People of the Philippines vs Pedro

Manayao
December 2, 2011
No comments
78 Phil. 721 Political Law Citizenship Defense of State Treason
Pedro Manayao was a member of the Makapili (a group of Filipino traitors aiding the
Japanese cause). Manayao conspired together with his Japanese comrade soldiers to inflict
terror upon the barrio of Banaban in Bulacan where they killed 60 to 70 residents. The
residents they killed were alleged to be supporters, wives and relatives of guerillas fighting
the Japanese forces. Manayao was positively identified by credible witnesses and he was
later convicted with the high crime of treason with multiple murder. He was sentenced to
death and to pay the damages. Manayaos counsel argued that his client cannot be tried
with treason because Manayao has already lost his Filipino citizenship due to his swearing
of allegiance to support the Japanese cause. Hence, Manayao cannot be tried under
Philippine courts for any war crimes for only Japanese courts can do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manayao is guilty of treason.
HELD: No. Manayaos swearing of allegiance to Japan was not proven as a fact nor is it
proven that he joined the Japanese Naval, Army or Air Corps. What he joined is the
Makapili, a group of Filipino traitors pure and simple. The Supreme Court also emphasized
that in times of war when the state invokes the Constitutional provision which state
The defense of the state is a prime duty of the government, in the fulfillment of this duty all
citizens may be required to render personal, military or civil service
no one can effectively cast off his duty to defend the state by merely swearing allegiance to
an enemy country, leaving and joining the opposite force, or by deserting the Philippine
Armed Forces. Or even if Manayao did lose his citizenship it is also indicated that no such
person shall take up arms against his native country; he shall be held guilty of a felony and
treason, if he does not strictly observe this duty.

DigestedCaseonPIRACYG.R.No.L17958PeopleVs.Lol
loandSaraw
G. R. No. L-17958 February 27, 1922
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Plaintiff-Appellee ,
Vs.
LOL-LO AND SARAW,
Defendants-Appellants.
FACTS: This case is a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas,attending rape and murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left of Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a
Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland.The
second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat
was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but
once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated two of the women by methods too horrible to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with
the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, with the idea
that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and
privation, were succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating them, the Moros
finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped
one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.
After Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands,
they were arrested and were charged in the CFI with the crime of piracy. The counsel of record interposed
a demurrer on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, nor of any
court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in
force in the Philippine Islands. The demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, a trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another
case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them
in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not the elements of piracy exists?
HELD: The SC decided that in the present case, the facts were proven and not disputed and all of the
elements of the crime of piracy were present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas,
without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility. Piracy
is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind which can be punished in the competent
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction
of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.
Therefore it does not matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign

state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U. S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5
Wheat., 184).
ISSUE2: The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time
is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force.
Articles 153 to 156 of the Penal Code?

"Art. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war
with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be
punished with the penalty or presidio mayor.
"Art. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article
shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the
second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
"2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified
in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of
article four hundred and sixteen.
"3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of
the book.
"4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
"5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
"Art. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title as well as all others of this code, when Spain is
mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory.
"Art. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the
Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such."
HELD: SC Decided that there was no doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with
piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code of the Penal Code in
relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the
Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.

It is also evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are
not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of Article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to Article 154. There
are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either cadena
perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the
abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary
for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this
connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and
compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as
amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by
causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength,
and that means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken
into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to
impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lol-lo [the accused who raped one of the women] but is not
unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since one member of the Court, Mr. Justice
Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it results,
therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is
reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by the Judge of First
Instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang and Maulanis,
defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of
924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances.
Posted by Ms. C at 8:18 PM

Arbitrary detention
In the case of JUDGE DOLORES L. ESPAOL vs. JUDGE LORINDA B. TOLEDO- MUPAS, En Banc,
A.M. No. 03-1462-MTJ, April 19, 2007, the Supreme Court held that when the gross inefficiency springs
from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his or her
duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the exalted position and title he or she holds,
or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority.

In the said case, the respondent judges insisted on issuing orders which she called "Detention Pending
Investigation of the Case" which she insisted to be an implied waiver of the rights of the accused under
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court reminded the Bench that although judges have in their favor the presumption of regularity and
good faith in the performance of their official functions, a blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable
terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders them susceptible to administrative sanctions.
Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigants, a wanton display of utter
lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes the confidence of the public in the
competence of our courts to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to embarrassment. Worse, it could

raise the specter of corruption.

