Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
RELOVA, J.:
FIRST DIVISION
Petitioner Isidro Bernardo was a tenant of Ledda Sta. Rosa in her
riceland in Plaridel, Bulacan from October 1972 to August 1974. At the
time, petitioner constructed a house therein for his family's dwelling. His
son, co-petitioner Cayetano Bernardo, was staying with him in said
house as his helper in tilling the land. Subsequently, Isidro left the
landholding and transferred to San Nicolas, Bulacan without the
knowledge of the landowner Ledda Sta. Rosa. Before leaving the
landholding, however, Isidro transferred his tenancy rights to his son, copetitioner Cayetano Bernardo, who continued to reside in subject house.
Eventually, Ledda Sta. Rosa took possession of the whole riceland,
through her overseer Dr. Patricio E. Cruz.
A case of forcible entry was filed by Ledda Sta. Rosa against herein
petitioners, Isidro Bernardo and Cayetano Bernardo, before the
Municipal Court of Plaridel, Bulacan. Petitioners lost before the inferior
court as well as in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Likewise,
petitioners lost in their petition for certiorari and mandamus before the
Court of Appeals.
2
Indeed, in the case of People vs. Echaves, supra, this Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Ramon C. Aquino, held that Presidential Decree No.
772 does not apply to pasture lands. The preamble of the decree is
quoted below:
3
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
REGALADO, J.:
It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were moved by
their desire to devote their remaining years to the service of their Creator
by forming their own civic organization for that purpose, should find
themselves enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a
community member allegedly without the required permit from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development.
The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter of 1985,
the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan
ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating
the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno,
the chairman of the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a
contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made
without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.
4
purposes are within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564.
Quantitatively, the financial sanction is a nominal imposition but, on a
question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court is gratified that
it can now grant this case the benefit of a final adjudication.
Petitioner questions the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to
solicitations for contributions intended for religious purposes with the
submissions that (1) the term "religious purpose" is not expressly
included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not
include, it excludes;
(2) penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused; and (3) to subject to State regulation solicitations
made for a religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right
to freedom of religion guaranteed under the Constitution.
Presidential Decree No. 1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise
known as the Solicitation Permit Law), provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or
association desiring to solicit or receive contributions
for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first
secure a permit from the Regional Offices of the
Department of Social Services and Development as
provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon
the filing of a written application for a permit in the form
prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department
of Social Services and Development, the Regional
Director or his duly authorized representative may, in
his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit
or disapprove the application. In the interest of the
public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any
permit issued under Act 4075.
The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase "charitable
purposes" should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a
religious purpose. We hold in the negative.
I. Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the
express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all
others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius." Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
5
been done away with by statute.10 The word "charitable," therefore,
like most other words, is capable of different significations. For
example, in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a
very wide meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is
a penal law, it cannot be given such a broad application since it
would be prejudicial to petitioners.
6
exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable restrictions which
may possibly be imposed thereon.
The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship. Freedom
of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or
form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by
law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen
form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is,
freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have
appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In
every case, the power to regulate must be so exercised, in attaining a
permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the protected
freedom. 17
Whence, even the exercise of religion may be regulated, at some slight
inconvenience, in order that the State may protect its citizens from injury.
Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent
solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting
him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and
his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The
State is likewise free to regulate the time and manner of solicitation
generally, in the interest of public safety, peace, comfort, or
convenience. 18
It does not follow, therefore, from the constitutional guaranties of the free
exercise of religion that everything which may be so called can be
tolerated. 19 It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate
7
this point that a judge is required to so behave at all times as to promote
public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, 25 should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its
Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud
in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic
projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually
conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for
public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as
great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to
solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.
Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J.:
I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of
donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered by P.D. No. 1564
which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for "charitable
or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold.
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not
solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a religious
purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public
welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a
church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or
for the construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of
subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of
religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of
faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not
belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does not
# Separate Opinions
MENDOZA, J.:
8
I concur in the result reached in this case that the solicitation of
donations for the repair of a chapel is not covered by P.D. No. 1564
which requires a permit for the solicitation of contributions for "charitable
or public welfare purposes." My reasons are three-fold.
First. Solicitation of contributions for the construction of a church is not
solicitation for "charitable or public welfare purpose" but for a religious
purpose, and a religious purpose is not necessarily a charitable or public
welfare purpose. A fund campaign for the construction or repair of a
church is not like fund drives for needy families or victims of calamity or
for the construction of a civic center and the like. Like solicitation of
subscription to religious magazines, it is part of the propagation of
religious faith or evangelization. Such solicitation calls upon the virtue of
faith, not of charity, save as those solicited for money or aid may not
belong to the same religion as the solicitor. Such solicitation does not
engage the philantrophic as much as the religious fervor of the person
who is solicited for contribution.
Second. The purpose of the Decree is to protect the public against fraud
in view of the proliferation of fund campaigns for charity and other civic
projects. On the other hand, since religious fund drives are usually
conducted among those belonging to the same religion, the need for
public protection against fraudulent solicitations does not exist in as
great a degree as does the need for protection with respect to
solicitations for charity or civic projects so as to justify state regulation.
