Boudard v Tait

Facts:
Emilie Boudard, as widow of Marie
Theodore Boudard and as guardian of
her children born during their marriage
obtained a judgment in their favor
from CFI Hanoi, French Indo-China for
the sum of 40,000 piastras plus
interest. The judgment was against
Stewart Tait who had been declared in
default for his failure to appear at the
trial before court.

Theodore Boudard, who was an

employee of Stewart Tait, was killed in
Hanoi by other employees of Tait,
although "outside of the fulfillment of
a duty", according to the English
translation of a certified copy of the
French decision. The dismissal of the
complaint was based principally on the
lack of jurisdiction of the CFI Hanoi to
render judgment. It was found that the
Tait was not a resident of, nor
domiciled in that country. Also, the
evidence adduced at the trial proves
that neither Tait nor his agent or
employees were ever in Hanoi and
that Theodore had never, at any time,
been his employee.

Issue:
1. Whether or not court erred in
admitting evidence for judicial foreign
records (in this case, it was the Hanoi
decision).

2. Whether or not the court erred in

declaring that it was indispensable for
Tait to be served with summons in
Hanoi.

3. Whether or not the decision of CFI

Hanoi was already conclusive.

Held:
1. Yes, Boudard failed to show that the
proceedings against Tait in CFI Hanoi
were in accordance with the laws of
France then in force.

Further, Boudard failed to show that

they are certified copies of judicial
records. They argue that the papers
are the original documents and that
the French consul in the Philippines
has confirmed this fact. This is not
sufficient to authorize a deviation from
the rule established by law. The best
evidence
of
a
foreign
judicial
proceeding is a certified copy with all
the formalities required.

2. No. French law regarding summons

states that: those who have no known
residence in France shall be served
summons in the place of their present
residence; if the place is unknown, writ
shall be placed at the main door of the
hall of the court where the complaint
is filed.

In the case, it was shown that

summons were delivered in Manila to
J.M. Shotwell, a representative or
agent of Churchill and Tait, Inc. which
is an entity entirely different from Tait.
Also, evidence shows that Tait was not
in Hanoi during the time the complaint
was filed by Boudard. The rule is that
judicial proceedings in a foreign
country,regarding payment of money,

are only effective against a party if

summons is duly served on him within
such foreign country before the
proceedings.

3. No. The decision cannot be

conclusive to such an extent that it
cannot be contested. It merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of Boudard's claim and
admits proof to the contrary.

The effect of a judgment of any

tribunal of a foreign country is:
- In case of judgment against a
specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing.

- In case of judgment against a person,

the judgment is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and
their
successors-in-interest
by
a
subsequent title, but the judgment
may be repelled by evidence of:

corporation organized under the laws

of the State of Minnesota, U.S.A.,
sought to enforce in the RTC- Manila, a
judgment rendered in its favor by a
Japanese
court
against
private
respondent C.F. Sharp & Company,
Inc.,
(SHARP),
a
corporation
incorporated under Philippine laws.

factual and procedural antecedents of

this controversy:

On May 9, 1974, Northwest Airlines

and Sharp, through its Japan branch,
entered
into
an
International
Passenger Sales Agency Agreement,
whereby the former authorized the
latter to sell its air transportation
tickets. Unable to remit the proceeds
of the ticket sales made by defendant
on behalf of the plaintiff under the said
agreement, plaintiff on March 25, 1980
sued defendant in Tokyo, Japan, for
collection of the unremitted proceeds
of the ticket sales, with claim for
damages.

-> want of jurisdiction

-> want of notice to the party
-> collusion
-> fraud
-> clear mistake of law or fact

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES,

INC. vs. CA and C.F. SHARP &
COMPANY INC.
G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

FACTS: Petitioner Northwest Orient

Airlines,
Inc.
(NORTHWEST),
a

On April 11, 1980, a writ of summons

was issued by the 36th Civil
Department, Tokyo District Court of
Japan against defendant at its office at
the Taiheiyo Building, 3rd floor, 132,
Yamashita-cho, Naka-ku, Yokohoma,
Kanagawa Prefecture. The attempt to
serve the summons was unsuccessful
because the bailiff was advised by a
person in the office that Mr. Dinozo,
the person believed to be authorized
to receive court processes was in
Manila and would be back on April 24,
1980.

On April 24, 1980, bailiff returned to

the defendants office to serve the
summons. Mr. Dinozo refused to
accept the same claiming that he was
no longer an employee of the
defendant.

After the two attempts of service were

unsuccessful, the judge of the Tokyo
District Court decided to have the
complaint and the writs of summons
served at the head office of the
defendant in Manila. On July 11, 1980,
the Director of the Tokyo District Court
requested the Supreme Court of Japan
to serve the summons through
diplomatic
channels
upon
the
defendants head office in Manila.
On August 28, 1980, defendant
received from Deputy Sheriff Rolando
Balingit the writ of summons (p. 276,
Records). Despite receipt of the same,
defendant failed to appear at the
scheduled hearing. Thus, the Tokyo
Court proceeded to hear the plaintiffs
complaint and on [January 29, 1981],
rendered judgment ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum
of 83,158,195 Yen and damages for
delay at the rate of 6% per annum
from August 28, 1980 up to and until
payment is completed (pp. 12-14,
Records).

On March 24, 1981, defendant

received from Deputy Sheriff Balingit
copy of the judgment. Defendant not
having appealed the judgment, the
same became final and executory.

Plaintiff was unable to execute the

decision in Japan, hence, on May 20,

1983, a suit for enforcement of the

judgment was filed by plaintiff before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila
Branch 54.

defendant filed its answer averring

that the judgment of the Japanese
Court: (1) the foreign judgment sought
to be enforced is null and void for
want of jurisdiction and (2) the said
judgment is contrary to Philippine law
and public policy and rendered without
due process of law.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals

sustained the trial court. It agreed with
the latter in its reliance upon Boudard
vs. Tait wherein it was held that the
process
of
the
court
has
no
extraterritorial
effect
and
no
jurisdiction is acquired over the person
of the defendant by serving him
beyond the boundaries of the state.
To support its position, the Court of
Appeals further stated:
In an action strictly in personam, such
as the instant case, personal service of
summons within the forum is required
for the court to acquire jurisdiction
over the defendant (Magdalena Estate
Inc. vs. Nieto, 125 SCRA 230). To
confer jurisdiction on the court,
personal or substituted service of
summons on the defendant not
extraterritorial service is necessary.

ISSUE: whether a Japanese court can

acquire jurisdiction over a Philippine
corporation doing business in Japan by
serving summons through diplomatic
channels on the Philippine corporation
at its principal office in Manila after

prior attempts to serve summons in

Japan had failed.

HELD: YES

A foreign judgment is presumed to be

valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until the contrary is
shown. It is also proper to presume the
regularity of the proceedings and the
giving of due notice therein. 6
The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.(See Sec. 50, R
39)

Being the party challenging the

judgment rendered by the Japanese
court, SHARP had the duty to
demonstrate the invalidity of such
judgment.

It is settled that matters of remedy

and procedure such as those relating
to the service of process upon a
defendant are governed by the lex fori
or the internal law of the forum. 8 In
this case, it is the procedural law of
Japan where the judgment was
rendered that determines the validity
of the extraterritorial service of
process on SHARP. As to what this law
is is a question of fact, not of law.
It was then incumbent upon SHARP to
present evidence as to what that
Japanese procedural law is and to
show that under it, the assailed
extraterritorial service is invalid. It did
not. Accordingly, the presumption of

validity and regularity of the service of

summons and the decision thereafter
rendered by the Japanese court must
stand.
Alternatively in the light of the
absence of proof regarding Japanese
law, the presumption of identity or
similarity or the so-called processual
presumption may be invoked. Applying
it, the Japanese law on the matter is
presumed to be similar with the
Philippine law on service of summons
on a private foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines.

Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of

Court provides that if the defendant is
a foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines, service may be made:
(1) on its resident agent designated in
accordance with law for that purpose,
or, (2) if there is no such resident
agent, on the government official
designated by law to that effect; or (3)
on any of its officers or agents within
the Philippines.

Where the corporation has no such

agent, service shall be made on the
government official designated by law,
to wit: (a) the Insurance Commissioner
in the case of a foreign insurance
company; (b) the Superintendent of
Banks, in the case of a foreign banking
corporation; and (c) the Securities and
Exchange Commission, in the case of
other
foreign
corporations
duly
licensed to do business in the
Philippines.

Nowhere in its pleadings did SHARP

profess to having had a resident agent

authorized to receive court processes

in Japan.
While it may be true that service could
have been made upon any of the
officers or agents of SHARP at its three
other
branches
in
Japan,
the
availability of such a recourse would
not preclude service upon the proper
government official, as stated above.
As found by the respondent court, two
attempts at service were made at
SHARPs Yokohama branch. Both were
unsuccessful.
The Tokyo District Court requested the
Supreme Court of Japan to cause the
delivery of the summons and other
legal documents to the Philippines.
Acting on that request, the Supreme
Court of Japan sent the summons
together
with
the
other
legal
documents to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Japan which, in turn,
forwarded the same to the Japanese
Embassy in Manila . Thereafter, the
court processes were delivered to the
Ministry (now Department) of Foreign
Affairs of the Philippines, then to the
Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
Manila, who forthwith ordered Deputy
Sheriff Rolando Balingit to serve the
same on SHARP at its principal office
in Manila. This service is equivalent to
service on the proper government
official under Section 14, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 128 of the Corporation Code.
Hence, SHARPs contention that such
manner of service is not valid under
Philippine laws holds no water.

We find NORTHWESTs claim for

attorneys fees, litigation expenses,
and exemplary damages to be without

merit. We find no evidence that would

justify an award for attorneys fees
and litigation expenses under Article
2208 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Nor is an award for
exemplary damages warranted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is

partly GRANTED, and the challenged
decision is AFFIRMED insofar as it
denied NORTHWESTs claims for
attorneys fees, litigation expenses,
and
exemplary
damages
but
REVERSED insofar as in sustained the
trial courts dismissal of NORTHWESTs
complaint in Civil Case No. 83-17637
of Branch 54 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, and another in its
stead is hereby rendered ORDERING
private respondent C.F. SHARP L
COMPANY, INC. to pay to NORTHWEST
the amounts adjudged in the foreign
judgment subject of said case, with
interest thereon at the legal rate from
the filing of the complaint therein until
the said foreign judgment is fully
satisfied.

SOORAJMULL
NAGARMULL
vs.
BINALBAGAN-ISABELA
SUGAR
COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. L-22470; May 28, 1970

Facts:

Under a Contract dated May 6, 1949,

plaintiff, a foreign corporation with
offices at Calcutta, India, agreed to
sell
to
defendant,
a
domestic
corporation with offices at the Manila,
1,700,000 pieces of Hessian bags at

$26.20 per 100 bags, C.I.F. Iloilo.

Shipment of these bags was to be
made in equal installments of 425,000
pcs. or 425 bales during each of the
months of July, August, September
and October, 1949.

On September 8, 1949, plaintiff

advised defendant that of the 850
bales scheduled for shipment in July
and August, the former was able to
ship only 310 bales owing to the
alleged failure of the Adamjee Jute
Mills to supply the goods in due time.
In a letter dated September 29, 1949,
defendant requested plaintiff to ship
100 bales of the 540 bales defaulted
from the July and August shipments. In
this connection, it may also be
mentioned that of the 425 bales
scheduled for shipment in September,
54 bales were likewise defaulted
resulting in a total of 154 bales which
is now the object of the controversy.

Meanwhile, on October 1, 1949, the

Government of India increased the
export duty of jute bags from 80 to
350 rupees per ton. On October 27,
1949, plaintiff wrote to defendant for
an increase of $4,000.00 in its letter of
credit to cover the shipment of 154
bales which under the contract should
have been included in the July, August
and September shipments.

On February 6, 1951, defendant

received notification from the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce Tribunal of
Arbitration in Calcutta, India, advising
it that on December 28, 1950, Plaintiff
applied to said Tribunal for arbitration
regarding their claim. The Tribunal

requested the defendant to send them

its version of the case. This, defendant
did on March 1, 1951, thru the then
Government
Corporate
Counsel,
former Justice Pompeyo Diaz.

The Bengal Chamber of Commerce,

Tribunal of Arbitration, refused to
sustain defendants contention and
decided in favor of the plaintiff,
ordering the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of 18,562 rupees and
8 annas. This award was thereafter
referred to the Calcutta High Court
which issued a decree affirming the
award.

Issue: WON the decision of the

Tribunal of Arbitration of the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce, as affirmed by
the High Court of Judicature of
Calcutta, is enforceable in the
Philippines.

Held:

Under the Rules, a judgment for a sum

of money rendered by a foreign court
is presumptive evidence of a right as
between
the
parties and
their
successors in interest by a subsequent
title,
but
when
suit
for
its
enforcement is brought in a Philippine
court, said judgment may be repelled
by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact

There is no question at all that

appellee was guilty of a breach of
contract when it failed to deliver one-

hundred fifty-four Hessian bales which,

according to the contract entered into
with appellant, should have been
delivered to the latter in the months of
July, August and September, all of the
year 1949. It is equally clear beyond
doubt that had these one-hundred
fifty-four bales been delivered in
accordance
with
the
contract
aforesaid, the increase in the export
tax due upon them would not have
been imposed because said increased
export tax became effective only on
October 1, 1949.

arrangement with Philippine Aluminum

Wheels, Incorporated (PAWI), a
Philippine corporation, and Fratelli
Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (FPS), an
Italian corporation. The agreement
provided for the purchase, importation
and distributorship in the United
States
of
aluminium
wheels
manufactured by PAWI. FASGI then
paid PAWI the FOB value of the
wheels. Unfortunately, FASGI later
found the shipment to be defective
and in non-compliance with the
contract.

To the extent, therefore, that the

decisions of the Tribunal of Arbitration
of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce
and of the High Court of Judicature of
Calcutta fail to apply to the facts of
this case fundamental principles of
contract,
the
same
may
be
impeached, as they have been
sufficiently impeached by appellant,
on the ground of clear mistake of
law. We can not sanction a clear
mistake of law that would work an
obvious injustice upon appellant.

On 21 September 1979, FASGI

instituted an action against PAWI and
FPS for breach of contract and
recovery of damages in the amount of
US$2,316,591.00 before the United
States District Court for the Central
District of California. In the interim,
two agreements were entered by the
parties but PAWI kept on failing to
discharge its obligations therein. Irked
by PAWIs persistent default, FASGI
filed with the US District Court of the
Central District of California the
agreements for judgment against
PAWI.

Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs

FASGI Enterprises
GR 137378; 12 October 2000

Facts:

On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises

Incorporated (FASGI), a corporation
organized and existing under and by
virtue of the laws of the State of
California, United States of America,
entered
into
a
distributorship

On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a

notice of entry of judgment. Unable to
obtain satisfaction of the final
judgment within the United States,
FASGI
filed
a
complaint
for
enforcement of foreign judgment,
before RTC Makati. The Makati court,
however, dismissed the case, on the
ground that the decree was tainted
with collusion, fraud, and clear
mistake of law and fact. The lower
court ruled that the foreign judgment
ignored the reciprocal obligations of

the parties. While the assailed foreign

judgment ordered the return by PAWI
of the purchase amount, no similar
order was made requiring FASGI to
return to PAWI the third and fourth
containers of wheels. This situation
amounted to an unjust enrichment on
the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the
RTC said, agreements which the
California
court
had
based
its
judgment were a nullity for having
been entered into by Mr. Thomas
Ready, counsel for PAWI, without the
latters authorization. However, the
Court of Appeals reversed this
decision.

