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine
sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine
resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions. 13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as "regime of islands" not only
results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for
what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of
UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions
compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners
alleged lack of locus standiand (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the

54
constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance
with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal.
Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic
interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that
what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the
waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens
and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA
9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On
Petitioners
Standi as Citizens

the

Possess

Threshold

Issues
Locus

Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because
the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative 15 nor misuse of public
funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize
petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits
of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution.
Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants
possessing "a more direct and specific interest" to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the
requirements for granting citizenship standing. 17
The
Writs
of
Are
Proper
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the
observance of the offices of the writs
absent any showing of grave abuse of
powers on the part of respondents and

Certiorari
Remedies

and
to

Prohibition
Test

petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict

of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue
discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners. 18

Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its
constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari
and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, 19 and indeed, of acts
of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of
statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such
relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of

55
the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
RA
9522
is
RA
9522
is
to
Demarcate
Maritime
Zones
Shelf
Under
UNCLOS
Delineate Philippine Territory

Not
a

the
and
III,

Unconstitutional
Tool
Countrys
Continental
not
to

Statutory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 "dismembers a large portion of the national territory" 21 because it
discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related
treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory
provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at
the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that
from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends
hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical
miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic
zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III
delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas,
recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and
submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to markout specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured,
to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental
shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the
exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic
baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the
rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within
which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the
contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive
economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the
waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines
would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other
portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the "outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago."24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners
claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely,
lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, 25 not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to

56
delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS
III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law. 26
RA
9522s
of
Regime
Maritime
Zones
Scarborough
with
the
Over these Areas

Use
of

of
Islands

of
Shoal,
Philippines

the
to

the
Claim

not

KIG

Determine
and
of

Framework
the
the
Inconsistent
Sovereignty

Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the
baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, "weakens our
territorial claim" over that area. 27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion
from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters," prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. 28 A comparison of the
configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space
encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional
deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.1avvphi1
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely
followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to
optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with
UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This
undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a
statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for
this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of "about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters" under RA 9522
is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of
basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea
and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below: 29

Internal
archipelagic
waters

Extent of maritime
area
using
RA
3046, as amended,
taking into account
the Treaty of Paris
delimitation
(in
square
nautical
miles)

Extent of maritime
area
using
RA
9522, taking into
account UNCLOS III
(in square nautical
miles)

166,858

171,435

274,136

32,106

or

Territorial Sea
Exclusive
Economic Zone
TOTAL

382,669
440,994

586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even
extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of
course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will
have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III. 30

57

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines
that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits
to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as "Regime of Islands" under the Republic of the
Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach
of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that "[t]he drawing of such
baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that "the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles," save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125
nautical miles.31

58
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG 32 and the Scarborough Shoal
for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest
shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the
nearest basepoint will inevitably "depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago."
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to
emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the
Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines
we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: "The drawing of such
baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago."
So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal,
hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim
them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the
orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa
itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the
Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines
para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng
United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits.1avvphi1 The need
to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps,
became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits
of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of
[UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some
technical deficiencies, to wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is
140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the
[UNCLOS III], which states that "The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical
miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago
may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles."
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted
from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by
geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of
Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on lowwater line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47. 35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress
decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as "Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121" 36 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible
observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any
"naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide," such as
portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of "regime of islands," whose islands generate their
own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory
RA 5446 Retained

Claim

Over

Sabah

under

59
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over
Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps
open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided
in this Actis without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around
the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines
has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS
III
Incompatible
Delineation of Internal Waters

with

and

RA
the

9522

not
Constitutions

As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law
unconstitutionally "converts" internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to
the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners
extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and
maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine "internal waters" under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as
"archipelagic waters" under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the
body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their
bed and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters,
regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as
to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other
respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the
exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air
space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law
norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the
interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the
international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation
designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. 40 Indeed,
bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress. 41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to
grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys
limitations and conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary
international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. 44 No modern State
can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance
with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent
passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal
States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit
passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic

60
waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all
the waters landward of their baselines,regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as
archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity
prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. 46 Separate islands
generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24
nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other
States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles
and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article
II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, "do not embody judicially enforceable
constitutional rights x x x."49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting
implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution.
Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of
Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed
constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth
(Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 51 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7 52 ), are not
violated by RA 9522.
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,
reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such
zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict
observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international
community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui
generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas.
UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this
zone up to 200 nautical miles. 53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of
other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to
pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners
reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this
Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III
compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of
internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf
is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring
powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our
archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine
maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas,
as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the
Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of
the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national
interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