Third. To require a government permit before solicitation for religious
purpose may be allowed is to lay a prior restraint on the free exercise of
religion. Such restraint, if followed, may well justify requiring a permit
before a church can make Sunday collections or enforce tithing. But
in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 1 we precisely held that an
9
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
MAKASIAR, J.:.
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.,
claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit
corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration
of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition,
petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its
ideology and program of government, which materials include Annex B;
and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its
purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional Convention who
will propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it
quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates
the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression
and that it is an ex post facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the
questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal
protection clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the clear and
present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of
electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws.
10
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto
laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are
given retroactive effect.4
Concurs in the sense that the law is declared not ex post facto law and
dissents as to the rest.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The Court's decision reaffirms its split-vote ruling last September 11,
1970 in Imbong vs. Ferrer and Gonzales vs. Comelec1 upholding the
Separate Opinions
I only wish to add a few words on the statements in the main opinion
in Imbong-Gonzales that "(W)hile it may be true that a party's support of
a candidate is not wrong per se, it is equally true that Congress in the
exercise of the broad law-making authority can declare certain acts
as mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One
such act is the party or organization support prescribed in Sec. 8(a),
which ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as
expression, for the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized
that 'equality of chances may be better attained by banning all
organization support.' "
I trust that said statements were not intended, and should not be
construed, as endorsing the contention of Senator Tolentino, the Act's
11
sponsor, that "(T)he protection of the Constitution cannot be invoked for
the right of association when the purpose is a malum
prohibitum because such purpose would be "contrary to law" " and
"(O)nce the ban (on party and organization support) is approved into
law, the freedom of association cannot be invoked against it" since the
Constitution decrees only that "(T)he right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."4
Such a concept of malum prohibitum vis-a-vis the Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association which has its root in the Malolos
Constitution would render sterile and meaningless the Constitutional
safeguard, should Congress be conceded, in the exercise of its broad
law-making authority, the power to strike down at any time associations
and societies by the simple expedient of declaring their purposes or
certain activities, not wrong per se as "contrary to law" or mala prohibita.
I believe that such a concept begs the question. Obviously, the word
"law" in the qualifying clause "for purposes not contrary to law" does not
mean that an enactment of the legislature forecloses the question with
finality and sounds the death-knell. Laws that would regulate the
purposes for which associations and societies may be formed or would
declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass the usual constitutional
test of reasonableness and furthermore, must not abridge freedom of
speech and press.5
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
Concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate opinion in Imbong
v. Comelec, L-32432 and Gonzales v. Comelec, L-32443.
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
Reiterates his views in Gonzales and Imbong insofar as they are
relevant to the issues in this case, dissents, even as agrees that
Republic Act 6132 is not ex post facto.
12
law, the freedom of association cannot be invoked against it" since the
Constitution decrees only that "(T)he right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."4
Such a concept of malum prohibitum vis-a-vis the Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association which has its root in the Malolos
Constitution would render sterile and meaningless the Constitutional
safeguard, should Congress be conceded, in the exercise of its broad
law-making authority, the power to strike down at any time associations
and societies by the simple expedient of declaring their purposes or
certain activities, not wrong per se as "contrary to law" or mala prohibita.
I believe that such a concept begs the question. Obviously, the word
"law" in the qualifying clause "for purposes not contrary to law" does not
mean that an enactment of the legislature forecloses the question with
finality and sounds the death-knell. Laws that would regulate the
purposes for which associations and societies may be formed or would
declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass the usual constitutional
test of reasonableness and furthermore, must not abridge freedom of
speech and press.5
13
EN BANC
14
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William
Montano (16 years old), Randy Tibule (17 years old), Jean Marie
Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr., were
at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag, Pangasinan.They were
discussing how to go to the wedding party of Jean Maries cousin in
Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18, 1996, pp.
23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia
going to Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and Willie. Jean
was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano
(TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN June 18,1996, pp. 23-25).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra
Montano and Willie Acosta dead (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 14-16).
They sustained the following injuries:
(Exhibit D)
Willie Acosta:
(Exhibit E)
On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule survived the
attack. They suffered serious gunshot injuries that could have caused
their death were it not for the timely medical attention given them
(TSN July 3, 1996, p. 6). Montano sustained several gunshot wounds
on the left arm, two on the left upper back, another on the left
shoulder and middle right finger (TSN June 25, 1996, p. 608). Tibule
sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper quadrant
15
(stomach) and the other at the left periumbelical (TSN July 3, 1996,
pp. 7-8).
a) P 50,000 as indemnity
b) P 500,000.00 as moral damages
a) P 50,000 as indemnity
a) P 50,000 as indemnity
a) P 50,000 as indemnity
b) P 48,269.80 as actual damages
c) P 500,000.00 as moral damages
5) To the victim WILLIAM MONTANO:
a) P 39,133.92 as actual damages
16
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARM AND AMMUNITIONS (Presidential Decree No. 1866)
and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
Finally, it is said: Dura lex, sed lex, translated as: The law is harsh,
but that is the law!
