1

Nationality Not Faith:

Roadblocks to Iranian Immigration and Acceptance in America
during the Iranian Hostage Crisis

HIST4839
5 May 2016

Introduction
Iran was once called an Island of stability in a troubled world by President Jimmy
Carter in 1978, and reflected the close and friendly relationship shared by the governments
of Iran and the United States. These cordial relations between the United States of America
and Iranian people would sour due to the United States maintenance and support of Shah
Mohammed Rezi Pahlavis government, who had dominated his country with an iron fist,
and any dissenting opposition with brutal force from 1953 until 1979. The Shah also
utilized the SAVAK, his secret police, to root out dissension and ensure the security of his
authoritarian rule. When the Shah visited the United States in 1977 to meet with President
Carter, to reinforce the ties that bound America and Iran, Iranian students protested
outside the White House, and they decried what they perceived as the westernization of
their culture, in addition, the secular views of the Shah were at odds with the Shia Muslim
majority of the country. While the Shah promoted a pro-Western government and
established a Westernized elite, the poor and middle class were dissatisfied with what they
viewed as the diminution of Iranian culture in favor of Western values and norms. The
students also disagreed with the American support of Israel in the Middle East. The
American government, and President Carter had a close relationship with the Iranian Shah
and his government, demonstrated most clearly by the fact that in the 1970s, Irans
military forces, armed and trained by the United States, were the most powerful in the
Middle East1 The strategic geographical position of Iran and the cordial political,
economic, and military relations the United States and Iran enjoyed throughout the 1950s,

Gaddis Smith, Morality Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years. (New York: Hill and Wang.
1986) 182.

60s, until the collapse of relations in 1979, as well as the American need for Iranian oil,
ensured that the Shah was supported by the United States against the threat of communism
and the expanding influence of the Soviet Union that had developed into the Cold War after
World War Two.
In 1978, the Shah of Iran, under considerable pressure from domestic protestors
and citizens who decried his attitudes towards Israel and America, was not a popular ruler.
In an attempt to quell dissent, the Shah banned all demonstrations and declared martial
law as a result of bombings and terrorist attacks against his government. On September 8,
1978, known as Black Friday, soldiers loyal to the Shah fired on demonstrators in Jaleh
Square.2 Reports of the dead range from 200 to 2000, but his harsh actions left the
country on January 16th, and effectively surrendered his rule of the country. Into the
vacuum stepped the Ayatollah Ruhalah Khomeini, an outspoken opponent of the Shah, who
had been exiled from Iran by the Shah in 1964. Khomeini, whom combined a dexterous
conflation of Islam and Iranian nationalism, [and] an implacable hostility toward the United
States, worked throughout the 1970s to bring together the disparate groups based upon
their shared opposition to the Shah.3 With the Shahs departure, Khomeini became the
ruler in Iran On the morning of November 4, 1979, the United States Embassy in Tehran,
Iran, was occupied by peaceful student demonstrators participating in a sit-in. Later in the
afternoon the demonstration would turn violent as the students began to storm the
Embassy buildings and approximately 100 hostages were taken, according to US
intelligence sources at the time. The students demanded the extradition of the deposed

Gaddis Smith, Morality Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years.187.
Roxanne Leslie Euben, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds. Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and
Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) 157-158.
3

Shah from the United States to Iran. This takeover of the US Embassy in Teheran, Iran,
which lasted from November 4, 1979 until January 20, 1981, would be, according to
historian Gaddis Smith, the crisis that absorbed more concentrated effort by American
officials and had more extensive coverage on television and in the press than any other
event since World War II, including the Vietnam War.4
Immigration from Iran to America reached a high point just before the seizure of the
US. Embassy in 1979. Prior to the revolution, the government of the Shah, with an
emphasis on westernization, modernization, and a military buildup in Iran that took place
through arms sales from the United States throughout the 1960s and 1970s. During this
time of steady trade and stable relations between the two nations, a large number of
Iranian students entered the United States on visas during this time, 101, 466 according to
Moshen M. Mobasher in his article Iranians and Iranian Americans, 1940-Present. As a
direct result of the confrontation over the American hostages held captive in the
Iran, United States policy and lawmaking efforts would attempt to curtail the
number of Iranian immigrants and nonimmigrants who entered the country through
the visa process. The impetus for the efforts to reduce Iranian immigration was to
reduce the threat of anti-American sentiment as espoused by the Ayatollah
Khomeini, and was created based upon the fear of unrest and potential terrorism
that might result as a large up swell of nationalism swept through Iranians, both in
American and Iran.

