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Taiwan DA FFRVS Wave 2

1NC
The plan rolls back our protections of Taiwan, opening the door
for Chinese invasion
Torsvoll 15-M.A. Law and Diplomacy, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University
Eirik, China's Anti-Access Challenge and America's Air-Sea Battle Response,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=188445
The novelty of todays A2/AD measures, however, is in the power of technology, which has
made missile capabilities much more potent and accessible . China now has the ability to
target U.S. bases and forces beyond ranges of a thousand nautical miles. Its missile capabilities include advanced
cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles, with greater precision and range than previously possible.

When this capability is coupled with existing and expanding military power , such as
modern submarines, fighter jets, and minelayers, it becomes a dangerous picture for any U.S.
commander attempting to operate near or within Chinas maritime periphery. The
development has turned the offense-defense balance decidedly in the favor of the
latter. The reach and effectiveness of Chinas missiles is significant, because much
of the U.S. force projection in the region is reliant on bases and access to the
maritime commons. When this is put at risk, decision-makers in Washington must
make a much tougher call on whether to deploy U.S. forces in a given situation. The
calculus is worsened further by the fact that U.S. forces are operating far from home ,
being reliant on a long logistical chain, while China would be operating in its own
backyard. Beijing is thus exploiting a home field advantage as well as the costeffectiveness of missile attacks against capital-intensive U.S. military assets . What is
at stake is Americas ability to deter China from using , or threatening to use, force against
its neighbors in the region. A response to Chinas A2/AD capabilities has therefore
been deemed crucial in Washington. Additionally, by being able to cast doubt over the United
States resolve and ability to intervene in a given situation, Beijing is strengthening
its overall regional power. This allows China greater flexibility in pursuing favorable
outcomes to its strategic interests, including territorial disputes in the S outh China Sea
and East China Sea, as well as changing the status of Taiwan . It could also lead
decision-makers in Beijing into thinking that it had the upper hand in any conflict
against the United States, and open up for adventurism in new areas of Chinas
neighborhood.

China will use nukes to get their way and continue their
expansion south only the US can act as a check
Lowther 2015 -Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air
Force Global Strike Command
Adam and Alex Littlefield [Prof at Feng Chia U], "Taiwan and the Prospects for War
Between China and America," Aug 11, thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-theprospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/
Chinas maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and
significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its
rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished.

Chinas relationship with the Philippines , which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also

change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is
actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing
may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be

Central to Chinas ability


to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of
commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans
underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will
ultimately go in order to guarantee them even the use of nuclear weapons.
Should China succeed it pushing the U nited States back, the PRC can deal with regional
territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably
responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.

takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As
such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits.
China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action.
This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee
Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainlands antics when the
U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou,

China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual
war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in
1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery
Corps nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard,

While the scenario described is


certainly not inevitable, the fact than many American readers will see it as implausible if not impossible is
overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate.

an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the
United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the United States. Unless we give serious

the United States may be


unprepared for a situation that escalates beyond its ability to prevent a catastrophe.
thought to possible scenarios where nuclear conflict could occur,

OR Taiwan survives by developing a deterrent


Cole 2015 - former analyst at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service
J. Michael, "Taiwan's Master Plan to Defeat China in a War," Mar 31,
nationalinterest.org/feature/taiwans-master-plan-defeat-china-war-12510?page=3
So what could Taiwan do to ward off a PLA invasion? Since the Taiwanese military cannot hope to defeat the PLA in a

given that Taipei has no assurances that allies such as the


United States and Japan would intervene on its side, its best defense is to ensure that
China does not launch such an aggression in the first place . In other words, Taiwan must
substantially increase the costs of invasionreal and perceivedby promising
unacceptable amounts of pain to the PLA, the leadership in Beijing, and the Chinese population.
Logically, this implies building up its capabilities to counter an amphibious assault through a
conventional battlefield, and

combination of naval and aerial assets, as well as anti-armor rockets, missile batteries, artillery, mobile special
forces units, and a well-trained and equipped reserve, to saturate the beaches with lead and create a kill zone for
advancing PLA forces. Ensuring the survival of its air force and navy assets following saturation bombing by the
Second Artillery in the initial phase of major hostilities would also be important, as those would also be necessary to

such a passive, or
defense strategy would probably not be enough to deter Beijing . Consequently,
a second aspect of Taiwans plans to inflict unacceptable pain on China must
explore more offensive options. It has already begun doing so, with the production and deployment of
counter PLA transport vessels ferrying troops across the Taiwan Strait. However,
porcupine

Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM), naval suppression kits, and standoff air-to-ground missiles (cluster bombs, antiradiation) capable of disabling airfields as well as missile and radar sites in China. The deployment and dispersal of
larger quantities of road-mobile or naval LACM launchers would also make it more difficult for the PLA to locate and
destroy all of them and thus increase the potency of Taiwans counterstrike capabilities, especially if their range
were increased (Taiwan should nevertheless keep the moral high ground by promising it would only use such assets
against military targets). To maximize the impact of its counterforce capabilities, Taiwan would also have to improve
its ability to pinpoint targets through greater investment in radar and satellite technologyand ensure redundancy,

as those would also likely be targeted by the PLA in the initial phase of a conflict. Greater human intelligence assets
inside China, as well as the ability to conduct sabotage against key military (and economic) sites, would
complement the offensive aspect of Taiwans defense strategy. Other options include armed unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) and a larger fleet of submarines with conventional LACM capability. All of this is contingent on a

several
asymmetrical options are also available to Taiwan to maximize the pain of a PLA
invasion, with the ultimate goal of deterring such action. On the political side, Taipei should redouble its efforts in
political decision to invest more on defense than Taiwan does at present. Beyond kinetic strategies,

political warfare. The first aim of this strategy should be to counter similar operations by China, which have
succeeded in undermining morale in the Taiwanese military while encouraging the perception abroad that Taiwan is
an unreliable security partner, or that unification is inevitable or even desirable. The second leg of a more active
political warfare strategy would be to convince Beijing that Taiwans alliesthe United States., and possibly Japan
would act quickly should the PLA attempt an invasion of Taiwan. In other words, Beijing should not longer be kept
guessing whether the United States would enter a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, especially at a time when
Washingtons commitment to the regionand to Taiwan more specificallyis in serious doubt. Strategic ambiguity,
which has served as a cornerstone of Washingtons policy in the Taiwan Strait since the conclusion of the Korean
War, should be abandoned and replaced by a series of well advertised tripwires or red lines that, if crossed, would

Tokyo is also ripe for closer cooperation with Taiwan , and


as such, political warfare that plays up the possibility of joint efforts between the two
countries could be of great assistance to Taiwan. The more Beijing is convinced that
the United States., and possibly Japan, would intervene in the Taiwan Strait, the greater will
be its reluctance to launch operations that would spark such a response, as their entry
prompt a response by the U.S. military.

in a conflict would substantially increase the costs of an invasion while diminishing the likelihood of a quick lowcost resolution on Beijings terms. Elsewhere, Taiwanese lobbyists and the Taiwanese diaspora could make more
effective use of the islands assetsa vibrant liberal democracy and an important economyto encourage the
international community to adopt a more vocal line in its opposition to the resolution of the Taiwan question by
military or coercive means. Convincing Beijing that the international community would not countenance use of force
and would slap painful economic sanctions should it decide to do sowould contribute to Taipeis deterrent.
Helping visitors to Taiwan better understand the nature and preciousness of its unique society, and encouraging
them to be more proactive in their home countries convincing their representatives to take a more principled stance
on Taiwan could go a long way. Existing programs under Taiwans Ministry of Foreign Affairs could serve as a basis
for such efforts; increasing contact via other departmentse.g., creating more exchange programs for foreign
military personnel to undergo language training in Taiwanshould also be explored. Additionally, taishang, the
Taiwanese who operate businesses in China and who played a crucial role in helping develop the Chinese economy
over the decades, could also threaten to cease their operations or pull out altogether if the PLA were activated in
the Strait. Though happy to make money in China, most taishang (including the many who vote for the KMT) remain
proud Taiwanese who do not want to see their home country devastated by war. Their possible role as a pressure
point against Beijing should not be underestimated. One last area where Taiwan could do more to deter Beijing is in
cyber warfare, or electronic sabotage. Using intelligence assets in China (closer contact between the two societies
works both ways and doesnt only create opportunities for China), Taiwan could identify and select civilian and
military targets for retaliation, with the aim of severely disrupting Chinas ability to operate normally should it
launch an attack against the island. The banking and high-tech sectors would be likely targets. On the military side,
promising to degrade, or perhaps even disable, Chinas nuclear deterrenteven if momentarily or knocking out
its air defense systems, thus exposing China to USAF bombing runs, would be enough to make Beijing think twice
about launching an invasion. In all those efforts, Taiwan would need to strike a balance between signaling its intent
and capability to launch disruptive attacks of that naturein other words, for deterrence to work, Beijing must be
convinced that the threat is realand the need to protect itself against Chinese espionage which could undermine

absent a U.S. and Japanese commitment to intervene in the early


stages of an attempted PLA invasion of Taiwan, there is only a slim likelihood that
the Taiwanese military would be able to defeat its opponent in the conventional
sense of the term. The force disparity between the two sides has simply become too wide. As such, under
prevailing circumstances, the only way that Taiwan can defeat China is to make sure
that the PLA is never used to attack Taiwan. Deterrence , therefore, is its most credible
asset, and one which it can put to much better use.
those efforts. In the end,

That causes an arms race and war


Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 44

Taiwan presents perhaps the least likely, but also the most provocative, case of nuclear weapons potential in the
region. In the 1970s and again in the 1980s, Taiwan launched clandestine nuclear fuel reprocessing programs aimed
at providing it with its own nuclear deterrent against mainland China. Both times, the United States forced Taiwan to
abandon these programs.25 Taiwan has stored spent nuclear fuel at three two-unit nuclear power plants, which
could be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium if Taiwan built a facility to do so, as it attempted to do

Taiwan also possesses the industrial and electronics


expertise to assemble a deliverable nuclear weapon. Taiwan is developing an
indigenously produced long-range land-attack cruise missile that in theory could be armed
clandestinely in the 1970s and 1980s.

with a nuclear warhead. The missile, named Cloud Peak, has a range of 1,200 and possibly 2,000 kilometers and

The leadership in Beijing would view a decision by


Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons as highly provocative and quite possibly a casus
belli. Beijing would likely view such a development as tantamount to a declaration
of independence, something that Beijing in the past has stated it would resist with force. Under current
circumstances, Taiwan appears to have no interest in this course. But a withdrawal of the U.S.
security presence would be a different matter, especially if it led to nuclear
and missile races elsewhere in the region. In that event a Taiwanese nuclear
program could go from being a highly remote case to perhaps the most likely path
to war in the region.
will be mounted on mobile transporters.26

2NC Must Read


We are past the tipping point on Chinese territorial claims, if
the US backs down now in any regard it sends a greenlight to
China that their expansion and nationalism is justified,
crushing the alliance system and guaranteeing conflict
Pickrell 2015 - Masters in IR, currently pursuing a PhD in IR and Diplomacy at
Central China Normal University
Ryan, "The Tipping Point: Has the U.S.-China Relationship Passed the Point of No
Return?," nationalinterest.org/feature/the-tipping-point-has-the-us-chinarelationship-passed-the-14168?page=3
Conflict between a rising power and an established power is not inevitable as most realist scholars suggest.

there is a tipping point or a point of no return, and China and the


United States are rapidly approaching this point. As traditional diplomatic outlets have done little to
However, in every relationship,

resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers
have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard power tactics. Thats especially true

in the

South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the
United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to

both China and the United States remain unwilling to compromise


and make the kind of meaningful concessions required to move the relationship
further from confrontation and conflict and closer to cooperation and rapprochement. Instead, these two
prevent great power conflict,

countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst. Failed pursuit of strategic stability Chinas
proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the new model of major-country relations, which
encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one anothers political systems
and national interestsspecifically Chinas core interestsand pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally
enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for

American
acceptance of Chinas proposal would facilitate Beijings rise, legitimize the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the
likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the new model of major-country relations
the new model of major-country relations can be explained in a number of different ways.

would create an international environment conducive to Chinas rise, it would essentially allow China to become the
preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put

Not
only would American recognition of Chinas strength and power have effects abroad,
but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership
at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American
China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States.

relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese
sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order. Prior to the recent meeting between Xi
Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that Chinas proposed new model of major-country-relations would be
an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear
progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the new model of major-country relations is not in
Americas best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed Chinas proposal. As the hegemonic power,
the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative
proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines,

acceptance of Chinas proposal might give other states in the international system
the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic
Thucydides trap. Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect Chinas
core interests as many Chinese and foreign scholars have notedis a loaded statement. While the United
States is not opposed to respecting a states national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests
which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of Chinas core interests .

In addition to
traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, Chinas core

interests also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is
concerned that Chinas new model of major-country relations is a ploy designed to
trick the United States into acknowledging Chinas extensive territorial claims and
undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region,
which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led hub-and-spoke security
structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also
suspicions in the United States that Chinas proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to
which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed. Americas approach to Sino-American strategic
stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one
area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles Chinas old shelving disputes
and pursuing joint development strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping
dirt under the rug, it is only effective to a point. Eventually, the dirt spills out. Sooner or later, unaddressed
problems surface. At best, this approach is only a temporary stop on the road to functional strategic stability. At
worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United
States to avoid addressing Chinas demands that the United States acknowledge Chinas rise to great power status
and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the already strong Chinese desire to push forward
the new model of major-country relations. China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic

While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great
power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or
implementable solution for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition continues
stability.

unmanaged, unchecked and confrontation is steadily evolving into conflict. Drawing Lines in the Sea The
problems pushing the Sino-American relationship towards conflict are numerous and diverse, but if you are looking
for the issue most likely to cause conflict, you need look no further than the South China Sea. China perceives the
territorial disputes in this area as issues in which aggressive foreign state actors led by the United States are
threatening Chinas territorial sovereignty. For China, because of its history, territorial sovereignty issues implicate

The United States, on the other


hand, views Chinas territorial claims and actions to bolster those claims as Chinese
expansionism, aggression against American allies and strategic partners , and a threat to
regime survival in a way that transcends all other quarrels and disagreements.

the guiding principles of the liberal world orderwhich the United States views as crucial for the preservation of
Americas global hegemonic power. The situation in the South China Sea has been steadily escalating for several
years now. In April, 2014, American defense secretary Chuck Hagel met with Chinese defense minister Chang
Wanquan. During the meeting, Hagel said, All parties should refrain from provocative actions and the use of
intimidation, coercion, or aggression to advance their claims. Such disputes must be resolved peacefully and in
accordance with international law. Chang replied, Id like to reiterate that the territorial sovereignty issue is a
Chinese core interest. On this issue, we will make no compromises, no concessions. Not even a tiny bit of violation
will be allowed. The inability to discuss openly or compromise on this issue has made it impossible to resolve and
has led to escalation and increased tension. In the aftermath of this meeting, China began investing heavily in
island construction and land reclamation activities in disputed waters. As these activities have stirred up a lot of
dust in the region, the United States has demanded that China abandon its present course of action, insisting that it

Not only has China dismissed


Americas demands, it has also increased its military presence in contested areas in
order to establish anti-access zones. While China claims that its actions are within the scope of
is provocative and negatively impacting regional peace and stability.

international law, the United States asserts that Chinese actions are in violation of the law of the sea and laws for
the regulation of the international commons. China argues that the South China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty
issue, yet the United States regards this issue as a freedom of navigation dispute, as well as a fight for the
preservation of the international legal systema cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order. In August of
this year, the United States launched its new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which aims to safeguard the
freedom of the seas, deter conflict and escalation, and promote adherence to international law and standards. The
Asia-Pacific region is now at the heart of the American naval security agenda. In response, Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson Hong Lei said that China opposes any countrys attempt to challenge Chinas territorial sovereignty
and security under the pretext of safeguarding navigation freedom. Responding to Chinese criticisms of Americas
new regional maritime security strategy, American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, Make no mistake, we
will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permitsWe will do that at times and places of our choosing.
In 2014, the United States carried out freedom of navigation exercises in various parts of the world and
challenged the territorial claims of 18 different countries; however, the United States has yet to officially challenge
Chinas claims in the South China Sea. But, that may soon change, as the United States is currently considering
sending American naval vessels within 12 nautical miles of Chinas artificial islands in order to force China to end its
land reclamation activities. Such plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the

Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, China mustnt tolerate rampant US violations of Chinas adjacent
waters and the skies over these expanding islands. The Chinese military should be ready to launch
countermeasures according to Washingtons level of provocation. The article further stated, If the US encroaches
on Chinas core interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop it. The article stated plainly, If
the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will breach Chinas bottom line, and China will not sit idly by. Other

if the bottom
line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation activities
in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this issue may
be the tipping point for the Sino-American relationship . How the United States and China
reports from this newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have made it clear that

choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine the relationship between these two great powers.

this issue is still decidedly


zero-sumwhich increases the likelihood of conflict. For China, political
preservation and a potential Chinese sphere of influence are on the line, and for the
United States, the liberal world order and American hegemony are at stake. Sooner or later,
Granted, this may just be saber rattling, but even if that is the case,

this trying issue will need to be resolved, and regardless of whether it is resolved through diplomacy or military
force, it will take a toll on the geopolitical influence of either one or both countries. Were the international
institutions for collective security strong enough to handle situations like this when they ariseand if China and the
United States were willing to establish a new relationship model which addresses each countrys respective security
concerns and encourages effective collaborationit might actually be possible to resolve this issue peacefully. But

there is currently
no clear solution to this problem that would allow both countries to walk
out of this situation with their heads held high, these two states are
pondering the unthinkable. Depending on each countrys level of commitment and resolve, this situation
may have already passed the tipping point. The outcome of the geopolitical power struggle
between China and the United States will almost certainly be decided in the South
China Sea. Some have suggested that the South China Sea issue is not a Sino-American issue. On the contrary,
it is the most pressing Sino-American issue. One side will either choose to back down or be
forced to back down. No matter how everything plays out in the South China Sea,
geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region will never be the same again.
given current circumstances, this is little more than idealism and wishful thinking. As

Impacts

2NC Prolif Impact


That increases the likelihood of a nuclear war
Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 41-2
Of the ten known, suspected, and impending nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, United Kingdom,
France, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel, and Iran), six have military forces in the Asia-Pacific region.

Should the Global Trends Hobbesian scenario occur due to a withdrawal of the U.S. forward
security presence, the number of nuclear weapon states would almost certainly rise.
That outcome would assuredly result in greater instability, as multisided security competitions would
very likely break out. Military planners in the region would have to defend against multiple
and possibly shifting adversary alliance combinations. The addition of more nuclear
players would result in the need for greater preparation and stockpiling by all, because
previously safe levels of nuclear munitions would no longer be safe enough. New
players would mean further reductions in warning time during crises. Some leaders might conclude
that striking first at the hint of crisis is the only way to survive. Under the Hobbesian
pathway, the odds of nuclear disaster would rise substantially.

And, even if they dont get the bomb the impact will be nuclear
because of the powers already in the region
Tan 2015 - Associate Professor At the University of New South Wales
Andrew T.H., Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31
East Asias arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which
a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by
other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and
ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are
supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asias sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War
in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that
growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 4748). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have
remained. Japans imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account
for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South
Korea. In additions, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as
strong as intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean
peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional
institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust
and confidence- and security-building measures which were in pace in Europe during the Cold
War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the SixParty Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem
North Koreas open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again.
The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of
miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced
that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same

there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should
now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and
South China Seas. Thus, Chinas nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory
time,

The consequences of conflict between China


and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional .
As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South
Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan, and troops on the ground in East Asia and
in the Western Pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East
Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long . In fact, it is likely that it would
rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely
China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.
emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012).

2NC Nationalism Mod


Uniqueness goes negative, Nationalist Sentiment is rampant in
China, which the CCP will capitalize on because on with
military adventurism in order to detract from other recent
losses
Friedberg 2015 - professor of politics at Princeton University
Aaron, "China, a wounded tiger, could lash out," www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/laoe-0914-schoenfeld-friedberg-china-danger-20150914-story.html
The Chinese Communist Party's power has long rested on four pillars: economic growth,
nationalism, repression and communist ideology. The last of these withered away
almost entirely as China liberalized its economy , with slogans such as "Long live the invincible
Marxism-Leninism theory" replaced by "To get rich is glorious ." Now the first pillar is unstable too. All
eyes are on the gyrating Chinese stock market. Its precipitous decline and the surprise devaluation of the renminbi
have been roiling world markets and stoking fears of currency wars and beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies. Given
that only about 1% of our gross domestic product comes from trade with China, the U.S. economy is hardly at risk.
Yet this summer's upheaval may accelerate developments that threaten the peace of Asia and pose a strategic
challenge to the West. China's economy has been slowing for a while. In this century's first decade, 10%-plus
returns were the norm; lately the growth rate has hovered around 7% if official figures are to be trusted, which
they are not. The Chinese people have begun to feel the effects, and so has the government, with its reputation for
sound economic stewardship declining in parallel with the downward-sloping GDP growth charts. Xi Jinping came to
power in 2012 determined to burnish the leadership's credentials in this all-critical area. His efforts have taken two
forms. The first has been an anti-corruption campaign that plays to popular sentiments but has doubled as a vehicle
for a purge of political opponents. Three years into the campaign, China's president has a large number of very

Xi has been
searching for ways to reinvigorate China's economy . One measure he embraced was to talk up
bitter and well-placed enemies, whose family fortunes and lives are on the line. At the same time,

the stock market, which he promised the Chinese people would create both personal and national wealth. Almost
right up to the initial tremors heralding this summer's crash, state-run news outlets were urging the population to
buy stocks. As the Chinese market soared, this may have seemed to Xi's colleagues in the Politburo as a stroke of
genius; millions of people were getting rich on paper, and the Communist Party was getting the credit for it. It now
must appear to them and to an entire class of unhappy investors as a monumental act of maladministration.

Having lost ideological purity and economic stewardship as claims to power, the
party is left, at least for the time being, with repression and nationalism. Accordingly, Xi has
cracked down on dissent with renewed vigor, sweeping up democracy advocates,
environmentalists, lawyers, champions of minority group rights and anyone else
who gets out of line. Simultaneously, he's intensified a campaign to bolster internal
support by riling China's neighbors, particularly the hated Japanese . In the last three
years, China has unilaterally declared an air-defense-identification zone over islands also claimed by Japan,
deployed oil rigs off the coast of Vietnam and built an assortment of fortified artificial islands at strategic locations

These actions have created alarm in capitals across Asia,


provoked military buildups and even encouraged regional cooperation in an effort to
around the South China Sea.

contain the increasingly menacing tiger. China's bellicosity may ultimately prove self-defeating as a national
security strategy. Indeed, Chinese conduct appears inexplicable without reference to its domestic sources. The costs
of antagonism are evidently offset by the internal benefits for Xi and the party's grip on power. Some observers
perceive a silver lining in China's difficulties, believing that a country preoccupied with internal problems will be less
aggressive and require fewer diplomatic, economic and military resources to hold it in check. That is wishful

Prospects for conflict


around China's periphery and beyond are likely to rise commensurately with the
scope of the Communist Party's internal crisis. It is not an accident that this month
China dared to send its navy into U.S. territorial waters next to Alaska , something it had
thinking rooted in a radical misreading of China's domestic political dynamics.

never before attempted. Even with the much-vaunted but underresourced "pivot" to Asia, the United States was illprepared to meet the challenge of preserving peace in the Pacific. Now the danger we face is growing steadily.

The

anxieties plaguing China's leaders , in place for decades, are fueling the belligerence of a
rising power; the stock market fiasco, coming on the heels of an economic
slowdown, has turned a scratch into gangrene.

In order to show resolve, the CCP is looking for any


justification to force unification of Taiwan, including force
Browne 2015 - Senior Correspondent and Columnist for The Wall Street Journal
Andrew, "The Implosion of Beijings Taiwan Strategy," www.wsj.com/articles/theimplosion-of-beijings-taiwan-strategy-1444719347
TAIPEINo matter how desperately China hankers for unification with Taiwan, a strong conviction that time is on its
side has long trumped its temptation to use bullying tactics to force the outcome. Eventually, the Chinese thinking
goes, the Taiwanese will come to the conclusion that their future lies in economic integration with the mainland, and
that once the two economies are thoroughly enmeshed a political settlement will end an estrangement that has

while
batteries of Chinese missiles still point toward the island, tranquility has reigned
across the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps not for much longer, as Beijings strategy of
waiting it out now seems to be in tatters. Presidential and legislative elections three months from
lasted since 1949, when the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan after losing the civil war on the mainland. So

now are likely to confirm that a drive by the Kuomintang under President Ma Ying-jeou for deeper economic
engagement, far from encouraging public sentiment in favor of unification, is having the opposite effect.