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 180-181, Rollo.)
TO
OF
HE
OF
17
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. When we were entering the road at Sitio Cabauangan at
around ten to fifteen meters, somebody plugged (sic) down
the tricycle, sir.
Q. And what happened next after somebody plugged (sic) down
your tricycle?
A. Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of our
motorcycle, sir.
Q. Now, what happened next, if any?
A. The one who was standing and was lighted with the headlight
was immediately recognized by me, sir.
Q Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately
recognized?
A. That one, sir.
ACTG. INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person wearing white t-shirt seated at the
bench for the accused, and when asked his name, he gave his
name as Rolando Valdez.
(pp. 11-12, tsn, June 11, 1996)
We are not persuaded.
In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and
September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4), William Montano pointed to
Bernard Castro as the person who flagged down the motorized
tricycle ridden by the victims. On November 8, 1995, William and
his co-victim/survivor Randy Tibule executed a Pinagsamang
Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Demanda where they disclaimed having
seen Bernard Castro at the scene of the crime. They declared that
18
cannot be one other and additional perpetrator anymore. Accusedappellants reasoning on this point is absolutely flawed. It is totally
unacceptable.
Accused-appellant likewise seeks shelter in the mysterious
withdrawal of the victims charges against Bernard Castro. He
insinuates that such recantation should not have been given any
consideration. But, this is water under the bridge. Anyway, even in
the remotest possibility that the retraction of the accusation against
Bernard Castro may be reversed, it does not get accused-appellant
off the hook. Considering that accused-appellant had himself been
positively identified, together with Bernard Castro, as one of the
other perpetrators of the crime, his conviction may still stand
independently and regardless of whether or not Castro is indicted or
remains unprosecuted.
Accused-appellant further argues that it is not he but Castro who
had the motive to shoot and fire at the occupants of the motorized
tricycle, mistaking one of the occupants thereof for Isidro
Capistrano, Castros former classmate and with whom he earlier had
an altercation. It is very clear in his brief, however, that accusedappellant predicates this argument on the mistaken premise that he
was not positively identified in the case at bar although he admits
that it is established that he was at the scene of the crime (p. 114,
Rollo). This argument will not hold simply because it is settled that
accused-appellant had been positively identified by eyewitnesses and
victims William Montano and Randy Tibule. It is basic and
fundamental rule that proof of motive is necessary for conviction
only when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, not when
accused has been positively identified as in the present case (People
vs. Caggaunan, 94 Phil. 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA
422 [1980]; People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it is
also to be noted that lack of motive for committing the crime does
not preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of
judicial knowledge that persons have killed or committed serious
offense for no reason at all (People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187
[1996]).
19
execution of the attack, without slightest provocation from the victim
who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise
present. After reviewing the evidence, however, we do not find any
showing of evident premeditation on the part of accusedappellant. While there may be testimonial evidence pointing to an
altercation between Bernard Castro and a certain Capistrano, it does
sufficiently prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation. It is not enough that evident premeditation is
suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by
notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the
crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the
circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be evident
premeditation (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the
following have to be prove: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse
of time between the determination and the execution to allow the
offender to reflect on the consequences of his act (People vs.
Juan, 254 SCRA 478 [1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the crime
does not constitute sufficient ground to consider the existence of
evident premeditation. At best, it may indicate the time when the
offenders determined to commit the crime (the first element). Their
act of arming themselves with caliber .30 carbines and thereafter
waiting for their supposed victims at ambush positions may have
also indicated that they clung to their determination to commit the
crime (the second element). More important that these two elements
is the proof that a sufficient period of time had lapsed between the
outward act evidencing intent and actual commission of the offense
(the third element). There must have been enough opportunity for the
initial impulse to subside. This element is indispensable for
circumstance of evident premeditation to aggravate the
20
finds compelling reasons to reduce the sentence from one death
penalty (for the complex crime of multiple murder with double
frustrated murder) and one reclusion perpetua (for the complex
crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions) to four
counts of reclusion perpetua (for 4 murders) and two indeterminate
sentences of prision mayor to reclusion temporal (for the 2 frustrated
murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the Peoples
brief that accused-appellant should instead be convicted of four
counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder is well taken.
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away by
the erroneous Information filed by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the complex crime of multiple
murder and double frustrated murder (p. 1, Record: Crim. Case No.
U-8747). It may be noted that in his Resolution dated September 26,
1995, the investigating municipal trial court judge of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, found a prima facie case for four separate counts of
murder (pp. 101- 102, Ibid.) Too, the same investigating judge in his
Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found a prima facie case for two
counts of frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was upon
reinvestigation by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint Resolution dated
November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes When a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. (As amended by Act No. 4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined
above. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan
21
Molina (G.R.No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and reiterated inPeople
vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September 17, 1998), that there can be
no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of firearms
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments
introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as
an aggravating circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act No.
