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The plan rolls back our protections of Taiwan, opening the door
for Chinese invasion
Torsvoll 15-M.A. Law and Diplomacy, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Tufts University
Eirik, China's Anti-Access Challenge and America's Air-Sea Battle Response,
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Detail/?lng=en&id=188445
The novelty of todays A2/AD measures, however, is in the power of technology, which has
made missile capabilities much more potent and accessible . China now has the ability to
target U.S. bases and forces beyond ranges of a thousand nautical miles. Its missile capabilities include advanced
cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles, with greater precision and range than previously possible.
When this capability is coupled with existing and expanding military power , such as
modern submarines, fighter jets, and minelayers, it becomes a dangerous picture for any U.S.
commander attempting to operate near or within Chinas maritime periphery. The
development has turned the offense-defense balance decidedly in the favor of the
latter. The reach and effectiveness of Chinas missiles is significant, because much
of the U.S. force projection in the region is reliant on bases and access to the
maritime commons. When this is put at risk, decision-makers in Washington must
make a much tougher call on whether to deploy U.S. forces in a given situation. The
calculus is worsened further by the fact that U.S. forces are operating far from home ,
being reliant on a long logistical chain, while China would be operating in its own
backyard. Beijing is thus exploiting a home field advantage as well as the costeffectiveness of missile attacks against capital-intensive U.S. military assets . What is
at stake is Americas ability to deter China from using , or threatening to use, force against
its neighbors in the region. A response to Chinas A2/AD capabilities has therefore
been deemed crucial in Washington. Additionally, by being able to cast doubt over the United
States resolve and ability to intervene in a given situation, Beijing is strengthening
its overall regional power. This allows China greater flexibility in pursuing favorable
outcomes to its strategic interests, including territorial disputes in the S outh China Sea
and East China Sea, as well as changing the status of Taiwan . It could also lead
decision-makers in Beijing into thinking that it had the upper hand in any conflict
against the United States, and open up for adventurism in new areas of Chinas
neighborhood.
China will use nukes to get their way and continue their
expansion south only the US can act as a check
Lowther 2015 -Director, School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies, Air
Force Global Strike Command
Adam and Alex Littlefield [Prof at Feng Chia U], "Taiwan and the Prospects for War
Between China and America," Aug 11, thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-theprospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/
Chinas maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and
significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its
rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished.
Chinas relationship with the Philippines , which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also
change dramatically. Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is
actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing
may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be
takes the non-Chinese side. China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As
such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits.
China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action.
This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee
Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainlands antics when the
U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits. Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou,
China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual
war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan. China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in
1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery
Corps nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard,
an example of the mirror-imaging that often occurs when attempting to understand an adversary. China is not the
United States nor do Chinese leaders think like their counterparts in the United States. Unless we give serious
combination of naval and aerial assets, as well as anti-armor rockets, missile batteries, artillery, mobile special
forces units, and a well-trained and equipped reserve, to saturate the beaches with lead and create a kill zone for
advancing PLA forces. Ensuring the survival of its air force and navy assets following saturation bombing by the
Second Artillery in the initial phase of major hostilities would also be important, as those would also be necessary to
such a passive, or
defense strategy would probably not be enough to deter Beijing . Consequently,
a second aspect of Taiwans plans to inflict unacceptable pain on China must
explore more offensive options. It has already begun doing so, with the production and deployment of
counter PLA transport vessels ferrying troops across the Taiwan Strait. However,
porcupine
Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM), naval suppression kits, and standoff air-to-ground missiles (cluster bombs, antiradiation) capable of disabling airfields as well as missile and radar sites in China. The deployment and dispersal of
larger quantities of road-mobile or naval LACM launchers would also make it more difficult for the PLA to locate and
destroy all of them and thus increase the potency of Taiwans counterstrike capabilities, especially if their range
were increased (Taiwan should nevertheless keep the moral high ground by promising it would only use such assets
against military targets). To maximize the impact of its counterforce capabilities, Taiwan would also have to improve
its ability to pinpoint targets through greater investment in radar and satellite technologyand ensure redundancy,
as those would also likely be targeted by the PLA in the initial phase of a conflict. Greater human intelligence assets
inside China, as well as the ability to conduct sabotage against key military (and economic) sites, would
complement the offensive aspect of Taiwans defense strategy. Other options include armed unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) and a larger fleet of submarines with conventional LACM capability. All of this is contingent on a
several
asymmetrical options are also available to Taiwan to maximize the pain of a PLA
invasion, with the ultimate goal of deterring such action. On the political side, Taipei should redouble its efforts in
political decision to invest more on defense than Taiwan does at present. Beyond kinetic strategies,
political warfare. The first aim of this strategy should be to counter similar operations by China, which have
succeeded in undermining morale in the Taiwanese military while encouraging the perception abroad that Taiwan is
an unreliable security partner, or that unification is inevitable or even desirable. The second leg of a more active
political warfare strategy would be to convince Beijing that Taiwans alliesthe United States., and possibly Japan
would act quickly should the PLA attempt an invasion of Taiwan. In other words, Beijing should not longer be kept
guessing whether the United States would enter a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, especially at a time when
Washingtons commitment to the regionand to Taiwan more specificallyis in serious doubt. Strategic ambiguity,
which has served as a cornerstone of Washingtons policy in the Taiwan Strait since the conclusion of the Korean
War, should be abandoned and replaced by a series of well advertised tripwires or red lines that, if crossed, would
in a conflict would substantially increase the costs of an invasion while diminishing the likelihood of a quick lowcost resolution on Beijings terms. Elsewhere, Taiwanese lobbyists and the Taiwanese diaspora could make more
effective use of the islands assetsa vibrant liberal democracy and an important economyto encourage the
international community to adopt a more vocal line in its opposition to the resolution of the Taiwan question by
military or coercive means. Convincing Beijing that the international community would not countenance use of force
and would slap painful economic sanctions should it decide to do sowould contribute to Taipeis deterrent.
Helping visitors to Taiwan better understand the nature and preciousness of its unique society, and encouraging
them to be more proactive in their home countries convincing their representatives to take a more principled stance
on Taiwan could go a long way. Existing programs under Taiwans Ministry of Foreign Affairs could serve as a basis
for such efforts; increasing contact via other departmentse.g., creating more exchange programs for foreign
military personnel to undergo language training in Taiwanshould also be explored. Additionally, taishang, the
Taiwanese who operate businesses in China and who played a crucial role in helping develop the Chinese economy
over the decades, could also threaten to cease their operations or pull out altogether if the PLA were activated in
the Strait. Though happy to make money in China, most taishang (including the many who vote for the KMT) remain
proud Taiwanese who do not want to see their home country devastated by war. Their possible role as a pressure
point against Beijing should not be underestimated. One last area where Taiwan could do more to deter Beijing is in
cyber warfare, or electronic sabotage. Using intelligence assets in China (closer contact between the two societies
works both ways and doesnt only create opportunities for China), Taiwan could identify and select civilian and
military targets for retaliation, with the aim of severely disrupting Chinas ability to operate normally should it
launch an attack against the island. The banking and high-tech sectors would be likely targets. On the military side,
promising to degrade, or perhaps even disable, Chinas nuclear deterrenteven if momentarily or knocking out
its air defense systems, thus exposing China to USAF bombing runs, would be enough to make Beijing think twice
about launching an invasion. In all those efforts, Taiwan would need to strike a balance between signaling its intent
and capability to launch disruptive attacks of that naturein other words, for deterrence to work, Beijing must be
convinced that the threat is realand the need to protect itself against Chinese espionage which could undermine
Taiwan presents perhaps the least likely, but also the most provocative, case of nuclear weapons potential in the
region. In the 1970s and again in the 1980s, Taiwan launched clandestine nuclear fuel reprocessing programs aimed
at providing it with its own nuclear deterrent against mainland China. Both times, the United States forced Taiwan to
abandon these programs.25 Taiwan has stored spent nuclear fuel at three two-unit nuclear power plants, which
could be reprocessed into bomb-grade plutonium if Taiwan built a facility to do so, as it attempted to do
with a nuclear warhead. The missile, named Cloud Peak, has a range of 1,200 and possibly 2,000 kilometers and
resolve the more challenging issues presently affecting the Sino-American relationship, these two great powers
have been increasingly relying on their military capabilities and hard power tactics. Thats especially true
in the
South China Sea, which is one of the single greatest points of contention between China and the
United States. While there is a realization on both sides of the Pacific that a kind of strategic stability is necessary to
countries are drawing lines in the sand and preparing for the worst. Failed pursuit of strategic stability Chinas
proposed solution to the Sino-American strategic stability issue is the new model of major-country relations, which
encourages the United States and China to avoid confrontation and conflict, respect one anothers political systems
and national interestsspecifically Chinas core interestsand pursue win-win cooperation. China is exceptionally
enthusiastic about this proposal and brings it up at every high-level Sino-American meeting. Chinese enthusiasm for
American
acceptance of Chinas proposal would facilitate Beijings rise, legitimize the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) as a leader for national strength and revival and reduce the
likelihood of American containment. As acceptance of the new model of major-country relations
the new model of major-country relations can be explained in a number of different ways.
would create an international environment conducive to Chinas rise, it would essentially allow China to become the
preeminent power in Asia without great power competition or conflict. This proposal also has the potential to put
Not
only would American recognition of Chinas strength and power have effects abroad,
but it would also stoke Chinese nationalism and strengthen CCP leadership
at home. Furthermore, this new model is a means of establishing a new code of conduct for the Sino-American
China on par with the United States, to elevate it to an equal status, one acknowledged by the United States.
relationship that is more in line with Chinese national interests, opening the door for the creation of a Chinese
sphere of influence in Asia and, potentially, a Sino-centric regional order. Prior to the recent meeting between Xi
Jinping and Barack Obama, Xi announced that Chinas proposed new model of major-country-relations would be
an important discussion point for the meeting, but, while this proposal was brought up during the meeting, no clear
progress was made. Because U.S. leaders believe that the new model of major-country relations is not in
Americas best interests, the United States has repeatedly dismissed Chinas proposal. As the hegemonic power,
the United States maintains its power by dominating global politics; to accept a geopolitical framework alternative
proposed by a strategic rival requires sacrificing a certain amount of power and influence. Along those same lines,
acceptance of Chinas proposal might give other states in the international system
the impression that the United States is in decline and on the losing end of the classic
Thucydides trap. Outside of traditional power politics, the call for the United States to respect Chinas
core interests as many Chinese and foreign scholars have notedis a loaded statement. While the United
States is not opposed to respecting a states national interests, it tends to be unwilling to respect national interests
which are highly contested, which is the situation for the majority of Chinas core interests .
In addition to
traditional Chinese national interests, such as Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, Chinas core
interests also cover most of its territorial claims in Asia. The United States is
concerned that Chinas new model of major-country relations is a ploy designed to
trick the United States into acknowledging Chinas extensive territorial claims and
undercutting the interests of American allies and long-time strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region,
which would likely result in the weakening of the American-led hub-and-spoke security
structure, a security framework China hopes to replace with its New Asian Security Concept. There are also
suspicions in the United States that Chinas proposal is a call for the creation of spheres of influence, a concept to
which the Obama administration has been consistently opposed. Americas approach to Sino-American strategic
stability is to have China and the United States focus on cooperation and agree to avoid letting competition in one
area affect cooperation and collaboration in others. In many ways, this resembles Chinas old shelving disputes
and pursuing joint development strategy for Asia. As this kind of strategy is the geopolitical equivalent of sweeping
dirt under the rug, it is only effective to a point. Eventually, the dirt spills out. Sooner or later, unaddressed
problems surface. At best, this approach is only a temporary stop on the road to functional strategic stability. At
worst, this approach has already outlived its usefulness. China views this strategy as an attempt by the United
States to avoid addressing Chinas demands that the United States acknowledge Chinas rise to great power status
and redefine the relationship accordingly, which only encourages the already strong Chinese desire to push forward
the new model of major-country relations. China and the United States are at an impasse regarding strategic
While both states have made commitments and promises to prevent great
power conflict, neither China nor the United States has developed a reasonable or
implementable solution for Sino-American strategic stability. Thus, competition continues
stability.
unmanaged, unchecked and confrontation is steadily evolving into conflict. Drawing Lines in the Sea The
problems pushing the Sino-American relationship towards conflict are numerous and diverse, but if you are looking
for the issue most likely to cause conflict, you need look no further than the South China Sea. China perceives the
territorial disputes in this area as issues in which aggressive foreign state actors led by the United States are
threatening Chinas territorial sovereignty. For China, because of its history, territorial sovereignty issues implicate
the guiding principles of the liberal world orderwhich the United States views as crucial for the preservation of
Americas global hegemonic power. The situation in the South China Sea has been steadily escalating for several
years now. In April, 2014, American defense secretary Chuck Hagel met with Chinese defense minister Chang
Wanquan. During the meeting, Hagel said, All parties should refrain from provocative actions and the use of
intimidation, coercion, or aggression to advance their claims. Such disputes must be resolved peacefully and in
accordance with international law. Chang replied, Id like to reiterate that the territorial sovereignty issue is a
Chinese core interest. On this issue, we will make no compromises, no concessions. Not even a tiny bit of violation
will be allowed. The inability to discuss openly or compromise on this issue has made it impossible to resolve and
has led to escalation and increased tension. In the aftermath of this meeting, China began investing heavily in
island construction and land reclamation activities in disputed waters. As these activities have stirred up a lot of
dust in the region, the United States has demanded that China abandon its present course of action, insisting that it
international law, the United States asserts that Chinese actions are in violation of the law of the sea and laws for
the regulation of the international commons. China argues that the South China Sea issue is a territorial sovereignty
issue, yet the United States regards this issue as a freedom of navigation dispute, as well as a fight for the
preservation of the international legal systema cornerstone for the American-led liberal world order. In August of
this year, the United States launched its new Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, which aims to safeguard the
freedom of the seas, deter conflict and escalation, and promote adherence to international law and standards. The
Asia-Pacific region is now at the heart of the American naval security agenda. In response, Chinese foreign ministry
spokesperson Hong Lei said that China opposes any countrys attempt to challenge Chinas territorial sovereignty
and security under the pretext of safeguarding navigation freedom. Responding to Chinese criticisms of Americas
new regional maritime security strategy, American Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, Make no mistake, we
will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law permitsWe will do that at times and places of our choosing.
