DA Japan Prolif CNDI 2016

1NC

1NC Japan DA
Japan alliance credibility is high recent visits prove
Lim 15 (Taiwei Lim, senior lecturer at UniSIM and adjunct research fellow at the
National University of Singapores East Asian Institute, 10/26/2015, US pivot to
Asia pays off, http://www.todayonline.com/world/asia/us-pivot-asia-pays?
singlepage=true)
Between April and October 2015, a procession of important leaders from North-east
and South Asia visited the United States. It began with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in April
2015, followed by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping in September, and South
Korean President Park Geun-hye in October. The visits show the USs pivot to Asia has worked, and these countries,
for their own national interests and reasons, are keen to engage America and strengthen relations. For its strategic
competitors, the US reiterates its message of Pacific commitment and willingness to work with rising powers on

These visits, taken together, are important in two ways. First, they show the USs
power and influence in the Pacific, reflecting a stature that is a far cry
from President Barack Obamas first term in office. The US then had to
persuade its allies of the need to pivot back to Asia. Even for those who felt the US
had never left to begin with, the pivot was needed to address perceptions that the
US had neglected the region. With Mr Abes visit to the US this year, the
decades-old US-Japan Alliance was reinforced after three years of uncertain
relations during the administration of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) from 2009 to 2012. The
DPJs ambivalent stance on the US naval base issues and collective self-defence
made relations with the US challenging . Mr Abe, who is from the Liberal Democratic Party,
removed these tensions. Mr Abes strong leadership style and control of a
two-thirds majority in the Japanese Diet pushed the collective self-defence
bills through parliament, enabling stronger cooperation with US forces
and reinforcing the Alliance as the cornerstone of peace in the region .
difficult issues.

Bilateral engagement with China damages the alliance and

causes Japanese nuclearization triggers a destabilizing
regional arms race.
Chanlett-Avery & Niktin 9 (Emma Chanlett-Avery is a specialist in Asian
affairs for the CRS, Mary Beth Niktin is an analyst in nonproliferation for the CRS.
The report: Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests
was prepared on February 19 2009 for Congress by the Congressional Research
Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf)
During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a
sort of perverse stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy,

Although the United States has reiterated its

commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in
Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the
United States develops a closer relationship with China, the gap between
Tokyos and Washingtons security perspectives will grow and further weaken the
U.S. commitment.28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North
felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence.

Koreas denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the United States does not share Japans

A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the

hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its
strategic perspective.29

own deterrence. Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is
fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of
the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, Chinas rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its
military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia.

If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental
component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not
only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level
consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift.
Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the
issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others

U.S. behavior plays an outsized role in

determining Japans strategic calculations, particularly in any debate on
developing nuclear weapons. Security experts concerned about Japans nuclear option have
insisting on the virtue on strategic ambiguity.30

stressed that U.S. officials or influential commentators should not signal to the Japanese any tacit approval of
nuclearization.31 Threatening other countries with the possibility of Japan going nuclear, for example, could be
construed as approval by some quarters in Tokyo. U.S.-Japanese joint development of a theater missile defense
system reinforces the U.S. security commitment to Japan, both psychologically and practically. The test-launch of
several missiles by North Korea in July 2006 accelerated existing plans to jointly deploy Patriot Advanced Capability
3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air interceptors as well as a sea-based system on Aegis destroyers. If successfully
operationalized, confidence in the ability to intercept incoming missiles may help assuage Japans fear of foreign
attacks. This reassurance may discourage any potential consideration of developing a deterrent nuclear force. In
addition, the joint effort would more closely intertwine U.S. and Japan security, although obstacles still remain for a

the most alarming

possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be
the development of a regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nucleararmed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage
China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to
pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already
nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospector even realityof several
nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical
grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing. The
seamless integration.32 Potential for Asian Arms Race To many security experts,

counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War,

most observers maintain that the

risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors. US-China Relations The course of the
relationship between Beijing and Washington over the next several years is likely to have a
significant impact on the nuclearization debate in Japan. If the relationship chills substantially
and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However,

and a Cold War-type standoff develops, there may be calls from some in the United States to reinforce the U.S.
deterrent forces. Some hawkish U.S. commentators have called for Japan to be unleashed in order to counter

Depending on the severity of the perceived threat from China,

Japanese and U.S. officials could reconsider their views on Japans non-nuclear status.
Chinas strength.34

Geopolitical calculations likely would have to shift considerably for this scenario to gain currency. On the other hand,

if U.S.-Sino relations become much closer, Japan may feel that it needs to
develop a more independent defense posture. This is particularly true if
the United States and China engaged in any bilateral strategic or nuclear
consultations.35 Despite improved relations today, distrust between Beijing and Tokyo
remains strong, and many in Japans defense community view Chinas rapidly
modernizing military as their primary threat.

Asian prolif causes nuclear war deterrence doesnt check.

Cimbala 15 [Stephen J. Cimbala, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at
Pennsylvania State University Brandywine, The New Nuclear Disorder: Challenges to
Deterrence and Strategy, 2015, p. 149]
Failure to contain proliferation in Pyongyang could spread nuclear fever throughout
Asia. Japan and South Korea might seek nuclear weapons and missile defenses. A
pentagonal configuration of nuclear powers in the Pacific basin (Russia, China, Japan, and
the two Koreasnot including the United States, with its own Pacific interests) could put deterrence at
risk and create enormous temptation toward nuclear preemption. Apart from
actual use or threat of use, North Korea could exploit the mere existence of an assumed nuclear capability in order

A five-sided nuclear competition in the Pacific would be

linked, in geopolitical deterrence and proliferation space, to the existing nuclear deterrents of
India and Pakistan, and to the emerging nuclear weapons status of Iran . An arc of
nuclear instability from Tehran to Tokyo could place US proliferation
strategies into the ash heap of history and call for more drastic military
options, not excluding preemptive war, defenses and counter-deterrent special operations. In
addition, an unrestricted nuclear arms race in Asia would increase the likelihood of
accidental or inadvertent nuclear war. It would do so because: (1) some of these states
already have histories of protracted conflict; (2) states may have politically unreliable
or immature command and control systems, especially during a crisis involving
a decision for nuclear first strike or retaliation; unreliable or immature systems might
permit a technical malfunction that caused an unintended launch , or a
deliberate, but unauthorized, launch by rogue commanders; and (3) faulty intelligence
and warning systems might cause one side to misinterpret the others defensive
moves to forestall attack as offensive preparations for attack, thus triggering a mistaken
preemption.
to support its coercive diplomacy.19

Impacts

Prolif Bad Asia War

Allied prolif is the only scenario for Asian war
Hunzeker 14, Michael Hunzeker is a postdoctoral fellow at Princeton University
and a major in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. His views do not necessarily reflect
those of the U.S. government, "Why the Next 'Great War' Won't Happen on China's
Doorstep," 7-11-2014, Defense One,
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2014/07/why-next-great-war-wont-happen-chinasdoorstep/88549/, DOA: 8-4-2015, y2k
The first problem with using the 2014 is 1914 analogy is that it doesnt even get the
present right. In all the ways that matter, the Asia-Pacific region of today is unlike Europe a
century ago. Although some international relations theorists point to overarching similarities
China is a rising power seeking to reassert regional dominance and the U.S. is a great
power with a preference for the status quo the specific parallels simply arent
there. Asia today lacks 1914 Europes competing webs of rigid alliances. There is no Serbiaesque regime yearning to carve an ethnically unified nation-state out of existing political boundaries. China is
not encircled (the protestationhs of some of its military planners notwithstanding), nor does an
insane monarch lead it. Asia is not swept up in a Cult of the Offensive the
shared belief that military technology makes it easier to attack than to defend. If
anything, Beijings acquisition of anti-access/area denial weapons systems has
convinced most strategists that defenders hold the upper hand. Globalized
trade and production chains have increased the economic costs of war. And
finally, for better or worse, we now live in a nuclear world. Nuclear deterrence makes unilateral
aggression much riskier for China than it ever was for Germany. Conversely, if the nuclear
balance were tipped by Japan, South Korea or even more problematically Taiwan
acquiring nuclear weapons, the region would likely become far more volatile than
pre-war Europe. In either case, nuclear weapons render the parallel obsolete.

Prolif Bad Preemption

Proliferation causes preemptive attacks
Friedberg 15 - Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton (Aaron
L., May 19, The Debate Over US China Strategy Global Politics and Strategy, 57:3,
89-110)
If it were to happen overnight, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by current US
security partners in East Asia (perhaps including Taiwan, as well as Japan and South Korea) might
improve their prospects for balanc- ing against Chinese power . But here again, there is
likely to be a significant gap between theory and reality . Assuming that Washington did not
actively assist them, and that they could not produce weapons overnight or in total secrecy, the interval
during which its former allies lost the protection of the American nuclear umbrella
and the point at which they acquired their own would be one in which they would be
exposed to coercive threats and possibly pre-emptive attack. Because it contains
a large number of tense and mistrustful dyads (including North Korea and South Korea,
Japan and China, China and Taiwan, Japan and North Korea and possibly South Korea and
Japan), a multipolar nuclear order in East Asia might be especially prone to
instability.48

Prolif Bad Accidents

Accidents are likely and go global outweighs intentional wars
Hayes 15 (Peter, Executive Director for the Nautilus Institute for Security and
Sustainability, Ending Nuclear Threat via a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free
Zone, http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/ending-a-nuclear-threatvia-a-northeast-asia-nuclear-weapons-free-zone/)
Deterrence, compellence, and reassurance are credible depending on the resolve
and capability of the state projecting nuclear threat , and the ability of the threatened state to respond
in kind or asymmetrically, to offset these threats. All three types of effects are almost always present in a nuclear threat made by
one party to another; sometimes all three effects may be in play at the same time, either in the intention of the state projecting

It is rare
for the intentions and perceptions of these two or more affected states to be the
same. Therein lies much of the risk of misperception, misunderstanding, and
inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. This risk arising from miscalculation is
compounded by the accidental risks of nuclear war because of technical or
computer malfunctions, misinterpreted signals of an impending attack,
problems in communication systems, problems in fail-safe and control systems,
and cybernetic organizational feedbacks that could lead to loss-of-control of
conventional and nuclear forces. 3. Nuclear Threat in Northeast Asia All states in the Northeast
Asia region fall under the shadow of the threat of nuclear war. Sometimes, this threat is
nuclear threat, or in the perception of the state that is the target of the threat, or in the perceptions of third parties.

intended, manipulated, and calibrated, by a variety of signalsnuclear testing, delivery system testing, visible transiting
deployments, forward deployment in host countries, declaratory doctrines, operational doctrines, political statements, propaganda
statements, sharing via deliberate open line communications, or even what is not done or said at a particularly tense moment.

Nuclear threat is one of the bases of interstate relations between the long-standing NWSs in
this region, the United States, China, and Russia, forming a triangle of strategic nuclear
deterrence, compellence, and reassurance that operates continuously and generally; and sometimes becomes part of an
immediate confrontation. Accordingly, these types of threat are termed general and immediate in western literature.[3] Thus,
general and strategic nuclear deterrence may be said to operate to ensure that NWSs avoid actions that might suggest that they
could involve nuclear weapons and intentions to use themthereby creating a cautionary behavior that operates all the time.

AT: Prolif Defense

Prolif in secondary states like Japan is uniquely destabilizing.
Lanoszka 12 Alexander, Ph.D. in IR, Postdoctoral Fellow Dickey Center for
International Understanding, Dartmouth College, Protection States Trust?:
Superpower Patronage, Nuclear Behavior, and Alliance Dynamics
https://www.princeton.edu/politics/about/file-repository/public/A-LanoszkaProtection-States-Trust-022012.pdf
As doubts over the superpowers commitment
increase, the secondary state will be more apt to explore military policies that insure against the
4.3 Nuclear Behavior as Insurance and Bargaining

effects of patron abandonment. They are more likely to adopt ambiguous nuclear postures or even begin pursuing

nuclear weapons program. Having a nuclear weapons arsenal offers a robust insurance policy for
the secondary state. Goldstein (2000) notes that the secondary state is not required to develop
such an extensive and technologically advanced arsenal as those possessed by the US and the
Soviet Union. Rather, it needs to have a sufficient number of weapons that are capable of secondstrike delivery to deter the adversary from launching a direct attack. Indeed, the philosophy guiding the
secondary states approach to deterrence is different from that of their patrons.
Superpowers rely on the threat of controlled escalation in which they proceed 21
through limited but gradually more intense exchanges to communicate their resolve in
inflicting damage. Engaging in controlled escalation requires advanced command and control
systems as well as the ability to absorb nuclear damage. These requirements are especially
demanding for smaller states that are less able to meet them.16 Consequently, such
states opt for a poison pill strategy in which their deterrence policy rests on the
threat of uncontrolled escalation. The high likelihood of both parties losing
control of a nuclear exchange characterizes this form of confrontation. For such an exchange
to occur there needs to be an element of risk that neither side could attenuate (Powell 1987, 719). A states
technological capacity for managing its nuclear weapons poses such a risk if it is involuntarily
underdeveloped and thus prone to accidents and other organizational failures.
These concerns gain significance when it comes to secondary states . Their national
command structures are likely to be small and more concentrated than is the case for
superpowers. In the event of a nuclear exchange, they face a much higher probability of being thrown into
disarray during the conflicts initial stages. Nuclear retaliation, therefore, becomes less inhibited
and results in the infliction of massive damage on the adversary (Goldstein 2000, 47their own

51). Backwards inducing from this possibility leads the adversary to refrain from direct military attack on the

secondary states have to

pass through various stages of nuclear development first . Indeed, there is a paradox
underlining nuclear weapons acquisition . As much as having a nuclear arsenal
might engender international stability, the process by which states finally acquire
nuclear weapons generates instability (Sagan and Waltz 1995). Adopting an
ambiguous nuclear posture or pursuing a nuclear weapons program provokes
alarm amongst neighboring states, regardless of whether they are allies. Those
states might be unsettled by the uncertainty of the potential proliferators intentions
and the fear of being vulnerable to nuclear blackmail in the future. Moreover, though the
secondary state acts to hedge against superpower abandonment in their effort to obtain greater foreign
policy autonomy, they also risk punishment from the superpower for threatening to
undermine its alliance structures.
secondary state.17 Such are the advantages of acquiring nuclear weapons, but

AT: No Arms Race

Prolif causes east Asian arms race
Chanlett-Avery & Niktin 9 (Emma Chanlett-Avery is a specialist in Asian
affairs for the CRS, Mary Beth Niktin is an analyst in nonproliferation for the CRS.
The report: Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U.S. Interests
was prepared on February 19 2009 for Congress by the Congressional Research
Service. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf)
Any reconsideration of Japans policy of nuclear weapons abstention would have
significant implications for U.S. policy in East Asia. Globally, Japans withdrawal from the
Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) could damage the most durable international nonproliferation regime. Regionally, Japan going nuclear could set off a nuclear arms race with
China, South Korea, and Taiwan and, in turn, India, and Pakistan may feel
compelled to further strengthen their own nuclear weapons capability . Bilaterally,
assuming that Japan made the decision without U.S. support, the move could indicate Tokyos lack
of trust in the American commitment to defend Japan. An erosion in the U.S.Japan alliance could upset the geopolitical balance in East Asia, a shift that
could indicate a further strengthening of Chinas position as an emerging hegemonic
power. These ramifications would likely be deeply destabilizing for the security of the Asia
Pacific region and beyond.

Reduced U.S. deterrence breaks the nuclear taboo and causes

regional arms races
Varner 9 [Sean Varner (Masters in Defense and Strategic Studies from Missouri
State University, International Programs Analyst @ Allied Associates International),
A Nuclear Japan?, 9/21/9, http://www.visionandvalues.org/2009/09/a-nuclearjapan/]
As North Korea grows increasingly provocative
and China continues to build up its nuclear forces, Japan has found itself confronted
with a more threatening security environment. Moreover, drastic reductions in the U.S.
nuclear arsenal, brought about by arms-control treaties with Russia, have
heightened Tokyos concern about the reliability of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. As one Japanese official has commented, We could afford to sleep during the Cold War;
we cannot afford to sleep now. The previous taboo on even discussing a
Japanese nuclear deterrent has already been broken, as prominent Japanese
lawmakers and politicians debate the option in response to North Korean and
Chinese actions. Tokyo justifiably feels threatened by Pyongyang and Beijing. At the same time, it is
almost completely dependent on Washington for deterrence. Japanese officials stated
There is, however, another side to Japans position:

to the Strategic Posture Commission that the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella was dependent on its specific
capabilities to hold a wide variety of targets at risk. Japan was greatly concerned when President Bush cut nuclear
warheads to 2,200. If President Obama cuts warheads to below 1,700, and without consulting Tokyo, as outlined by

Japanese officials may perceive the U.S.

extended deterrent to be insincere and unreliable. And what if Japan decided to go
nuclear? The consequences would be far-reaching: First, it would be a major blow
to the NPT. Japan has served as the epitome of nonproliferation and, as the only
victim of nuclear attack, carried a moral authority in its calls for nuclear
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START agreement),

disarmament. Without that voice, the NPT becomes a largely meritless system of
haves and have-nots. Second, a nuclear arms race would seem almost inevitable. Not
only would China and North Korea respond by ramping up capabilities, but South
Korea and Taiwan might be compelled to go nuclear as well. The spillover effects
would likely ratchet up the arms race between India and Pakistan, too.