8294, which in part, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days
after its publication on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in the
case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case of
any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will
generally have prospective application. In cases, however, where the
new law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given
retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it
will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar from a separate
conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic
Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case
No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of Firearm) subject of this present
review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case
for illegal possession of firearm should not be misinterpreted as
meaning that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime of
illegal possession of firearm. In general, all pending cases involving
illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and
tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294
are involved (murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion,
insurrection, sedition or attemptedcoup detat under Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a special aggravating circumstance in
22
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
included in the list of lost, stolen and questionable animals; one from the
LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal Industry of Libmanan, Camarines
Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
SECOND DIVISION
In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the
carabaos, while passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated
by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's police station commander,
and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The confiscation
was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which
provides "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabaos or carabeef transported in violation of
this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers
through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
AQUINO, J.:
+.wph! 1
The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for
replevin for the recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000
and damages of P92,000. The replevin order could not be executed by
the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge Domingo Medina
Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to
Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
and section 25 of the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No.
5440, a 1968 law which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the
Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette
dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes
circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and
23
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
(People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of
the Phils., 104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil.
150.)
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica
de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con
las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1 Manresa, Codigo
Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.)
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of
having violated Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six
months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P1,000, was acquitted by this
Court because the circular was published in the Official Gazette three
months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because
its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal
statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the public must be informed of
that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before violators of
the executive order can be bound thereby.
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian
of Camarines Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the
Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of Executive Order No. 626-A. The
Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of such an
executive order.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the
carabaos. The summary confiscation was not in order. The recipients of
the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans. However, they cannot
transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the
said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda
and Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal
of the carabaos.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation
and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents
Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the carabaos, with the
requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are entitled to
possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot,
Camarines Sur. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
1wph1.t
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971,
37 SCRA 230 and Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System,
124 Phil. 499, cited by the respondents, do not involve the enforcement
of any penal regulation.
Separate Opinions
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the
Gazette. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
even bureau "regulations and orders shall become effective only when
approved by the Department Head and published in the Official Gazette
or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service
vs. Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.)
24
Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos or the value of
each carabao which is not returned for any reason. The Pesigans are
also entitled to a reasonable rental for each carabao from the twenty six
farmers who used them. The farmers should not enrich themselves at
the expense of the Pesigans.
25
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to
the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658,
661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935,
961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644,
1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108,
116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261,
263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349,
357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405,
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527,
561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612,
615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,11801278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
65.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a
right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
26
649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 2527, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged nonpublication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case
of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the
27
proceedings no other person could be, as we have
seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would
indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally
empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for
respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws
themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted
that since the presidential issuances in question contain special
provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is
anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has
28
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads:
"There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall"
used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from
such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or
otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice
Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of
instructions which all form part of the law of the land,
the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their official
and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was
declared unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior
to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may
have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive
29
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be
justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears
that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in
the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so
published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
Separate Opinions
30
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process
clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its closing
paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that
it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is
to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of
view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise
provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of
Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal
character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught,
as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas,
and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
31
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2
of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be
no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil
Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are
ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil
Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be
published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly
untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a
different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the
basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of
this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it
"shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or
decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the
Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate
effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes
that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the
proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official
Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines
its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the
authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover,
the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes
are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot
32
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a
provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher
law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires
notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a
law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that
it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should
be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
33
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall
be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the
command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is
to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a
constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of
Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal
character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught,
as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore
unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas,
and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
34
published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil
Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be
published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly
untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws
shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e. a
different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso
perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the
basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of
this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it
"shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such
publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or
decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the
Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate
effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in
provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes
that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its
effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official
Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the
proposition that for their effectivity, laws must be published in the Official
Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform
Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably
therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines
its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the
authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important
legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the
Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the
Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover,
the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is
essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes
are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier
one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot
nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a
provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher
law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
35
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires
notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a
law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to
disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette.
36
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270
37
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels,
carrying or transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals
from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from any
foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall
provide suitable means for securing such animals while in
transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and
unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon
which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary
suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle
upon or from vessels by swinging them over the side by means
of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals,
who knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of
section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a
penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five
hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense.
Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or
port in which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not
state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were
disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel
registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on
Courts of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or
port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing
inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the
organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely
extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or
within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or
water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in
accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S.vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.)
This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any
province into which such ship or water upon which the offense or crime
was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this
offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there
could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is
expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized
and established public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel,
and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the Philippine
Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the
court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on
board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and
omission which constitutes the offense continued during the time the
ship was within the territorial waters of the United States. No court of the
Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed
on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but
when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which
embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters,
and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law
(Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.;
Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to
the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper
political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters.
From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have
traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of
her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the
jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same
conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The
offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa,
was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it
existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed
forbidden act was done within American waters, and the court therefore
had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of
the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question
whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the
ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may
not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now
conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are considered
as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The exemption of such
vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not
established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-
38
General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions
to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the commander of a foreign
ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into
which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also
supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British
Government as late as 1820. In the leading case of the
Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief
Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels
enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing
exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory
she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the
Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of
exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of
nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on
the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations."