In 2014, the United States carried out freedom of navigation exercises in various parts of the world and
challenged the territorial claims of 18 different countries; however, the United States has yet to officially challenge
Chinas claims in the South China Sea. But, that may soon change, as the United States is currently considering
sending American naval vessels within 12 nautical miles of Chinas artificial islands in order to force China to end its
land reclamation activities. Such plans are considered aggressive, dangerous and extremely provocative by the
Chinese. A recent Global Times editorial read, China mustnt tolerate rampant US violations of Chinas adjacent
waters and the skies over these expanding islands. The Chinese military should be ready to launch
countermeasures according to Washingtons level of provocation. The article further stated, If the US encroaches
on Chinas core interests, the Chinese military will stand up and use force to stop it. The article stated plainly, If
the US adopts an aggressive approach, it will breach Chinas bottom line, and China will not sit idly by. Other
if the bottom
line for the United States is that China must end all of its land reclamation activities
in the South China Sea, then war is inevitable, which suggests that this issue may
be the tipping point for the Sino-American relationship . How the United States and China
reports from this newspaper, a state-sponsored Chinese media outlet, have made it clear that
choose to move forward on this issue will permanently redefine the relationship between these two great powers.
this trying issue will need to be resolved, and regardless of whether it is resolved through diplomacy or military
force, it will take a toll on the geopolitical influence of either one or both countries. Were the international
institutions for collective security strong enough to handle situations like this when they ariseand if China and the
United States were willing to establish a new relationship model which addresses each countrys respective security
concerns and encourages effective collaborationit might actually be possible to resolve this issue peacefully. But
there is currently
no clear solution to this problem that would allow both countries to walk
out of this situation with their heads held high, these two states are
pondering the unthinkable. Depending on each countrys level of commitment and resolve, this situation
may have already passed the tipping point. The outcome of the geopolitical power struggle
between China and the United States will almost certainly be decided in the South
China Sea. Some have suggested that the South China Sea issue is not a Sino-American issue. On the contrary,
it is the most pressing Sino-American issue. One side will either choose to back down or be
forced to back down. No matter how everything plays out in the South China Sea,
geopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region will never be the same again.
given current circumstances, this is little more than idealism and wishful thinking. As
Impacts
Should the Global Trends Hobbesian scenario occur due to a withdrawal of the U.S. forward
security presence, the number of nuclear weapon states would almost certainly rise.
That outcome would assuredly result in greater instability, as multisided security competitions would
very likely break out. Military planners in the region would have to defend against multiple
and possibly shifting adversary alliance combinations. The addition of more nuclear
players would result in the need for greater preparation and stockpiling by all, because
previously safe levels of nuclear munitions would no longer be safe enough. New
players would mean further reductions in warning time during crises. Some leaders might conclude
that striking first at the hint of crisis is the only way to survive. Under the Hobbesian
pathway, the odds of nuclear disaster would rise substantially.
And, even if they dont get the bomb the impact will be nuclear
because of the powers already in the region
Tan 2015 - Associate Professor At the University of New South Wales
Andrew T.H., Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31
East Asias arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which
a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by
other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and
ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are
supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asias sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War
in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that
growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 4748). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have
remained. Japans imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account
for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South
Korea. In additions, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as
strong as intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean
peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional
institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust
and confidence- and security-building measures which were in pace in Europe during the Cold
War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the SixParty Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem
North Koreas open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again.
The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of
miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced
that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same
there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should
now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and
South China Seas. Thus, Chinas nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory
time,
Xi has been
searching for ways to reinvigorate China's economy . One measure he embraced was to talk up
bitter and well-placed enemies, whose family fortunes and lives are on the line. At the same time,
the stock market, which he promised the Chinese people would create both personal and national wealth. Almost
right up to the initial tremors heralding this summer's crash, state-run news outlets were urging the population to
buy stocks. As the Chinese market soared, this may have seemed to Xi's colleagues in the Politburo as a stroke of
genius; millions of people were getting rich on paper, and the Communist Party was getting the credit for it. It now
must appear to them and to an entire class of unhappy investors as a monumental act of maladministration.
Having lost ideological purity and economic stewardship as claims to power, the
party is left, at least for the time being, with repression and nationalism. Accordingly, Xi has
cracked down on dissent with renewed vigor, sweeping up democracy advocates,
environmentalists, lawyers, champions of minority group rights and anyone else
who gets out of line. Simultaneously, he's intensified a campaign to bolster internal
support by riling China's neighbors, particularly the hated Japanese . In the last three
years, China has unilaterally declared an air-defense-identification zone over islands also claimed by Japan,
deployed oil rigs off the coast of Vietnam and built an assortment of fortified artificial islands at strategic locations
contain the increasingly menacing tiger. China's bellicosity may ultimately prove self-defeating as a national
security strategy. Indeed, Chinese conduct appears inexplicable without reference to its domestic sources. The costs
of antagonism are evidently offset by the internal benefits for Xi and the party's grip on power. Some observers
perceive a silver lining in China's difficulties, believing that a country preoccupied with internal problems will be less
aggressive and require fewer diplomatic, economic and military resources to hold it in check. That is wishful
never before attempted. Even with the much-vaunted but underresourced "pivot" to Asia, the United States was illprepared to meet the challenge of preserving peace in the Pacific. Now the danger we face is growing steadily.
The
anxieties plaguing China's leaders , in place for decades, are fueling the belligerence of a
rising power; the stock market fiasco, coming on the heels of an economic
slowdown, has turned a scratch into gangrene.
while
batteries of Chinese missiles still point toward the island, tranquility has reigned
across the Taiwan Strait. Perhaps not for much longer, as Beijings strategy of
waiting it out now seems to be in tatters. Presidential and legislative elections three months from
lasted since 1949, when the Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan after losing the civil war on the mainland. So
now are likely to confirm that a drive by the Kuomintang under President Ma Ying-jeou for deeper economic
engagement, far from encouraging public sentiment in favor of unification, is having the opposite effect.
Popular
its possible
Beijings patience may snap and it will shift tack from conciliation to coercion to
complete the Communist Partys most important piece of unfinished business . That
could mean anything from squeezing Taiwans already narrow international spacestealing away its dwindling
number of diplomatic friends, for instanceto applying pressure on its fragile economy, perhaps by slowing the flow
Chinese president likes to think he understands Taiwan; as a senior official in coastal provinces, Xi Jinping was on
friendly terms with many Taiwan factory owners and investors. Maybe, speculates Mr. Chang, the former nationalsecurity adviser, Mr. Xi will persevere with the old strategy of forbearance but in a smarter way by reaching beyond
the Kuomintang and the wealthy elites and engaging ordinary Taiwanese and small-business owners. That would
require flexibility and imagination. So far, on every issue relating to Chinas troubled peripheryHong Kong, Tibet,
XinjiangMr. Xi has taken an uncompromising line, doubling down on hard-line policies that have stirred popular
the U.S., Taiwans main military backer. The critical question, though, is whether the risks outweigh the danger
to Mr. Xi if Taiwan appears to be drifting permanently away under his watch. No Chinese leader can afford to let that
happen, and Mr. Xi has built his popularity around a muscular brand of nationalism that puts him under greater
pressure to take action. As a political goal, unification is now a nonstarter in Taiwan. But Mr. Xi cant wait forever.
Compared with Taiwan, all the other island disputes in East Asiaincluding one thats
bubbling now over Chinas artificial islands in the S outh China Seaare a sideshow.
And the plan sends that greenlight because the plan weakens
our resolve regarding China, sending the perception of
abandonment according to Trossvell. More importantly the CCP
will view the plan as brief moment of opportunity and attack
Lee and Schreer 2013 - Lee is PhD student in Political Science at the
University of Pennsylvania Benjamin & Schreer is Senior Analyst for Defence
Strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute
Sheryn and Benjamin, "The Taiwan Strait: Still Dangerous," Survival: Global Politics
and Strategy Volume 55, Issue 3, 2013, p. 55-62
The United States has long encouraged Taiwan to focus on self-defence capacity and forgo offensive military
informal security commitments towards Taiwan in the context of the 1979 Taiwan's Relations Act and its strategic
China's investments in
sophisticated A2/AD capabilities now pose serious challenges to US forces in and
around the Taiwan Strait, inviting more and more doubt over whether Washington is
really prepared to defend Taiwan. Some US analysts have argued that the defence of the island might
relations with a rising China. But this position is increasingly difficult to sustain.
no longer be worth the cost of a war with China, given that America has only reputational interests at stake.13
That the United States might simply give up on Taiwan, however, is one of the greatest myths of modern global
politics.14 Reputation is often a major influence on a state's decision to go to war. 15
Washington's
commitment to Taiwan is becoming even more important as an indicator for the
credibility of America's rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific . There is great uncertainty among
Asian allies of whether the coming US defence-budget cuts will lead to at least a partial withdrawal of American
Pentagon is looking for a credible war-fighting doctrine to reassure its allies and partners about US forces' continued
Part of its
response to China's A2/AD strategy is the Air-Sea Battle concept, which makes
Taiwan a front-line state. The ROC is uniquely positioned to provide the United States with access and
situational awareness about PLA air, space, sea and cyber domains.16 Taiwan is thus even more
important for the United States and Japan as the PLA looks to project naval power
beyond the Taiwan Strait. To do this, it will have to overcome the chokepoint created by highly
ability and resolve to project military power even in maritime zones contested by the PLA.
sophisticated US and allied capabilities to monitor and track the PLA Navy once it enters the Western Pacific.
Without controlling Taiwan, the PLA will find it very difficult to escape this tyranny of
geography that allows the US and its allies to deny the PLA control of the seas in the
Taiwan Strait and beyond. The 2013 QDR stresses that Taiwan is located in the center position of the First
Island Chain in the Western Pacific and possesses geo-strategic importance and that it will service [its related]
strategic warning function.17 The Taiwan Strait remains volatile, and stands to become more so. One key danger is
Chinese overconfidence with regard to the PLA's strength, Taiwan's defensive capabilities and US resolve.
Taiwanese Navy also plans to acquire six new indigenously built minehunting ships over the next 12 years to
counter a possible PLA blockade. In combination with Taiwans air-to-air, naval-to-naval and ground-to-ground
in response to a PLA attack. In November 2012, Taiwan also test-fired a new supersonic anti-ship missile, the Hsiung
Feng III, which could be used against a future Chinese aircraft carrier and other surface vessels.
2NC - Heg
Taiwan is key to heg plan causes war
Liao & Lin 15 (*Nien-Chung, Ph.D., Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies,
National Chengchi University (2012), **Dalton; researcher of US-Chinese relations at
Princeton, B.A. from the National Taiwan University and a M.A. from Australian
National University (with High Distinction). He received his Ph.D. degree in political
science from the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 2015, Rebalancing TaiwanUS
Relations, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Volume 57, Issue 6, 2015,
DOI:10.1080/00396338.2015.1116161, http://cwp.princeton.edu/news/delicatebalance-rebalancing-taiwan%E2%80%93us-relations, BC)
Other abandonists, who are more pessimistic about China's rise, consider US
promises to Taiwan too costly to keep. Eschewing the rosy picture of Sino-US cooperation, they warn
instead of intensifying competition, and set their sights on the challenges of the
future, arguing that China's ascendency will eventually spell US decline and Taiwanese surrender.11 (link is
external) If the key presumption of these pessimists is American retreat from the Asia-Pacific, then abandoning
Taiwan is not so much a policy or a calculated choice for the US government as it is an inevitability. If the
pessimists aim is to shape the trajectory of China's ascendency to US advantage, however,
then abandoning Taiwan would be a mistake . Historically, the United States has
consistently prevented any power it sees as potentially hostile from controlling Asia .
The likelihood of a Sino-US crisis t riggered by maritime disputes will increase as long as
Washington finds it necessary to maintain a substantial military presence and support to
its allies in the region.12 (link is external) Given its location at a strategic crossroads of the Asia-Pacific , Taiwan
will remain an indispensable part of the US regional security architecture .
US regional allies and partners, such as Japan, South Korea and Southeast Asian
countries, thus also have much at stake in Washington's continuing commitment to
Taiwan. Cutting Taiwan loose will not only weaken US credibility as a reliable partner,
but will also enhance the PRC's ability to project power, should the island fall into its
orbit. The fate of Taiwan's autonomy is a litmus test of China's wider intentions as well as US resolution and
commitment to the Asia-Pacific. The desire of both the optimistic and pessimistic abandonists for the United States
to avoid unnecessary confrontation with China, and to mitigate the unfolding security dilemma in the region, is
constructive. But Taiwan is not the right card to play. Abandoning Taiwan would create conditions detrimental both
to the Sino-US relationship and to regional stability. As Washington strives to build a constructive relationship with
Beijing, Taipei has also been doing its part to make peace with its long-term rival. The cross-Strait detente could, to
some extent, facilitate Sino-US collaboration by mitigating a contentious issue in their bilateral relationship. Taipei's
The
optimistic and pessimistic abandonists for the United States to avoid unnecessary
confrontation with China, and to mitigate the unfolding security dilemma in the region, is constructive.
But Taiwan is not the right card to play. Abandoning Taiwan would create
conditions detrimental both to the Sino-US relationship and to regional stability. As
Washington strives to build a constructive relationship with Beijing, Taipei has also
been doing its part to make peace with its long-term rival. The cross-Strait detente could,
to some extent, facilitate Sino-US collaboration by mitigating a contentious issue in their bilateral
recent policies have been conducive to regional peace and prosperity, and deserve Washington's support.
desire of
both the
relationship. Taipei's recent policies have been conducive to regional peace and prosperity, and deserve
Washington's support.
2NC Alliances
Abandonment makes South Korea and Japan nervous
Mearsheimer 14 (John; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago; March/April 2014 National Interest,
Issue #130, Taiwans Dire Straits, http://political-science.uchicago.edu/facultyarticles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf, BC)
Abandoning Taiwan would erode American credibility in the Indo-Pacific and add
fuel to an ongoing regional arms race. Taiwan policy cannot be compartmentalized, and
viewed in isolation from the pivot and U.S. policy towards Asia. Decision-makers in Seoul, Tokyo, and
Manila would naturally question U.S. resolve and Washingtons commitment to their
security in the event of an abandonment of Taiwan . Japan, in particular, would feel
threatened by the stationing of Chinese forces on Taiwan in essence losing a valuable
geopolitical bufferin such close proximity to its southwestern approaches. Heightened threat
perceptions in Tokyo, if combined with a lack of faith in the credibility of U.S. conventional and nuclear
deterrence, could lead Japan to acquire a nuclear-weapons capability. The
corrosive effect of forfeiting Taiwan would also extend to other key allies such as South
Korea, which might question Washingtons determination to defend it from North
Korean aggression. Indeed, recent public-opinion polls have indicated that a growing proportion of
the South Korean public now favors the development of a South Korean nuclear
arsenal. Revealingly, the reasons invoked for such a shift were growing concerns over North Koreas increasingly
unpredictable and belligerent behavior, as well as over the continued viability of the United States security
large numbers of nuclear capable delivery vehicles and other offensive weapons.