Japan nuclearization spark nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia

Matake Kamiya, associate professor of IR at the National Defense Academy of Japan. The
Washington Quarterly. Nuclear Japan:Oxymoron or Coming Soon?. 2002. Page 63-75
Second, contrary to what most foreign observers believe, nuclearization would actually threaten
Japans military security. A decision to go nuclear might trigger an arms race in
Northeast Asiain a worst-case scenario, prompting the two Koreas and Taiwan to
accelerate their nuclear development or go nuclear as wellultimately reducing
regional and global security. Japans Defense Agency soberly recognizes this reality. An unofficial study
conducted in 1994 by Defense Agency officials and Self-Defense Forces officers at the behest of Administrative
Vice-Minister Shigeru Hatakeyama concluded that Japans possession of its own nuclear arsenal had little if any
strategic merit.19 In a 1996 presentation, Lt. Gen. Noboru Yamaguchi of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces

without the protection of a U.S.

nuclear umbrella, Japan would be worse off with its own nuclear arsenal .20 He
reportedly a participant in the 1994 study groupasserted that, even

emphasized that, because Japan is an island country with a large part of its population of more than 120 million

nuclear armament would not suit Japan

because of its inherent vulnerability to nuclear attack. As a result, Japan is better off
in a world where just a few states possess nuclear weapons capability .
Consequently, going nuclear would only endanger Japan because, while bringing only minimal
military benefits to the country, such a move would motivate numerous other currently
nonnuclear states to pursue proliferation.
living in a small number of densely populated cities,

Japan prolif would cause an East Asian arms race, North

Korean hostility, destroy the NPT, and the US-Japan alliance
Kurt Campbell, senior vice president and director of the International Security Program
and Chair in National Security at CSIS, and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, visiting fellow in the
International Security Program at CSIS,

2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point

It was in the context of this increasingly disturbing environment that the Japanese Defense
Agency conducted a secret investigation into Japans nuclear option in late 1995. Although
the full details of the thirty-one-page report have never been released, in 2003 the Asahi
Shim- bun obtained a copy of the report and revealed some of its findings. The study
resoundingly reaffirmed Japans non-nuclear status and outlined the numerous drawbacks
that would result from Japans nuclearization. In particular, the study found that Japans

acquisition of nuclear weapons would destroy the military balance in Asia and
possibly cause an arms race with China, a nuclear South Korea, or an openly hostile
North Korea. According to Asahi, the report said that Japan would effectively destroy
the basis for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; the reliability of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella would he undermined and Japan would he viewed as distrustful of its
military alliance with the United States ; landi neighbors would fear that Japan was
taking a more independent defense policy stance.26

AT: No Arms Race Perception

Perception of Japanese prolif is enough to trigger the arms
race
Bakanic 8 (Elizabeth D. Bakanic, MA from Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson
School of Public and International Affairs, Bakanic worked on a policy report that
recommended ways in which to prevent proliferation chain reactions in Japan, South
Korea, and Egypt. Accordingly, in fall 2007, she traveled to Tokyo, conducting
interviews with Japanese and U.S. government officials, nuclear experts, and
academics. She simultaneously served as a Department of Homeland Security
Graduate Fellow for Science and Technology, The end of Japan's nuclear taboo,
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 6/9/8, http://www.thebulletin.org/webedition/features/the-end-of-japans-nuclear-taboo)
So why should the world be concerned about Japan's fading nuclear allergy? Because Tokyo's attitude
toward nuclear weapons is incredibly important to Japan's neighbors and the
nonproliferation regime, meaning subtle changes in its attitude could carry
serious security consequences for both. Historically, Japan has maintained
complicated relations with many of its neighbor s--specifically China, North Korea, and South
Korea. While functional relationships do exist, deep mistrust and suspicions persist,
creating a paranoid security environment where an innocuous change from
an outside perspective sets off alarm bells in the region . So what may seem
like a natural shift in Japan's nuclear attitudes may be a destabilizing change for
those less trustful and less objective. Therefore, if discussing nuclear weapons
becomes more acceptable in Japan, China and the Koreas might perceive this as a
dangerous development and use it as an excuse to increase their military
capabilities--nuclear or otherwise.

AT: No Arms Race Domino Theory

Domino theory is real countries dont prolif only with explicit
U.S. reassurance policies
Miller 14 (Nick, Frank Stanton Assistant Professor of Nuclear Security and Policy
in the Department of Political Science and Watson Institute for International Studies
at Brown University, 10/6, U.S. nonproliferation policy is an invisible success story,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/10/16/u-snonproliferation-policy-is-an-invisible-success-story/)
Even though five decades have passed,

experts disagree over whether these policies were

successful. Some public commentators and academics describe U.S. nonproliferation policy as a failure,
emphasizing the inability of the U.S. government to arrest the nuclear programs of Pakistan, North Korea, or Iran.

a large body of recent academic research on nuclear proliferation

either pays little attention to U.S. policy or argues that there was not much
proliferation for the United States to prevent. According to this school of thought,
nuclear domino effects are a myth that have been proven historically invalid; leaders understanding of
On the other hand,

their states identity, domestic regime type, or the strategic characteristics of nuclear weapons make them much
less attractive and contagious than traditionally believed. Research on the NPT, meanwhile, has seen it as a set of
norms that affect states understanding of appropriate behavior, while downplaying the role of coercion and power.

my own research suggests that nuclear domino effects are real and
that U.S. policy has been crucial in preventing them from reaching fruition. In
the wake of the Chinese nuclear test, for example, India, Japan, Taiwan, and Australia
all began moving toward developing a nuclear arsenal. U.S. efforts were
important in preventing Japan, Taiwan, and Australia from following through .
In contrast,

Moreover, while the U.S. failed to prevent India from testing in 1974, it responded by strengthening its

automatic sanctions policies that I argue have deterred

states that are dependent on the United States from pursuing nuclear
weapons. The policy has helped decrease the rate at which states begin to develop
nuclear weapons programs. It also explains why recent proliferators have
exclusively been rogue states outside the U.S. sphere of influence like Iran,
North Korea, Iraq, and Libya. This stands in stark contrast to the roster of U.S. friends and allies that
nonproliferation policy further, instituting

pursued nuclear weapons before the strengthening of U.S. policy, i.e. South Korea, Taiwan, Pakistan, Israel, and

This evidence is only one part of a burgeoning research program that is

uncovering the long underappreciated role of American nonproliferation policy,
including its efforts to prevent nuclear tests , induce compliance with the NPT, or coerce some
of its closest allies into remaining non-nuclear. Much of this research has drawn on recently
France.

declassified documents from the National Security Archive and Cold War International History Project and has
benefited from the support and resources of the Stanton Foundation and Nuclear Studies Research Initiative.

The

lesson of this research is clear. Examples of the failures of U.S.

nonproliferation policy like Pakistan and North Korea are conspicuous and therefore
receive more press. In contrast, the successes are often invisible, because they
involve states tacit decisions not to start nuclear weapons programs. American citizens
and policymakers should not lose sight of the broader success of U.S. nonproliferation.

AT: No Arms Race NPT

Japan nuclearization collapses the NPT
Hughes 7 PhD Candidate in Poli Sci @ MIT (Spring 2007, Llewellyn, International
Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 6796, Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear
(Yet) International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,
http://www.mitpressjournals.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/abs/10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.
67)
Second, a decision by Japan to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent would
undermine the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, which is already
viewed by some as teetering on the brink of irrelevancy.4 Such a decision would
also worsen regional security relations, possibly leading China to bolster its nuclear
weapons force and South Korea to reconsider its nuclear weapons policy.

Key to stop prolif

Godsberg 2008 [Strategic Posture Review Commission- U.S. Institute of Peace Research Assoc. at Fed.
Of American Scientists, Lawyers Committee of Nuclear Policy]- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
[NPT] http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/]

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

(NPT), obligates the five acknowledged nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russian
Federation, United Kingdom, France, and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons, other nuclear
explosive devices, or their technology to any non-nuclear-weapon state . Nuclear weapon
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also referred to as

States Parties are also obligated, under Article VI, to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." Non-nuclear-weapon States

are required
also to accept safeguards to detect diversions of nuclear materials from peaceful
activities, such as power generation, to the production of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. This must be done in accordance with an individual safeguards agreement,
Parties undertake not to acquire or produce nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. They

concluded between each non-nuclear-weapon State Party and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Under
these agreements, all nuclear materials in peaceful civil facilities under the jurisdiction of the state must be
declared to the IAEA, whose inspectors have routine access to the facilities for periodic monitoring and inspections.
If information from routine inspections is not sufficient to fulfill its responsibilities, the IAEA may consult with the
state regarding special inspections within or outside declared facilities. The Treaty was opened for signature on 01
July 1968, and signed on that date by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and 59 other
countries. The Treaty entered into force with the deposit of US ratification on 05 March 1970. China acceeded to the
NPT on 09 March 1992, and France acceded on 03 August 1992. In 1996, Belarus joined Ukraine and Kazakhstan in
removing and transferring to the Russian Federation the last of the remaining former Soviet nuclear weapons
located within their territories, and each of these nations has become a State Party to the NPT, as a non-nuclear-

The NPT is the most widely

accepted arms control agreement; only Israel, India, and Pakistan have never been signatories of the
weapon state. In June 1997 Brazil became a State Party to the NPT.

Treaty, and North Korea withdrew from the Treaty in 2003. In accordance with the terms of the NPT, on May 11,
1995 more than 170 countries attended the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) in New York.
Three decisions and one resolution emanated from NPTREC. First, the NPT was extended for an indefinite duration
and without conditions. Second, Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament were
worked out to guide the parties to the treaty in the next phase of its implementation. Third, an enhanced review

a resolution endorsed the

establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
There have been no confirmed instances of official states party transfers of nuclear
weapon technology or unsafeguarded nuclear materials to any non-nuclear-weapon
states party. However, some non-nuclear-weapon states, such as Iraq, were able to obtain sensitive technology
process was established for future review conferences. Finally,

and/or equipment from private parties in states that are signatories to the NPT. South Africa conducted an
independent nuclear weapons production program prior to joining the NPT, however, it dismantled all of its nuclear
weapons before signing the Treaty. In 1994, the United States and North Korea signed an "Agreed Framework"
bringing North Korea into full compliance with its non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. In 2003 North Korea
announced it was withdrawing from the Treaty effective immediately, and on October 9, 2006 became the eighth
country to explode a nuclear device.

2NC Impact Japan-China War

Prolif causes Japan-China war
Swaine 13 Michael D. Swaine et al- senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, doctorate in government from Harvard University", CHINAS
MILITARY & THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE IN 2030",
carnegieendowment.org/files/net_assessment_full.pdf
Due in large part to deteriorating trends in the conventional balance described above, as well as its own doubts

Japan could perceive an independent nuclear

capability as a cost-effective means of preventing Chinese attack or coercion .
Consequently, the nuclear domain would become a locus of destabilizing
competition between China and Japan, with a far greater likelihood of outright
confrontation than in any other scenario. Japan would likely pursue a modest sea-based deterrent, most
likely in the form of SSBNs, and would adopt a comparatively restrained nuclear posture that
places an emphasis on retaliation against countervalue targets. But to maximize the deterrent
potential of its arsenal, Japan could maintain some degree of ambiguity regarding the use of its
regarding the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence,

nuclear weapons in very specific contingencies against overwhelming conventional threats. Although news of such

Japan would probably require a few years

to field the full suite of compatible warheads, missiles, and delivery platforms
necessary to ensure a second-strike capability.24 During this period, China could be tempted to launch
some form of preventive attack in order to neutralize the emergence of an independent and, in
Beijings view, unpredictable nuclear power on its periphery. Such temptations could grow in the event of
an effort would likely break out within a period of months,

a total disintegration of the United StatesJapan alliance, although the overall possibility of such a destabilizing and

At a minimum, however, Japanese nuclearization and the open

would most likely set off a regional arms race. Faced with a
deteriorat-ing security environment, China could be prompted to shift toward a limited
deterrence posture, with an emphasis on a larger nuclear force capable of early attacks
against military targets. In this instance, pervasive strategic distrust between Tokyo and Beijing
and regular incidents and crises arising from their geographically proximate forces would raise the
possibility of brinkmanship and confrontation.
catastrophic scenario would be low.
violation of nonproliferation taboos

Goes nuclear rapidly

Ayson & Ball 14 [Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria
University & Desmond Ball Head of the Strategic and Defense Study Center at the
Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. Can a SinoJapanese War Be Controlled? Volume 56, Issue 6, 2014 Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy pages 135-166 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2014.985441]
In the strategic relationship between Japan and China, however, there are problems
at both the political and militarytechnical levels. Firstly, there seems to be minimal
political understanding of, or commitment to, avoiding escalation. It is hard to tell
whether Japan and China will see it as in their political interests to constrain what
begins as a minor conflict. These political obstacles increase the pressure created
by military considerations that encourage swift escalation, to the point at which
even nuclear options seem attractive. The close military links between Japan
and the US would not necessarily encourage restraint. It may be militarily
logical for the US to place China in a position in which further escalation seemed

tempting, while it could be politically logical for Japan to create conditions in which
American action became more likely. An initial outbreak of hostilities between Japan
and China over the East China Sea could remain just that: a short, contained exchange of fire and a sobering
lesson that encouraged much-needed efforts to improve communication and recognise their common interest in

might also veer out of control before they had a chance to take
preventative measures. The subsequent involvement of the United States could
lead to Asia's first serious war involving nuclear-armed states. And we have no
precedent to suggest how dangerous that would become.
avoiding conflict. But it

--- AT: No Escalation

It will escalate domestic nationalism, no hotlines, denial of
the dispute, history of peace makes them unprepared
Ayson & Ball 14 [Robert Ayson Professor of Strategic Studies at Victoria
University & Desmond Ball Head of the Strategic and Defense Study Center at the
Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National University. Can a SinoJapanese War Be Controlled? Volume 56, Issue 6, 2014 Survival: Global Politics and
Strategy pages 135-166 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2014.985441]
China's demonstration of its willingness and capacity to use force, albeit in modest doses, suggests that it
might be expected to escalate first. The fact that Beijing has an unconvincing claim in the
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute should not be a source of comfort because, as Taylor Fravel observes, it is in such weak

Japanese escalation
could not be ruled out if Tokyo saw China's actions as part of a new and more
assertive pattern of behaviour that signalled a commitment to upping the ante. In
their contribution to these judgements, political leaders on both sides would probably
be unable to act with cool detachment, due to domestic pressure from
nationalists. Chinese analysts often explain to outsiders that measures overseas
governments characterise as too assertive are seen by these nationalists as too
reserved. In any incident that gains public attention, Beijing is compelled to strike a bargain between those
internal and external expectations. A minor concession designed to placate a domestic
audience could easily be interpreted by Tokyo as serious escalation. There is also
the prospect of Japanese misjudgement of a similar kind. Tokyo's nationalisation of the
Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands, in 2012, was partly an attempt to ward off even more provocative
acts by nationalists. But this backfired. Partially because of a deep distrust, it is possible that in a severe
crisis, any use of the JSDF (even one designed to lower the temperature) would be
read as escalation. The political leaderships on both sides also face two more
problems that hinder their ability to effectively manage Sino-Japanese interaction .
The first is that they have lacked a strong pattern of contact at senior levels, especially
between heads of government. At the time of writing, speculation was growing that Abe and Chinese
positions that the Chinese leadership has proven more likely to employ violence.20 And

President Xi Jinping would meet briefly at the November 2014 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, but this

Japan and China also lack an

emergency communication mechanism that would reduce the chances of a
misunderstanding between their armed forces in the event of a sudden, serious
maritime crisis. In addition to the frequent external calls for a system of this sort, Japan has continually
would have been the exception to what resembled a Chinese boycott.

supported the idea, only to be rebuffed by China. In September 2014, the two countries agreed to resume

given their level of distrust, there is no guarantee

such a mechanism will be used even if it is established . The first obstacle is
partly the product of another problem: the absence of an agreement that recognises
the dangers in Sino-Japanese relations and the urgent need for greater cooperation.
In the evolving Cold War relationship between Washington and Moscow, that need
was most clearly illustrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis, which helped create a
partnership based on, in Coral Bell's words, consciousness between the dominant
powers that they have solid common interests as well as sharp conflicting
interests.21 The establishment of this political consciousness was arguably more
important than the installation of the famous hotline. In Bell's view, some of the
discussions on the subject but,

seeds of this approach were planted far earlier in the post-war period. The
admission by the two superpowers that their relationship was indeed adversarial
had been brought home by the time that the Truman Doctrine was announced, in
1947.22 However, the notion that there needed to be some sort of adverse
partnership (a term taken from Marshall Shulman) would come as the crises they
were involved in grew more serious. China and Japan's frequent admonitions of each other (including
their use of absurd Harry Potter analogies) might suggest that the countries treat each other as adversaries.23 But
there are at least two kinds of denial involved here. The first has been

Japan's official position that there

is no dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. There has been logic in this approach:
acknowledging the existence of the disagreement (which everyone is aware of) would grant China a negotiation

reduces the scope

for effective cooperation, as it gives the impression that conflict resolution is
unnecessary. This leaves Japan with a real conundrum, reflected in recent criticism that the Abe government
might concede too much ground if it finally acknowledges that China has a different position.24 The second
form of denial is China's avowed view that its rise avoids the tragedy of great-power
politics, which in the past has resulted in major conflict.25 This position is dangerous because it encourages the
position on the future sovereignty of the islands. The problem is that this stance also

perception that Beijing is free to commit itself to increasingly provocative actions without seriously risking

Both of these denial hazards are exacerbated by the insufficient sense

of danger in Beijing and Tokyo about the possibility of an outbreak of violence . There
is little sign that the neighbours have noticed the brink from which they need to step back. This likely fosters
excessive confidence that they can continue to taunt each other without coming
to blows, any threats of force are permitted and bluffs will not be called. Goldstein is
confrontation.

right to be concerned about indications that Chinese analysts overestimate the ease with which military actions
can be used to send signals, andunderestimate the escalation risks that could result if the signalling action goes
awry or is misunderstood.26 In this context, the absence of a cautionary tale a recent war or serious crisis

These factors might lead to

escalation after the first shots have been fired. A lack of effective
communication at the political level would curtail leaders' ability to
coordinate a ceasefire. Their lack of trust would create suspicion that any
stabilisation proposal was a ruse. The lack of an informal tradition of
recognising, let alone managing, their adversarial partnership would also hinder
political control of escalation. At this precarious point, other factors are likely to kick in,
further increasing the danger. There is almost no question that curbing domestic nationalism
would become an even greater challenge for leaders in both countries during the onset of even
minor hostilities, and there is also a possibility that one or both leaderships would be
tempted to exploit a heightened crisis for domestic reasons. An initial act of
violence would put the other side under significant pressure to respond in kind (at the
involving Asia's major powers could prove to be a problem.

very least).

Turns Case

Turns Warming Nuclear Winter

Nuke winter destroys the climate regional war is sufficient
Cirincione 8 -- President of the Ploughshares Fund, a public grant-making
foundation focused on nuclear weapons policy and conflict resolution. Cirincione
had previously served as vice president for national security and international policy
at the Center for American Progress in Washington, DC, and for eight years as the
director for non-proliferation at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
(Joseph, The continuing threat of nuclear war. In Global Catastrophic Risk, ed.
Bostrom and Cirkovic, Oxford, 2008)
Sagan and Richard Turco, two of the original scientists developing the nuclear winter analysis, concluded
Especially through the destruction of global agriculture, nuclear winter might
be considerably worse than the short-term blast, radiation, fire, and fallout of
nuclear war. It would carry nuclear war to many nations that no one intended to attack, including the poorest
and most vulnerable.22 In 2007, members of the original group of nuclear winter scientists collectively
performed a new comprehensive quantitative assessment utilizing the latest
computer and climate models. They concluded that even a small-scale, regional nuclear war
could kill as many people as died in all of World War II and seriously disrupt the global climate for a
decade or more, harming nearly everyone on Earth. The scientists considered a nuclear exchange
involving 100 Hiroshima-size bombs (15 kilotons) on cities in the subtropics, and found that: Smoke
emissions of 100 low-yield urban explosions in a regional nuclear conflict would
generate substantial global-scale climate anomalies, although not as large as the previous 'nuclear
winter' scenarios for a full-scale war. However, indirect effect on surface land temperatures ,
precipitation rates, and growing season lengths would be likely to degrade agricultural productivity
to an extent that historically has led to famines in Africa, India and Japan after the 1784 Laki eruption or in the
northeastern United States and Europe after the Tambora eruption of 1815. Climatic anomalies could
persist for a decade or more because of smoke stabilization, far longer than in previous
nuclear winter calculations or after volcanic eruptions. 23 The scientists concluded that the nuclear
explosions and firestorms in modern cities would inject black carbon particles higher
into the atmosphere than previously thought and higher than normal volcanic
activity (see Chapter 10, this volume). Blocking the Sun's thermal energy, the smoke clouds would
lower temperatures regionally and globally for several years, open up new holes in
the ozone layer protecting the Earth from harmful radiation, reduce global
precipitation by about 10% and trigger massive crop failures. Overall, the global cooling
from a regional nuclear war would be about twice as large as the global warming of
the past century 'and would lead to temperatures cooler than the pre-industrial
Little Ice Age'.
Carl

in 1993:

Nuclear war causes extinction destroys the environment

Wickersham 10 - University of Missouri adjunct professor of Peace Studies and a member of The
Missouri University Nuclear Disarmament Education Team, author book about nuclear disarmament education (Bill,
4/11/10, Threat of nuclear winter remains New START treaty is step in right direction.
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2010/apr/11/threat-of-nuclear-winter-remains/)

In addressing the environmental consequences of nuclear war , Columbian Steve Starr

has written a summary of studies published by the Bulletin of the International
Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, which concludes: U.S.

researchers have confirmed the scientific validity of the concept of

nuclear winter and have demonstrated that any conflict which targets even a
tiny fraction of the global arsenal will cause catastrophic disruptions of the global
climate. In another statement on his Web site, Starr says: If 1% of the nuclear weapons now
ready for war were detonated in large cities, they would utterly devastate the
environment, climate, ecosystems and inhabitants of Earth. A war fought with
thousands of strategic nuclear weapons would leave the Earth uninhabitable.