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55;
Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and
go freely. Local official exercise but little control over their actions, and
offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own officers
acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance. This
limitation upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based
entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification in the
fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to
respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the health,
order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not
require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant
vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of the
immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French theory
and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not
concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are
justiciable only by the court of the country to which the vessel belongs.
The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction over crimes
committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign ports by one
member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat.
ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339;
Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.)
Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great Britain as a
right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int.
Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.)
Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have
sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading
English authority, says that
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the
territoriality of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter
the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are
touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a
merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of
the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a
portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int.
Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II,
No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said that
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would
be obviously in convinient and dangerous to society and would
subject the laws to continual infraction and the government to
degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary
and local allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction
of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the
merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the
purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the ports
they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace,
unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed
by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden
and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to
the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each country "The right to
sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between
the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose
interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the
local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains
should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties
in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies between
39
the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes
regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318;
Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the
country are affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or
general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew
upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no
knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance
of the local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged
in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They
were prosecuted before a justice of the peace, but the United States
district attorney was instructed by the Government to take the necessary
steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of
Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of similar
proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and
Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not
appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to amount to a breach
of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the
Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia
County for an assault and battery committed on board the ship while
lying in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the
treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations
were made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on
July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count
Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful
consideration in connection with the views and suggestion of
your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty
of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway.
The stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . .
are those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is
conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such
differences of a civil nature growing out of the contract of
engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense
for which the party may be held amenable under the local
criminal law.
40
Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in
order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction
of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at
the port into which the animals are bought. They are then within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their
disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This
might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a
constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to
allege that the defendant knowingly andwillfully failed to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty
and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that the act
was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed
knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67
Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in
connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be done
knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to,
designed, and directed the act." So in Wongvs. City of Astoria (13
Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the complaint did not
show, in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did
the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the
respondent's counsel that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly'
conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was
done by design done for a certain purpose; and I think that it would
necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect
is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours
with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly
done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his
experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in
the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the
animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done
knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58,
paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or omission complained
of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and concise
language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the words of
the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of common
41
presented requires a statement of the principles which govern those
relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative
power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the
Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion
certain applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to
make war and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to
acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to
the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power of
Congress to provide for its government being questioned, the framers of
the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have
the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States."
(Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the territory by the United
States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of
providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern
the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local government, and
delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government.
(Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure.
Congress has provided such governments for territories which were
within the Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated
therein. It has been customary to organize a government with the
ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and judicial,
and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in
accordance with which the local government should act. The organic act
thus became the constitution of the government of the territory which
had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and the validity of
legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its
conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National
Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the
local government Congress has delegated that portion of legislative
power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of
the territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local
legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has
been exercised during the entire period of the history of the United
States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power can no
longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U.
S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate
within such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the
42
before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil
government which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely
military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power.
The military power of the President embraced legislative, executive
personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select.
As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901
The military power in exercise in a territory under military
occupation includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority.
It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a military
commander can be found the exercise of all three of these
different powers the exercise of the legislative powers by
provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by
determination of right; and the executive power by the
enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as
rapidly as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the
organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a
commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On
September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of
the President. "that part of the military power of the President in the
Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred
from the military government to the Commission, to be exercised under
such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of
War, until such time as complete civil government should be established,
or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred
upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and
orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes,
customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public
funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to
secure an efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of
courts; the organization and establishment of municipal and
departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which
the military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a
legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the Commission
was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the protection of
individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the
government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the
expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and
prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures
43
instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine
Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of
government which the President had erected. Congress adopted the
system which was in operation, and approved the action of the President
in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations which had
been imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions
were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by
legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection
of the rights and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under
the conditions. The action of the President in creating the Commission
with designated powers of government, in creating the office of the
Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly
approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the President in
imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of peace
was also ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act
of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincolnvs. U.S., 197
U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue
to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the
enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United
States" instead of "By the authority of the President." In the course of
time the legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands
not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a
legislature consisting of two houses the Philippine Commission and
the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus
assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory
not incorporated into the United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory,
although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It
stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and
Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and
maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States,
which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not
directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United
States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power
from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers
and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to
the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of
Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the
44
Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State legislature.
The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are expressly
or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while
the States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the
central government. The former operates under grants, the latter subject
to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon whether
the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or
implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless
the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its
enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the Philippines
Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is
valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional
legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic
laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in
general terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not
alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific
authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain
subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon
certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as
enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready
to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative
authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16,
1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of
legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm
the view that for purposes of construction the Government of the
Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of enumerated
legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new government was
to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from
the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better
to grant general legislative power to the new government, subject to
broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the
power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore
provided "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine
Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby reserves the power
and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec.