Issue: WON the Philippine Court may

enforce the said foreign judgment.

Held:
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment
rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate
parties and the underlying cause of
action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has
been an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction; that trial upon regular
proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant and
under a system of jurisprudence likely
to secure an impartial administration
of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and
in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment. PAWI claims that its
counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without
its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction,
it is clear that an attorney cannot,
without a clients authorization, settle

the action or subject matter of the

litigation even when he honestly
believes that such a settlement will
best serve his clients interest.
However, PAWI failed to substantiate
this complain with sufficient evidence.
Hence, the foreign judgment must be
enforced.

Even if PAWI assailed that fraud

tainted the agreements which the US
Court based its judgment, this cannot
prevent the enforcement of said
judgment. PAWI claimed that there
was collusion and fraud in the signing
of the agreements. Although the US
Court already adjudicated on this
matter, PAWI insisted on raising it
again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder
the
enforcement
within
this
jurisdiction of a foreign judgment,
must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud based on
facts not controverted or resolved in
the case where judgment is rendered,
or that which would go to the
jurisdiction of the court or would
deprive the party against whom
judgment is rendered a chance to
defend the action to which he has a
meritorious case or defense. In fine,
intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud which
goes to the very existence of the
cause of action such as fraud in
obtaining the consent to a contract is
deemed already adjudged, and it,
therefore, cannot militate against the
recognition or enforcement of the
foreign judgment.

Tayag v. Benguet
Mining Inc.

Consolidated

26 SCRA 242 Business Organization

Corporation Law Domicile of a
Corporation By Laws Must Yield To a
Court Order Corporation is an
Artificial Being

Facts: In March 1960, Idonah Perkins

died in New York. She left behind
properties here and abroad. One
property she left behind were two
stock certificates covering 33,002
shares of stocks of the Benguet
Consolidated, Inc (BCI). Said stock
certificates were in the possession of
the Country Trust Company of New
York (CTC-NY). CTC-NY was the
domiciliary administrator of the estate
of Perkins (obviously in the USA).
Meanwhile, in 1963, Renato Tayag was
appointed
as
the
ancillary
administrator (of the properties of
Perkins she left behind in the
Philippines).
A dispute arose between CTC-NY and
Tayag as to who between them is
entitled
to
possess
the
stock
certificates. A case ensued and
eventually, the trial court ordered CTCNY to turn over the stock certificates
to Tayag. CTC-NY refused. Tayag then
filed with the court a petition to have
said stock certificates be declared lost
and to compel BCI to issue new stock
certificates in replacement thereof.
The trial court granted Tayags
petition.
BCI assailed said order as it averred
that it cannot possibly issue new stock
certificates because the two stock
certificates declared lost are not
actually lost; that the trial court as
well Tayag acknowledged that the
stock certificates exists and that they
are with CTC-NY; that according to

BCIs by laws, it can only issue new

stock certificates, in lieu of lost, stolen,
or destroyed certificates of stocks,
only after court of law has issued a
final and executory order as to who
really owns a certificate of stock.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arguments

of Benguet Consolidated, Inc. are
correct.

HELD: No. Benguet Consolidated is a

corporation who owes its existence to
Philippine laws. It has been given
rights and privileges under the law.
Corollary, it also has obligations under
the law and one of those is to follow
valid legal court orders. It is not
immune from judicial control because
it is domiciled here in the Philippines.
BCI is a Philippine corporation owing
full allegiance and subject to the
unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts.
Its shares of stock cannot therefore be
considered in any wise as immune
from lawful court orders. Further, to
allow BCIs opposition is to render the
court order against CTC-NY a mere
scrap of paper. It will leave Tayag
without any remedy simply because
CTC-NY, a foreign entity refuses to
comply with a valid court order. The
final recourse then is for our local
courts to create a legal fiction such
that the stock certificates in issue be
declared lost even though in reality
they exist in the hands of CTC-NY. This
is valid. As held time and again,
fictions which the law may rely upon in
the pursuit of legitimate ends have
played an important part in its
development.
Further still, the argument invoked by
BCI that it can only issue new stock

certificates in accordance with its

bylaws is misplaced. It is worth noting
that CTC-NY did not appeal the order
of the court it simply refused to turn
over the stock certificates hence
ownership can be said to have been
settled in favor of estate of Perkins
here. Also, assuming that there really
is a conflict between BCIs bylaws and
the court order, what should prevail is
the lawful court order. It would be
highly irregular if court orders would
yield to the bylaws of a corporation.
Again, a corporation is not immune
from judicial orders.

OIL AND NATURAL GAS vs. CA

For those who did not take up
arbitration: Big commercial contracts,
particularly international commercial
contracts now usually have a provision
to submit all disputes to arbitration. In
arbitration, the parties are free to
choose who the arbitrators who will
render the award. An award in an
arbitration proceeding is equivalent to
a ruling or decision of a court. After
parties present their arguments and
evidence, the arbitrators render the
award. The winning party goes to
court to have the award confirmed
by a judge or magistrate. Once
confirmed by the court, the party can
have it enforced. In this case, the
parties agreed on an arbitrator and
the arbitration proceedings were held
in India. The award of the arbitrator
was then confirmed or adopted by a
court in India. It was the Indian courts
ruling which was being sought to be
enforced here in the Philippines. They
did this by filing a complaint for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment in
the RTC of Pasig.

FACTS

Oil and Natural Gas Commission

is a foreign corporation, owned and
controlled by the Government of India.

Pacific Cement Co is a Philippine

corporation.

Pacific was supposed to deliver

more than 4,000 metric tons of oil well
cement to Bombay and Calcutta but
because of a dispute with the carrier,
the shipment never reached the
destination. Despite payment by Oil
and Natural, as well as repeated
demands, Pacific did not deliver the oil
well cement.

During negotiations, the parties

agreed that the Pacific will replace the
oil well cement with Class G cement.
Pacific did deliver the Class G
cement but they were not according to
specifications.
Oil
and
Natural
informed Pacific that they will submit
the dispute to arbitration as provided
for in their contract.

The dispute was therefore

submitted to arbitration, the arbitrator
was Shri Malhotra, an employee of Oil
and Natural Gas. The decision of the
arbitrator was in favour of Oil and
Natural Gas. The arbitral decision was
confirmed by an Indian court.

Oil and Natural Gas filed a

complaint in Pasig RTC for the
enforcement of the foreign judgment.
This was opposed by Pacific for being
bereft of any statement of facts and
law upon which the award in favor of
the petitioner was based. The
judgment
of
the
Indian
court
apparently simply adopted the award
of the arbitrator without stating

anything by way of support for its

judgment.

The Pasig RTC dismissed the

complaint. The RTC said that the
contract provided for some disputes to
be settled by the regular court and
some to be submitted to arbitration.
This type, the RTC said, was for the
courts.
Consequently,
the
proceedings had before the arbitrator
were null and void and the foreign
court had therefore, adopted no legal
award which could be the source of an
enforceable right.