Turns Warming Nuclear Power

Nonproliferation is key to successful nuclear energy programs.
Yim & Li 13 (Man-Sung Yim, Department of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering,
Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Jun Li, UNC Chapel Hill,
Examining relationship between nuclear proliferation and civilian nuclear power
development, Progress in Nuclear Energy, Vol. 66, p. 108-114, July 2013,
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0149197013000504)
for a civilian nuclear power program to be ultimately successful, the
study finds the role of nuclear nonproliferation very important. The analysis
indicated that serious interest in nuclear weapons with accompanying national
programs may have a negative effect on a civilian nuclear power program. Thus, a
country with major efforts to develop nuclear weapons is likely to fail in
their pursuit of civilian nuclear power development. The presence of nuclear
weapons in a country was also found to have a negative impact on a civilian nuclear
power program. The study showed the importance of state level commitment to
nuclear nonproliferation for the success of civilian nuclear power development. NPT
ratification and IAEA safeguards were very important factors in the success of
civilian nuclear power development. This observation thus does not support the argument made by
However,

Fuhrmann (2009) that all types of civilian nuclear assistance raise the risks of nuclear proliferation and that
peaceful nuclear cooperation and proliferation are causally connected. A subsequent finding by Fuhrmann (2012) is

the evidence does not support the

argument that countries pursue civilian nuclear power to augment nuclear
weapons programs.
in line with the results of this study by stating that

Nuclear power key to solve warming no other tech is

sufficient
Miller 16 (William, professor emeritus of nuclear engineering at the University of
Missouri, 1/19, Nuclear power is key to climate change effort,
http://www.columbiatribune.com/opinion/oped/nuclear-power-is-key-to-climatechange-effort/article_77282378-0be5-5744-bde3-f92e4a75520f.html, NKF)
Whats the best way to combat climate change? James Hansen one of Americas
leading atmospheric scientists, who, in the late 1980s, was the first to tell Congress about the danger of
global warming says it is nuclear power. Because it accounts for more than 60 percent
of Americas carbon-free electricity and is available around the clock, nuclear power
is an obvious answer one we have known for some time now. But its nice to hear it come from a highly
regarded climatologist like Hansen. With five new nuclear plants under construction in the United
States and a new generation of small modular reactors on the horizon, nuclear
power is positioned to play a central role in the effort to achieve a lowcarbon energy future despite a small but vocal opposition. During the Paris climate talks late last year,
Hansen, longtime head of NASAs Goddard Institute for Space Studies, joined with three other prominent
climatologists to say that nuclear

power paves the only viable path forward on

climate change. In a joint statement, Hansen and the other climatologists said the
voluntary measures in the Paris accord on climate change are a welcome step but far from
sufficient: The climate issue is too important for us to delude ourselves with wishful
thinking. Throwing tools such as nuclear power out of the box constrains humanitys

options and makes climate mitigation more likely to fail. In fact, the climatologists said,
Nuclear will make the difference between the world missing crucial
climate targets or achieving them. In a previous separate study, Hansen, who
has solid environmental credentials, estimated that nuclear power has saved 1.84
million lives worldwide by reducing air pollution from the burning of fossil fuels and will save many more
lives in the years ahead. Despite this record, few policies have been put in place to spur an expansion of nuclear
power in the United States. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering the idea of approving a second

Congress recently
increased funding for the development of small modular reactors that could be built
for much less than the cost of a large power plant. But nothing yet has been done at the federal level to
license renewal for nuclear plants deemed capable of operating for 80 years. And

correct for abnormalities in the electricity market that are leading to the premature retirement of some existing
nuclear plants. Market reform is needed to ensure that the environmental and economic benefits of nuclear power
are not taken for granted and that existing plants are compensated for their zero-carbon electricity and grid
reliability in the same way that solar and wind power receive support. This is not to suggest that we should lessen

we cant achieve our clean-energy goals

by relying heavily on solar and wind because they are intermittent energy
sources that require backup power from fossil fuels on days when the
weather isnt cooperating. Despite federal tax credits and state mandates for
solar and wind power, they supply only 6 percent of the nations electricity . Simply put,
solar and wind power are starting out from a very small base and wont be able to
get us even halfway to where we need to be by 2030. Now, after decades, we have a broad
our commitment to renewable energy sources. But

and widely accepted framework to address climate change. Hansen and other accomplished scientists who have

nuclear power is
the best approach to reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Nuclear power
is not the problem. In fact, its a key part of the answer to climate change.
spent their careers trying to solve the worlds biggest environmental problem say that

--- Nuclear Power Key

Nuclear power solves warming its the only sufficient
technology
Hinkle 16 (Barton, Senior editorial writer and a columnist at the Richmond TimesDispatch, 1/11, Saving the Planet Requires Nuclear Power,
http://reason.com/archives/2016/01/11/saving-the-planet-requires-nuclear-power,
NKF)
But climate-change activists fall prey to this confirmation bias, too. And a lot of them seem to be suffering from it

If you truly believe global warming is the greatest threat

facing human civilization, then you ought to consider nuclear power a godsend.
Restricting carbon-dioxide emissions to levels that can keep global warming within two
degrees Celsius is immensely easier with nuclear power, and perhaps
impossible without it. Some climate activists are quick to say so. The Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change's Fifth Assessment Report noted that global-warming mitigation scenarios
anticipate at least a doubling, and perhaps a tripling, of nuclear power by 2050. The
"stabilization of (greenhouse-gas concentrations) at a level consistent with (earlier agreements)
requires a fundamental transformation of the energy supply system, " the IPCC says. It
cites research suggesting the need for "the construction of 29 to 107 new nuclear plants
per year," depending on targets. The upper figure is "historically unprecedented." During the Paris climate talks
with regard to nuclear power.

last month, James Hansenone of the godfathers of the climate-change movementjoined with three other
prominent climate scientists to issue a statement explaining why "nuclear power paves the only viable path forward
on climate change." The "voluntary measures put on the table at Paris" are a "welcome step," they wrote, but far
from sufficient. "The

climate issue is too important for us to delude ourselves with

wishful thinking. Throwing tools such as nuclear out of the box constrains
humanity's options and makes climate mitigation more likely to fail. " In fact,
they conclude, "nuclear will make the difference between the world missing
crucial climate targets or achieving them." This provokes a fair amount of pushback. One
piece in The Guardian went so far as to term such views "a new, strange form of denial." The author of that piece,
Naomi Oreskes, is a history professor at Harvard. (Apparently history profs now know more about the subject than
the IPCC, too.) Oreskes never even attempts to refute the conclusion about the need for more nuclear power. She

Many environmentalists consider nuclear power

yucky. So they will argue that the world can ratchet
back greenhouse-gas emissions without any nuclear power at all. There are entire campaigns
simply disparages it. It's easy to understand why.
pardon the technical jargonreally

built around selling the idea. You can visit their websites, which claim we can power the world with nothing but
renewable-energy sources such as wind, water, and solar. And on that point they are correctin the same sense
that it is correct to say you can run a mile in under four minutes. All you have to do is run four quarter-miles in
under 60 seconds each, without stopping. Mission accomplished! And just as nothing in the laws of biology prevents
you from running a four-minute mile, nothing in the laws of physics prevents powering the planet with renewables
alone. In the real world, there is a little more to it than that. Acreage, for instance. Consider Dominion

Virginia

Power's new gas-fired generation plant in Warren County, which can generate 1,329
megawatts of electricityon a slab of land measuring only 39 acres. To generate
that much electricity from sunlight, you would need 36,000 acres of solar panels .
That's 56 square miles. For comparison's sake, the entire city of Richmond is 60 square miles . Dominion's
North Anna nuclear-power station can produce up to 1,892 megawatts. To get that
much energy from sunlight would require 65,000 acres of solar panels , or 101 square
miles. That's slightly bigger than the area of Charleston, South Carolina or Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Dominion can
generate slightly more than 24,000 megawatts of power all together. To get that from solar power alone would
require more than 1,000 square miles of solar panels. That's the equivalent of putting the District of Columbia (68.3
square miles) inside the commonwealth15 times over. And while Dominion is Virginia's biggest electricity supplier,

it is not the only one. Granted, rooftop solar arrays and other forms of distributed generation would chip away at
the need for dedicated real estate somewhat, but they can't offer the economies of scale that industrial-scale solar
plants can, and that would be necessary under any realistic transition scenario. And the issues with solar power

solar facilities can provide reliable energy only about 25 percent

of the time, because the sun isn't shining strongly enough the rest of the time. For all
practical purposes, this means that every megawatt of solar energy needs a megawatt of
backup power from some other source, such as a natural gas-fired plant that can be
switched on quickly when the clouds roll in. A quantum leap in battery technology might change that, of
don't end there. In Virginia,

course. (Fingers crossed!) But hoping technological revolution will magically make a problem go away is not a sober
strategy for dealing with climate change.

A robust pivot to nuclear power is key to resolving climate

change but proliferation blocks it
WNN 15 (World Nuclear News, Nuclear power can address two 'existential
threats', says former US official, 9/16, citing Dan Poneman was the United States
Deputy Secretary of Energy from 2009 to 2014 and is currently a Distinguished
Fellow at the Paulson Institute at the University of Chicago, NKF)
The nuclear power industry has a unique role to play in tackling two "existential
threats" facing all humanity - climate change and nuclear war, Daniel Poneman , president and
CEO of Centrus Energy Corp told delegates at the World Nuclear Association's Annual Symposium in London
last week. From 2009 to 2014, Poneman was US deputy secretary of energy and also served as the COO of the US
Department of Energy. History will record 2015 as a pivotal year for both of those existential
threats, Poneman said. "First, when it comes to the most pressing global proliferation threat - the possibility of Iran
acquiring nuclear weapons - the P5+1 and Iran have concluded a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which will

three months
from now, negotiators from 190 nations will meet in Paris for historic climate talks
aimed at finding a way to limit global warming to 2C this century - an ambitious target
that many scientists say is necessary to avert the worst consequences of the change in climate," he said. The
International Energy Agency (IEA) "has urged with growing insistence" , he said, "that the
window available to take action to deal with this threat effectively is closing rapidly ".
constrain Iran's nuclear program and subject it to enhanced international monitoring. Second,

Reading a quote by German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche - "The most common form of human stupidity is
forgetting what we were trying to do in the first place" Poneman said, " If

our goal is to address

climate change and to reduce the threat of proliferation, then we must
have a strong and focused nuclear power policy that supports both things". This
means that laws, regulations and public policies "should not pit one carbon-free
energy source against the other", he said. Citing World Nuclear Association data, Poneman said there
are at least 60 reactors under construction and at least 500 more that are planned or
proposed around the world. At the same time, however, the industry is constrained by
competition for alternatives and issues regarding cost, safety, environmental factors
and non-proliferation, he said. Poneman praised World Nuclear Association director general Agneta
Rising for her speech at the Symposium, during which she said the industry should aim to add 1000 GWe of new
nuclear power by 2050. He said: "Interestingly, the IEA view is largely consistent with that, telling us that we need
930 GWe of new nuclear by 2050 if we are to do our part in meeting the 2 Degree Scenario." He was referring to

the transformation to
clean-energy is progressing at levels well short of those needed to limit the global
increase in temperature to no more than 2C. Using Centrus Energy as an example, Poneman said
that a "robust nuclear growth scenario" will require many things, including reliable
fuel supply and strong competition with multiple suppliers . Centrus Energy was formerly
Paris-based IEA's report Energy Technology Perspectives 2015, which argues that

known as United States Enrichment Corp. "While we view ourselves as an important partner in supporting the US

we are also keenly focused on providing our LEU customers with

reliable, on-time deliveries on commercially attractive terms. While current uranium
prices will not support investment in global new capacity today, we are also keenly
focused on ensuring that our own suppliers can count on us to be reliable counterparties," he
national security mission,

said. "Today's market has too much supply but not too many suppliers. We are optimistic about the long term that,
eventually, the market will support investment in new enrichment capacity. To be able to commit to that 2 Degree
Scenario, well need to more than double our enrichment capacity by 2050."

Nuclear power is key clean, effective, and a baseload energy

source
FOE 15 (Forum on Energy, leading reporters on development in nuclear energy,
citing United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 11/25, Nuclear
Energy and COP21, http://forumonenergy.com/2015/11/25/nuclear-energy-andcop21/, NKF)
The lifespan of a nuclear power plant is, on average, between 30 to
40 years. During that lifetime, electricity generation produces virtually zero carbon
emissions. In fact, in 2014, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change found the emissions of nuclear to be comparable to wind, solar, geothermal
and hydroelectric generation, traditionally recognized as the clean power sources. On top of its
ability to emit zero greenhouse gases, nuclear power plants are several times more
efficient than their renewables counterparts . For example, in one year, just one 1154Megawatt nuclear power plant generates the same amount of clean electricity as
2,077 2-Megawatt wind generators. Even more significant, nuclear power serves as a
baseload source of power generation, operating regardless of weather conditions ,
and fully dispatchable to match demand. This stands in stark contrast to the variable nature of
wind and solar power, which- until significant progress is made in battery storage capacity- are unable to
serve as the baseload backbone of an electricity grid. In short, when executed properly, with
abundant safety mechanisms, nuclear energy can turn the tide in the effort to
address climate change. Indeed, France exemplifies the results nuclear power can achieve. In the
1970s and 1980s, France embraced nuclear energy and as a result, lowered its greenhouse gas emissions by
roughly 2 percent per year. To this day, it operates a fully stable grid 76% reliant on nuclear
power, even serving as a net exporter to the rest of the EU. The Solution for Climate Change
The Potential of Nuclear Power

and Global Energy Equity On November 6, the White House hosted a Summit on Nuclear Energy. President and CEO
of the Nuclear Energy Institute, Marvin Fertel, expressed that, This

event reflects recognition of the

indispensable- and larger- role that nuclear energy must play in any
successful effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from the electric sector, also
marking the fortuitous timing as the Administration embarks upon the next round of emissions reduction

World leaders gathering at COP21

must recognize the imminent threat of climate change and use every tool at their
disposal- especially nuclear energy- to change course, while facilitating global
energy access parity. Thorough integration of and continued innovation in nuclear
energy is the only way we can achieve both.
negotiations during the international climate change talks in Paris

Only nuclear energy solves the 6 degree threshold no other

energy source comes close and the transition alone saves
millions
Biello 13 (David, award-winning senior reporter for environment and energy at
Scientific America, 12/12, How Nuclear Power Can Stop Global Warming Nuclear
power is one of the few technologies that can quickly combat climate change,
experts argue, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-nuclear-power-canstop-global-warming/, NKF)
When the Atlantic Navigator docked in Baltimore harbor earlier this month, the freighter carried the last remnants of
some of the nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union had brandished in the cold war. During the past 20 years more
than 19,000 Russian warheads have been dismantled and processed to make fuel for U.S. nuclear reactors. In fact,
during that period more than half the uranium fuel that powered the more than 100 reactors in the U.S. came from
such reprocessed nuclear weapons. In addition to reducing the risk of nuclear war, U. S.

reactors have also

been staving off another global challenge: climate change. The low-carbon electricity
produced by such reactors provides 20 percent of the nation's power and, by the
estimates of climate scientist James Hansen of Columbia University, avoided 64 billion metric tons of
greenhouse gas pollution. They also avoided spewing soot and other air pollution like coal-fired
power plants do and thus have saved some 1.8 million lives . And that's why Hansen, among others,
such as former Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, thinks that nuclear power is a key energy
technology to fend off catastrophic climate change. "We can't burn all these
fossil fuels," Hansen told a group of reporters on December 3, noting that as long as fossil fuels are the
cheapest energy source they will continue to be burned . "Coal is almost half the [global]
emissions. If you replace these power plants with modern, safe nuclear reactors you could do a lot
of [pollution reduction] quickly ." Indeed, he has evidence: the speediest drop in
greenhouse gas pollution on record occurred in France in the 1970s and 80s, when
that country transitioned from burning fossil fuels to nuclear fission for electricity,
lowering its greenhouse emissions by roughly 2 percent per year. The world needs
to drop its global warming pollution by 6 percent annually to avoid "dangerous"
climate change in the estimation of Hansen and his co-authors in a recent paper in PLoS One. " On a global
scale, it's hard to see how we could conceivably accomplish this without
nuclear," added economist and co-author Jeffrey Sachs, director of the Earth Institute at Columbia
University, where Hansen works.

Nuclear power is necessary

NEI 16 (Nuclear Energy Institute, leading researchers and crafters of nuclear
energy policy, January, New Nuclear Energy Facilities Will Support Growth, Provide
Clean Electricity, http://www.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/FactSheets/New-Nuclear-Energy-Facilities-Will-Support-Growth)
Why Nuclear Energy? Clean Air Energy Clean-air energy sources nuclear

energy facilities, hydroelectric

power and renewableshelp minimize the production of greenhouse gases and pollutants
because they generate electricity that otherwise would have to come from burning
fossil fuels. Without nuclear energy facilities, levels of harmful emissions released
into the atmosphere would increase significantlyparticularly those that contribute to acid rain (sulfur
dioxide) and urban smog (nitrogen oxide). Nuclear energy facilities do not produce any greenhouse gases
generating electricity and have among the lowest total life-cycle carbon emissions. Independent studies show that

nuclear energys life-cycle emissions of carbon dioxide are about the same as wind
and geothermal power and significantly less than other electricity sources. This measurement

takes into account the facilitys construction, the mining and processing of fuel, routine
operation, disposal of used fuel and the ultimate dismantling of the facility. Nuclear
energy is a leading carbon-reduction tool. Without nuclear power plants in 30 states, carbon dioxide
emissions from the U.S. electric sector would be approximately 25 percent higher. Appropriately, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agencys Clean Power Plan places a premium on nuclear
energy to meet 2030 goals. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to meet
the goal of reducing carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 without existing
and new plants. That is why nuclear energy is counted toward compliance with the rule in three ways:
plants currently under construction, uprates to include the power output of existing nuclear plants and new nuclear
plants in the future.

--- AT: No Investment

Investment is happening now
NEI 16 (Nuclear Energy Institute, leading researchers and crafters of nuclear
energy policy, January, New Nuclear Energy Facilities Will Support Growth, Provide
Clean Electricity, http://www.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/FactSheets/New-Nuclear-Energy-Facilities-Will-Support-Growth)
Key Facts Nuclear energy plays a vital role in meeting our nations electricity needs ,
protecting the environment, and preserving the fuel and technology diversity that is the strength of the U.S.