86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the
Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or
by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts
of the Government of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners
Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain
whether the Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to
enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the
Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign
commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern
the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign
commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through
a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this respect if
delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which
shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has
expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for
the needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A
few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found
in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the
Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of
Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval.
The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and
Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the
regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted
before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was
amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2,
1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government
instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called
legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign
nations and the ports of the territory. (Crossvs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.),
164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has
remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other action
by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We
are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the Legislature now
has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of
commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine
Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the
meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the
ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the
evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and
45
disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came
from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for
securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the
evidence:
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the
Norwegian steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six
months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908,
was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from
Chines and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands.
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such
master and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila,
aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was
anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the
breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and
within the jurisdiction of this court; and that fifteen of said cattle
then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle
were dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were
transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said
animals, and to avoid danger and risk to their lives and security;
and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said ship
by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city
of Manila, without any provisions being made whatever upon
said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said
cattle in a suitable condition and position for such
transportation.
That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport
cattle abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading
in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle,
providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front
sides, and rear thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on
which they stand and are transported, of that in case of storms,
which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be
46
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4963
and sentenced him under that judgment to pay a fine of P500, Philippine
currency, and to pay the costs of the action, and to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment during the time and in the form and in the place prescribed
by law until said fine should be paid. From that judgment and sentence
the defendant appealed to this court.
A careful examination of the record brought to this court discloses the
following facts:
That on or about the 4th day of August, 1908, in the city of Manila, the
appellant Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show
cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions, in the
form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in
miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or
device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United
States. On the day previous to the one above set forth the appellant had
purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions
formed a part, at a public sale made under authority of the sheriff of the
city of Manila. On the day in question, the 4th of August aforesaid, the
appellant was arranging his stock of goods for the purpose of displaying
them to the public and in so doing placed in his showcase and in one of
the windows of his store the medallions described. The appellant was
ignorant of the existence of a law against the display of the medallions in
question and had consequently no corrupt intention. The facts above
stated are admitted.
The appellant rests his right to acquittal upon two propositions:
First. That before a conviction under the law cited can be had, a criminal
intent upon the part of the accused must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Second. That the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the
identical banners, devices, or emblems actually used during the
Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United
States.
In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should
have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by
statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime
47
is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as
a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be
impossible of execution. In many cases the act complained of is itself
that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to
avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the
same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the
act is good or bad. The case at bar is a perfect illustration of this. The
display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by
the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to
governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority
just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the
most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any
other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes,
made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect
upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person
perpetrating the act. If A discharges a loaded gun and kills B, the interest
which society has in the act depends, not upon B's death, upon the
intention with which A consummated the act. If the gun were discharged
intentionally, with the purpose of accomplishing the death of B, then
society has been injured and its security violated; but if the gun was
discharged accidentally on the part of A, then society, strictly speaking,
has no concern in the matter, even though the death of B results. The
reason for this is that A does not become a danger to society and
institutions until he becomes a person with a corrupt mind. The mere
discharge of the gun and the death of B do not of themselves make him
so. With those two facts must go the corrupt intent to kill. In the case at
bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend
upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the
effect which that display has upon the public mind. In the one case the
public is affected by the intention of the actor; in the other by the act
itself.
It is stated in volume 12 of Cyc., page 148, that
The legislature, however, may forbid the doing of an act and
make its commission a crime without regard to the intent of the
doer, and if such an intention appears the courts must give it
effect although the intention may have been innocent. Whether
or not in a given case the statute is to be so construed is to be
determined by the court by considering the subject-matter of the
prohibition as well as the language of the statute, and thus
ascertaining the intention of the legislature.
In the case of The People vs. Kibler (106 N. Y., 321) the defendant was
charged with the sale of adulterated milk under a statute reading as
follows:
No person or persons shall sell or exchange or expose for sale
or exchange any impure, unhealthy, adulterated, of
unwholesome milk.
It was proved in that case that one Vandeburg purchased at the
defendant's store 1 pint of milk which was shown to contain a very small
percentage of water more than that permitted by the statute. There was
no dispute about the facts, but the objection made by the defendant was
that he was not allowed, upon the trial, to show an absence of criminal
intent, or to go the jury upon the question whether it existed, but was
condemned under a charge from the court which made his intent totally
immaterial and his guilt consist in having sold the adulterated article
whether he knew it or not and however carefully he may have sought to
keep on hand and sell the genuine article.
The opinion of the court in that case says:
As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no elements of
the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes
the crime.
xxx
xxx
xxx
48
In the case of Gardner vs. The People (62 N. Y., 299) the question arose
under a statute which provided that an inspector of elections of the city
of New York should not be removed from office except "after notice in
writing to the officer sought to be removed, which notice shall set forth
clearly and distinctly the reasons for his removal," and further provided
that any person who removed such an officer without such notice should
be guilty of a misdemeanor. An officer named Sheridan was removed by
Gardener, the defendant, without notice. Gardener was arrested and
convicted of a misdemeanor under the statute. He appealed from the
judgment of conviction and the opinion from which the following
quotation is made was written upon the decision of that appeal. Chief
Justice Church, writing the opinion of the court, says in relation to
criminal intent:
In short, the defense was an honest misconstruction of the law
under legal device. The court ruled out the evidence offered,
and held that intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted
the offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if
true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a
corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate the statute.