Popular

attitudes toward China are actually hardening as economic convergence


disproportionately benefits Taiwan businesses that have headed off to China at the
expense of workers left behind. Among younger Taiwanese in particular, integration has bred despair as
pay stagnates and property prices boom. Meanwhile, the Kuomintang itself, Chinas former enemy and now its best
hope for reaching a political deal, is self-destructing. It has picked a presidential candidate who is so pro-Beijing
shes unelectable. At the 11th hour, party elders are trying to dump Hung Hsiu-chudubbed Taiwans Sarah Palin
for her outspokenness and polarizing viewsand draft in Eric Chu, the party chairman and dynamic mayor of New
Taipei City, who had earlier declined to run. But Mr. Chu has almost certainly left it too late to beat the front-runner,
Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party, though he might just be able to save the Kuomintang from losing
control of the legislature for the first time. Even party insiders now fret about the Kuomintangs future. The debacle
over Ms. Hungs candidacy has exposed an organization riven by factionalism. If it loses legislative control, the fear
is that Ms. Tsais camp may strip it of assets worth hundreds of millions of dollars, a legacy of the days when it ran
Taiwan as a single-party dictatorship. In putting its bets on its old adversarywith which it traditionally shared the
belief in One China that includes TaiwanBeijing has backed a loser, which leaves it with few options. Now, it
faces the prospect of having to deal with a new Taiwan leader, Ms. Tsai, whose party attracts die-hard proindependence supporters. Ms. Tsai herself has taken a middle-of-the-road position in favor of the status quo, in
which Taiwan enjoys de facto, even if not de jure, independence. Tsai isnt crazy, says Chang Jung-feng, a former
Taiwan national-security adviser. She wont declare independence. Still, without an unambiguous declaration by
Ms. Tsai that she accepts Beijings One China position, and with no prospect of cozy deal-making ,

its possible
Beijings patience may snap and it will shift tack from conciliation to coercion to
complete the Communist Partys most important piece of unfinished business . That
could mean anything from squeezing Taiwans already narrow international spacestealing away its dwindling
number of diplomatic friends, for instanceto applying pressure on its fragile economy, perhaps by slowing the flow

China has never abandoned the option of


using force to reunite what it regards as a rogue province with the mainland. The
of mainland Chinese tourists. Or something far worse.

Chinese president likes to think he understands Taiwan; as a senior official in coastal provinces, Xi Jinping was on
friendly terms with many Taiwan factory owners and investors. Maybe, speculates Mr. Chang, the former nationalsecurity adviser, Mr. Xi will persevere with the old strategy of forbearance but in a smarter way by reaching beyond
the Kuomintang and the wealthy elites and engaging ordinary Taiwanese and small-business owners. That would
require flexibility and imagination. So far, on every issue relating to Chinas troubled peripheryHong Kong, Tibet,
XinjiangMr. Xi has taken an uncompromising line, doubling down on hard-line policies that have stirred popular

An attack on Taiwan would be immensely risky; it would terrify


Chinas other Asian neighbors and potentially bring China into direct conflict with
resentments against Beijing.

the U.S., Taiwans main military backer. The critical question, though, is whether the risks outweigh the danger
to Mr. Xi if Taiwan appears to be drifting permanently away under his watch. No Chinese leader can afford to let that
happen, and Mr. Xi has built his popularity around a muscular brand of nationalism that puts him under greater
pressure to take action. As a political goal, unification is now a nonstarter in Taiwan. But Mr. Xi cant wait forever.

Compared with Taiwan, all the other island disputes in East Asiaincluding one thats
bubbling now over Chinas artificial islands in the S outh China Seaare a sideshow.

And the plan sends that greenlight because the plan weakens
our resolve regarding China, sending the perception of
abandonment according to Trossvell. More importantly the CCP
will view the plan as brief moment of opportunity and attack
Lee and Schreer 2013 - Lee is PhD student in Political Science at the
University of Pennsylvania Benjamin & Schreer is Senior Analyst for Defence
Strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Sheryn and Benjamin, "The Taiwan Strait: Still Dangerous," Survival: Global Politics
and Strategy Volume 55, Issue 3, 2013, p. 55-62
The United States has long encouraged Taiwan to focus on self-defence capacity and forgo offensive military

Washington has also been hesitant to provide Taipei with capabilities


critical for air and maritime denial. As long as the PLA cannot significantly challenge
America's naval preeminence in the Taiwan Strait, this approach supports America's
policy of strategic ambiguity. It has allowed the US to maintain the precarious balance between
options. But

informal security commitments towards Taiwan in the context of the 1979 Taiwan's Relations Act and its strategic

China's investments in
sophisticated A2/AD capabilities now pose serious challenges to US forces in and
around the Taiwan Strait, inviting more and more doubt over whether Washington is
really prepared to defend Taiwan. Some US analysts have argued that the defence of the island might
relations with a rising China. But this position is increasingly difficult to sustain.

no longer be worth the cost of a war with China, given that America has only reputational interests at stake.13
That the United States might simply give up on Taiwan, however, is one of the greatest myths of modern global
politics.14 Reputation is often a major influence on a state's decision to go to war. 15

Washington's
commitment to Taiwan is becoming even more important as an indicator for the
credibility of America's rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific . There is great uncertainty among
Asian allies of whether the coming US defence-budget cuts will lead to at least a partial withdrawal of American

Japan anxiously watches for signals that the United


States might be abandoning Taiwan. Taiwan will not fall victim to some great
bargain between China and the US over spheres of influence in East Asia. Instead, the
troops from the region. In particular,

Pentagon is looking for a credible war-fighting doctrine to reassure its allies and partners about US forces' continued

Part of its
response to China's A2/AD strategy is the Air-Sea Battle concept, which makes
Taiwan a front-line state. The ROC is uniquely positioned to provide the United States with access and
situational awareness about PLA air, space, sea and cyber domains.16 Taiwan is thus even more
important for the United States and Japan as the PLA looks to project naval power
beyond the Taiwan Strait. To do this, it will have to overcome the chokepoint created by highly
ability and resolve to project military power even in maritime zones contested by the PLA.

sophisticated US and allied capabilities to monitor and track the PLA Navy once it enters the Western Pacific.

Without controlling Taiwan, the PLA will find it very difficult to escape this tyranny of
geography that allows the US and its allies to deny the PLA control of the seas in the
Taiwan Strait and beyond. The 2013 QDR stresses that Taiwan is located in the center position of the First
Island Chain in the Western Pacific and possesses geo-strategic importance and that it will service [its related]
strategic warning function.17 The Taiwan Strait remains volatile, and stands to become more so. One key danger is
Chinese overconfidence with regard to the PLA's strength, Taiwan's defensive capabilities and US resolve.

Encouraged by an illusion of easy victory, a future Chinese leadership might


resort to military force to resolve what it regards as an internal conflict. As
the ROC upgrades its defensive posture and as the Chinese leadership recognises that reunification on its terms is

Beijing might feel tempted to act. Without serious dialogue between


Taipei, Beijing and Washington, there is little hope for continued calm in what is one of the
most dangerous flashpoints in Asia.
becoming even more remote,

2NC - Taiwan First Strike


Taiwan has the capacity to pull-off a first-strike, despite
Chinese A2AD
Schreer 2013 - Senior Analyst for Defence Strategy at ASPI Benjamin, "Strategy:
Planning the Unthinkable War," April, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/planningthe-unthinkable-war-airsea-battle-and-its-implications-foraustralia/Strategy_AirSea.pdf
Taiwan is moving towards a more asymmetric defence posture aimed at denying
This includes a focus on hardening critical
infrastructure such as airfields and ports to survive PLA missile bombardments, as well as
investments in mines, fast missile boats, attack helicopters and special forces. The
However,

PLA forces the approaches to the island.

Taiwanese Navy also plans to acquire six new indigenously built minehunting ships over the next 12 years to
counter a possible PLA blockade. In combination with Taiwans air-to-air, naval-to-naval and ground-to-ground

this strategy could hold off a Chinese first strike long


enough to draw US forces into the conflict. Given the inherent difficulties of large-scale amphibious
invasions, Taiwan wouldnt be an easy target for the PLA. Moreover, Taiwan is reportedly working on a
new supersonic offensive surface-to-surface missile that could reach Chinas central
and southern regions, including Shanghai, thereby retaining a punishment capability against Chinese cities
defensive interdiction weapons systems,

in response to a PLA attack. In November 2012, Taiwan also test-fired a new supersonic anti-ship missile, the Hsiung
Feng III, which could be used against a future Chinese aircraft carrier and other surface vessels.

2NC - Heg
Taiwan is key to heg plan causes war
Liao & Lin 15 (*Nien-Chung, Ph.D., Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies,
National Chengchi University (2012), **Dalton; researcher of US-Chinese relations at
Princeton, B.A. from the National Taiwan University and a M.A. from Australian
National University (with High Distinction). He received his Ph.D. degree in political
science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2015, Rebalancing TaiwanUS
Relations, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 57, Issue 6, 2015,
DOI:10.1080/00396338.2015.1116161, http://cwp.princeton.edu/news/delicatebalance-rebalancing-taiwan%E2%80%93us-relations, BC)

Other abandonists, who are more pessimistic about China's rise, consider US
promises to Taiwan too costly to keep. Eschewing the rosy picture of Sino-US cooperation, they warn
instead of intensifying competition, and set their sights on the challenges of the
future, arguing that China's ascendency will eventually spell US decline and Taiwanese surrender.11 (link is
external) If the key presumption of these pessimists is American retreat from the Asia-Pacific, then abandoning
Taiwan is not so much a policy or a calculated choice for the US government as it is an inevitability. If the
pessimists aim is to shape the trajectory of China's ascendency to US advantage, however,
then abandoning Taiwan would be a mistake . Historically, the United States has
consistently prevented any power it sees as potentially hostile from controlling Asia .
The likelihood of a Sino-US crisis t riggered by maritime disputes will increase as long as
Washington finds it necessary to maintain a substantial military presence and support to
its allies in the region.12 (link is external) Given its location at a strategic crossroads of the Asia-Pacific , Taiwan
will remain an indispensable part of the US regional security architecture .
US regional allies and partners, such as Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian
countries, thus also have much at stake in Washington's continuing commitment to
Taiwan. Cutting Taiwan loose will not only weaken US credibility as a reliable partner,
but will also enhance the PRC's ability to project power, should the island fall into its
orbit. The fate of Taiwan's autonomy is a litmus test of China's wider intentions as well as US resolution and
commitment to the Asia-Pacific. The desire of both the optimistic and pessimistic abandonists for the United States
to avoid unnecessary confrontation with China, and to mitigate the unfolding security dilemma in the region, is
constructive. But Taiwan is not the right card to play. Abandoning Taiwan would create conditions detrimental both
to the Sino-US relationship and to regional stability. As Washington strives to build a constructive relationship with
Beijing, Taipei has also been doing its part to make peace with its long-term rival. The cross-Strait detente could, to
some extent, facilitate Sino-US collaboration by mitigating a contentious issue in their bilateral relationship. Taipei's

The
optimistic and pessimistic abandonists for the United States to avoid unnecessary
confrontation with China, and to mitigate the unfolding security dilemma in the region, is constructive.
But Taiwan is not the right card to play. Abandoning Taiwan would create
conditions detrimental both to the Sino-US relationship and to regional stability. As
Washington strives to build a constructive relationship with Beijing, Taipei has also
been doing its part to make peace with its long-term rival. The cross-Strait detente could,
to some extent, facilitate Sino-US collaboration by mitigating a contentious issue in their bilateral
recent policies have been conducive to regional peace and prosperity, and deserve Washington's support.

desire of

both the

relationship. Taipei's recent policies have been conducive to regional peace and prosperity, and deserve
Washington's support.

2NC Alliances
Abandonment makes South Korea and Japan nervous
Mearsheimer 14 (John; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago; March/April 2014 National Interest,
Issue #130, Taiwans Dire Straits, http://political-science.uchicago.edu/facultyarticles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf, BC)

Second, Americas commitment to Taiwan is inextricably bound up with U.S.


credibility in the region, which matters greatly to policy makers in Washington. Because the
United States is located roughly six thousand miles from East Asia, it has to work hard to convince
its Asian alliesespecially Japan and South Koreathat it will back them
up in the event they are threatened by China or North Korea . Importantly, it
has to convince Seoul and Tokyo that they can rely on the American
nuclear umbrella to protect them. This is the thorny problem of extended deterrence, which the
United States and its allies wrestled with throughout the Cold War. If the United States were to sever
its military ties with Taiwan or fail to defend it in a crisis with China, that would surely send
a strong signal to Americas other allies in the region that they cannot rely
on the United States for protection. Policy makers in Washington will go to great lengths to
avoid that outcome and instead maintain Americas reputation as a reliable partner. This means they will be inclined
to back Taiwan no matter what

Abandoning Taiwan decimates American cred and causes


regional proliferation
Rehman 14 (Iskander; fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary
Assessments (CSBA) in Washington, DC; 2/28/14, Why Taiwan Matters,
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-taiwan-matters-9971?page=4)

Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add
fuel to an ongoing regional arms race. Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and
viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy towards Asia. Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and
Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and Washingtons commitment to their
security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan . Japan, in particular, would feel
threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan in essence losing a valuable
geopolitical bufferin such close proximity to its southwestern approaches. Heightened threat
perceptions in Tokyo, if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear
deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. The
corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as South
Korea, which might question Washingtons determination to defend it from North
Korean aggression. Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated that a growing proportion of
the South Korean public now favors the development of a South Korean nuclear
arsenal. Revealingly, the reasons invoked for such a shift were growing concerns over North Koreas increasingly
unpredictable and belligerent behavior, as well as over the continued viability of the United States security

regional states might find themselves both disinclined to


place their faith in the United States, and cowed into submission by a more self-assured and
guarantee. Meanwhile, smaller

abandonment of Taiwan could thus lead to a creeping


Finlandizationor rapid nuclearizationof large tracts of the Indo-Pacific, and, in
time, to the sunset of American primacy in Asia. Taiwan, therefore, most certainly matters.
advantageously positioned China. An

2NC Japan Mod


Giving up Taiwan militarily would confirm Japans fear of
abandonment
Lee, 4/16, (Joseph Tse-Hei, Taipei Times, Taiwan can follow South Korea,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2016/04/16/2003644054,
4/16/16, //VZ)
The US also finds it impossible to give up Taiwan, as this would intensify South Koreas and
Japans fear of US abandonment. Therefore, Taiwan can follow in the footsteps of South Korea to pursue a proactive
diplomatic strategy amid the US-China competition.

Giving up Taiwan militarily creates a perception of


abandonment
Mearsheimer 14, (John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished
Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the
advisory council of The National Interest, and his most recent book, Why Leaders
Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics, was published in January 2011 by
Oxford University Press, Say Goodbye to Taiwan
http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=4, March April
2014, //VZ)
If the United States were to sever its military ties with Taiwan or fail to defend it in a
crisis with China, that would surely send a strong signal to Americas other allies in
the region that they cannot rely on the United States for protection . Policy makers in Washington
will go to great lengths to avoid that outcome and instead maintain Americas reputation as a reliable partner. This means they will be inclined to back
Taiwan no matter what.

Turns Chinese Aggression


U.S. presence is the only barrier to full Chinese aggression
against Taiwan
Ian Easton, a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts
research on defense and security issues in Asia, 09-26- 13, Online:
http://www.project2049.net/documents/China_Military_Strategy_Easton.pdf,
Article: CHINAS MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: Implications for Regional
Stability Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
The U.S. alliance with Japan is also key factor in understanding Beijings strategic
animus toward Tokyo. Chinas civilian and military leaders are keenly aware that the
security treaty that binds the U.S.-Japan alliance explicitly allows American forces to
use bases on Japan for responding to regional contingencies, including Chinese
aggression against Taiwan.10 Moreover, the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF)
intends to assist the U.S. military in any cross-strait conflagration.11 The U.S.
military presence on Japan therefore represents a serious barrier to the CCPs efforts
to gain leverage over the government of Taiwan. As such, even in the absence of
territorial disputes in the East China Sea, the PLA would likely focus on challenging
the credibility of the U.S.- Japan alliance as a means of achieving its strategic goals
related to Taiwan.12

Taiwan will proliferate absent U.S. commitment Past proves


Rebecca K. C. Hersman and Robert Peters, Hersman is director of the Project
on Nuclear Issues and senior adviser for the International Security Program, Peters,
now a Research Fellow, joined the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass
Destruction as a Research Associate in August 2005, November 2006, Online:
https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/133hersman.pdf, Article:
NUCLEAR U-TURNS: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback Accessed
on: 06-29-16//AWW
By the early 1970s, the Taiwanese, like the South Koreans, feared that President
Richard Nixons new relationship with and later recognition of the PRC might
undermine Americas commitment to their country, thereby strengthening internal
arguments for an independent nuclear capability. During this period, Taiwan
purchased light water reactors and other nuclear technologies from the United
States, West Germany, Canada, South Africa, France, and other nations, and the
defense ministry began to pursue secretly a plutonium separation capability. In
1973, the island state began operating the same type of heavy water reactor that
India used to produce fissile material for its 1974 nuclear detonation. By the mid1970s, Taiwan was purchasing double the amount of fuel needed to operate its
reactors and by 1978 had separated 30 kilograms of plutonium.29 By 1973, the U.S.
Embassy in Taiwan had noticed the large acquisitions of technology and uranium
that had no overt corresponding research program. In 1974, the CIA concluded that
Taiwan was engaged in a small nuclear weapons program.30

Turns Arms Race


U.S. abandonment leads to an arms race leading to regional
instability
Ian Easton, a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts
research on defense and security issues in Asia, 09-26- 13, Online:
http://www.project2049.net/documents/China_Military_Strategy_Easton.pdf,
Article: CHINAS MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: Implications for Regional
Stability Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
Chinas projectile-centric strategy is also destabilizing because it focuses on
undermining the U.S. commitment to its allies in order to gain political leverage
over them. It fails to take into account the second order effects of such a campaign.
Should the PLA military strategy show signs of success over the coming years and
result in a gradual weakening of U.S. resolve, it is highly probable that Taiwan and
Japan would respond not by surrendering on sovereignty issues as Beijing expects,
but rather by developing and deploying their own land-based strike systems to
defend themselves.60 Indeed, there are already strong indications that Taiwan and
Japan are seeking to allay their respective perceptions of a deteriorating security
situation in the region by developing their own ballistic and cruise missile systems
for deterring China.61 This emerging arms race in nuclear capable delivery systems
could weaken regional stability.

Continued U.S. presence is key to counter-balance Chinas


military modernization The alternative is nuclear arms race
Ian Easton, a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts
research on defense and security issues in Asia, 09-26- 13, Online:
http://www.project2049.net/documents/China_Military_Strategy_Easton.pdf,
Article: CHINAS MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: Implications for Regional
Stability Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
Nonetheless, the military modernization program being undertaken by the PLA is
changing the security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific. The choice of a projectile-centric
strategy for projecting power makes the PLA an inherently offensive force, and one
that risks causing an accidental war with rapid escalation and devastating effects in
a crisis. Countermeasures must be taken by the U.S. and its allies to balance against
the PLAs modernization program to maintain conventional war fighting superiority.
The other alternative could be to see region devolve into nuclear missile racing.
What follows is a list of recommendations for decision-makers to consider. These
recommendations are not exhaustive, but are intended to provide a sample of the
potential countermeasures the United States and its allies Japan and Taiwan,
individually and jointly, can take to inject a new energy into their respective
alliances and partnerships to improve the deteriorating regional security dynamic.
At the strategic level, national leaders in Washington, Tokyo and Taipei need to
recognize the destabilizing nature of Chinas military strategy in the Asia-Pacific and
seek a mix of political and military means to counter it. Politically, China should be
condemned at the United Nations and other international forums for developing

large numbers of nuclear capable delivery vehicles and other offensive weapons.
The U.S., the E.U., Russia, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, Israel and many
other key U.N. members all have clear strategic imperatives for pushing China to
join a global INF treaty. Until China verifiably dismantles its theater missiles and
support infrastructures, the U.S. and Russia will have a strong case for suspending
their INF Treaty obligations. As both the U.S. and Russia learned some three decades
ago, arms control treaties are only possible when all sides have leverage. More
broadly, Washington needs a long-term strategy for maintaining its leadership in the
Asia-Pacific. Elevating the currently diminished role of regional allies and partners in
the rhetorical rebalance to Asia is the single most powerful means available for
achieving this goal. In particular, increased support for Taiwan and Japan would
bolster American credibility with the many regional allies and partners who are
eager to see a stronger U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific.

TurnsChinese Invasion
U.S. withdrawal in Taiwan is the next step for victory for China
Ian Easton, a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts
research on defense and security issues in Asia, 09-26- 13, Online:
http://www.project2049.net/documents/China_Military_Strategy_Easton.pdf,
Article: CHINAS MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: Implications for Regional
Stability Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
In light of this, the PLAs strategy to use projectiles is well suited to the political
mission assigned to it. Missiles and other unmanned strike weapons have powerful
disruptive effects, both physically and psychological. The latter is important
because the definition of victory for China does not necessarily require that Taiwan
and Japan are physically dominated and the U.S. military is physically kept out of
the Western Pacific. Ideally, victory for the PLA would be keeping the U.S. from
upholding its legal obligations to defend Taiwan and Japan, either through a gradual
weakening of these bilateral relationships or by a sudden collapse of national will
(for example, a White House decision to reinterpret or ignore the Taiwan Relations
Act). The psychological pressure induced by the threat of the PLAs growing
offensive missile force is intended to aid the CCP in achieving such effects through
coercion.57 Should efforts at intimidation prior to or during a crisis fail, the PLA
would define victory as keeping Washington from being able to effectively intervene
in a Taiwan or Japan scenario. It would do this by seeking to assure that the
American military could not gain air superiority and effectively project power into
the region. And, because the ultimate aim of the CCPs strategy in most foreseeable
situations would be to change the decision-making calculus of the President of
Taiwan or the Prime Minister of Japan, it could be sufficient to make them think the
U.S. was unable or unwilling to support them during a crisis, thereby gaining
psychological leverage over them. For this reason, the PLAs ability to credibly
threaten the U.S. with potential military defeat or at least stalemate in the Western
Pacific is critical to its success. Unless Chinas neighbors believe that the PLA has
the wherewithal to present the U.S. the possibility of defeat, they are unlikely to feel
pressured to grant Beijing whatever political concessions it is seeking. Tactical
credibility aside, Chinese strategists are also well aware that the mere presence of
destructive projectiles within range of an adversary can be a powerful force for
affecting mindsets. This is arguably more important to the PLA than the value of
missiles and UAVs as effectors of the physical realm of battle, and it helps explain
why projectiles and not platforms have been chosen as Chinas primary means of
projecting power.