Gaddis Smith, Morality Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years. (New York: Hill and Wang.
1986) 198.

Historiography
Yvonne Haddad, in Chapter 15 of The Muslims of America, examined the impact that
US foreign policy has played regarding the identity of Arab immigrants in America. Haddad
argues that the Six-Day War of 1967, which consisted of Israel versus the neighboring Arab
states of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon, built upon the Kennedy doctrine, and
affirmed that the US would act promptly and decisively against any nation in the Middle
East which attacks its neighbors (219). The Kennedy Doctrine declared that border
changes could not be achieved by force of arms, and the land rights of the assailants would
not be justified by victory, but created a double standard when the US allowed Israel to
maintain the territories it took from the aggressors in the war.5 The Camp David Accords
witnessed by President Carter and concluded between Egyptian President Anwar el Sadat
and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on September 17, 1978, would eventually
bring peace between Egypt and Israel, and according to Haddad, this action promoted by
President Carter further exacerbated American and Muslim relations diplomatically,
dividing the Middle East by isolating Egypt, while the further support of Israel was
perceived as a wedge to divide the Arab world6. Haddad also critiques the impact that
President Reagan had regarding the American view of Arabs, and labels his time as
President of the USA as a period of intense stress for Muslims in the United States.7 She
also discusses Reagans 1980 interview with Time magazine, which Haddad used to

The Six Days War, also known as the Third Arab-Israeli war took place from 5 June 1967 through 10 June 1967.
Israel was attacked by the nations of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. Israel achieved a decisive victory and
seized control of the Sanai Peninsula from Egypt, and in addition occupied the Gaza Strip and West Bank.
Gaddis Smith, Mortality Reason and Power, 156-159.
6Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, The Muslims of America. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) 219.
7Ibid. 220.

emphasize Reagans intolerant view of Islam. Haddad highlighted the Islamic perception of
anti-Islamic sentiment and a pro-Israeli agenda favored by America that Arabs viewed as
counter to their own goals.
Isaiah Wilson III wrote an article entitled Rediscovering Containment: The Sources
of American-Iranian Conduct, which appeared in the Journal of International Affairs, for
the Spring/Summer 2007 issue, in which he analyzed and compared the current problems
the US government faced regarding Iran in comparison to the Cold War with the Soviet
Union. Wilson provided a good background of the issues that the two country have
contended for, and he argued that Americans need to understand that the underlying issues
of the problems come to loggerheads when the goals of the two countries of Iran and
America do not coincide. Wilson argued that the oppressive nature of the Shahs
government was discordant to many Iranians who identified their nation as exceptional in
the way of American Exceptionalism and decreed that Irans has a similar ideology and
argued that this shared and opposing ideology of each nations own exceptionalism has
helped to fan the flames of discord between the two nations. In order to understand the
Iranian ideology, we must understand their ideas, goals, and sense of self, and in doing so,
we may, according to Wilson, see that we as Americans are not so different from Iranians. 8
While the United States government established and maintained a cordial
relationship with the Shah and his government, the same cordial relationship did not exist
between the United States and the majority of the population of Iran. According to Shiran
Hakimzadeh, in an article written for the Migration Policy Institute in 2006 entitled Iran: A

Isaiah Wilson III, REDISCOVERING CONTAINMENT: THE SOURCES OF AMERICAN-IRANIAN CONDUCT. Journal of
International Affairs 60 (2). (Journal of International Affairs Editorial Board, 2007) 100.

Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at Home, the roots of the Iranian
Revolution were
precipitated by some key factors, including corruption at the government level,
infringement of civil liberties, underlying religious tendencies, economic inflation,
and, perhaps most significantly, polarization of the Iranian people after the
overthrow of the nationalist government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq
in 1953, led by the US Central Intelligence Agency.9
Hakimzadeh argued that these factors separated Iran into three groups: a Westerneducated and Western-oriented elite; an educated middle class of anti-Shah dissidents; and
a powerless lower class whose conservatism clashed with the penetration of Western
culture and the degradation of Shia values supported by the monarchy.10 This
stratification of the various classes created a society in which the wealthy supported the
regime, while the middle class and lower class were marginalized in favor of what the
Shahs opposition saw as westernization and secularization, at odds with the majority of
the populations views.
Gaddis Smith, in his book Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the
Carter Years, written in 1986, delivered a similar argument to Hakimzadeh twenty years
earlier. Gaddis argued that President Carter in 1977, upon his assumption of office,
inherited an impossible situation with respect to Iran, and that the United States, as
viewed by Iranians, was intimately connected to the oppressive monarchy that the United
States themselves had helped install and continued to support, without regard for the
Iranian people. Gaddis argued that it was inevitable that the Shah would fall, and that there