The CA affirmed the dismissal

by the RTC. Aside from agreeing with
the RTC that the arbitral award was
void, the CA also said that the full
text of the judgment of the foreign
court contains the dispositive portion
only and indicates no findings of fact
and law as basis for the award. Hence,
the said judgment cannot be enforced
by any Philippine court as it would
violate the constitutional provision
that no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein
clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based.
ISSUE
Whether or not the judgment of the
foreign court is enforceable in this
jurisdiction in view of the private
respondent's allegation that it is bereft
of any statement of facts and law
upon which the award in favor of the
petitioner was based.
RULING
Yes,
it
is
enforceable
in
this
jurisdiction. The SC said that even in
this jurisdiction, incorporation by
reference is allowed if only to avoid
the cumbersome reproduction of the

decision of the lower courts, or

portions thereof, in the decision of the
higher court. This is particularly true
when the decision sought to be
incorporated is a lengthy and thorough
discussion of the facts and conclusions
arrived at, as in this case, where
Award Paper No. 3/B-1 consists of
eighteen (18) single spaced pages..
In effect, the SC was saying that we
also do in this country what the Indian
court did and it was okay for as long
as the award or decision adopted was
complete in terms of the discussion of
the facts and conclusions. The 18
pages of single spaced award by the
arbitrator was, according to the SC,
complete enough. The short decision
of the Indian court which merely
adopted the award was acceptable in
our jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the recognition to be
accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that
the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was
rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the
judgment is relied on. This Court has
held that matters of remedy and
procedure are governed by the lex fori
or the internal law of the forum. Thus,
if under the procedural rules of the
Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid
judgment may be rendered by
adopting the arbitrators findings, then
the same must be accorded respect. In
the same vein, if the procedure in the
foreign court mandates that an Order
of the Court becomes final and
executory upon failure to pay the
necessary docket fees, then the courts
in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate
the order of the foreign court simply
because our rules provide otherwise.

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS

(M) BERHAD vs. CA and PNCC
G.R. No. 110263, July 20, 2001

Facts: Petitioner Asiavest Merchant

Bankers (M) Berhad is a corporation
organized under the laws of Malaysia
while private respondent Philippine
National Construction Corporation is a
corporation duly incorporated and
existing under Philippine laws.
Petitioner initiated a suit for collection
against private respondent, then
known
as
Construction
and
Development Corporation of the
Philippines, before the High Court of
Malaya in Kuala Lumpur entitled
Asiavest
Merchant
Bankers
(M)
Berhad v. Asiavest CDCP Sdn. Bhd.
and Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines.
Petitioner sought to recover the
indemnity of the performance bond it
had put up in favor of private
respondent
to
guarantee
the
completion of the Felda Project and
the nonpayment of the loan it
extended to Asiavest-CDCP Sdn. Bhd.
for the completion of Paloh Hanai and
Kuantan By Pass; Project.
The High Court of Malaya (Commercial
Division) rendered judgment in favor
of the petitioner and against the
private
respondent.
Following
unsuccessful attempts to secure
payment from private respondent
under
the
judgment,
petitioner
initiated the complaint before RTC of
Pasig, Metro Manila, to enforce the
judgment of the High Court of Malaya.

Private
respondent
sought
the
dismissal of the case via a Motion to
Dismiss, contending that the alleged
judgment of the High Court of Malaya
should be denied recognition or
enforcement since on in face, it is
tainted with want of jurisdiction, want
of notice to private respondent,
collusion and/or fraud, and there is a
clear mistake of law or fact. Dismissal
was, however, denied by the trial
court considering that the grounds
relied upon are not the proper grounds
in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Subsequently, private respondent filed
its Answer with Compulsory Counter
claims and therein raised the grounds
it brought up in its motion to dismiss.
In its Reply filed, the petitioner
contended that the High Court of
Malaya acquired jurisdiction over the
person of private respondent by its
voluntary submission the courts
jurisdiction through its appointed
counsel.
Furthermore,
private
respondents counsel waived any and
all objections to the High Courts
jurisdiction in a pleading filed before
the court.
In due time, the trial court rendered its
decision
dismissing
petitioners
complaint. Petitioner interposed an
appeal with the Court of Appeals, but
the appellate court dismissed the
same and affirmed the decision of the
trial court.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in
denying recognition and enforcement
to the Malaysian Court judgment.
Ruling: Yes. Generally, in the absence
of a special compact, no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its
dominion to a judgment rendered by a

tribunal of another country; however,

the rules of comity, utility and
convenience
of
nations
have
established a usage among civilized
states by which final judgments of
foreign
courts
of
competent
jurisdiction are reciprocally respected
and rendered efficacious under certain
conditions that may vary in different
countries.
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment
rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate
parties and the underlying cause of
action are concerned so long as it is
convincingly shown that there has
been an opportunity for a full and fair
hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction; that the trial upon regular
proceedings has been conducted,
following due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant and
under a system of jurisprudence likely
to secure an impartial administration
of justice; and that there is nothing to
indicate either a prejudice in court and
in the system of laws under which it is
sitting or fraud in procuring the
judgment.
A foreign judgment is presumed to be
valid and binding in the country from
which it comes, until a contrary
showing,
on
the
basis
of
a
presumption
of
regularity
of
proceedings and the giving of due
notice in the foreign forum Under
Section 50(b), Rule 39 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which was the
governing law at the time the instant
case was decided by the trial court
and respondent appellate court, a
judgment, against a person, of a
tribunal of a foreign country having
jurisdiction to pronounce the same is
presumptive evidence of a right as

between
the
parties and
their
successors in interest by a subsequent
title. The judgment may, however, be
assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. In addition,
under Section 3(n), Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court, a court,
whether
in
the
Philippines
or
elsewhere, enjoys the presumption
that it was acting in the lawful
exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, once
the authenticity of the foreign
judgment is proved, the party
attacking a foreign judgment, is
tasked with the burden of overcoming
its presumptive validity.
In
the
instant
case,
petitioner
sufficiently established the existence
of the money judgment of the High
Court of Malaya by the evidence it
offered. Petitioners sole witness,
testified to the effect that he is in
active practice of the law profession in
Malaysia; that he was connected with
Skrine
and
Company
as
Legal
Assistant up to 1981; that private
respondent,
then
known
as
Construction
and
Development
Corporation of the Philippines, was
sued by his client, Asiavest Merchant
Bankers (M) Berhad, in Kuala Lumpur;
that the writ of summons were served
on March 17, 1983 at the registered
office of private respondent and on
March 21, 1983 on Cora S. Deala, a
financial planning officer of private
respondent
for
Southeast
Asia
operations; that upon the filing of the
case, Messrs. Allen and Gledhill,
Advocates and Solicitors, with address
at 24th Floor, UMBC Building, Jalan
Sulaiman, Kuala Lumpur, entered their
conditional appearance for private
respondent questioning the regularity

of the service of the writ of summons

but subsequently withdrew the same
when it realized that the writ was
properly served; that because private
respondent failed to file a statement of
defense within two (2) weeks,
petitioner filed an application for
summary judgment and submitted
affidavits and documentary evidence
in support of its claim; that the matter
was then heard before the High Court
of Kuala Lumpur in a series of dates
where
private
respondent
was
represented by counsel; and that the
end result of all these proceedings is
the judgment sought to be enforced.

In addition to the said testimonial

evidence, petitioner also offered the
documentary evidence to support
their claim.

Having thus proven, through the

foregoing evidence, the existence and
authenticity of the foreign judgment,
said
foreign
judgment
enjoys
presumptive validity and the burden
then fell upon the party who disputes
its validity, herein private respondent,
to prove otherwise. However, private
respondent
failed
to
sufficiently
discharge the burden that fell upon it
to prove by clear and convincing
evidence the grounds which it relied
upon to prevent enforcement of the
Malaysian High Court judgment.

WANG
MENDOZA

LABORATORIES

v.

Royal Crowne International vs.

