An Epitome of Rational Dhamma

Y. Karunadasa, Early Buddhist Teachings: The Middle Position in Theory and Practice, Centre of
Buddhist Studies, University of Hong Kong, 2013, $30, 205pp hback.
Review by Dhivan Thomas Jones
The term early Buddhism refers to the teaching of the Buddha and to the Buddhism of his
followers up until the time of the second council and the first schism, about one hundred years after
the death of the Buddha, when various geographically and doctrinally distinct schools of Buddhism
came into being. There is a growing body of literature concerning the Buddhism of this earliest
period,1 despite the problem of historical evidence. Our best evidence for early Buddhism is the Pli
canon, which is the product of translation and of centuries of oral transmission. There is always an
element of faith involved in discussing the Buddhism of the Buddha, faith that there really was such
a person as the Buddha, and that the early discourses contain something of what he taught. In this
context, Prof. Karunadasas new book makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of early
Buddhism by drawing out the meaning of the Buddhas middle way, mainly in theory, but also in
relation to the practice of the ethical life. In doing so, he does more than illuminate early Buddhist
teachings: he provides a lucid though dense summary of the Buddhas psychology of liberation,
clearly explained, capable of being practised his book is an epitome of rational Dhamma.
Prof. Karunadasa, from Sri Lanka, has specialised in Theravdin Abhidhamma studies.2 But
in this book he turns to the suttas or discourses of the Pli canon to explore an excellent hypothesis:
that the best way to understand early Buddhist doctrine is as a critical response to the opposition of
two opposed world-views, spiritual eternalism and materialist annihilationism. In his preliminary
observations he makes clear that his method is one of interpretation. He draws on various
discourses, subjecting them to close reading, sometimes using Theravdin exegetical terms, for the
sake of presenting a coherent rational synthesis of early Buddhist teaching. The result is extremely
interesting and inspiring, mainly because the authors thinking is very clear and does not betray any
imposition of a view onto the materials discussed.
He begins by proposing a historical context of the Buddhas teaching, in which religious and
philosophical discourse was polarised between two views. On the one hand the Brahmans and some
ascetics (samaas) taught that there was a permanent metaphysical self, a spirit distinct from the
body, and that spiritual practice consisted of uniting with that self. In reaction to this metaphysical
view, which the Buddha called eternalism (sassatavda), other ascetics taught that there was only
a physical self, and that this self will be annihilated at death, a view which the Buddha called
annihilationism (ucchedavda). These two extremes are two versions of the theory of the self, and
they were associated with asceticism in the case of eternalism, and hedonism in the case of
annihilationism. The Buddhas middle way is both a teaching by the middle (majjhena dhamma)
in respect of views and a middle path (majjhim paipad) in respect of practice. There is plenty
of scope for further discussion of the historical hypothesis that Prof. Karunadasa proposes, but
nevertheless it works well enough as a framework for the discussion of the Buddhas teaching of
the middle way.
Karunadasa next interprets dependent arising (paicca-samupda) in terms of the middle
way. The point of view of dependent arising transcends the dualities of monism and pluralism, in
that reality is neither grounded in a single principle, nor is it a collection of unrelated entities. The
best-known application of dependent arising, the twelve nidnas, he interprets as the causal