U.S. presence is the only backstop to Chinese invasion of


Taiwan
Ian Easton, a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts
research on defense and security issues in Asia, 02-02-16, Online:
http://www.project2049.net/documents/Strategic

%20Standoff_US_China_Rivalry_Taiwan.pdf, Article: Strategic Standoff The U.S.China Rivalry and Taiwan Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
Of all the powder kegs out there, the potential for a war over Taiwan is the largest
and most explosive.14 Beijing has made clear that its main external objective is
attaining the ability to apply overwhelming force against Taiwan during a conflict,
and in a manner that would keep American-led coalition forces from intervening.15
Chinese military strategists focus on Taiwan because the communist party is
insecure. The CCP views Taiwan, which exists as a free and independent state that is
officially called the Republic of China (ROC), as a grave threat to its grip on power.
Taiwan is anathema to the PRC because it serves as a beacon of freedom for
Chinese speaking people everywhere. 16 Consequently, the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), which is the armed wing of the CCP, considers the invasion of Taiwan to
be its most critical mission. It is this envisioned future war that drives the PLA's
modernization program.17

AT: No Prolif
Yes tech + reason to prolif
Fitzpatrick 16 (Mark; ten years heading the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Policy Programme, 26-year career in the US Department of State, where for the
previous ten years he focused on non-proliferation issues, 2/2/16, Asias Latent
Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, accessed through UMich Library,
BC)

What if?,

Although it is highly unlikely that Taiwan will again seek nuclear weapons
this possibility cannot be ruled out. The security condition that sparked the nuclearweapons pursuit in 1964 and that sustained it for more than two decade s a
looming potential threat from the mainland remains a dominant risk in Taiwan's
security landscape. Strait relations have improved, the military balance ha steadily worsened. To the extent
that Taiwan enjoys de facto protection from the US, it does not need to consider a nuclear equaliser. Two
conditions thus could prompt reconsideration . If the threat perception were to
become sufficiently dire and the US could not be counted upon to deter
mainland China, then Taiwan would have a logical motivation to seek an autonomous A-bomb. Even then, however, the risks would probably be judged to be too great in terms of the
provocation to Beijing. Some analysts claim that if Taiwan decided to produce nuclear weapons, it would take eight
to ten years66 or longer. Such estimates apparently assume a systematic development effort, similar to the past
programmes of Pakistan and North Korea. Those countries had time for a measured approach since they did not

If, on the contrary, Taiwan's security circumstances


were so dire as to prompt a weaponisation decision, the government
would need to embark on a crash course. Such an emergency programme that
mobilised the nation's na s top talent and prioritised speed over safety could
perhaps produce crude weapons within two years . For a crash programme, the plutonium route
would be quicker than uranium enrichment. Taiwan learned the essentials of reprocessing 40
years ago, while the enrich-ment programme in the 1980s never got beyond laboratory level. Although the two
key scientists who led the plutonium programme are deceased, others who assisted in ancillary roles
can be brought out of retirement to help jump-start a programme . While little is left of the
former reprocessing facilities, the documentation is presumably preserved somewhere. Building a
reprocessing plant might take up to one year. Weapons design work would proceed in tandem, and
face an imminent existential threat.

might be accelerated by foreign weapon designers. Weapons fabrication might then take several more months.
Because Taiwan's land-attack missiles are small in diameter and thus unsuitable for crude A-bombs, the weapons
would have to be designed for air drop, or possibly suicidal delivery via water. Such a crash course could not be
kept secret from LkEA inspector), the Taiwan public or outside po w ers. A uranium enrichment programme would be
easier to hide, but prob-ably still impossible to keep secret given the porous nature of Taiwan politics and the
open_ness of society. Taiwan has no known uranium resources and importing the necessary uranium would itself be
difficult to keep under wraps. The cost of a Manhattan Project-style weapons programme, estimated at up to US$10

drivers If Taiwan were ever again to seek


nuclear weapons, it would be for the same reason as before: for protection against a
threat from the mainland with which the government has been at odds since the
Chinese civil war of the 1940s. Today, for all intents and purposes, the dispute is not over who rules
bn 69 also could not be kept confidential. Proliferation

China, but rather the sovereign identity of Taiwan itself. 7 An ever-increasing majority of the island's residents feel
a sepa rate national identity, while mainland China is determined to prevent independence for the island. The
precipitating shock of 1964 was abrupt conventional: Beijing's nuclear test put Taiwan's leadership in a precarious
position. Any PRC effort to forcefully reunite Taiwan with the mainland would probably involve nuclear weapons only
indirectly, as a threat to back up conventional force. Any actual use of nuclear weapons against Taiwan would be
counterproductive to the purpose of incorporating an advanced infrastructure and population!' The military threat of

if Taiwan
perceived those forces as presenting an existential threat and if, at the
same time, it believed it could no longer count on the protection of the US,
then pursuing a nuclear option might again be attractive. Only with such a
more concern to Taiwan is the steady build-up of PRC conventional armed forces. As indicated above,

combination of these two factors, producing a profound sense of fear on the part of the population, is it conceivable
that Taiwan would even seriously consider going down the nuclear path.

top military elites want prolif


Fitzpatrick 16 (Mark; ten years heading the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Policy Programme, 26-year career in the US Department of State, where for the
previous ten years he focused on non-proliferation issues, 2/2/16, Asias Latent
Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, accessed through UMich Library,
BC)

there remains a view within Taiwan military circles that


Taiwan needs a powerful means of deterring the PRC and that nuclear
weapons may be best suited for this role. Some retired officers speak euphemistically of
the need for an 'assassin's mace' (shashoujian), meaning a weapon with which to
quickly incapacitate a superior enemy. According to one retired officer who now holds an academic
In light of this imbalance,

position, without such a weapon, Taiwan's military forces could not last beyond the first 70 hours of a concerted PRC

Perhaps of greater relevance than Beijing's invasion capa-bilities is its


growing potential to complicate America's ability to come to Taiwan's defence . In
attack.Th

March 1996, America demon-strated its naval superiority in the region by dispatching two carrier task forces to the

command of the sea and air around Taiwan is increasingly


challenged by the PRC's emphasis on precision-strike systems and other forces
intended for what the Pentagon calls an anti-access/area-denial role." To counter China,
the US military has been increasing however, that its own capabilities. There remains concern, however,
that the US eventually may no longer be able credibly to protect Taiwan against a
strike from the mainland aimed at quickly island's defences' The mainland also has overwhelming the an
Taiwan region. Today, US

increasing ability to impose an air and sea blockade.

Fear of abandonment = prolif


Fitzpatrick 16 (Mark; ten years heading the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Policy Programme, 26-year career in the US Department of State, where for the
previous ten years he focused on non-proliferation issues, 2/2/16, Asias Latent
Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, accessed through UMich Library,
BC)

fear of abandonment by the US is the other factor that, in


conjunction with fear of the mainland, could possibly again push Taiwan down the
nuclear path as an option to replace US protection. Indeed, there could be reasons
As noted earlier,

to question Washington's Willingness to come to Taiwan's assis-tance in


the future. One reason is Beijing's growing importance to the US in almost every area of economic and
transnational policy, from non-proliferation to climate change. Washington insists that the China relationship will not

some American commentators have called for stop-ping- arms


sales to Taiwan in exchange for Beijing's cooperation on other issues of greater
geopolitical importance.89 In fact, Taiwan today does not have a formal US defence
guarantee. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which replaced the 1954 defence treaty following the
lead to abandoning allies. Yet

termination of diplomatic relations, is ambiguous. It declares it is the policy of the US to 'consider any effort to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means ... a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States', to provide Taiwan with 'arms of a defensive character', and
to 'maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan'. This falls far short of the previous commitment
for military assistance under the 1954 defence treaty, even though commitments under the latter were not airtight,
either.% US president Bill Clinton in 2004 acknowledged that the US 'had never said whether we would or wouldn't
come to the defence of Taiwan if it were attacked'.91 When the US in 2001 designated Taiwan as the equivalent of a
major non-NATO ally, it allowed Taiwan to submit mili-tary equipment requests at any time, rather than annually,
but it did not otherwise change the nature of the relationship. And there has been no follow-through on a 2001
commitment to help Taiwan acquire modern submarines, of import partly because the US no longer manufactures
diesel submarines and because other states that do so are unwilling to suffer Beijing's ire.' Although the TRA has
sometimes been interpreted to mean that the US will defend Taiwan in the case of an attack, this is not necessarily

To the extent that US deterrence covers Taiwan it is a de facto, not de jure,


commitment, and therefore more amenable to change . There is nothing close to a Taiwan
equivalent of the extended deterrence consultations the US holds with Japan and South Korea. Taiwan is
hardly even mentioned in many American analytical discussions of extended
deterrence. As a 2010 Policy paper explained, extended deterrence is a latent issue in the Taiwan, case,
the case.

'subsumed by the larger question of whether the United States would come to the island's defence at all." Think
tanks find it difficult to obtain funding from US governmental and philanthropic foundations for research or Track H

One last factor that


could also contribute to a Taiwan nuclear push would be a breakdown in
the global non-prolif-eration regime. If Japan or South Korea were to go nuclear
in response to Chinese and North Korean threats, there would be fewer inhibitions
on Taiwan doing so as well. In such a circum-stance, the NPT would be a dead letter .
events on extended deterrence for Taiwan. The topic is considered too sensitive.

The causation for such a domino effect would not be direct: Japanese or South Korean nuclear weapons would pose

since these allies would only seek nuclear weapons in the event of
no longer being able to rely on US protection, there would also be a loss of
credibility regarding lingering US commitments to not-quite-ally Taiwan.
no threat to Taiwan. But

U.S. security is the key backstop to Taiwan prolif


Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Professor of Political Science Associate Dean, School of
Arts and Sciences University of Richmond, 2008, Book: Taiwan: Conventional
Deterrence, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Option Pg. 409-410//AWW
The last point illustrates an inherent alliance dilemma. In a seminal work, Glenn Snyder discusses the logics of "abandonment" and
"entrapment" and con-cludes "alliance bargaining considerations . . . tend to favor a strategy of weak or ambiguous commitment"

In the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, Taiwan has always feared abandonment


by the United States. In contrast, the United States fears entrapment, "being dragged into a conflict over an ally's interests that one does not share, or shares only partially." Historically, the United States has played a
critical role in Taiwan's security. Under its defense treaty with Taiwan (1954-78), the United States dispatched the
(Snyder 1984: 467).

Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait and extended its nuclear umbrella to Taiwan. Recently declassified material shows that from
January 1958 to July 1974, the United States stored nuclear weapons on Taiwan.7 U.S. protection prevented a Chinese attack on
Taiwan. In December 1978, as one of the conditions for normalizing relations with the PRC, the United States abrogated the 1954

it is
debatable whether the "residual" U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security under the
defense treaty with Taiwan. U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to shore up Taiwan's security. However,

TRA constitutes an implicit nuclear umbrella. The TRA de-clares that it is the policy of the United States to
"consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means . . . a threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States," to provide Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character," and to
"maintain the ca-pacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the

TRA is silent on
whether the United States will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. Snyder's
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan" (Taiwan Relations Act 1979). But the

in-sights on entrapment help explain why the United States adopts a policy of "stra-tegic ambiguity" toward the Taiwan Strait. It is
intended to keep both China and Taiwan in check. Unlike Japan or South Koreaboth treaty allies of the United States Taiwan

cannot for certain rely on America's extended deterrence com-mitment. It must work hard
to cultivate American support. Given its existential insecurity and the implicit and ambiguous
commitment of its only ally, Taiwan has often been identified as a country with good
reasons for possessing nuclear weapons as part of its comprehensive strategy of
survival. Andrew Mack grouped Taiwan along with Japan, South Korea, and North Korea in a category called "virtual nuclear
powers" who could acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short time but have chosen not to do so
(Mack 1997).

Taiwan will be the next nuclear state if arms race arises


Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Professor of Political Science Associate Dean, School of
Arts and Sciences University of Richmond, 2008, Book: Taiwan: Conventional
Deterrence, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Option Pg. 404-405//AWW
Nonetheless, Taiwan figures prominently in the security picture in twenty-firstcentury Asia for two reasons. First, facing an acute threat, Taiwan has been labeled
a "virtual nuclear power" or "virtual proliferant" (Mack 097)that could acquire
nuclear weapons in a relatively short time due to its well-developed in-dustrial
infrastructure, civilian nuclear expertise, and past attempt at developing a nuclear
weapon program. The October 2006 North Korean nuclear test rekindled speculation
as to whether Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea might become the "next nuclear
states" should a nuclear arms race ensue in East Asia (Rosen 2006). Second, Taiwan
is important to Asian regional security because of the possibility of a conflict
between two major nuclear powers. China claims the right to use force against
Taiwan while the United States, under the Taiwan Relations Act, might choose to
intervene in a cross-Strait conflict.

--AT: Deterrence Checks


Deterrence doesnt check Taiwan prolif
Mark Fitzpatrick, Executive Director, IISSAmericas, and director of the IISS NonProliferation and Nuclear Policy Programme, 02-02-16, Online:
https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/adelphi/by%20year/2015-9b13/asias-latentnuclear-powers-7b8a, Article: Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea
and Taiwan Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan are threshold nuclear powers by virtue of their robust
civilian nuclear-energy programmes. All three once pursued nuclear weapons and all
face nuclear-armed adversaries. Fitzpatricks latest book analyses these past nuclear pursuits and
Under what conditions would the democracies in Northeast Asia seek to join the nuclear weapons club?

current proliferation drivers. It considers how long it would take each to build a nuclear weapon if such a fateful
decision were made but does not predict such a scenario. Unlike when each previously went down a nuclear path,
democracy and a free press now prevail as barriers to building bombs in the basement. Reliance on US defence

extended
deterrence is not a barrier to proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies. Nuclear
hedging by its Northeast Asian partners will challenge Washingtons nuclear
diplomacy.
commitments is a better security alternative as long as such guarantees remain credible. But

AT: No Chinese Invasion China Invades


China would invade Taiwan 6 reasons
Shannon Tiezzi, is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she
writes on Chinas foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. Shannon
previously served as a research associate at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation, where
she hosted the weekly television show China Forum. She received her A.M. from
Harvard University and her B.A. from The College of William and Mary. Shannon has
also studied at Tsinghua University in Beijing, 11-03-15, Online:
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/6-reasons-china-would-invade-taiwan/, Article: 6
Reasons China Would Invade Taiwan Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
Taiwans Ministry of National Defense submitted its 2015 report on mainland Chinas
military to the Taiwanese legislature yesterday. The report noted a variety of
scenarios under which Chinas Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) might invade Taiwan,
and outlined the possible attack strategy. The MND report noted that leaders in
Beijing are concerned about the 2016 presidential elections in Taiwan. Tsai Ing-wen,
the candidate for the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is currently
leading in the polls, and Beijing has not-so-fond memories of the previous DPP
president, Chen Shui-bian. The MND suggested that recent PLA drills seeming to
simulate an attack on Taipei, Taiwans capital, were a direct result of Beijings
worries. The report said that Beijing might decide to invade Taiwan under a number
of circumstances: if Taiwan declares independence or takes steps toward de jure
independence; if Taiwan obtains nuclear weapons; if foreign troops are deployed in
Taiwan; if there is extreme civil unrest or other internal chaos in Taiwan; if foreign
forces interfere in Taiwans affairs; or if Taiwan delays cross-strait negotiations on
eventual reunification. In 2005, when Beijing was concerned about the possibility of
a move toward Taiwanese independence under President Chen, it passed an AntiSecession Law, which made it clear that Beijing will use non-peaceful means if it
believes that Taiwan is moving toward independence. The law also allows for the
use of force against Taiwan if possibilities for a peaceful re-unification should be
completely exhausted. Its that last point that has always worried Taiwans leaders
the possibility that Beijing could order an invasion simply because it believes talks
on reunification are going nowhere. As for how China would attack Taiwan, the MND
said the PLA would probably use a combination of military threats and a blockade
against Taiwan to intimidate Taiwanese. Then Beijing would move to use missiles
against Taiwans military and political centers. According to the MND, the PLAs
Second Artillery Crops currently has 1,500 missiles deployed against Taiwan. After
missile attacks, the PLA would use both aircraft and amphibious vehicles to mount
an actual invasion. The MND noted that vast discrepancies between its military
budget and Chinas (which increased another 10 percent last year) has tipped the
cross-strait military balance in Beijings favor. Still, the report emphasized that
Taiwans armed forces are prepared to defend against a possible PLA attack. Next
week Taiwan will hold its annual Han Kuang military exercises, including a new drill
simulating the defense of Taipei. The new exercise is named Counter-Operation
Decapitation the PLAs simulated attack on Taiwans Presidential Office Building
was named Operation Decapitation. Beyond the prospect of a PLA invasion of

Taiwan, the MND report also notes that Chinas reclamation and construction work in
the South China Sea will have the end result of militarizing the outposts. The MND
also says that it expects China to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in
the South China Sea. The report says Chinas island-building has changed the
strategic dynamic in the disputed region. Taiwan shares Chinas claims in the South
China Sea, but looks with unease on the growing tensions in the region. In May,
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou unveiled a South China Sea Peace Initiative that
calls for all claimants to shelve the disputes and seek to jointly develop resources.
The initiative also urges all parties to respect international law (particularly the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea) and to set up a code of conduct to reduce
tensions.

China has the capabilities to invade


Kyodo News, a nonprofit cooperative news agency based in Minato, Tokyo. It
was established in November 1945 and it distributes news to almost all newspapers,
and radio and television networks in Japan, 10-27- 15, Online:
http://www.todayonline.com/chinaindia/china/china-set-invade-retake-taiwan-2020taipei, Article: China set to invade, retake Taiwan by 2020: Taipei Accessed on:
06-29-16//AWW
TAIPEI China has completed its planned build-up of joint forces for military
engagement against Taiwan and is on its way to ensure victory in a decisive battle
by 2020, Taiwans Defence Ministry said in its National Defence Report released
today (Oct 27(. The 13th edition of the biennial report states that China has recently
held military exercises simulating attacks by the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) on
Taiwans landmarks and government buildings. The PLA has possessed an adequate deterrent force capable of launching joint military operations against
Taiwan, it said. The PLA also continues to step up the deployment of missiles
against Taiwan and aims to upgrade its long-range strike capability. Its goal is to be
in complete combat readiness status to invade Taiwan by 2020, the report said.
Apart from the deployment against Taiwan, China is strengthening the combat
readiness of its navy and air force in the west Pacific region to avoid any foreign
intervention in cross-strait conflicts, it said. Chinas navy and air force have
successfully penetrated the first island chain on numerous occasions and hope to
be able to deter foreign intervention should a war break out in the Taiwan Strait, it
said. The first island chain refers to a strategic concept of an offshore defence line
extending from Japans Okinawa and Taiwan down to the Philippines and Indonesia.
While the Taiwan Strait remains a strategic priority of Chinas military development,
the report said Beijing has recently attached increasingly greater importance to the
East China Sea and the South China Sea. In the East China Sea, China has increased
patrols in waters off the disputed Diaoyu Islands, called Senkaku in Japan, which
administers them, and Tiaoyutai in Taiwan, which also claims them. In the South
China Sea, China has not only strengthened its military presence but also continued
land reclamation efforts, seeking to reaffirm its sovereignty claim over the reefs and
islands in the disputed region. The report said Chinas military spending has
maintained a two-digit growth over the years. While China earmarked 911.4 billion
yuan (S$199.7 billion) for military spending this year, the real figure could be two to

three times more, it said. By contrast, Taiwans defence budget has showed a
declining trend over the past decade, remaining at between NT$252.5 billion
(S$10.8 billion) and NT$334 billion. Taiwan and China have been governed
separately since they split in a civil war in 1949. Beijing has since tried to isolate
Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province awaiting reunification by force if
necessary. Relations between Taiwan and China have significantly improved since
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou was first elected in 2008. Since then, both sides have
signed 23 agreements. Despite a cross-strait detente, many suspect the Chinese
are using cross-strait trade to draw Taiwan economically closer, leading to eventual
political union. KYODO NEWS

AT: War stays conventional


A conventional attack by China will still be bad because it will
either draw in the US because we are legally bound to protect
Taiwan, triggering massive escalation OR it proves the US is
not willing to stand up for its allies, causing massive instability
China will have to resort to nukes because of Taiwanese
capabilities
Schreer 2013 - Senior Analyst for Defence Strategy at ASPI Benjamin, "Strategy:
Planning the Unthinkable War," April, https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/planningthe-unthinkable-war-airsea-battle-and-its-implications-foraustralia/Strategy_AirSea.pdf
Taiwan is moving towards a more asymmetric defence posture aimed at denying
This includes a focus on hardening critical
infrastructure such as airfields and ports to survive PLA missile bombardments, as well as
investments in mines, fast missile boats, attack helicopters and special forces. The
However,

PLA forces the approaches to the island.

Taiwanese Navy also plans to acquire six new indigenously built minehunting ships over the next 12 years to
counter a possible PLA blockade. In combination with Taiwans air-to-air, naval-to-naval and ground-to-ground

this strategy could hold off a Chinese first strike long


enough to draw US forces into the conflict. Given the inherent difficulties of large-scale amphibious
invasions, Taiwan wouldnt be an easy target for the PLA. Moreover, Taiwan is reportedly working on a
new supersonic offensive surface-to-surface missile that could reach Chinas central
and southern regions, including Shanghai, thereby retaining a punishment capability against Chinese cities
defensive interdiction weapons systems,

in response to a PLA attack. In November 2012, Taiwan also test-fired a new supersonic anti-ship missile, the Hsiung
Feng III, which could be used against a future Chinese aircraft carrier and other surface vessels.

AT: NFU = No War


Chinas No-First-Use policy doesnt apply to Taiwan
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, Professor of Political Science Associate Dean, School of
Arts and Sciences University of Richmond, 2008, Book: Taiwan: Conventional
Deterrence, Soft Power, and the Nuclear Option Pg. 406//AWW
This raises questions about the nuclear dimension. Unlike most analysts, James Nolt
(1999) argues that China has no real military option in dealing with Taiwan and can
only defeat Taiwan by using nuclear weapons. But as China's goal is pri-marily
political (unification), do nuclear weapons serve any purpose? China offi-cially
espouses a no-first-use (NFU) policyit will not be the first to use nuclear weapons
against other states. But former Chinese chief arms control negotiator, Sha Zukang,
claimed that China's NFU commitment does not extend to Taiwan, because "Taiwan
is a province of China, not a state, so the policy of no-first-use does not apply"
(Straits Times 1996: 3).

AT: Vagueness of Defense Agreements


Vagueness of Defense Agreements doesnt matter doesnt
decrease commitment and ensures flexibility political will is
crucial
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an
Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED
TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
while the language of the TRA is vague, it is ultimately not any more
vague than language used in some of the mutual defense treaties that bind the U.S.
with its allies. It is worthwhile to look at the wording of the TRAs predecessor, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, its article V in particular:
Lohman is right. In addition,

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and
all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated

the
absence of formal links between Taiwan and the U.S. matter less in terms
of formal obligations. The key variable is the political will to make difficult
decisions at a time when the need arises. Where it matters is the public perception of the relationship. For it to work in a
desirable way, strategic ambiguity is not the best tool. It is an absence of political will that prevents greater
utilization of the existing framework.
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Ultimately,

AT: Arms Link Turn


Taiwan deterrence is crucial for stability and an absence of
sales ONLY risks a more aggressive China
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an
Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED
TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has been the most reliable
indicator of U.S. resolve to uphold stability in the Taiwan Strait . That resolve became
In the decades since 1979,

even more important with Taiwans transition to multi-party democracy. However, since mid-2000s sales have become increasingly irregular. Partly for
reasons stemming from gridlock in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bians second term, partly for what appears to be consideration to Chinese hostile position on
any arms sales to Taiwan. The large arms sales packages from years 2008, 2010 and 2011, the last ones until December 2015, were mostly realization of
arms package agreed in 2001. Arguably, the amount of weapons acquired between 2009 and 2011 take some time to absorb, which in turn justifies the
four year gap between 2011 and the most recent sale in December 2015. However, the long period of no sale has done some harm, and no good.

Absence of arms sales has greater potential to encourage than to placate


Beijing. The way out is to arrange for arms sales on annual basis, thus making the
sales part of status quo. It does not need to include big ticket items every year. That is not really necessary. What is
important is to renew some sense of order in the sales.

