KendrickWang

Week6Journal

Despitetherebeingaspectrumofopiniononthematter,contributorstothediscussion
onnuclearproliferationfallintothreemajorcamps.Firstly,theextremists,whostatethat
nucleardeterrenceisastablestrategyforallcountries,andthatthebenefitsofspreading
nuclearweaponsoutweighthecostsandpotentialdangers.Second,therearethepessimists,
whostatethatnuclearweaponsareinherentlydangerous,andthatcontinuingtospreadthem
onlyincreasesthechanceofadevastatingnuclearwar.Finally,betweenthetwoothercamps,
therearethemoderates,whodobelievethatnucleardeterrenceworks,butmustbe
approachedwithextremecaution,especiallywhenspreadingtheseweaponstoanother
country.
Inallcases,theargumentthateachcampmakesisdependentontwoimportantpoints:
iftheconceptofnucleardeterrenceworks,andifso,howeasyisittoattain?Theextremist
campandthemoderatecampbothbelievethatanyonewhohasrisentothepositionof
leadershipofacountryis
ipsofacto
rationalenoughtounderstandwhatwouldresultfromusing
anuclearweaponnoamountoffirststrikeattackswouldbeenoughtofullydestroytheability
foracountrytorespondinkind.TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionclearlyboth
understoodthisduringthecoldwar,andasaresult,nucleardeterrenceworked.Theextremist
camppointsoutthatseveralcountrieshavesincejoinedthenuclearclub,andyettherehasnot
beenanuclearwar.Therefore,thespreadofnuclearweaponswillonlyservetomakemutually
assureddestructionstronger.
However,thepessimistcampstatesthatnotallleadersarerationalenoughto
understandtheconsequencesofanuclearstrike.Anexampleofthisisthecurrentleaderof
NorthKorea,KimJongUn.KimdidnotachieveleadershipofNorthKoreathroughmerit,but
ratherhispositionasKimJongIlsson,andisarguablynotasrationalasotherleaders.
Therefore,thestatecontinuestopursueanuclearweaponsprogram,andhasmadeclearits
intentiontousethemontheUnitedStates.WhetherNorthKoreawillachievethelevelof
technologicalsuperiorityneededtolaunchasuccessfulstrikeontheUnitedStatesisamatterof
debate,butthejingoisticnatureoftheirleadershipmakesnucleardeterrenceseemlikeapolicy
thatwontworkonthem.Theentireconceptofnucleardeterrencereliesontheunderstanding
thatsecondstrikecapabilityisinvulnerable,andwouldthusresultinthedestructionofboth
nations.ConsideringthetreatmentofmanyNorthKoreansbythestate,itisapparentthatthe
leadershipmaybewillingtosacrificethesafetyoftheircountrytoattacktheUnitedStatesand
itsallies.
Iftheconceptofnucleardeterrenceisatallvalid,thenconsequently,oneasksofthe
questionofhoweasyitistoachieve.Lookingathistory,theextremistcamppointsoutthatitis
relativelyeasytoattain,aslongasallcountriesparticipatingmaintaininvulnerablesecondstrike
capability.ThenumberofwarheadsproducedduringtheColdWar,enoughtowipeoutthe
worldtentimesover,wasaccordingtotheextremistcamp,merelyapoliticalshowofforce,and
notnecessarytokeepthebalancefornucleardeterrence.Ontheflipsideofthis,themoderate
campmaintainsthatthenumberofnuclearweaponscreatedbybothsidesduringtheColdWar
wereabsolutelynecessaryinordertokeepsecondstrikeinvulnerability.Thus,acountrywitha

smallnumberofwarheads,orisntwealthyenoughtobuildthenecessaryinfrastructurefor
secondstrikecapabilityisunabletoattaintruenucleardeterrence.Thepessimistsalsostate
thatitisdifficulttoattainnucleardeterrence,especiallyinthattheybelievethatitdoesntwork.
Inmyopinion,thepessimistcampmakesthemostsense.Therehasnotbeenproof
thatnucleardeterrenceisageneralmethodforobtainingpeace,astherehasonlybeena
historicalsamplesizeofone.TheUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionwerebothheadedby
capableleadersduringtheColdWar,andwerethusabletokeepnucleardeterrencestable.
However,asweheadfurtherintothe21stcentury,moreandmorenationsareabletodevelop
nuclearcapability,anditisbecomingincreasinglydifficulttokeeptabsonallofthem.The
aforementionedNorthKoreanshavebeenunabletobedissuadedbyinternationalpressureto
stoptheirnuclearweaponsprogram,andonlyrecentlyandwithgreatdebatewasanuclear
dealabletobeachievedwithIran.Currently,onlytheUnitedStatesandRussiahavebeen
confirmedtousethenucleartriadmethodofdeterrence.SmallercountriessuchastheUnited
KingdomandFrancemaintainlandandseabaseddeliverymethods,whicharepossiblynotan
invulnerablesourceofsecondstrikecapability.Ifproliferationweretocontinuetosmallerand
smallercountries,atsomepoint,theriskofastatelosinganuclearweaponbecomesapparent.
Asmentionedinthelecture,terroristsdonothaveacountrytostrikebackat,nordothey
necessarycarethatasecondstrikewoulddestroythem.Shouldastatethatdoesnothavethe
capabilitytosecurenuclearweaponsobtainthemsomehow,theriskofonebeinghijackedbya
terroristorganizationbecomesveryreal.