structure of individual existence (p.26). Implicitly eschewing the later interpretation of the nidnas
as spread over three lives, Karunadasa boldly proposes that each nidna implies the presence of the
five aggregates (khandhas) which constitute individual existence, namely, physical form, feeling,
contact, volitional formations and consciousness. Each of the nidnas, from ignorance (avijj) to
ageing-and-death (jarmaraa) concerns how the individual, made up of the aggregates, enters into
sasra. Karunadasa next revisits the well-explored territory of not self (anatt) but with great
delicacy, stressing how the not self teaching is the middle way between an eternalist conception of a
metaphysical self and an annihilationist conception of a physical self, in the sense that the person or
individual is the sum total of the five aggregates when they are structurally organised according to
the principle of dependent arising (p.37). Somewhat anachronistically, however, he criticises
earlier scholars of Buddhism (such as Radhakrishnan, Mrs Rhys Davids, Grimm, Bhattacarya, etc.)
who claimed that the Buddha taught a higher Self.
The chapter on the Analysis of the Mind seems to me to be the central chapter of the book.
The Buddhas middle way begins to take shape in terms of how individual existence, constituted by
the five aggregates, undergoes a cognitive process which it mistakes for a self. The co-arising of
sense-experience and sense-consciousness leads to contact, feeling, perception, thinking, conceptual
proliferation and the consequent impact of proliferation back upon the individual. In this way we
come to experience being a self in sasra. Karunadasa stresses how consciousness is reciprocally
dependent on name and form, the physical organism plus mental factors, this reciprocal dependence
constituting an irreducible ground of sasric existence (p.61), a position transcending either an
eternalist tendency to view the mind as the ultimate reality, or a materialist tendency to view
physical matter as what is real. In this central chapter we begin to sense the authors underlying
conviction concerning a humanistic and psychological interpretation of the Buddhas teaching. He
shows no interest in myth or symbol, even though all of these are evidently as much part of the
Buddhas teachings.
The next few chapters explore the practical implications of this theory. The Buddha
characterised the human condition as dukkha, suffering (meaning, being stuck in conditioned
existence). Individual existence is a causally conditioned process of grasping the five aggregates;
grasping is the superimposition of the ideas this is mine, I am this, this is my self, onto the
aggregates. When this process ends, suffering ends. Suffering, therefore, is the same as being
motivated by self-centred craving, and the Buddhist ethical life is lived to ameliorate this suffering.
Karunadasa explores three principles of the ethical life: kammavda (that actions have
consequences), kiriyavda (the need to act wholesomely), and viriyavda (the need to make an
effort). The discussion of kamma as intention, and what this entails, is dense and stimulating. Next
Karunadasa explores the nature and application of the eightfold path, the Buddhas middle way.
Finally, he discusses the role and place of happiness in early Buddhism. He successfully presents
happiness as both a goal of all our desires and the result of living a wholesome (kusala) life.
In the concluding chapters, Karunadasa returns to his main theme of the teaching by the
middle. Nibbna is neither the attainment of a metaphysical reality nor the annihilation of a
physical self. He begins with the simple definition of nibbna as the destruction of greed, hatred and
delusion, and then expands this definition in terms of various other ways in which nibbna is
described: as knowledge, as world-transcendence, as the unconditioned, as non-proliferation, and so
on. He denies that nibbna has anything to do with a transcendental reality. The chapter on the
Buddhas unanswered questions (Is the world finite or infinite? Has it a beginning or not? Is the
soul the same or different to the body? Does the Tathgata exist after death, not, both, or neither?) is
more philosophical but nicely demonstrates the methodology of the whole book, as well as showing

the importance of right view for the practice of Buddhism. Karunadasa explores the cultural context
of the questions and how the Buddha handles them, and concludes that he did not answer them
because they are inappropriate and meaningless. Hence the positions put forward by other scholars,
such as nave agnosticism, pragmatism, rational agnosticism and positivism, are all incorrect.
Karunadasa ends with a chapter on the Buddhist attitude to the idea of God: not only does
God have not place in Buddhism, but the Buddha offers arguments against belief in his existence.
He concludes that Buddhism is anthropology, not theology. An appendix on Buddhism and
fundamentalism explores how the belief, which the Buddha warned against, that this alone is true;
all other beliefs are false is as corrosive a view within Buddhism as without, and how Buddhism is
a pluralist tradition, admitting a plurality of doctrines, scriptures, cultures and societies. Moreover,
the Buddha did not deny that there can be liberation outside Buddhism, for what the Buddha
discovered, is open to anyone to discover; and while what was said by the Buddha was well said,
whatever has been well said by anyone (or in other scriptures) is the word of the Buddha too.
In short, this is a high-level abstract synthesis of Buddhist doctrine. Its value lies in its
steady focus on the early discourses, its method of interpretation guided not by later Buddhist
exegesis but by a historical hypothesis about the metaphysical context of the Buddhas teaching.
Karunadasa tries to cover both the theory and practice of the middle way, but in doing so the book
feels like two books, the one on practice sandwiched between chapters on theory. As it is, I suspect
that Early Buddhist Teachings will not gain much of a readership beyond the Buddhist
intelligentsia, especially because it makes no attempt to relate the early Buddhist teachings to other
philosophical or religious traditions. This is a pity, and I predict the book is destined to remain a
hidden treasure among books on early Buddhism, partly because of its specialism, and also because
it is only available direct from the publishers in Hong Kong.
Available direct from the publishers, www.buddhism.hku.hk/Publications.html for $30 + $10p&p.
Dhivan Thomas Jones is the editor of Western Buddhist Review, and the author of This Being, That
Becomes: the Buddhas teaching on Conditionality
(http://windhorsepublications.com/this_being_that_becomes_the_buddhas_teaching_on_conditional
ity).
1

For instance Richard Gombrich, What the Buddha Thought, and Alexander Wynne, The Origins of
Buddhist Meditation, reviewed in WBR volume 5
(https://thebuddhistcentre.com/westernbuddhistreview/volume-5). Bhikkhu Anlayo is a prolific
scholar of early Buddhism too; his books on satipahna
(http://windhorsepublications.com/satipatthana_the_direct_path_to_realization) are published by
Windhorse Publications.
2
His book on the dhamma-theory published by the Buddhist Publication Society is available online
(http://www.bps.lk/olib/wh/wh412.pdf).