Ninety-nine reactors in 30 states operate around the clock,

producing almost 20 percent of U.S. electricity while emitting no carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide or
electricity supply system.

nitrogen oxide (a precursor to ground-level ozone). Nuclear energy generates more electricity than any other source
in Connecticut, Illinois, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina and Virginia. Nationwide ,

nuclear plants
generated an estimated 797 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity in 2014. The United States
generates most of its electricity by burning fossil fuels, which produce carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and nitrogen
oxide.

Emission-free sources provide 30 percent of Americas electricity, and nearly

two-thirds of that comes from nuclear energy facilities. U.S. electricity demand will rise 22 percent by
2040, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administrations Annual Energy Outlook 2015. The United
States will need hundreds of new power plants of all types to meet increased
demand and replace older facilities that are retired. Nuclear energy is the only large-scale,
emission-free electricity source that can be widely expanded. Nuclear energy
facilities strengthen state and local economies through jobs, taxes, and direct and
secondary spending. Building new reactors and exporting commercial nuclear technologies creates
additional jobs throughout the U.S. economy. New Nuclear Facilities Under Construction Five reactors are under

Tennessee Valley Authority

has completed construction of Watts Bar 2 and plans to have the reactor operating
in early 2016. In early 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission granted
construction and operating licenses for two Westinghouse AP1000 reactors to be built at
construction in the United States and many more are in the planning stages.

Southern Co.s Vogtle Electric Generating Plant in Georgia and for two more to be built at South Carolina Electric &

Major construction is under way at both sites.

Vogtle 3 and 4 and Summer 2 and 3 are scheduled to be on-line in 2019 and 2020. In
Gas Co.s Summer Nuclear Generating Station.

2015, the NRC granted a combined construction and operating license to DTE Electric Co. for a GE Hitachi Nuclear
Energy Economic Simplified Boiling Water Reactor (ESBWR) at the companys Fermi nuclear plant site. While the
company currently has no plans to build a reactor, this license gives DTE the option to build an ESBWR when new
generating capacity is needed. In addition, six applications for construction and operating licenses ( 10

and one application for an early site permit are under

NRC

reactors)

review. Construction of those

projects is not expected to start before 2020.

Investment is surging uranium deposits and energy prices

spike corporate interest
Els 15 (Frik, Financial journalist for 15 years appearing in a number of business and
consumer publications including Business Insider, Investment.com, Driving.ca, and
Business in Vancouver, 9/11, Nuclear power to grow fastest in more than 20
years, http://www.mining.com/nuclear-power-to-grow-fastest-in-more-than-20years/,)
A new report by the World Nuclear Association estimates global nuclear power
generation capacity should grow by more than 45% over the next 20 years
and a new pipeline of uranium mines will be needed after 2025. The 40-year old association's bi-

annual 2015 Nuclear Fuel report released on Thursday forecasts global nuclear capacity will
grow to 552 gigawatts equivalent (GWe) by 2035 from 379 GWe or roughly 11% of world electricity
supply at the moment. The report states that until the Fukushima accident in Japan, the outlook for nuclear power

despite the March 2011 disaster, "many countries are

putting more emphasis on satisfying environmental and security of supply
objectives in their energy strategies, which should favour increased nuclear power."
around the world was improving, but

The prospects for new reactor build continue to be strong in China, India and Korea as well as in a number of
countries in the EU and the Middle East, but electricity demand growth in countries where nuclear power is wellestablished continues to be slow. "Nuclear

electricity output is set to increase at a faster rate

over the next five years than we have seen for more than two decades ," said Agneta
Rising, director general of the association which started life in 1975 as the Uranium Institute. To feed the rise in

capacity, the world will likely need 103,000 tonnes of elemental uranium or tU
(equal to roughly 267m pounds of U3O8) by 2035, up from 56,250 tU (146m pounds U3O8) in 2014, according to
the report. Secondary supplies of uranium are gradually playing a diminishing role in
the world market according to the report, but will continue to be an important source of
supply as underfeeding of enrichment plants is expected to add significant
quantities of uranium to the market in the period to 2025. World known resources of uranium
are more than adequate to satisfy reactor requirements to well beyond 2035, but
depressed uranium prices have curtailed exploration activities and the opening of new mines
global

and some mines have stopped production. The report concludes that rapid uranium demand growth in a number of
countries, particularly China, coupled with a limited contribution of secondary supplies will result in the need for
additional mined uranium. Nevertheless, the market should still be adequately supplied to 2025 according to the
report but only if all planned mines and those under development start up as forecast. After 2025 however a new
supply pipeline will have to be developed to meet demand.

--- AT: Expensive

Nuclear power is substantially cheaper than coal or gas
factories are cash cows
WNA 16 (World Nuclear Association, international organization that promotes
nuclear power and supports the companies that comprise the global nuclear
industry, 3/16, The Economics of Nuclear Power, http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/economic-aspects/economics-of-nuclear-power.aspx,)
Overnight capital costs for nuclear technologies in OECD countries ranged from $2021 per
kWe of capacity (in South Korea) to $6125 per kWe (in Hungary) in the 2015 report. Rosatom claimed in
November 2015 that due to its integrated structure, the LCOE of new VVER reactors exported is no
more than $50-$60 per MWh in most countries. The 2010 edition of the report had noted a
significant increase in costs of building base-load plants over the previous five years. The 2015 report shows that
this increase has stopped, and that this is particularly significant for nuclear technologies, " undermining

the
growing narrative that nuclear costs continue to increase globally." The 2010 edition
of Projected Costs of Generating Electricity set out some actual costs of electricity
generation, showing nuclear as very competitive at 5% discount rate, especially if CCS
was added to fossil fuel sources, but much less so at 10% (details in section below on Major
studies on future cost competitiveness).It is important to distinguish between the economics of nuclear plants

Once capital investment costs are effectively

sunk, existing plants operate at very low costs and are effectively cash
machines. Their operations and maintenance (O&M) and fuel costs (including used fuel
management) are, along with hydropower plants, at the low end of the spectrum and make them
very suitable as base-load power suppliers. This is irrespective of whether the
investment costs are amortized or depreciated in corporate financial accounts
assuming the forward or marginal costs of operation are below the power price, the plant will operate. US figures
for 2012 published by NEI show the general picture, with nuclear generating power at 2.40
c/kWh, compared with coal at 3.27 cents and gas at 3.40 cents
already in operation and those at the planning stage.

The benefits outweigh the pivot to nuclear is an economic

miracle
NEI 16 (Nuclear Energy Institute, leading researchers and crafters of nuclear energy
policy, January, New Nuclear Energy Facilities Will Support Growth, Provide Clean
Electricity, http://www.nei.org/Master-Document-Folder/Backgrounders/FactSheets/New-Nuclear-Energy-Facilities-Will-Support-Growth)
A diverse mix of energy sources enables
America to balance the cost of electricity production , availability and environmental impacts.
Below is a breakdown of the main sources: Nuclear energy facilities provide 19.5 percent of the
nations electricity. They do not produce carbon dioxide or air pollutants, and their fuel costs are stable.
Coal-fired facilities provide 38.7 percent of Americas electricity. Coal is abundant and relatively
Diversity of Electricity Supply Balances Costs and Benefits

cheap, but burning it contributes to air pollution. New technologies are making coal-fired generating facilities
cleaner, but these innovations also add to the cost. Natural gas facilities account for most of the new generating

Natural gas provides 27.4 percent of our

electricity. While the carbon emissions are lower than with coal, the cost of fuel is
higher and more volatile. Wind provides 4.4 percent of Americas electricity, but it is intermittent and expensive.
Wind facilities complement other sources of electricity, but they cannot provide the
capacity brought on line in the past 15 years.

massive amounts of power needed around the clock. Solar energy contributes 0.4 percent of
Americas electricity. Like wind power, it can augment other electricity sources, but solar-generated power remains

On average, a nuclear energy facility

generates $470 million in sales of goods and services in the local community and nearly
$40 million in total labor income annually. Each year, it pays about $67 million in federal
taxes and almost $16 million in state and local taxescrucial revenue that benefits schools, improves roads, and
pays for other infrastructure and programs. Construction of a nuclear energy facility gives a
substantial boost to suppliers of concrete, steel and other commodities needed to
manufacture hundreds of components. The nuclear energy industry provides
100,000 high-paying jobs in occupations ranging from electricians and machinists to electrical and nuclear
engineers, reactor operators, and more. Due to ongoing expansion, the industry is hiring thousands of
well-paid workers to build new reactors in the U.S. and up to 700 permanent staff to
operate each site long-term. And because of expected retirements, the industry plans to hire as many as
intermittent and expensive. Economic Growth and Job Creation

20,000 highly skilled workers over the next few years to operate and maintain existing reactors. Exporting

67 reactors are under

construction and 166 reactors are on order or planned. The demand for high-quality
commodities, components and services provides an export opportunity for U.S.
manufacturers. The industry has added 15,000 American jobs through the export of
nuclear energy technologies in the past few years.
commercial nuclear technology means more jobs for Americans. Worldwide,

--- AT: Uranium Shortages

Uranium is abundant post-Fukushima hoarding has flooded
the market and we have enough for centuries
Conca 16 (James, geochemist, an RDD expert, a planetary geologist and
professional speaker, , As The World Warms To Nuclear Power, The Outlook For
Uranium Is Up, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/01/04/the-2016uranium-market-reflecting-the-worldview-on-nuclear-power/#4a849d53c6e5)
In the wake of the COP21 climate meeting in Paris, which subtly endorsed nuclear power, and the
aggressive move by China to build a nuclear plant a month, the supplies of uranium
are once again in the spotlight. The price of uranium for fuel in nuclear reactors has had a complicated
history over the last forty years (see figure below). After the 2011 Tohoku tsunami and Fukushima reactor accidents,
uranium prices dropped about 60%, bottoming out near $30/lb in mid-2014. By late 2013, all of Japans nuclear
facilities were completely shut down. Other countries also closed nuclear power plants, including Germany and

reliance on brown coal, and large-scale wind and solar systems,

have neither met the climate needs of Germany, nor provided reasonable and
stable electricity costs in Japan. But uranium prices are recovering and the outlook for the
Switzerland. However,

uranium market has brightened for several reasons: - Japan restarted nuclear reactors at the Sendai power plant a
few months ago, and about 40 of Japans 54 nuclear plants will likely be restarted. - Chinas current and planned
construction of nuclear power plants is a good indicator of future uranium demand. Mainland China has 26 nuclear
power reactors in operation and 25 under construction, according to the World Nuclear Association, with almost 100
more planned by 2030.- India is also in the midst of a major expansion of nuclear-power generation. The countrys
installed capacity is now at 5.7 GW, but that is set to grow to 10 GW in just the next four years, which puts pressure
on global uranium demand. - In the United States, about 90% of our existing reactors will soon be relicensed for
another 20 years, many for another 40 years, keeping the United States the biggest producer of nuclear power for

idling Japans reactors for a

few years caused Japanese utilities to accumulate about 120 million pounds of
uranium since they still had to honor their existing supply contracts. This is enough
to fuel its restarting fleet for the next decade. In fact, according to Jim Ostroff, senior editor of
Platts Nuclear Publications, Japan is swimming some would say drowning in uranium. And this
is probably why uranium prices have stayed under $40 a pound. But while other energy
at least ten more years until China completes their 100 new units. However,

commodity prices, particularly oil, have drastically fallen lately, uranium prices have stabilized. Uranium spot prices
are usually driven by production (which is guided by demand) or by inventory (especially excess amounts of
uranium from weapons stockpiles that can be blended down for fuel). As shown in the above figure, for the 20 years
following 1980, abundant stockpiles of weapons-grade uranium in the Soviet Union and the United States were
blended down for reactor fuel as part of treaties aimed at reducing the number of nuclear weapons. This kept
uranium prices, and uranium mining production, low. When those stockpiles were mostly used up, prices became
more volatile. The Fukushima disaster dropped prices again by significantly reducing demand since Japan was the

the price
of uranium has little effect on the price of nuclear power since the fuel is such a
small part of the total cost and the cost of fuel itself is dominated by the fabrication costs, not the cost of
uranium. Decisions to build nuclear power plants do not hinge on uranium supplies.
And there are sufficient uranium deposits in the world to provide nuclear energy at
any level for many thousands of years. Eighty-nine percent of the fuel requirements
of the current fleet of nuclear reactors worldwide , totaling some 377 million pounds U3O8
(yellowcake), will be met in 2016 by Canada, Australia, and Kazakhstan, with only
smaller supplies from other sources. In contrast, the U.S. will consume more uranium than anyone else in the
third-largest producer of nuclear energy at that time, behind the United States and France. However,

world, about 50 million pounds of U3O8 in 2016. Yet, we produce less than 5 million pounds domestically. As
uranium prices rise, however, more in-situ uranium mines in the U.S. should come on-line. Thirteen states contain
known deposits and new discoveries, with Virginia most notable because of a large, recently discovered deposit in
that state. Although China produces only 4 million pounds of U3O8 annually, the country consumes 19 million
pounds per year. Chinas planned increase in nuclear energy will raise that amount to over 70 million pounds by

uranium commodity prices most likely will rise,

driving stock prices up, driving new exploration and processing plant construction,
and causing new rounds of mergers and acquisitions of uranium properties and their companies. This
2030. Looking at the uranium picture in total,

was foreshadowed last April during the first India-Canada head-of-state visit in 42 years. In Ottowa, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi of India signed a five-year deal to buy 3,000,000 lbs of U3O8 for his countrys reactors, an
agreement worth almost $300 million, or about $40/lb U3O8. Oddly enough, this was also the first nuclear contract
between these two nations. So an increase in global nuclear power, led by China, should stabilize uranium prices at
somewhere between $40 and $60 per pound in the coming decade. Just in time for a new expansion of nuclear
energy and its role in addressing global warming. For more information on this subject see the I2M Web Portal which
monitors the global activities of the uranium, thorium, and rare earth exploration and mining industry. The Portal
contains about 5,000 entries drawn from reports, media articles and other sources available on the Internet for use
by geoscientists and the general public, and for use during assessment of activities for the independent AAPG
Energy Minerals Divisions Uranium Committee on Nuclear and Rare Earth Minerals for the committees Annual and
Mid-Year reports to the EMD (full disclosure I am a member of that committee).

Kazakh developments change the game sustainable mining

will fuel the planet for centuries
WNA 16 (World Nuclear Association, international organization that promotes
nuclear power and supports the companies that comprise the global nuclear
industry, May, Uranium and Nuclear Power in Kazakhstan, http://www.worldnuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/kazakhstan.aspx)
Over 2001 to 2013
production rose from 2022 to about 22,550 tonnes U per year, making Kazakhstan
the world's leading uranium producer. Mine development has continued with a view
to further increasing annual production by 2018 , 23,400 tU being the target for 2015. Capacity is
Kazakhstan has been an important source of uranium for more than 50 years.

around 25,000 tU/yr, but in October 2011 Kazatoprom announced a cap on production of 20,000 tU/yr, which was
evidently disregarded. Of its 17 mine projects, five are wholly owned by Kazatomprom and 12 are joint ventures
with foreign equity holders, and some of these are producing under nominal capacity. In 2013, 9402 tU was
attributable to Kazatomprom itself 16% of world production, putting it slightly ahead of Cameco, Areva and ARMZUranium One. Kazakhstan has northern and southern electricity grids with some connection, and links to Russia and
Kyrgystan and Uzbekistan respectively. Electricity production was 91 TWh in 2015, 74 TWh (81%) from coal and gas
thermal, 7 TWh from gas turbine, 9 TWh from hydro and 0.2 TWh from wind, according to KEGOC (Kazakhstan
Electricity Grid Operating Company). Net imports from Russia was 471 GWh, net exports to Kyrgystan was 421
GWh. In 2015 capacity was 21 GWe with 17.5 GWe available, but maximum output was 12.5 GWe. In 2012 the
government's energy system development plan had 150 TWh/yr production in 2030, with 4.5% of this from nuclear

The government planned investment in electricity production

and grid of $7.8 billion by 2015, and foresees $64 billion by 2030. Future electricity demand
and 10% from renewables.

will depend to some extent on the countrys role from 2019 in the Eurasian Economic Community energy market.
Also the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) is planning transmission links from China. The state-owned
Kazakhstan Electricity Grid Operating Company (KEGOC) was set up in 1997. Kazatomprom is the national

controls all uranium exploration and

mining as well as other nuclear-related activities, including imports and exports of
nuclear materials. It announced in 2008 that it aims to supply 30% of the world uranium by
2015 (it produced 16% by 2013), and through joint ventures: 12% of uranium conversion
market, 6% of enrichment, and 30% of the fuel fabrication market by then.Prior to
atomic company set up in 1997 and owned by the government. It

Kazatomproms establishment, other arrangements pertained for uranium development. One of these was with
Canada-based World-Wide Minerals Ltd (WWM), under a 1989 bilateral investment treaty between Canada and the
USSR.** WWM invested heavily in the country over 1996-97, upgrading and operating the Tselinny (TGK) uranium
mining and processing facilities at Stepnogorsk, with an option to acquire 90% equity in them as well as developing
additional mines. WWM and subsidiaries entered into agreements with the Kazakh government, but claims that the
government frustrated its endeavours, leading to a loss of more than $50 million and its exit from the country. In
January 2016 an international arbitral tribunal upheld WWMs claims under investor-state arbitration and dismissed

Kazatomprom has
forged major strategic links with Russia, Japan and China, as well as taking a
Kazakh objections. WWM is seeking $5 billion settlement. International collaboration

significant share in the international nuclear company Westinghouse. Canadian and

French companies are involved with uranium mining and other aspects of the fuel
cycle.