AT: Realism Bad


It is necessary to take a realist approach towards China,
alternatives cause war
Auslin 2015 - resident scholar and the director of Japan Studies at AEI
Michael, "Time for realism in US-China relations," Sep 22,
www.aei.org/publication/time-for-realism-in-us-china-relations/
The United States welcomes a rising China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in global
affairs. So asserted Susan Rice, National Security Advisor to President Obama, during a speech yesterday at
George Washington University on the eve of Chinese President Xi Jinpings state visit to Washington. In an address
designed to tout the arc of progress in Sino-U.S. relations, Rice chastised the lazy rhetoric that says conflict
between the U.S. and China is inevitable. Rice may have set up her straw person, but

no serious Asia

watcher either predicts or desires a clash with China . However, even by the measuring stick of
her own aspirations noted above, China today is falling far short of the mark, raising serious
questions about the future of its relationship with the U nited States. To begin with, few of
Chinas neighbors feel that Beijing is altogether peaceful these days. Its coercion
over disputed maritime territory in the East and South China Seas continues unabated, and it
has now built islands in contested waters and is beginning to militarize them. Its military might,
showcased this month at a major parade, was a clear message of Chinas strength and a
warning to those who would oppose it. Secondly, longtime observers of China are increasingly concerned about its
stability. Xi Jinping has instituted a social crackdown that belies the regimes concern over its safety. Xi has arrested
potential threats to his own power in the Communist Party, tightened control over the military, jailed lawyers and
dissidents, and maintained oppression of Tibetan and Uighur minorities. Even established academics like George
Washington Universitys David Shambaugh are beginning to say that the Communist Party is entering its endgame,
with unknown effects on social stability. Americans are willing to overlook these failings as long as China remained
the goose that laid the golden egg. Yet this summer showed that Chinese prosperity, the third of Rices goals, can

The stock market collapse over the past few months is a sign of
much deeper problems in the broader economy. The official growth rate has been knocked down
be taken for granted.

to 7 percent, but few economists believe the figure, and it is entirely likely that China is already in stagnation. That

When the slowdown


hits the pocketbooks of Chinas nouveaux middle class, then social stability will be
even more at risk. A China suffering from economic stagnation and turmoil at home is unlikely to be a
means, as trade figures showed, dropping industrial production and shrinking imports.

responsible player in global affairs. In fact, it already isnt, despite Rices desire. Just days before Xis visit to
Obama, his government has formallyarrested an American citizen on charges of spying. This sends a clear message
to Obama about Beijings regard for diplomatic niceties. Far more serious, of course, is the unprecedented cyber
espionage conducted by Chinese hacker s, undoubtedly controlled or supported by the government, against U.S.
citizens and businesses. The hack of the Office of Personnel Management compromised the sensitive data of tens of
millions of Americans. In response,Washington is toying with signing a cybersecurity pact with Beijing that will do

Add on Beijings claims over the South China Sea and its
attempt to dominate contested waters, its refusal to pressure North Korea, and its
campaign to seek out Chinese expats in America and coerce them to return home ,
nothing to stop such aggression.

and the picture of bonhomie between America and China is itself a product of the kind of reductive reasoning and
lazy rhetoric denounced by Rice. The question is, what to do about all this? How can the United States effectively
pressure its largest import partner and the worlds second-largest economy? Must the arc of progress championed

It is time for a new realism in U.S.-China relations. Such


realism begins with an official acceptance that we are locked in a competition with
China that is of Beijings choosing. Our economies may be increasingly
interconnected, but no longer can U.S. officials quail at responding to Beijings
provocations out of fear that trade relations will be harmed. It is time for high-level U.S.-China
by Rice always bend in Chinas favor?

dialogues to be reset, to use a term once in favor in the Obama Administration, and conducted not as an unearned
gift to Beijing, but only when there are concrete goals to be

achieved. A state that acts increasingly

in violation of global norms of behavior is not one that should be rewarded with
pomp and circumstance by U.S. leaders. In addition, it is past time for the U.S. to act as
the guarantor of regional stability that it claims to be. That means sending U.S.
ships and planes right up to the edges of Chinas manmade islands in the South
China Sea, something that Obama Administration admitted in Senate testimony last week that it was not doing.
By not challenging Chinas territorial claims we are in essence confirming them, and
sending a message of political weakness to our allies in Asia. A China that knows we will
employ our military strength where it is most in question will be far more circumspect in its attempts to undermine
the rules of international behavior. As for cyber, it is Beijing that has caused this crisis, and no U.S. administration
should be negotiating a pact with the wolf in the sheep pen. First, we should be thinking of financial sanctions and
diplomatic freezes as punishment for aggression already committed and that to come. It also is past time to throw
some cyber elbows to show we wont simply sit and take whatever fouls China decides to commit. There is no
question that the U.S. is probably more vulnerable that China on the cyber front, but we are steadily being led down
the path towards a real cyber Pearl Harbor (such as the shutting down of our energy grid) by our unwillingness to
show that we can play the same game. Its a discomfiting thought, but that is the world we have let ourselves be

The point of the new realism is not to force a conflict with China.
It is to avoid one. Only steady strength, a firm response, and a willingness to speak the
truth will show Xi Jinping and his fellow leaders that America is no better friend and no worse adversary. The
trapped into.

choice lies entirely with the Chinese leadership. So far, they have ignored Susan Rices earnest exhortations, and
instead shown a dangerous willingness to undermine the very peace that has allowed their country to grow so

we will also help deflect China from a path that


increasingly looks like one that will result in far greater risks to stability, prosperity,
and peace.
much. By acting in our best interests,

AT: China Benign


Intentions are irrelevant---Chinas rise makes revisionism
structurally inevitable unless the US keeps up
Robert S. Ross 13, professor of political science at Boston College, associate at
Harvard Universitys Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, and senior advisor to the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology security studies program, Summer 2013, US
Grand Strategy, the Rise of China, and US National Security Strategy for East Asia,
Strategic Studies Quarterly, p. 20-40
The rise of China poses a challenge to US security in East Asia because, unless
balanced, China could achieve regional hegemony. This could occur regardless of
Chinese intentions and policies. Given the historical pattern of great-power politics, once
China possesses the capabilities to challenge the regional order, it will presumably seek
a dominant strategic position throughout East Asia. This has been the European
experience, repeated many times over the past 500 years and often
characterized by war. It has also been the experience in the Western Hemisphere since 1823, when the
United States proclaimed its regional ambitions in the Monroe Doctrine. And it has been the recent experience in
South Asia, where only Pakistans possession of nuclear weapons has prevented India from achieving dominance

Great powers in search of security seek a region-wide


sphere of influence. Should China have similar aspirations, it would be neither
good nor bad nor reflect hostility toward the United States; it would simply reflect great-power
politics. On the other hand, even should China not have aspirations for regional leadership, it will emerge
as the regional hegemon unless its rise is balanced by another great power .
Local powers, responding to Chinas growing advantage in the balance of capabilities in the region, will
gravitate toward it rather than risk its hostility. In the absence of balancing, the rise
of China will challenge a cornerstone of US securitya divided flank across the
Pacific Ocean.
throughout the subcontinent.

The United States requires sufficient military and political presence in East Asia
to balance the rise of China and to deter it from using force to achieve regional
hegemony, should it become frustrated at the pace of change. US strength will also
reassure local powers that their security does not require accommodation to
Chinas rise.15

Links

Link Extension (Greenlight)


Unchecked Chinese A2AD means they can easily take Taiwan
Masahiro Matsumura 14, Professor of International Politics at St. Andrews
University (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku) in Osaka, 2014, The Limits and
Implications of the Air-Sea Battle Concept: A Japanese Perspective, Journal of
Military and Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3, p. 23-59
To achieve limited objectives, China can maximize its relative strength and exploit
US weaknesses, politically, diplomatically, and/or militarily. China neither has to achieve global military
primacy nor possess military capability symmetric force-to-force with the US counterpart. China just has to
attain local superiority in the immediate neighboring areas around Taiwan by
denying US forces to enter into the theatre and by limiting maneuverability within it,
namely, Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD).12 Once such superiority is established, the US has to
withdraw its forces to more distant locations from China, including naval
surface ships operating in waters near China. Certainly, China will enjoy local superiority if the US does not
have enough forces available in the East Asia or if the US were engaged in two wars simultaneously in the Middle
East and in East Asia. Similarly, China could attain local superiority by pressing potentially unreliable US allies to
either limit or deny US access to forward bases in the theatre. In this light, Japan is Chinas primary diplomatic and
political target, particularly because US bases in Okinawa will surely play a critical role when the country takes
military action against China.

China currently has military weaknesses and shortcomings vis--vis the


technologically superior US, across the board from weapon systems to organizational capability to human
resources. Only by employing A2/AD measures, including ground-based, sea-based and airborne
ballistic and cruise missiles in combination with cyber, anti-satellite, and
electric/electro-magnetic warfare, could China be a US near-peer competitor in the
theatre centered on Taiwan.
China can take full advantage of specific geographical
and political contexts. The country has to avoid direct force-on-force confrontation
with the technologically superior US. Instead, China would have to seize the initiative early at
the operational level, avoiding the risks of passively waiting for the US to
completely deploy. Also, China would have to use the element of surprising the US by
striking at an unexpected time and in an unanticipated place, entailing focused
preemptive attacks against vulnerable key-point military targets , including command
To achieve a limited military victory,

systems, weapon systems, logistic systems, air bases, ports, and sea lanes of communication, and aircraft
carriers.13 Furthermore, China would have to strike US integrated information systems that are central to collecting,
processing, and transmitting electronic data, such as C4ISR systems, computer networks and satellites, given that
they are essential for successful execution of high-tech weaponry. With all these measures combined, China could
crush US will to resist.
This strategy is very remincient of Soviet thinking during the Cold War. It aims to purse an asymmetrical capability
based on mobile precision-guided, land-based ballistic missiles, which is far cheaper than building a 21st-century
version of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In fact, China watched the development of these missiles, including US
Pershing II missiles and Maneuvering Reentry Vehicles (MaRVs). Erickson and Yang found that, even in 1972, China
considered using land-based ballistic missiles to hit targets at sea,14 and that China incorporated A2/AD thinking
and measures very well into its military publications on operational doctrines.15
In 2007, Roger Cliff and others noted that anti-access themes were pronounced in Chinese strategies as options
available in an armed conflict with the US, although Chinese military publications did not use a term equivalent to
anti-access.16

To bring the A2/AD thinking into reality, it is essential to construct operational


doctrines and to develop, acquire and deploy A2/AD weapons and measures . By
examining the variety, quantity, and quality of Chinas current armaments, it will be possible to grasp its A2/AD
capability as embodiment of the thinking.

Link - Korea Troop Presence


Taiwan plays a crucial role in the US pivot to Asia the plan
reverses the pivot which decks relations with Taiwan signals
decrease in commitments
Mazza 13, (Michael, is a research fellow in foreign and defense policy studies at
the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), where he analyzes US defense policy in the
Asia-Pacific region, Chinese military modernization, crossTaiwan Strait relations,
and Korean Peninsula security. A regular writer for the AEIdeas blog, he is also the
program manager of AEIs annual Executive Program on National Security Policy and
Strategy, Taiwans crucial role in the US pivot to Asia,
http://www.aei.org/publication/taiwans-crucial-role-in-the-us-pivot-to-asia/, //VZ)
Obama
s pivot
human rights in the region
The

administration

or rebalance

to Asia aims to improve security, prosperity, and

, with particular focus on security efforts. Taiwan and the United States have a long-standing but often-underemphasized security partnership that could play a

Taiwan is uniquely equipped to help US efforts to (1)


expand presence and access in the region
build
partnership capacity
and improve military innovation by sharing
experience, technology, and intelligence with the United States
Although Taiwans potential role in
the US pivot to Asia has been largely ignored, the island nation is uniquely
poised to be an important partner in the security component of that effort The
United States should help Taiwan shore up its air and sea defenses so that it can
assist in deterring potential Chinese aggression, thus contributing to stability
Taiwan is positioned to contribute important cyber knowledge, communications
capabilities, and intelligence to US defense efforts
significant role in this effort. Because of its proximity to and knowledge of China,

by ensuring US forces can utilize facilities on the island in the event of a conflict; (2)

by improving its self-defense capabilities;

(3)

. Rather than fearing damaging bilateral ties with China,

the United States should take advantage of the benefits this important partnership can offer. Key points in this Outlook:

in the region.

in the Asia-Pacific region. The Republic of China (ROC), on Taiwan, is one of Americas oldest

security partners. The formal relationship dates back at least as far as the early days of Americas participation in World War II, when the famed US Flying Tigers began flying combat missions over China against the Japanese. US and
Republican Chinese forces fought side by side in Burma during the war and stood together against communism during the Cold War. Ironically, faced with a reemergent Peoples Republic of China on the mainland, which is posing a
significant and growing threat to regional security for the first time since the mid-20th century, the United States has not attempted to reinvigorate its relationship with Taiwan. This is all the more peculiar at a time when the United

The Obama administrations pivot to Asiaalso


called the rebalanceis more than 18 months old.
as a Pacific nation, the United States will play a larger and longterm role in shaping this region and its future, by upholding core principles and in
close partnership with our allies and friends.[1]
In describing how
the United States would seek security, the president discussed defense
modernization,
South Korea
and
engagement with regional organizations Nowhere in his speech did he mention
Taiwanwhich knows China better than anyone and occupies key geostrategic
territoryor the Taiwan Relations Act, which requires the United States
This neglect on the part of the Obama
administration comes from a desire to avoid the supposed risk of
offending China and damaging bilateral ties.
China will not like a
cozier US-Taiwan defense relationship. But such a relationship would serve to
stabilize the region, better deter China from using coercion or force against the
island, and ensure continued peace in the Taiwan Strait. If the military pillar of
the Asia pivot is meant to deter Chinese adventurism, there is little
States is supposedly pivoting its foreign, defense, and trade policies to focus on Asia.

In a November 2011 speech to the Australian parliament, President Obama announced

that he had made a deliberate and strategic decision

The president described three pillars of his new Asia policy: ensuring security, promoting

prosperity, and supporting human rights. Listing security first was deliberate. Security and peace enable continued prosperity and advancements on questions of human rights.

the five US alliances in Asia (with Australia, Japan,

, the Philippines, and Thailand), outreach to Southeast Asian states,

to supply arms to Taiwan and to

ensure its own capacity to come to Taiwans aid in the case of conflict.

But such logic is shortsighted. No,

question that Taiwan has an important role to play in ensuring that


outcome.

-- 2NC Korea Troop Presence


US commitment is especially needed after Tsais presidency
Taiwans solitary pivot to Southeast Asia now only angers
China they dont like her intentions
Tay and Tan 6/1/16, (Simon and Cheryl, Japan Times, Renewing Taiwans
pivot to Southeast Asia,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/06/01/commentary/worldcommentary/renewing-taiwans-pivot-southeast-asia/#.V3QcW2grK00, //VZ)
Many people watched the inauguration of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen with
great interest.
Beijing closely watches what Tsai says and does to
see if she might seek to unravel the closer cross-straits ties that developed during
the presidency of her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou
SINGAPORE

Millions of Taiwanese who had decisively voted her and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) into power listened out of hope for significant change under a new leader. Across the strait and

elsewhere, officials and analysts scrutinized her speech, but with different intentions.

. Washington, too, needs to balance its historical links to Taiwan with bigger issues at stake in the

Sino-American relationship. Other Asians should also rightly observe the new administration. The last DPP presidency under Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008 seemed to set a course for pro-independence. Mainland Chinas strong

There was expectation


in Beijing that Tsai would clarify her views and expressly adopt the 1992
Consensus, which has been a touchstone used by the two sides to stabilize ties.
This basis had been acceptable for Ma, who warmed ties with Beijing to new levels.
Tsais noncommittal one-China policy stance failed to appease those in Beijing
opposition to that course sent tensions rippling across the region. In this context, Tsais inauguration speech can be especially noted for what she did and did not do.

But

. Choosing to

walk the line of ambiguity in her official remarks, Tsai acknowledged that cross-strait relations have become an integral part of building regional peace and collective security, and that she will work to maintain the existing
mechanisms for dialogue and communication across the Taiwan Strait. She did, however, add that as president she is responsible for safeguarding the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China. Following her speech,
Chinas Taiwan Affairs Office released a statement reaffirming, among other things, that Beijing will resolutely contain any Taiwan independence separatist acts or plots.

directly addressing this issue

Tsai has avoided

. She has made no express push for independence or separatism. But neither has she explicitly accepted the one-China principle nor laid out her plans

Tsai announced during her swearing-in


ceremony Taiwans intention to pivot to Southeast Asia through a new
southbound policy
to ensure the peaceful and stable development of cross-straits relations. While quiet on the mainland,

. Announcing her intention to elevate the scope and diversity of Taiwans external economy, Tsai wants to court the region to provide Taiwanese businesses with an alternative

investment destination to China. It is also part of the new governments effort to overhaul and stimulate the islands stagnating economy by reaching actively out to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is not the
first effort in this direction by Taipei leaders. Indeed, it is the third time. The first attempt was made in the 1990s by then-Kuomintang (KMT) President Lee Teng-hui, whose push toward the south saw investments gain momentum but
dip in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Thereafter, China, offering abundant labor, low-cost manufacturing and a huge market, soaked up the attention and investment from Taiwanese businesses. The next attempt was made in

Tsai seems serious


about her commitment toward re-engaging Southeast Asia. Her administration has
established a special task force called the New Southbound Office. This will set
the tone and direction of Taiwans overall strategy for Southeast Asia.
2002 during the first DPP presidency of Chen Shui-bian. This got nowhere because more than 60 percent of Taiwanese foreign investments had roots in China by that time.

While the policy cannot be prejudged,

there are economic and political factors that could buoy or hinder Tsais latest push south. There is more economic logic than before. Given that Chinas growth is relatively slowing and costs have increased considerably, especially in
the coastal areas, Taiwanese businesses will be more willing to push southward. Reciprocally, a number of ASEAN countries will welcome Taiwanese investment. However, ASEAN countries do not wish to be caught in the middle when
Taiwan and China squabble as ASEANs economic interdependence with China has deepened and grown significantly since the early 2000s. The launch of Chinas One Belt, One Road policy and its Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank initiative also focus attention on keeping win-win ties with Beijing. The key therefore is for Taiwan to pursue a southbound policy in tandem with stable, cross-strait ties with Beijing. If China is discomforted, it is unlikely that ties
with ASEAN members will prosper. Whenever Taipei appears to be seeking recognition as a state, Beijing counters. As such, rather than over emphasizing government-to-government relations in its ties with Taiwan, ASEAN should
pursue a multi-pronged approach that prioritizes the promotion of business ties and people-to-people exchanges. Two-way research, business and investment links should be re-established and strengthened. Such networks will be
important in helping the Taiwanese understand more about the regions political and economic nuances, and in so doing, carve out a niche economic strategy on how best to engage with the region without going head to head with
China. For example, instead of dealing with central governments, Taiwanese construction and heavy machinery businesses can engage with ASEANs regional governments to carve out industrial or economic zones for smaller scale
investment and development. The Taiwanese private sector can also play a key role in Taiwans new southbound initiative and should be encouraged to establish business-to-business partnerships with local companies. For example,

ties between ASEAN and


Taiwan will be contingent on the nature of cross-strait relations, which will be the
cornerstone that determines whether Tsais new southbound policy can make real
headway.
Foxconn Technology Group has managed to establish a presence and local business partnerships in Vietnam, and is seen as a key investor in the country. Closer

Taiwan is bandwagoning on South Koreas middle power lead


now an absence of US presence would spur backlash
Lee, 4/16/16, (Joseph Tse-Hei, Taipei Times, Taiwan can follow South Korea,
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2016/04/16/2003644054,
4/16/16, //VZ)

*note: This card is very VERY BAD (i.e. tag =/= warrants)
As a middle-power nation, South Korea has remained flexible to pursue its
independent agenda amid the US-China rivalry . This serves as a model for Taiwan as
the nation strives to gain more diplomatic space. In conventional international
relations, lesser powers are thought to live at the mercy of greater powers and the latter make
decisions without consulting the former. However, South Korea proves to be an exception, as it maintains strong
security ties with the US against North Korea while expanding substantial business
links with China.

--AT: Troop withdrawal not Pivot


US presence in Korea represents an Asia Pivot a withdrawal
would signal abandonment
Lee 14, (Christopher, is an active duty Major in the U.S. Army. A graduate of West
Point, he has served for eight years as an intelligence officer. He is currently a
Foreign Area Officer for the Northeast Asia region and a graduate student at
Columbia University. The views expressed are his own and not those of the United
States Army or the Department of Defense, TIME FOR U.S. FORCES TO LEAVE
SOUTH KOREA
http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/time-for-u-s-forces-to-leave-south-korea/,
7/24/14, //VZ)
American foreign policy towards the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea) has focused on a
substantial amount of military and economic support and is primarily based on the Mutual Defense Treaty between the
United States and the Republic of Korea (1953). The mutual defense treaty continues to be the cornerstone of
the security relationship between the two, which guarantees peace and stability by extended
deterrence28,500 United States Forces Korea (USFK) troops on ground and the U.S. nuclear umbrella .
The combined threats of North Koreas nuclear weapons and conventional forces, as well as the specter of the collapse of the Kim Jong-Un family regime, compel the United States

The need to protect South Korea


against its neighbor to the north also drivesin partAmericas ongoing
rebalance or pivot towards Asia. President Barack Obama recently reaffirmed Americas dedication to Seoul and the mutual
defense treaty during his official visit to South Korea in April 2014. During that visit, the president promoted his pivot and
pledged a continuing U.S. commitment to a strong alliance with South Korea . Obama
government to continue its strong military defense of, and economic devotion to, South Korea.

reminded South Korean President Park Geun-hye that recent developments in North Korea, such as significant increased activity at Punggye-ri nuclear test site coupled with multiple
long-range missile tests, beckoned for fiercer efforts toward denuclearization.

Link Arms Sales


The plan functionally eliminates the TRA and Six Assurances
undermining the cornerstone of Taiwan-US relations
TT, 5/3/16 (Taiwan Today, a multilingual news agency that tracks the latest
developments in Taiwan, Taiwan Relations Act, Six Assurances reaffirmed as US
policy toward Taiwan, http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?
xItem=244324&ctNode=2194, //VZ)
The Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances were reaffirmed as the U.S. policy
toward Taiwan April 28 with the passage of S.1635 Department of State Operations
Authorization and Embassy Security Act,
by the U.S. Senate.
Fiscal Year 2016,

Title I, Section 117 of the bill states that it is the

sense of the Congress that the U.S. policy toward Taiwan is based upon the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances and that provision of defensive weapons to Taiwan should continue as mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act

The act follows resolutions


reiterating the TRA and Six Assurances
as the cornerstone of Taiwan-U.S. relations. In response, Taipei Economic and
Cultural Representative Office
the organization responsible for representing
Taiwans interests in the U.S.said it was grateful for the strong vote of confidence
by U.S. Congress and Republican Party in the TRA and Six Assurances The series of
supporting actions by the U.S. Congress and Republican National Committee
demonstrates that Taiwan-U.S. relations are at their highest level since
enactment of the TRA.
the TRA authorizes the
continuation of substantive relations between the people of the U.S. and the
people on Taiwan
to help maintain peace, security and
stability in the western Pacific.
the Six Assurances
stipulat
that the U.S. would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan;
alter the terms of the TRA; consult with mainland China in advance before
making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan ; mediate between Taiwan
and mainland China; alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan and pressure
Taiwan to enter into negotiations with mainland China; and formally recognize
mainland Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.
and enhanced trade relations with Taiwan should be pursued to mutually benefit the citizens of both countries.

by the House of Representatives Foreign

Affairs Committee April 20 and the Republican National Committee during its spring meeting April 20-23,

in the U.S.

Signed into law in 1979 following the switch of recognition from Taipei to Beijing by the U.S.,

in the absence of diplomatic ties between them, as well as

Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan issued

in 1982,

ing

-- xt Arms sales
US arms sales are key to Taiwan relations key to deterrence
and has kept China-Taiwan mil-to-mil contact minimal
Kan 15, (Shirley, is a retired specialist who worked for the US government in a
variety of capacities, including at the Congressional Research Service (CRS); study
of the CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, PacNet #39 - Obamas
policy on arms sales to Taiwan needs credibility and clarity,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-39-obama%E2%80%99s-policy-arms-salestaiwan-needs-credibility-and-clarity, 7/7/15, //VZ)
The
TRA guides US policy in making available to Taiwan defense articles and defense
services for its self-defense.
Just as President George W. Bush raised doubts with a much-criticized freeze on arms sales to Taiwan, President Barack Obama has raised questions about his adherence to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).

US leadership and credibility regarding the Rebalance to Asia requires decisive, urgent action regarding Taiwan. That policy should include tangible

follow-up actions to support Taiwan, maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific, and help Taiwan avoid coercion and conflict. In May, the Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted to Congress its annual report on Chinas military power, a

the administration claimed that consistent with the TRA, the


United States has helped to maintain peace, security, and stability in the Taiwan
Strait by providing defense articles and services to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability
Taiwan
President Ma Ying-jeou boasted that the U.S. has sold a total of $18.3 billion worth
of arms to Taiwan since he took office
report that is coordinated throughout the administration. In it,

. To this end, the United States has announced more than $12 billion in arms sales to Taiwan since 2010. The next month,

seven years ago. While this is a high-profile, political (perhaps disingenuous) sign of support for Taiwan, it is also incomplete.

Compared to Bushs freeze, President Obamas inaction and changes to policy have dragged on longer with less critical attention. Obama has failed to notify Congress of major Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan for almost four
years. As Congress will soon recess in August, the president has an imperative to submit arms sales for Congressional review. The last time that the president notified Congress of major FMS to Taiwan occurred on Sept. 21, 2011.
Though not a so-called package, the president waited to send to Congress on a single day three notices of proposed programs worth $5.9 billion, including upgrades for Taiwans F-16A/B fighters. Why has the president failed to

Officials and experts are


increasingly concerned about China's potential use of coercion or attacks against
Taiwan The Defense Departments reports to Congress have warned annually that
preparing for potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait remains the focus and primary
driver of Chinas military investment
exercise leadership and sell arms to Taiwan under the TRA since then? First, his inaction cannot be explained by a lack of defensive requirement.