May I digest the same below, thus:

X x x.
In the same Comment, Judge Espaol said that Judge Mupas operated the MTC of Dasmarias, Cavite
as a One-Stop Shop where criminal suspects apprehended without a warrant are ordered detained in
the municipal jail by virtue of an unsigned Detention Pending Investigation of the Case, in lieu of a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as prescribed by R.A. No. 7438 and by
Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Thus, according to Judge Espaol, the
apprehended persons were detained for a long time until Judge Mupas set the case for preliminary
investigation. If the detainee can post bail, Judge Mupas would fix the amount of bail and require that the
premium, usually equivalent to 20% or 30% thereof, be paid in cash. If the surety bond was secured
outside of the MTC, the bond would be rejected. Hence, the applicants for bail bonds would go to the
RTC of Dasmarias, Cavite to complain and apply for the release of the detention prisoners.
X x x.

Accordingly, Judge Mupas faced the following charges: (1) violation of Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and Republic Act No. 7438; and (2)
violation of the rules on preliminary investigation (a) for the delay in the resolution of preliminary
investigation cases pending in [Judge Mupas] court; (b) for failure to perform her ministerial duty of
transmitting the records of the case, including the resolution on the preliminary investigation, within 10
days from the issuance of the said resolution to the provincial prosecutor of Cavite; and (c) for conducting
preliminary investigation despite the fact that there were many prosecutors in Cavite not indisposed to do
the job.
X x x.

In an undated Resolution filed with the OCA on February 9, 2007, Justice Myrna Dimaranan-Vidal found,
contrary to Judge Mupas claim, that the document entitled "Detention Pending Investigation of Cases"
cannot validly be deemed to be an implied waiver of the rights of the accused under Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Justice Vidal submits the following findings:
Extant from the records, is Respondents admission of her practice in the issuance of the document
entitled Detention Pending Investigation of Cases claiming, however, that such document served as an
implied waiver of the rights of the accused under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
The undersigned disagrees.
Sec. 2 e) of RA 7438 is in point, thus:
xxx Any waiver by a person arrested or detained under the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, or under custodial investigation, shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence of
his counsel; otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and of no effect. (Underscoring supplied)
The afore cited law is clear and simple. Thus, construction is unnecessary. Clearly, what the said

provision requires to protect the rights of the accused is a written waiver signed by the accused with the
assistance of a counsel. However, the procedure adopted by the Respondent runs counter thereto. She
resorted to the issuance of a commitment order dubbed as Detention Pending Investigation of the Case
to legally prolong the detention of the accused pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation.
Obviously, this is not within the contemplation of the law. Thus, the practice is highly erroneous a blatant
manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary (AM No. 03-05-01-SC; June 1, 2004)
provides:
Canon 6 Competence and Diligence
xxx
Sec. 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and personal
qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage for this purpose of the
training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to judges.
xxx
Otherwise put, Respondent is presumed to know the basic measures to protect the rights of the accused
during preliminary investigation. Sadly, Respondent failed in this regard. Instead, she maintained the
practice of issuing this highly improper order, i.e., Detention Pending Investigation of the Case, just to put
a semblance of legality in the detention of the accused.

With respect to the other charges, Justice Vidal found the evidence insufficient to support the accusations
that Judge Mupas: (1) detained the accused for a long period of time while the preliminary investigation
was pending in her court; (2) failed to transmit to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite the records of the
case within 10 days after preliminary investigation; and (3) acted without authority to conduct preliminary
investigation because there were enough prosecutors in Cavite to conduct the same.

Justice Vidal then concludes:

However, the undersigned finds that Respondent should still be held administratively liable.
Respondents act of issuing orders dubbed as Detention Pending Investigation of Cases instead of
requiring the accused to execute a written waiver, with the assistance of counsel, pursuant to Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, fall [sic] short of the measure of responsibility expected from a judge.
Respondent should be reminded that the actions of everyone connected with an office charged with the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with
a high degree of responsibility. The image of a court, as a true temple of justice, is mirrored in the
conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat. Judicial personnel are expected
to be living examples of uprightness in the performance of official duties [and] preserve at all times the
good name and standing of the courts in the community.

X x x.
There is no gainsaying that Judge Mupas practice of issuing "Detention Pending Investigation of the
Case" orders in lieu of a written waiver signed by the accused with the assistance of counsel is, in the
words of Justice Vidal, "a blatant manifestation of ignorance in the legal procedure." It is gross ignorance

of the law, pure and simple.