The U.S., the E.U., Russia, Japan, India, Australia, South Korea, Israel and many
other key U.N. members all have clear strategic imperatives for pushing China to
join a global INF treaty. Until China verifiably dismantles its theater missiles and
support infrastructures, the U.S. and Russia will have a strong case for suspending
their INF Treaty obligations. As both the U.S. and Russia learned some three decades
ago, arms control treaties are only possible when all sides have leverage. More
broadly, Washington needs a long-term strategy for maintaining its leadership in the
Asia-Pacific. Elevating the currently diminished role of regional allies and partners in
the rhetorical rebalance to Asia is the single most powerful means available for
achieving this goal. In particular, increased support for Taiwan and Japan would
bolster American credibility with the many regional allies and partners who are
eager to see a stronger U.S. commitment to the Asia-Pacific.
TurnsChinese Invasion
U.S. withdrawal in Taiwan is the next step for victory for China
Ian Easton, a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he conducts
research on defense and security issues in Asia, 09-26- 13, Online:
http://www.project2049.net/documents/China_Military_Strategy_Easton.pdf,
Article: CHINAS MILITARY STRATEGY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: Implications for Regional
Stability Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
In light of this, the PLAs strategy to use projectiles is well suited to the political
mission assigned to it. Missiles and other unmanned strike weapons have powerful
disruptive effects, both physically and psychological. The latter is important
because the definition of victory for China does not necessarily require that Taiwan
and Japan are physically dominated and the U.S. military is physically kept out of
the Western Pacific. Ideally, victory for the PLA would be keeping the U.S. from
upholding its legal obligations to defend Taiwan and Japan, either through a gradual
weakening of these bilateral relationships or by a sudden collapse of national will
(for example, a White House decision to reinterpret or ignore the Taiwan Relations
Act). The psychological pressure induced by the threat of the PLAs growing
offensive missile force is intended to aid the CCP in achieving such effects through
coercion.57 Should efforts at intimidation prior to or during a crisis fail, the PLA
would define victory as keeping Washington from being able to effectively intervene
in a Taiwan or Japan scenario. It would do this by seeking to assure that the
American military could not gain air superiority and effectively project power into
the region. And, because the ultimate aim of the CCPs strategy in most foreseeable
situations would be to change the decision-making calculus of the President of
Taiwan or the Prime Minister of Japan, it could be sufficient to make them think the
U.S. was unable or unwilling to support them during a crisis, thereby gaining
psychological leverage over them. For this reason, the PLAs ability to credibly
threaten the U.S. with potential military defeat or at least stalemate in the Western
Pacific is critical to its success. Unless Chinas neighbors believe that the PLA has
the wherewithal to present the U.S. the possibility of defeat, they are unlikely to feel
pressured to grant Beijing whatever political concessions it is seeking. Tactical
credibility aside, Chinese strategists are also well aware that the mere presence of
destructive projectiles within range of an adversary can be a powerful force for
affecting mindsets. This is arguably more important to the PLA than the value of
missiles and UAVs as effectors of the physical realm of battle, and it helps explain
why projectiles and not platforms have been chosen as Chinas primary means of
projecting power.
%20Standoff_US_China_Rivalry_Taiwan.pdf, Article: Strategic Standoff The U.S.China Rivalry and Taiwan Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
Of all the powder kegs out there, the potential for a war over Taiwan is the largest
and most explosive.14 Beijing has made clear that its main external objective is
attaining the ability to apply overwhelming force against Taiwan during a conflict,
and in a manner that would keep American-led coalition forces from intervening.15
Chinese military strategists focus on Taiwan because the communist party is
insecure. The CCP views Taiwan, which exists as a free and independent state that is
officially called the Republic of China (ROC), as a grave threat to its grip on power.
Taiwan is anathema to the PRC because it serves as a beacon of freedom for
Chinese speaking people everywhere. 16 Consequently, the People's Liberation
Army (PLA), which is the armed wing of the CCP, considers the invasion of Taiwan to
be its most critical mission. It is this envisioned future war that drives the PLA's
modernization program.17
AT: No Prolif
Yes tech + reason to prolif
Fitzpatrick 16 (Mark; ten years heading the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Policy Programme, 26-year career in the US Department of State, where for the
previous ten years he focused on non-proliferation issues, 2/2/16, Asias Latent
Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, accessed through UMich Library,
BC)
What if?,
Although it is highly unlikely that Taiwan will again seek nuclear weapons
this possibility cannot be ruled out. The security condition that sparked the nuclearweapons pursuit in 1964 and that sustained it for more than two decade s a
looming potential threat from the mainland remains a dominant risk in Taiwan's
security landscape. Strait relations have improved, the military balance ha steadily worsened. To the extent
that Taiwan enjoys de facto protection from the US, it does not need to consider a nuclear equaliser. Two
conditions thus could prompt reconsideration . If the threat perception were to
become sufficiently dire and the US could not be counted upon to deter
mainland China, then Taiwan would have a logical motivation to seek an autonomous A-bomb. Even then, however, the risks would probably be judged to be too great in terms of the
provocation to Beijing. Some analysts claim that if Taiwan decided to produce nuclear weapons, it would take eight
to ten years66 or longer. Such estimates apparently assume a systematic development effort, similar to the past
programmes of Pakistan and North Korea. Those countries had time for a measured approach since they did not
might be accelerated by foreign weapon designers. Weapons fabrication might then take several more months.
Because Taiwan's land-attack missiles are small in diameter and thus unsuitable for crude A-bombs, the weapons
would have to be designed for air drop, or possibly suicidal delivery via water. Such a crash course could not be
kept secret from LkEA inspector), the Taiwan public or outside po w ers. A uranium enrichment programme would be
easier to hide, but prob-ably still impossible to keep secret given the porous nature of Taiwan politics and the
open_ness of society. Taiwan has no known uranium resources and importing the necessary uranium would itself be
difficult to keep under wraps. The cost of a Manhattan Project-style weapons programme, estimated at up to US$10
China, but rather the sovereign identity of Taiwan itself. 7 An ever-increasing majority of the island's residents feel
a sepa rate national identity, while mainland China is determined to prevent independence for the island. The
precipitating shock of 1964 was abrupt conventional: Beijing's nuclear test put Taiwan's leadership in a precarious
position. Any PRC effort to forcefully reunite Taiwan with the mainland would probably involve nuclear weapons only
indirectly, as a threat to back up conventional force. Any actual use of nuclear weapons against Taiwan would be
counterproductive to the purpose of incorporating an advanced infrastructure and population!' The military threat of
if Taiwan
perceived those forces as presenting an existential threat and if, at the
same time, it believed it could no longer count on the protection of the US,
then pursuing a nuclear option might again be attractive. Only with such a
more concern to Taiwan is the steady build-up of PRC conventional armed forces. As indicated above,
combination of these two factors, producing a profound sense of fear on the part of the population, is it conceivable
that Taiwan would even seriously consider going down the nuclear path.
position, without such a weapon, Taiwan's military forces could not last beyond the first 70 hours of a concerted PRC
March 1996, America demon-strated its naval superiority in the region by dispatching two carrier task forces to the
termination of diplomatic relations, is ambiguous. It declares it is the policy of the US to 'consider any effort to
determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means ... a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States', to provide Taiwan with 'arms of a defensive character', and
to 'maintain the capacity of the US to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan'. This falls far short of the previous commitment
for military assistance under the 1954 defence treaty, even though commitments under the latter were not airtight,
either.% US president Bill Clinton in 2004 acknowledged that the US 'had never said whether we would or wouldn't
come to the defence of Taiwan if it were attacked'.91 When the US in 2001 designated Taiwan as the equivalent of a
major non-NATO ally, it allowed Taiwan to submit mili-tary equipment requests at any time, rather than annually,
but it did not otherwise change the nature of the relationship. And there has been no follow-through on a 2001
commitment to help Taiwan acquire modern submarines, of import partly because the US no longer manufactures
diesel submarines and because other states that do so are unwilling to suffer Beijing's ire.' Although the TRA has
sometimes been interpreted to mean that the US will defend Taiwan in the case of an attack, this is not necessarily
'subsumed by the larger question of whether the United States would come to the island's defence at all." Think
tanks find it difficult to obtain funding from US governmental and philanthropic foundations for research or Track H
The causation for such a domino effect would not be direct: Japanese or South Korean nuclear weapons would pose
since these allies would only seek nuclear weapons in the event of
no longer being able to rely on US protection, there would also be a loss of
credibility regarding lingering US commitments to not-quite-ally Taiwan.
no threat to Taiwan. But
Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait and extended its nuclear umbrella to Taiwan. Recently declassified material shows that from
January 1958 to July 1974, the United States stored nuclear weapons on Taiwan.7 U.S. protection prevented a Chinese attack on
Taiwan. In December 1978, as one of the conditions for normalizing relations with the PRC, the United States abrogated the 1954
it is
debatable whether the "residual" U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security under the
defense treaty with Taiwan. U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to shore up Taiwan's security. However,
TRA constitutes an implicit nuclear umbrella. The TRA de-clares that it is the policy of the United States to
"consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means . . . a threat to the peace and security of the
Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States," to provide Taiwan with "arms of a defensive character," and to
"maintain the ca-pacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the
TRA is silent on
whether the United States will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. Snyder's
security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan" (Taiwan Relations Act 1979). But the
in-sights on entrapment help explain why the United States adopts a policy of "stra-tegic ambiguity" toward the Taiwan Strait. It is
intended to keep both China and Taiwan in check. Unlike Japan or South Koreaboth treaty allies of the United States Taiwan
cannot for certain rely on America's extended deterrence com-mitment. It must work hard
to cultivate American support. Given its existential insecurity and the implicit and ambiguous
commitment of its only ally, Taiwan has often been identified as a country with good
reasons for possessing nuclear weapons as part of its comprehensive strategy of
survival. Andrew Mack grouped Taiwan along with Japan, South Korea, and North Korea in a category called "virtual nuclear
powers" who could acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short time but have chosen not to do so
(Mack 1997).
current proliferation drivers. It considers how long it would take each to build a nuclear weapon if such a fateful
decision were made but does not predict such a scenario. Unlike when each previously went down a nuclear path,
democracy and a free press now prevail as barriers to building bombs in the basement. Reliance on US defence
extended
deterrence is not a barrier to proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies. Nuclear
hedging by its Northeast Asian partners will challenge Washingtons nuclear
diplomacy.
commitments is a better security alternative as long as such guarantees remain credible. But
Taiwan, the MND report also notes that Chinas reclamation and construction work in
the South China Sea will have the end result of militarizing the outposts. The MND
also says that it expects China to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in
the South China Sea. The report says Chinas island-building has changed the
strategic dynamic in the disputed region. Taiwan shares Chinas claims in the South
China Sea, but looks with unease on the growing tensions in the region. In May,
Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou unveiled a South China Sea Peace Initiative that
calls for all claimants to shelve the disputes and seek to jointly develop resources.
The initiative also urges all parties to respect international law (particularly the UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea) and to set up a code of conduct to reduce
tensions.
three times more, it said. By contrast, Taiwans defence budget has showed a
declining trend over the past decade, remaining at between NT$252.5 billion
(S$10.8 billion) and NT$334 billion. Taiwan and China have been governed
separately since they split in a civil war in 1949. Beijing has since tried to isolate
Taiwan, which it regards as a renegade province awaiting reunification by force if
necessary. Relations between Taiwan and China have significantly improved since
Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou was first elected in 2008. Since then, both sides have
signed 23 agreements. Despite a cross-strait detente, many suspect the Chinese
are using cross-strait trade to draw Taiwan economically closer, leading to eventual
political union. KYODO NEWS
Taiwanese Navy also plans to acquire six new indigenously built minehunting ships over the next 12 years to
counter a possible PLA blockade. In combination with Taiwans air-to-air, naval-to-naval and ground-to-ground
in response to a PLA attack. In November 2012, Taiwan also test-fired a new supersonic anti-ship missile, the Hsiung
Feng III, which could be used against a future Chinese aircraft carrier and other surface vessels.
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and
all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated
the
absence of formal links between Taiwan and the U.S. matter less in terms
of formal obligations. The key variable is the political will to make difficult
decisions at a time when the need arises. Where it matters is the public perception of the relationship. For it to work in a
desirable way, strategic ambiguity is not the best tool. It is an absence of political will that prevents greater
utilization of the existing framework.
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Ultimately,
even more important with Taiwans transition to multi-party democracy. However, since mid-2000s sales have become increasingly irregular. Partly for
reasons stemming from gridlock in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bians second term, partly for what appears to be consideration to Chinese hostile position on
any arms sales to Taiwan. The large arms sales packages from years 2008, 2010 and 2011, the last ones until December 2015, were mostly realization of
arms package agreed in 2001. Arguably, the amount of weapons acquired between 2009 and 2011 take some time to absorb, which in turn justifies the
four year gap between 2011 and the most recent sale in December 2015. However, the long period of no sale has done some harm, and no good.
no serious Asia
watcher either predicts or desires a clash with China . However, even by the measuring stick of
her own aspirations noted above, China today is falling far short of the mark, raising serious
questions about the future of its relationship with the U nited States. To begin with, few of
Chinas neighbors feel that Beijing is altogether peaceful these days. Its coercion
over disputed maritime territory in the East and South China Seas continues unabated, and it
has now built islands in contested waters and is beginning to militarize them. Its military might,
showcased this month at a major parade, was a clear message of Chinas strength and a
warning to those who would oppose it. Secondly, longtime observers of China are increasingly concerned about its
stability. Xi Jinping has instituted a social crackdown that belies the regimes concern over its safety. Xi has arrested
potential threats to his own power in the Communist Party, tightened control over the military, jailed lawyers and
dissidents, and maintained oppression of Tibetan and Uighur minorities. Even established academics like George
Washington Universitys David Shambaugh are beginning to say that the Communist Party is entering its endgame,
with unknown effects on social stability. Americans are willing to overlook these failings as long as China remained
the goose that laid the golden egg. Yet this summer showed that Chinese prosperity, the third of Rices goals, can
The stock market collapse over the past few months is a sign of
much deeper problems in the broader economy. The official growth rate has been knocked down
be taken for granted.
to 7 percent, but few economists believe the figure, and it is entirely likely that China is already in stagnation. That
responsible player in global affairs. In fact, it already isnt, despite Rices desire. Just days before Xis visit to
Obama, his government has formallyarrested an American citizen on charges of spying. This sends a clear message
to Obama about Beijings regard for diplomatic niceties. Far more serious, of course, is the unprecedented cyber
espionage conducted by Chinese hacker s, undoubtedly controlled or supported by the government, against U.S.
citizens and businesses. The hack of the Office of Personnel Management compromised the sensitive data of tens of
millions of Americans. In response,Washington is toying with signing a cybersecurity pact with Beijing that will do
Add on Beijings claims over the South China Sea and its
attempt to dominate contested waters, its refusal to pressure North Korea, and its
campaign to seek out Chinese expats in America and coerce them to return home ,
nothing to stop such aggression.
and the picture of bonhomie between America and China is itself a product of the kind of reductive reasoning and
lazy rhetoric denounced by Rice. The question is, what to do about all this? How can the United States effectively
pressure its largest import partner and the worlds second-largest economy? Must the arc of progress championed
dialogues to be reset, to use a term once in favor in the Obama Administration, and conducted not as an unearned
gift to Beijing, but only when there are concrete goals to be
in violation of global norms of behavior is not one that should be rewarded with
pomp and circumstance by U.S. leaders. In addition, it is past time for the U.S. to act as
the guarantor of regional stability that it claims to be. That means sending U.S.
ships and planes right up to the edges of Chinas manmade islands in the South
China Sea, something that Obama Administration admitted in Senate testimony last week that it was not doing.