--- AT: No Tech

Sufficient nuclear tech exists now only barrier is political
Conca 15 (James, geochemist, an RDD expert, a planetary geologist and
professional speaker, 12/15, Paris COP21 And The Urgent Need For More Nuclear
Energy, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2015/12/15/paris-cop21-and-theurgent-need-for-more-nuclear-energy/#1712cb214952)
Nuclear power is already a mature technology. The barriers to a more rapid
deployment are political and social, not technical , nor safety, nor scientific. Nuclear energy
currently produces 11% of global electricity, the second -largest source of low-carbon
power after hydro (16%). Globally, nuclear avoids over 2 billion metric tons of CO2 from being
emitted into the atmosphere each year. Hydro is about the same. After a decade of intense promotion, tax
incentives and investment, wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass altogether are still only 2%, and together avoid

The International Energy

projects that, in order to meet any desired emissions goals, the share of
nuclear energy in global electricity production needs to rise from about 400 GW to
1,000 GW by 2050, producing about 9 trillion kWhs/year, at a construction cost of about $8 trillion. This also
only 0.1 billion metric tons of CO2 from being emitted into the atmosphere each year.
Agency (IEA)

assumes wind and solar reach about 2,000 GW each, producing a combined 10 trillion kWhs/year, over the same
time period, at a construction cost of about $20 trillion. So ex panding

nuclear at reasonable build

rates could provide almost half of our emissions reduction target necessary for
atmospheric CO2 to drop to a concentration of 350 ppm by around the end of this century. Nuclear power
was discussed in Paris as a major climate mitigation option, appearing as a significant component of the Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of major emitters including China, the United States and India. But

We know how to solve the

nuclear waste problem, we have new, even safer, even more efficient reactors, the
life-cycle carbon emissions are as low as wind, and the life-cycle costs for nuclear
are now as good as natural gas. Its just that the public doesnt know that, and the
media keep recycling old, wrong information . But many world leaders are afraid to discuss nuclear
nuclear was not discussed as often as it should have been in the main hall.

for fear of anti-nuclear activists. In Paris, American Nuclear Society President Gene Grecheck said that
policymakers need to not be afraid to say they support nuclear technology at conferences such as COP21

every serious look at the energy technologies required to mitigate climate

change has concluded that large amounts of nuclear energy must be part of the
mix. Grecheck and ANS Director of Communications Tari Marshall were in Paris, serving as ambassadors for
because

nuclear energy and as part of the Nuclear for Climate coalition, supporting the flow of information to UN delegates
on how nuclear is an critical option in reducing emissions and helping all nations meet their carbon-reduction goals.
During those discussions, it was pointed out that just last year reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, the International Energy Agency, the UN Sustainable Solutions Network and the Global Commission on the
Economy and Climate argued for a tripling of nuclear energy, requiring over a thousand new reactors to stabilize
carbon emissions. Even more persuasive ,

four of the worlds top climate scientists , Dr. James

issued a stark challenge about
nuclear energy to world leaders and environmental campaigners at a COP21 press
conference on December 3. The group presented new research showing the increasing urgency of fully
Hansen, Dr. Tom Wigley, Dr. Ken Caldeira and Dr. Kerry Emanuel,

decarbonizing the world economy, and they also showed that renewables alone cannot meet the goal of limiting

a major expansion of nuclear power is essential to

avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system in this century. The
global warming to 2C. They stressed that

four scientists outlined how only a combined strategy of employing all the major sustainable clean energy options,
including renewables and nuclear, and efficiency and conservation, can prevent the worst effects of climate change
by the end of this century effects like the loss of coral reefs, severe damages from extreme weather events, large-

In light
of the new urgency of reigning in global warming, the four scientists challenged
scale human migrations as eco-refugees, and the destruction of biodiversity and ecosystems worldwide.

environmental leaders who still hold anti-nuclear positions to wake up and support
development and deployment of safe and environmentally-friendly nuclear power.

--- AT: Accidents

Nuclear power is exceedingly safe regulations solve and
alternatives are worse
Follett 16 (Andrew, environmental reporter for Daily Caller, 1/16, 7 Ways The
Grand Solution Were All Looking For Could Actually Be In Nuclear Power,
http://dailycaller.com/2016/01/16/7-ways-the-grand-solution-were-all-looking-forcould-actually-be-in-nuclear-power/)
The Department of Energy announced
major new investment in advanced nuclear reactors. Friday shortly after the Democratic, New
Nuclear power had a great, and shockingly bipartisan, week.

York Gov. Andrew Cuomo announced his state would support existing nuclear reactors to help slow global warming.

Republicans rolled back state regulations against nuclear plants and

boosted Congressional support for cutting-edge nuclear research earlier this week, in the
face of intense opposition from environmentalists. Environmental groups have always heavily lobbied
Meanwhile,

against nuclear power, but it seems doubtful theyll be able to continue increasing the cost of nuclear plants and
creating artificial delays in construction. Organizations like The Sierra Club, still oppose nuclear energy as they
believe it leads to energy over-use and unnecessary economic growth, but new pro-nuclear environmental

Despite environmental opposition,

most scientists and engineers agree that nuclear power is actually great for the
environment. Among the environmentalist community, there has traditionally been a lack of recognition of
groups, like the Breakthrough Institute, are growing in statute.

nuclear energy plants contribution to reducing carbon emissions, Evan Bayh, a former Democratic Senator from
Indiana and current co-chair of Nuclear Matters, told The Daily Caller News Foundation. [T]he good news is that

were seeing growing recognition from all stakeholders

that if you want to ensure a cleaner energy future, nuclear must be a part of the
mix. Nuclear power has enormous environmental benefits, so here are the top 7
reasons nuclear power is actually really good for the planet. 1: Nuclear Is The Largest
Electricity Source That Doesnt Emit Carbon Dioxide Nuclear energy is good for the environment
because it is the largest source of electricity that doesnt emit greenhouse gases. In
this has taken a significant turn and

fact, nuclear accounts for 63 percent of the electricity from zero-carbon sources, Mitchell Singer of the Nuclear
Energy Institute told The Daily Caller News Foundation. A single nuclear reactor can prevent 3.1 million tons of

The Economist calls nuclear energy the most costeffective zero-emission technology. The Wall Street Journal agrees that [if] the world intends to
carbon-dioxide emissions annually.

address the threat of global warming and still satisfy its growing appetite for electricity, it needs an ambitious
expansion of nuclear power. 2: American Reactors Are Incredibly Safe There is also a common
misperception that nuclear is not safe, Evan Bayh, a former Democratic Senator from Indiana and current co-chair

nuclear plants are held to

exacting standards of safety they are operated by highly skilled and trained
workers and are designed with multiple layers of redundant back-up safety
systems. Nuclear power, even with the two high-profile nuclear accidents, is statistically the
safest way of generating electricity. Coal power in China kills 280,000 people for
every trillion kilowatt hours it produces. Rooftop solar kills 440 for the same amount of
electricity. Nuclear energy only kills 90, by this measure, including deaths from disasters.
Deaths from nuclear power, are very rare relative to deaths from industrial accidents, mining
accidents, or pollution. Even before the Chernobyl meltdown in the Soviet Union, US reactors
had already implemented safety procedures that would prevent a similar event from
happening here. Before the Fukushima disaster occurred, American reactors had already
implemented safety procedures that would prevent something similar from happening.
of Nuclear Matters, told The Daily Caller News Foundation. To the contrary, U.S.

The reactor at Fukushima could not be cooled without electrical power, but American reactors elevate a reservoir of

New nuclear reactor designs are

much safer and emit less radiation than the coal plants they replace .
water to cool the reactor without back-up power in an emergency.

--- AT: Hurts Environment

Graphite evaporation solves waste new technology makes
environmental risks negligible
Science Daily 16 (Leading publication on developments in science, technology,
and clean energy, 4/26, Radioactive waste disposal could be safer and cheaper,
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/04/160426101311.htm)
Scientists from Tomsk Polytechnic University and Rosatom have developed a technology to
reprocess irradiated reactor graphite by evaporation. This technology allows making
radioactive waste disposal safer and economically feasible . According to the polytechnicers
the technology itself is not new: previously radioactive waste has been processed in plasma. However,
this was low-level metal waste. The evaporation and stepwise deposition of reactor graphite
is the know-how of scientists of Tomsk Polytechnic University and Rosatom professionals. They have
already patented this development. The technology implies the heating of reactor graphite in a low-temperature
plasma to more than three thousand degrees Celsius (5,432 F). As a result, graphite and radionuclides contained

To
create such a reactor is a task for the scientists. "Carbon and radionuclides
evaporate together, they are separated one from another in steps in different parts
of plasma chemical reactor due to the difference in physicochemical properties. Thus,
radioactive nuclei are selectively extracted from graphite. Therefore, carbon black,
which is formed by plasma-chemical reactions within the plasma chamber, is getting less active," says
therein sublimate. Further there is a stepwise deposition of substances in a special plasma-chemical reactor.

Evgeniy Bespala, a PhD student at the Department of Technical Physics. Evgeniy Bespala has been addressing the
issue of nuclear graphite reprocessing for more than five years. Currently, he is an R & D engineer at JSC "Pilot and
Demonstration Center for Uranium-Graphite Reactors Decommissioning" (a Rosatom subsidiary, the city of Seversk,
Russia). Last year, the polytechnicer became one of the winners of the UMNIK program and received financial
support to perform his research. "Within the UMNIK grant I will deal with creating a facility that provides mass

This will allow automating the entire process

and protecting people from hazardous radioactive sources. It is planned, irradiated
nuclear graphite will be loading to the facility only and then carbon waste with less
activity compared to the original will be removed, " says the polytechnicer. Tomsk scientists and
graphite processing without human intervention.

Seversk colleagues already are testing their technology. The Department of technical physics at Tomsk Polytechnic
University conducts required experiments for graphite evaporation in low-temperature plasma. All radiation
research, in turn, is held in Seversk, as there is an opportunity to follow all the rules of radiation safety. For the

the technology has been tested on mixtures of carbon stable isotopes. Next
year, the scientists plan to test their facility on irradiated reactor graphite.
present,

Internal Links

2NC Will Prolif

Anti-prolif args are culturally outdated and ignore internal
politics Japan is shifting towards militarization, has the
capacity, and is bypassing legal restraints
Hunt 15 [Jonathan Hunt (Post-Doctoral Fellow @ Stanton Nuclear Security
Program, fellow @ Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford
University, Visiting Professor @ Emory University), Out of the Mushroom Clouds
Shadow, Foreign Policy, 8/5/15, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/05/japans-nuclearobsession-hiroshima-nagasaki/]
With the average age of the hibakusha now over 80, and Japanese society gradually
leaving its pacifist and anti-nuclear roots behind, however, the security alliance
with the United States and the nuclear umbrella that it affords are increasingly crucial
backstops for Japans commitments to nonproliferation and disarmament. Without them,
a nuclear arms race could ensue in East Asia. If Japan pursued nuclear
weapons, it would upend efforts to restrict their spread , especially in East Asia. With the
largest nuclear program of any state outside the 9-member nuclear club, Japan has long been a poster
child for nonproliferation. Besides its NPT membership, it accepts the safeguards of the International
Atomic Energy Agency the global nuclear watchdog on activities ranging from uranium imports to plutonium
reprocessing. In 1998, it was the first to sign up for the IAEAs voluntary Additional Protocol, which mandated even
more comprehensive and onerous inspections after the first Gulf War. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs touts
nuclear disarmament, and officials of its Arms Control and Disarmament Division toil abroad in support of

These attitudes and

are often ascribed to the bombs enduring impact on Japanese culture and
politics. An estimated 66,000 people were killed and 69,000 injured in Hiroshima, and another 39,000 and
international efforts to manage and eventually eliminate weapons of mass destruction.
behaviors

25,000 in Nagasaki in all, 250,000 to 300,000 died within 13 years. During the 7-year U.S. occupation of Japan,
U.S. authorities censored accounts of the bombings and its radioactive aftereffects on the cities populations. Antinuclear sentiment flared again after an American H-bomb test went awry in 1954, contaminating 7000 square miles
of the South Pacific and irradiating 23 crew members of a Japanese fishing vessel the Lucky Dragon one of
whom later died from radiation poisoning. The incident gave rise to public outcry and anti-nuclear protests in Japan
and was featured in the godfather of all monster movies Godzilla. One year later, Japans parliament, the Diet,
restricted domestic nuclear activities to those with civilian uses, a norm which Prime Minister Eisaku Sato further
reinforced in 1967, when he introduced his Three Non-Nuclear Principles: non-possession, non-manufacture, and

Yet Japanese leaders renunciation of nuclear

weapons has never been absolute. In private remarks, many of Japans prime
ministers in the 1950s and 1960s asserted that the weapons would enhance their
countrys national security and international standing. (This was partly a mark of the era, when
non-introduction of nuclear weapons.

President Dwight Eisenhower insisted that he saw no reason why [nuclear weapons] shouldnt be used just exactly
as you would use a bullet or anything else.) After Chinas first nuclear test in 1964, Sato informed
U.S. President Lyndon Johnson that if the [Chinese] had nuclear weapons, the Japanese also should have them. He

confided to the U.S. ambassador to Japan U. Alexis Johnson that the Three NonNuclear Principles were nonsense. Why then did Japan not build atomic bombs in the 1960s?
later

Mainly because the United States offered to share its own. Security treaties signed in 1952 and 1960 granted the
U.S. military basing rights in exchange for protecting Japan. Those treaties were silent on nuclear threats, however,
so after Chinas nuclear test, Johnson and his foreign-policy team devised various schemes to make U.S. atom and
hydrogen bombs available to Japan amid a crisis. In January 1965, Johnson inaugurated a tradition of American
presidents vowing to Japanese prime ministers, if Japan needs our nuclear deterrent for its defense, the United
States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense. These reassurances seemed to have their
intended effect. In 1967, Sato acknowledged the importance of extended nuclear deterrence in a meeting with
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: The Japanese were well-protected by
the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and Japan had no intention to make nuclear weapons, he told them. Afterward, Sato
announced that extended nuclear deterrence also formed a pillar of Japans nuclear posture. When Satos former

Foreign Minister Takeo Miki became prime minister in 1974, he convinced the Diet to ratify Japans acceptance of
the NPT, thanks to President Gerald Fords reaffirmation that the U.S.-Japan security treaty encompassed nuclear
threats and the establishment of the Subcommittee on U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, where the two countries

Optimists claim
that nuclear aversion, political checks, and international commitments will prevent a
Japanese nuclear breakout in the future. After all, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida who hails from
foreign and defense ministers would thereafter meet to coordinate their common defense.

Hiroshima renewed calls to accelerate nuclear disarmament at the NPT Review Conference this April, inviting
world leaders to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to witness with their own eyes the reality of atomic

And yet, Japan is becoming increasingly ambivalent about its

military restraint. Before his speech in New York, Kishida finalized new arrangements with the United
States that encourage Japan to function more proactively in East Asia. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is brushing
aside widespread public resistance to a Diet resolution that would authorize the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate overseas for the first time since World War II. During his
first administration, in the wake of the first North Korean nuclear test in 2006, Abe declared that a
limited nuclear arsenal would not necessarily violate the pacifist
constitution. Tokyo affirmed its non-nuclear status in 2006, but with North Korea testing
medium-range ballistic missiles, and China enhancing its conventional and nuclear
forces amid the contest of wills over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, another review
seems inevitable. In 2011, Shintaro Ishihara, the then powerful governor of Tokyo,
even called for Japan to build its own nuclear arsenal. A key variable will be how Seoul reacts to
bombings.

Pyongyangs provocations. South Korea is even more exposed to North Korean threats, and possesses an advanced

if
Tokyo invoked North Koreas nuclear arsenal to withdraw from the NPT , which has a 90day waiting period, it could build its own in short order. It has a growing defense
industry recently freed from export restrictions, mastery over missile
technology thanks to its space program, and a reprocessing facility
capable of producing enough weapons-useable plutonium to fuel more
than 1000 bombs like the one that leveled Nagasaki. Indeed, if Japan wanted to, it could
probably develop basic explosives in less than a year and a sophisticated
arsenal in three to five years. Faced with an existential crisis , however, those numbers
would plummet, as Tokyo fast-tracked a national undertaking. For all of these reasons,
civilian nuclear program of its own. If it took the radical step of nuclearizing, Japan would likely follow. And

Washington needs Tokyo to play a more active role in regional security. The bilateral Extended Deterrence Dialogue
formalized mid-level consultations in 2010; the meetings should expand to include South Korea trilateral
coordination is overdue. The United States should continue urging Japan to invest more on conventional forces. For
decades, Japanese military spending has hovered around 1 percent of gross domestic product. Even a half-percent
increase would help offset smaller U.S. defense budgets, reducing scenarios where U.S. nuclear forces would have

Hibakusha have
educated Japan and humanity about the lifelong harm that nuclear weapons can
inflict. Their advancing age is representative of the generational changes facing
Japan, however, with profound implications for its foreign policies. As Japan assumes a
more active security role in East Asia, it may be tempted to rethink its nuclear
options. With some experts promoting tailored proliferation to U.S. allies to counter Chinas rise, U.S.Japanese efforts to reduce nuclear risks regionally and worldwide appear
increasingly in jeopardy. The shadow of American power still looms over Japan 70 years after two artificial
to be called on and increasing the credibility of U.S. deterrent threats in East Asia as a result.

suns rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The nuclear partnership with Washington has afforded Tokyo the security

With Japans nuclear

restraint no longer the article of faith it once was, the significance of the nuclear pacts
struck decades ago will become ever more consequential.
necessary to renounce nuclear weapons and champion a world without them.

2NC Threat Perception I/L

Reduced U.S. assurance makes nuclearization uniquely likely
perception of Chinese threat will flip Japanese opinion.
Machida 14 [Satoshi Machida (Professor of Political Science @ University of
Nebraska Kearney, Ph.D., University of Kentucky), Who Supports Nuclear
Armament in Japan? Threat Perceptions and Japan's Nuclear Armament, Asian
Journal of Political Science, Volume 22, Issue 2, May 2014,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02185377.2014.913492]
Japan has been going through
important changes. Surrounded by increasing levels of threat from its
neighboring states, Japan has begun to adopt a more aggressive security policy
In a quickly changing environment in East Asia, it has been reported that

with the growing capability of the SDF. Along with this tendency, the possibility of Japan's nuclear armament has
become a focus of the debate involving both policy-makers and academics. The goal of this study has been to
examine the prospect of Japan's nuclearization. I investigated this question by paying particular attention to public

The statistical analysis relying on the survey data in Japan

has found that people's threat perceptions powerfully determine their
attitudes toward nuclear armament. Specifically, the results indicate that it is people's
perceptions of China as a military threat that significantly boost their support for
nuclear armament. Consistent with the security model of nuclear proliferation, this
study has verified that threat perceptions powerfully shape the content of public
opinion regarding nuclear weapons (Beckman, 1992: 14). These findings have important
implications for the prospect of nuclear proliferation involving Japan . As of now, most
perceptions of nuclear armament.

scholars dismiss the possibility of Japan's nuclear armament. Hughes (2007) suggests that a variety of domestic
constraints that are deeply embedded in Japan will continue to prevent Japan from pursuing the option of nuclear
armament. Similarly, Yoshihara and Holmes (2009) maintain that Japan will try to secure its survival in
strengthening its ties with the United States rather than attempting to develop nuclear weapons (Hughes, 2006).

Under the assumption that Japan is protected by the US security guarantee,

Japan's nuclear armament is unlikely. However, this does not mean that Japan will
never consider the option of nuclear armament. Based on the findings from this study,
we can predict that people's support for Japan's nuclear armament will grow
along with increasing levels of military threat from China. As China becomes
more aggressive with its growing military capability, the Japanese will be
increasingly concerned about the situation. As a consequence, it is possible that Japan will
eventually embrace the option of nuclear armament to counter the threat from China. As
Japanese history shows, a state's path can change drastically. A state that
was dictated by the fascist ideology was transformed into a peaceful country after
the end of World War II in 1945. Facing external threat, one cannot deny the possibility that
Japan may turn its course once again to become a more aggressive state in the
international system. Indeed, one can observe a number of changes in Japan that
could drive the country toward the option of nuclear armament (Tanter, 2005). The
recent debate concerning the possible revision of the Japanese
constitution should be understood in this context (Japan Times, 2013).

