WOORDRIDGE SCHOOL, INC. VS.

ARB CONSTRUCTION
Statement of the Case
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Trial court rendered its decision in favor of Woodridge.School

CA reversed RTC.

Statement of Facts
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Woodridge is the usufructuary of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title(TCT) No. T-363902 in the name of spouses Ernesto T.
Matugas and Filomena U. Matugas.
Its co-petitioner, Miguela JimenezJavier, is the registered owner of the adjacent lot under TCT No.T-330688.
ARB is the owner and developer of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in Bacoor, Cavite, which is composed of four phases.
Phase 1 of the subdivision was already accessible from the Marcos Alvarez Avenue.
To provide the same accessibility to the residents of Phase II of the subdivision, ARB constructed the disputed road to link the two phases.As
found by the appellate court, petitioners properties sit right in the middle of several estates: Phase 1 of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the
north, a creek in the east, and Green Valley Subdivision the farther east, a road within Soldiers Hills Subdivision IV which leads
to the Marcos Alvarez Avenue in the west and Phase III of Soldiers Hills Subdivision in the south.
Initially, petitioners offered to pay ARB P50,000 as indemnity for the use of the road. Adamant, ARB refused the offer and fenced the perimeter of
the road fronting the properties of petitioners. By doing so, ARB effectively cut off petitioners access to and from the public highway.
Petitioners argue that the contested road lot is a property of public dominion pursuant to Article 40 of the Civil Code because the disputed road
falls under the category of others of similar character which is the last clause of Article 420 (1)?
Hence, it is a property of public dominion which can be used by the general public without need for compensation. Consequently, it is wrong for
ARB to exclude petitioners from using the road lot or to make them pay for the use of the same.
Petitioners also assert that their initial offer of P50,000 should be sufficient compensation for the right of way.
Further, they should not be held accountable for the increase in the value of the property since the delay was attributable to the stubborn refusal
of ARB to accept their offer.

Applicable Laws:
Issues:
1
2
3

Is the disputed road falls under the category of others of similar character which is the last clause of Article 420 (1)? No.
Is the road in question the valid subject for legal easement? Yes
Is the offer of P50,000 is a sufficient compensation for the right of way? No

Rationale:
1

The road lots in a private subdivision are private property, hence, the local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation, if they are to
be utilized as a public road (Abellana, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, ). Otherwise, they remain to be private properties of the owner-developer.
a

The use of the subdivision roads by the general public does not strip it of its private character. The road is not converted into public property by mere
tolerance of the subdivision owner of the public's passage through it. The local government should first acquire them by donation, purchase, or expropriation,
if they are to be utilized as a public road.

Since no donation has been made in favor of any local government and the title to the road lot is still registered in the name of ARB, the disputed property
remains private.

Requisites to be entitled to a legal easement of right of way: (1) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway; (2) payment of proper indemnity; (3) the isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point
least prejudicial to the servient estate. Only requisite number two is not present in this case.
a

The appellate and trial courts found that the properties of petitioners are enclosed by other estates without any adequate access to a public highway except
the subject road lot which leads to Marcos Alvarez Avenue.

Although it was shown that the shortest distance from the properties to the highway is toward the east across a creek, this alternative route does not provide
an adequate outlet for the students of the proposed school. This route becomes marshy as the creek overflows during the rainy season and will endanger the
students attending the school.

The Civil Code categorically provides for the measure by which the proper indemnity may be computed: value of the land occupied plus the amount of the damage
caused to the servient estate.
a

Art 649. Par 2. xxx xxx xxx

Should this easement be established in such a manner that its use may be continuous for all the needs of the dominant estate, establishing a permanent
passage, the indemnity shall consist of the value of the land occupied and the amount of the damage caused to the servient estate. xxx
Judgment: Case remanded to court

ZARATE VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS

FACTS:
Petittioner Francisco Zarate applied for registration of title of 3 parcels of land in Tangalan, Aklan. He claims that he bought the land from Josefino Tirol,
who inherited the same from Ignacio Tirol. There were different oppositors to his application.
ISSUE:
WON subject parcels of land are registrable under petitioners name.
Petitioner: Geodetic Engineers testimony and certification show that the subject property is alienable and disposable.
Respondent Preciosa Tirol Davila: She is the daughter of Ignacio Tirol. She opposed saying that the land was not donated by his father to Josefino.
Respondent DBP: The lots are owned by spouses Molo and was mortgaged to them. When the mortgage was foreclosed, the land became the banks
property.

Respondents Toriaga: They owned the land.