. Moreover, the PRC has been determined to reach military and economic benchmarks by 2020, moving toward a goal of fighting

and winning potential conflicts that include those related to Taiwan. Ominously, this years report warned that, while Taiwan historically has relied upon multiple military variables to deter aggression by the PRC, its increasingly
modern weapons and platforms have eroded or negated many of these factors in Taiwans defense. Second, the administrations inaction cannot be explained by lack of preparation and authorization, nor Taiwans lack of interest
and funding. For more than five years, the US Navy, other parts of the Executive Branch, and Congress worked on authorization for the Navy to transfer Perry-class frigates as Excess Defense Articles to other navies. After
consideration that started during the 112th Congress, the 113th Congress approved legislation that authorized the proposed transfer of excess frigates to Taiwan and Mexico. Last December, the Senate and House passed the
authorizing legislation, and President Obama signed it into law. Third, the administrations inaction cannot be explained by the US Navy, which would benefit from foreign funds and the transfer of decommissioned ships to other
authorized navies without incurring the costs of maintaining inactivated ships. It is in the interest of the Navy to transfer the ships as soon as possible. Chairman Ed Royce of the House Foreign Affairs Committee just visited one of
the ships that has completed its final deployment. Taiwan has prepared for years for the potential transfers and included in the 2014 defense budget about $175 million to acquire two excess frigates. Fourth, the administrations

problems persist in
Chinas military and cyber threats, weapons proliferation, the North
Korean threat, buildup against Taiwan, and aggressive expansionism and
environmental destruction in the East and South China Seas
despite
the conventional wisdom about fears of Beijings suspensions of meetings to
retaliate for the arms sales, their impact has been minimal
when it comes to
mil-to-mil contacts with China.
inaction cannot be explained by military-to-military contacts with China. Expanded contacts have not resulted in significant gains for US interests, since

, etc. Moreover,

and mixed

Three other explanations remain. One, the administration is shifting policy in a smart response to changing conditions and new priorities,

even as it demands the status quo from Taiwan. Two, the president is preferring to delay overdue and justified actions on Taiwan until after a scheduled visit in September by Xi Jinping, the top ruler of the Communist Party of China.
Three, the administration is timing the arms sales to influence the presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan scheduled for January 2016. These explanations could violate the law as well as stated policies. Section 3(b) of the TRA
stipulates that both the president and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by

in 1982, President Reagan extended Six Assurances to Taipei, including


assurances that Washington had not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to
Taiwan nor to consult with Beijing on arms sales.
At a hearing in the Senate in April 2014
Russel promptly clarified that the administration
remained committed to the Six Assurances
law. Moreover,

At a hearing in the House in October 2011, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific

Affairs Kurt Campbell reaffirmed the Six Assurances.

, in response to Sen. Marco Rubio, current Assistant Secretary of State

Daniel Russel failed to reaffirm clearly the Six Assurances. After the hearing,

. In September 2011, an official of the administration raised doubts about its professed neutrality in Taiwans

elections when he gave negative comments to the Financial Times about the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)s presidential candidate. In September-December 2011, the administration took various actions, including notifying
Congress of arms sales, that some observers saw as attempts to support Mas re-election. This May, however, Russel publicly said that the United States does not take sides and does not take actions that would imply that we are
taking sides in Taiwans elections.

Link US Umbrella
US Defense crucial to the Taiwan relationship TRA guarantees
both political and perception checks against Chinese
aggression creates a positive perception
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an
Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED
TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
Relations between Taiwan and the U.S. have been built upon mutual
security interests

. In the 1950s, the KMT regimes self-preservation interest overlapped with Washingtons containment strategy in Asia. While Taiwans population suffered under martial law, the

security relations between the two countries flourished under the 1955 mutual defense treaty. In 1979, strategic clarity underscored by a mutual defense treaty and official diplomatic relations was replaced by strategic ambiguity
and unofficial relations, in which the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Washington, D.C. pretend they are not embassies of their respective countries and the U.S. remains ambiguous as to

The framework for bilateral relations is the Taiwan Relations Act


of 1979 (TRA). It is not a treaty between two friendly nations, but a U.S. domestic
law
the fact that the TRA is
a U.S. domestic law could mean a better chance of Washingtons response in case
of PRCs aggressive behaviour toward Taiwan
what its reaction to Chinas aggression would look like.

, arguably a far cry from formal defense treaty. Or is it? Solid Fundamentals The absence of official ties could create the impression that the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship is resting on unstable ground. After all,

regulation of relations with a country via means of a domestic law, which is not reciprocated by the other side, is a rather unusual way of doing business. Paradoxically,

. The TRA makes U.S. relations with Taiwan a single area of U.S. foreign policy that is not exclusively in

hands of the administration. Its existence provides legal leverage for the U.S. Congress to put pressure on the administration. Granted, it has been of rather symbolical importance lately. Unsuccessful Congressional pressure to push
for an F-16 sale is a case in point. Nevertheless, the TRA introduced strong bipartisan Congressional support for Taiwan into an equation. Heritage Foundations expert Walter Lohman believes that the TRA comes close to what

The TRA contains assurances of U.S. concern for Taiwans security


that are as strong as possible
declares that peace and stability in the
area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States
it declares that any attempt to determine Taiwans future
by anything other than peaceful means constitutes a threat to the peace and
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.
otherwise would be a formal treaty:

short of a treaty commitment. It

, and are matters of

international concern [as opposed to internal PRC concern]. Additionally,

Lohman is

right. In addition, while the language of the TRA is vague, it is ultimately not any more vague than language used in some of the mutual defense treaties that bind the U.S. with its allies. It is worthwhile to look at the wording of the
TRAs predecessor, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, its article V in particular: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the

the
absence of formal links between Taiwan and the U.S. matter less in terms of formal
obligations The key variable is the political will to make difficult decisions at a time
when the need arises. Where it matters is public perception
Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Ultimately,

the

of the relationship. For it to work in a desirable way,

strategic ambiguity is not the best tool. It is an absence of political will that prevents greater utilization of the existing framework. Cold War-era interests that bonded Washington and Taipei together are long gone. However, a new
factor has emerged to strengthen relations between Taiwan and America: Taiwans democracy. During the Cold War, U.S. ties to Taiwan were dictated by geostrategic interests. Times have changed, but little has changed in terms of
Taiwans significance. Compared to the past, Taiwans democracy adds an additional layer strengthening Taiwans relationship not only with the U.S., but also with U.S. regional allies, Japan in particular. The importance of Taiwan-U.S.
relations goes well beyond the limits of bilateral relations. Taiwan is a claimant in both the East and South China Seas, where tensions have been ratcheted up, particularly by Beijing. In the East China Sea, Taiwan has demonstrated a
flexible attitude by reaching a fishery agreement with Japan in 2013. Likewise, in the South China Sea, Taiwan is a voice supporting settlement of the disputes according to UNCLOS and other principles of international law. Thus,
Taiwan tends to be more supportive of U.S. efforts in the region. Even if Taiwan cannot be expected to completely drop its South China Sea claim, the incoming DPP administration is likely to be less ideologically committed in
emphasizing the original ROC claim, and focus more on practical measures related to its hold on Taiping Island. Strong cooperation between Washington and Taipei should manifest in Taiwan playing positive role in managing regional
disputes. which needs some adjustment The TRA provides a solid frame for strong bilateral relations. The problem is a number of political considerations that put Taiwan in an awkward position and put the strength of the mutual
security relationship in doubt in the publics eye. It does not help that Taiwans de facto embassy is not allowed to fly the national flag, Taiwans government officials are banned from entering Washington, D.C., and the over-reported
views of some U.S.-based academics and think-tank experts treat Taiwan as an expendable accessory to U.S.-China relations. Under the surface, there are many positive exchanges taking place, and last year was quite illustrative in
revealing some of the activities that usually stayed undetected. In May 2015, delegation from Taiwan took part in U.S. Marine Corps conference on maritime and amphibious operations in Hawaii. In June 2015, Taipei Times reported
that Taiwans Army Aviation 601st Brigade formed a sister-unit relationship with U.S. Army 25th Combat Aviation Brigade based in Hawaii. Earlier this year, tragic accident drew attention to a fact that Taiwanese pilots train for nearly
20 years on Luke Air Force Base in Texas. The question is how to translate extensive cooperation between the two sides into greater confidence in Taiwan, which in turn will strengthen existing cooperation in the eyes of Taiwanese

Military exercises have


two basic functions.
they help to increase familiarity between allied
militaries and examine scenarios for different contingencies. On a political level,
they are a form of signalling to domestic public and potential rivals . I
public. Fortunately, it only takes some adjustment in selected areas and carefully calibrated publicity to improve the image of the bilateral relationship. Military Exercises
On a practical level,

t is easy to see

why the U.S. would be hesitant to openly promote military cooperation with Taiwan. But it is essential to have joint exercises between the two militaries. In case of military conflict, Taiwanese and American soldiers may need to face
the enemy together, and without the close cooperation between them that can be achieved only through joint exercises, the alternative is to run two parallel campaigns. Granted, most of these activities do not necessarily need to be

making selected opportunities public sends a signal about ongoing


cooperation and contributes to deterring Beijing from resorting to military
force
publicized. However,

. Joint exercises in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HADR) is another area where strengthening cooperation is of great importance for both sides given the regions propensity to natural disasters.

A good publicity opportunity is the forthcoming multi-national RIMPAC naval exercise in Hawaii. The Taiwan Navy could send its combat support ship Panshih (also suitable for HADR missions) to avoid the presence of any of the more
high-profile warships in Taiwans naval inventory. Granted, the Chinese who are likely to participate this year for a second time, despite their 2014 appearance ending rather embarrassingly, would not be very happy. They may even
withdrawal their participation. But then, perhaps the U.S. military should not put too big of emphasis on the mil-to-mil contacts with China which are of dubious overall value. An alternative solution is to start with port calls of U.S.
Navy ships in Taiwanese ports as well as Taiwanese ships in U.S. ports and naval bases. Frequent visits Port calls are form of visits that are typically publicised and help to signal a good relationship. It is also an opportunity for the
crews to meet their counterparts. This is not to say that members of both armed forces do not meet regularly. According to Ian Easton, around 3000 meetings between members of Taiwan and U.S. military take place every year.

What is missing are visits on a high military level. The commander of 5th fleet based in Japan, for example, should be able to visit Taipei and discuss matters of common interests with Taiwanese counterparts and vice versa.
Removing the outdated ban on Taiwans government officials coming to D.C. should be natural part of the process. One good sign from the past year was the U.S.-Taiwan defense conference, known as the Monterey Talks which has
taken place annually since 1997. The significance of last years conference was the place: for the first time it took place in Washington, D.C. with Taiwans delegation led by former defense minister Andrew Yang. Arms sales In the

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has been the most reliable indicator of
U.S. resolve to uphold stability in the Taiwan Strait
decades since 1979,

. That resolve became even more important with Taiwans transition to

multi-party democracy. However, since mid-2000s sales have become increasingly irregular. Partly for reasons stemming from gridlock in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bians second term, partly for what appears to be consideration to
Chinese hostile position on any arms sales to Taiwan. The large arms sales packages from years 2008, 2010 and 2011, the last ones until December 2015, were mostly realization of arms package agreed in 2001. Arguably, the
amount of weapons acquired between 2009 and 2011 take some time to absorb, which in turn justifies the four year gap between 2011 and the most recent sale in December 2015. However, the long period of no sale has done

Absence of arms sales has greater potential to encourage than to


placate Beijing
some harm, and no good.

. The way out is to arrange for arms sales on annual basis, thus making the sales part of status quo. It does not need to include big ticket items every year. That is not really necessary.

What is important is to renew some sense of order in the sales.

--xt ASB
In the context of ASB, Taiwan is in NEA
Schreer 2013 - Senior Analyst for Defence Strategy at ASPI
Benjamin, "Strategy: Planning the Unthinkable War," April,
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/planning-the-unthinkable-war-airsea-battleand-its-implications-for-australia/Strategy_AirSea.pdf
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are the key potential players in Northeast
Asia when it comes to AirSea Battle. Japan and Taiwan are frontline states in a
possible Sino-US conflict, while South Koreas geostrategic location and its hosting of US bases also give it
Northeast Asia

a potentially important role. While all of them have sought to engage China in order to encourage its peaceful rise,
fears about Beijings trajectory have recently led to their increased reliance on the US as a means of external

As a result, they might be more open to support an AirSea Battle


framework, albeit to varying degrees.
balancing.

AT: We solve the link


China wont simply reverse course on its modernization efforts
Haddick 2014 -an independent contractor at U.S. Special Operations Command
Robert, Fire on the Water, Naval Institute Press, p. 211
skeptics who doubt whether it is wise or even practical for the United States to
attempt to sustain its leading role in the region in the face of China's rapid rise.16 It is
Naturally there are

important to rebut the skeptics' arguments. Some skeptics assert that a visible and formidable response to China
will only antagonize China, making an enemy where none previously existed. But this ignores the fact that C hina's

well-planned military modernization strategy began two decades ago and has
followed a steady course since its inception. The U.S. "pivot to Asia" came long after
and was clearly a response to decisions China's leaders had previously taken. The skeptics'
view also presumes that China's leaders respond emotionally rather than deliberately, as is much more likely the

The recent U.S. response to the changing security balance in the western Pacific
will not spark a new military competition with China, because that competition has
been already been under way for some time.
case.

They lack a reverse causal claim diplomacy will fail because


Chinas A2AD capacity is developed in order to expand their
economic and military might
Friedberg 2015 -professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton
University
Aaron L, "Deterrence and Alliance: The Debate Over US China Strategy," Survival:
Global Politics and Strategy Volume 57, Issue 3, 2015, p 89-110
Albeit with occasional shifts in rhetorical tone and emphasis, and comparatively minor adjustments in the blend of
engagement and balancing, for the past quarter-century successive US administrations have continued to adhere to
the same basic approach. In the last several years, however, questions have emerged about the adequacy and
long-term durability of this strategy. While China is obviously far richer today than it was in the aftermath of the
Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, it is no more democratic. Indeed, to the contrary, the elevation of Xi Jinping to
the status of China's paramount leader in 2012 has been accompanied by a wide-ranging crackdown on dissent, a
further tightening of controls over access to the internet, and new restrictions on the activities of non-governmental
organisations, especially those suspected of trying to strengthen civil society in order to promote human rights and

Despite decades of deepening engagement, China appears , if anything, to


have moved further away from meaningful political reform. Meanwhile, fuelled by rapid
economic expansion, the nation's military capabilities have grown to impressive
dimensions. Among other developments, the deployment by China of so-called anti-access/areadenial (A2/AD) forces has raised serious questions about the future willingness and, perhaps,
the ability of the United States to project power into the Western Pacific. Especially in light of the fiscal
social justice.

constraints under which it now labours, it is not obvious that the United States can continue to play its accustomed

China's recent behaviour, especially


in disputes with several of its maritime neighbours, has caused some observers to reexamine the pleasing assumption that the country is fast on its way to becoming a
status quo power. To the contrary, China's assertion of the right to control most of the water, islands and
resources off its coasts, and its new-found ability to use displays of power and threats of
force to advance those claims, have shattered the illusion that it wants nothing
more than to become a responsible stakeholder in the existing international order.
role in preserving a favourable balance of power in East Asia. Finally,

AT: Abandonment Improves Relations


Abandonment jacks relations
Tucker & Glaser 11 (*Nancy Bernkopf; authority on U.S. diplomatic relations
with Taiwan and China and a professor of history at Georgetown Universitys School
of Foreign Service; **Bonnie Glaser, senior adviser for Asia and the director of the
China Power Project at CSIS, erved as a member of the Defense Departments
Defense Policy Board China Panel in 1997, Should the United States Abandon
Taiwan?, The Washington Quarterly 34:4 pp. 23-37, Fall 2011, https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf, BC)

A decision to jettison Taiwan, or even cut back significantly on U.S. support , would
prove to an increasingly confident China that Washington has become
weak, vacillating, and unreliable. The 2009 U.S.China Joint Statement reflected Beijings
estimate that Washington could be intimidated or misled, as it juxtaposed a reference to Taiwan as a Chinese core
interest with concurrence that the two sides agreed that respecting each others core interests is extremely
important to ensure steady progress in U.SChina relations.4 Analysts who argue that Washington can safely
appease Beijing because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail are, without evidence, assuming
improbably modest Chinese objectives (emphasis added).5 Relying on the sacrifice of Taiwan to fulfill Chinese
ambitions ignores more than intentions, it also overlooks internal dynamics in China. Beijing confronts constant
domestic turmoil. Corruption, income inequality, and environmental degradation have tarnished the
accomplishments of the government and party. Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest,
spurred by the Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East, produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet
along with the imprisonment of artists, underground church members, protesting peasants, lawyers, and human
rights activists. Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring balance to internal unhappiness.

Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which , though fostered by the government, is still
difficult to control. Any suspicion that authorities are not adequately safeguarding
Chinese interests and securing international respect could threaten regime stability. Accordingly,
a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, could not thoroughly slake a continuing
need for Beijing to demonstrate its power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote
new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to satisfy that need. Accommodating
Chinas demands on Taiwan, moreover, would not necessarily cause Beijing to be more
pliable on other matters of importance to the United States. Beijings positions on issues such
as Korea and Iran are shaped by Chinas national interests and are not taken as
favors to Washington. Beijings determination to preserve stability in its close neighbor and ally North Korea
would continue to prevent China from increasing pressure on Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons. Resolving
Chinas Taiwan problem would also not mean greater cooperation in preventing Iran
from going nuclear given Beijings almost universal opposition to muscular sanctions, its growing
energy needs, and desire to promote Chinese influence in the Middle East.

UQ

2NC - Brink
The US-Taiwan coalition is balancing China now but its on the
brinkany signal of abandonment causes Tawainese
proliferation and military buildup
Mearsheimer 14 (John; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago; March/April 2014 National Interest,
Issue #130, Taiwans Dire Straits, http://political-science.uchicago.edu/facultyarticles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf, BC)

the United States is likely to be somewhat schizophrenic about


Taiwan in the decades ahead. On one hand, it has powerful incentives to make it part of a
balancing coalition aimed at containing China. On the other hand, there are good reasons
to think that with the passage of time the benefits of maintaining close ties with
Taiwan will be outweighed by the potential costs , which are likely to be huge. Of course, in
the near term, the United States will protect Taiwan and treat it as a strategic asset.
All of this is to say that

But how long that relationship lasts is an open question. So far, the discussion about Taiwans future has focused

what happens to
Taiwan in the face of Chinas rise also depends greatly on what policies Taiwans
leaders and its people choose to pursue over time. There is little doubt that Taiwans
overriding goal in the years ahead will be to preserve its independence
from China. That aim should not be too difficult to achieve for the next decade,
mainly because Taiwan is almost certain to maintain close relations with the United
States, which will have powerful incentives as well as the capability to protect Taiwan. But after that
point Taiwans strategic situation is likely to deteriorate in significant
ways, mainly because China will be rapidly approaching the point where it can conquer Taiwan even if the
American military helps defend the island. And, as noted, it is not clear that the United States
will be there for Taiwan over the long term. In the face of this grim future, Taiwan has
three options. First, it can develop its own nuclear deterrent . Nuclear weapons are
almost exclusively on how the United States is likely to act toward Taiwan. However,

the ultimate deterrent, and there is no question that a Taiwanese nuclear arsenal would markedly reduce the

Taiwan pursued this option in the 1970s, when it


feared American abandonment in the wake of the Vietnam War. The United States, however,
stopped Taiwans nuclear-weapons program in its tracks. And then Taiwan tried to develop a bomb
secretly in the 1980s, but again the United States found out and forced Taipei to shut the program down. It
likelihood of a Chinese attack against Taiwan.

is unfortunate for Taiwan that it failed to build a bomb, because its prospects for maintaining its independence

Taiwan still has time to acquire a


nuclear deterrent before the balance of power in Asia shifts decisively against it. But
would be much improved if it had its own nuclear arsenal. No doubt

the problem with this suggestion is that both Beijing and Washington are sure to oppose Taiwan going nuclear. The
United States would oppose Taiwanese nuclear weapons, not only because they would encourage Japan and South
Korea to follow suit, but also because American policy makers abhor the idea of an ally being in a position to start a
nuclear war that might ultimately involve the United States. To put it bluntly, no American wants to be in a situation
where Taiwan can precipitate a conflict that might result in a massive nuclear attack on the United States. China will
adamantly oppose Taiwan obtaining a nuclear deterrent, in large part because Beijing surely understands that it
would make it difficultmaybe even impossibleto conquer Taiwan. Whats more, China will recognize that

Taiwanese nuclear weapons would facilitate nuclear proliferation in East


Asia, which would not only limit Chinas ability to throw its weight around
in that region, but also would increase the likelihood that any
conventional war that breaks out would escalate to the nuclear level . For

these reasons, China is likely to make it manifestly clear that if Taiwan decides to pursue nuclear weapons, it will
strike its nuclear facilities, and maybe even launch a war to conquer the island. In short, it appears that it is too late
for Taiwan to pursue the nuclear option. Taiwans second option is conventional deterrence. How
could Taiwan make deterrence work without nuclear weapons in a world where China has clear-cut military

The key to success is not to


be able to defeat the Chinese militarythat is impossiblebut instead to
make China pay a huge price to achieve victory. In other words, the aim is to make China
superiority over the combined forces of Taiwan and the United States?

fight a protracted and bloody war to conquer Taiwan. Yes, Beijing would prevail in the end, but it would be a Pyrrhic
victory. This strategy would be even more effective if Taiwan could promise China that the resistance would

The threat that Taiwan might turn into


another Sinkiang or Tibet would foster deterrence for sure. This option is akin to Admiral
continue even after its forces were defeated on the battlefield.

Alfred von Tirpitzs famous risk strategy, which Imperial Germany adopted in the decade before World War I.
Tirpitz accepted the fact that Germany could not build a navy powerful enough to defeat the mighty Royal Navy in
battle. He reasoned, however, that Berlin could build a navy that was strong enough to inflict so much damage on
the Royal Navy that it would cause London to fear a fight with Germany and thus be deterred. Moreover, Tirpitz
reasoned that this risk fleet might even give Germany diplomatic leverage it could use against Britain. There are a
number of problems with this form of conventional deterrence, which raise serious doubts about whether it can
work for Taiwan over the long haul. For starters, the strategy depends on the United States fighting side by side
with Taiwan. But it is difficult to imagine American policy makers purposely choosing to fight a war in which the U.S.
military is not only going to lose, but is also going to pay a huge price in the process. It is not even clear that Taiwan
would want to fight such a war, because it would be fought mainly on Taiwanese territorynot Chinese territory
and there would be death and destruction everywhere. And Taiwan would lose in the end anyway. Furthermore ,

pursuing this option would mean that Taiwan would be constantly in an


arms race with China, which would help fuel an intense and dangerous
security competition between them. The sword of Damocles, in other words, would always be
hanging over Taiwan. Finally, although it is difficult to predict just how dominant China will become in the distant
future, it is possible that it will eventually become so powerful that Taiwan will be unable to put up major resistance
against a Chinese onslaught. This would certainly be true if Americas commitment to defend Taiwan weakens as
China morphs into a superpower.

UQ Caution Now Good


Scaling back U.S. commitment leads to armed conflict
Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor at the University of Maryland, College Park,
02-26-16, Online: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/taiwan-strait3_final.pdf, Article: How Stable Is the Taiwan Strait? Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
Maintaining the U.S. Commitment to Taiwan. The above analysis suggests that the
United States will continue to face difficult trade-offs in its Taiwan Strait policy. On
the one hand, the United States should notas some prominent analysts have
suggestedscale back its commitment to Taiwan. Such a change in U.S. policy
would accelerate the shifting balance of power in the strait, thereby magnifying the
risk of armed conflict between the PRC and Taiwan. On the other hand, Washington
must continue to tread cautiously on the Taiwan issue. The fact remains that many
in China care deeply about Taiwan. PRC leaders will thus continue to feel compelled
to react strongly to U.S. policies and actions that appear to be ratcheting up U.S.Taiwan security cooperation especially when Taiwan is governed by the DPP

Assurance High - TRA


Taiwan feels safe after passage of TRA in the House
Taiwan Today 5/17/16 (TRA, 6 Assurances reaffirmed as cornerstone of Taiwan-US
relations; 5/17/16; accessed 6/29/16; http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?
xItem=244801&ctNode=2175)
The Taiwan Relations Act and Six Assurances were reaffirmed May 16 as the
cornerstone of U.S.-Taiwan relations following unanimous passage of House
Concurrent Resolution 88 by the U.S. House of Representatives.
It was the first time for the TRA and Six Assurances to appear in a resolution passed
by Congress, and reaffirms a firm foundation of U.S. support for Taiwan in the run up
to the May 20 inauguration of President-elect Tsai Ing-wen.
HCR 88 follows approval April 28 by the U.S. Senate of S. 1635, a bill containing
similar text in support for the TRA and Six Assurances, as well as a resolution to the
same effect by the Republican National Committee during its April 20-23 spring
meeting.
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S.the
organization responsible for representing Taiwans interests in the U.S.said it was
grateful for the strong vote of confidence by Congress in the TRA and Six
Assurances. At a time when Taiwan is about to undergo a change of government,
HCR 88 sends a clear message that Congress supports defending Taiwans
democracy and freedom.
Signed into law in 1979 following the switch of recognition from Taipei to Beijing by
the U.S., the TRA authorizes the continuation of substantive relations between the
people of the U.S. and the people on Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic ties
between them, as well as to help maintain peace, security and stability in the
western Pacific.
Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan issued the Six Assurances in 1982, stipulating
that the U.S. would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan; alter the
terms of the TRA; consult with mainland China in advance before making decisions
about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan; mediate between Taiwan and mainland China; alter
its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan and pressure Taiwan to enter into
negotiations with mainland China; and formally recognize mainland Chinese
sovereignty over Taiwan.
Taiwan and the U.S. share such common values as freedom, democracy, respect for
human rights, rule of law and a market-based economy. Over the past decades,
both sides have enjoyed a robust relationship spanning commerce, culture and
other areas of mutual interest.