By not challenging Chinas territorial claims we are in essence confirming them, and
sending a message of political weakness to our allies in Asia. A China that knows we will
employ our military strength where it is most in question will be far more circumspect in its attempts to undermine
the rules of international behavior. As for cyber, it is Beijing that has caused this crisis, and no U.S. administration
should be negotiating a pact with the wolf in the sheep pen. First, we should be thinking of financial sanctions and
diplomatic freezes as punishment for aggression already committed and that to come. It also is past time to throw
some cyber elbows to show we wont simply sit and take whatever fouls China decides to commit. There is no
question that the U.S. is probably more vulnerable that China on the cyber front, but we are steadily being led down
the path towards a real cyber Pearl Harbor (such as the shutting down of our energy grid) by our unwillingness to
show that we can play the same game. Its a discomfiting thought, but that is the world we have let ourselves be
The point of the new realism is not to force a conflict with China.
It is to avoid one. Only steady strength, a firm response, and a willingness to speak the
truth will show Xi Jinping and his fellow leaders that America is no better friend and no worse adversary. The
trapped into.
choice lies entirely with the Chinese leadership. So far, they have ignored Susan Rices earnest exhortations, and
instead shown a dangerous willingness to undermine the very peace that has allowed their country to grow so
The United States requires sufficient military and political presence in East Asia
to balance the rise of China and to deter it from using force to achieve regional
hegemony, should it become frustrated at the pace of change. US strength will also
reassure local powers that their security does not require accommodation to
Chinas rise.15
Links
systems, weapon systems, logistic systems, air bases, ports, and sea lanes of communication, and aircraft
carriers.13 Furthermore, China would have to strike US integrated information systems that are central to collecting,
processing, and transmitting electronic data, such as C4ISR systems, computer networks and satellites, given that
they are essential for successful execution of high-tech weaponry. With all these measures combined, China could
crush US will to resist.
This strategy is very remincient of Soviet thinking during the Cold War. It aims to purse an asymmetrical capability
based on mobile precision-guided, land-based ballistic missiles, which is far cheaper than building a 21st-century
version of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In fact, China watched the development of these missiles, including US
Pershing II missiles and Maneuvering Reentry Vehicles (MaRVs). Erickson and Yang found that, even in 1972, China
considered using land-based ballistic missiles to hit targets at sea,14 and that China incorporated A2/AD thinking
and measures very well into its military publications on operational doctrines.15
In 2007, Roger Cliff and others noted that anti-access themes were pronounced in Chinese strategies as options
available in an armed conflict with the US, although Chinese military publications did not use a term equivalent to
anti-access.16
administration
or rebalance
, with particular focus on security efforts. Taiwan and the United States have a long-standing but often-underemphasized security partnership that could play a
by ensuring US forces can utilize facilities on the island in the event of a conflict; (2)
(3)
the United States should take advantage of the benefits this important partnership can offer. Key points in this Outlook:
in the region.
in the Asia-Pacific region. The Republic of China (ROC), on Taiwan, is one of Americas oldest
security partners. The formal relationship dates back at least as far as the early days of Americas participation in World War II, when the famed US Flying Tigers began flying combat missions over China against the Japanese. US and
Republican Chinese forces fought side by side in Burma during the war and stood together against communism during the Cold War. Ironically, faced with a reemergent Peoples Republic of China on the mainland, which is posing a
significant and growing threat to regional security for the first time since the mid-20th century, the United States has not attempted to reinvigorate its relationship with Taiwan. This is all the more peculiar at a time when the United
The president described three pillars of his new Asia policy: ensuring security, promoting
prosperity, and supporting human rights. Listing security first was deliberate. Security and peace enable continued prosperity and advancements on questions of human rights.
ensure its own capacity to come to Taiwans aid in the case of conflict.
Millions of Taiwanese who had decisively voted her and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) into power listened out of hope for significant change under a new leader. Across the strait and
elsewhere, officials and analysts scrutinized her speech, but with different intentions.
. Washington, too, needs to balance its historical links to Taiwan with bigger issues at stake in the
Sino-American relationship. Other Asians should also rightly observe the new administration. The last DPP presidency under Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008 seemed to set a course for pro-independence. Mainland Chinas strong
But
. Choosing to
walk the line of ambiguity in her official remarks, Tsai acknowledged that cross-strait relations have become an integral part of building regional peace and collective security, and that she will work to maintain the existing
mechanisms for dialogue and communication across the Taiwan Strait. She did, however, add that as president she is responsible for safeguarding the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China. Following her speech,
Chinas Taiwan Affairs Office released a statement reaffirming, among other things, that Beijing will resolutely contain any Taiwan independence separatist acts or plots.
. She has made no express push for independence or separatism. But neither has she explicitly accepted the one-China principle nor laid out her plans
. Announcing her intention to elevate the scope and diversity of Taiwans external economy, Tsai wants to court the region to provide Taiwanese businesses with an alternative
investment destination to China. It is also part of the new governments effort to overhaul and stimulate the islands stagnating economy by reaching actively out to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This is not the
first effort in this direction by Taipei leaders. Indeed, it is the third time. The first attempt was made in the 1990s by then-Kuomintang (KMT) President Lee Teng-hui, whose push toward the south saw investments gain momentum but
dip in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Thereafter, China, offering abundant labor, low-cost manufacturing and a huge market, soaked up the attention and investment from Taiwanese businesses. The next attempt was made in
there are economic and political factors that could buoy or hinder Tsais latest push south. There is more economic logic than before. Given that Chinas growth is relatively slowing and costs have increased considerably, especially in
the coastal areas, Taiwanese businesses will be more willing to push southward. Reciprocally, a number of ASEAN countries will welcome Taiwanese investment. However, ASEAN countries do not wish to be caught in the middle when
Taiwan and China squabble as ASEANs economic interdependence with China has deepened and grown significantly since the early 2000s. The launch of Chinas One Belt, One Road policy and its Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank initiative also focus attention on keeping win-win ties with Beijing. The key therefore is for Taiwan to pursue a southbound policy in tandem with stable, cross-strait ties with Beijing. If China is discomforted, it is unlikely that ties
with ASEAN members will prosper. Whenever Taipei appears to be seeking recognition as a state, Beijing counters. As such, rather than over emphasizing government-to-government relations in its ties with Taiwan, ASEAN should
pursue a multi-pronged approach that prioritizes the promotion of business ties and people-to-people exchanges. Two-way research, business and investment links should be re-established and strengthened. Such networks will be
important in helping the Taiwanese understand more about the regions political and economic nuances, and in so doing, carve out a niche economic strategy on how best to engage with the region without going head to head with
China. For example, instead of dealing with central governments, Taiwanese construction and heavy machinery businesses can engage with ASEANs regional governments to carve out industrial or economic zones for smaller scale
investment and development. The Taiwanese private sector can also play a key role in Taiwans new southbound initiative and should be encouraged to establish business-to-business partnerships with local companies. For example,
*note: This card is very VERY BAD (i.e. tag =/= warrants)
As a middle-power nation, South Korea has remained flexible to pursue its
independent agenda amid the US-China rivalry . This serves as a model for Taiwan as
the nation strives to gain more diplomatic space. In conventional international
relations, lesser powers are thought to live at the mercy of greater powers and the latter make
decisions without consulting the former. However, South Korea proves to be an exception, as it maintains strong
security ties with the US against North Korea while expanding substantial business
links with China.
reminded South Korean President Park Geun-hye that recent developments in North Korea, such as significant increased activity at Punggye-ri nuclear test site coupled with multiple
long-range missile tests, beckoned for fiercer efforts toward denuclearization.
sense of the Congress that the U.S. policy toward Taiwan is based upon the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances and that provision of defensive weapons to Taiwan should continue as mandated in the Taiwan Relations Act
Affairs Committee April 20 and the Republican National Committee during its spring meeting April 20-23,
in the U.S.
Signed into law in 1979 following the switch of recognition from Taipei to Beijing by the U.S.,
in 1982,
ing
-- xt Arms sales
US arms sales are key to Taiwan relations key to deterrence
and has kept China-Taiwan mil-to-mil contact minimal
Kan 15, (Shirley, is a retired specialist who worked for the US government in a
variety of capacities, including at the Congressional Research Service (CRS); study
of the CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, PacNet #39 - Obamas
policy on arms sales to Taiwan needs credibility and clarity,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/pacnet-39-obama%E2%80%99s-policy-arms-salestaiwan-needs-credibility-and-clarity, 7/7/15, //VZ)
The
TRA guides US policy in making available to Taiwan defense articles and defense
services for its self-defense.
Just as President George W. Bush raised doubts with a much-criticized freeze on arms sales to Taiwan, President Barack Obama has raised questions about his adherence to the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).
US leadership and credibility regarding the Rebalance to Asia requires decisive, urgent action regarding Taiwan. That policy should include tangible
follow-up actions to support Taiwan, maintain stability in the Asia-Pacific, and help Taiwan avoid coercion and conflict. In May, the Office of the Secretary of Defense submitted to Congress its annual report on Chinas military power, a
. To this end, the United States has announced more than $12 billion in arms sales to Taiwan since 2010. The next month,
seven years ago. While this is a high-profile, political (perhaps disingenuous) sign of support for Taiwan, it is also incomplete.
Compared to Bushs freeze, President Obamas inaction and changes to policy have dragged on longer with less critical attention. Obama has failed to notify Congress of major Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan for almost four
years. As Congress will soon recess in August, the president has an imperative to submit arms sales for Congressional review. The last time that the president notified Congress of major FMS to Taiwan occurred on Sept. 21, 2011.
Though not a so-called package, the president waited to send to Congress on a single day three notices of proposed programs worth $5.9 billion, including upgrades for Taiwans F-16A/B fighters. Why has the president failed to
. Moreover, the PRC has been determined to reach military and economic benchmarks by 2020, moving toward a goal of fighting
and winning potential conflicts that include those related to Taiwan. Ominously, this years report warned that, while Taiwan historically has relied upon multiple military variables to deter aggression by the PRC, its increasingly
modern weapons and platforms have eroded or negated many of these factors in Taiwans defense. Second, the administrations inaction cannot be explained by lack of preparation and authorization, nor Taiwans lack of interest
and funding. For more than five years, the US Navy, other parts of the Executive Branch, and Congress worked on authorization for the Navy to transfer Perry-class frigates as Excess Defense Articles to other navies. After
consideration that started during the 112th Congress, the 113th Congress approved legislation that authorized the proposed transfer of excess frigates to Taiwan and Mexico. Last December, the Senate and House passed the
authorizing legislation, and President Obama signed it into law. Third, the administrations inaction cannot be explained by the US Navy, which would benefit from foreign funds and the transfer of decommissioned ships to other
authorized navies without incurring the costs of maintaining inactivated ships. It is in the interest of the Navy to transfer the ships as soon as possible. Chairman Ed Royce of the House Foreign Affairs Committee just visited one of
the ships that has completed its final deployment. Taiwan has prepared for years for the potential transfers and included in the 2014 defense budget about $175 million to acquire two excess frigates. Fourth, the administrations
problems persist in
Chinas military and cyber threats, weapons proliferation, the North
Korean threat, buildup against Taiwan, and aggressive expansionism and
environmental destruction in the East and South China Seas
despite
the conventional wisdom about fears of Beijings suspensions of meetings to
retaliate for the arms sales, their impact has been minimal
when it comes to
mil-to-mil contacts with China.
inaction cannot be explained by military-to-military contacts with China. Expanded contacts have not resulted in significant gains for US interests, since
, etc. Moreover,
and mixed
Three other explanations remain. One, the administration is shifting policy in a smart response to changing conditions and new priorities,
even as it demands the status quo from Taiwan. Two, the president is preferring to delay overdue and justified actions on Taiwan until after a scheduled visit in September by Xi Jinping, the top ruler of the Communist Party of China.
Three, the administration is timing the arms sales to influence the presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan scheduled for January 2016. These explanations could violate the law as well as stated policies. Section 3(b) of the TRA
stipulates that both the president and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established by
At a hearing in the House in October 2011, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Daniel Russel failed to reaffirm clearly the Six Assurances. After the hearing,
. In September 2011, an official of the administration raised doubts about its professed neutrality in Taiwans
elections when he gave negative comments to the Financial Times about the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)s presidential candidate. In September-December 2011, the administration took various actions, including notifying
Congress of arms sales, that some observers saw as attempts to support Mas re-election. This May, however, Russel publicly said that the United States does not take sides and does not take actions that would imply that we are
taking sides in Taiwans elections.