The defendants made a mistake of law. Such mistakes do not
excuse the commission of prohibited acts. "The rule on the
subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, intent governs but
in those mala prohibit a, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated?
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
49
In the case of Halsted vs. The State (41 N. J. L., 552; 32 Am. Rep., 247),
the question of a criminal intent arose under a statute, under which the
defendant was convicted of a crime, providing that if any township
committee or other body shall disburse or vote for the disbursement of
public moneys in excess of appropriations made for the purpose, the
persons constituting such board shall be guilty of a crime. The defendant
was one who violated this law by voting to incur obligations in excess of
the appropriation. He was convicted and appealed and the opinion from
which the quotation is taken was written upon a decision of that appeal.
That court says:
When the State had closed, the defense offered to show that
the defendant, in aiding in the passage and effectuation of the
resolution which I have pronounced to be illegal, did so under
the advice of counsel and in good faith, and from pure and
honest motives, and that he therein exercise due care and
caution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
In the case of The State vs. McBrayer (98 N. C., 623) the court stated:
It is a mistaken notion that positive, willful intent to violate the
criminal law is an essential ingredient in every criminal offense,
and that where is an absence of such intent there is no offense;
this is especially true as to statutory offenses. When the statute
plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person,
the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the
offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he
violates. When the language is plain and positive, and the
offense is not made to depend upon the positive, willful intent
and purpose, nothing is left to interpretation.
In the case of the Commonwealth vs. Weiss (139 Pa. St., 247), the
question arose on an appeal by the defendant from a judgment requiring
him to pay a penalty for a violation of the statute of the State which
provided that any person would be liable to pay a penalty "who shall
manufacture, sell, or offer or expose for sale, or have in his possession
with intent to sell," oleomargarine, etc. At the trial the defendant
requested the court to instruct the injury that if they believed, from the
evidence, that the defendant did not knowingly furnish or authorize to be
furnished, or knew of there furnished, to any of his customers any
oleomargarine, but, as far as he knew, furnished genuine butter, then
the verdict must be for the defendant. The court refused to make the
charge as requested and that is the only point upon which the defendant
appealed.
The court says:
The prohibition is absolute and general; it could not be
expressed in terms more explicit and comprehensive. The
statutory definition of the offense embraces no word implying
that the forbidden act shall be done knowingly or willfully, and if
it did, the designed purpose of the act would be practically
defeated. The intention of the legislature is plain, that persons
engaged in the traffic so engage in it at their peril and that they
can not set up their ignorance of the nature and qualities of the
commodities they sell, as a defense.
The following authorities are to the same effect: State vs. Gould (40 Ia.,
374); Commonwealth vs. Farren (9 Allen, 489);
50
Commonwealth vs. Nichols (10 Allen, 199); Commonwealth vs. Boyton
(2 Allen, 160); Wharton's Criminal Law, section 2442;
Commonwealth vs. Sellers (130 Pa., 32); 3 Greenleaf on Evidence,
section 21; Farrell vs. The State (32 Ohio State, 456);
Beekman vs. Anthony (56 Miss., 446); The People vs. Roby (52 Mich.,
577).
It is clear from the authorities cited that in the act under consideration
the legislature did not intend that a criminal intent should be a necessary
element of the crime. The statutory definition of the offense embraces no
word implying that the prohibited act shall be done knowingly or willfully.
The wording is plain. The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the
interpretation.
Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The
accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend
to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime
itself intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and
the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. The accused intended to
put the device in his window. Nothing more is required to commit the
crime.
We do not believe that the second proposition of the accused, namely,
that the law is applicable only to the identical banners, etc., actually used
in the late insurrection, and not to duplicates of those banners, can be
sustained.
It is impossible that the Commission should have intended to prohibit the
display of the flag or flags actually used in the insurrection, and, at the
same time, permit exact duplicates thereof (saving, perhaps, size) to be
displayed without hindrance. In the case before us, to say that the
display of a certain banner is a crime and that the display of its exact
duplicate is not is to say nonsense. The rules governing the
interpretation of statutes are rules of construction not destruction. To
give the interpretation contended for by the appellant would, as to this
particular provision, nullify the statute altogether.