Shirin Hakimzadeh, Iran: A Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at Home (Migrationpolicy.org. 2006)
Accessed April 2, 2016. 2. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/iran-vast-diaspora-abroad-and-millionsrefugees-home/.
10
Ibid. 3.

was nothing the United States could do to foresee the eventual fall of the shah, much less
prevent the fall from power, even if American officials had possessed the ability to see into
the future.11
Iranian immigration to America prior to the Hostage Crisis
Early in the morning in America, and around 10am in Iran on November 4th, 1979,
also known as Will Rogers Day the American Embassy in Tehran, Iran was being occupied
and hostages were held by anti-Shah protesters and left wing students. Two days prior to
the seizure of the United States Embassy that would focus the attention of the US
government on Iran, both the House of Representatives and Senate had passed Public Law
96-99, officially recognizing November 4th as Will Rogers Day.12 This day however, would
be forever remembered as the first day of what would turn out to be a 444 day crisis that
would impact American policy and immigration procedures, and would lead to the creation
of numerous resolutions attempting to curtail the influence of Iranians in America, as well
as those aimed at impacting the economic state of Iran. Within days of the takeover of the
embassy, legislation attempting to restrict and curtail the flow of visa holders and
immigrants from Iran would be introduced into the House of Representatives, and antiIranian protests in America would begin.
By viewing the records from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and
the Department of Homeland Security, the immigration of Iranians to America can be
tracked, and the records showed that prior to the time of the fall of the Shah and the rise of

11

Gaddis Smith, Morality Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years. 188.
U.S. Congress. House-Post Office and Civil Service | Senate - Judiciary. Congress.gov. By Tom Steed. 96th Cong.
Cong. Bill. Accessed April 8, 2016. https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-joint-resolution/3/allinfo?resultIndex=2
12

the Ayatollah, Iranian immigration to America doubled roughly every four years. Mohsen
Mobasher, in his article Iranians and Iranian Americans, 1940- Present, which appeared in
Immigrants in American History: Arrival, Adaptation, and Integration in 2013, gives a
detailed description of Iranian immigration to accompany the U.S. government data. By
first observing 1960-1964, from 2,960 men and women from 1960-64 to 5,935 people from
1965 to 1969. The same pattern held for the 1970s, with 12,901 Iranian immigrants
arriving from 1970-1974, and 56, 799 arriving from 1975-1979. During this time period, a
much more dramatic rise was noted in the nonimmigrant population of Iranian students
who came to the United States to receive a college education. From 1960to 1964 4,403
students from Iran obtained student visas. From 1965 through 1969, the number of
Iranian students increased, with 7,022 arriving during this time. The number almost
quadruples from 1970-1974 with 23, 749 students entering the United States, while from
1975 through 1979 101, 466 students entered the United States from Iran. As oil revenue
increased in Iran, government spending increased along with a growing industrializing
Iranian economy, and more students left Iran to meet their educational needs in America.
This number decreased drastically from 1980 to 1984 with the number of Iranian student
visas issued dropped to 14, 152.13 Was this dramatic decrease due to the legislative actions
of the American government, or was it a testament to the differences that divided the
United States of America and Iran?

13

Mohsen M. Mobasher, Iranians and Iranian Americans, 1940 Present in Immigrants in American History:
Arrival, Adaptation, and Integration. Edited by Elliott Robert Barkin. 1st ed. 4 vols. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013.
1001.