Link US Umbrella
US Defense crucial to the Taiwan relationship TRA guarantees
both political and perception checks against Chinese
aggression creates a positive perception
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an
Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED
TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
Relations between Taiwan and the U.S. have been built upon mutual
security interests
. In the 1950s, the KMT regimes self-preservation interest overlapped with Washingtons containment strategy in Asia. While Taiwans population suffered under martial law, the
security relations between the two countries flourished under the 1955 mutual defense treaty. In 1979, strategic clarity underscored by a mutual defense treaty and official diplomatic relations was replaced by strategic ambiguity
and unofficial relations, in which the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Washington, D.C. pretend they are not embassies of their respective countries and the U.S. remains ambiguous as to
, arguably a far cry from formal defense treaty. Or is it? Solid Fundamentals The absence of official ties could create the impression that the U.S.-Taiwan security relationship is resting on unstable ground. After all,
regulation of relations with a country via means of a domestic law, which is not reciprocated by the other side, is a rather unusual way of doing business. Paradoxically,
. The TRA makes U.S. relations with Taiwan a single area of U.S. foreign policy that is not exclusively in
hands of the administration. Its existence provides legal leverage for the U.S. Congress to put pressure on the administration. Granted, it has been of rather symbolical importance lately. Unsuccessful Congressional pressure to push
for an F-16 sale is a case in point. Nevertheless, the TRA introduced strong bipartisan Congressional support for Taiwan into an equation. Heritage Foundations expert Walter Lohman believes that the TRA comes close to what
Lohman is
right. In addition, while the language of the TRA is vague, it is ultimately not any more vague than language used in some of the mutual defense treaties that bind the U.S. with its allies. It is worthwhile to look at the wording of the
TRAs predecessor, the U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, its article V in particular: Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the West Pacific Area directed against the territories of either of the Parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the
the
absence of formal links between Taiwan and the U.S. matter less in terms of formal
obligations The key variable is the political will to make difficult decisions at a time
when the need arises. Where it matters is public perception
Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security. Ultimately,
the
strategic ambiguity is not the best tool. It is an absence of political will that prevents greater utilization of the existing framework. Cold War-era interests that bonded Washington and Taipei together are long gone. However, a new
factor has emerged to strengthen relations between Taiwan and America: Taiwans democracy. During the Cold War, U.S. ties to Taiwan were dictated by geostrategic interests. Times have changed, but little has changed in terms of
Taiwans significance. Compared to the past, Taiwans democracy adds an additional layer strengthening Taiwans relationship not only with the U.S., but also with U.S. regional allies, Japan in particular. The importance of Taiwan-U.S.
relations goes well beyond the limits of bilateral relations. Taiwan is a claimant in both the East and South China Seas, where tensions have been ratcheted up, particularly by Beijing. In the East China Sea, Taiwan has demonstrated a
flexible attitude by reaching a fishery agreement with Japan in 2013. Likewise, in the South China Sea, Taiwan is a voice supporting settlement of the disputes according to UNCLOS and other principles of international law. Thus,
Taiwan tends to be more supportive of U.S. efforts in the region. Even if Taiwan cannot be expected to completely drop its South China Sea claim, the incoming DPP administration is likely to be less ideologically committed in
emphasizing the original ROC claim, and focus more on practical measures related to its hold on Taiping Island. Strong cooperation between Washington and Taipei should manifest in Taiwan playing positive role in managing regional
disputes. which needs some adjustment The TRA provides a solid frame for strong bilateral relations. The problem is a number of political considerations that put Taiwan in an awkward position and put the strength of the mutual
security relationship in doubt in the publics eye. It does not help that Taiwans de facto embassy is not allowed to fly the national flag, Taiwans government officials are banned from entering Washington, D.C., and the over-reported
views of some U.S.-based academics and think-tank experts treat Taiwan as an expendable accessory to U.S.-China relations. Under the surface, there are many positive exchanges taking place, and last year was quite illustrative in
revealing some of the activities that usually stayed undetected. In May 2015, delegation from Taiwan took part in U.S. Marine Corps conference on maritime and amphibious operations in Hawaii. In June 2015, Taipei Times reported
that Taiwans Army Aviation 601st Brigade formed a sister-unit relationship with U.S. Army 25th Combat Aviation Brigade based in Hawaii. Earlier this year, tragic accident drew attention to a fact that Taiwanese pilots train for nearly
20 years on Luke Air Force Base in Texas. The question is how to translate extensive cooperation between the two sides into greater confidence in Taiwan, which in turn will strengthen existing cooperation in the eyes of Taiwanese
t is easy to see
why the U.S. would be hesitant to openly promote military cooperation with Taiwan. But it is essential to have joint exercises between the two militaries. In case of military conflict, Taiwanese and American soldiers may need to face
the enemy together, and without the close cooperation between them that can be achieved only through joint exercises, the alternative is to run two parallel campaigns. Granted, most of these activities do not necessarily need to be
. Joint exercises in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HADR) is another area where strengthening cooperation is of great importance for both sides given the regions propensity to natural disasters.
A good publicity opportunity is the forthcoming multi-national RIMPAC naval exercise in Hawaii. The Taiwan Navy could send its combat support ship Panshih (also suitable for HADR missions) to avoid the presence of any of the more
high-profile warships in Taiwans naval inventory. Granted, the Chinese who are likely to participate this year for a second time, despite their 2014 appearance ending rather embarrassingly, would not be very happy. They may even
withdrawal their participation. But then, perhaps the U.S. military should not put too big of emphasis on the mil-to-mil contacts with China which are of dubious overall value. An alternative solution is to start with port calls of U.S.
Navy ships in Taiwanese ports as well as Taiwanese ships in U.S. ports and naval bases. Frequent visits Port calls are form of visits that are typically publicised and help to signal a good relationship. It is also an opportunity for the
crews to meet their counterparts. This is not to say that members of both armed forces do not meet regularly. According to Ian Easton, around 3000 meetings between members of Taiwan and U.S. military take place every year.
What is missing are visits on a high military level. The commander of 5th fleet based in Japan, for example, should be able to visit Taipei and discuss matters of common interests with Taiwanese counterparts and vice versa.
Removing the outdated ban on Taiwans government officials coming to D.C. should be natural part of the process. One good sign from the past year was the U.S.-Taiwan defense conference, known as the Monterey Talks which has
taken place annually since 1997. The significance of last years conference was the place: for the first time it took place in Washington, D.C. with Taiwans delegation led by former defense minister Andrew Yang. Arms sales In the
U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has been the most reliable indicator of
U.S. resolve to uphold stability in the Taiwan Strait
decades since 1979,
multi-party democracy. However, since mid-2000s sales have become increasingly irregular. Partly for reasons stemming from gridlock in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bians second term, partly for what appears to be consideration to
Chinese hostile position on any arms sales to Taiwan. The large arms sales packages from years 2008, 2010 and 2011, the last ones until December 2015, were mostly realization of arms package agreed in 2001. Arguably, the
amount of weapons acquired between 2009 and 2011 take some time to absorb, which in turn justifies the four year gap between 2011 and the most recent sale in December 2015. However, the long period of no sale has done
. The way out is to arrange for arms sales on annual basis, thus making the sales part of status quo. It does not need to include big ticket items every year. That is not really necessary.
--xt ASB
In the context of ASB, Taiwan is in NEA
Schreer 2013 - Senior Analyst for Defence Strategy at ASPI
Benjamin, "Strategy: Planning the Unthinkable War," April,
https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/planning-the-unthinkable-war-airsea-battleand-its-implications-for-australia/Strategy_AirSea.pdf
Japan, South Korea and Taiwan are the key potential players in Northeast
Asia when it comes to AirSea Battle. Japan and Taiwan are frontline states in a
possible Sino-US conflict, while South Koreas geostrategic location and its hosting of US bases also give it
Northeast Asia
a potentially important role. While all of them have sought to engage China in order to encourage its peaceful rise,
fears about Beijings trajectory have recently led to their increased reliance on the US as a means of external
important to rebut the skeptics' arguments. Some skeptics assert that a visible and formidable response to China
will only antagonize China, making an enemy where none previously existed. But this ignores the fact that C hina's
well-planned military modernization strategy began two decades ago and has
followed a steady course since its inception. The U.S. "pivot to Asia" came long after
and was clearly a response to decisions China's leaders had previously taken. The skeptics'
view also presumes that China's leaders respond emotionally rather than deliberately, as is much more likely the
The recent U.S. response to the changing security balance in the western Pacific
will not spark a new military competition with China, because that competition has
been already been under way for some time.
case.
constraints under which it now labours, it is not obvious that the United States can continue to play its accustomed
A decision to jettison Taiwan, or even cut back significantly on U.S. support , would
prove to an increasingly confident China that Washington has become
weak, vacillating, and unreliable. The 2009 U.S.China Joint Statement reflected Beijings
estimate that Washington could be intimidated or misled, as it juxtaposed a reference to Taiwan as a Chinese core
interest with concurrence that the two sides agreed that respecting each others core interests is extremely
important to ensure steady progress in U.SChina relations.4 Analysts who argue that Washington can safely
appease Beijing because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail are, without evidence, assuming
improbably modest Chinese objectives (emphasis added).5 Relying on the sacrifice of Taiwan to fulfill Chinese
ambitions ignores more than intentions, it also overlooks internal dynamics in China. Beijing confronts constant
domestic turmoil. Corruption, income inequality, and environmental degradation have tarnished the
accomplishments of the government and party. Fears among the leadership concerning mounting social unrest,
spurred by the Jasmine Revolutions in the Middle East, produced harsh restrictions of the media and the Internet
along with the imprisonment of artists, underground church members, protesting peasants, lawyers, and human
rights activists. Regaining Taiwan is unlikely to provide a broad and enduring balance to internal unhappiness.
Beijing also confronts militant nationalism which , though fostered by the government, is still
difficult to control. Any suspicion that authorities are not adequately safeguarding
Chinese interests and securing international respect could threaten regime stability. Accordingly,
a U.S. sacrifice of Taiwan, while gratifying, could not thoroughly slake a continuing
need for Beijing to demonstrate its power. Indeed, the sacrifice might promote
new appetites and necessitate fresh efforts to satisfy that need. Accommodating
Chinas demands on Taiwan, moreover, would not necessarily cause Beijing to be more
pliable on other matters of importance to the United States. Beijings positions on issues such
as Korea and Iran are shaped by Chinas national interests and are not taken as
favors to Washington. Beijings determination to preserve stability in its close neighbor and ally North Korea
would continue to prevent China from increasing pressure on Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons. Resolving
Chinas Taiwan problem would also not mean greater cooperation in preventing Iran
from going nuclear given Beijings almost universal opposition to muscular sanctions, its growing
energy needs, and desire to promote Chinese influence in the Middle East.
UQ
2NC - Brink
The US-Taiwan coalition is balancing China now but its on the
brinkany signal of abandonment causes Tawainese
proliferation and military buildup
Mearsheimer 14 (John; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago; March/April 2014 National Interest,
Issue #130, Taiwans Dire Straits, http://political-science.uchicago.edu/facultyarticles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf, BC)
But how long that relationship lasts is an open question. So far, the discussion about Taiwans future has focused
what happens to
Taiwan in the face of Chinas rise also depends greatly on what policies Taiwans
leaders and its people choose to pursue over time. There is little doubt that Taiwans
overriding goal in the years ahead will be to preserve its independence
from China. That aim should not be too difficult to achieve for the next decade,
mainly because Taiwan is almost certain to maintain close relations with the United
States, which will have powerful incentives as well as the capability to protect Taiwan. But after that
point Taiwans strategic situation is likely to deteriorate in significant
ways, mainly because China will be rapidly approaching the point where it can conquer Taiwan even if the
American military helps defend the island. And, as noted, it is not clear that the United States
will be there for Taiwan over the long term. In the face of this grim future, Taiwan has
three options. First, it can develop its own nuclear deterrent . Nuclear weapons are
almost exclusively on how the United States is likely to act toward Taiwan. However,
the ultimate deterrent, and there is no question that a Taiwanese nuclear arsenal would markedly reduce the
is unfortunate for Taiwan that it failed to build a bomb, because its prospects for maintaining its independence
the problem with this suggestion is that both Beijing and Washington are sure to oppose Taiwan going nuclear. The
United States would oppose Taiwanese nuclear weapons, not only because they would encourage Japan and South
Korea to follow suit, but also because American policy makers abhor the idea of an ally being in a position to start a
nuclear war that might ultimately involve the United States. To put it bluntly, no American wants to be in a situation
where Taiwan can precipitate a conflict that might result in a massive nuclear attack on the United States. China will
adamantly oppose Taiwan obtaining a nuclear deterrent, in large part because Beijing surely understands that it
would make it difficultmaybe even impossibleto conquer Taiwan. Whats more, China will recognize that
these reasons, China is likely to make it manifestly clear that if Taiwan decides to pursue nuclear weapons, it will
strike its nuclear facilities, and maybe even launch a war to conquer the island. In short, it appears that it is too late
for Taiwan to pursue the nuclear option. Taiwans second option is conventional deterrence. How
could Taiwan make deterrence work without nuclear weapons in a world where China has clear-cut military
fight a protracted and bloody war to conquer Taiwan. Yes, Beijing would prevail in the end, but it would be a Pyrrhic
victory. This strategy would be even more effective if Taiwan could promise China that the resistance would
Alfred von Tirpitzs famous risk strategy, which Imperial Germany adopted in the decade before World War I.
Tirpitz accepted the fact that Germany could not build a navy powerful enough to defeat the mighty Royal Navy in
battle. He reasoned, however, that Berlin could build a navy that was strong enough to inflict so much damage on
the Royal Navy that it would cause London to fear a fight with Germany and thus be deterred. Moreover, Tirpitz
reasoned that this risk fleet might even give Germany diplomatic leverage it could use against Britain. There are a
number of problems with this form of conventional deterrence, which raise serious doubts about whether it can
work for Taiwan over the long haul. For starters, the strategy depends on the United States fighting side by side
with Taiwan. But it is difficult to imagine American policy makers purposely choosing to fight a war in which the U.S.
military is not only going to lose, but is also going to pay a huge price in the process. It is not even clear that Taiwan
would want to fight such a war, because it would be fought mainly on Taiwanese territorynot Chinese territory
and there would be death and destruction everywhere. And Taiwan would lose in the end anyway. Furthermore ,
Alliance High
US-Taiwan relations strongest in four decades after US to
support Taiwan bid for Interpol observer status
The News Lens 3/16/16 (The News Lens is a bilingual website based in Taiwan and
Hong Kong; US Congress Passes Bill for Taiwan to Join Interpol as an Observer;
translated by Shin-wei Chang; 3/16/16; accessed 6/29/16;
http://international.thenewslens.com/article/38290)
On March 8, the US Senate approved the bill supporting Taiwan in joining the
International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) as an observer. On March 15,
the US House of Representative unanimously passed the bill, completing the last
stage of making it legislation with 381 supporting votes.
The bill was introduced last April and has gained full support of the US Congress
within a year. It will officially become a legislative law after President Obama signs
it.
As an observer, Taiwan will have the right to speak during the General Assembly
plenary sessions. However, when the President of Interpol considers the discussion
topic irrelevant to Taiwan, s/he has the right to ask Taiwan to leave the conference
hall.
Moreover, Taiwan will not be able to raise points of order, put procedural motions,
appeal against decisions of the President or submit proposals in the General
Assembly.
