Will China S Rise Lead To War Foreign Affairs

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WillChina'sRiseLeadtoWar?|ForeignAffairs
COURTESYREUTERS
ESSAY
March/April 2011 Issue
WillChina'sRiseLeadtoWar?
WhyRealismDoesNotMeanPessimism
ByCharlesGlaser
heriseoChinawilllikelybethemostimportantinternationalrelations
storyothetwentyrstcentury,butitremainsunclearwhetherthat
storywillhaveahappyending.WillChina'sascentincreasethe
probabilityogreatpowerwar?WillaneraoU.S.Chinesetensionbeas
dangerousastheColdWar?Willitbeevenworse,becauseChina,unlikethe
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/20110301/willchinasriseleadwar
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SovietUnion,willproveaseriouseconomiccompetitoraswellasageopolitical
one?
Theseissueshavebeenaddressedbyawiderangeoexpertsregionalists,
historians,andeconomistsallowhomcanclaiminsightintocertainaspectsof
thesituation.ButChina'suniquequalities,pastbehavior,andeconomictrajectory
maywellturnouttobelessimportantindrivingfutureeventsthanmanyassume
becausehowacountryactsasasuperpowerandwhetheritsactionsandthoseof
otherswillendinbattleareshapedasmuchbygeneralpatternsointernational
politicsasbyidiosyncraticfactors.Suchbroaderquestionsabouttheconditions
underwhichpowertransitionsleadtoconictarepreciselywhatinternational
relationstheoristsstudy,sothey,too,havesomethingtoaddtothediscussion.
Sofar,theChinadebateamonginternationalrelationstheoristshaspitted
optimisticliberalsagainstpessimisticrealists.Theliberalsarguethatbecausethe
currentinternationalorderisdenedbyeconomicandpoliticalopenness,itcan
accommodateChina'srisepeacefully.TheUnitedStatesandotherleadingpowers,
thisargumentruns,canandwillmakeclearthatChinaiswelcometojointhe
existingorderandprosperwithinit,andChinaislikelytodosoratherthanlaunch
acostlyanddangerousstruggletooverturnthesystemandestablishanordermore
toitsownliking.
Thestandardrealistview,incontrast,predictsintensecompetition.China's
growingstrength,mostrealistsargue,willleadittopursueitsinterestsmore
assertively,whichwillinturnleadtheUnitedStatesandothercountriestobalance
againstit.ThiscyclewillgenerateattheleastaparalleltotheColdWarstando
betweentheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion,andperhapsevenahegemonic
war.AdherentsothisviewpointtoChina'srecentharderlineonitsmaritime
claimsintheEastChinaandSouthChinaseasandtotheincreasinglyclose
relationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandIndiaassignsthatthecycleof
assertivenessandbalancinghasalreadybegun.
Infact,however,amorenuancedversionorealismprovidesgroundsfor
optimism.China'sriseneednotbenearlyascompetitiveanddangerousasthe
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standardrealistargumentsuggests,becausethestructuralforcesdrivingmajor
powersintoconictwillberelativelyweak.Thedangersthatdoexist,moreover,
arenottheonespredictedbysweepingtheoriesotheinternationalsystemin
generalbutinsteadstemfromsecondarydisputesparticulartoNortheastAsia
andthesecurityprevalentintheinternationalsystematlargeshouldmakethese
disputeseasierfortheUnitedStatesandChinatomanage.Intheend,therefore,
theoutcomeoChina'srisewilldependlessonthepressuresgeneratedbythe
internationalsystemthanonhowwellU.S.andChineseleadersmanagethe
situation.ConictisnotpredeterminedanditheUnitedStatescanadjustto
thenewinternationalconditions,makingsomeuncomfortableconcessionsandnot
exaggeratingthedangers,amajorclashmightwellbeavoided.