AT: Nuclear Taboo

No nuclear taboo Japanese internal memos confirm theyll
develop in response to weakened U.S. commitment
Saunders & Fearey 15 [Emily Cura Saunders (PhD in Political Science,
Claremont Graduate University, Research Outreach Coordinator @ Vanderbilt) &
Bryan L. Fearey (Director of the National Security Office at Los Alamos National
Laboratory, has served as Arms Control R&D Program Manager for the Department
of Defense, PhD from Iowa State), To Pursue an Independent Nuclear Deterrent or
Not? Japans and South Koreas Nuclear Decision Making Models, chapter in
Nuclear Threats and Security Challenges, NATO Science for Peace and Security
Series, ed. Samuel Apikyan & David Diamond, 2015,
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-017-9894-5_3]
Japans potential nuclear latency has been one of great debate and speculation since the end of the Second World
War. There have been many theories as to why Japan would or would not pursue a weapons program, but the two

regional security and confidence in the United States

extended deterrent, have strongly influenced this issue. Having been the sole victim of a
variables identified in this paper,

nuclear attack, Japanese politicians have always taken great care with regard to their rhetoric concerning nuclear
weapons. This rhetoric should be carefully monitored by the United States. Many of Japans nuclear options can be

the
Cabinet Legal Affair Bureau confirmed that nuclear weapons were not
unconstitutional.40 Domestic pressure and outrage at this claim soon forced Prime Minister Kishi to
resign; however, the taboo of talking about Japanese nuclear weapons had been
broken.41 In the early 1960s Prime Minister Sato went so far as to explicitly tell President
Johnson that he was not opposed to exploring a nuclear option for Japan, remarking
that, Japanese public opinion will not permit this at present, but I believe the public, especially the
younger generation, can be educated. 42 Ironically, Prime Minister Sato ended up winning a Nobel
measured in this highly nuanced political rhetoric. For example, in 1957 under Prime Minister Nobosuke Kishi,

Prize for what he deemed the Three NonNuclear Principlesno manufacturing, possessing, or presence of nuclear

change in rhetoric was important, it did not end nuclear

exploration in Japan. Several Japanese administrations since Prime Minister Sato have
commissioned reports on the feasibility, both scientifically and
economically, of developing nuclear weapons. In the context of these administrations the
idea of latent capability surfaced. In a memorandum written by the director
of the Japanese Defense Policy Bureau, Kubo Takyua, he makes this option out to
be an insurance plan to keep the United States commitment strong. The
memorandum reads, If Japan prepares a latent nuclear capability which would enable Japan
to develop significant nuclear armament at any time, the United States would be motivated to
sustain the Japan-US security system by providing nuclear guarantee to Japan, because otherwise, the
US would be afraid of the stability in the international relations triggered by nuclear proliferation.44 The
commitment of the United States is clearly an issue for Japan. They want to be
assured that the commitments are strong, and if not, this memo suggests that
they are willing to consider an independent deterrent if need be.
weapons in Japan.43 While this

AT: Pacifism
Pacifism is dead constitutional reinterpretation toward
militarization
Mohammed 15 [Arshad Mohammed (Reuters Foreign Policy Correspondent),
U.S., Japan unveil new defense guidelines for global Japanese role, Reuters,
4/28/15, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/28/us-usa-japan-defenseidUSKBN0NI08O20150428]
Japan and the United States unveiled new guidelines for defense cooperation on
Monday, reflecting Japan's willingness to take on a more robust international
role at a time of growing Chinese power and rising concerns about nuclear-armed
North Korea. Washington told Japanese leaders its commitment to Japan's
security remained "iron-clad" and covered all territories under Tokyo's
administration, including tiny East China Sea islets that Japan disputes with Beijing. A centerpiece of Japanese
Prime Minster Shinzo Abe's U.S. visit this week for talks with President Barack Obama, the guidelines are
part of Abe's wider signal that Japan is ready to take more responsibility
for its security as China modernizes its military and flexes its muscles in Asia. The guidelines allow
for global cooperation militarily, ranging from defense against ballistic missiles, cyber and space attacks
as well as maritime security. They follow a cabinet resolution last year reinterpreting Japan's
post-World War Two pacifist constitution. The resolution allows the exercise of
the right to "collective self-defense." This means, for example, that Japan could shoot down
missiles heading toward the United States and come to the aid of third countries under attack. At a joint news
conference with Japan's foreign and defense ministers, U.S. Secretary of State John

Kerry called the

first

revision of the guidelines

since 1997 "an historic transition." In a pointed message to Beijing over

its increasing assertiveness in Northeast and Southeast Asia, Kerry said the United States rejected any suggestion
that freedom of navigation and overflight were "privileges granted by big states to small ones subject to the whim

The guidelines are expected to lead to greater U.S.-Japan

coordination in the South China Sea, where China and other regional states have competing claims on
and fancy of the big state."

scattered islands. However, at the news conference, Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani and Foreign Minister
Fumio Kishida repeatedly dodged questions about the possibility of joint patrolling of Asian sea lanes, saying
legislation in Japan had still to be worked out and regional countries consulted. ANXIETY OVER CHINESE
RECLAMATION WORK Asked about joint patrols, Obama's chief East Asia adviser, Evan Medeiros, said

Washington and Tokyo were "in lock step" on the need for freedom of
navigation and unimpeded commerce and that China's reclamation and building work on disputed
South China Sea reefs presented "real challenges." "The speed, the scale and the scope of this is very problematic ..
raising anxiety, he told reporters, adding that China's statement this month that reclaimed land would be used for
defense had "raised all sorts of questions among Southeast Asian countries, in the United States, in Tokyo about
what Chinas long-term strategic intentions are." Kerry stressed that Washington would stick to its obligations to
protect Japan, saying, "Our treaty commitment to Japan's security remains iron-clad and covers all territories under
Japan's administration." Despite U.S. assurances of its military commitment, worries have persisted in Tokyo that
one day Washington, which is reining in defense spending and is deeply intertwined economically with China, may
not come to Japan's defense. Patrol ships and military aircraft from rival claimants in the East China and South
China seas routinely shadow each other near contested territory, raising fears that an unintended collision or other

The guidelines eliminate geographic restrictions that

had largely limited joint work to the defense of Japan and the surrounding area, a senior U.S.
incident could develop into a larger clash.

official said. "We will be able to do globally what weve been able to do in the defense of Japan and regionally," the
official said. The changes allow greater coordination and information sharing and allow increased cooperation in
cybersecurity and defense of assets in space. While saying the guidelines were "not specifically aimed" at China
and highlighting the threat from North Korea, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter told the news conference: The
answer for this region isnt for anybody to throw their weight around. Obama, who meets Abe on Tuesday, has said
Japanese-controlled isles are covered by a bilateral treaty obliging the United States to defend Japan, but
Washington has made clear it does not want to get dragged into a Sino-Japanese conflict.

The revisions to

the guidelines reflect a profound evolution in Japanese security policy and

represent the most dramatic shift since Japan's military was rebuilt after
World War Two. The constitutional reinterpretation still needs to be enabled by legislation later
this year, but will also allow Japan to take action such as mine-sweeping during
hostilities in the Hormuz Strait and provide logistical support for U.S. forces beyond
Japan's immediate neighborhood without a specific law for each operation, Japanese lawmakers and
government sources say.

Japanese politics is moving away from pacifism now new

votes for constitutional reinterpretation prove its the majority
opinion.
Ripley 15 [Will Ripley, International correspondent in Tokyo bureau, Assertive
Japan poised to abandon 70 years of pacifism, CNN, 9/18/15,
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/16/asia/japan-military-constitution/]
Japan's upper chamber of parliament early Saturday gave final approval to a set of
controversial bills allowing the country's military to engage in overseas combat
assignments -- under certain circumstances -- for the first time since World War II. The lower
chamber approved the bills in July. Japan's upper house of Parliament is poised to pass the first
major reinterpretation of the country's pacifist constitution since the end of World
War II, despite fierce and vocal opposition that culminated with lawmakers getting into physical altercations.
The historic vote, which could take place Friday, marks the most dramatic shift in Japanese
military policy in 70 years, and has triggered the largest protests seen in Tokyo in decades. A scuffle broke
out Thursday as opposition lawmakers in a special committee of the Upper House attempted to delay a vote. But
the bill ultimately passed the committee, clearing a key hurdle and setting the stage for a vote on the measure.

The controversial legislation reinterprets Article 9 of the Japanese constitution,

which outlaws war as a means of settling international disputes. The
reinterpretation allows Japan to exercise collective self-defense, enabling the Japanese
military, known as the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), to fight overseas and defend allies with limited conditions. The

Supporters of the legislation, including top U.S. officials, say Japan needs to
expand the role of the SDF to counter potential threats from nations such as China
and North Korea. Both continue to develop their military and nuclear weapons programs.
argument for the bills

Earlier this month, China staged its largest military parade ever to celebrate 70 years since Japan's World War II
defeat. Beijing remains locked in territorial disputes with multiple Asian neighbors in the East and South China seas.
On Tuesday, North Korea warned the United States and its allies that it is ready to use nuclear weapons "at any

Tokyo
has faced growing international pressure to expand the role of its military to defend
the interests of its key allies, including the United States. America is bound by treaty to defend Japan, an
time" and is expected to launch a new satellite using a long-range rocket sometime in the coming weeks.

agreement that has been in place since 1960. "Japan is like the 42-year-old kid still living in the basement of the
United States," said longtime Asia strategist Keith Henry. Henry's Tokyo-based consulting firm, Asia Strategy,
provides governmental policy analysis. Henry likens the defense bills to Japan finally "growing up" and moving
beyond vague concepts of peace and democracy that are no longer practical given today's rapidly changing

Japan is assuming a more proactive role in regional

security, in part to offset China's growing military might. "Japan is moving out of the house of the
geopolitical landscape. Henry says

U.S. that was essentially built after World War II," Henry said. "But there are risks involved in protecting one's
national self interests."

AT: Politics Blocks Prolif

Yes political capability
John W. Dower, 2014 "Could Japan Ever Become a Nuclear Weapons State?",
historynewsnetwork.org/article/154836
influential Japanese politicians and officials
have made clear -- sometimes privately and frequently publicly -- that they themselves do not
suffer any nuclear allergy. In May 1957, for example, Prime Minister Kishi told a
parliamentary committee that the constitution did not bar possession of nuclear
weapons for defensive purposes. Four years later, in a November 1961 meeting with the U.S. secretary of
state, Kishis successor Ikeda Hayato wondered out loud whether Japan should possess its
own nuclear arsenal. (He was told that the United States opposed nuclear proliferation.) In December 1964,
two months after China tested its first atomic bomb, Prime Minister Sat informed the U.S.
ambassador in Tokyo that Japan might develop nuclear weapons. A month later, Sat told the
On various occasions during and after the Cold War,

U.S. secretary of state that if war broke out with China, Japan expected the United States to retaliate immediately

Despite having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, moreover, Japanese

politicians and planners have secretly examined the feasibility of Japan acquiring
tactical nuclear weapons. Over the course of recent decades, various conservative politicians
and officials have publicly stated that this would be constitutionally permissible
and strategically desirable. (11)
with nuclear weapons.

Abe can push it through

Kingston 14 Jeff Kingston, Director of Asian Studies, Temple University Japan,
June 9, 2014, "After 3.11: Imposing Nuclear Energy on a Skeptical Japanese Public",
The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol.11, Issue 23, No. 4, japanfocus.org/-JeffKingston/4129/article.html
Prime Minister Abe Shinzos nuclear renaissance involves downplaying risks,
restarting reactors, building new ones, and exporting reactor technology and
equipment. Polls in Japan indicate that the public remains overwhelmingly
opposed to Abes nuclear agenda, but in various national and local
elections since late 2012 antinuclear candidates have not fared well. The
implosion of the DPJ left an open political field for the LDP, so even if voters dont
support its nuclear energy policy, they have given it power to promote its
agenda. The safety myth is being recalibrated, but remains based on rosy
assumptions in a nation especially prone to massive seismic disasters. The
reinstatement of nuclear energy in the 2014 national energy policy marks a victory
for the nuclear village, a remarkable example of institutional resilience in the face of
extremely adverse developments since the massive earthquake and tsunami of 11 March
2011. Despite extensive revelations about slipshod safety practices in the nuclear
industry and collusive relations between regulators and those they regulate (Diet 2012,
Cabinet 2012, RJIF 2014, Lochbaum 2014), Abe has successfully promoted a nuclear
revival that few would have thought possible before his election in 2012. Reactor
restarts face a number of hurdles, but the pronuclear lobby now finds it has a policy opening.
The summer of 2014 will be nuclear-free, but in all likelihood it will be Japans last
for decades to come.

AT: Public Support

The public accepts nuclear weapons rising nationalism and
decreased opposition from younger generations
Tatsumi and Weiner 14 Yuki Tatsumi, senior associate of the East Asia
program at the Stimson Center, Dr. Robert Weiner Naval Postgraduate School,
Political Influence on Japanese Nuclear and Security Policy, Project on Advanced
Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report Number
2014-004, February 2014,
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2014/2014%20004
%20Japan%20Politicization.pdf
changes in grassroots
public opinion can also be seen as a potential source of political pressure away
from Japans nuclear-policy status quo. Two streams of public opinion in this vein
have been alluded to above: a gradual warming to the formerly taboo notion of
Japanese autonomous nuclear weapons capabilities, and an apparent rise in
nationalism. The former has gradually been growing with the passing of the
generations that directly witnessed Japans atomic bombings and the more general
privations of war, and that in turn formed the backbone of Japans peace and
nonproliferation movements. Younger generations treat security policy, including
nuclear weapons, more pragmatically, and their security consciousness is more
strongly shaped by the immediate nuclear threat posed by North Korea and the
larger but latent threat posed by China. The rise in nationalism shares some of the
same roots, but in recent years has been more acutely spurred by tensions with
China and South Korea over interpretations of World War II-era history, which
itself is partly a product of political reform and increasing economic competitiveness
on the part of those two neighbors; and by conflict over disputed island territories.
Alongside Japans individual political parties and its party system as a whole,

AT: Nuclear Umbrella Solves

Nuclear deterrence is not credible US flip flop and no delivery
capability
Flores 14 citing Lyon and Pifer (Daniel Flores, A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE
INTERSCHOOL HONORS PROGRAM IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES CENTER
FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, FREEMAN SPOGLI INSTITUTE
FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, STANFORD UNIVERSITY, citing Rod Lyon, Fellow International Strategy at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, also citing Steven
Pifer, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center on the United States and
Europe as well as the Director of Brookings' Arms Control Initiative, June 2014, The
Credibility of Extended Deterrence and Assurance: The US Commitment to Japan)
The security environment, as has been previously discussed in the relevant literature, of course brings its unique

Lyon notes that the nature of the power distribution in the region further
complicates matters. US extended deterrence in Europe during the Cold War was simple in the sense that it
challenges.

was bipolar and symmetric. There were two principle actors, the US and Soviet Union, who were relatively equal in
power. In todays Asia, it is more complicated; the power distribution is multipolar and asymmetric. The actors are

US allies are not unified under a single bloc nor are

China and North Korea, though allies, cannot be said to
constitute a unified front either. These states are not equal in power. Their nuclear
statuses in themselves demonstrate this , as China is a nuclear power, North Korea a budding nuclear
power, and Japan and South Korea non-nuclear states. These factors contribute to make US
calculations very complicated. They have several variables to consider and multiple relationships to
various and disparate. Unlike the NATO alliance,
their relations with each other always stable.

balance. Lyon briefly describes some of the ways the United States affects assurance in Asia, focusing on the

The apparent US commitment to a world free of nuclear

weapons is naturally in conflict with its nuclear umbrella . The retirement of
tactical and intermediate-range delivery systems is cause for concern among US
allies. The terminology of US policy has shifted to some degree from
extended nuclear deterrence to just extended deterrence, possibly
signaling a reluctance on the part of the US to emphasize or use nuclear weapons in
the defense of its allies. Pifer et al further elucidate the security environment .74 Also
keeping the comparison to the NATO alliance in mind, they highlight the fact that nuclear weapons have
never been available to the United States allies in East Asia as they were
in Europe. 75 NATO allies maintain dual-use aircraft capable of delivering US nuclear weapons. The presence of
nuclear element.

nuclear weapons naturally enhances the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. Tactical weapons were once

The lack
of nuclear weapons in Asia plus the retirement of some strategic delivery
systems puts the US at a disadvantage when trying to bolster the
credibility of nuclear assurance to its Asian allies.
deployed in the Republic of Korea but were withdrawn during the administration of George H.W. Bush.

Japan doesnt trust the nuclear umbrella

Samuels 9, Ford International Professor of Political Science and Director, Center
for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Wing Walking: The
USJapan Alliance, www.globalasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/360.pdf
Getting the alliance right is more urgent than it may seem . With China rising and
new nuclear As in the case of the Depression Era wing-walkers who entertained crowds high above state fairs with
their airborne acrobatics, in matters of national security

it is dangerous to let go with one hand

before having a secure grasp with the other.

10 An Alliance in Need of Attention, International

Herald Tribune, 23 January 2008. 11 See her 13 February speech to the Asia Society, op.cit. 20 global asia Cover

some in Tokyo worry that the US nuclear

umbrella might be developing holes.12 Japan is increasingly concerned about
being bullied by a stronger China or blackmailed by North Koreas nuclear and missile
programs, while the US is focused on nuclear proliferation and terrorist attacks on American territory. Much to
Tokyos chagrin, Washington ceded leadership in multilateral talks about North
Korea to Beijing, and in 2008 Washington took North Korea off the list of state-sponsors of
terrorism, tacitly accepting North Korean nukes.
story USJapan Relations facts on North Korean ground,

AT: Cant Nuclearize

Japan can nuclearize takes less than 2 years
Kim 15 [Ji Young Kim (Center for International Studies @ Inha University),
Dismantling the Final Barrier: Transforming Japan into a Normal Country in the
Post-Cold-War Era, Pacific Focus Inha Journal of International Studies, Volume 30,
Issue 2, pages 223248, August 2015,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12049/full]
It has been widely acknowledged that Japan possesses technical capabilities, if
not political will, sufficient to develop nuclear weapons. Japan currently operates 54
nuclear reactors, and is the third largest nuclear power in the world. Japan owns a
huge stockpile (about 53 tons) of plutonium, stored in France, the UK, and Japan, sufficient to be
used to produce over 1,000 nuclear weapons.22 From a more realistic standpoint, Japan may
lack both the experience and the facilities necessary for manufacturing nuclear weapons on an immediate basis.

considering the fact that Japan possesses the three basic facilities (enriched
uranium concentrators; weapons-grade plutonium production pile; and fuel
reprocessing plants) to produce nuclear weapons independently, it would not take
more than 2 years for Japan to develop nuclear weapons, once it made up its
mind to do so.23 In fact, Japan has opted for non-nuclearization, not because domestic
constraints are insurmountable, but for its own strategic reasons for disadvantaging independent
However

nuclearization.24 From an international perspective, Japan has fully complied with the International Atomic Energy
Agency verification measures and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, it is worth noting that there
are only five nuclear states under the terms of the NPT, four non-NPT nuclear states, and one undeclared nuclear
state in the world out of many non-nuclear normal countries. Thus, possession of nuclear weapons does not serve
as a proper criterion to judge the normalcy of the country.

--- AT: Slow Timeframe

Timeframe is rapid six months
Keck, Managing Editor of The Diplomat, 14 (Zachary, Japan and Chinas Dispute
Goes Nuclear,)
Many experts believe that Japan could produce nuclear weapons within 6
months of deciding to do so, and some believe that Tokyo is pursuing a nuclear hedging strategy. Japan
has done little to mollify these concerns. In fact, it has often encouraged them, with a Japanese
official recently saying off the record that Japan already has the technical capability
[to build a nuclear bomb], and has had it since the 1980s.