To be accepted as a full membership, it takes a two-thirds of majority of the General
Assembly to consent.
Full support of the US Congress
Ed Royce, chairman for the Foreign Affairs Committee, says Taiwan will be able to
know the latest information of criminal activities by joining Interpol, and that helps
everyones security. Royce added, I urge President Obama to sign it as soon as
possible.
Voice of America reports, Rep. Chris Smith, who sponsored the bill, also pointed out
the danger for Taiwan unable to obtain first-hand criminal intelligence saying that it
makes the island vulnerable to security threats. Smith also says, Taiwans
participation will benefit Interpols reform.
Senator Cory Gardner introduced this bill, and Senator Ben Cardin was the cosponsor. In addition, Ros-Lehtinen, former chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, not only voted, but also signed a petition supporting Taiwan rejoining
Interpol.
New benchmark of Taiwan-US relations
The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US says the bill
indicates US consistent position of supporting Taiwan to participate in international
organizations. The office also expressed its appreciation for all of the
congresspersons that support the bill.
On March 8, when the Senate passed the bill, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Taiwan released a statement saying, Taiwan-US relations are at their best state in
37 years.
Alliance on Brink
The US-Taiwan relationship is fragile after Taiwans elections--any new engagement will hurt relations
Hammond-Chambers 1/25/16 (Rupert Hammond-Chambers has a Ph.D. in Political Science from the
University of Chicago and a BA in Mathematics from Cornell University, is the Chairman on the US-Taiwan Business
Council, is a visiting scholar at American Enterprise Institute, was president of the World Bank Group, was Deputy
Secretary of the US Department of Defense, was a Dean and Professor of International Relations in the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, was Ambassador to Indonesia, was Under
Secretary for Policy at the US DOD, was Assistant Secretary for East Asian & Pacific Affairs in the State Department,
was Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, was the Visiting Professor of the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins, was Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Programs in the DOD,
was a Special Assistant of SALT of the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, and was the Professor of the
Department of Political Science at Yale University; Taiwans new administration and the US; The Hill; 1/25/16;
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/266739-taiwans-new-administration-and-the-us)
Tsai will also need to deepen her relationship with the United States, which has had
to be rebuilt after poor U.S. treatment of her and her candidacy in 2012. The
remainder of 2016 will therefore necessitate a feeling-out period, as she will need
the U.S. to appear willing to support her, while the U.S. needs to demonstrate its
credibility with the new Taiwan government.
The U.S. relationship could be boosted significantly if Tsai were to immediately prioritize tackling the most
contentious issue in bilateral trade ties - imports of U.S. pork containing the additive ractopamine - and she has
already commented on US pork import arrangements with Korea and Japan as potentially providing a solution.
Addressing this issue would not only improve the Taiwan-U.S. relationship, it would also boost Taiwan's bid for
consideration as a second round entrant into the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
Indeed, Tsai's primary external goal must be membership in the TPP. Taiwan's over-reliance on China must be
addressed, and access to the world's most important multilateral trade initiative could play a key role. Preparations
for joining could act as a catalyst for much needed domestic trade and economic reforms, and membership would
afford Taiwan renewed engagement with the TPP member countries, thereby boosting relationships with its Asia
Pacific neighbors.
China will not be happy with the outcome of Taiwan's elections, but it has only itself to blame. The PRC leadership
has not persuaded the people on Taiwan that unification is the best course forward. Instead, tensions are going to
Tsai does have one significant card to play with China; Taiwan's dormant cross-Strait trade legislation. If she
persuades the legislature to pass a China fast-track authority in the next four months that would be a major gesture
of goodwill. The sequencing of such a move would depend on how quickly China spikes tensions and any US politics
affecting Taiwan's effort to join the TPP.
Taiwan's role in the global supply chain is an economic and strategic imperative for the island. China's ambition to
build a "red supply chain" is not designed to compete against the legacy supply chain but to replace it, and could
have dire implications for Taiwan and for global tech companies. It was spotlighted by recent hostile attempts by
Tsinghua Unigroup to acquire companies in Taiwan's chip sector, specifically in IC design and in semiconductor
packaging and testing. Security and business concerns over relying on Chinese suppliers include intellectual
property and trade secrets protection, competitiveness, and innovation. With Taiwan a major player in the global
technology supply chain, Tsai will need to frame policies that keep domestic businesses competitive and free of
Chinese control.
Tsai should enjoy a honeymoon period in which to tackle some early issues, but she
will need strong reciprocal support from the U.S. as well. If any coercive behavior
from China isn't met head on, China may see an ambivalent U.S. as an opportunity
to define and set the tone for Tsai's presidency before potentially more assertive
U.S. leadership is in place to push back. That will boost the fortunes of small but growing political
parties whose views are more radical than the DPP and KMT. That could result in further estrangement for the
island, in radicalization of Taiwan independence politics, and a bigger headache for both China and the U.S. down
the road.
U.S. policy will need to strike a careful balance, continuing to support Taiwans
resilience against coercion, but without excessively stoking animosities on either
side of the strait. This will include both economic and strategic hedges. Taiwan needs a source of growth,
international integration and economic autonomy that is separate from its mainland neighbor. In addition, Taiwan
needs to continue to bolster its defensive capabilitiesbut with a more pragmatic
eye toward distinguishing its true needs from hardware prestige projects.
Should the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) take effect, the United States should
support eventual Taiwanese accession to the agreement. Dr. Tsai and the incoming DPP
government have made joining TPP a high priority, but they could face stiff opposition from other advanced,
existing intra-TPP advanced manufacturing. Taiwan would also be wise to engage in trade
liberalization prior to formal accession talks. The United States has been on the receiving end of
protectionist Taiwanese policies and could serve as a willing partner in such
commercial confidence-building measures.
Strategically, the United States should encourage Taiwan toward efforts that are
quietly strengthening and powerfully practical. The presidential campaign focused on fostering
advanced indigenous defense manufacturing, such as submarine construction, but building such a capacity from
scratch can be immensely expensive, technically complicated and geopolitically destabilizing, without any
guarantee of success. Rather than attempting to match major-power capabilities, Taiwan should consider investing
in cheaper platforms more tailored to its needsnamely, amphibious invasion defense. Sea mines, anti-ship
missiles, embedded antiship and antiair gunnery, and hardened infrastructure would gain Taiwan far more bang for
its buck than a few submarines or fighter jets.
More important than defensive hardware, however, would be a renewed focus on human capital. Taiwans military
has had a troubled transition to an all-volunteer force, largely failing to attract and retain volunteers in adequate
numbers. The United States has significant experience transforming its military from a mass-conscription service to
an elite and desirable vocationexperience that could be shared with its Taiwanese partners via greater
institutional support and training. U.S. policymakers should also place such warfighter-focused initiatives on the
same diplomatic level as conventional arms sales, with congressional notifications and international signaling
marking the seriousness of such aid.
Continued stability in the Strait of Taiwan requires both sides to feel economically, militarily and politically secure.
With these strategic and economic hedges, Taiwan may be able to improve its deterrence against Chinese threats
and get its economy growing again. If not, the voices calling for confrontation on both sides of the strait may grow
too loud to resist.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/tsai-ing-wen-hardly-beijings-worst-nightmare/
Beijings worst nightmare has materialized and it turns out to be not so bad after
all, if China can tolerate modest success. Taiwans pro-independence Democratic
Progressive Party has swept the presidency and, for the first time, the national
legislature.
But Tsai Ing-wen immediately used her landslide election to assure Beijing and
Washington that she would be a reliable, predictable partner in preserving crossstrait stability. Now it is time for the other governments involved, China and the
United States, to reciprocate her positive message.
Throughout the campaign and since her victor, the president-elect has had to
address three different audiences: Taiwans voters, particularly her own enthusiastic
supporters; Chinas ruling Communist Party; and the United States government,
which was more sensitive to the views of the latter than the former.
Tsai, a sober, scholarly lawyer, skillfully negotiated a political tightrope, adhering to
her principles and those of her party while avoiding inflammatory language or a
defiant tone whenever she addressed the issues separating China and Taiwan. She
maintained that posture after her dramatic and historic win Taiwans sixth direct
presidential election since the end of martial law, the third peaceful transfer of
power, and the elevation of the first female leader in a Chinese-speaking society.
UQ CCP Weak
The CCP is vulnerable
Coassa and Glosserman 2015 - Both at Pacific Forum CSIS
Ralph A and Brad, "Regional Overview: The Rebalance Picks up Steam," September,
csis.org/files/publication/1502qoverview.pdf
The ripples from Chinese decisions are spreading. The slowdown has reduced Chinas
demand for the raw materials that feed its manufacturing machine. African nations such as Sierra Leone,
Angola, Zambia, and Liberia are considered especially vulnerable to the new normal in China. Chinas foreign direct
investment is also expected to take a hit, which will end up bruising many emerging market economies that have
come to rely on its investments. One study concluded that Australia, Brazil, Russia, Chile, and Korea will be
AT: Links
Abandonment Good
Absent abandonment, Taiwan will become a flashpoint for USChina war
Mearsheimer 14 (John; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of
Political Science at the University of Chicago; March/April 2014 National Interest,
Issue #130, Taiwans Dire Straits, http://political-science.uchicago.edu/facultyarticles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf, BC)
While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing
coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is
not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or
so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against
a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military
capability than it has today. In addition, geography works in Chinas favor in a major
way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from
the United States. When it comes to a competition between China and the United States over projecting
military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan,
American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against
Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation.
This reticence would also work to Chinas advantage. One might argue that there is a simple
way to deal with the fact that Taiwan will not have an effective conventional deterrent against China in the not-toodistant future: put Americas nuclear umbrella over Taiwan. This approach will not solve the problem, however,
the United States is not going to escalate to the nuclear level if Taiwan is
being overrun by China. The stakes are not high enough to risk a general
thermonuclear war. Taiwan is not Japan or even South Korea. Thus, the smart strategy for America is to not
even try to extend its nuclear deterrent over Taiwan. There is a second reason the United
States might eventually forsake Taiwan: it is an especially dangerous
flashpoint, which could easily precipitate a Sino-American war that is not in
Americas interest. U.S. policy makers understand that the fate of Taiwan is a matter of great
concern to Chinese of all persuasions and that they will be extremely angry if it
looks like the United States is preventing unification . But that is exactly what Washington will be
because
doing if it forms a close military alliance with Taiwan, and that point will not be lost on the Chinese people. It is
important to note in this regard that Chinese nationalism, which is a potent force, emphasizes how great powers like
the United States humiliated China in the past when it was weak and appropriated Chinese territory like Hong Kong
wherewithal to conquer Taiwan, which will make war even more likely. There was no flashpoint between the
superpowers during the Cold War that was as dangerous as Taiwan will be in a Sino-American security competition.
Some commentators liken Berlin in the Cold War to Taiwan, but Berlin was not sacred territory for the Soviet Union
pause, to get them to think twice before they attack, explained Rupert Hammond-Chambers, president of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council. The higher the price any PRC government
In the past military meetings have been suspended, though only temporarily. There could be economic retaliation, though the threat seems overblown: defense companies are barred
from supplying the PRC and sanctions against civilian sales would hurt the PRC as well.
AT: Glaser
Glaser is wrong
Blumenthal 11 (David; director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise
Institute, where he focuses on East Asian security issues and Sino-American
relations. Mr. Blumenthal has both served in and advised the U.S. government on
China issues for over a decade, From 2001 to 2004, he served as senior director for
China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense, Rethinking U.S. foreign
policy towards Taiwan, 3/2/11, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/03/02/rethinking-u-sforeign-policy-towards-taiwan/, BC)
Then there is the role of Taiwan in our foreign policy. It has been a significant part of Asias democratic peace, as
well as a critical part of Asias including Chinas economic boom and the regions political transitions. Every
time we try and abandon it in the 50s, in the 70s, in the 90s we find it too important to be left to Chinas
much to the consternation of so called realists in U.S. foreign policy. While most Congressmen today do not focus
intensely on Taiwan, a debate about the repeal of the Taiwan Relations Act would focus the mind. In all likelihood, all
the latent frustrations the American public and their representatives feel toward China from unfair trade
practices, to constant cyber attacks, to human rights abuses would find expression in a debate about whether or
not to repeal a law that has kept the peace and allowed Taiwan to prosper. In short, a debate about abandoning a
democratic friend in the face of Chinese pressure would probably bring about the exact opposite of what Glaser
intends. Congress would start to focus on all the dangers that China poses and frustrations its presents. Glaser
Obama has
more or less tried Glasers approach and the result has been a nadir in Sino-U.S.
relations and an intensifying Asian arms race . Given what we have learned about China over
should be commended for his effort to think through war avoidance with China. But President
the recent past, the answer to its aggressiveness is not more concessions and certainly not the abandonment of
a key partner in Asias long peace.
Indeed, in providing an answer to Secretary Rumsfelds infamous public query about why the Chinese are engaged
years in Afghanistan? If North Korea collapses tomorrow, we may be looking for nukes with a heavy ground
presence for some time). Only three years ago we were certain that Chinas "core interests" were limited to Tibet,
slog through the Pacific again, it would defend forward, and it would rely on a set of allies to do so. It would press
those allies to become democratic capitalists (realists never explain why the United States always thinks it does
We have
enjoyed peace in Asia for over three decades. Our policy has worked, why should we
adjust it?
better in a world populated by other democracies) and forego their nuclear weapons. It all happened.
A key abandonist argument is that the Taiwan issue has impeded Sino-American
cooperation. Advocates of this position are optimistic about China's rise , and about the
potential effects of a US concession on Taiwan, arguing that the PRC would be pacified by a
symbolic end to the century of humiliation and would not further challenge the US-led regional
order. In this view, American patronage of Taiwan, particularly in the form of continuing arms sales to Taipei, only
exacerbates Beijing's distrust of Washington and thus derails the potential for partnership.7 (link is external)
This
The desire of
both the
optimistic and pessimistic abandonists for the United States to avoid unnecessary confrontation with China,
and to mitigate the unfolding security dilemma in the region, is constructive. But Taiwan is not
the right card to play. Abandoning Taiwan would create conditions detrimental
both to the Sino-US relationship and to regional stability. As Washington strives to build a
constructive relationship with Beijing, Taipei has also been doing its part to make
peace with its long-term rival. The cross-Strait detente could, to some extent, facilitate Sino-US
collaboration by mitigating a contentious issue in their bilateral relationship. Taipei's recent policies have been
conducive to regional peace and prosperity, and deserve Washington's support.