AGOODKINDOFSECURITYDILEMMA
Structuralrealismexplainsstates'actionsintermsothepressuresand
opportunitiescreatedbytheinternationalsystem.Oneneednotlooktodomestic
factorstoexplaininternationalconict,inthisview,becausetheroutineactionsof
independentstatestryingtomaintaintheirsecurityinananarchicworldcanresult
inwar.Thisdoesnothappenallthetime,ocourse,andexplaininghowsecurity
seekingstatesndthemselvesatwarisactuallysomethingoapuzzle,sincethey
mightbeexpectedtochoosecooperationandthebenetsopeaceinstead.The
solutiontothepuzzleliesintheconceptothesecuritydilemmaasituationin
whichonestate'seortstoincreaseitsownsecurityreducethesecurityoothers.
Theintensityothesecuritydilemmadepends,inpart,ontheeaseoattackand
coercion.Whenattackingiseasy,evensmallincreasesinonestate'sforceswill
signicantlydecreasethesecurityoothers,fuelingaspiralofearandarming.
Whendefendinganddeterringareeasy,incontrast,changesinonestate'smilitary
forceswillnotnecessarilythreatenothers,andthepossibilityomaintaininggood
politicalrelationsamongtheplayersinthesystemwillincrease.
Theintensityothesecuritydilemmaalsodependsonstates'beliefsaboutone
another'smotivesandgoals.Forexample,iastatebelievesthatitsadversaryis
drivenonlybyaquestforsecurityratherthan,say,aninherentdesireto
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dominatethesystemthenitshouldndincreasesintheadversary'smilitary
forceslesstroublingandnotfeeltheneedtorespondinkind,thuspreventingthe
spiralopoliticalandmilitaryescalation.
Thepossibilityovariationintheintensityothesecuritydilemmahasdramatic
implicationsforstructuralrealisttheory,makingitspredictionslessconsistently
bleakthanoftenassumed.Whenthesecuritydilemmaissevere,competitionwill
indeedbeintenseandwarmorelikely.Thesearetheclassicbehaviorspredictedby
realistpessimism.Butwhenthesecuritydilemmaismild,astructuralrealistwill
seethattheinternationalsystemcreatesopportunitiesforrestraintandpeace.
Properlyunderstood,moreover,thesecuritydilemmasuggeststhatastatewillbe
moresecurewhenitsadversaryismoresecurebecauseinsecuritycanpressurean
adversarytoadoptcompetitiveandthreateningpolicies.Thisdynamiccreates
incentivesforrestraintandcooperation.Ianadversarycanbepersuadedthatall
onewantsissecurity(asopposedtodomination),theadversarymayitselrelax.
WhatdoesallthisimplyabouttheriseoChina?Atthebroadestlevel,thenewsis
good.CurrentinternationalconditionsshouldenableboththeUnitedStatesand
Chinatoprotecttheirvitalinterestswithoutposinglargethreatstoeachother.
Nuclearweaponsmakeitrelativelyeasyformajorpowerstomaintainhighly
eectivedeterrentforces.EveniChinesepowerweretogreatlyexceedU.S.
powersomewheredowntheroad,theUnitedStateswouldstillbeabletomaintain
nuclearforcesthatcouldsurviveanyChineseattackandthreatenmassivedamage
inretaliation.LargescaleconventionalattacksbyChinaagainsttheU.S.
homeland,meanwhile,arevirtuallyimpossiblebecausetheUnitedStatesand
ChinaareseparatedbythevastexpanseothePacicOcean,acrosswhichitwould
bediculttoattack.NoforeseeableincreaseinChina'spowerwouldbelarge
enoughtoovercomethesetwinadvantagesodefensefortheUnitedStates.The
samedefensiveadvantages,moreover,applytoChinaaswell.AlthoughChinais
currentlymuchweakerthantheUnitedStatesmilitarily,itwillsoonbeableto
buildanuclearforcethatmeetsitsrequirementsfordeterrence.AndChinashould
notndtheUnitedStates'massiveconventionalcapabilitiesespeciallythreatening,
becausethebulkoU.S.forces,logistics,andsupportlieacrossthePacic.
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Theoveralleectotheseconditionsistogreatlymoderatethesecuritydilemma.