Assurance High Military Budge


Increased military budget for Taiwan bolsters its assurances of
US protection
Taiwan Today 5/16/16 (Taiwan Today is the nations premier Internet-based news
outlet, providing comprehensive coverage of the latest business, cultural and
political developments; MOFA thanks US for firm stance on cross-strait peace;
Taiwan Today, An official website of the Peoples Republic of China (Taiwan); 5/16/16;
accessed 6/29/16; http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=244769&ctNode=2175)
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs thanked May 14 the U.S. for paying close attention to
Taiwans national security situation and cross-strait relations, and for its
commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act as demonstrated in the latest U.S.
Department of Defense annual report on military and security developments
involving mainland China.
As per the TRA, the report said the U.S. has contributed to peace, security and
stability in the Taiwan Strait through such efforts as announcing arms sales of more
than US$14 billion to Taiwan since 2009 to help the nation maintain sufficient selfdefense capabilities.
Signed into law in 1979 following the switch of recognition from Taipei to Beijing by
the U.S., the TRA authorizes the continuation of substantive relations between the
people of the U.S. and the people on Taiwan in the absence of diplomatic ties
between them, as well as to help maintain peace, security and stability in the
western Pacific.
While addressing the current and likely course of mainland Chinas militarytechnology development and future security and military strategies, the report said
Taiwans military spending has dropped to around 2 percent of its gross domestic
product, whereas mainland Chinas official defense budget has surged to about 14
times that of Taiwans.
In response to the report, the Ministry of National Defense said Taiwans annual
defense budget, although representing less than 3 percent of its GDP, has been
trending upward over the last three years.
The MND has repeatedly stated that the government would consider using a reserve
fund or other sources to finance major arms procurements in the future. The armed
forces will continue making effective use of available resources to bolster national
defense, safeguard national security and maintain peace and stability across the
Taiwan Strait. (KH-E)

Alliance High
US-Taiwan relations strongest in four decades after US to
support Taiwan bid for Interpol observer status
The News Lens 3/16/16 (The News Lens is a bilingual website based in Taiwan and
Hong Kong; US Congress Passes Bill for Taiwan to Join Interpol as an Observer;
translated by Shin-wei Chang; 3/16/16; accessed 6/29/16;
http://international.thenewslens.com/article/38290)
On March 8, the US Senate approved the bill supporting Taiwan in joining the
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) as an observer. On March 15,
the US House of Representative unanimously passed the bill, completing the last
stage of making it legislation with 381 supporting votes.
The bill was introduced last April and has gained full support of the US Congress
within a year. It will officially become a legislative law after President Obama signs
it.
As an observer, Taiwan will have the right to speak during the General Assembly
plenary sessions. However, when the President of Interpol considers the discussion
topic irrelevant to Taiwan, s/he has the right to ask Taiwan to leave the conference
hall.
Moreover, Taiwan will not be able to raise points of order, put procedural motions,
appeal against decisions of the President or submit proposals in the General
Assembly.
To be accepted as a full membership, it takes a two-thirds of majority of the General
Assembly to consent.
Full support of the US Congress
Ed Royce, chairman for the Foreign Affairs Committee, says Taiwan will be able to
know the latest information of criminal activities by joining Interpol, and that helps
everyones security. Royce added, I urge President Obama to sign it as soon as
possible.
Voice of America reports, Rep. Chris Smith, who sponsored the bill, also pointed out
the danger for Taiwan unable to obtain first-hand criminal intelligence saying that it
makes the island vulnerable to security threats. Smith also says, Taiwans
participation will benefit Interpols reform.
Senator Cory Gardner introduced this bill, and Senator Ben Cardin was the cosponsor. In addition, Ros-Lehtinen, former chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, not only voted, but also signed a petition supporting Taiwan rejoining
Interpol.
New benchmark of Taiwan-US relations
The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US says the bill
indicates US consistent position of supporting Taiwan to participate in international
organizations. The office also expressed its appreciation for all of the
congresspersons that support the bill.

On March 8, when the Senate passed the bill, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Taiwan released a statement saying, Taiwan-US relations are at their best state in
37 years.

Alliance on Brink
The US-Taiwan relationship is fragile after Taiwans elections--any new engagement will hurt relations
Hammond-Chambers 1/25/16 (Rupert Hammond-Chambers has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the
University of Chicago and a BA in Mathematics from Cornell University, is the Chairman on the US-Taiwan Business
Council, is a visiting scholar at American Enterprise Institute, was president of the World Bank Group, was Deputy
Secretary of the US Department of Defense, was a Dean and Professor of International Relations in the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, was Ambassador to Indonesia, was Under
Secretary for Policy at the US DOD, was Assistant Secretary for East Asian & Pacific Affairs in the State Department,
was Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, was the Visiting Professor of the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins, was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Programs in the DOD,
was a Special Assistant of SALT of the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, and was the Professor of the
Department of Political Science at Yale University; Taiwans new administration and the US; The Hill; 1/25/16;
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/266739-taiwans-new-administration-and-the-us)

Tsai will also need to deepen her relationship with the United States, which has had
to be rebuilt after poor U.S. treatment of her and her candidacy in 2012. The
remainder of 2016 will therefore necessitate a feeling-out period, as she will need
the U.S. to appear willing to support her, while the U.S. needs to demonstrate its
credibility with the new Taiwan government.
The U.S. relationship could be boosted significantly if Tsai were to immediately prioritize tackling the most
contentious issue in bilateral trade ties - imports of U.S. pork containing the additive ractopamine - and she has
already commented on US pork import arrangements with Korea and Japan as potentially providing a solution.
Addressing this issue would not only improve the Taiwan-U.S. relationship, it would also boost Taiwan's bid for
consideration as a second round entrant into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Indeed, Tsai's primary external goal must be membership in the TPP. Taiwan's over-reliance on China must be
addressed, and access to the world's most important multilateral trade initiative could play a key role. Preparations
for joining could act as a catalyst for much needed domestic trade and economic reforms, and membership would
afford Taiwan renewed engagement with the TPP member countries, thereby boosting relationships with its Asia
Pacific neighbors.
China will not be happy with the outcome of Taiwan's elections, but it has only itself to blame. The PRC leadership
has not persuaded the people on Taiwan that unification is the best course forward. Instead, tensions are going to

China will keep Taiwan and


the U.S. on the defensive, intimidating both sides into negotiating with themselves
in the hope that unilateral concessions to China will prevent the possibility of PRC
belligerence. It will require strong U.S. leadership to fend off this strategy.
rise over Taiwan because China now views that to be in its own best interest.

Tsai does have one significant card to play with China; Taiwan's dormant cross-Strait trade legislation. If she
persuades the legislature to pass a China fast-track authority in the next four months that would be a major gesture
of goodwill. The sequencing of such a move would depend on how quickly China spikes tensions and any US politics
affecting Taiwan's effort to join the TPP.
Taiwan's role in the global supply chain is an economic and strategic imperative for the island. China's ambition to
build a "red supply chain" is not designed to compete against the legacy supply chain but to replace it, and could
have dire implications for Taiwan and for global tech companies. It was spotlighted by recent hostile attempts by
Tsinghua Unigroup to acquire companies in Taiwan's chip sector, specifically in IC design and in semiconductor
packaging and testing. Security and business concerns over relying on Chinese suppliers include intellectual
property and trade secrets protection, competitiveness, and innovation. With Taiwan a major player in the global
technology supply chain, Tsai will need to frame policies that keep domestic businesses competitive and free of
Chinese control.

Tsai should enjoy a honeymoon period in which to tackle some early issues, but she
will need strong reciprocal support from the U.S. as well. If any coercive behavior
from China isn't met head on, China may see an ambivalent U.S. as an opportunity
to define and set the tone for Tsai's presidency before potentially more assertive
U.S. leadership is in place to push back. That will boost the fortunes of small but growing political

parties whose views are more radical than the DPP and KMT. That could result in further estrangement for the
island, in radicalization of Taiwan independence politics, and a bigger headache for both China and the U.S. down
the road.

US walking fine line on Taiwan relations


Krejsa 5/18/16 (Harry Krejsa is a Research Associate at the Center for a New
American Security working in the Asia-Pacific Security Program and he worked for
the Joint Economic Committee in Congress, and served as a Fulbright Fellow in
Taiwan; How to Keep a Tougher Taiwan from Blowing Up; The National Interest;
5/18/16; accessed 6/29/16; http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-keep-toughertaiwan-blowing-16257)
This week, Taiwan will swear in its fourth democratically elected president, the first woman to hold the title.
President-elect Tsai Ing-wen will also assume office with a historic legislative majority, marking the first time her
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) will enjoy unified control of government. The DPP has traditionally favored
moving Taiwan toward formal independence, but during the campaign it promised domestic and nervous
international audiences that it would largely maintain the cross-Strait status quo. Mounting economic anxiety, an
increasingly independence-minded public and growing pressure from mainland China, however, may bend that
pledge to its breaking point.
Unlike the events of the early 2000s, these confrontational pressures are not of the DPPs own making. In a
forthcoming report from the Center for a New American Security, I outline how Taiwanese society seems to be
shifting away from a trajectory of ever greater economic integration, and toward growing Sino-skepticism. Outgoing
President Ma Ying-jeou and his Kuomintang (KMT) party deserve credit for bringing much-needed stability and
commerce to cross-Strait relations, but his rapprochement agenda hit a wall in his second term. The traditional
high/low-tech division of labor across the strait began to blur as the mainland transitioned from a complementary
source of cheap labor to an increasingly advanced direct competitor. Moreover, Chinas gangbusters growth, which
had so recently been a compelling reason for closer cross-Strait economic ties, began rapidly decelerating and
dragging Taiwan down with it. In the eyes of the Taiwanese public, Chinas economy had shifted from a source of
stability to a liability.
In addition to this perception of economic malaise, a surging sense of Taiwanese identity distinct from China
promises to alter the islands politics for years to come. Polls reflect a public that increasingly rejects the shared
Chinese identity and historical affinity that have been at the heart of the traditional ruling KMT line. Tensions over
how close Taiwan should get to China boiled over in the spring of 2014, as the Sunflower Movement formed to
protest a new services trade pact. Two hundred demonstrators occupied the legislature calling for greater
transparency in cross-Strait negotiations, and within two weeks five hundred thousand people were rallying on the
streets of Taipei.
China, which sees eventual reunification with Taiwan as a core national interest, had until recently been relatively
content that the trends were at least moving in a favorable direction. Now that Taiwanese public opinion has turned
rather decisively against deeper integration, carrying the Sino-skeptic party to historic majorities, the mainland
seems poised to ratchet up the pressure. Recent weeks have seen a proliferation of hostile gestures, from small and
symbolic to severe and embarrassing. Most newsworthy has been the deportation of dozens of Taiwanese
citizens from Kenya and Malaysia to China rather than their island home, constituting an abduction in the eyes of
many in Taiwan.

U.S. policy will need to strike a careful balance, continuing to support Taiwans
resilience against coercion, but without excessively stoking animosities on either
side of the strait. This will include both economic and strategic hedges. Taiwan needs a source of growth,
international integration and economic autonomy that is separate from its mainland neighbor. In addition, Taiwan
needs to continue to bolster its defensive capabilitiesbut with a more pragmatic
eye toward distinguishing its true needs from hardware prestige projects.
Should the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) take effect, the United States should
support eventual Taiwanese accession to the agreement. Dr. Tsai and the incoming DPP
government have made joining TPP a high priority, but they could face stiff opposition from other advanced,

U.S. policymakers should acclimate existing partners to


the idea, emphasizing the supply-chain efficiencies that Taiwan would likely bring to
midsized economies like South Korea.

existing intra-TPP advanced manufacturing. Taiwan would also be wise to engage in trade
liberalization prior to formal accession talks. The United States has been on the receiving end of
protectionist Taiwanese policies and could serve as a willing partner in such
commercial confidence-building measures.
Strategically, the United States should encourage Taiwan toward efforts that are
quietly strengthening and powerfully practical. The presidential campaign focused on fostering
advanced indigenous defense manufacturing, such as submarine construction, but building such a capacity from
scratch can be immensely expensive, technically complicated and geopolitically destabilizing, without any
guarantee of success. Rather than attempting to match major-power capabilities, Taiwan should consider investing
in cheaper platforms more tailored to its needsnamely, amphibious invasion defense. Sea mines, anti-ship
missiles, embedded antiship and antiair gunnery, and hardened infrastructure would gain Taiwan far more bang for
its buck than a few submarines or fighter jets.
More important than defensive hardware, however, would be a renewed focus on human capital. Taiwans military
has had a troubled transition to an all-volunteer force, largely failing to attract and retain volunteers in adequate
numbers. The United States has significant experience transforming its military from a mass-conscription service to
an elite and desirable vocationexperience that could be shared with its Taiwanese partners via greater
institutional support and training. U.S. policymakers should also place such warfighter-focused initiatives on the
same diplomatic level as conventional arms sales, with congressional notifications and international signaling
marking the seriousness of such aid.
Continued stability in the Strait of Taiwan requires both sides to feel economically, militarily and politically secure.
With these strategic and economic hedges, Taiwan may be able to improve its deterrence against Chinese threats
and get its economy growing again. If not, the voices calling for confrontation on both sides of the strait may grow
too loud to resist.

http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/tsai-ing-wen-hardly-beijings-worst-nightmare/
Beijings worst nightmare has materialized and it turns out to be not so bad after
all, if China can tolerate modest success. Taiwans pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party has swept the presidency and, for the first time, the national
legislature.
But Tsai Ing-wen immediately used her landslide election to assure Beijing and
Washington that she would be a reliable, predictable partner in preserving crossstrait stability. Now it is time for the other governments involved, China and the
United States, to reciprocate her positive message.
Throughout the campaign and since her victor, the president-elect has had to
address three different audiences: Taiwans voters, particularly her own enthusiastic
supporters; Chinas ruling Communist Party; and the United States government,
which was more sensitive to the views of the latter than the former.
Tsai, a sober, scholarly lawyer, skillfully negotiated a political tightrope, adhering to
her principles and those of her party while avoiding inflammatory language or a
defiant tone whenever she addressed the issues separating China and Taiwan. She
maintained that posture after her dramatic and historic win Taiwans sixth direct
presidential election since the end of martial law, the third peaceful transfer of
power, and the elevation of the first female leader in a Chinese-speaking society.

UQ CCP Weak
The CCP is vulnerable
Coassa and Glosserman 2015 - Both at Pacific Forum CSIS
Ralph A and Brad, "Regional Overview: The Rebalance Picks up Steam," September,
csis.org/files/publication/1502qoverview.pdf
The ripples from Chinese decisions are spreading. The slowdown has reduced Chinas
demand for the raw materials that feed its manufacturing machine. African nations such as Sierra Leone,
Angola, Zambia, and Liberia are considered especially vulnerable to the new normal in China. Chinas foreign direct
investment is also expected to take a hit, which will end up bruising many emerging market economies that have
come to rely on its investments. One study concluded that Australia, Brazil, Russia, Chile, and Korea will be

It can be assumed that key institutions, such as


the military, will not be affected by the slowdown or any cut in foreign exchange reserves. The
Chinese Communist Party has, since the adoption of economic reforms more than two decades ago,
established its legitimacy on the ability to offer steadily improving lives to Ch inese; its
claim to rule is based on economic returns , not ideology. That image is now badly
dented and if investors take big hits, the credibility of the party and its legitimacy could be
at risk.
especially hard hit by the currency devaluation.

Aff - Taiwan Prolif DA

AT: Links

Abandonment Good
Absent abandonment, Taiwan will become a flashpoint for USChina war
Mearsheimer 14 (John; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago; March/April 2014 National Interest,
Issue #130, Taiwans Dire Straits, http://political-science.uchicago.edu/facultyarticles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf, BC)

While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing
coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is
not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or
so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against
a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military
capability than it has today. In addition, geography works in Chinas favor in a major
way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from
the United States. When it comes to a competition between China and the United States over projecting
military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan,
American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against
Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation.
This reticence would also work to Chinas advantage. One might argue that there is a simple
way to deal with the fact that Taiwan will not have an effective conventional deterrent against China in the not-toodistant future: put Americas nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. This approach will not solve the problem, however,

the United States is not going to escalate to the nuclear level if Taiwan is
being overrun by China. The stakes are not high enough to risk a general
thermonuclear war. Taiwan is not Japan or even South Korea. Thus, the smart strategy for America is to not
even try to extend its nuclear deterrent over Taiwan. There is a second reason the United
States might eventually forsake Taiwan: it is an especially dangerous
flashpoint, which could easily precipitate a Sino-American war that is not in
Americas interest. U.S. policy makers understand that the fate of Taiwan is a matter of great
concern to Chinese of all persuasions and that they will be extremely angry if it
looks like the United States is preventing unification . But that is exactly what Washington will be
because

doing if it forms a close military alliance with Taiwan, and that point will not be lost on the Chinese people. It is
important to note in this regard that Chinese nationalism, which is a potent force, emphasizes how great powers like
the United States humiliated China in the past when it was weak and appropriated Chinese territory like Hong Kong

it is not difficult to imagine crises breaking out over Taiwan or


scenarios in which a crisis escalates into a shooting war. After all, Chinese nationalism
will surely be a force for trouble in those crises, and China will at some point have the military
and Taiwan. Thus,

wherewithal to conquer Taiwan, which will make war even more likely. There was no flashpoint between the
superpowers during the Cold War that was as dangerous as Taiwan will be in a Sino-American security competition.
Some commentators liken Berlin in the Cold War to Taiwan, but Berlin was not sacred territory for the Soviet Union

Given how dangerous it


is for precipitating a war and given the fact that the United States will eventually
reach the point where it cannot defend Taiwan, there is a reasonable chance that
American policy makers will eventually conclude that it makes good strategic sense
to abandon Taiwan and allow China to coerce it into accepting unification.
and it was actually of little strategic importance for either side. Taiwan is different.

AT: Arms Sales k2 Relations


L/T: Taiwan deterrence is a fallacy arms sales only provide a
false sense of security Taiwans self-defense would prevent
US-China relations from tanking AND rationality checks
Chinese invasion
Bandow 12/21/15, (Doug, is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is a
former special assistant to President Ronald Reagan and the author of several
books, including Foreign Follies: Americas New Global Empire; Arm Taiwan,
America. But Dont Defend It. http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/armtaiwan-america-dont-defend-it-14695?page=2, 12/21/15, //VZ)
the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity has become more dangerous as Chinas
power has increased. Taiwan matters much more to the PRC than America. Thus, as a Chinese general not so
subtly argued, the United States wont risk Los Angeles for Taipei. Indeed, it
would be madness for America to do so. It might seem equally foolish for China to risk,
say, Shanghai to regain Taiwan. But it is far more plausible that the PRC might do so. Enabling Taiwan to
defend itself is the best way out of this conundrum . So long as the residents of Zhongnanhai value prosperity
and stability, they have reason to avoid costly conflict. No arms sales would enable Taipei to defeat a
determined PRC in war. The formers objective, however, should be deterrence, not victory. The idea is to complicate Chinas scenarios, to make them
Indeed,

pause, to get them to think twice before they attack, explained Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. The higher the price any PRC government

Continued patience would remain good sense.


That doesnt mean there wont be costs to the U.S.-China relationship as a result, but they are worth bearing. Theres likely diplomatic turbulence.
would pay for attempting to coerce Taipei, the less likely it would try to do so.

In the past military meetings have been suspended, though only temporarily. There could be economic retaliation, though the threat seems overblown: defense companies are barred
from supplying the PRC and sanctions against civilian sales would hurt the PRC as well.

AT: Glaser
Glaser is wrong
Blumenthal 11 (David; director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, where he focuses on East Asian security issues and Sino-American
relations. Mr. Blumenthal has both served in and advised the U.S. government on
China issues for over a decade, From 2001 to 2004, he served as senior director for
China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense, Rethinking U.S. foreign
policy towards Taiwan, 3/2/11, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/02/rethinking-u-sforeign-policy-towards-taiwan/, BC)

Then there is the role of Taiwan in our foreign policy. It has been a significant part of Asias democratic peace, as
well as a critical part of Asias including Chinas economic boom and the regions political transitions. Every
time we try and abandon it in the 50s, in the 70s, in the 90s we find it too important to be left to Chinas

Theorists like Glaser offer no explanation for why we have not


abandoned Taiwan given all the opportunities we have had to do so. Let me offer a few. Any
change to Taiwans de facto independent status would be highly destabilizing. First,
almost no Taiwanese want to live under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party .
Many Taiwanese would leave the island, meaning that Asia would lose a critical part
of its economic engine. Those who would not leave would likely start to build
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems a process that began, and which we
stopped, the last time we tried to abandon Taiwan. Second, if Taiwan were to fall into
Chinas hands, China could militarize it in such a way as to remove any strategic depth from Japan, to
control the South China Sea, and to push farther forward into the Pacific. For the first time since
Pearl Harbor, we face threats to our command of the Pacific Ocean. Chinas
control of Taiwan would hasten that process. The United States and China would then find many
new reasons for conflict the protection of Japan, access to the Pacific Ocean and
the South China Sea, and so on. Third, there is the matter of U.S. politics, always a significant factor
tender mercies.

much to the consternation of so called realists in U.S. foreign policy. While most Congressmen today do not focus
intensely on Taiwan, a debate about the repeal of the Taiwan Relations Act would focus the mind. In all likelihood, all
the latent frustrations the American public and their representatives feel toward China from unfair trade
practices, to constant cyber attacks, to human rights abuses would find expression in a debate about whether or
not to repeal a law that has kept the peace and allowed Taiwan to prosper. In short, a debate about abandoning a
democratic friend in the face of Chinese pressure would probably bring about the exact opposite of what Glaser
intends. Congress would start to focus on all the dangers that China poses and frustrations its presents. Glaser

Obama has
more or less tried Glasers approach and the result has been a nadir in Sino-U.S.
relations and an intensifying Asian arms race . Given what we have learned about China over
should be commended for his effort to think through war avoidance with China. But President

the recent past, the answer to its aggressiveness is not more concessions and certainly not the abandonment of
a key partner in Asias long peace.

His analysis of Chinese intentions is wrong


Blumenthal 11 (David; director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, where he focuses on East Asian security issues and Sino-American
relations. Mr. Blumenthal has both served in and advised the U.S. government on
China issues for over a decade, From 2001 to 2004, he served as senior director for
China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense, Rethinking U.S. foreign
policy towards Taiwan, 3/2/11, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/02/rethinking-u-sforeign-policy-towards-taiwan/, BC)

Indeed, in providing an answer to Secretary Rumsfelds infamous public query about why the Chinese are engaged

Glaser undermines a pillar of his own argument that Chinas goals


are limited. He says that China is merely responding to U.S. regional military
activities. Exactly right. But the activity that Glaser describes includes strategic tasks
that the United States has undertaken since the end of the Second World War . Perhaps
China is building up its military because it does not like U.S. presence in
Asia, no matter how limited. The difference now is it has the power to do something about it . China is
certainly not reacting to a U.S. military build-up . To the contrary, the very capabilities the
United States most needs in the Pacific have been steadily eroding over the past
decade. Yet despite stability in the strait and a relative decline of U.S. military power in the Pacific, Chinese
military advances continue apace. Glaser never asks the central question how do
China and the United States come to their respective views of security? My
own view is that the sources of national security policy are both deeply embedded in a
nations traditions and are constantly changing. (Who would have imagined that we would be fighting for ten
in a military build-up,

years in Afghanistan? If North Korea collapses tomorrow, we may be looking for nukes with a heavy ground
presence for some time). Only three years ago we were certain that Chinas "core interests" were limited to Tibet,

the Chinese have informed us that their core interests include


the entire South China Sea. For its part, the United States has always taken an
expansive view of its security in Asia; an impulse that intensified after Pearl Harbor. It would never
Xinjiang, and Taiwan. Now

slog through the Pacific again, it would defend forward, and it would rely on a set of allies to do so. It would press
those allies to become democratic capitalists (realists never explain why the United States always thinks it does

We have
enjoyed peace in Asia for over three decades. Our policy has worked, why should we
adjust it?
better in a world populated by other democracies) and forego their nuclear weapons. It all happened.