10
Iranian Immigration to America, Table 1

Year
1960-1964
1965-1969
1970-1974
1975-1979
1980-1984

Iranian Immigrants Iranian Students -Visas

2,960
5,935
12,901
23,635
56,799

4,403
7,022
23,749
101,466
14,152 14

Information gathered from U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Department of Homeland
Security 1960-1985

Immediate Impact of the Hostage Crisis on Iranians living in America

On November 8th, 1979, just 4 days after the beginning of what became known as
the Iran Hostage Crisis, Representative Edward Beard, a Democrat from Rhode Island,
introduced House Resolution 480, in which he called for
A resolution urging the Attorney General to immediately revoke student
visas held by Iranian citizens who participate in political demonstrations in
the United States.15 This call for the exclusion of Iranian citizens engaging in
political demonstrations in the United States and to require that all Iranian
citizens in the United States submit to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service a statement of their intention to respect the laws of the United
States.16
Though this resolution was sent to the Judiciary committee, it was not further supported or
turned into law, and died in committee. House Resolution 5842, the Iranian Student
Expulsion Act, was presented by the Texas Republican Ron Paul on November 8, 1979, if
successfully passed into law, would have made all Iranian students in the United States

14

Ibid, 1001.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Judiciary. Congress.gov. By Edward Beard. 96th Cong. House Resolution
480. Accessed April 8, 2016 https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/houseresolution/480?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hres480%5C%22%22%5D%7D&resultIndex=19
15

11

ineligible for any form of federal aid.17 While neither bill ever made it out of the
committees they were sent to, the introduction of anti-Iranian laws focused on students
was presented from a bipartisan front, as both a Republican and Democrat both introduced
legislation designed to impact only Iranian citizens living in the United States. These bills
highlight the fact that some members of Congress, along with regular American citizens,
held a view that the interests and values of Iranian citizens were at odds with American
values due to the actions of students in Iran, and therefore poised a threat to the American
way of life.

18
Caption: This photo was taken by Marion Trikosko, a photographer for US News and World Report, 9 November 1979, during
an anti-Iranian protest in Washington D.C., following the seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Iran 5 days before by Iranian students.

A day after the introduction of House Resolution 480, protesters gathered in

Washington D.C. to call for the removal of Iranian citizens from America. An image
captured by Marion S. Trikosko during the protest encapsulates the anger and fear that

17

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Congress.gov. By Rep. Ron Paul. 96th Cong.
House Resolution 5842. Accessed April 8, 2016. https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/5842/allinfo?resultIndex=10
18
Trikosko, Marion S. Iran Hostage Crisis Student Demonstration, Washington, D.C. November 9, 1979.
Miscellaneous Items in High Demand, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, Washington, D.C.
Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2005696439/.

12

plagued American students, as they demanded the release of the Americans held hostage in
Iran. This photo captured the feelings of the anger and disconnection between America
and Iran in the minds of some American citizens, and was representative of an anti-Iranian
rhetoric that occupied the minds of those in government, the media, and the public. It is
interesting to note the phrase Camel Jockey appeared on the protestors placard, and that
this phrase is usually used to derogatorily describe someone on Arab descent.
In the November 13, 1979 issue of the Chicago Tribune, a page 2 article recounted
the recent spate of harassment directed at Iranian students who attended the Central
YMCA Community College in Chicago. Tyner, the journalist responsible for the article,
reported that verbal abuse of Iranians and vandalism of their property had been reported,
and that an Iranian student club had been broken into and vandalized as well. One of the
Iranian students interviewed in the article, Amir Rezie, described the harassment he
received, and stated, People treat us like we have committed a crime. I have been called a
dirty pig, a cameljack, and some other things a lot worse. Tyner described how the
students, who said they spoke for most of the Iranians studying at the college, blamed
incorrect and inadequate information, not the hostage crisis, for shaping the attitude of
Americans toward them. Reza Mobrze was also interviewed for the article, and described
what he believed to be the cause for the insults he and other Iranian students received,
noting that the [p]eople in the United States are made tense by the influence of the news
reports. When I walk down the street people act like I had done something to the American
people and not the American Government.19 I find it interesting that both of those

19

Howard A. Tyner, Iranian Students Here Hit Harassment, Attack on Club." Chicago Tribune, November 13, 1979,
sec. 1. Accessed March 29, 2016. http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/11/13/page/1/article/u-s-halts-irainoil-imports.