X x x.
In the present case, while the documents denominated "Detention Pending Investigation of the Case"
were issued during the same period of time that the three (3) above-cited cases were decided, it is
noteworthy that Judge Mupas continued with the practice even after her attention had been called.
Worse, she remained insistent that the document was an implied waiver of the rights of the accused
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Judge Mupas must be reminded that although judges have
in their favor the presumption of regularity and good faith in the performance of their official functions, a
blatant disregard of the clear and unmistakable terms of the law obviates this presumption and renders
them susceptible to administrative sanctions. Being among the judicial front-liners who have direct contact
with the litigants, a wanton display of utter lack of familiarity with the rules by the judge inevitably erodes
the confidence of the public in the competence of our courts to render justice. It subjects the judiciary to
embarrassment. Worse, it could raise the specter of corruption.
When the gross inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a
principle in the discharge of his or her duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the
exalted position and title he or she holds, or the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority.
All said, this Court finds the respondent, Judge Lorinda B. Toledo-Mupas, administratively liable for gross
ignorance of the law. Considering that this is her fourth offense, she deserves to be meted the supreme
penalty of dismissal from the service, with all the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

F ri da y, Dec em b er 21 , 2 01 2

GONZALES vs ABAYA Case Digest

EUGENE GONZALES, ET AL. vs. NARCISO ABAYA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006.

FACTS: In relation to the celebrated Oakwood mutiny where a total of 321 soldiers including
petitioners herein declared their withdrawal of support to the Commander-in-chief, President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo declared a state of rebellion and ordered the arrest of the said soldiers. In order
to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. After
several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their
arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments.
Eventually, they returned to their barracks.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the
military personnel involved be charged with coup d'etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice
(DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against them.

Meanwhile, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then
AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident
and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.

On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information for
coup d'etat against those soldiers, Subsequently, this case was consolidated involving the other
accused, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City.

On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 032784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for
violations of Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 (otherwise known as "The Articles of War"), as amended,
against the same military personnel.

Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein)
filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7055.

Subsequently, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report to
the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d'etat
before the RTC should not be charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.

For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order stating that "all charges before the
court martial against the accused . . . are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat." The trial court then proceeded to
hear petitioners' applications for bail.

Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of
the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved in the Oakwood
incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general court martial for violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. The same was approved by
the AFP.

The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge.
Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that

respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War
in relation to the Oakwood incident.

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11, 2004
that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is
absorbed in the crime of coup d'etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its
jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

1.Whether the court martial may assume jurisdiction over those who have been criminally charged of
coup dtat before the regular courts.

2. Whether the doctrine of absorption of crimes is applicable.

HELD:

1. Yes. Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1
(second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the
duly-constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military
profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed
for the same dismissal from the service imposable only by the military court. Such penalty is
purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to
preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.

Hence, there is no merit in petitioners argument that they can no longer be charged before the court
martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the
RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d'etat," hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in
making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the court martial the
jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law has conferred the court
should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court,
tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. And it is only
through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and
fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to be.
Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.

2. No. The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged
crime of coup d'etat. Firstly, the doctrine of absorption of crimes' is peculiar to criminal law and
generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here where different statutes are
involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses.
Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses,
including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable
to this case.

ECOND DIVISION
ANGEL CELINO, SR.,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 170562

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING,* J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,**
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.

COURT OF APPEALS, CEBU

CITY,
HON.
DELANO
F.
VILLARUZ, Presiding Judge,
Promulgated:
Branch
16,
Regional
Trial
Court,Capiz, Roxas City, and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
June 29, 2007
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the
Court of Appeals Decision dated April 18, 2005[1] affirming the trial courts denial
of petitioner Angel Celino, Sr.s Motion to Quash; and Resolution dated September
26, 2005[2] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the said Decision.

The following facts are not disputed:

Two separate informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City charging petitioner with violation of Section 2(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 6446 (gun ban),[3] and Section 1, Paragraph 2 of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 8294[4] (illegal possession of firearm), as follows:
Criminal Case No. C-137-04
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry
outside of his residence an armalite rifle colt M16 with serial number
3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty (30) live
ammunitions of the same caliber during the election period December
15, 2005 to June 9, 2004 without first having obtained the proper
authority in writing from the Commission on Elections, Manila,
Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [5]
Criminal Case No. C-138-04
That on or about the 12th day of May, 2004, in the City of Roxas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in
his possession and control one (1) armalite rifle colt M16 with serial
number 3210606 with two (2) long magazines each loaded with thirty
(30) live ammunitions of the same caliber without first having obtained
the proper license or necessary permit to possess the said firearm.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-138-04, petitioner pleaded not

guilty to the gun ban violation charge.[7]