NLRC G.R. No. 78085; October 16,
1989

FACTS:
Petitioner, a duly licensed private
employment agency, recruited and
deployed private respondent Virgilio
for employment with ZAMEL as an
architectural draftsman in Saudi
Arabia.
Service
agreement
was
executed by private respondent and
ZAMEL whereby the former was to
receive per month a salary of
US$500.00
plus
US$100.00
as
allowance for a period of one year
commencing from the date of his
arrival in Saudi Arabia. However,
ZAMEL terminated the employment of
private respondent on the ground that
his performance was below par. For
three successive days thereafter, he
was detained at his quarters and was
not allowed to report to work until his
exit papers were ready. On February
16, 1984, he was made to board a
plane bound for the Philippines.
Private respondent then filed a
complaint
for illegal
termination
against
Petitioner
Royal
Crown
Internationale and ZAMEL with the
POEA.

Petitioner contends that there is no

provision in the Labor Code, or the
omnibus rules implementing the
same, which either provides for the
"third-party
liability"
of
an
employment agency or recruiting
entity for violations of an employment
agreement performed abroad, or
designates it as the agent of the
foreign-based employer for purposes
of enforcing against the latter claims
arising
out
of
anemployment
agreement.
Therefore,
petitioner
concludes, it cannot be held jointly
and severally liable with ZAMEL for

violations,
if
any,
of
private
respondent's service agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner as a private
employment agencymay be held
jointly and severally liable with the
foreign-based employer for any claim
which may arise in connection with the
implementation of the employment
contracts of the employees recruited
and deployed abroad.

HELD:
Yes, Petitioner conveniently overlooks
the fact that it had voluntarily
assumed solidary liability under the
various contractual undertakings it
submitted
to
the
Bureau
of
Employment Services. In applying for
its license to operate a private
employment agency for overseas
recruitment and placement, petitioner
was required to submit, among others,
a document or verified undertaking
whereby it assumed all responsibilities
for the proper use of its license and
the implementation of the contracts of
employment with the workers it
recruited and deployed for overseas
employment. It was also required to
file with the Bureau a formal
appointment or agency contract
executed
by
the
foreign-based
employer in its favor to recruit and
hire personnel for the former, which
contained a provisionempowering it to
sue and be sued jointly and solidarily
with the foreign principal for any of
the violations of the recruitment
agreement and the contracts of
employment. Petitioner was required
as well to post such cash and surety

bonds as determined by the Secretary

of Labor to guarantee compliance with
prescribed recruitment procedures,
rules and regulations, and terms and
conditions
of
employment
as
appropriate.

These
contractual
undertakings
constitute the legal basis for holding
petitioner,
and
other
private
employment or recruitment agencies,
liable jointly and severally with its
principal, the foreign-based employer,
for all claims filed by recruited workers
which may arise in connection with the
implementation
of
the
service
agreements or employment contracts.

LONGER AND FISHER GMBH V. CA

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES V. CA

(G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998)

FACTS: Petitioner SAUDIA hired private

respondent MORADA as a flight
attendant in 1988, based in Jeddah.
On 1990, while on a lay-over in
Jakarta, Indonesia, she went to party
with 2 male attendants, and on the
following morning in their hotel, one of
the male attendants attempted to
rape her. She was rescued by hotel
attendants who heard her cry for help.
The Indonesian police arrested the 2.

MORADA returned to Jeddah, but was

asked by the company to go back to
Jakarta and help arrange the release of
the 2 male attendants. MORADA did
not cooperate when she got to Jakarta.

What followed was a series of

interrogations from the Saudi Courts
which she did not understand as this
was in their language. In 1993, she
was surprised, upon being ordered by
SAUDIA to go to the Saudi court, that
she was being convicted of (1)
adultery; (2) going to a disco, dancing
and listening to the music in violation
of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing with
the male crew, in contravention of
Islamic tradition, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to 286
lashes. Only then did she realize that
the Saudi court had tried her, together
with the 2, for what happened in
Jakarta.

SAUDIA denied her the assistance she

requested, But because she was
wrongfully convicted, Prince of Makkah
dismissed the case against her and
allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.
Shortly before her return to Manila,
she was terminated from the service
by
SAUDIA,
without
her
being
informed of the cause.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a

Complaint
for
damages
against
SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi (AlBalawi), its country manager.
SAUDIA ALLEGES: Private respondents
claim for alleged abuse of rights
occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia. It alleges that the existence of
a foreign element qualifies the instant
case for the application of the law of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue
of the lex loci delicti commissi rule.

MORADA
ALLEGES:
Since
her
Amended Complaint is based on
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code,
then the instant case is properly a
matter of domestic law.

ISSUE: WON the Philippine courts have

jurisdiction to try the case

HELD: YES.

On the presence of a Foreign

Element in the case: A factual
situation that cuts across territorial
lines and is affected by the diverse
laws of two or more states is said to
contain a foreign element. The
presence of a foreign element is
inevitable since social and economic
affairs of individuals and associations
are rarely confined to the geographic
limits of their birth or conception. The
forms in which this foreign element
may appear are many. The foreign
element may simply consist in the fact
that one of the parties to a contract is
an alien or has a foreign domicile, or
that a contract between nationals of
one State involves properties situated
in another State. In other cases, the
foreign element may assume a
complex form.

In the instant case, the foreign

element consisted in the fact that
private respondent Morada is a
resident Philippine national, and that
petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign
corporation. Also, by virtue of the
employment of Morada with the
petitioner
Saudia
as
a
flight
stewardess, events did transpire

during her many occasions of travel

across national borders, particularly
from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that
caused a conflicts situation to arise.

COURT disagrees with MORADA that

his is purely a domestic case.
However, the court finds that the RTC
of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit. Its
authority to try and hear the case is
provided for under Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

BP129 Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil

Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(8) In all other cases in which demand,
exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney`ys fees,
litigation expenses, and cots or the
value of the property in controversy
exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in such other cases
in Metro Manila, where the demand,
exclusive of the above-mentioned
items exceeds Two hundred Thousand
pesos (P200,000.00). (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised
Rules of Court the venue, Quezon
City, is appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First
Instance. [Now Regional Trial Court]
(a) xxx xxx xxx
(b) Personal actions. All other
actions may be commenced and tried
where the defendant or any of the

defendants resides or may be found,

or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiff resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.

Weighing the relative claims of the

parties, the court a quo found it best
to hear the case in the Philippines.
Had it refused to take cognizance of
the case, it would be forcing plaintiff
(private respondent now) to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no
longer
maintains
substantial
connections. That would have caused
a fundamental unfairness to her.
Moreover, by hearing the case in the
Philippines no unnecessary difficulties
and inconvenience have been shown
by either of the parties. The choice of
forum of the plaintiff (now private
respondent) should be upheld.

The
trial
court
also
acquired
jurisdiction over the parties. MORADA
through her act of filing, and SAUDIA
by praying for the dismissal of the
Amended Complaint on grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction.

As to the choice of applicable law, we

note that choice-of-law problems seek
to answer two important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a
given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or
more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen
legal system regulate the situation.

Considering that the complaint in the

court a quo is one involving torts, the
connecting factor or point of
contact could be the place or places
where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actus occurred. And applying the torts
principle in a conflicts case, we find
that the Philippines could be said as a
situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place).
This is because it is in the Philippines
where petitioner allegedly deceived
private respondent, a Filipina residing
and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that
petitioner would, in the exercise of its
rights and in the performance of its
duties, act with justice, give her due
and observe honesty and good faith.
Instead, petitioner failed to protect
her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred
in another country is of no moment.
For in our view what is important here
is the place where the over-all harm or
the totality of the alleged injury to the
person, reputation, social standing and
human rights of complainant, had
lodged, according to the plaintiff below
(herein private respondent). All told, it
is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged
tort.

In applying State of the most

significant
relationship
rule,
to
determine the State which has the
most significant relationship, the
following contacts are to be taken into
account and evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the
place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred; (c) the domicile,

residence,
nationality,
place
of
incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.