BoththeUnitedStatesandChinawillbeabletomaintainhighlevelsosecurity
nowandthroughanypotentialriseoChinatosuperpowerstatus.Thisshould
helpWashingtonandBeijingavoidtrulystrainedgeopoliticalrelations,which
shouldinturnhelpensurethatthesecuritydilemmastaysmoderate,thereby
facilitatingcooperation.TheUnitedStates,forexample,willhavetheoptionto
foregorespondingtoChina'smodernizationoitsnuclearforce.Thisrestraintwill
helpreassureChinathattheUnitedStatesdoesnotwanttothreatenitssecurity
andthushelpheadoadownwardpoliticalspiralfueledbynuclearcompetition.
BUTWHATABOUTTHEALLIES?
Theprecedinganalysis,ocourse,overlooksakeyfeatureoU.S.foreignpolicy
theimportantsecurityalliancestheUnitedStatesmaintainswithJapanandSouth
Korea,aswellasotherU.S.securitycommitmentsinNortheastAsia.Yetalthough
addingU.S.alliesyieldsamorecomplexpicture,itdoesnotundercuttheoverall
optimismaboutChina'srise.Instead,itraisesthequestionojusthowessential
regionalalliancesinthePacicaretoU.S.security.
TheUnitedStates'alliancecommitmentshavebeenremarkablystablesincethe
beginningotheColdWar,butChina'sriseshouldleadtoreneweddebateover
theircostsandbenets.Arguingalonglinessimilartothosementionedabove
thattheUnitedStatescanbesecuresimplybytakingadvantageoitspower,
geography,andnucleararsenalsocalledneoisolationistsconcludethatthe
UnitedStatesshouldenditsalliancesinEuropeandAsiabecausetheyare
unnecessaryandrisky.ItheUnitedStatescandeterattacksagainstitshomeland,
theyask,whybelongtoalliancesthatpromisetoengagetheUnitedStatesinlarge
warsondistantcontinents?ProtectingU.S.alliesinAsiamightrequiretheUnited
Statestoengageinpoliticalskirmishesandmilitarycompetitionthatwillstrainits
politicalrelationswithChina.Accordingtoneoisolationists,inshort,China'srise
willnotjeopardizeU.S.security,butmaintainingcurrentU.S.alliancescould.
Advocatesoselectiveengagement,incontrastanapproachsimilartoexisting
U.S.policyclaimthattheirchosenstrategyisalsoconsistentwiththebroad
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outlinesostructuralrealism.WhereasneoisolationistswanttheUnitedStatesto
withdrawfromforwardpositionsinordertoavoidbeingsuckedintoaregional
conict,thosefavoringselectiveengagementarguethatpreservingU.S.alliance
commitmentsinEuropeandAsiaisthebestwaytopreventtheeruptionoa
conictintherstplace.
ExamininghowexistingU.S.alliancecommitmentsarelikelytointeractwith
China'sriseisthusacrucialissue,withimplicationsforbothregionalpolicyand
U.S.grandstrategymoregenerally.ItheUnitedStatesmaintainsitskeyalliance
commitments,asislikely,itwillneedtoextenditsdeterrenttoJapanandSouth
KoreawhilefacingsignicantlylargerandmorecapableChineseconventional
militaryforces.Inmanyways,thischallengewillbeanalogoustotheonethe
UnitedStatesfacedinextendingitsdeterrenttoWesternEuropeduringtheCold
War.Bothsuperpowershadrobustnuclearretaliatorycapabilities,andtheSoviet
Unionwaswidelybelievedtohavesuperiorconventionalforcesthatwerecapable
oinvadingEurope.
Backthen,expertsdebatedwhetherU.S.capabilitiesweresucienttodetera
massiveSovietconventionalattackagainstEurope.Theydisagreedoverwhether
NATO'sdoctrineoexibleresponsewhichcombinedlargeconventionalforces
withanarrayonuclearforcesenabledtheUnitedStatestomakenuclearthreats
credibleenoughtodeteraSovietconventionalattack.DoubtsaboutU.S.
willingnesstoescalatereectedthecleardangerthatU.S.escalationwouldbemet
bySovietnuclearretaliation.Nevertheless,thestrongerargumentinthisdebate
heldthatU.S.strategydidprovideanadequatedeterrenttoaSovietconventional
attack,becauseevenasmallprobabilityoU.S.nuclearescalationpresentedthe
Sovietswithoverwhelmingrisks.ThesamelogicshouldapplytoafutureChinese
superpower.Thecombinationoclearalliancecommitments,forwarddeployed
conventionalforces,andlargesurvivablenuclearforcesshouldenabletheUnited
StatestodeteraChineseattackoneitherJapanorSouthKorea.