AT: Mearsheimer
Mearsheimer concludes negTaiwan will seek a peaceful
solution instead of prolif or militarization
Mearsheimer, your author, 14 (John; R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished
Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago; March/April 2014
National Interest, Issue #130, Taiwans Dire Straits, http://politicalscience.uchicago.edu/faculty-articles/Mearsheimer---Taiwans%20Dire%20Straits.pdf,
BC)
Taiwans third option is to pursue what I will call the Hong Kong strategy. In this case,
Taiwan accepts the fact that it is doomed to lose its independence and become part
of China. It then works hard to make sure that the transition is peaceful and
that it gains as much autonomy as possible from Beijing. This option is unpalatable today and will
remain so for at least the next decade. But it is likely to become more attractive in the distant
future if China becomes so powerful that it can conquer Taiwan with relative ease. So where does this
leave Taiwan? The nuclear option is not feasible, as neither China nor the
United States would accept a nuclear-armed Taiwan. Conventional deterrence
in the form of a risk strategy is far from ideal, but it makes sense as long as China is not so
dominant that it can subordinate Taiwan without difficulty. Of course, for that strategy to work, the
United States must remain committed to the defense of Taiwan, which is not guaranteed
over the long term. Once China becomes a superpower, it probably makes the most sense for Taiwan to give
up hope of maintaining its de facto independence and instead pursue the Hong Kong strategy. This is definitely
not an attractive option, but as Thucydides argued long ago, in international politics the strong do what they can
and the weak suffer what they must. By now, it should be glaringly apparent that whether Taiwan is forced to give
Taiwan
will surely do everything it can to buy time and maintain the political
status quo. But if China continues its impressive rise, Taiwan appears destined to become part of China.
up its independence largely depends on how formidable Chinas military becomes in the decades ahead.
again refuses to participate, President Obama should proceed without it and prepare publicly to provide additional armaments to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Malaysia as necessary.
AT: Perception
Public Perceptions have already been tanked Washington
restraints and attitudes
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an
Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED
TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
The TRA provides a solid frame for strong bilateral relations. The problem is a number of political
considerations that put Taiwan in an awkward position and put the strength of the
mutual security relationship in doubt in the publics eye . It does not help that
Taiwans de facto embassy is not allowed to fly the national flag, Taiwans
government officials are banned from entering Washington, D.C., and the overreported views of some U.S.-based academics and think-tank experts treat Taiwan
as an expendable accessory to U.S.-China relations.
The status quo solves any positive perceptions HADR ops and
RIMPAC exercises
Thim 4/18/16, (Michal, is a Taiwan specialist, a Research Fellow at the Praguebased think-tank Association for International Affairs, a member of CIMSEC, and an
Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, TIME FOR AN IMPROVED
TAIWAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONSHIP, https://taiwan-inperspective.com/2016/04/18/time-for-an-improved-taiwan-u-s-security-relationship/,
4/18/16, //VZ)
Military exercises have two basic functions. On a practical level, they help to increase familiarity between allied militaries and examine scenarios for different contingencies. On a political
level, they are a form of signalling to domestic public and potential rivals. It is easy to see why the U.S. would be hesitant to openly promote military cooperation with Taiwan. But it is
essential to have joint exercises between the two militaries. In case of military conflict, Taiwanese and American soldiers may need to face the enemy together, and without the close
cooperation between them that can be achieved only through joint exercises, the alternative is to run two parallel campaigns. Granted, most of these activities do not necessarily need
Taiwans naval inventory. Granted, the Chinese who are likely to participate this year for a second time, despite their 2014 appearance ending rather embarrassingly, would not be very
happy. They may even withdrawal their participation. But then, perhaps the U.S. military should not put too big of emphasis on the mil-to-mil contacts with China which are of dubious
overall value. An alternative solution is to start with port calls of U.S. Navy ships in Taiwanese ports as well as Taiwanese ships in U.S. ports and naval bases.
Ambiguity in
its present state presents inherent danger to be misperceived by the
Taiwanese public as disinterest. If there is little to show for, especially when most of the bilateral activity
slips under the radar for good practical reasons, what confidence is the strength of mutual relationship it
elicits? Granted, Washington may feel that ambiguity serves well in checking potential
reckless behaviour by Taiwan. However, if that used to be the idea once, it is very
outdated now. No one can reasonably argue that Tsai Ing-Wen and other elected
leaders of Taiwan would deliberately provoke Beijing [1], especially if the U.S. could
decide not to support Taiwan directly anyway. The case for a more visible security relationship is that it helps to deter Beijing. The
between Taiwan and the U.S. would also be encouraging for other U.S. partners, namely Japan and The Philippines, to seek avenues of closer cooperation.
ultimate goal is and should be to never have to deal with the question what if China attacks Taiwan?
AT: Impact
No Prolif
No Taiwan proliftoo many barriers
-no nuclear facilities
-US pressure
-no scientists
-no money
-no uranium supply
-internal political pressure
-Mainland China gets pissed
but stalled fourth one are only light water reactors and cannot be used to produce plutonium 239, the essential
abroad, which would attract intemational attention, since Taiwan is in worse shape than 1988, as far as material and
reprocessing capabilities. Taiwan's research reactor and its reprocessing facility were shut down during the resence
Taiwan's best supplier, since the Nonproliferation Treaty had no impact on South Africa. South Africa was Taken's
closest military ally, but the situation has changed drastically. Since the end of apartheid,
and is certainly not in any position to provide Taiwan with material that could be used to
develop nuclear weapons. Taiwan's nuclear intentions might also face both internal
and external political pressures. While the tanner ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) could
view the possession of nuclear weapons as a viable tool to achieve its ultimate goal of an independent Taiwan, it
would be difficult for the DPP to support such development due to its long-standing policy against nuclear energy,
130 including the repeated protests against the fourth nuclear power plant while it was the apposition party, as well
looking forward to a military conflict with the PRC. Since China considers Taiwan's research and development of
nuclear weapons as a preset condition to take Taiwan by force, it would be in the best interests of the US to prevent
Taiwan from achieving this goal Unlike possible strategies against Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, a military magical
to Taiwan since the US is Taiwan's main arms supplier. Taiwan also trades heavily with the US and any economic
sanctions could also cause extreme and immediate hardship to Taiwan's economy.
Although the US would be the most Important country able to restrain Taiwan's nuclear intention, it is certainly not
the only one with the will and ability to do so. While Japan has been supportive toward Taiwan against their mutual
131 rival China--, it is certainly very sensitive to the nuclear issue. As the only country ever attacked with atomic
possess as much influence on Taiwan as the US, do maintain strong economic ties. Some European nations, such as
threatened to seize Taiwan by force, under certain conditions. Developing nuclear weapons and associated delivery
means are one of these conditions. While the possession of nuclear weapons would be a viable deterrence against
a military conflict.
No chance of prolif
-Taiwan = democratic faces internal backlash
-would face PRC backlash
-US backlashcutting arms sales + US would put sanctions + cut off nuclear
materials
-Taiwanese culture is biased against nuclear weapons, especially scientists
Fitzpatrick 16 (Mark; ten years heading the IISS Non-Proliferation and Nuclear
Policy Programme, 26-year career in the US Department of State, where for the
previous ten years he focused on non-proliferation issues, 2/2/16, Asias Latent
Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, accessed through UMich Library,
BC)
Far greater than the theoretical proliferation drivers that Taiwan faces are the
practical and political constraints on any move down this path constraints
that are more powerful today than during the 1970s and 198os . A combination of stra-tegic
Constraints
and economic vulnerabilities and the near-certainty that any such effort would be revealed before it came to fruition
make it highly unlikely that Taiwan would again seek nuclear weapons. Given the obvious downsides, nobody in the
observer of Taiwan politics is quick to point out, it would be impossible to keep a nuclear-weapons programme
would probably be the case if Taiwan broke its non-proliferation promises, Taiwan could not hold out against the
mainland for more than a month or two before munitions and oil reserves ran out. Even if an A-bomb could be
produced in the shortest imaginable time period, say six months at a bare minimum, it would be too late.
Revelation of such a programme would make Taiwan immensely vulnerable. In 1998, Beijing officially asserted that
the development of nuclear weapons would be an induce-ment for an attack on the island, putting in writing
something it had unofficially made known for over a decade.96 Although this criterion has not been repeated in
subsequent policy pronouncements or White Papers, it is widely regarded as still valid and as a reason why the
Taiwan military would not support a nuclear weapons programme. Whether Or not the mainland would use force to
notes 'Although Taiwan may view a nuclear option as insurance against possible future US abandonment, such a
be scenario-dependent, of a conflict that was provoked by PRC aggression would not be regarded in the same way
as one precipitated by Taiwan declaring independence.99 Even if the US were to deter-mine that Beijing was to
blame in provoking Taiwan to act, at a minimum, US law would require halting nuclear energy cooperation. This
buys uranium - primarily Australia and Canada - before it is enriched by US Enrichment Corporation can be
trade' and exacerbate its diplomatic isolation. The security and economic risks underscore the political factors and
The non-proliferation
norm is universally accepted in Taiwan, which accepts every non-proliferation
instrument and practice in which it is eligible to participate. As in Japan, development of
nuclear weapons is widely regarded as immoral , particularly by the scientific
community whose talents would need to be harnessed for a strategic
weapons programme. Only a deep shock to the collective psyche could change this mentality. A move
physical contrainsts that argue against any Taiwan pursuit of nuclear weapons today.
by Beijing that induced such fear is not inconceivable, but it remains unlikely. Meanwhile, although the US security
commitment remains ambiguous, wholesale abandonment by Washington is not likely in the foresseable future
either. Among the three democracies that are the subject of this book, Taiwan is the least likely to acquire nuclear
weapons today, even though it was once the party that was the most intent on this path.
No prolif
NTI, is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization founded in 2001 by Ted Turner and
Sam Nunn in the United States, which exists to strengthen global security by
reducing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and also to reduce
the risk that they will actually be used, May 2015, Online:
http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/taiwan/, Article: TAIWAN Accessed on: 06-2916//AWW
In 1968, Taiwan then recognized as the Republic of China by the UN signed the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). After the seat for China
in the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council reverted from Taipei to
Beijings control in 1971, [3] the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
coordinated only with the Beijing government on issues related to China. Nuclear
safeguards are applied in Taiwan under a trilateral agreement with the U.S. and the
IAEA. [4] Taiwan has since implemented the IAEA's "Program 93+2" safeguards. [5]
In January 2014, Taiwan and the United States renewed an agreement for peaceful
nuclear cooperation. The agreement, which includes a new 123 Agreement, will take
effect after the existing one expires on 22 June 2014. [6]
relations with the United States, which will have powerful incentives as well as the capability to protect Taiwan. But after that point Taiwans strategic situation is likely to deteriorate in
significant ways, mainly because China will be rapidly approaching the point where it can conquer Taiwan even if the American military helps defend the island. And, as noted, it is not
In the face of this grim future, Taiwan has three options. First, it
can develop its own nuclear deterrent. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate
deterrent, and there is no question that a Taiwanese nuclear arsenal
would markedly reduce the likelihood of a Chinese attack against Taiwan.
clear that the United States will be there for Taiwan over the long term.
Taiwan pursued this option in the 1970s, when it feared American abandonment in the wake of the Vietnam War. The United States, however, stopped Taiwans nuclear-weapons program
in its tracks. And then Taiwan tried to develop a bomb secretly in the 1980s, but again the United States found out and forced Taipei to shut the program down. It is unfortunate for
No doubt
Taiwan still has time to acquire a nuclear deterrent before the balance of power in
Asia shifts decisively against it. But the problem with this suggestion is that both Beijing and Washington are sure to oppose Taiwan going nuclear.
Taiwan that it failed to build a bomb, because its prospects for maintaining its independence would be much improved if it had its own nuclear arsenal.
The United States would oppose Taiwanese nuclear weapons, not only because they would encourage Japan and South Korea to follow suit, but also because American policy makers
abhor the idea of an ally being in a position to start a nuclear war that might ultimately involve the United States. To put it bluntly, no American wants to be in a situation where Taiwan
can precipitate a conflict that might result in a massive nuclear attack on the United States.
Deterrence Checks
Taiwans defenses deter China
Michal Thim, a postgraduate research student in the Taiwan Studies Program at
the China Policy Institute (CPI), University of Nottingham, an Asia-Pacific Desk
Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, and a Research Fellow at the Prague-based thinktank Association for International Affairs, 09-25- 15, Online: http://thinkingtaiwan.com/china-taiwan-military-transformation/, Article: China, Taiwan, and the
Challenge of Military Transformation Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
In terms of eyes and ears, Taiwan has an extraordinary early warning (and
intelligence collection) capability in the form of the new PAVE PAWS radar and it has
developed a network of sensors making Taiwans maritime domain awareness one
of the best in the region. Taiwans domestic defense sector provides some of the key
capabilities needed for mounting a credible conventional deterrent, and
considerable effort has been put into moving some of the most critical infrastructure
underground, thus decreasing the PLAs ability to deliver a devastating first strike. It
is perfectly natural that Taiwans progress is being judged against that made by the
PLA. However, it is also not an entirely fair position to take. Taiwans military has
been rather busy organization during last two decades, and while many problems
plague its armed forces, it also deserves credit for embracing civilian control while
striving to absorb all the technological innovations that came along and re-organize
itself after several waves of downsizing. The PLA has made some of those changes
as well, but it certainly has not had to overcome the hurdles of democratization.
No Conflict
War with China is impossible Interdependence, military
capabilities, and nations are pragmatic
Scott L. Kastner, Associate Professor at the University of Maryland, College Park,
02-26-16, Online: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/taiwan-strait3_final.pdf, Article: How Stable Is the Taiwan Strait? Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
The possibility that China-Taiwan relations could revert to their pre-2008 state is
disquieting, given that many analysts at the time viewed armed conflict in the
Taiwan Strait as a serious risk. Nevertheless, although China-Taiwan relations will
almost certainly deteriorate to some degree under a Tsai presidency, military
conflict remains unlikely. To understand why, it is important to first consider some of
the major trends that have characterized the cross-strait relationship in recent
years. A Changing China-Taiwan Relationship First, economic integration across the
strait has become deeper and more institutionalized. China-Taiwan trade and
investment flows have grown rapidly since the 1980s; by the mid-2000s, the PRC
had replaced the United States as Taiwans primary trading partner. China-Taiwan
trade continued to grow after 2008 as the two sides took steps, such as lifting
restrictions on direct trade across the strait, to normalize bilateral economic ties.