13

interviewed declared that their mistreatment at the hands of American citizens was not a
result of the hostage crisis, but a result of incorrect information and the news media.
Another article appearing in the Chicago Tribune on November 11, 1979, written by
James Yuenger and James Coates, entitled Student protests try Americas patience,
described the increasing angry and outrage Americans felt towards Iran as a result of the
newly begun hostage crisis, and showed how this anger was beginning to be focused on
those Iranians who resided in America. The Iranian students had begun holding
demonstrations in support of the government of the Ayatollah Khomeini and demanded
that the US Government send the former Shah, who was undergoing cancer treatment in
New York, back to Iran. The article then goes on to describe a plot by four Iranian men to
kidnap the governor of Minnesota, which was foiled two days previously on Friday,
November 9th, as another reason for Anti-Iranian feelings. As American anger seethed in
the cauldron of resentment towards those demonstrating Iranian students in America, it
was further exacerbated by the view that the U.S. military [was] helplessness to aid [the]
hostages, as the headline of the second article on this page read, written by James Coates
as well. 20 So the American public, overcome with feelings of anger and hostility towards
those they held responsible for the unjust imprisonment of American citizens, lashed out at
Iranians with snowballs and swear words, and actions were also taken to remove those
students of Iranian descent who were illegally or improperly registered from school and
the country. At the same time, Yuenger and Coates mention the fact that the Immigration
Service has expedited the granting of limited work permits that allow bona fide students to

20

James Coates, U.S. Military helpless to aid hostages Chicago Tribune, November 11, 1979, sec 1. Accessed
April 29, 2016. http:// http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/11/11/page/30/article/crisis-in-iran

14

work up to 20 hours a week. Those extra work hours are necessary for thousands of
Iranian students here because in a variety of ways money coming from Iran has dried up.21
Even during the initial burst of anger and hostility towards Iranians, the U.S. government
took steps to ensure that those Iranians legally in the country for educational visas could
supplement their decreased income through work. The actions of the US government were
at odds with the cries of the anti-Iranian protesters who shouted GET THE HELL out of
America! Get on your Camel and ride! Go home where you belong! These articles also did
not tie the Iranian protests or anger towards faith or religion in any way shape or form,
even though it seems today that those correlations would be easily made by the American
public during this time of intense emotion.
The November 13th edition of the Chicago Tribune also contained a headline that
exclaimed US halts Iran oil imports and Carter vows firm stand on hostages. Michael
Coakley, the author of the article, stated President Carted halted direct oil imports from
Iran Monday, declaring that the United States will not capitulate to economic pressures or
terrorism in its efforts to protect the lives of our people held hostage at the American
Embassy in Tehran.22 Coakley also noted in his article that Carter avoided classifying the
oil embargo as a punitive move meant to punish Iran, for fear that this attitude would
provoke attacks or abuse against the hostages held in Tehran.23 It is interesting to note the
incendiary rhetoric in the newspapers matches the description given by Amir Rezie in the
previously mentioned article.

21

James Yuenger and James Coates, Student protests try Americas patience. Chicago Tribune, November 11,
1979. Sec 1 p21. http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/11/11/page/30/article/crisis-in-iran
22
Coakley, Michael. "U.S. Halts Iran Oil Imports." Chicago Tribune, November 13, 1979, sec. 1. Accessed March 29,
2016. http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/11/13/page/1/article/u-s-halts-irain-oil-imports.
23
Ibid.1.

15

Impact on Immigration
On November 14, 1979, President Carter issued his first Executive Order directly
related to the Hostage crisis, number 12170, in which he declared a state of national
emergency, Carter declared that the situation in Iran constitutes an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and economy of the United
States.24 He also ordered that all property owned by the Government of Iran and its
entities should come within the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States, and Carter empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to use the
powers granted to the President by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.25
This economic action came the day after Carter had stopped American importation of
Iranian oil, and as noted by the Chicago Tribunes articles on Tuesday the 13th, perhaps
Carters rhetoric and actions fanned the flames of discontent that had been lit among the
American population by the seizure of the embassy staff.
President Carter had enacted economic action against Iran in response to the
hostage situation by halting oil importation, in addition President Carter, perhaps in an
effort to safeguard Americans against the threat of Iranian terrorists, announced Executive
Order 12172, in which he delegated authority to the Secretary of State and Attorney
General of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 USC 1185.26 Carter basically empowered
both the Attorney General and Secretary of State to restrict the immigration of Iranian
citizens who attempted to enter America without proper documentation, or through illegal
means which violated American law. The order also gives the two delegated officials the

24

Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979).

Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979).
26
Exec. Order No. 12172, 3 C.F.R. 461 (1979).
25

16

powers to impose limitations or exceptions as to who may depart or enter the country. The
flow of Iranian oil to America was cut off, and the flow of Iranian citizen to America was
beginning to be challenged through executive order, to protect America.
Charles R. Babcock, in an article written for the Washington Posts April 9, 1980
edition, described the impact of President Carters announcement on April 8, 1980 of his
Executive Order 12206, in which he revoked all visas held by Iranians who had not yet
entered the United States. 27 Babcock also noted, however, that since the beginning of the
hostage crisis, over 14,000 Iranians had immigrated to the United States, with half of them
religious minorities who fear persecution under the regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, while also noting that 14,700 Iranians had left the United States during this
same time, not including over 10,000 students who had either been removed from the
country, ordered out, or were subject to deportation hearings. Babcock also pointed out
that the State Department and immigration officials stated that concern about religious or
political persecution in Iran would be viewed as a valid humanitarian reason for
revalidating the visas of those now being barred from the United States. 28

Judging by

the government officials and Babcock, religious affiliation was a way with which an Iranian
could receive a revalidated visa for admittance into the United States, not something with
which to restrict immigration based upon belief. According to the documentation, no
restrictions were placed those seeking to enter America from Iran simply due to the fact
that the applicant might be a practitioner of Islam. Nationality, rather than religious belief,
was the restricting factor for those wishing to enter the United States from Iran.

27
28

Exec. Order No. 12206, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1980)

Charles R. Babcock "Carter's Visa Crackdown Won't Hurt Immediately." The Washington Post, April 9, 1980.

17

As these restrictions were being imposed upon Iran, the United States had been
preparing and training for a military mission to retrieve the US hostages held by Iran.
Historian Gaddis Smith described the United States rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw,
as one of the best known events in recent history and it certainly would have been when
he authored Morality, Reason and Power in 1986.29 On April 24, 1980, the mission began,
but quickly encountered difficulties. Eight helicopters were to fly undetected through the
night and deposit the Delta Force, a unit of highly trained special forces soldiers whose
name would come to stand for quick and decisive action against terrorists and hostage
takers during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the first mission was a world-wide
embarrassment and a military failure for the United States. The required helicopters
deemed necessary to complete the mission were unable to complete the journey to the
hostage location due to weather conditions and fuel issues, and President Carter, on the
advice of his military advisors called off the operation. However, during the operation, a
helicopter collided with an accompanying aircraft, and 8 United States soldiers were killed.
Gaddis stated that after the failed rescue attempt, the remaining hostages were separated
and moved throughout the country, and the hostage crisis slowly began to lose its place at
the pinnacle of the news cycle.
In July of 1980, the Shah died of cancer, and in September 4, 1980 Iran and Iraq
began a war that would wage for years, resulting in a religious war of Shia Iran versus
Sunni Iraq. A week after war broke out between Iran and Iraq, representatives of the
Ayatollah informed the US government through the German ambassador in Tehran that in
exchange for a non-intervention agreement in the Iran-Iraq War, and many other

29

Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 203.

18

considerations that were to be worked out, that Iran wanted to return the American
hostages.30 After months of deliberation, 444 days after being taken captive, the American
hostages were released minutes after Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President of the
United States, on January 20, 1981.
The Iran Hostage Crisis, which lasted from November 4, 1979 to January 20, 1981, a
total of 444 days, represented a difficult time for the United States. The Hostage Crisis
occupied the attention of America for months, and raised the ire of Americans against Iran.
Acts of harassment and vandalism were carried out by Americans against Iranian citizens
living in the country, and protests demanded the deportation of Iranians. The lack of an
expedient military solution to the problem fomented feelings of helplessness and
impotence among Americans, as protests by Iranian students in America demanding the
return of the Shah to Iran further enflamed those tensions. The United States Congress
attempted to pass legislation to deport politically active Iranians, and to removed financial
aid from Iranian students. President Carter, through executive order, revoked entrance
visas for all Iranian Citizens on April 7, 1980, and empowered certain members of his
administration to restrict Iranian immigration as well. But President Carter did not ban
Iranian immigration based upon any fear of the Islamic faith, but out of a concern for the
safety of the United States, during what was regarded as an act of state sponsored
terrorism during an upsurge of Iranian Nationalism. During the Iranian Hostage Crisis,
President Carter, through Executive Order, restricted specifically the immigration of
Iranian citizens to America based upon their nationality, not their religion.

30

Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 203-207.

