The closing section of this weeks parashah presents
to us the mitzvah of eglah arufah. When an unclaimed corpse is found discarded between two cities and the murderer cannot be found, the Torah prescribes for us a process of measuring the location of the corpse to the closest city, having the elders of that city declare they are not responsible for the murder, and then having them axe a young heifer as an offering. The Rambam in Moreh Nevuchim sees this mitzvah as a means to bringing the killer to justice. When the case turns cold and the detectives can find no leads, the next step is to perform the mitzvah of eglah arufah. The very nature of the mitzvah is a public spectacle. As they measure the distance from the body to the closest city, those traveling along the route will gather to see what is occurring. As the elders march from their city to the site of the forsaken body, the population will follow them to witness their declaration. Finally, the peculiar form of offering with a myriad of strange and intricate details will inspire even more curiosity in the events unfolding. In short, a brouhaha is created and everyone and anyone in the surrounding area will be talking about it. Additionally, the land on which the mitsvah is performed becomes off limits for any future activity. It must remain fallow as a means of publicizing the crime long after the initial excitement of the mitzvah. As such, it will only be a matter of time that someone will come forward with details about the murder. Perhaps even the murderer himself will feel the pressure of the entire region talking about his crime and will make a mistake in covering his tracks. Either way, in the Rambams perspective, the mitsvah of eglah arufah is a last ditch effort to solve the crime when normal procedures have failed to yield results. Rabbi Gideon Rothsteins novel Murder in the Mikdash offers a creative fictional depiction of the Rambams eglah arufah. From an investigative or forensic perspective, the methodology of the Rambams eglah arufah is perhaps flawed. The closest city may have something to do with the murder,
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or it may not. You may create a ruckus by marching the elders
of that city to the site of the crime, but at the same time you may be missing those with the real information in a city just a few kilometers further down the road. The spectacle may cause those with evidence to come forward, or perhaps it will lead them to assume that the Beit Din has acted and there is nothing left to be done. The Ramban highlights that the Torahs demand that the calf be killed in a nachal eitan would run contrary to the Rambams theory; why choose a discarded desolate area if youre trying to raise awareness? Better to choose fertile territory that onlookers will notice more. The Ramban himself argues that this mitzvah is better viewed as a chok. The Ibn Ezra, however, takes a very different view of eglah arufah. He argues that we are not concerned with finding the actual perpetrator of this heinous act. Rather, our concern is to find those who are spiritually accountable for this tragedy. There must be some type of sin in their midst for such a terrible occurrence to happen in their vicinity. If the people of the closest city were acting in ways that were in accordance with hayashar beeinei Hashem it is inconceivable that a grave sin would be connected in any way to their town; hence, the need for a public ritual of atonement. The elders of that city really do need to declare that they are not directly guilty of this crime, for in a certain sense they are truly guilty. A murder that happens in your backyard reflects something spiritually rotten in your essence. In his introductory shiurim (Elul 5763) to masechet Sanhedrin, Rabbi Michael Rosensweig highlighted a Tosafot in Bava Batra that seems to echo this sentiment. Tosafot on Bava Basra 23b note that when determining which city is responsible to bring the eglah arufah you dont measure to the nearest metropolis per se, rather to the nearest city that contains a functioning Beit Din. Tosafot note that if your working logic is that the closest city performed the crime, or has knowledge of the crime, it makes little sense to bypass a city just because they do not have a Beit Din. Rather, it seems that we are looking for spiritual accountability. Indeed, it is the responsibility of the nearest Beit Din, which is tasked with teaching and enforcing the Torah and is held accountable for the troubling events that occur in its surroundings. Rabbi Rosensweig argued that this
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insight should have significant impact on how you understand
the opening lines of parashat Shofetim and the mitsvah to appoint judges in every city; it is not merely about creating an efficient system of justice, but attempting to create an ideal atmosphere of kedushah in every city. Perhaps, as we begin the month of Elul and the process of readying ourselves for the Yamim Noraim, both of these understandings of eglah arufah can inform our teshuvah process. On the one hand, we are in the midst of performingteshuvah for defined sins and transgressions. In this sense, we are like those trying to catch the actual criminal: looking carefully at the evidence and doing everything we can to determine what was done wrong and how best to atone. However, the Ibn Ezras view of eglah arufah can challenge us to perform a different type of teshuvah. There is a more subtle repentance that must be done, one that may not be for any particular action or sin. Rather we must evaluate how our actions have influenced those around us; if there are negative things occurring in our backyard, then we have to take ourselves to task. We have to hold ourselves spiritually accountable for our environmentonly then can there beshalom al Yisraeil. Axe-idental Murderers
Yehuda Snow (18)
In this weeks parashah, parashas Shofetim, the Torah discusses the laws of two different types of murderers: murderers who kill intentionally and murderers who kill unintentionally (they should have been more careful, but werent). The Torah confers many laws about an unintentional murderer; for example: the Torah states that the goeil hadam, a close relative of the person who was murdered unintentionally, may kill the murderer, and the murderer can flee to a city of refuge, a place where the goeil hadam cant kill him. The question is, why would Hashem make the unintentional murderer, murder at all? What did he do wrong to deserve blood on his hands? It is true that the murderer should have been more careful, but is being a bit less careful than he should have been, reason enough for Hashem to make him kill? Is it so egregious a mistake that he should have to leave his home town and go into exile to a city of refuge until the kohen gadol dies? Furthermore, what did the person who was killed do wrong? Why is he punished because someone else was a bit less careful than he should have been? I believe the answers to all of these questions can be found in two different pieces of gemara in maseches Makkos. The gemara on daf yud amud beis states that whenever Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish would start talking about theparashah of
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murderers, his opening statement would always be the same;
he would start off by explaining the pessukimof vaasher lo tsadah vehaelokim innah leyado, But one who did not stalk [him], but God brought [it] about into his hand, I will make a place for you to which he shall flee (Exodus 21:13) and kaasher yomar meshal hakkadmoni meireshaim yeitsei resha, As says the proverb of the ancient one; 'From the wicked comes forth wickedness,' (Samuel I 24:14). He explains that these pessukim are referring to a case in which there are two different people. One killed intentionally without witnesses, and the other killed unintentionally without witnesses. Hashem arranged for them to be at one innthe person who killed unintentionally was going down a ladder and the person who killed intentionally was standing at the bottom. Hashem caused the person who killed unintentionally to slip off of the ladder and kill the person who killed intentionally while there were two witnesses watching. In this way Hashem caused both of them to get what they deserved. This gemara seemingly answers why Hashem would cause someone to be killed (because he was deserving of death) but the question of why Hashem causes someone else to kill unintentionally and go into exile, remains. The solution to this question lies on daf yud amud aleph. The Torah in Deuteronomy 4:42 commands the accidental killer: venas el achas min hearim haeil vachai, and by fleeing to one of these cities he might live, The gemara renders thispassuk to mean that we have to do things for the person who killed unintentionally so that he wont have a horrible life. One of the kindnesses performed for the murderer is, when he goes down into exile to the cities of refuge, his Rebbe must to go down into exile with him. Rav Zeira says from here we learn that a Rebbe should not teach "letalmud sheeino hagun, to an improper student. We can infer from here, that if someone acts improperly he can end up killing someone unintentionally, going into exile, and leaving his home town. One can glean a very powerful message from this: we need to be very careful to act properly and not do aveiros. May we all be zokhe to act properly, do mitsvos, and succeed in all of our endeavors, speedily ushering in the mashiakh.