CondenceintheU.S.deterrentislikelytobereinforcedbyrelativelygood
relationsbetweentheUnitedStatesandChina.ThosewhofearedthattheUnited
StatescouldnotextenditsdeterrenttoWesternEuropebelievedthattheSoviet
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Unionwasahighlyrevisioniststatebentonradicallyoverturningthestatusquo
andwillingtorunenormousrisksintheprocess.Thereisvirtuallynoevidence
suggestingthatChinahassuchambitiousgoals,soextendingtheU.S.deterrent
shouldbeeasiernowthanduringtheColdWar.Andevenintheunlikelyevent
thatChinaevolvedintosuchadangerousstate,deterrencewouldstillbepossible,
albeitmoredicult.
Somerealistpessimistsarguethatinordertobehighlysecure,Chinawillnd
itselcompelledtopursueregionalhegemony,fuelingconictalongtheway.
However,China'ssize,power,location,andnucleararsenalwillmakeitvery
challengingtoattacksuccessfully.ChinawillnotneedtopushtheUnitedStates
outoitsregioninordertobesecure,becauseaforwardU.S.presencewillnot
undermineChina'scoredeterrentcapabilities.AmajorU.S.withdrawal,moreover,
wouldnotautomaticallyyieldChineseregionalhegemony,becauseJapanand
SouthKoreamightthenacquirestrongerconventionalmilitarycapabilitiesand
nuclearcapabilitiesotheirown,greatlyreducingChina'scoercivepotential.A
Chinesedriveforregionalhegemony,therefore,wouldbebothunnecessaryand
infeasible.
TheUnitedStates'forwardmilitarypresencedoesenhanceitspowerprojection
capabilities,whichthreatenChina'sabilitytoprotectitssealanesandcoerce
Taiwan.ButtheU.S.alliancewithJapanalsobenetsChinabyenablingJapanto
spendfarlessondefense.AlthoughtheUnitedStates'powerfarexceedsJapan's,
Chinahasseentheallianceasaddingtoregionalstability,becauseitfearsJapan
morethantheUnitedStates.AsChinagrowsmorepowerful,itmayincreasingly
resentU.S.inuenceinNortheastAsia.ButunlessU.S.Chineserelationsbecome
severelystrained,ChinaislikelytoacceptacontinuingU.S.presenceinthe
region,giventhealternatives.
ACCOMMODATIONONTAIWAN?
Theprospectsforavoidingintensemilitarycompetitionandwarmaybegood,but
growthinChina'spowermayneverthelessrequiresomechangesinU.S.foreign
policythatWashingtonwillnddisagreeableparticularlyregardingTaiwan.
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AlthoughitlostcontroloTaiwanduringtheChineseCivilWarmorethansix
decadesago,ChinastillconsidersTaiwantobepartoitshomeland,and
unicationremainsakeypoliticalgoalforBeijing.Chinahasmadeclearthatit
willuseforceiTaiwandeclaresindependence,andmuchoChina'sconventional
militarybuilduphasbeendedicatedtoincreasingitsabilitytocoerceTaiwanand
reducingtheUnitedStates'abilitytointervene.BecauseChinaplacessuchhigh
valueonTaiwanandbecausetheUnitedStatesandChinawhatevertheymight
formallyagreetohavesuchdierentattitudesregardingthelegitimacyothe
statusquo,theissueposesspecialdangersandchallengesfortheU.S.Chinese
relationship,placingitinadierentcategorythanJapanorSouthKorea.
AcrisisoverTaiwancouldfairlyeasilyescalatetonuclearwar,becauseeachstep
alongthewaymightwellseemrationaltotheactorsinvolved.CurrentU.S.policy
isdesignedtoreducetheprobabilitythatTaiwanwilldeclareindependenceandto
makeclearthattheUnitedStateswillnotcometoTaiwan'saidiitdoes.