AT: Optimism/China Rise Good


Youre soooooo wrong
Liao & Lin 15 (*Nien-Chung, Ph.D., Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies,
National Chengchi University (2012), **Dalton; researcher of US-Chinese relations at
Princeton, B.A. from the National Taiwan University and a M.A. from Australian
National University (with High Distinction). He received his Ph.D. degree in political
science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2015, Rebalancing TaiwanUS
Relations, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 57, Issue 6, 2015,
DOI:10.1080/00396338.2015.1116161, http://cwp.princeton.edu/news/delicatebalance-rebalancing-taiwan%E2%80%93us-relations, BC)

A key abandonist argument is that the Taiwan issue has impeded Sino-American
cooperation. Advocates of this position are optimistic about China's rise , and about the
potential effects of a US concession on Taiwan, arguing that the PRC would be pacified by a
symbolic end to the century of humiliation and would not further challenge the US-led regional
order. In this view, American patronage of Taiwan, particularly in the form of continuing arms sales to Taipei, only
exacerbates Beijing's distrust of Washington and thus derails the potential for partnership.7 (link is external)

This

optimistic stance has been undermined, however, by China's recent assertive


operations in the East and South China seas.8 (link is external) Beijing's coercive
diplomacy calls into question the optimists assertions that the Taiwan
issue is nothing but a nuisance, and that the island's fate is irrelevant to the US-led regional
security architecture. Washington has come to realise that there are numerous issues
other than Taiwan that could spark a conflict with Beijing .9 (link is external) The United
States can bolster regional stability by increasing the cost of adventurism for a
confrontational Beijing. Abandoning Taiwan clearly defeats this purpose .10 Other abandonists,
who are more pessimistic about China's rise, consider US promises to Taiwan too costly to keep. Eschewing the rosy
picture of Sino-US cooperation, they warn instead of intensifying competition, and set their sights on the challenges
of the future, arguing that China's ascendency will eventually spell US decline and Taiwanese surrender.11 (link is
external) If the key presumption of these pessimists is American retreat from the Asia-Pacific, then abandoning
Taiwan is not so much a policy or a calculated choice for the US government as it is an inevitability. If the
pessimists aim is to shape the trajectory of China's ascendency to US advantage, however, then abandoning
Taiwan would be a mistake. Historically, the United States has consistently prevented any power it sees as
potentially hostile from controlling Asia. The likelihood of a Sino-US crisis triggered by maritime disputes will
increase as long as Washington finds it necessary to maintain a substantial military presence and support to its
allies in the region.12 (link is external) Given its location at a strategic crossroads of the Asia-Pacific, Taiwan will
remain an indispensable part of the US regional security architecture. US regional allies and partners, such as Japan,
South Korea and Southeast Asian countries, thus also have much at stake in Washington's continuing commitment
to Taiwan. Cutting Taiwan loose will not only weaken US credibility as a reliable partner, but will also enhance the
PRC's ability to project power, should the island fall into its orbit. The fate of Taiwan's autonomy is a litmus test of
China's wider intentions as well as US resolution and commitment to the Asia-Pacific.

The desire of

both the

optimistic and pessimistic abandonists for the United States to avoid unnecessary confrontation with China,
and to mitigate the unfolding security dilemma in the region, is constructive. But Taiwan is not
the right card to play. Abandoning Taiwan would create conditions detrimental
both to the Sino-US relationship and to regional stability. As Washington strives to build a
constructive relationship with Beijing, Taipei has also been doing its part to make
peace with its long-term rival. The cross-Strait detente could, to some extent, facilitate Sino-US
collaboration by mitigating a contentious issue in their bilateral relationship. Taipei's recent policies have been
conducive to regional peace and prosperity, and deserve Washington's support.

AT: Mearsheimer
Mearsheimer concludes negTaiwan will seek a peaceful
solution instead of prolif or militarization
Mearsheimer, your author, 14 (John; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished
Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago; March/April 2014
National Interest, Issue #130, Taiwans Dire Straits, http://politicalscience.uchicago.edu/faculty-articles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf,
BC)

Taiwans third option is to pursue what I will call the Hong Kong strategy. In this case,
Taiwan accepts the fact that it is doomed to lose its independence and become part
of China. It then works hard to make sure that the transition is peaceful and
that it gains as much autonomy as possible from Beijing. This option is unpalatable today and will
remain so for at least the next decade. But it is likely to become more attractive in the distant
future if China becomes so powerful that it can conquer Taiwan with relative ease. So where does this
leave Taiwan? The nuclear option is not feasible, as neither China nor the
United States would accept a nuclear-armed Taiwan. Conventional deterrence
in the form of a risk strategy is far from ideal, but it makes sense as long as China is not so
dominant that it can subordinate Taiwan without difficulty. Of course, for that strategy to work, the
United States must remain committed to the defense of Taiwan, which is not guaranteed
over the long term. Once China becomes a superpower, it probably makes the most sense for Taiwan to give
up hope of maintaining its de facto independence and instead pursue the Hong Kong strategy. This is definitely
not an attractive option, but as Thucydides argued long ago, in international politics the strong do what they can
and the weak suffer what they must. By now, it should be glaringly apparent that whether Taiwan is forced to give

Taiwan
will surely do everything it can to buy time and maintain the political
status quo. But if China continues its impressive rise, Taiwan appears destined to become part of China.
up its independence largely depends on how formidable Chinas military becomes in the decades ahead.

AT: Reverse Asia Pivot


No link uniqueness Asia Pivot has already reversed and
ultimately fails to prevent Chinese aggression
Dole 15, (Bob, Kansas Republican, is a former Senate Majority Leader and was
the 1996 Republican nominee for president, Washington Times, How Obamas
pivot to Asia is coming apart,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/24/bob-dole-how-obamas-pivot-toasia-is-coming-apart/, 9/24/15, //VZ)
As China increases its presence in the South China Sea by building islands that
literally expand its territory, the Obama administrations avowed and widely hailed
pivot to Asia is degenerating into a genuflection to Beijing. In short order, the
Chinese regime has turned reefs in the Spratly Islands , over which several Asian nations claim sovereignty, into
2900 acres of islands that it can use for military purposes . Motorized artillery pieces
have already been observed on one of the islands, and Chinas airstrip on one reef dwarfs those operated by other countries in the island group.
Escalating its bid for hegemony of the Sea, Beijing has flaunted international law by
warning other countries that they must obtain the regimes permission before flying
or sailing within twelve nautical miles of the reclaimed islands. At the same time, it
is dramatically increasing its anti-access/anti-denial (A2/AD) forces and other naval capabilities. It already
has 1500 short-range ballistic missiles positioned on the mainland and aimed at our nations close ally Taiwan, to which the United States is committed to provide defensive aid under
the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which the Obama administration has repeatedly identified as an important security and economic partner, and which I have supported as a senator
and as counselor for Taiwan in the private sector. In addition to its short-range and anti-ship missiles, Beijing has more than 60 submarines and intends to add 20 more to its fleet within
the next five years. By 2023, it is expected to acquire more than 40,000 stealthy unmanned air vehicles, many of which will feature precision-strike capability. The United States national
interest in addressing this dangerously gross militarization is obvious. In addition to the growing menace to Taiwan, Beijing is posing a direct threat to the U.S. Navy and commercial
shipping. The South China Sea carries 30 percent of the worlds annual maritime trade, including $1.2 trillion in ship-borne trade bound for the United States. Last month, the
Department of Defense reported that Beijing is undertaking a steady progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed areas. Chinas strategy is
incremental in order to avoid escalation to military conflict, a goal that the United States itself seems to share to the point of effectively denying its interests in free and open seas;
preserving the democracy and freedom of Taiwan; and preventing Beijing from further destabilization of and growing dominance over the region. As is too often the case, the
administration has been big on rhetoric, but short on action. Its thus-far feeble response has been largely limited to pledging an increased number of military and humanitarian drills in

Much stronger measures are


required. In the wake of Chinese President Xis exchange of talking points in
Washington last week, President Obama should now challenge him at long last to clarify
Chinas claims and intentions regarding the Sea. At the same time, he should initiate multilateral talks to resolve the crisis. If Beijing
the Asia-Pacific and committing to assign more of its existing worldwide naval fleet to patrols and homeports in the region.

again refuses to participate, President Obama should proceed without it and prepare publicly to provide additional armaments to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia as necessary.

AT: Perception
Public Perceptions have already been tanked Washington
restraints and attitudes
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an
Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED
TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
The TRA provides a solid frame for strong bilateral relations. The problem is a number of political
considerations that put Taiwan in an awkward position and put the strength of the
mutual security relationship in doubt in the publics eye . It does not help that
Taiwans de facto embassy is not allowed to fly the national flag, Taiwans
government officials are banned from entering Washington, D.C., and the overreported views of some U.S.-based academics and think-tank experts treat Taiwan
as an expendable accessory to U.S.-China relations.

The status quo solves any positive perceptions HADR ops and
RIMPAC exercises
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an
Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED
TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
Military exercises have two basic functions. On a practical level, they help to increase familiarity between allied militaries and examine scenarios for different contingencies. On a political
level, they are a form of signalling to domestic public and potential rivals. It is easy to see why the U.S. would be hesitant to openly promote military cooperation with Taiwan. But it is
essential to have joint exercises between the two militaries. In case of military conflict, Taiwanese and American soldiers may need to face the enemy together, and without the close
cooperation between them that can be achieved only through joint exercises, the alternative is to run two parallel campaigns. Granted, most of these activities do not necessarily need

making selected opportunities public sends a signal about ongoing


cooperation and contributes to deterring Beijing from resorting to military force. Joint exercises in
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HADR) is another
area where strengthening cooperation is of great importance for both
sides given the regions propensity to natural disasters. A good publicity
opportunity is the forthcoming multi-national RIMPAC naval exercise in
Hawaii. The Taiwan Navy could send its combat support ship Panshih (also suitable for HADR missions) to avoid the presence of any of the more high-profile warships in
to be publicized. However,

Taiwans naval inventory. Granted, the Chinese who are likely to participate this year for a second time, despite their 2014 appearance ending rather embarrassingly, would not be very
happy. They may even withdrawal their participation. But then, perhaps the U.S. military should not put too big of emphasis on the mil-to-mil contacts with China which are of dubious
overall value. An alternative solution is to start with port calls of U.S. Navy ships in Taiwanese ports as well as Taiwanese ships in U.S. ports and naval bases.

Strategic ambiguity causes Taiwanese misperceptions now


viewed as a lack of commitment
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an

Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED


TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
Strategic ambiguity has served the U.S. for a long time, but the time has come to
re-evaluate that approach. China is not the backward military power it used to be
in 1980s, nor can Washington be confident it would prevail under any circumstances
as in the 1990s. This is not to argue that ambiguity needs to be removed completely from the picture. However, there is inherent value in a more pronounced
relationship between Taipei and Washington and unambiguous signals sent to Beijing that intimidation toward Taiwan will not be tolerated. A more confidently pronounced relationship

Ambiguity in
its present state presents inherent danger to be misperceived by the
Taiwanese public as disinterest. If there is little to show for, especially when most of the bilateral activity
slips under the radar for good practical reasons, what confidence is the strength of mutual relationship it
elicits? Granted, Washington may feel that ambiguity serves well in checking potential
reckless behaviour by Taiwan. However, if that used to be the idea once, it is very
outdated now. No one can reasonably argue that Tsai Ing-Wen and other elected
leaders of Taiwan would deliberately provoke Beijing [1], especially if the U.S. could
decide not to support Taiwan directly anyway. The case for a more visible security relationship is that it helps to deter Beijing. The
between Taiwan and the U.S. would also be encouraging for other U.S. partners, namely Japan and The Philippines, to seek avenues of closer cooperation.

ultimate goal is and should be to never have to deal with the question what if China attacks Taiwan?

AT: Impact

No Prolif
No Taiwan proliftoo many barriers
-no nuclear facilities
-US pressure
-no scientists
-no money
-no uranium supply
-internal political pressure
-Mainland China gets pissed

Chang 11 (Alan; Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies; Crisis


Avoided: the Past, Present, and Future of Taiwans Nuclear Program, Fall 2011,
http://www.hpu.edu/CHSS/History/GraduateDegree/MADMSTheses/files/alanchang.p
df, BC)

challenges for Taiwan in


pursuing a new nuclear weapons program are not only potential US and international
scrutiny, but also the difficulty of obtaining the necessary equipment and material .
After Chang lisien-yift defection , Taiwan sealed off its heavy water facility
permanently and If nuclear weapons were to be developed, Taiwan would need to build a new facility. The
material to construct such a reactor would be difficult to get and would certainly trigger
immediately scrutiny, especially from the US. Taiwan's three existing nuclear power plants and the planned
E. CONSTRAINTS FOR TAIWAN TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR PROGRAM The

but stalled fourth one are only light water reactors and cannot be used to produce plutonium 239, the essential

there are intamal and external constraints that


would prevent Taiwan from acquiring nuclear weapons. Intemally , the number one
would be material. As mentioned earlier, Taiwan must acquire additional material and equipment from
element to produce nuclear weapons. Specifically,

abroad, which would attract intemational attention, since Taiwan is in worse shape than 1988, as far as material and
reprocessing capabilities. Taiwan's research reactor and its reprocessing facility were shut down during the resence

Another internal constraint would


be money. Taiwan would have to make a heavy financial investment in order to
reacquire not only the material and equipment but also technical expertise . Many of
the scientists and engineers who participated in the original research and development are now
either retired or no longer work in similar fields . Many younger researchers do not
necessarily see participating in weapons research as a great career opportunity !. As
we have noted in eadier chapters, Taiwan nuclear researchers, including Chang Hsien-yi,
mostly received their training in the US and this would continue to make Taiwan's
further research vulnerable to US monitoring or, in a worse scenario of history repeating Itself, a
successful US recruitment of Taiwan researchers studying in the US. Furthermore, Taiwan would run into
problems acquiring a steady supply of uranium . In the 1970s and 19805. South Africa was
of US and IAEA observers and dismantled permanently.21F 129

Taiwan's best supplier, since the Nonproliferation Treaty had no impact on South Africa. South Africa was Taken's
closest military ally, but the situation has changed drastically. Since the end of apartheid,

signed the Nonproliferation Treaty

South Africa has

and has switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing

and is certainly not in any position to provide Taiwan with material that could be used to
develop nuclear weapons. Taiwan's nuclear intentions might also face both internal
and external political pressures. While the tanner ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could
view the possession of nuclear weapons as a viable tool to achieve its ultimate goal of an independent Taiwan, it
would be difficult for the DPP to support such development due to its long-standing policy against nuclear energy,
130 including the repeated protests against the fourth nuclear power plant while it was the apposition party, as well

Any DPP plan to conduct


nuclear weapons research would, for sure, receive heavy criticism from the KMT,
which, ironically, conducted such research in the past. It Might also face strong objection from its
own party members. It is not difficult to assume that no matter which political party Is in
charge, its rival will likely seize An issue for political gain if such a nuclear
program were reactivated. Externally, Taiwan would face political pressure horn the
US. While the US has a strategic interest in preventing mainland China from seizing Taiwan, it is certainly not
as halting retire plants construction when it won the presidential election in 2000.

looking forward to a military conflict with the PRC. Since China considers Taiwan's research and development of
nuclear weapons as a preset condition to take Taiwan by force, it would be in the best interests of the US to prevent
Taiwan from achieving this goal Unlike possible strategies against Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, a military magical

The US does have enormous leverage


with Taiwan, such as the threat of halting weapon sales, which would be devastating
strike to eliminate Taiwan's research is extremely unlikely.

to Taiwan since the US is Taiwan's main arms supplier. Taiwan also trades heavily with the US and any economic

sanctions could also cause extreme and immediate hardship to Taiwan's economy.
Although the US would be the most Important country able to restrain Taiwan's nuclear intention, it is certainly not
the only one with the will and ability to do so. While Japan has been supportive toward Taiwan against their mutual
131 rival China--, it is certainly very sensitive to the nuclear issue. As the only country ever attacked with atomic

it would be hard for Japan to support a Taiwan government that conducts


research and development of nuclear weapons European nations , although they do not
weapons,

possess as much influence on Taiwan as the US, do maintain strong economic ties. Some European nations, such as

would not want to create a diplomatic crisis


over Taiwan's plan for new nuclear weapons, Mainland China could also serve
as a constraint on Taiwan's nuclear dream. Since China views Taiwan as a renegade province," it has
France and Germany, have sold weapons to Taiwan and

threatened to seize Taiwan by force, under certain conditions. Developing nuclear weapons and associated delivery
means are one of these conditions. While the possession of nuclear weapons would be a viable deterrence against

Taiwan could face a dilemma it cannot restart the nuclear research


and development and also construct functioning device with a delivery platform
early enough to deter an invasion by China. The road to acquire the deterrence could be the road of
Chinas military threat,

a military conflict.

No chance of prolif
-Taiwan = democratic faces internal backlash
-would face PRC backlash
-US backlashcutting arms sales + US would put sanctions + cut off nuclear
materials
-Taiwanese culture is biased against nuclear weapons, especially scientists

Fitzpatrick 16 (Mark; ten years heading the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Policy Programme, 26-year career in the US Department of State, where for the
previous ten years he focused on non-proliferation issues, 2/2/16, Asias Latent
Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, accessed through UMich Library,
BC)

Far greater than the theoretical proliferation drivers that Taiwan faces are the
practical and political constraints on any move down this path constraints
that are more powerful today than during the 1970s and 198os . A combination of stra-tegic
Constraints

and economic vulnerabilities and the near-certainty that any such effort would be revealed before it came to fruition
make it highly unlikely that Taiwan would again seek nuclear weapons. Given the obvious downsides, nobody in the

During the earlier pursuit of nuclear


weapons, Taiwan was ruled by an authoritarian regime, with strict press controls, a
rubber-stamp legislature and swift punishment for any revela-tion of state secrets. Today, Taiwan is a
multiparty democracy with robust freedom of speech and a raucous parliament. The
budget allocation process is transparent; no public spending can avoid legislative scrutiny. As every
public realm in Taiwan today advocates nuclearisation.

observer of Taiwan politics is quick to point out, it would be impossible to keep a nuclear-weapons programme

While Taiwan would be most


vulnerable when the effort was discovered, US Taiwan expert Alan Romberg notes
that 'even having a complete ready-to-go weapon would not make Taiwan
invulnerable. Beijing could not sit by and not respond .'95 The most compelling argument
against Taiwan embark-ing on its own Manhattan Project is the vulnerability that it would invite . Beijing would
probably learn of the project well before any weapons were produced, and would
regard it as a casus Belli. If war broke out and Taiwan could not count on an American intervention, which
confidential for the period of time it would take to build them.

would probably be the case if Taiwan broke its non-proliferation promises, Taiwan could not hold out against the
mainland for more than a month or two before munitions and oil reserves ran out. Even if an A-bomb could be
produced in the shortest imaginable time period, say six months at a bare minimum, it would be too late.
Revelation of such a programme would make Taiwan immensely vulnerable. In 1998, Beijing officially asserted that
the development of nuclear weapons would be an induce-ment for an attack on the island, putting in writing
something it had unofficially made known for over a decade.96 Although this criterion has not been repeated in
subsequent policy pronouncements or White Papers, it is widely regarded as still valid and as a reason why the
Taiwan military would not support a nuclear weapons programme. Whether Or not the mainland would use force to

Not only would


such a move move prompt Chinese hostility, woUld at the same time
create a negative US backlash. 111 In light of the challenge to Washington's global nonproliferation policy and to regional peace and stability, Taiwan could not count on unconditional US
support in an ensuing cross-Strait contretemps. As international relations expert Derek Mitchell
disallow nuclearization,Taiwan's economic integration gives it other ways to exert pressure.

notes 'Although Taiwan may view a nuclear option as insurance against possible future US abandonment, such a

The us arms sales and defence ties


on which Taiwan relies to a degree would be severely jeopardised . The US response would
programme could make this scenario a self-fulfilling prophecv.T4

be scenario-dependent, of a conflict that was provoked by PRC aggression would not be regarded in the same way
as one precipitated by Taiwan declaring independence.99 Even if the US were to deter-mine that Beijing was to
blame in provoking Taiwan to act, at a minimum, US law would require halting nuclear energy cooperation. This

Given America's unique status


regarding nuclear safeguards in Taiwan, no other country can supply nuclear
materials or equipment without US consent. In any case, all of the countries from which Taiwan
move would bring Taiwan s nuclear programme to a quick end .100

buys uranium - primarily Australia and Canada - before it is enriched by US Enrichment Corporation can be

Criticism of_ Taiwan nuclear weapons would be likely to


find expression in various forms of sanctions that Would risk Taiwan's dependency on international
expected to be similarly disapproving.

trade' and exacerbate its diplomatic isolation. The security and economic risks underscore the political factors and

The non-proliferation
norm is universally accepted in Taiwan, which accepts every non-proliferation
instrument and practice in which it is eligible to participate. As in Japan, development of
nuclear weapons is widely regarded as immoral , particularly by the scientific
community whose talents would need to be harnessed for a strategic
weapons programme. Only a deep shock to the collective psyche could change this mentality. A move
physical contrainsts that argue against any Taiwan pursuit of nuclear weapons today.

by Beijing that induced such fear is not inconceivable, but it remains unlikely. Meanwhile, although the US security
commitment remains ambiguous, wholesale abandonment by Washington is not likely in the foresseable future

either. Among the three democracies that are the subject of this book, Taiwan is the least likely to acquire nuclear
weapons today, even though it was once the party that was the most intent on this path.

Barriers block Taiwan prolif and would take 8 years to develop


NTI, is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization founded in 2001 by Ted Turner and
Sam Nunn in the United States, which exists to strengthen global security by
reducing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and also to reduce
the risk that they will actually be used, May 2015, Online:
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/taiwan/, Article: TAIWAN Accessed on: 06-2916//AWW
Taiwan possesses much of the technological expertise necessary to develop nuclear
weapons, but would face significant obstacles in doing sonamely, U.S. opposition,
international pressure, and the threat of a pre-emptive strike by China. Recent
assessments indicate that it would take Taiwan between one and eight years to
develop a complete nuclear warhead, and most likely much longer to design one
light enough to be carried by any of Taiwan's current land-attack missiles.
Regardless, most analysts agree that under the current political situation, Taiwan is
very unlikely to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. [38]

No prolif
NTI, is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization founded in 2001 by Ted Turner and
Sam Nunn in the United States, which exists to strengthen global security by
reducing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and also to reduce
the risk that they will actually be used, May 2015, Online:
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/taiwan/, Article: TAIWAN Accessed on: 06-2916//AWW
In 1968, Taiwan then recognized as the Republic of China by the UN signed the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After the seat for China
in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council reverted from Taipei to
Beijings control in 1971, [3] the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
coordinated only with the Beijing government on issues related to China. Nuclear
safeguards are applied in Taiwan under a trilateral agreement with the U.S. and the
IAEA. [4] Taiwan has since implemented the IAEA's "Program 93+2" safeguards. [5]
In January 2014, Taiwan and the United States renewed an agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation. The agreement, which includes a new 123 Agreement, will take
effect after the existing one expires on 22 June 2014. [6]

Taiwan Prolif Good


Taiwan Nuclearization would be the ultimate deterrent
reducing any likelihood of a Chinese attack against Taiwan
Mearsheimer 14, (John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished
Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. He is on the
advisory council of The National Interest, and his most recent book, Why Leaders
Lie: The Truth About Lying in International Politics, was published in January 2011 by
Oxford University Press, Say Goodbye to Taiwan
http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=5, March April
2014, //VZ)
what happens to
Taiwan in the face of Chinas rise also depends greatly on what policies Taiwans
leaders and its people choose to pursue over time. There is little doubt that Taiwans
overriding goal in the years ahead will be to preserve its independence from China.
That aim should not be too difficult to achieve for the next decade, mainly because Taiwan is almost certain to maintain close
SO FAR, the discussion about Taiwans future has focused almost exclusively on how the United States is likely to act toward Taiwan. However,

relations with the United States, which will have powerful incentives as well as the capability to protect Taiwan. But after that point Taiwans strategic situation is likely to deteriorate in
significant ways, mainly because China will be rapidly approaching the point where it can conquer Taiwan even if the American military helps defend the island. And, as noted, it is not

In the face of this grim future, Taiwan has three options. First, it
can develop its own nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate
deterrent, and there is no question that a Taiwanese nuclear arsenal
would markedly reduce the likelihood of a Chinese attack against Taiwan.
clear that the United States will be there for Taiwan over the long term.