Prior to his arraignment in Criminal Case No. C-137-04, petitioner filed a

Motion to Quash[8] contending that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession
of firearms x xx if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic]
violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts x x x.[9]
By Order of July 29, 2004,[10] the trial court denied the Motion to Quash on
the basis of this Courts[11] affirmation in Margarejo v. Hon. Escoses[12] of therein
respondent judges denial of a similar motion to quash on the ground that the other
offense charged x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294
x x x. [13] Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by September
22, 2004 Resolution,[14] hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari[15] before the
Court of Appeals.
By Decision dated April 18, 2005,[16] the appellate court affirmed the trial
courts denial of the Motion to Quash. Petitioners May 9, 2005 Motion for
Reconsideration[17]having been denied by Resolution of September 26, 2005,
[18]
petitioner filed the present petition.
The petition fails.
Petitioners remedy to challenge the appellate courts decision and resolution
was to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 on or before October
20, 2005 or 15 days after he received a copy of the appellate court's resolution
on October 5, 2005[ 1 9 ] denying his motion for reconsideration. Instead, petitioner
chose to file the present petition under Rule 65 only on December 2, 2005,[20] a
good 58 days after he received the said resolution.
Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for lost appeal. Certiorari lies only
when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. Why the question being raised by petitioner, i.e., whether the
appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion, could not have been raised on
appeal, no reason therefor has been advanced.[21]
While this Court, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of
Court and in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a petition
for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45, especially if filed within

the reglementary period under said Rule, it finds nothing in the present case to
warrant a liberal application of the Rules, no justification having been proffered, as
just stated, why the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period,[22] especially
considering that it is substantially just a replication of the petition earlier filed
before the appellate court.
Technicality aside, the petition fails just the same.

The relevant provision of R.A. 8294 reads:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SECTION
1. Unlawful
Manufacture,
Sale,
Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in
the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. x x x.
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period
and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000) shall be
imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm
which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38
caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45
and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful
such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and
other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and
by burst of two or three: Provided, however, That no other
crime was committed by the person arrested.
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
"If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of or
incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion or
insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat, such

violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of

rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or attempted coup d'etat.
xxxx
(Underscoring supplied)

The crux of the controversy lies in the interpretation of the underscored

proviso. Petitioner, citing Agote v. Lorenzo,[23] People v. Ladjaalam,[24] and other
similar cases,[25]contends that the mere filing of an information for gun ban
violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of
firearm. The Solicitor General contends otherwise on the basis of Margarejo v.
Hon. Escoses [26] and People v. Valdez.[27]
In Agote,[28] this Court affirmed the accuseds conviction for gun ban
violation but exonerated him of the illegal possession of firearm charge because it
cannot but set aside petitioners conviction in Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for
illegal possession of firearm since another crime was committed at the same
time, i.e., violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban. [29] Agote is
based on Ladjaalam[30] where this Court held:
x x x A simple reading [of RA 8294] shows that if an unlicensed firearm
is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense
of simple illegal possession of firearms.Hence, if the other crime is
murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an
aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault
with multiple attemptedhomicide was committed in this case, appellant
can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of firearms.
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor of the
accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA 8294's simple language is
most favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is
justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates the legislative
intent to favor the accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted
of two separate offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct
assault with attempted homicide. x x x
xxxx

x x x The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple

illegal possession of firearms, provided that no other crime was
committed by the person arrested. If the intention of the law in the
second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should
have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the
law does not distinguish, neither should we.[31]

The law is indeed clear. The accused can be convicted of illegal possession
of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The
word committed taken in its ordinary sense, and in light of the Constitutional
presumption of innocence,[32] necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by
final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.[33]
Petitioners reliance on Agote, Ladjaalam, Evangelista, Garcia, Pangilinan,
Almeida, and Bernal is, therefore, misplaced. In each one of these cases, the
accused were exonerated of illegal possession of firearms because of their
commission, as shown by their conviction, of some other crime.[34] In the present
case, however, petitioner has only been accused of committing a violation of the
COMELEC gun ban. As accusation is not synonymous with guilt, there is yet no
showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime charged.
[35]
Consequently, the proviso does not yet apply.
More
applicable
is Margarejo[36] where,
as
stated
earlier,
this Court affirmed the denial of a motion to quash an information for illegal
possession of firearm on the ground that the other offense charged [i.e., violation of
gun ban] x x x is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294 x x x.[37] in
consonance with the earlier pronouncement inValdez[38] that all pending cases
involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried
if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.
[39]

In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under
R.A. 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed
because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such
other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or
homicide,[40] or absorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or

attempted coup detat.[41] Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of
those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then the separate case for illegal possession of
firearm should continue to be prosecuted.
Finally, as a general rule, the remedy of an accused from the denial of his
motion to quash is for him to go to trial on the merits, and if an adverse decision is
rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.[42] Although the
special civil action for certiorari may be availed of in case there is a grave abuse of
discretion,[43] the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition as that vitiating
error is not attendant in the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

(ON OFFICIAL LEAVE)

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the Courts Division.