Second, the military balance of power in the Taiwan Strait has been shifting rapidly
in Chinas favor. Preparation for a conflict in the strait has been the primary driver
of PRC military modernization efforts dating to the 1990s, and Chinas booming
economy has facilitated impressive advances in this regard. The PRC most likely
does not (yet) possess the capacity to invade and occupy Taiwan, particularly if the
United States were to intervene in a cross-strait conflict. China certainly has an
increasing ability, however, to impose tremendous costs on Taiwan in the event of a
cross-strait war. Third, Taiwanese public opinion on sovereignty issues continues to
evolve. To an increasing extent, most Taiwan citizens see themselves as Taiwanese
rather than Chinese, and they view political unification with the PRC as a nonstarter.
Indeed, most Taiwanese today reject unification even under hypothetically favorable
conditions, such as the emergence of democracy in China. The recent dtente in
cross-strait relations has not altered these trends; to the contrary, the percentage of
Taiwans citizens self-identifying as Taiwanese grew especially rapidly during the Ma
presidency. Still, most Taiwanese remain pragmatic. A majority of Taiwanese, for
instance, does not support formal independence if it were to trigger armed conflict
with China.
No China Invasion
China doesnt have the capabilities to invade
John Grady, a former managing editor of Navy Times, retired as director of
communications for the Association of the United States Army, 02-10-16, Online:
https://news.usni.org/2016/02/10/atlantic-council-panel-china-likely-doesnt-havethe-ability-to-invade-taiwan-yet, Article: Atlantic Council Panel: China Likely
Doesnt Have the Ability to Invade Taiwan, Yet Accessed on: 06-29-16//AWW
When viewed from the Chinese mainland, a hundred miles of water is a long way
away and remains a big obstacle if Beijing intends to take military action anytime
soon against Taiwan following the islands election of a new president and a
legislature controlled by pro-independence parties, an international security expert
said Tuesday. Speaking Tuesday at the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., Thomas
L. McNaugher, a professor at Georgetown University, said, an amphibious assault
would be an extremely dicey operation for a military still dominated by its army
and having no recent experience in that kind of warfare. Right now, theyre
capable of moving about two divisions at a time over water, he said in answer to a
question. But theyre working on overcoming those shortfalls. Roger Cliff, a fellow
of the councils Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, said despite
Chinas 600 percent increase in real-term defense spending over the past 20 years
important weaknesses remain in technology, logistics, training and organization.
An example he used was maintaining equipment in the field. It has to be sent back
to the factory for maintenance and repair, making sustained operations difficult.
Cliff also cited shortfalls in underway replenishment and aerial refueling. While
China has changed its military doctrine from positional warfare since 1995when
it launched missiles to intimidate Taiwanto one based on surprise, deception and
indirection used by the United States in Desert Storm, it still retains a centralized
structure that does not encourage risk-taking or creativity, but loyalty and
obedience. In response 20 years ago to Chinas attempt to cow the island, which
was holding its first presidential election, the United States sent two aircraft carrier
battle groups into those waters and were not detected by the Chinese. Taiwan is not
a treaty partner with the United States. After recognizing the Peoples Republic of
China, the Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which, in part, allows United
States arms sales to the island. In a cross-straits conflict, however, Cliff said that
Chinas numerical superiority could make up for organizational shortcomings.
The question is still out there for Beijing in whether to try to recover Taiwan, said
Tiffany Ma, the centers director of political and security affairs. One factor that
could cause Chinese to move against Taiwan is that they no longer see time is on
their side and/or inattention on the part of the United States. Inattention is
really the poison here. Taiwans incoming administration, led by Tsai Ing-wen, has
not ratcheted up the rhetoric with the mainland but intends to continue its defense
buildup, she said. McNaugher added, based upon what is happening in Hong Kong
since it reverted to Chinese control, the Taiwanese do not want to go back to
China. Taiwans economy is booming. In fact, Chinas more assertive stance in
territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas may lead to more regional
support for Taiwan, Ma said. McNaugher said that Taiwan needs to keep at
improving its defenses and the United States should look at its basing strategy in
the Pacific to include hardening air bases in Japan. Cliff said Taiwanese defense
investments should look to better protecting itself against air and maritime
blockade or invasion. In addition to corvettes, modern submarines and mines,
Taiwan needs more platforms, more modern platforms, such as F-16s, and mobile
air-defense systems. Taiwan earlier announced plans to spend 3 percent of its gross
domestic product on defense. Those plans included spending $4 billion for eight
diesel-powered submarines, but contracts have not yet been announced. If there
were a blockade, Beijing needs to realize two can play that game, McNaugher
said, referring to the American Navys strong presence in the Pacific. If there were
an invasion, Ma said the Chinese should not underestimate a peoples will to fight.
the near future. Especially given Mas recent victory and his pledge of the Three Nos No independence, No
unification, No use of force. It is reasonable to assume that the majority of the Taiwanese public agree with him,
Here
are five major reasons why a full-fledged Chinese invasion of the island is
more suited for a video game rather than reality. 5. Economics: China has
always placed economics at the forefront of most other matters . Despite the
often-tumultuous state of Sino-Indian relations (and an unresolved border dispute), trade has
touched $63 billion. China is Indias second largest trading partner . In the Senkaku
island dispute with Japan, Deng Xiaoping, as soon as he came into power in 1978, proposed that
and are happy with the status quo (the latter has been demonstrated by numerous opinion polls as well).
China and Japan jointly explore the oil and gas deposits near the disputed islands
without touching on the issue of sovereignty . China has also sought joint exploration in the
resource-rich Spratlys, a solution which is the right step forward and is in fact more urgent than sovereignty, which
regarding the Senkaku dispute, It does not matter if this question is shelved for some time, say, 10 years. Our
generation is not wise enough to find common language on this question. Our next generation will certainly be
wiser. They will certainly find a solution acceptable to all. Unlike his predecessor Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao has used a
softer approach towards Taiwan, promoting stronger economic and cultural ties, high-level official visits and direct
(including Hong Kong) accounted for over 29.0% of Taiwans total trade and 41.8% of Taiwans exports. The ECFA
was heavily tilted in Taiwans favor. It cut tariffs on 539 Taiwanese exports to China and 267 Chinese products
entering Taiwan. Under the agreement, approximately 16.1 % of exports to China and 10.5 % of imports to China
will be tariff free by 2013. Taiwanese firms have invested $200 billion in the mainland, and
trade between
the two sides has exceeded $150 billion . Taiwanese trade with China. Source: Reuters Both China
and Taiwan have a lot to lose by fighting with each other. Another factor to consider is the incalculable loss that an
4. The
Taiwanese public: China is, quite rightly, obsessed with stability , President Hus
invasion will have on the Chinese economy, not to mention scaring away potential investors.
watchword. Analysts agree that this is one of the main reasons why it is not being tough on North Korea that it
for reunification on the island, and opinion polls make clear that only a tiny minority of Taiwanese identify
themselves as Chinese. The Anti-Secession also explicitly states in Article 9: In the event of employing and
executing non-peaceful means and other necessary measures as provided for in this Law, the state shall exert its
utmost to protect the lives, property and other legitimate rights and interests of Taiwan civilians and foreign
Chinese invasion might inevitably lead to riots and international condemnation. China would thus risk flushing down
the toilet many years hard work of patient diplomacy (in convincing other countries of its peaceful rise). This
3. The
threat of American intervention: The United States of America, the responsible
superpower, has been engaged in more military conflicts around this world than any
other. Since the Second World War, the US has: Attempted to overthrow
more than 50 governments, most of them democratically-elected.
Attempted to suppress a populist or national movement in 20 countries.
Grossly interfered in democratic elections in at least 30 countries.
Dropped bombs on the people of more than 30 countries. Attempted to
assassinate more than 50 foreign leaders. Hence, the plain fact that needs to be realized is
that the United States is more prone to violent outbursts than any other country. The
would in turn cause them to inch even closer to America, were they would be welcomed with open arms.
PLA doctrinal textbook, Zhanyixue, explicitly states that China is not in the same league as advanced countries
(The entire document never mentions the United States by name), argues Thomas J. Christensen in Chinas
Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs: Recent Trends in the Operational Art of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (CNA,
Moreover, unlike in the heady early days of the Great Leap Forward, PLA
strategists do not envision China closing that overall gap anytime soon . There is no
stated expectation of short-cuts or leapfrogging to great power military status . In other
words, China will have to accept that its relative technological backwardness
and weakness in power projection will persist for a long time. And then goes on
2005). He further states,
to quote the text of Zhanyixue explicitly: Our military equipment has gone through major upgrading () in
comparison with the past, but in comparison to advanced countries, whether it be now or even a relatively long
period from now, there will still be a relatively large gap ( ).The most prominent objective
reality that the PLA will face in fighting future campaigns is that in [the area of] military equipment, the enemy will
Resolutions of boundary disputes can be generally considered as a fundamental indication whether a country is pursuing expansionist or peaceful policies (which is one reason why a
thorough analysis of Chinas border disputes has been neglected by almost all western media outlets and analysts). China has had the highest number of border disputes of any country
in the world and with no intention of living in an unfriendly atmosphere over a peace of land, has successfully handled and offered substantial compromises (this is the other reason) in
most of them. China borders 14 countries by land; and as a result of territorial dismemberment and unequal treaties, the PRC government, when it came into power, found itself involved
in territorial disputes with all of them. The way in which China resolved those disputes stands as testimony to its desire of peace at any cost and serves as an example to other countries.
China has, in the interests of peace and stability on its borders, adopted a negotiation tactic favorable to rival claimants that other countries would do well to emulate. Many of these
claimants were countries much weaker than China. China was under no obligation to offer such substantial compromises. The portion of land that China received in border settlements
with various neighbouring countries is as follows. Afghanistan 0% Tajikistan 4% Nepal 6% Burma 18% Kazakhstan 22% Mongolia 29% Kyrgyzstan 32% North Korea 40% Laos
50% Vietnam 50% Russia 50% Pakistan 54% Some of this land was strategically important (such as the Wakhan corridor that was disputed with Afghanistan) and extremely rich in
resources (such as the Pamir mountain range in case of Tajikistan). China has also not reiterated its claims on a majority of the territory which was seized from it by the unequal treaties
(even if it meant being cut off from the strategic Sea of Japan). In the map below, the gray area was part of China when the Qing dynasty was at its height, and then was snatched away
stands as a textbook example of this strategy. Nehru, the then Indian PM, rejecting all Chinese offers for
negotiations, constituted a Forward Policy of pushing forward to enemy lines and made belligerent statements
about China (I have ordered the army to throw the Chinese out), implicitly announcing Indian intentions to attack.
Some of the Indian outposts established under this policy went even further then Chinese ones. China, correctly
interpreting these actions as hostile and viewing India through the prism of British imperialist intentions on Tibet (as
India had made itself the British successor in all matters regarding Tibet and China), made multiple diplomatic
protests against the Forward Policy, but Nehru ignored them and never thought that China would have the guts to
attack. After China finally did attack and occupied the disputed areas, it declared a unilateral ceasefire and
withdraw to pre-war status quo borders without occupying an inch of territory. Hence, Chinese intentions were just
with Taiwan, and indeed, negotiating a peace agreement was one of the points that President Hu introduced as a
blueprint for cross-strait relations in December 2008. Ma made a campaign promise to sign a peace treaty in the
run up to the 2008 elections, but reneged on it after becoming president. Such a treaty will not only assure Chinas
maritime neighbors (including rival claimants in the South China Sea) of Chinas peaceful intentions, but will have
have a penchant for putting issues on the backburner. They adapt to changing situations and are happy to do what
they can (business) and leave for future generations what they cannot (reunification). So what next? Chinese
seems to be no reason to worry about a military conflict. And since a majority of the Taiwanese people are happy to
be were they are, rocking the boat is the last thing leaders on both sides of the strait would want to do. Both
economies are growing, and people are living happily on both sides. Every generation of leaders thus hands over
this problem to the next one, with the hope that they might one day either solve it, or preserve the status quo and
would be a nightmare for China, and it simply wouldnt do it. Or, as Jim Hacker would say, Not just that it shouldnt,
but it couldnt, and if it could, it wouldnt, would it?
motivation to acquire Taiwan, China seemingly is rapidly acquiring the capability to take the island by force. In
recent years, the cross-Strait military balance has rapidly shifted in Beijings favor, and this trend is almost certain
to continue so long as Chinas economy continues to grow. Today, China has at least 1,600 ballistic missiles pointed
at Taiwan, and Taiwans own Ministry of Defense admits that China will have sufficient military capabilities to mount
This has led some U.S. analysts, particularly academics of the Realist
persuasion, to argue that the U.S. should gradually cede Taiwan to the Peoples
Republic of China. For example, Charles Glaser argued in a controversial Foreign Affairs article in 2011 that,
a full cross-Strait attack by 2020.
given the risks of nuclear war between China and the United States, the United States should consider backing
away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the
United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Similarly,
and become part of China. It then works hard to make sure that the transition is peaceful and that it gains as much
it is
ultimately extremely unlikely that China will try to seize Taiwan by force.
Furthermore, should it try to do this, it is unlikely to succeed. Even assuming
autonomy as possible from Beijing. Although the trend lines are undoubtedly working in Chinas favor,
Chinas military capabilities are great enough to prevent the U.S. from intervening, there are two forces that would
would diminish any lingering debate over how Beijing will use its growing power. Every regional power would see its
an environment in which each state was dedicated to cooperating with others to balance against Chinese power.
But the more important deterrent for China would be the uncertainty of
success. To be sure, Chinas military capabilities are growing to the point where it will soon be assured of its
ability to quickly defeat Taiwans military forces. A little longer down the road it will also likely be
confident that it can prevent the U.S. from intervening in the conflict. However, as recent
U.S. military conflicts have adequately demonstrated, being able to defeat another nations armed
forces and being able to pacify the country are two different things altogether . It is in
this latter aim that Chinas strategy is likely to falter. Taiwanese are adamantly opposed to being incorporated into a
even if it
quickly defeated Taiwans formal military forces, the PLA would continue to have to
contend with the remnants of resistance for years to come . Such a scenario would
be deeply unsettling for leaders in Beijing as this defiance would likely inspire similar resistance
non-Democratic China. These feelings would only harden in the aftermath of the invasion. Thus,
among various groups on the mainland, starting first and foremost with ethnic minorities in the western China.
Should the PLA resort to harsh oppression to squash resistance in Taiwan, this would deeply unsettle even Han
Chinese on the mainland. In fact, the clear parallels with how Imperial Japan sought to pacify Taiwan and China
formally declared independence. But if Taiwanese leaders have avoided doing so to date, they are unlikely to think
economically, and seeking to disrupt the U.S.-Taiwanese bilateral relationship. The hope would be that leaders in
Taipei will ultimately conclude that they cannot resist being absorbed into China, something China itself can
facilitate this by offering favorable terms.