Taiwan pursued this option in the 1970s, when it feared American abandonment in the wake of the Vietnam War. The United States, however, stopped Taiwans nuclear-weapons program
in its tracks. And then Taiwan tried to develop a bomb secretly in the 1980s, but again the United States found out and forced Taipei to shut the program down. It is unfortunate for

No doubt
Taiwan still has time to acquire a nuclear deterrent before the balance of power in
Asia shifts decisively against it. But the problem with this suggestion is that both Beijing and Washington are sure to oppose Taiwan going nuclear.
Taiwan that it failed to build a bomb, because its prospects for maintaining its independence would be much improved if it had its own nuclear arsenal.

The United States would oppose Taiwanese nuclear weapons, not only because they would encourage Japan and South Korea to follow suit, but also because American policy makers
abhor the idea of an ally being in a position to start a nuclear war that might ultimately involve the United States. To put it bluntly, no American wants to be in a situation where Taiwan
can precipitate a conflict that might result in a massive nuclear attack on the United States.

--AT: Nuclear Taiwan unpredictable


Taiwan is rational with nukes empirics dictate defensive
posturing
FAS 8, (Federation of American Scientists, Strategic Security, Nukes in the Taiwan
Crisis
https://fas.org/blogs/security/2008/05/nukes-in-the-taiwan-crisis/, 5/13/8, //VZ)
Nuclear weapons also were deployed to Taiwan. As mentioned above, the Matador cruise missile was already present on the island
when the Taiwan Strait crisis erupted. The nuclear bombs arrived in January 1960 and stayed for a
decade and a half until July 1974. Together with nuclear bombs for tactical fighter wings deployed at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, Kusan Air
Base in South Korea and Kadena Air Base on Okinawa, the nuclear bombs in Taiwan probably were intended for use
against targets in China and North Korea.

Deterrence Checks
Taiwans defenses deter China
Michal Thim, a postgraduate research student in the Taiwan Studies Program at
the China Policy Institute (CPI), University of Nottingham, an Asia-Pacific Desk
Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, and a Research Fellow at the Prague-based thinktank Association for International Affairs, 09-25- 15, Online: http://thinkingtaiwan.com/china-taiwan-military-transformation/, Article: China, Taiwan, and the
Challenge of Military Transformation Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
In terms of eyes and ears, Taiwan has an extraordinary early warning (and
intelligence collection) capability in the form of the new PAVE PAWS radar and it has
developed a network of sensors making Taiwans maritime domain awareness one
of the best in the region. Taiwans domestic defense sector provides some of the key
capabilities needed for mounting a credible conventional deterrent, and
considerable effort has been put into moving some of the most critical infrastructure
underground, thus decreasing the PLAs ability to deliver a devastating first strike. It
is perfectly natural that Taiwans progress is being judged against that made by the
PLA. However, it is also not an entirely fair position to take. Taiwans military has
been rather busy organization during last two decades, and while many problems
plague its armed forces, it also deserves credit for embracing civilian control while
striving to absorb all the technological innovations that came along and re-organize
itself after several waves of downsizing. The PLA has made some of those changes
as well, but it certainly has not had to overcome the hurdles of democratization.

No Conflict
War with China is impossible Interdependence, military
capabilities, and nations are pragmatic
Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor at the University of Maryland, College Park,
02-26-16, Online: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/taiwan-strait3_final.pdf, Article: How Stable Is the Taiwan Strait? Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
The possibility that China-Taiwan relations could revert to their pre-2008 state is
disquieting, given that many analysts at the time viewed armed conflict in the
Taiwan Strait as a serious risk. Nevertheless, although China-Taiwan relations will
almost certainly deteriorate to some degree under a Tsai presidency, military
conflict remains unlikely. To understand why, it is important to first consider some of
the major trends that have characterized the cross-strait relationship in recent
years. A Changing China-Taiwan Relationship First, economic integration across the
strait has become deeper and more institutionalized. China-Taiwan trade and
investment flows have grown rapidly since the 1980s; by the mid-2000s, the PRC
had replaced the United States as Taiwans primary trading partner. China-Taiwan
trade continued to grow after 2008 as the two sides took steps, such as lifting
restrictions on direct trade across the strait, to normalize bilateral economic ties.
Second, the military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait has been shifting rapidly
in Chinas favor. Preparation for a conflict in the strait has been the primary driver
of PRC military modernization efforts dating to the 1990s, and Chinas booming
economy has facilitated impressive advances in this regard. The PRC most likely
does not (yet) possess the capacity to invade and occupy Taiwan, particularly if the
United States were to intervene in a cross-strait conflict. China certainly has an
increasing ability, however, to impose tremendous costs on Taiwan in the event of a
cross-strait war. Third, Taiwanese public opinion on sovereignty issues continues to
evolve. To an increasing extent, most Taiwan citizens see themselves as Taiwanese
rather than Chinese, and they view political unification with the PRC as a nonstarter.
Indeed, most Taiwanese today reject unification even under hypothetically favorable
conditions, such as the emergence of democracy in China. The recent dtente in
cross-strait relations has not altered these trends; to the contrary, the percentage of
Taiwans citizens self-identifying as Taiwanese grew especially rapidly during the Ma
presidency. Still, most Taiwanese remain pragmatic. A majority of Taiwanese, for
instance, does not support formal independence if it were to trigger armed conflict
with China.

No China Invasion
China doesnt have the capabilities to invade
John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of
communications for the Association of the United States Army, 02-10-16, Online:
https://news.usni.org/2016/02/10/atlantic-council-panel-china-likely-doesnt-havethe-ability-to-invade-taiwan-yet, Article: Atlantic Council Panel: China Likely
Doesnt Have the Ability to Invade Taiwan, Yet Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
When viewed from the Chinese mainland, a hundred miles of water is a long way
away and remains a big obstacle if Beijing intends to take military action anytime
soon against Taiwan following the islands election of a new president and a
legislature controlled by pro-independence parties, an international security expert
said Tuesday. Speaking Tuesday at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., Thomas
L. McNaugher, a professor at Georgetown University, said, an amphibious assault
would be an extremely dicey operation for a military still dominated by its army
and having no recent experience in that kind of warfare. Right now, theyre
capable of moving about two divisions at a time over water, he said in answer to a
question. But theyre working on overcoming those shortfalls. Roger Cliff, a fellow
of the councils Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, said despite
Chinas 600 percent increase in real-term defense spending over the past 20 years
important weaknesses remain in technology, logistics, training and organization.
An example he used was maintaining equipment in the field. It has to be sent back
to the factory for maintenance and repair, making sustained operations difficult.
Cliff also cited shortfalls in underway replenishment and aerial refueling. While
China has changed its military doctrine from positional warfare since 1995when
it launched missiles to intimidate Taiwanto one based on surprise, deception and
indirection used by the United States in Desert Storm, it still retains a centralized
structure that does not encourage risk-taking or creativity, but loyalty and
obedience. In response 20 years ago to Chinas attempt to cow the island, which
was holding its first presidential election, the United States sent two aircraft carrier
battle groups into those waters and were not detected by the Chinese. Taiwan is not
a treaty partner with the United States. After recognizing the Peoples Republic of
China, the Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which, in part, allows United
States arms sales to the island. In a cross-straits conflict, however, Cliff said that
Chinas numerical superiority could make up for organizational shortcomings.
The question is still out there for Beijing in whether to try to recover Taiwan, said
Tiffany Ma, the centers director of political and security affairs. One factor that
could cause Chinese to move against Taiwan is that they no longer see time is on
their side and/or inattention on the part of the United States. Inattention is
really the poison here. Taiwans incoming administration, led by Tsai Ing-wen, has
not ratcheted up the rhetoric with the mainland but intends to continue its defense
buildup, she said. McNaugher added, based upon what is happening in Hong Kong
since it reverted to Chinese control, the Taiwanese do not want to go back to
China. Taiwans economy is booming. In fact, Chinas more assertive stance in
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas may lead to more regional
support for Taiwan, Ma said. McNaugher said that Taiwan needs to keep at

improving its defenses and the United States should look at its basing strategy in
the Pacific to include hardening air bases in Japan. Cliff said Taiwanese defense
investments should look to better protecting itself against air and maritime
blockade or invasion. In addition to corvettes, modern submarines and mines,
Taiwan needs more platforms, more modern platforms, such as F-16s, and mobile
air-defense systems. Taiwan earlier announced plans to spend 3 percent of its gross
domestic product on defense. Those plans included spending $4 billion for eight
diesel-powered submarines, but contracts have not yet been announced. If there
were a blockade, Beijing needs to realize two can play that game, McNaugher
said, referring to the American Navys strong presence in the Pacific. If there were
an invasion, Ma said the Chinese should not underestimate a peoples will to fight.

China wont invade 5 warrants


Maitreya Bhakal, 01-24-12 analyst on Chinese relations. Article: Five reasons
why China will not invade Taiwan, and an analysis of Cross-strait Relations. Online:
http://blog.hiddenharmonies.org/2012/01/24/china-taiwan-america-us-cross-straitrelations-invade-five-reasons/
-Economics
-Public Perception
-Threat of American intervention
-China wants peace
-Taiwan wont declare independence
Five reasons why China will not invade Taiwan Journalists and analysts never forget
to dutifully remind us that China has not ruled out the use of force against Taiwan.
What they do not remind us with such regularity however, is that the Chinese leadership has
regularly stressed that they seek peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland. China
has deployed, they say, 1500 missiles targeting Taiwan (or 2000, if one is feeling so inclined), due to which Taiwan
should be regularly supplied with US arms to enable it to defend itself. They find the subtle politics of Chinas

What they also fail to address is why


China should redeploy or dismantle a major part of its defense arsenal (and one that
faces the South China Sea and defends Chinas most populated areas) just to placate Taiwan and US
hawks. Moreover, even if the missiles were withdrawn, they could be redeployed at any time. These missiles are
seen as an important deterrent to Taiwans independence and potential US intervention. Whatever the
media wants its readers to believe, the only major reason why China would actually
consider an invasion is if Taiwan declares independence. This is in no danger of happening in
missile deployments beyond the scope of their understanding.

the near future. Especially given Mas recent victory and his pledge of the Three Nos No independence, No
unification, No use of force. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of the Taiwanese public agree with him,

Here
are five major reasons why a full-fledged Chinese invasion of the island is
more suited for a video game rather than reality. 5. Economics: China has
always placed economics at the forefront of most other matters . Despite the
often-tumultuous state of Sino-Indian relations (and an unresolved border dispute), trade has
touched $63 billion. China is Indias second largest trading partner . In the Senkaku
island dispute with Japan, Deng Xiaoping, as soon as he came into power in 1978, proposed that
and are happy with the status quo (the latter has been demonstrated by numerous opinion polls as well).

China and Japan jointly explore the oil and gas deposits near the disputed islands
without touching on the issue of sovereignty . China has also sought joint exploration in the
resource-rich Spratlys, a solution which is the right step forward and is in fact more urgent than sovereignty, which

China doesnt mind waiting and


biding its time until sovereignty issues get resolved . As Deng Xiaoping famously remarked
the Philippines and Vietnam and have so far been reluctant to do.

regarding the Senkaku dispute, It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, 10 years. Our
generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be
wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all. Unlike his predecessor Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao has used a
softer approach towards Taiwan, promoting stronger economic and cultural ties, high-level official visits and direct

This pragmatic approach is on display even in the Taiwan


dispute. China is Taiwans largest trading partner , and Taiwan is Chinas seventh
largest. Two-thirds of all Taiwanese companies have made investments in China in recent years. In 2010, China
flights in order to reduce tensions.

(including Hong Kong) accounted for over 29.0% of Taiwans total trade and 41.8% of Taiwans exports. The ECFA
was heavily tilted in Taiwans favor. It cut tariffs on 539 Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese products
entering Taiwan. Under the agreement, approximately 16.1 % of exports to China and 10.5 % of imports to China
will be tariff free by 2013. Taiwanese firms have invested $200 billion in the mainland, and

trade between

the two sides has exceeded $150 billion . Taiwanese trade with China. Source: Reuters Both China
and Taiwan have a lot to lose by fighting with each other. Another factor to consider is the incalculable loss that an

4. The
Taiwanese public: China is, quite rightly, obsessed with stability , President Hus
invasion will have on the Chinese economy, not to mention scaring away potential investors.

watchword. Analysts agree that this is one of the main reasons why it is not being tough on North Korea that it

With hundreds of protests happening in China


every year, it most certainly wouldnt want yet another headache on its hands and
alienate the islands inhabitants (even more than they are at the moment). There is very less support
wants a stable neighbor with no refugee spillover.

for reunification on the island, and opinion polls make clear that only a tiny minority of Taiwanese identify
themselves as Chinese. The Anti-Secession also explicitly states in Article 9: In the event of employing and
executing non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in this Law, the state shall exert its
utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign

the state shall protect the rights and


interests of the Taiwan compatriots in other parts of China in accordance with law. A
nationals in Taiwan, and to minimize losses. At the same time,

Chinese invasion might inevitably lead to riots and international condemnation. China would thus risk flushing down
the toilet many years hard work of patient diplomacy (in convincing other countries of its peaceful rise). This

3. The
threat of American intervention: The United States of America, the responsible
superpower, has been engaged in more military conflicts around this world than any
other. Since the Second World War, the US has: Attempted to overthrow
more than 50 governments, most of them democratically-elected.
Attempted to suppress a populist or national movement in 20 countries.
Grossly interfered in democratic elections in at least 30 countries.
Dropped bombs on the people of more than 30 countries. Attempted to
assassinate more than 50 foreign leaders. Hence, the plain fact that needs to be realized is
that the United States is more prone to violent outbursts than any other country. The
would in turn cause them to inch even closer to America, were they would be welcomed with open arms.

PLA doctrinal textbook, Zhanyixue, explicitly states that China is not in the same league as advanced countries
(The entire document never mentions the United States by name), argues Thomas J. Christensen in Chinas
Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Recent Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (CNA,

Moreover, unlike in the heady early days of the Great Leap Forward, PLA
strategists do not envision China closing that overall gap anytime soon . There is no
stated expectation of short-cuts or leapfrogging to great power military status . In other
words, China will have to accept that its relative technological backwardness
and weakness in power projection will persist for a long time. And then goes on
2005). He further states,

to quote the text of Zhanyixue explicitly: Our military equipment has gone through major upgrading () in
comparison with the past, but in comparison to advanced countries, whether it be now or even a relatively long
period from now, there will still be a relatively large gap ( ).The most prominent objective

reality that the PLA will face in fighting future campaigns is that in [the area of] military equipment, the enemy will

Chinese policy-makers are realists, and thus can


be relied upon to heavily weigh the consequences of a possible US intervention. 2.
China wants peace: China is one of the few rising powers in the whole of human
history to announce peaceful intentions and no desire to rule or establish hegemony
over the world. In what might come as a shock to most people who consider media reports as a textbook for
Chinese foreign policy, China has, on the whole, been a peaceful nation and has not
engaged in military action unless provoked. And the military action that it has
been involved in in its modern history has been extremely limited in its duration and
objectives. Barring a misadventure with Vietnam in 1979 (which was also quite limited), China has only used war as a last resort, when it was left with no other alternative.
be superior and we will be inferior. As is clear,

Resolutions of boundary disputes can be generally considered as a fundamental indication whether a country is pursuing expansionist or peaceful policies (which is one reason why a
thorough analysis of Chinas border disputes has been neglected by almost all western media outlets and analysts). China has had the highest number of border disputes of any country
in the world and with no intention of living in an unfriendly atmosphere over a peace of land, has successfully handled and offered substantial compromises (this is the other reason) in
most of them. China borders 14 countries by land; and as a result of territorial dismemberment and unequal treaties, the PRC government, when it came into power, found itself involved
in territorial disputes with all of them. The way in which China resolved those disputes stands as testimony to its desire of peace at any cost and serves as an example to other countries.
China has, in the interests of peace and stability on its borders, adopted a negotiation tactic favorable to rival claimants that other countries would do well to emulate. Many of these
claimants were countries much weaker than China. China was under no obligation to offer such substantial compromises. The portion of land that China received in border settlements
with various neighbouring countries is as follows. Afghanistan 0% Tajikistan 4% Nepal 6% Burma 18% Kazakhstan 22% Mongolia 29% Kyrgyzstan 32% North Korea 40% Laos
50% Vietnam 50% Russia 50% Pakistan 54% Some of this land was strategically important (such as the Wakhan corridor that was disputed with Afghanistan) and extremely rich in
resources (such as the Pamir mountain range in case of Tajikistan). China has also not reiterated its claims on a majority of the territory which was seized from it by the unequal treaties
(even if it meant being cut off from the strategic Sea of Japan). In the map below, the gray area was part of China when the Qing dynasty was at its height, and then was snatched away

China has generally been known to


attack when it has been taken advantage of or construed as weak , or when the
enemy was at its very doorstep, such as during the Korean war . The Sino-Indian war of 1962
from it due to unequal treaties. China has pursued claims on no more than 7% of these territories.

stands as a textbook example of this strategy. Nehru, the then Indian PM, rejecting all Chinese offers for
negotiations, constituted a Forward Policy of pushing forward to enemy lines and made belligerent statements
about China (I have ordered the army to throw the Chinese out), implicitly announcing Indian intentions to attack.
Some of the Indian outposts established under this policy went even further then Chinese ones. China, correctly
interpreting these actions as hostile and viewing India through the prism of British imperialist intentions on Tibet (as
India had made itself the British successor in all matters regarding Tibet and China), made multiple diplomatic
protests against the Forward Policy, but Nehru ignored them and never thought that China would have the guts to
attack. After China finally did attack and occupied the disputed areas, it declared a unilateral ceasefire and
withdraw to pre-war status quo borders without occupying an inch of territory. Hence, Chinese intentions were just

peaceful South China Sea


and Taiwan strait is in Chinas interest. As China rises, the last thing it wants to do is
anything that might be construed as provocative . It has indicated that it wants a peace treaty
to just India a lesson. It had no interest in occupying any territory. Hence, a

with Taiwan, and indeed, negotiating a peace agreement was one of the points that President Hu introduced as a
blueprint for cross-strait relations in December 2008. Ma made a campaign promise to sign a peace treaty in the
run up to the 2008 elections, but reneged on it after becoming president. Such a treaty will not only assure Chinas
maritime neighbors (including rival claimants in the South China Sea) of Chinas peaceful intentions, but will have

1. Taiwan is not going to declare


independence: The most important reason why China has not yet considered an invasion. Ma has
explicitly declared that he is not seeking independence , and the voters seem to be
siding with him and are happy with the status quo. And so is China. Chinese leaders
the effect of also formally ending the Chinese Civil War.

have a penchant for putting issues on the backburner. They adapt to changing situations and are happy to do what
they can (business) and leave for future generations what they cannot (reunification). So what next? Chinese

As long as both sides are happy with the status


quo, there seems to be no reason to fret. As long as Taiwan does not declare independence, there
leaders will be happy to admit they dont know.

seems to be no reason to worry about a military conflict. And since a majority of the Taiwanese people are happy to
be were they are, rocking the boat is the last thing leaders on both sides of the strait would want to do. Both
economies are growing, and people are living happily on both sides. Every generation of leaders thus hands over
this problem to the next one, with the hope that they might one day either solve it, or preserve the status quo and

discussion of a Chinese invasion serves


little purpose other than to be used by various foreign-policy analysts to
justify their grants and pass their time. There ought to be no doubt that a full-blown invasion
hand the headache over to their successors. Hence,

would be a nightmare for China, and it simply wouldnt do it. Or, as Jim Hacker would say, Not just that it shouldnt,
but it couldnt, and if it could, it wouldnt, would it?

China will not invade Taiwan and deterrence prevents


escalation
Zachary Keck, is a writer for the diplomat, 12-24-13, Online:
http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/why-china-wont-attack-taiwan/, Article: Why
China Won't Attack Taiwan, Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
Although relatively muted in recent years, Taiwan is seen as the greatest potential
flashpoint in U.S.-China relations. Indeed, U.S. defense analysts perceive Chinas
expanding Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capabilities primarily through the lens of
preventing the U.S. from intervening should Beijing invade Taiwan . Consequently, the main
concepts the U.S. military has developed for countering A2/AD namely, Air-Sea Battle and a blockade approach
appear to be based on the assumption that a shooting war with China would break out over Taiwan. In many ways,
the concern over Taiwan is well-placed. China covets the island far more than any other piece of real estate,
including the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. For CCP leaders and many ordinary Chinese, Taiwan is one of the vast
remaining vestiges of the countrys century of humiliation. Acquiring Taiwan would also significantly enhance the

Despite improvements in cross-Strait relations in


recent years, China has refused to rule out the possibility of invasion. Besides having the
PLAs ability to project power outwardly.

motivation to acquire Taiwan, China seemingly is rapidly acquiring the capability to take the island by force. In
recent years, the cross-Strait military balance has rapidly shifted in Beijings favor, and this trend is almost certain
to continue so long as Chinas economy continues to grow. Today, China has at least 1,600 ballistic missiles pointed
at Taiwan, and Taiwans own Ministry of Defense admits that China will have sufficient military capabilities to mount

This has led some U.S. analysts, particularly academics of the Realist
persuasion, to argue that the U.S. should gradually cede Taiwan to the Peoples
Republic of China. For example, Charles Glaser argued in a controversial Foreign Affairs article in 2011 that,
a full cross-Strait attack by 2020.

given the risks of nuclear war between China and the United States, the United States should consider backing
away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the
United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Similarly,

Mearsheimer argued that short of acquiring an independent


nuclear deterrent, Taiwans best option is to pursue the Hong Kong strategy
toward Beijing. Under the Hong Kong strategy, Taiwan accepts the fact it is doomed to lose its independence
in a recent talk in Taiwan, John

and become part of China. It then works hard to make sure that the transition is peaceful and that it gains as much

it is
ultimately extremely unlikely that China will try to seize Taiwan by force.
Furthermore, should it try to do this, it is unlikely to succeed. Even assuming
autonomy as possible from Beijing. Although the trend lines are undoubtedly working in Chinas favor,

Chinas military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from intervening, there are two forces that would

The first and least important is the


dramatic impact this would have on how countries in the region and around the
world would view such a move. Globally, China seizing Taiwan would result in it
being permanently viewed as a malicious nation. Regionally, Chinas invasion of Taiwan
likely be sufficient to deter China from invading Taiwan.

would diminish any lingering debate over how Beijing will use its growing power. Every regional power would see its

Although Beijing would try to reassure countries by claiming that


Taiwan was part of China already, and thus the operation was a domestic stability one, this
narrative would be convincing to none of Chinas neighbors . Consequently, Beijing would face
own fate in Taiwan.

an environment in which each state was dedicated to cooperating with others to balance against Chinese power.

But the more important deterrent for China would be the uncertainty of
success. To be sure, Chinas military capabilities are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its
ability to quickly defeat Taiwans military forces. A little longer down the road it will also likely be
confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict. However, as recent
U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, being able to defeat another nations armed
forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether . It is in
this latter aim that Chinas strategy is likely to falter. Taiwanese are adamantly opposed to being incorporated into a

even if it
quickly defeated Taiwans formal military forces, the PLA would continue to have to
contend with the remnants of resistance for years to come . Such a scenario would
be deeply unsettling for leaders in Beijing as this defiance would likely inspire similar resistance
non-Democratic China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of the invasion. Thus,

among various groups on the mainland, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the western China.
Should the PLA resort to harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle even Han
Chinese on the mainland. In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China

The entire situation would be a nightmare


for Chinese leaders. Consequently, they are nearly certain to avoid provoking it
by invading Taiwan. The only real scenario in which they would invade Taiwan is if the island nation
would be lost on no one in China and elsewhere.

formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think

the status-quo in the Taiwanese strait is


unlikely to be changed by military force . Instead, Beijing is likely to continue drawing Taiwan closer
the idea is very wise as China goes stronger. Thus,

economically, and seeking to disrupt the U.S.-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. The hope would be that leaders in
Taipei will ultimately conclude that they cannot resist being absorbed into China, something China itself can
facilitate this by offering favorable terms.