As already discussed, there is basis for

the claim that over-all injury occurred
and lodged in the Philippines. There is
likewise no question that private
respondent is a resident Filipina
national, working with petitioner, a
resident foreign corporation engaged
here in the business of international
air carriage. Thus, the relationship
between the parties was centered
here, although it should be stressed
that this suit is not based on mere
labor law violations. From the record,
the claim that the Philippines has the
most significant contact with the
matter in this dispute, raised by
private respondent as plaintiff below
against defendant (herein petitioner),
in our view, has been properly
established.

NOTE:

These test factors or points of

contact or connecting factors could
be any of the following:

(1) The nationality of a person, his

domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical
person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the
place where a thing is, or is deemed to
be situated. In particular, the lex situs

is decisive
involved;

when

real

rights

are

(4) the place where an act has been

done, the locus actus, such as the
place where a contract has been
made, a marriage celebrated, a will
signed or a tort committed. The lex
loci actus is particularly important in
contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is intended
to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or
the place where a power of attorney is
to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting
parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or
administrative
proceedings
are
instituted or done. The lex fori the
law of the forum is particularly
important because, as we have seen
earlier, matters of procedure not
going to the substance of the claim
involved are governed by it; and
because the lex fori applies whenever
the
content
of
the
otherwise
applicable foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the
reason that it falls under one of the
exceptions to the applications of
foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many
cases is decisive of practically all legal
relationships of the ship and of its
master or owner as such. It also
covers
contractual
relationships
particularly contracts of affreightment.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE

ISLANDS vs.WONG CHENG (alias

WONG CHUN) G.R. No. L-18924,

October 19, 1922

FACTS: Appellee is accused of having

illegally smoked opium, aboard the
merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was
anchored in Manila Bay two and a half
miles from the shores of the city. The
demurrer filed by said appellee
alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part
of the lower court, which so held and
dismissed the case.
ISSUE: Whether the courts of the
Philippines have jurisdiction over
crime, like the one herein involved,
committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters.
HELD: There are two fundamental
rules on this particular matter in
connection with International Law; to
wit, the French rule, according to
which crimes committed aboard a
foreign merchant vessels should not
be prosecuted in the courts of the
country
within
whose
territorial
jurisdiction they were committed,
unless their commission affects the
peace and security of the territory;
and the English rule, based on the
territorial principle and followed in the
United States, according to which,
crimes
perpetrated
under
such
circumstances are in general triable in
the courts of the country within
territory they were committed. Of this
two rules, it is the last one that
obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this
matter are authority in the Philippines
which is now a territory of the United
States (we were still a US territory
when this was decided in 1922).

We have seen that the mere

possession of opium aboard a foreign
vessel in transit was held by this court
not triable by or courts, because it
being the primary object of our Opium
Law to protect the inhabitants of the
Philippines against the disastrous
effects entailed by the use of this
drug, its mere possession in such a
ship, without being used in our
territory, does not being about in the
said territory those effects that our
statute contemplates avoiding. Hence
such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public
order.
But to smoke opium within our
territorial limits, even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship, is certainly a
breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such
drug to produce its pernicious effects
within our territory. It seriously
contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the
aforesaid repressive statute.
Remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in accordance
with law.

US v. BULL
Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC

FACTS:

accused H. N. Bull, master of

vessel,
willfully,
unlawfully,
and
wrongly carry, transport, and bring
into the port and city of Manila, aboard
said vessel, from the port of Ampieng,
Formosa, 677 head of cattle and
carabaos, without providing suitable
means for securing the animals while

in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and

unnecessary suffering.

animals to be tied by means of

rings passed through their noses, and
allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on
the deck of said vessel without being
tied or secured in stalls, and all
without bedding

neglect and failure of the accused

to provide suitable means for securing
said animals while so in transit, the
noses of some of said animals were
cruelly torn, and many of said animals
were tossed about upon the decks and
hold of said vessel, and cruelly
wounded, bruised, and killed.

All contrary to the provisions of

Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went
into effect January 1, 1901, provides
that
The owners or masters of steam,
sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from
one port in the Philippine Islands to
another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the
Philippine Islands, shall carry with
them, upon the
vessels
carrying
such
animals,
sufficient forage and fresh water to
provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the
ordinary period occupied by the vessel
in passage from
the port of shipment to the port of
debarkation, and shall cause such
animals to be provided

with adequate forage and fresh water

at least once in every twenty-four
hours from the time
that the animals are embarked to the
time of their final debarkation.

Bull(Norweigan): Norwegian
vessel, and it is conceded that it was
not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws
thereof so it is not within the
jurisdiction of the Philippines
ISSUE: W/N the court had jurisdiction
over an offense of this character when
the neglect and omission which
constitutes the offense continued
during the time the ship was within
the territorial waters of the United
States
HELD: The defendant was found guilty
YES.

No court of the Philippine Islands

had jurisdiction over an offenses or
crime committed on the high seas or
within the territorial waters of any
other country, but when she came
within 3 miles of a line drawn from the
headlines which embrace the entrance
to Manila Bay, she was within
territorial waters, and a new set of
principles became applicable.
Note: when it comes in our territory it
has the discretion to prosecute or not.
If it choose to prosecute must be
justified.

2 well-defined theories as to
extent of the immunities ordinarily
granted to them
1.
French theory and practicematters happening on board a
merchant ship which do not concern
the tranquillity of the port or persons

foreign to the crew, are justiciable only

by the court of the country to which
the vessel belongs. The French courts
therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed on board
French merchant vessels in foreign
ports by one member of the crew
against another.
2.
The United States has adhered
consistently to the view that when a
merchant vessel enters a foreign port
it is subject to the jurisdiction of the
local authorities, unless the local
sovereignty
has
by
act
of
acquiescence
or
through
treaty
arrangements consented to waive a
portion of such jurisdiction.
The disembarkation of the animals
is not necessary in order to constitute
the
completed
offense,
and
a
reasonable
construction
of
the
language of the statute confers
jurisdiction upon the court sitting at
the port into which the animals are
bought. They are then within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation
is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is
concerned.

The appellant contends that the

language of the Spanish text of the
information does not charge him with
failure to provide "sufficient" and
"adequate" means. The words used
are "medios suficientes" and "medios
adecuados." In view of the fact that
the original complaint was prepared in
English, and that the word "suitable" is
translatable by the words "adecuado,"
"suficiente,"
and
"conveniente,"
according
to
the
context
and
circumstances, we determine this
point
against
the
appellant,
particularly in view of the fact that the
objection was not made in the court

below, and that the evidence clearly

shows a failure to provide "suitable
means for the protection of the
animals."