19
Annotated Bibliography
Primary Sources
Babcock, Charles R. "Carter's Visa Crackdown Won't Hurt Immediately." The Washington Post, April 9, 1980.
Accessed April 16, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1980/04/09/cartersvisa-crackdown-wont-hurt-immediately/2d181230-dcf9-4fe7-958c-947b7626213e/.
This article discussed the overall immediate impact that President Carters legislation regarding the
issuance of visas to Iranians would have. The article also emphasized the fact that Iranians who were
in fear of religious persecution would still be able to seek refugee status for purposes of asylum
based upon this persecution.
Coakley, Michael. "U.S. Halts Iran Oil Imports." Chicago Tribune, November 13, 1979, sec. 1. Accessed March
29, 2016. http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/11/13/page/1/article/u-s-halts-irain-oilimports.
This article discussed the impacts of the Oil embargo that President Carter enacted against Iran, and
labeled the perpetrators as terrorists. The article also brings to light the reticence of Carter, who did
not want to be seen as taking large punitive or provocative actions against Iran for fear that Iranian
retaliation would involve the harming or death of American hostages.
Coates, James. U.S. Military helpless to aid hostages Chicago Tribune, November 11, 1979, sec 1. Accessed
April 29, 2016. http:// http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/11/11/page/30/article/crisis-iniran
The feelings of impotence the US faced due to the militarys inability early on in the crisis to affect a
resolution helped stoke American resentment, and the feelings of helplessness and anger worked
together to create emotions contrary to American Exceptionalism.
Exec. Order No. 12170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979).
President Carters order that mandated all Iranian government property and interests in the United
States, must be in the possession or under the control of someone subject to the jurisdiction of the
Government of the United States of America, and emphasized the split between Iran and America.
This requirement also insured that the US government could prosecute or legally bind those
responsible for this capital.
Exec. Order No. 12172, 3 C.F.R. 461 (1979).
Text of President Carters Executive Order 12172 that gave powers to the Secretary of State and
Attorney General to restrict the immigration of Iranians to America with exceptions and regulations
to their specific admittance to the United States. Carter basically delegated his presidential powers,
regarding immigration restriction and limitation to the aforementioned authorities, and ordered
them to protect America.
U.S. Congress. House-Post Office and Civil Service | Senate - Judiciary. Congress.gov. By Tom Steed. 96th Cong.
House Joint Resolution 3. Accessed April 8, 2016. https://www.congress.gov/bill/96thcongress/house-joint-resolution/3/all-info?resultIndex=2.
History of Rep Edward Beards bill to call for revocation of student visas issued to any Iranian
student who participated in a political demonstration.

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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Congress.gov. By Rep. Ron Paul. 96th Cong.
House Resolution 5842. Accessed April 8, 2016. https://www.congress.gov/bill/96thcongress/house-bill/5842/all-info?resultIndex=10
Representative Ron Pauls call for the suspension of all federal student aid given to Iranian students.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Judiciary. Congress.gov. By Edward Beard. 96th Cong. House Resolution
480. Accessed April 8, 2016 https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/houseresolution/480?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22hres480%5C%22%22%5D%7D&res
ultIndex=19
Information regarding Rep. Edward Beards H.R. 480 which would allow the revocation of any
student visas held by Iranian students who participated in a political demonstration.
Trikosko, Marion S. Iran Hostage Crisis Student Demonstration, Washington, D.C. November 9, 1979.
Miscellaneous Items in High Demand, Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division,
Washington, D.C. Accessed April 5, 2016. http://www.loc.gov/pictures/item/2005696439/.
Picture of Washington D.C. protests 5 days after the seizure of American hostages and the US
Embassy on November 4, 1979. The picture was taken by Trikosko who worked as a staff
photographer for US News and World Report. The photo offers a look into the mindset of the early
Anti-Iranian protestors just days after the crisis began.
Tyner, Howard A. "Iranian Students Here Hit Harassment, Attack on Club." Chicago Tribune, November 13,
1979, sec. 1. Accessed March 29, 2016.
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/11/13/page/1/article/u-s-halts-irain-oil-imports.
This article demonstrated the growing anger Americans felt towards Iranians, and demonstrated the
Negative actions that were taking place against them. One of the Iranian students offered interesting
insight as to why he felt Americans were angry, and he blamed incomplete information and the news
media.
Yuenger, James and James Coates, Student protests try Americas patience. Chicago Tribune, November 11,
1979. Sec 1 p21. Accessed April 29, 2016.
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1979/11/11/page/30/article/crisis-in-iran
This article highlights the perceived differences between the Iranians and the Americans. The
Iranian students belief that the Shah should be returned to Iran stands in contrast to the American
call for the return of their citizens.
Secondary Sources
Barry, Dr. Susan. "Flashback: President Jimmy Carter Banned Iranians from U.S." Breitbart News. December
09, 2015. Accessed April 2, 2016. http://www.breitbart.com/biggovernment/2015/12/09/flashback-president-jimmy-carter-banned-iranians-u-s/.
This article, written in December of 2015 was an inspiration for the initial research into this topic.
The comparison of Donald Trumps call for restrictions on Islamic immigrants to President Carters
suspension of Iranian immigration led me to wonder if the acts of Carter were motivated in some
way out of a fear of Islam itself.
Cooper, Bo. "Immigration and Nationality Act (1952)." Major Acts of Congress. Ed. Brian K. Landsberg. Vol. 2.
New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004. 178-184. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web. 1 Mar.
2016.