Nevertheless,theUnitedStateswouldnditselunderpressuretoprotectTaiwan
againstanysortoattack,nomatterhowitoriginated.Giventhedierentinterests
andperceptionsothevariouspartiesandthelimitedcontrolWashingtonhasover
Taipei'sbehavior,acrisiscouldunfoldinwhichtheUnitedStatesfounditself
followingeventsratherthanleadingthem.
Suchdangershavebeenaroundfordecades,butongoingimprovementsinChina's
militarycapabilitiesmaymakeBeijingmorewillingtoescalateaTaiwancrisis.In
additiontoitsimprovedconventionalcapabilities,Chinaismodernizingitsnuclear
forcestoincreasetheirabilitytosurviveandretaliatefollowingalargescaleU.S.
attack.StandarddeterrencetheoryholdsthatWashington'scurrentabilityto
destroymostoralloChina'snuclearforceenhancesitsbargainingposition.
China'snuclearmodernizationmightremovethatcheckonChineseaction,leading
Beijingtobehavemoreboldlyinfuturecrisesthanithasinpastones.AU.S.
attempttopreserveitsabilitytodefendTaiwan,meanwhile,couldfuela
conventionalandnucleararmsrace.EnhancementstoU.S.oensivetargeting
capabilitiesandstrategicballisticmissiledefensesmightbeinterpretedbyChinaas
asignalomalignU.S.motives,leadingtofurtherChinesemilitaryeortsanda
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generalpoisoningoU.S.Chineserelations.
Givensuchrisks,theUnitedStatesshouldconsiderbackingawayfromits
commitmenttoTaiwan.Thiswouldremovethemostobviousandcontentiousash
pointbetweentheUnitedStatesandChinaandsmooththewayforbetter
relationsbetweentheminthedecadestocome.Criticsosuchamovearguethatit
wouldresultinnotonlydirectcostsfortheUnitedStatesandTaiwanbutindirect
costsaswell:Beijingwouldnotbesatisedbysuchappeasement;instead,itwould
nditsappetitewhettedandmakeevengreaterdemandsafterwardspurredby
Washington'slostcredibilityasadefenderoitsallies.Thecriticsarewrong,
however,becauseterritorialconcessionsarenotalwaysboundtofail.Notall
adversariesareHitler,andwhentheyarenot,accommodationcanbeaneective
policytool.Whenanadversaryhaslimitedterritorialgoals,grantingthemcanlead
nottofurtherdemandsbutrathertosatisfactionwiththenewstatusquoanda
reductionotension.
Thekeyquestion,then,iswhetherChinahaslimitedorunlimitedgoals.Itistrue
thatChinahasdisagreementswithseveraloitsneighbors,butthereisactually
littlereasontobelievethatithasorwilldevelopgrandterritorialambitionsinits
regionorbeyond.ConcessionsonTaiwanwouldthusriskencouragingChinato
pursuemoredemandingpoliciesonthoseissuesforwhichthestatusquois
currentlydisputed,includingthestatusotheoshoreislandsandmaritime
bordersintheEastChinaandSouthChinaseas.ButtherisksoreducedU.S.
credibilityforprotectingallieswhenthestatusquoiscrystalclearasisthecase
withJapanandSouthKoreashouldbesmall,especiallyianychangeinpolicy
onTaiwanisaccompaniedbycountervailingmeasures(suchasarenewed
declarationotheUnitedStates'otheralliancecommitments,areinforcementof
U.S.forwarddeployedtroops,andanincreaseinjointmilitaryexercisesand
technologicalcooperationwithU.S.allies).
WhetherandhowtheUnitedStatesshouldreduceitscommitmenttoTaiwanis
clearlyacomplexissue.ItheUnitedStatesdoesdecidetochangeitspolicy,a
gradualeasingoitscommitmentislikelybest,asopposedtoasharp,highly
advertisedbreak.AndsincerelationsbetweenTaiwanandChinahaveimproved
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overthepastfewyears,Washingtonwilllikelyhaveboththetimeandtheroomto
evaluateandadjustitspolicyastheregionalandglobalsituationsevolve.