PP v. TULIN
FACTS: In the evening of March 2,
1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel
owned by the PNOC Shipping and
Transport
Corporation,loaded
with
barrels of kerosene, regular gasoline,
and diesel oil, was boarded by 7 fully
armed
pirates.
The
pirates
includingthe accused Roger P. Tulin,
Virgilio Loyola, and Andres Infante Jr.
detained the crew and completely
took over the vessel.The vessel was
directed to proceed to Singapore
where the cargoes were unloaded
transferred and sold under the
directsupervision of accused Cheong
San Hiong. Thereafter, the captive
vessel returned to the Philippines.
A series of arrests was thereafter
effected and all the accused were
charged with qualified piracy or
violation of PresidentialDecree No. 532
(Piracy in Philippine Waters). They
were subsequently convicted of the
crime
charged.
Hence,
this
appeal.Meanwhile accused Cheong
argues that

the trial court erred in convicting and

punishing him as an accomplice when
theacts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside of
Philippine
waters
and
territory,
stripping
the
Philippinecourts
of
jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to
convict, and sentence.ISSUE:WON the
Philippines is without jurisdiction to try

a crime committed outside the

Philippine
waters
and
territory?
RULING:We affirm the conviction of all
the accused-appellants. Article 122 of
the Revised Penal Code, before its
amendment, provided that piracy
must be committed on the high seas
byany person not a member of its
complement nor a passenger thereof.
Upon its amendment by Republic Act
No. 7659, thecoverage of the pertinent
provision was widened to include
offenses committed "in Philippine
waters." On the other hand,under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in
1974), the coverage of the law on
piracy embraces
any person
including "apassenger or member of
the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger
or not, a member of thecomplement
or not, any person is covered by the
law.Republic Act No. 7659 neither
superseded
nor
amended
the
provisions on piracy under Presidential
Decree
No.
532.
Thereis
no
contradiction between the two laws.
There is likewise no ambiguity and
hence, there is no need to construe or
interpretthe law. All the presidential
decree did was to widen the coverage
of the law, in keeping with the intent
to protect thecitizenry as well as
neighboring
states
from
crimes
against the law of nations. As
expressed in one of the "whereas"
clausesof Presidential Decree No. 532,
piracy is "among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of allcountries." For this
reason, piracy under the Article 122,
as amended, and piracy under
Presidential
Decree
No.
532
existharmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial

court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the person of accused-appellantHiong
since the crime was committed
outside Philippine waters, suffice it to
state
that
unquestionably,
the
attackon
and
seizure
of
"M/T
Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by
the pirates) and its cargo were
committed
inPhilippine
waters,
although the captive vessel was later
brought by the pirates to Singapore
where
its
cargo
wasoff-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such
transfer was done under accusedappellant
Hiong's
direct
supervision.Although
Presidential
Decree No. 532 requires that the
attack and seizure of the vessel and
its cargo be committedin Philippine
waters, the disposition by the pirates
of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy,
hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One

of Book Two of the Revised Penal
Code. As such, it is an exception to
therule on territoriality in criminal law.
The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were
charged, notwith a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code
but under a special law, Presidential
Decree No. 532 whichpenalizes piracy
in
Philippine
waters.
Verily,
Presidential Decree No. 532 should be
applied with more force heresince its
purpose is precisely to discourage and
prevent piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan , 278 SCRA761
[1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that
regardless of the law penalizing the

same, piracy is a reprehensible

crimeagainst the whole world (People
v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922])

LIANG
VS
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES
GR
no.
125865
January 28, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working
with the Asian Development Bank
(ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly
uttering defamatory words against
fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged
before
the
MeTC
of
Mandaluyong City with two counts of
oral
defamation.
Petitioner
was
arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
by the MeTC. After fixing petitioners
bail, the MeTC released him to the
custody of the Security Officer of ADB.
The next day, the MeTC judge received
an office of protocol from the DFA
stating that petitioner is covered by
immunity from legal process under
section 45 of the Agreement between
the
ADB
and
the
Philippine
Government
regarding
the
Headquarters of the ADB in the
country. Based on the said protocol
communication that petitioner is
immune from suit, the MeTC judge
without notice to the prosecution
dismissed the criminal cases. The
latter
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration which was opposed by
the DFA. When its motion was denied,
the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the RTC
of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier
issued.
After
the
motion
for
reconsideration
was
denied,
the
petitioner elevated the case to the SC

via a petition for review arguing that

he is covered by immunity under the
Agreement and that no preliminary
investigation was held before the
criminal case.

by law. The rule on criminal procedure

is
clear
that
no
preliminary
investigation is required in cases
falling within the jurisdiction of the
MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.

ISSUES:
(1)
Whether or not the petitioners
case is covered with immunity from
legal process with regard to Section 45
of the Agreement between the ADB
and the Philippine Govt.
(2)
Whether or not the conduct of
preliminary
investigation
was
imperative.

HELD:
(1)
NO. The petitioners case is not
covered by the immunity. Courts
cannot
blindly
adhere
to
the
communication from the DFA that the
petitioner is covered by any immunity.
It has no binding effect in courts. The
court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but
also of the prosecution. Secondly, the
immunity under Section 45 of the
Agreement is not absolute, but subject
to the exception that the acts must be
done in official capacity. Hence,
slandering a person could not possibly
be
covered
by
the
immunity
agreement because our laws do not
allow the commission of a crime, such
as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
(2)
NO. Preliminary Investigation is
not a matter of right in cases
cognizable by the MeTC such as this
case. Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation may be
invoked only when specifically granted

United
States
vs.
Fowler
December 31, 1902 (1 Phil 614)
FACTS:
August 12, 1901, the defendants were
accused of the theft of 16 champagne
bottles worth 20 dollars while on board
the vessel Lawton. The counsel for
defendants alleged to the Court of
First Instance that they were without
jurisdiction over the crime charged .
Since it happened in the high seas and
not in the city of Manila or in the
territory in which the jurisdiction of the
court extends, they asked that the
case be dismissed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of First
Instance has jurisdiction over crimes
committed on the high seas on board
of transport not registered in the
Philippines.

HELD:
No. The Philippine court has no
jurisdiction over the crime of theft
committed on high seas on board a
vessel not registered or licensed in teh
Philippines. The transport Lawton
not being a vessel of this class, our
courts are without jurisdiction to take
a cognizance of a crime committed on
board the same.

Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. VS.

Intermediate Appellate Court
(150 SCRA 463)
Facts: Sometime in or prior to June
1977, the M/S Asiatica, a vessel
operated
by
petitioner
Eastern
Shipping Lines Inc., loaded at Kobe,
Japan for transportation to Manila
loaded 5,000 pieces of calorized pipes
valued at P256,039.00 which was
consigned to Philippine Blooming Mills
Co, Inc. and 7 cases of spare parts
valued at P92, 361.75 consigned to
Central Textile Mills. Both sets of goods
were inured against marine risk for
their stated value with respondent
Development Insurance and Surety
Corp.
In the same vessel, 2 containers of
garment fabrics were also loaded
which was consigned to Mariveles
Apparel Corp worth $46,583. The said
cargoes were consigned to Nisshin Fire
and Marine Insurance. Another cargo
loaded to the vessel was the surveying
instruments
consigned
to
Aman
Enterprises and General Merchandise
and insured against respondent Dowa
Fire & Marine Insurance for $1,385.00.

On the way to Manila, M/S Asiatica

caught fire and sank. This resulted to
the loss of the ship and its cargoes.
The respective Insurers paid the
corresponding
marine
insurance
values and were thus subrogated to
the rights of the insured.

The insurers filed a suit against the

petitioner carrier for recovery of the
amounts paid to the insured. However,
petitioner contends that it is not liable
on the ground that the loss was due to
an extraordinary fortuitous event.

Issue:
Whether
the
Civil
Code
provisions on Common Carriers or the
Carriage of the Goods by Sea Act will
govern the case at bar?

Held: The law of the country to which

the goods are to be transported
governs the liability of common carrier
in case of their loss, destruction or
deterioration. The liability of petitioner
is governed primarily by the Civil Code
however, in all matters not regulated
by the Civil Code, the Code of
Commerce and Special Laws will
govern with respect to the rights and
obligations of the carrier. Therefore
COGSA is suppletory to the provisions
of the Civil Code.

FUJIKI V. MARINAY
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a
Japanese
national
who
married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioners parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan
where he resides. Eventually, they lost
contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another
Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were

married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon

City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started
to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and
they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a
petition in the RTC entitled: Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or
Decree
of
Absolute
Nullity
of
Marriage).

citizen of a foreign country. Moreover,

in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court
held that the rule in A.M. No. 02- 1110-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage does not
apply if the reason behind the petition
is bigamy. While the Philippines has
no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with
Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the
beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of
the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48(b) of the Rules of Court.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC: dismissed the petition for
"Judicial
Recognition
of
Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of
personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki,
to file the petition.