--- AT: No Plutonium

Japan has a huge supply of plutonium
Iwata 15 MARI IWATA, reporter @ The WSJ, July 15, 2015, Japans Plutonium
Stockpile Creates a Nuclear Headache, The Wall Street Journal,
www.wsj.com/articles/japans-plutonium-stockpile-creates-a-nuclear-headache1436934838
TOKYOAs

Japan prepares for the return of nuclear-generated electricity to its grid

next month after a two-year hiatus, an old problem has resurfaced: what to do with
its huge pile of plutonium. Two nuclear reactors on Japans southern island of Kyushu are set to
resume operations as soon as mid-August, with another reactor on nearby Shikoku
island likely to restart several months later. They will be the first to restart under
new Japanese regulations adopted after the Fukushima disaster in March 2011. One
side-effect is that it will likely add to Japans reserves of plutonium, which is
generated when nuclear fuels are burned in power generation. If it is then separated
from spent fuels, it can potentially be made into atomic bombs. With 47
metric tons of separated plutonium, Japan already has the largest
stockpile of any country that isnt a nuclear power. That, in turn, is a
headache for Japan and its key ally, the U.S., which has been leading global efforts
to restrict nuclear weapons proliferation. This is such an exceptionally large
amount that it would be difficult for the U.S. to answer if its asked why
Washington leaves Japan alone while it presses other countries to meet
strict nonproliferation demands, said Nobumasa Akiyama, nuclear security
policy professor at the Hitotsubashi University. Japans plutonium pile already dwarfs that of most
countries. Germany, another signatory of nuclear nonproliferation treaties which doesnt own nuclear weapons, had

Even
major nuclear powers such as the U.S. and Russia only possess 49 tons and 52 tons
respectively of separated plutonium not already used in nuclear weapons , according to
the same data. Neighboring countries, particularly South Korea and China, have long
questioned why Japanwhich has signed international nonproliferation agreements
-- needs so much plutonium. Chinas foreign ministry said that Beijing has
repeatedly urged Japan to reduce its stockpiles of nuclear material and doesnt want
to see those stockpiles increase. Reducing inventory of sensitive nuclear materials is the consensus
only 3 tons of separated plutonium at the end of 2013, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

among international communities, and it will help to reduce risks to nuclear proliferation and security, the foreign
ministry said in a statement. It called on Japan to take practical actions for an early settlement of its sensitive
nuclear materials supply and demand imbalances, and in particular not to take actions to exacerbate the
imbalances. Chinas Atomic Energy Authority and defense ministry didnt respond to requests for comment. The
existence of the Japanese surplus doesnt only cause tensions regionally. Countries like Turkey and Egypt have
pressed for the right to reprocess spent nuclear fuel to obtain the fuel. Some experts say there is even a risk
terrorists could somehow get hold of the plutonium.

Uniqueness

Assurance Now Fragile

Recent U.S. actions demonstrate assurance but its sensitive to
future changes nuclearization is still possible.
Smith 15 (Dr. Shane Smith is a Senior Research Fellow at the National Defense
Universitys Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction. His current
research focuses on strategic stability and the role of nuclear weapons in AsiaPacific affairs, extended deterrence, and North Koreas nuclear program. He is also a
Special Advisor at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Implications for Extended
US Deterrence and Assurance in East Asia, November 2015. http://38north.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/NKNF-Smith-Extended-Deterrence-Assurance.pdf)
Japan is also wrestling with uncertainty about the future of US security
commitments in a changing regional and global environment. Some analysts argue
that Japan is at a critical juncture in its security policy, driven both by North Koreas nuclear
program and the rise of China.43 In the minds of some regional experts, the two threats are not mutually
exclusive. North Korea is sometimes considered the cats paw in a Chinese strategy to push the United States out
of the region, antagonize and distract Japan, and pave the way for Chinas regional expansion.44 Regardless of the

rising costs of US regional deterrence against

multiple nuclear threats heighten Japans long-term anxiety over US security
commitments.45 North Koreas growing capabilities and threats generate three immediate kinds of concerns in
actual link between China and North Korea, the

Japan. First, North Korea could launch non-nuclear provocations against Japan while using nuclear threats to deter
retaliation. Second, Japan would be a primary nuclear target during a conflict that it cannot control on the
peninsula. Indeed, many Japanese take Pyongyang at its word when it states that Japan is always in the [nuclear]
cross-hairs of our revolutionary army and if Japan makes a slightest move, the spark of war will touch Japan first.46
Third, once North Korea can target the US homeland with nuclear weapons, it can intimidate Washington in a way
that leaves Japan vulnerable to coercion. For instance, one former Japanese defense official reportedly opined about
the implications of a nuclear-armed North Korea, we cannot completely rule out the possibility of Japans being cut

Faced with these challenges, Japan has engaged in intense

debate over new policies to address a changed and changing security environment.
off from US nuclear strategy.47

Calls in Japan for a more robust US nuclear presence or for independent capabilities are quieter than in South Korea.
Public opinion and institutional opposition to nuclear weapons continue to shape Japanese discourse on such issues.

a growing number of US and Japanese analysts argue that Japans

indefinite renunciation of nuclear weapons cannot be taken for granted; it
would likely consider changing course if the security environment
deteriorated or if it lost faith in the US extended deterrent .48 As Richard Samuels
and James Schoff suggest, since the 1950s, Japan has more or less made clear that it
reserves the right, and maintains the capacity, to develop its own nuclear
arsenal if the situation warrants it.49Meanwhile, Japan is already exploring other
measures to augment the US deterrent, arguably in areas where it sees US
assurances lacking. For instance, there is now debate in Japan over developing a
conventional strike capability that could, as Prime Minister Abe reportedly told the National Diet, hit
However,

enemy bases in accordance with the changing international situation.50 A primary justification for such capabilities
is the need to conduct preemptive counterforce operations against a nuclear-armed North Korea.51 Unsurprisingly,
these discussions raise regional concerns about a fundamental shift in Japans military posture partly because the
debate is taking place in the context of Japans reinterpretation of the constitution to enable collective selfdefense and the 2013 National Security Strategy that argues for the need to first and foremost strengthen its own
capabilities and the foundation for exercising those capabilities.52 Not only do these developments have the
potential to aggravate Japans relations with both South Korea and China, but it is also not clear in the literature
how the changes and new capabilities would work within the structure of the US-Japan alliance. A lack of

In
an effort to enhance consultation on future challenges and the role of US extended
coordination between the two could lead to dangerous and unhelpful escalation during conflict on the peninsula.

deterrence, the US and Japan established the Extended Deterrence Dialogue. There
have also been repeated statements from US political leaders recommitting the full
range of US capabilities to the defense of Japan. The United States has also
committed additional capabilities to signal its willingness and ability to uphold its
security commitments, such as the deployment of additional missile defense assets
to the region, including plans to increase ground-based interceptors for national missile defense; deployment
of additional Aegis-equipped warships to the West Pacific; and the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense battery to Guam.

These may not be sufficient for assuring Japan in the

future, however, as it faces an increasingly nuclear-capable and unpredictable North Korea.53

Assurance Now China Key

Commitment is stable in the status quo but fear of China
magnifies the link
Einhorn 15 (Robert, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institutions Center for 21st
Century Security and Intelligence, and is the former special advisor to Secretary of
State Clinton for nonproliferation and arms control, The Washington Quarterly 38:1
pp. 4772 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2015.1038174,
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring201
5_Einhorn.pdf)
Japan is concerned by Chinas military modernization efforts and its greater regional
assertiveness, especially Beijings claim to what Tokyo regards as the Japanese Senkaku Islands. It is also
concerned by North Koreas growing nuclear and missile capabilities as well as by the continuing bilateral
tensions with both North Korea and China over historical grievances. But at the present time, there is little
reason to believe that these concerns will lead to a Japanese interest in pursuing nuclear
weapons. Prime Minister Abes determination to strengthen Japans self-defense
capabilities as well as his governments reinterpretation of Japans constitution to permit collective defense
efforts have increased confidence within Japan regarding its ability to address regional security
threats. Moreover, the perception in some parts of the world that the United
States may be pulling back from its global responsibilities does not seem
to have shaken Japanese confidence in the U.S. security guarantee . In
addition to continuing to station sizable military forces in Japan the United States
has taken a variety of steps to reinforce the credibility of the mutual defense
relationship including support for Abes defense policies, close cooperation on
missile defenses, a challenge to Chinas unilateral declaration of an Air Defense
Identification Zone, and President Obamas April 2014 public assertion that U.S. obligations under
the U.S. Japan mutual defense treaty cover all territories under the administration of Japan, including the
disputed Senkaku Islands.39 Moreover, while members of Japans national security establishment have from
time to time privately debated whether Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, the Japanese public remains firmly
opposed to Japan becoming a nuclear weapon state.40

Assurance is stable now but perception of US-China relations is

key.
Samuels & Schoff 13 Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff,. Ford
International Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for
International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; and Senior
Associate in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Japans Nuclear Hedge: Beyond Allergy and Breakout, Strategic Asia 2013-14:
Asia in the Second Nuclear Age. Eds. Tellis, Ashley J., Abraham M. Denmark, and
Travis Tanner, http://www.nbr.org/Publications/issue.aspx?id=294.
Despite shifting threat perceptions among Japanese policymakers, Tokyos level of
confidence in U.S. security guarantees remains high due to the Obama
administrations emphasis on diplomatic and military investments in Asia ,
Washingtons bipartisan emphasis on the importance of alliances, and robust U.S. support for Japan
during the tsunami and nuclear disaster in 2011. In the medium term, however, Japanese

strategists are closely watching the U.S. response to Sino-Japanese confrontation in

the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. For many, this is a representative or test case
of the United States capacity and determination to deter Chinese aggression.90 Moreover, an
anticipated one-third drop in U.S. defense spending from 2010 to 2015 and congressional resistance to
funding base realignment plans in the AsiaPacific raise doubts for some in Japan about U.S. staying
power in the region over the long term. 91 Thus, while there is no imminent loss of

confidence, certain trends are unsettling to the leadership in Tokyo . One of these
trends is the decline in the qualitative advantage that the allies have traditionally
held over Chinas armed forces. As one analyst opined, if the U.S.-China military
balance in East Asia reaches parity, then the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella
will be gravely shaken. 92 On this view, Chinese and North Korean nuclear-force modernization
programs will exacerbate the decoupling problem for Japan. But such modernization could also
accelerate U.S. rethinking of a possible Japanese breakout. Although a decision by Japan to acquire
nuclear weapons may not be in the United States current interest, Washingtons ability and willingness
to prevent it would wane over time if Chinas capabilities were to continue to expand and
especially if North Koreas status as a nuclear power were to become a normal part of the strategic
environment in Asia. Under such conditions, Japans desire for nuclear weapons would

appear more reasonable and harder to counter .93

Assurance Now Defense Guidelines

New defense guideline revisions prove alliance credibility but
the Chinese threat means Japan is still wary of U.S.
engagement.
Basu 15 [Titli Basu (PhD, Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University), 5-29-2015, "US-Japan Security Alliance:
Standing the Test of Time," Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis,
http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/USJapanSecurityAlliance_tbasu_290515]
Abes visit to the United States (US) in late April and early May 2015 and his
was aimed at demonstrating two things: First, Japans
readiness to shoulder extra responsibilities within the framework of the US-Japan
security alliance, which, since its inception, has been an asymmetrical arrangement owing to the constraints
imposed by Japans pacifist constitution. The categorical message that emerged from the
Japanese side was that the alliance with the US will continue to be at the core of
Japanese security strategy despite unfolding changes in that policy. Second, Americas
Prime Minister Shinzo

meeting with President Barack Obama

reiteration of its commitment to the rebalancing strategy in the wake of East Asias geopolitical transition as well as
extension of assurance to Japan that it will continue to be the key anchor of American strategy in East Asia.

Although the seven decade old alliance has been put to test on several occasions,
Obama underlined its essence as being with and for each other .1 What are the variables
driving America and Japan to further strengthen their security alliance? What challenges confront them as they
shape their partnership? And, what do these developments imply for regional stability? These are the questions that
this Issue Brief explores. Abes visit to the US needs to be seen through the prism of security, economics and the
history which has sparked a renewed sense of nationalism in the region against the backdrop of the 70th

The biggest take away from his state visit was that the core of
the US-Japan security alliance, i.e., the Guidelines for US-Japan Defense
Cooperation, has been revised after 18 years, reflecting a vertical and horizontal
deepening of security relations. Moreover, the economic pillar of Obamas rebalancing strategy,
anniversary of World War II.

namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade negotiations, which has tested the depth of the US-Japan
partnership in recent times as the two countries fiercely debated rice and automobile tariff barriers, has reportedly
reached its penultimate stage. However, it did not translate into an actual agreement during the summit.
Furthermore, while addressing the US Congress, Abe adopted a measured approach in articulating Japans
perspective on the critical history issue,2 as the region debates the possible content of his upcoming August 15
speech vis--vis Japans deep remorse and apology for its role during World War II.3 This has sparked critical

Post-war Japan relied

exclusively on the US-Japan security alliance , which has served both nations interests. The
responses from regional actors including China and the Korean Peninsula.

conservative pragmatist school of thought in the Japanese security discourse, led by Yoshida Shigeru, supported the
alliance since it enabled Japan to direct post-war resources on economic development while depending on the US to
ensure security. At the same time, this alliance allowed the US access to Japanese bases,4 thus facilitating the
forward deployment of troops and other military assets to bolster its strategic presence in East Asia aimed at
containing the Soviet Union and communist China.5 Bases in Japan were used by US forces during the Korean and
Vietnam wars. Moreover, in 1954, the US transported hydrogen-bomb equipped F-100 fighter-bombers to the
Kadena air base situated in Okinawa.6 Even as Japan is faced with the predicament associated with the stationing
of marines in Okinawa, public opposition and HNS (Host Nation Support) burden sharing issues, the Japanese
foreign policy discourse suggests that the US presence in the region is a stabilizing factor for which there is no
substitute.7 While the alliance has survived several challenges including severe trade frictions and the collapse of
the Soviet Union, troop commitments to Japan and South Korea constitute the core of the US presence in Northeast

The alliance is navigating through the post-Cold

War challenges originating from the expanding Chinese sphere of influence and the
provocative rhetoric and behaviour of nuclear North Korea. The two primary drivers reinforcing the
US-Japan commitment to the alliance includes managing Chinas relative increase of
power in the post-Cold War era as well as an unpredictable North Korea. The Peoples Liberation
Asia. The China Variable in the US-Japan Alliance

Armys (PLA) military modernisation and Chinas expansive territorial claims in the
East China Sea have increased Japanese apprehensions. Even as Japan has been
articulating its concern about the lack of transparency in Chinas military budget,
the latters defence expenditure has increased by nearly four times during the last
10 years and by 40 times in the last 26 years.8 Numerous incidents, including nuclear powered Chinese
submarines entering Japanese territorial waters southwest of Okinawa in 2004, the collision between a Chinese
fishing boat and a Japanese Coast Guard vessel in September 2010, a Chinese vessel directing its radar at a
Japanese naval destroyer in January 2013, Chinas establishment of an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in

Jinpings advice to the PLA

to strengthen combat responsiveness, maintain military readiness and advance its
fighting capability to win regional wars in the information age, all have made
Japan nervous. During April-September and October-December 2014, there were
reportedly 20710 and 16411 instances, respectively, of Japans Air Self-Defence
Force (ASDF) scrambling fighter jets to deal with intruding Chinese aircraft. Moreover,
November 2013 encompassing the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and Xi

in 2014, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan reported 88 instances of Chinese vessels being found lurking in the

Chinas assertive behaviour regarding the nine-dash line in

the South China Sea and its reported reclamation work in various disputed islands
have also raised Japanese anxiety. Chinas military modernization, largely sustained
by a rapidly growing economy, is worrying to the US and its other regional allies as
well. Besides, the ongoing debate over power transition altering the post-war regional order depending on whether China in due course will dislodge
territorial sea12. In addition,

the US as the principal power in East Asia; Xi Jinpings New Asian Security Concept founded on the slogan of Asia for Asians13; the Chinese Dream and
rejuvenation narrative seeking the centrality it once enjoyed in Asia; China consolidating naval power with sophisticated nuclear attack submarines;
Chinas stationing of nuclear armed boomers in Hainan Province aimed at constricting US involvement in regional hotspots and capable of striking
Hawaii, Alaska and the continental US from the mid-Pacific; Chinas robust Anti-Access Area Denial strategy (A2AD) to deal with US power projection in the
Western Pacific; Chinese efforts to drive rival militaries including the US from regional conflicts by increasing operational reach through intermediate and
medium-range conventional ballistic missiles besides long-range, land-attack, and anti-ship cruise missiles;14 Sino-US differences over freedom of
navigation and military activities within EEZs; all pose a serious challenge to the US. It is in response to all this that the Obama administration crafted the
pivot to Asia policy and its attempting to bolster its alliances and partnerships with important stakeholders in the region. The North Korea factor The
security threat posed by North Korea is also a vital issue determining Japans alliance with the US.15 In addition to conducting three nuclear tests and
further developing smaller nuclear warheads, North Korea has deployed ballistic missiles that can target the whole of Japan. And as North Korea has
placed a satellite in orbit in December 2012, this technology can be employed to deliver nuclear warheads to the west coast of the US. The North Korean
regime has categorically asserted that Japan will be consumed in nuclear flames16 if it shoots down any North Korean missile and that Japan will have
to pay a dear price17 for supporting US policy. Moreover, North Korea has conveyed its objective of devastating Washington into a sea of fire18 and
that it should remember that the Anderson air force base in Guam and US bases in Japan and Okinawa are inside the striking capability of DPRKs
precision strike means.19 Besides, North Koreas augmentation of its ballistic missile development as well as their transfer and proliferation also pose
serious concerns. In 2013, North Korea resumed its 5 MWe gas-graphite plutonium production reactor, capable of producing six kgs of plutonium annually,
at Yongbyon nuclear facility to increase the weapons-grade plutonium supply. Moreover, it reportedly has expanded the size of the facility that hosts the
gas centrifuge plant for uranium enrichment at Yongbyon. In 2014, there were indications of a major excavation at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site. In
addition, gantry modifications at the Sohae launch site in northwest North Korea could be aimed at supporting the launch of rockets of up to 50 meters in
length. In 2013, the building of new facilities was evident at the Tonghae Satellite Launching Ground. A UN report suggests that North Korea has engaged
in selling weapons to Iran, Syria and Burma.20 Lately, North Korea has fired a series of short-range ballistic missile into the Sea of Japan, further
heightening security concerns. In April 2014, then US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel responded to North Koreas provocative and destabilizing
actions21 with the decision to deploy two additional Aegis-class ballistic missile defence ships by 2017 in Yokosuka naval base. Moreover, to counter the
North Korean ballistic missile threat, a second Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2) has been deployed in Kyogamisaki, Japan, in
December 2014.22 Besides, North Koreas spy-boats, espionage operations and abduction incidents constitute a major irritant for Japan. Several instances
of North Korean spy vessels, camouflaged as fishing boats, venturing into Japanese territorial waters have been documented including the 2001 incident of
spy-boats in the sea southwest of Kyushu, the 1999 incident when suspicious vessels were identified off the coast of the Noto Peninsula and the October
1990 Mihama incident. Revised defence guidelines adding depth to the alliance The November 1978 defence guidelines were drawn up by the US-Japan
Security Consultative Committee under the guidance of James Schlesinger (the then US Secretary of Defence) and Michita Sakata (the then Director
General of the Defence Agency of Japan) during the Cold War keeping in mind the threat of a Soviet invasion. The guidelines outlined the distribution of
responsibility between the US military and the Japanese Self-Defence Force (SDF). While Japan was expected to have defence capabilitywithin the scope
necessary for self-defense, the US was supposed to uphold nuclear deterrent capability and the forward deployments of combat-ready forces.23 In case
of an armed attack against Japan, the SDF was to mainly conduct defensive operations in Japanese territory, its surrounding waters and airspace. The US
military agreed to conduct operations to complement functional areas which surpassed the limits of the SDF. While this arrangement worked during the
Cold War, it had to adapt to the drastically transformed environment of the postCold War era. The need for revisiting the defence guidelines surfaced in
the wake of the Taiwan Strait crisis and the North Korean challenge. While the 1995 Nye Initiative presented the policy rationale for continued US military
commitment in the Asia-Pacific region and redefining the US-Japan alliance, the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis offered both the US and Japan the raison dtre to
strengthen bilateral security ties. The strategic importance of Taiwan in securing Japans national interest was underscored during the crisis since most of
its oil imports sourced from the Middle East and trade passed through this maritime space. The significance of Okinawa base in the US military strategy
was stressed given its geographical proximity to Taiwan. The September 1997 revised guidelines presented three basic types of security cooperation
aimed at crafting a strong foundation for more effective and credible cooperation under normal circumstances; in case of an armed attack against
Japan; and in situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japans peace and security. A noteworthy development here
was that the revised guidelines charted an extended role for Japanese SDFs in the defence of not only Japans own territory, but also in areas surrounding
it during any contingency. Consequently, Japan was required to enact new laws to enable the SDF to contribute in a number of activities particularly those
connected to situations in areas surrounding Japan as indicated in the revised guidelines. The Diet had established the legal framework by 2000 and this
enabled Japan to cooperate with US forces in areas surrounding Japan. For long, the alliance suffered operational limitations as Japan refused to exercise
the right to collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. However, the 2015 revision of the US-Japan defence guidelines go beyond the
original post-World War bargain and is founded on the July 2014 reinterpretation of the concept of right to collective self-defence by the Abe
administration. Post-war Japan had considered the exercise of the right of collective self-defence as going beyond the limit on self-defence sanctioned
under Article 9 of its constitution and therefore not permissible. However, following criticism of chequebook diplomacy (Japan contributed $13 billion)
during the 1991 Gulf War, Japan incrementally expanded its role with overseas deployment of SDFs. Following the September 2001 attacks, Japan