61
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 169304

March 13, 2007

THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, SECRETARY MANUEL M. DAYRIT, USEC. MA. MARGARITA

GALON
and
USEC.
ANTONIO
M.
LOPEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Assailed via petition for review are issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84457, to wit: a)
Decision1 dated May 12, 2005 which affirmed the order issued by Judge Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 264 denying petitioners motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
68208; and b) Resolution2 dated August 9, 2005 which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Phil. Pharmawealth, Inc. (respondent) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing and supplying pharmaceutical products to government hospitals in the Philippines.
On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 27,3 Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and procedures on the accreditation of
government suppliers for pharmaceutical products.
A.O. No. 27 was later amended by A.O. No. 10, 4 Series of 2000, providing for additional guidelines for
accreditation of drug suppliers aimed at ensuring that only qualified bidders can transact business with
petitioner Department of Health (DOH). Part V of A.O. No. 10 reads, in part:
1. Drug Manufacturer, Drug Trader and Drug Importer shall be allowed to apply for accreditation.
2. Accreditation shall be done by the Central Office-Department of Health.
3. A separate accreditation is required for the drug suppliers and for their specific products.
xxxx
12. Only products accredited by the Committee shall be allowed to be procured by the DOH and
all otherentities under its jurisdiction.5 (Underscoring supplied)
On May 9, 20006 and May 29, 2000,7 respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request for the inclusion
of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including the antibiotic "Penicillin G
Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided by petitioner DOH, it appears that processing of and
release of the result of respondents request were due on September 2000, the last month of the
quarter following the date of its filing. 8
Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez, chairperson of the
pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation for Bids 9 for the procurement of 1.2
million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine (Penicillin G Benzathine contract).
Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondents request for inclusion of
additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its bid for the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on October 11, 2000, only two companies
participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid at P82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS
Laboratories (YSS) bid of P95.00 per unit. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondents
Penicillin G Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS.
Respondent thus filed a complaint 10 for injunction, mandamus and damages with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial

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Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia, that the trial court "nullify the award of the Penicillin G
Benzathine contract (IFB No. 2000-10-11 [14]) to YSS Laboratories, Inc. and direct defendant DOH,
defendant Romualdez, defendant Galon and defendant Lopez to declare plaintiff Pharmawealth as
the lowest complying responsible bidder for the Benzathine contract, and that they accordingly award
the same to plaintiff company" and "adjudge defendants Romualdez, Galon and Lopez liable, jointly and
severally to plaintiff, for [the therein specified damages]."11
In their Comment,12 petitioner DOH, Secretary Alberto Romualdez, Jr. who was later succeeded by
petitioner Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit, and individual petitioners Undersecretaries Margarita Galon and
Antonio Lopez argued for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit in view of the express
reservation made by petitioner DOH to accept or reject any or all bids without incurring liability to the
bidders, they positing that government agencies have such full discretion.
Petitioners subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion 13 (motion to dismiss) praying for the outright
dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. Additionally, they alleged that
respondents representative was not duly authorized by its board of directors to file the complaint.
To petitioners motion to dismiss, respondent filed its comment/opposition 14 contending, in the main,
that the doctrine of state immunity is not applicable considering that individual petitioners are being
sued both in their official and personal capacities, hence, they, not the state, would be liable for
damages.
By Order of December 8, 2003, the trial court 15 denied petitioners motion to dismiss.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, 16 petitioners filed a petition for certiorari 17 with
the Court of Appeals, before which they maintained that the suit is against the state.
By the assailed Decision18 of May 12, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Order. And by
Resolution of August 9, 2005, it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review which raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred
in upholding the denial of petitioners motion to dismiss.
The petition fails.
The suability of a government official depends on whether the official concerned was acting within his
official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether the acts done in the performance of official functions will
result in a charge or financial liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself
assures the availability of judicial review, 19 and it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as
the proper party.20
In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against petitioners in their
official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been tainted with grave abuse of
discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily follows that it is the official concerned who
should be impleaded as defendant or respondent in an appropriate suit. 21
Moreover, part of the reliefs prayed for by respondent is the enjoinment of the implementation, as well
as the nullification of the award to YSS, the grant of which may not be enforced against individual
petitioners and their successors except in their official capacities as officials of the DOH. 22
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite its being an
unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action directed against it are
preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule 58 23 of the Rules of Court, preliminary
injunction may be directed against a party or a court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of
state immunity from suit does not apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or
financial liability against the State.24

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As regards individual petitioners suability for damages, the following discussion on the applicability of
the defense of state immunity from suit is relevant.
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3, Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of international law, which we have now
adopted as part of the law of the land.25
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its
consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. 26 The suit is regarded as one against the state
where satisfaction of the judgment against the officials will require the state itself to perform a positive
act, such as the appropriation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them. 27
The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances. Shauf v.
Court of Appeals28 elucidates:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts
contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in
Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al., 29 Inasmuch as the State
authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded
or violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to
act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an
unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against
the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)1avvphi1
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that
are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of others. Neither does it apply where the public
official is clearly being sued not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts
complained of may have been committed while he occupied a public position. 30
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for damages in connection
with their alleged act of "illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official positions to make sure that plaintiff
Pharmawealth would not be awarded the Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and
with full knowledge of the limits and breadth of their powers given by law" 31 is permissible, in
consonance with the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by
law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally. 32
It bears stressing, however, that the statements in the immediately foregoing paragraph in no way
reflect a ruling on the actual liability of petitioners to respondent. The mere allegation that a
government official is being sued in his personal capacity does not automatically remove the same
from the protection of the doctrine of state immunity. Neither, upon the other hand, does the mere
invocation of official character suffice to insulate such official from suability and liability for an act
committed without or in excess of his or her authority. 33 These are matters of evidence which should be
presented and proven at the trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 12, 2005 and Resolution dated
August 9, 2005 issued by the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.