Oppositor Republic of the Philippines: Subject land was timberland or unclassified forest.
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT:
Application for registration of title by Zarate and the claims of private oppositors is dismissed.
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS:
CA affirmed the ruling of the Trial Court.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:
The petition is DENIED. Ruling of the CA and Trial Court is affirmed.
Subject lands were released as alienable and disposable only in 1973. The application for registration was filed in 1976. Thus, the applicant and/or
private oppositors possessed the land for only 3 years prior to the filing of application and the 30-year requirement imposed by CA 141 (Public Land Act)
was not met.
The applicant (and oppositors) failed to show evidence that they have complied with the requisites provided by law 1) the land applied for was
alienable and disposable. 2) the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and
adversely for 30 years immediately preceding the filing of application. More than 1/2 of the total area applied for are not in the possession of the
applicant and thus, he cannot claim exclusive and notorious possession under the claim of ownership, nor can he support his claim of title through
acquisitive prescription.
A positive act of government is needed to convert forest land into alienable or disposable land. Possession of forest lands, which are incapable of private
appropriation, no matter how long cannot ripen into private ownership.

SECRETARY OF DENR VS. YAP

Secretary of DENR vs Yap

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws: Regalian Doctrine

GR No. 167707; Oct 8, 2008

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey
of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming
that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified
land of the public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not available for disposition pursuant
to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
ISSUE:
Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.
HELD:
No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act
of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau
of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has
time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable
public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not
been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CITY OF PARANAQUE

G.R. No. 191109 | July 18, 2012
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 195, Paranaque City (RTC), which ruled that
petitioner Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), a taxable entity, and,
therefore, not exempt from payment of real property taxes.
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation created by virtue of P.D. No. 1084 to provide a coordinated, economical
and efficient reclamation of lands, and the administration and operation of lands belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the
government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development consistent with public interest.

By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay, including those located in
Paraaque City. Paraaque City Treasurer issued Warrants of Levy on PRAs reclaimed properties based on the assessment for delinquent
real property for tax years 2001 and 2002.
PRA asserted that:
It is not a GOCC under the Administrative Code, nor is it a GOCC under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because it is not
required to meet the test of economic viability.
It is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public service. Although it has a capital stock
divided into shares, it may not be classified as a stock corporation because it lacks the second requisite of a stock corporation: to
distribute dividends and allotment of surplus and profits to its stockholders.
It may not be classified as a non-stock corporation because it has no members and it is not organized for charitable, religious, educational,
professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and
like chambers as provided in Section 88 of the Corporation Code.
It was not created to compete in the market place as there was no competing reclamation company operated by the private sector. Also,
while PRA is vested with corporate powers under P.D. No. 1084, such circumstance does not make it a corporation but merely an
incorporated instrumentality and that the mere fact that an incorporated instrumentality of the National Government holds title to real
property does not make said instrumentality a GOCC.
City of Paraaque (respondent) argued that:
PRA since its creation consistently represented itself to be a GOCC. PRAs very own charter (P.D. No. 1084) declared it to be a GOCC and
that it has entered into several thousands of contracts where it represented itself to be a GOCC. In fact, PRA admitted in its original and
amended petitions and pre-trial brief filed with the RTC of Paraaque City that it was a GOCC.
It argues that PRA is a stock corporation with an authorized capital stock divided into 3 million no par value shares, out of which 2 million
shares have been subscribed and fully paid up. Section 193 of the LGC of 1991 has withdrawn tax exemption privileges granted to or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is an incorporated instrumentality of the national government and is, therefore, exempt from payment of real
property tax under sections 234(a) and 133(o) of Republic Act 7160 or the Local Government Code vis--vis Manila International Airport
Authority v. Court of Appeals.
HELD:
Yes it is a Government Instrumentality. However, it is not a GOCC. When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers,
the instrumentality does not necessarily become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or nonstock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers.

Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a GOCC as any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation,
vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or
through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51)
percent of its capital stock: x x x.
From the above definitions, it is clear that a GOCC must be "organized as a stock or non-stock corporation" while an instrumentality is
vested by law with corporate powers. Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the
instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework.
Many government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock or non-stock corporations, which is a
necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed a GOCC.
The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special charters on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be
established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC must meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first
condition of common good but failed the second one - economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the creation of PRA was not for
economic or commercial activities. Neither was it created to compete in the market place considering that there were no other competing
reclamation companies being operated by the private sector.
Further, when local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the tax. Any
doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local
governments seek to tax national government instrumentalities.
Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress grants an
exemption to a national government instrumentality from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in favor of the national
government instrumentality.

HEIRS OF MALABANAN VS. REPUBLIC

FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in
Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four
sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons
from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural
Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within
the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on
March 15, 1982. On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the
length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed the
appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land
and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
or both?
HELD:
The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of
acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are
alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for
public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence
the Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in
1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.