ISSUES & RULING:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute

Nullity
of
Void
Marriages
and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a
petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a

prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his
or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.

Yes. [t]he recognition of the foreign

divorce decree may be made in a Rule
108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is
precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact.
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any
person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating

thereto, with the Regional Trial Court

of
the
province
where
the
corresponding civil registry is located.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no doubt that the prior spouse
has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court

can recognize the foreign judgment in
a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil
Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

Yes. There is neither circumvention of

the
substantive
and
procedural
safeguards
of
marriage
under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of
Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is
an action for Philippine courts to
recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided
under foreign law.
In
the
recognition
of
foreign
judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent
to
substitute
their
judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide
on the family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal
capacity of the foreign citizen who is
a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the
question of whether to extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage

involving a citizen of a foreign country,

Philippine courts only decide whether
to extend its effect to the Filipino
party, under the rule of lex nationalii
expressed in Article 15 of the Civil
Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will
only determine (1) whether the foreign
judgment is inconsistent with an
overriding
public
policy
in
the
Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign
judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with
public policy nor adequate proof to
repel the judgment, Philippine courts
should, by default, recognize the
foreign judgment as part of the comity
of nations.

CORPUZ vs. STO. TOMAS and The

SOLICITOR GENERAL G.R. No.
186571 August 11, 2010

FACTS:
This is a petition for review on
certiorari seeking a direct appeal from
the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R.
Corpus is a naturalized Canadian
citizen
who
married
respondent
Daisylyn
Tirol
Sto.
Tomas
but
subsequently left for Canada due to
work
and
other
professional
commitments. When he returned to
the Philippines, he discovered that Sto.
Tomas
was
already
romantically
involved with another man. This
brought about the filing of a petition
for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which

was eventually granted by the Court

Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A
month later, the divorce decree took
effect. Two years later, Corpuz has
fallen in love with another Filipina and
wished to marry her. He went to Civil
Registry Office of Pasig City to register
the Canadian divorce decree of his
marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas.
However, despite the registration, an
official of National Statistics Office
informed Corpuz that the former
marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a
judicial recognition of the Canadian
divorce by a competent judicial court
in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982. Consequently, he filed a petition
for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce
and/or
declaration
of
dissolution of marriage with the RTC.
However, the RTC denied the petition
reasoning out that Corpuz cannot
institute the action for judicial
recognition of the foreign divorce
decree because he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It was provided
further that Sto. Tomas was the proper
party who can institute an action
under the principle of Article 26 of the
Family Code which capacitates a
Filipino citizen to remarry in case the
alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce
decree.

ISSUE: Whether or not the second

paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code grants aliens like Corpuz the
right to institute a petition for judicial
recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.

HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision

REVERSED.

The
foreign
divorce
decree
is
presumptive evidence of a right that
clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this
jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e.,

that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code bestows no
rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this
conclusion is not sufficient basis to
dismiss Gerberts petition before the
RTC.In other words, the unavailability
of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the
recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national
law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a
presumptive evidence of right in favor
of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the effect of foreign
judgments.
a
A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the
foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioners presumptive evidence of a
right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution
must be taken to ensure conformity
with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res
judicata between the parties, as

provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the

Rules of Court.

MIJARES V. RANADA
Lessons Applicable: In all civil actions
in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation

RTC:

estimated

the

proper

amount
of
filing
fees
was
approximately P472 and dismissing
the case without prejudice
Petition for Certiorari under
Rule

65

Applicable:

ISSUE: W/N the enforcement of a

foreign judgment is incapable of
pecuniary
estimation

May 9 1991: a complaint was

filed by ten Filipino citizens

representing a class of 10,000
members who each alleged having
suffered human rights abuses such
as arbitrary detention, torture and
rape in the hands of police or
military forces during the Marcos
regime with the United States
District Court (US District Court),
District of Hawaii, against the
Estate
of
former
Philippine
President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos Estate)
US District Court and Affirmed

HELD: NO. (But belongs to "other

actions
not
involving
property")
petition
is
GRANTED.

by
US
CA:
awarded
them
$1,964,005,859.90
Petitioners filed Complaint with

Makati RTC for the enforcement of

the Final Judgment
Marcos Estate filed a motion to

dismiss, raising, among others, the

non-payment of the correct filing
fees paying only P410
Petitioners claimed that an

Laws
FACTS:

action for the enforcement of a

foreign judgment is not capable of
pecuniary estimation

There is an evident distinction

between a foreign judgment in an

action in rem and one in personam.
For an action in rem, the foreign
judgment is deemed conclusive
upon the title to the thing, while in
an action in personam, the foreign
judgment is presumptive, and not
conclusive, of a right as between
the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title
However, in both cases, the
foreign judgment is susceptible to
impeachment in our local courts on
the grounds of want of jurisdiction
or notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. Thus, the party aggrieved by
the foreign judgment is entitled to
defend against the enforcement of
such decision in the local forum. It
is essential that there should be an
opportunity
to
challenge
the
foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly
determine its efficacy even if such

judgment has conclusive effect as

in the case of in rem actions, if only
for the purpose of allowing the
losing party an opportunity to
challenge the foreign judgment.
Consequently, the party attacking
a foreign judgment has the burden
of overcoming the presumption of
its validity. Absent perhaps a
statutory grant of jurisdiction to a
quasi-judicial body, the claim for
enforcement of judgment must be
brought before the regular courts.
There are distinctions, nuanced

but discernible, between the cause

of
action
arising
from
the
enforcement of a foreign judgment,
and that arising from the facts or
allegations that occasioned the
foreign judgment.
They may
pertain to the same set of facts,
but there is an essential difference
in the right-duty correlatives that
are sought to be vindicated.
Extensive
litigation
is
thus
conducted on the facts, and from
there the right to and amount of
damages are assessed. On the
other hand, in an action to enforce
a foreign judgment, the matter left
for proof is the foreign judgment
itself, and not the facts from which
it prescinds.
As stated in Section 48, Rule 39,
the actionable issues are generally
restricted to a review of jurisdiction
of the foreign court, the service of
personal notice, collusion, fraud, or
mistake of fact or law.
The

limitations
on
review
is
in
consonance with a strong and
pervasive policy in all legal
systems to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues. Otherwise
known as the policy of preclusion,
it
seeks
to
protect
party
expectations
resulting
from
previous litigation, to safeguard
against
the
harassment
of
defendants, to insure that the task
of courts not be increased by
never-ending litigation of the same
disputes, and in a larger sense to
promote what Lord Coke in the
Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be
the goal of all law: "rest and
quietness." If every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on
the merits, the plaintiff would be
forced back on his/her original
cause
of
action,
rendering
immaterial
the
previously
concluded litigation.
Marcos Estate cites Singsong v.

Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v.

Court of Appeals:
In determining whether
an action is one the subject matter
of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has
adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought.
If it is primarily for the recovery of
a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary
estimation,
and
whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal

courts or in the courts of first

instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However,
where the basic issue is something
other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
An examination of Section
19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the
instant complaint for enforcement
of a foreign judgment, even if

capable of pecuniary estimation,

would fall under the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Courts
The complaint to enforce the US
District Court judgment is one
capable of pecuniary estimation.
But at the same time, it is also an
action based on judgment against
an estate, thus placing it beyond
the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule
141. It is covered by Section 7(b)
(3), involving as it does, "other
actions not involving property."
The petitioners thus paid the
correct amount of filing fees, and it
was a grave abuse of discretion for
respondent judge to have applied
instead a clearly inapplicable rule
and dismissed the complaint.