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This copy of the Immigration and Nationality Act was used to determine the impact of its use on
Iranian immigrants to America. This bill empowered President Carter to enact his restriction of Visas to
Iranians, and to impose limitations in order to keep the country secure.
Euben, Roxanne Leslie, and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, eds. Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and
Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009.
This text provided a background on the Ayatollah Khomeini, in relation to both the Shah of Iran and
to the United States. This information was used to furnish background on discontent between the
Shah, the Ayatollah, and the discontented Iranians. Euben also highlighted the differences between
the Shah and his westernized elite and the rest of the discontented, non-westernized lower and
middle classes.
Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck, The Muslims of America. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
Haddads book was used to provide Historiography regarding the relationship between America and
its Muslim populations as a result of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Haddad focused on
how American foreign policy had led many Muslims to see America as siding with Israel in the
struggles in the Middle East, and argued that this support of Israel created a sense of disconnection
between Muslims in America and America as a whole.
Hakimzadeh, Shirin. "Iran: A Vast Diaspora Abroad and Millions of Refugees at Home." Migrationpolicy.org.
2006. Accessed April 11, 2016. http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/iran-vast-diaspora-abroadand-millions-refugees-home/.
Hakimzadeh explored the causes of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 and broke the causes down
into class, economics, and the religious versus the secular. Hakimzadeh also discussed Iranian
immigration to America and other countries, as immigrants from Iran dispersed into the Diaspora.
Mobasher, Mohsen M. Iranians and Iranian Americans, 1940 Present in Immigrants in American History:
Arrival, Adaptation, and Integration. Edited by Elliott Robert Barkin. 1st ed. 4 vols. Santa Barbara:
ABC-CLIO, 2013. 999-1001.
Mobasher analyzed U.S. governmental data, to create a discussion about Iranian immigration to
America. Mobasher argued that during the late 1970s, more Iranian students were studying in
America than in any other country, and that this pattern of immigration which had been building
during the time of the Shah was reduced from a flood to a trickle in 1980 following the start of the
Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979.
Smith, Gaddis. Morality Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years. New York: Hill and Wang.
1986
Smith offered an insight into the events in Iran and America leading up to the fall of the Shah and the rise of
Khomeini. Smith argued that America was unable to predict the pending fall of the Shah, and that
nothing could have prevented the fracturing of the unsustainable government of the Shah, in the face
of the political upheaval and discontent he was facing.
The Iran Hostage Crisis, A Chronology of Daily Developments: Report / prepared for the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives; by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division,
Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1981. Accessed April 10, 2016.
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/77922NCJRS.pdf
This in depth report provided a tight chronology of the days leading up to the Iranian Hostage Crisis
and the following days until the crisis ended on 20 January 1981. This large report was an excellent
roadmap of the crisis and provided insight as to what actions were taking place when,

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Wilson, Isaiah. 2007. REDISCOVERING CONTAINMENT: THE SOURCES OF AMERICAN-IRANIAN CONDUCT.
Journal of International Affairs 60 (2). Temporary Publisher: 95112. http://0www.jstor.org.skyline.ucdenver.edu/stable/24357972.
Wilsons description of the differences that have divided America and Iran since the fall of the Shah
provided a nice historiography into the current state of affairs between the two nations, and
introduced the idea that Iran as a nation maintains a sense of exceptionalism, similar to America, and
that this strong national feeling has exacerbated issues between the two countries.