ThebroaderpointisthatalthoughChina'sriseiscreatingsomedangers,the
shiftingdistributionopowerisnotrenderingvitalU.S.andChineseinterests
incompatible.Thepotentialdangersdonotadduptoclashinggreatpower
intereststhatcanberesolvedonlybyriskingamajorpowerwar.Rather,the
dicultyoprotectingsomesecondary,albeitnotinsignicant,U.S.interestsis
growing,requiringtheUnitedStatestoreevaluateitsforeignpolicycommitments.
THEDANGERSOFEXAGGERATION
Realistanalysesohowpowertransitionswillplayoutarebasedontheassumption
thatstatesaccuratelyperceiveandrespondtotheinternationalsituationstheyface.
RealistoptimisminthiscasethusrestsontheassumptionthatU.S.leaders
appreciate,andwillbeabletoacton,theunusuallyhighdegreeosecuritythatthe
UnitedStatesactuallyenjoys.Shouldthisassumptionproveincorrect,andshould
theUnitedStatesexaggeratethethreatChinaposes,therisksofutureconict
willbegreater.Unfortunately,therearesomereasonsforworryingthatthe
assumptionmightinfactbewrong.
Forexample,thepopularbeliethatarisingChinawillseverelythreatenU.S.
securitycouldbecomeaselffulllingprophecy.ShouldWashingtonfailto
understandthatChina'sgrowingmilitarycapabilitiesdonotthreatenvitalU.S.
interests,itmayadoptoverlycompetitivemilitaryandforeignpolicies,whichmay
inturnsignaltoChinathattheUnitedStateshasmalignmotives.ShouldChina
thenfeellesssecure,itwillbemorelikelytoadoptcompetitivepoliciesthatthe
UnitedStateswillseeasmorethreatening.Theresultwouldbeanegativespiral
drivennotbytheinternationalsituationthestatesactuallyfacedbutbytheir
exaggeratedinsecurities.
Moreover,stateshaveoftenoverestimatedtheirinsecuritybyfailingtoappreciate
theextenttowhichmilitarycapabilitiesfavoreddefense.BeforeWorldWarI,
GermanyexaggeratedtheeaseoinvasionandthereforebelievedthatRussia's
growingpowerthreateneditssurvival.Asaresult,Germanylaunchedan
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unnecessarypreventivewar.DuringtheColdWar,theUnitedStatesexaggerated
thenuclearthreatposedbytheSovietUnion,failingtoappreciatethatlarge
improvementsinSovietforcesleftthekeyaspectotheAmericandeterrenta
massiveretaliatorycapabilityentirelyintact.Thisdidnotleadtowar,thankfully,
butitdidincreasetherisksooneandledtomuchunnecessarytensionand
expenditure.Washingtonwillhavetoguardagainstmakingsimilarerrorsdownthe
roadasChina'sconventionalandnuclearforcesgrowandasclashesoversecondary
issuesstrainrelations.
TherehasbeennoU.S.overreactiontothegrowthinChina'smilitarycapabilities
yet,butthepotentialforonecertainlyexists.ThecurrentU.S.NationalSecurity
Strategy,forexample,callsfortheUnitedStatestomaintainitsconventional
militarysuperiority,butitdoesnotspelloutwhythissuperiorityisrequiredor
WILL CHINA'S RISE LEAD TO WAR?
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whatforcesandcapabilitiesthisrequires.Fortheforeseeablefuture,Chinawill
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Charles Glaser
lackpowerprojectioncapabilitiescomparabletothoseotheUnitedStates,butits
militarybuildupisalreadyreducingtheUnitedStates'abilitytoghtalong
China'speriphery.ThiswillsoonraisequestionssuchaspreciselywhytheUnited
Statesrequiresacrosstheboardconventionalsuperiority,whatspecicmissions
theU.S.militarywillbeunabletoperformwithoutit,andhowmuchtheinability
toexecutethosemissionswoulddamageU.S.security.Withoutclearanswers,the
UnitedStatesmaywelloverestimatetheimplicationsoChina'sgrowingmilitary
forces.
Thedangeroanexaggeratedsecuritythreatisevengreaterinthenuclearrealm.