The words "used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to
designate or identity those in armed rebellion against the United States"
mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but
any flag which is of that type. This description refers not to a particular
flag, but to a type of flag. That phrase was used because there was and
is no other way of describing that type of flag. While different words
might be employed, according to the taste of the draftsman, the method
of description would have to be the same. There is no concrete word
known by which that flag could be aptly or properly described. There
was no opportunity, within the scope of a legislative enactment, to
describe the physical details. It had no characteristics whatever, apart
from its use in the insurrection, by which it could, in such enactment, be
identified. The great and the only characteristic which it had upon the
which the Commission could seize as a means of description and
identification was the fact that it was used in the insurrection. There was,
therefore, absolutely no way in which the Commission could, in the Act,
describe the flag except by reciting where and how it was used. It must
not be forgotten that the Commission, by the words and phrases used,
was not attempting to describe a particular flag, but a type of flag. They
were not describing a flag used upon a particular field or in a certain
battle, but a type of flag used by an army a flag under which many
persons rallied and which stirred their sentiments and feelings wherever
seen or in whatever form it appeared. It is a mere incident of description
that the flag was used upon a particular field or in a particular battle.
They were describing the flag not a flag. It has a quality and significance
and an entity apart from any place where or form in which it was used.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of
being used in more than one sense, and the literal interpretation
of a statute may lead to an absurdity or evidently fail to give the
real intent of the legislature. When this is the case, resort is had
to the principle that the spirit of a law controls the letter, so that
a thing which is within the intention of a statute is as much
within the statute as if it were within the letter, and a thing which
is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless it
be within the intention of the makers, and the statute should be
construed as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief
contemplated by the framers. (U. S. vs. Kirby, 7 Wall., 487;
State Bolden, 107 La., 116, 118; U.S.vs. Buchanan, 9 Fed.
Rep., 689; Green vs. Kemp, 13 Mass., 515; Lake Shore R. R.
Co. vs. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339; Delafield vs. Brady, 108 N. Y.,
524 Doyle vs. Doyle, 50 Ohio State, 330.)
The intention of the legislature and the object aimed at, being
the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, are to control
51
the literal interpretation of particular language in a statute, and
language capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in
that sense which will harmonize with such intention and object,
and effect the purpose of the enactment. (26 Am. & Eng. Ency.
of Law., 602.)
52
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER,
INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and
THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY,
REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of
Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike but hear me first!" It is this cry that
the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 626-A.
The said executive order reads in full as follows:
WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting
the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the
requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly
with respect to age;
WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such
orders the violators still manage to circumvent the
prohibition against inter-provincial movement of
carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and
53
R
D
I
N
A
N
D
E
.
M
A
R
The C
petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from
O to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by
Masbate
S
the police
station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the
above measure. 1 The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin
upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00.
P
After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
r
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The
e the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the
court also declined to rule on
s and also for its presumed validity. 2
petitioner, for lack of authority
i
d the decision to the Intermediate Appellate
The petitioner appealed
3
Court,* which uphelde the trial court, ** and he has now come before us in this
n
petition for review on certiorari.
t
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional
R as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef
insofar
e transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the
being
p is invalid because it is imposed without according the owner a
penalty
rightuto be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed
b process. He complains that the measure should not have been
by due
l
presumed,
and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge
i improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President
to the
c Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4
under
o also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v.
While
f
5
Angeles
is not applicable here. The question raised there was the
e
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
54
requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so,
however, this Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General,
impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
That is an entirely different matter.
This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a
becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
55
When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the
reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not proceed against
the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful
judgment of his peers or the law of the land, they thereby won for
themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is
now the hallmark of the free society. The solemn vow that King John
made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every
person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to
have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.
The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the
sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an opinion is
formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously,
one side is only one-half of the question; the other half must also be
considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed
appreciation of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two
sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to
the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the
other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that
this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or
useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or
worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and
hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are
intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our
judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty
as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have
consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is
entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years
ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the
rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken
zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case
for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions. The
conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary
evidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or
there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for
expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the
immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily
destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without
hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16Filthy restaurants may be
summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the
public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without
violation of due process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the
need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.
56
consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more
effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that
the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as
follows:
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful
subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal
certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be
a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure,
Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on
theslaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no
carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and
no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The
object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved
by the questioned measure is missing
We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of
carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than
in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not
prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the
prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it
could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so.
However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that
there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant
dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be
assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction that the
measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright
confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio
Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was
fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and
conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly,
no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is
immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure
itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he
had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce
57
the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order
defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately
imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure
struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a
chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of
elementary fair play.
It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and
hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual
requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also
conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative
proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial
only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a
thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a
court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose
the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.
We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the
disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the questioned
executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be
distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the
Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commissionmay see fit, in the
case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the
Director of Animal Industrymay see fit, in the case of carabaos."
(Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous
and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One
searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines,
or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when
they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently
boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity
and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can
supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they
see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a
"roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not
"canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly
profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve
the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and,
worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense
and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the
properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare
Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.
We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station
commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not liable in
damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its
mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid, and it was his
obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been
impertinent of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare
the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone,
refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals
itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior
authority, to question the order we now annul.
The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and
protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have reached
us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would
have become afait accompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for
his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in
that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for
58
all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without
protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the
courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are ignored or
violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry,
all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a
promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role
assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp
with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.
WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the
amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera and Feliciano, JJ., are on leave.