TheObamaadministration's2010NuclearPostureReviewholdsthat"theUnited
StatesandChina'sAsianneighborsremainconcernedaboutChina'scurrent
militarymodernizationeorts,includingitsqualitativeandquantitative
modernizationoitsnucleararsenal."TheNPR,however,doesnotidentifyjust
whatdangerChina'smilitarymodernizationposes.Thereisnoprospectthatany
conceivablenuclearmodernizationintheforeseeablefuturewillenableChinato
destroythebulkoU.S.nuclearforcesandunderminetheUnitedStates'abilityto
retaliatemassively.Themostsuchmodernizationmightdoiseliminatea
signicantU.S.nuclearadvantagebyprovidingChinawithalargerandmore
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survivableforce,therebyreducingtheUnitedStates'abilitytocrediblythreaten
Chinawithnuclearescalationduringaseverecrisis.
TheNPRsaysthattheUnitedStates"mustcontinuetomaintainstablestrategic
relationshipswithRussiaandChina,"butChinahasalwayslackedthetypeoforce
thatwouldprovidestabilityaccordingtoU.S.standards.ItheUnitedStates
decidesthatitssecurityrequirespreservingitsnuclearadvantagevisvisChina,
itwillhavetoinvestincapabilitiesdedicatedtodestroyingChina'snewnuclear
forces.SuchaneortwouldbeinlinewiththeUnitedStates'ColdWarnuclear
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strategy,whichplacedgreatimportanceonbeingabletodestroySovietnuclear
forces.Thiskindoarmsracewouldbeevenmoreunnecessarynowthanitwas
then.TheUnitedStatescanretainformidabledeterrentcapabilitieseveniChina
modernizesitsarsenal,andacompetitivenuclearpolicycouldwelldecreaseU.S.
securitybysignalingtoChinathattheUnitedStatesishostile,therebyincreasing
ChineseinsecurityanddamagingU.S.Chineserelations.
ThereisnoquestionthatChina'sconventionalandnuclearbuildupswillreduce
someU.S.capabilitiesthatWashingtonwouldprefertoretain.ButtheUnited
Statesshouldnotrushtoimputemalignmotivestothosebuildupsandshould
insteadbesensitivetothepossibilitythattheysimplyreectChina'slegitimate
desireforsecurity.WhenDonaldRumsfeldwasU.S.secretaryodefense,hesaid,
aproposoChina'sincreaseddefensespending,that"sincenonationthreatens
China,onemustwonder:Whythisgrowinginvestment?Whythesecontinuing
largeandexpandingarmspurchases?"Theanswershouldhavebeenobvious.If
ChinawereabletooperatecarrierbattlegroupsneartheU.S.coastandattackthe
U.S.homelandwithlongrangebombers,Washingtonwouldnaturallywantthe
abilitytobluntsuchcapabilities,anditheUnitedStateshadastrategicnuclear
forceasvulnerableandcomparativelysmallasChina's(nowsomewherebetweena
tenthandahundredththesizeotheU.S.force),itwouldtrytocatchupas
quicklyasithadtheresourcestodoso.Thoseactionswouldnothavebeendriven
byanynefariousplantosubjugatetheworld,andsofartherearestrongreasonsto
believethatthesameholdstrueforChina'scourse.
Insum,China'srisecanbepeaceful,butthisoutcomeisfarfromguaranteed.
Contrarytothestandardrealistargument,thebasicpressuresgeneratedbythe
internationalsystemwillnotforcetheUnitedStatesandChinaintoconict.
Nuclearweapons,separationbythePacicOcean,andpoliticalrelationsthatare
currentlyrelativelygoodshouldenablebothcountriestomaintainhighlevelsof
securityandavoidmilitarypoliciesthatseverelystraintheirrelationship.The
UnitedStates'needtoprotectitsalliesinNortheastAsiacomplicatesmatters
somewhat,buttherearestronggroundsforbelievingthatWashingtoncancredibly
extenditsdeterrenttoJapanandSouthKorea,itsmostimportantregional
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partners.ThechallengefortheUnitedStateswillcomeinmakingadjustmentsto
itspoliciesinsituationsinwhichlessthanvitalinterests(suchasTaiwan)might
causeproblemsandinmakingsureitdoesnotexaggeratetherisksposedby
China'sgrowingpowerandmilitarycapabilities.
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