supported the US-led war on terror. It promptly enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on October 29, 2001, which permitted the extension of
logistical and other support to US forces while at the same time constricting Japanese involvement in direct offensive combat. Three Maritime Self-Defence
Force (MSDF) vessels including the fuel supply vessel Hamana and the escort vessels Kurama and Kirisame left Sasebo naval base on November 9, 2001
for the Indian Ocean. Two more ships, the Sawagiri and the Towada, joined them later.24 MSDF vessels performed refuelling of other nations ships
involved in Operation Enduring Freedom. At the same time, the ASDF was involved in carrying cargo for the US military in Japan and abroad.25 Moreover,
Japan enacted the Law Concerning the Special Measures on the Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in July 2003. The Ground Self-Defence
Force (GSDF) was sent off to Samawah for humanitarian and reconstruction work. The ASDF was despatched to Kuwait for transporting supplies.
Subsequently, the rapidly changing East Asian security architecture compelled the leadership to initiate a fresh debate on Japans defence policy. After Abe
assumed power in December 2012, he spearheaded the national debate on the right to collective self-defence. The debate culminated in the July 2014
cabinet approval for re-interpreting the constitution. According to this re-interpretation, Japan possessed the right to exercise limited collective selfdefence as well as to engage in wider involvement in US military operations. And earlier this month, on May 14, 2015, the Japanese cabinet approved a
package of bills that would increase the role of the SDFs. The latest revision to the US-Japan defence guidelines is based on this fundamental shift in

The April 2015 US-Japan defence guideline revision agreed on

seamless defence cooperation in all phases from peacetime to contingencies . In the
Security Consultative Committee 2+2 meeting, the two countries agreed to cooperate in
intercepting ballistic missiles and asset protection, real-time information sharing
pertaining to ballistic missile threats and airspace infringement, expanding SDF
operations beyond areas surrounding Japan, joint operations to protect waters
surrounding Japan, enhancing maritime security by way of inspection of vessels,
sweeping international sea lanes for mines including in the Hormuz Strait, and SDF
operations to counter an armed attack against a foreign nation that has close
relations with Japan. While these revised guidelines bring a qualitative depth
to the alliance, it needs to be noted that they are not legally binding. Predicaments shaping the partnership
The need to sustain the US alliance at a time when Chinese President Xi Jinping is
promoting the concept of a New Type of Great Power Relations with the US, when
China has emerged as Americas biggest creditor, and when fears of entrapment
have grown within the US strategic community vis--vis the Senkaku dispute, has
compelled Japan to think about alternative security frameworks including with
Japanese security policy.

Australia and India. Moreover, budgetary constraints remain a major concern regarding future US commitments in

the US has welcomed the changes in Japanese security policy and has
revised the US-Japan defence guidelines factoring in the reinterpretation of Article
9, nevertheless, to operationalise the agreement, Abe needs to pass several laws in the Diet to translate the
the region. While

cabinet approval into action. Moreover, Abe also has to garner public support for these measures. A recent poll
conducted by Kyodo has brought out that 47.9 per cent were against and only 35.5 per cent for the revised
guidelines. Further, an Asahi Shimbun poll published on May 19 indicated that 60 per cent of respondents were
against the passage of new security laws in the ongoing Diet session. Another critical challenge in the US-Japan
alliance is the controversial plan to relocate US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from Ginowan to Henoko (Nago) in
Okinawa prefecture. Strong anti-base sentiments of the Okinawa Governor Takeshi Onaga and the local populations
abhorrence of the US military footprint given a series of crimes committed by US forces as well as noise pollution
and additional burden on taxpayers to maintain these bases, are major stumbling blocks for the Abe administration.

Abe is keen to strengthen Japans position in the fast changing regional security
environment by re-energising the security alliance with the US which has served as
the core of the countrys security policy since the end of World War II. Hence, his initiative
in advancing the concept of Active Pacifism and spearheading the domestic debate on the right to collective selfdefence in order to enable Japan to emerge as an equal partner and shoulder greater responsibilities within the
framework of the alliance. In addition, the idea is also to build Japans own capabilities for dealing with
developments in East Asia. Regional response The revised defence guidelines have triggered concerns in China.
Questioning the value of the US-Japan alliance, the Chinese defence ministry termed it as an out-dated product
and asserted that it should not harm the interests of any third party or contain the development of other
countries.26 For its part, the Chinese foreign ministry stressed that the alliance should not undermine regional
peace and stability. China has systematically accused the Abe administration of fabricating a China Threat Theory to
rationalise Abes ambition of a normal Japan and strengthened security alliances. South Korea, a major US ally in
the region and with which Japan has deep historical issues, exercised caution while responding to the revised
guidelines. Its foreign ministry indicated that it expects the US and Japan to engage in consultations with the South
Korean leadership vis--vis issues pertaining to security on the Korean Peninsula and South Koreas legitimate
national interests. Meanwhile, North Korea has referred to the alliance as a cancer like entity27 that poses a

Japan is at a crossroads. Shinzo Abes

Liberal Democratic Party and coalition partner Komeito have concurred on the new
serious security threat to the Korean Peninsula. Way ahead

security bills to expand the scope of the SDFs role abroad and the areas in which they can
operate. Abes cabinet approved the draft security bills on May 14. As the bills translate into laws,
cooperation between the SDF and US military will deepen in conformity with the
freshly revised defence cooperation guidelines. This fundamental shift in Japanese security policy
complements the US decades-old calls upon Japan to share a greater portion of the security burden in the alliance.

given that countries in the region are wary of Abes revisionist ambitions owing
to Japans aggressive policies in the past, it is Japans responsibility to make
tangible efforts for gaining the confidence of its neighbours and preventing China
from exploiting the historical fault lines to its own advantage. The US-Japan
convergence of interests and shared values of democracy and rule of law will sustain the alliance
in the coming years. Meanwhile, the US is cultivating relations with other regional actors including China
and South Korea. While the US is anxious about the status of relations between Japan and South Korea, Japan is
nervous about the evolving relationship between the US and China. Japan needs to
realise that the US will not be held captive in the intra-regional historical conflicts.
But

For instance, the State Department expressed its disappointment when Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in
December 2013. As nationalism runs high, any escalation of tension in the region, whether it is between China and
Japan or between Japan and the Korean Peninsula, is neither in the US nor in Japans interest. Regional stability

Though re-energising the USJapan security alliance and revising the US-Japan defence guidelines are positive
developments, unless there is de-escalation of tensions between Japan and China
and Japan and the two Koreas, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific are likely to be remote
possibilities.
cannot be solely guaranteed by reaffirming the US-Japan security alliance.

Assurance Now Polls

Polls prove allied confidence
Stokes 15 Bruce Stokes, director of global economic attitudes at Pew Research
Center, former senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund and a former
senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Jul 14 2015, Mixed public
response to America's pivot to Asia,
http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Geopolitico/Mixed-public-response-to-America-spivot-to-Asia?page=2
When asked if the U.S. should come to the defense if one of its Asian allies got into
a serious military conflict with China, 56% of Americans say Washington should
respond with military force. However, while 64% of U.S. men say Washington should respond with
force, only 48% of women hold this view. And there is a partisan division: 68% of Republicans are in favor of

major U.S. allies in the region

expect Uncle Sam to come to their defense in the event of a clash with China.
Some 73% of South Koreans, 66% of Filipinos and 60% of Japanese believe the
U.S. would use military force to defend them. Notably, in Japan young people
(70%) are more likely than those ages 50 or older (53%) to trust the U.S. to come to
their military aid. The U.S. pivot to Asia is an evolving project, with the TPP yet to be
completed and the military rebalancing a long-term effort . Both initiatives have more support in
Asia than they do in the U.S. But the public credibility of the pivot now seems wellestablished.
defending allies, compared with 49% for Democrats.

Nevertheless,

Links

Link Engagement
Engaging China reverses Japans military restraint and causes
re-arm.
Feng 9 [Zhu Feng the director of International Security Program and professor in
the School of International Studies of Peking University AN EMERGING TREND IN
EAST ASIA: MILITARY BUDGET INCREASES AND THEIR Impact Summer 2009
accessed July 16, 2010 IMPACT http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v33n4b.pdf]
Japans international stance is not fixed and unchangeable. Chinas
growing international clout is beginning to transform Japans long-held selfrestraint in defense thinking. Chinas military spending surpassed Japan in
2006, and the gap between Tokyo and Japan will continue to grow as long as the
Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) remains bent on rapid modernization . Chinas military
spending will, sooner or later, produce less tolerant behavior from Japan. At the same time, the
constructive U.S.-China relationship calls into question the U.S.
commitment to protect Japan if Tokyo comes into conflict with Beijing. There is
a remarkable tendency in Tokyo to see U.S. efforts to engage China as
detrimental to Japan. Many Japanese aligned with the Liberal Democratic
Party mistakenly interpret efforts to engage China as hostility, or at least,
the malign neglect of their own country. 30 Japans international behavior and
calculations, meanwhile have been premised on a strong U.S.-Japan security
alliance. In return, domestic political dynamics have done little to modify Japans geostrategic perspective. In the
However,

short and medium term, maintaining the U.S.-Japan security alliance is important mainly due to the China factor.

in the long run, it remains unclear if the comprehensive improvement of

the PLAs power capability both in quantity and quality will eventually undermine
Japans confidence, shake up alliance politics, and prompt Tokyo to embark
on a significant rearming process. Reinforcing Japans military commitment to
its alliance with the United States would be one way of addressing the growing
China concern. On the other hand, a rejuvenated nationalism in Tokyo could push the
country into assuming a more independent role in security . In either case, China might
be less motivated to slow down its pace of military modernization . The major powers
in East Asia might increase their struggle for geopolitical gain in the Taiwan Strait,
the South China Sea, and perhaps the entire East Asian region. Thus, a looming greatpower rivalry will overshadow the region
Nevertheless,

Shifting attention to China causes Japanese nuclearization no

barriers to proliferation.
Shulong 8 [Chu Shulong (Professor, School of Public Policy and Management,
Tsinghua University), A MECHANISM TO STABILIZE U.S.-CHINA-JAPAN TRILATERAL
RELATIONS IN ASIA, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN
POLICY STUDIES, January 2008, https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/2736/uploads]
Japan may increase its military force substantially, and go beyond its bilateral
alliance with the United States in search of a bigger role in Asia and in the world. Not only may Japan
become a strong conventional military power again, but it may also become a nuclear power. As the

Japan certainly has the economic, financial, and

technological capability to substantially expand its military power and become a normal
country, when it feels the need to do so. It may also feel the need to react to Chinas military
buildup and it may have to increase its military power substantially if it suspects
that the protection afforded by its alliance with the United States is no
longer firm or sufficient. Japan is now on its way to becoming a political power in Asia and in the world,
worlds second largest economy,

following its rise to economic power twenty or thirty years ago. Once Japan believes it has become a regional and
global political power, then it may also want to become much stronger military power. Japan does not currently
pursue such a strategy, but it may when the situation in Asia changes in the future. Japans potential to become a
greater military power has been noticed by certain Chinese, American, and Japanese observers. In a recent issue of
Foreign Affairs, Eugene Matthews wrote that the December 18, 2001, North Korean spy ship event demonstrated
that Tokyo was suddenly willing to use force, which suggested a major shift in the attitudes of the Japanese about

This
development could have an alarming consequence: namely, the rise of a
militarized, assertive, and nuclear-armed Japan. Japan is clearly moving in
a different direction.2 Matthews argues that Japanese resentment over the United
Statess shift of attention to China, coupled with Japan-China strategic
tensions, has strengthened the hand of Japanese nationalists who think
their country should once more possess military power to rival that of its neighbors. The
lack of recognition of Japan in international institutions strikes many Japanese as
profoundly unjust, and leads some to wonder whether military rearmament might
be one way to help their country get the respect it deserves. In the words of Kitaoka Shinichi,
their country and its defense. rising nationalism has taken hold in one of Americas closest allies.

a University of Tokyo law professor whom Matthews cites, Remilitarization is indeed going on.3 When Shinzo Abe
was about to take office as Japans Prime Minister in September 2006, the New York Times and other news media
published many articles and reports on the rise of Japanese nationalism, represented by Junichiro Koizumi and
Shinzo Abe. According to the Washington Post, Prime Minister Abe would encourage Japanese citizens to take pride
in their countryand promote the ideal of a proud and independent Japan.4

Abe had a big vision for the

future of Japan. Rather than getting praised for wrestling a good round of sumo under the rules that foreign
countries make, we should join in the making of the rules, he said in televised debate in September 2006, I
believe I can create a new Japan with a new vision.5 The Post further reported that he would implement a
sweeping education bill, strengthening the notion of patriotism in public classrooms in a way not seen since the fall
of Imperial Japan, and would rewrite

Japans pacifist constitution to allow the country to

again have an official and flexible military. It claimed that [t]he rise of Abe, an
unabashed nationalist set to be Japans youngest post postwar prime minister and its
first to be born after the conflict, underscores a profound shift in thinking that
has been shaped by those threats.6

Link Decoupling
US-China cooperation causes Japanese decoupling fears that
damages the alliance and incentivizes militarization.
Glosserman 13 [Brad Glosserman (executive director of the Pacific Forum CSIS
in Honolulu, contributing editor to The Japan Times, lecturer on Japanese politics at
the Institute for the International Education of Students, J.D. from George
Washington University, an M.A. from Johns Hopkins Universitys School of Advanced
International Studies), The China challenge and the US-Japan Alliance, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 11/21/13,
http://csis.org/files/publication/Pac1383.pdf]
The biggest issue for the US-Japan alliance is China. Washington and Tokyo
must address the direct challenges that Beijing poses to regional security as well as
manage the impact of China's rise on their bilateral relationship. The latter
is the more difficult of the two assignments: while there is considerable common
ground in the two countries' assessment of China, there is a growing gap between
Americans and Japanese on how to respond to Chinese behavior. On paper, the two
countries are in lockstep when it comes to China. The language of the last Security Consultative Committee
meeting (the SCC, usually called the "2+2") is explicit: The US and Japan "continue to encourage China to play a
responsible and constructive role in regional stability and prosperity, to adhere to international norms of behavior,
as well as to improve openness and transparency in its military modernization with its rapid expanding military
investments." It sounds like boilerplate, but it hits the right notes, identifying concerns and telling Beijing what they
expect it to do. But beneath this concord, there is discord. When it comes to China, Japan is
channeling the spirit of Margaret Thatcher, who once warned President George HW Bush to "not go wobbly" when

Japanese experts and officials voice two concerns. The first is a fear of
"decoupling" the US and Japan, a worry since President Bill Clinton overflew
Tokyo twice on his way to and from Beijing. Japanese worry that they have been
eclipsed by China as the US's preferred partner in Asia. There is teeth gnashing
in Tokyo every time the US-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue convenes,
and Prime Minister Abe Shinzo is still waiting for his shirt-sleeves Sunnylands summit with President Obama. Fears
of decoupling have receded - but haven't vanished - and Tokyo now frets over "mutual
vulnerability" (sometimes called "strategic stability"), a world in which China's nuclear arsenal makes
dealing with the Soviets.

Washington hesitant to respond to Chinese aggression. This leads to a "stability-instability paradox": a situation in
which the prospect of mutual pain creates stability at the strategic level (MAD provided this during the Cold War)

The geographic focus of this particular

fear is the Senkaku Islands, uninhabited islets in the East China Sea that are held by Japan and claimed by
but invites small-scale provocations or aggression locally.

China (and called the Daioyutai in Chinese), that have become the locus of tensions in the Japan-China relationship.
Even though the US has insisted for years that the islands are covered under the US-Japan Security Treaty, Japanese
are not mollified. The standard US response is that the "US takes no stand on the claims to disputed territory, but

Japanese experts
and officials urge the US to be more forward leaning, actually backing Japan's claim
to the islands as well as chastising China for threatening instability in the region. They prefer
the Senkakus are covered under Article 5 of the treaty as 'territory administered by Japan.' "

language from the Trilateral Security Dialogue (which includes the US, Japan and Australia), released a day after the
SCC statement, which decries "coercive or unilateral actions that could change the status quo in the East China
Sea," wording more explicit than that in the 2+2 declaration. What accounts for the gap in perspectives? One

Japan feels threatened now by Chinese actions . As a Japanese scholar

explained, "this is the first occasion in which the Japanese people really sense the
possibility that Japanese territory under control of their government may be
menaced by an external enemy." The US is also worried by Chinese behavior, but the threat is more
difference is obvious:

distant, both in terms of geography and time, and more abstract (typically framed in regard to a shifting balance of

This reflects a second difference: how each country ranks security threats.
China tops Japan's list, while the US identifies North Korea as its immediate regional
concern. The US may be dragged into conflict in both cases, but Pyongyang is considered a more belligerent and
unpredictable force than Beijing. Third, there is the context in which each country frames
relations with China. China is among both countries' top trading partners and the destination of considerable
investment from both. But Washington sees relations with Beijing more broadly, engaging it
as a partner across a range of endeavors, while Japan's perspective is narrower - it
sees China primarily as a threat. US references to a strategic partnership, or
sometimes even cooperation, with China raise temperatures in Tokyo. Other
power).

factors tug on the alliance. The bitter, bloody history of Japan-China relations during the 20th century distinguishes
regional analysis in Tokyo and Washington, creating expectations and obstacles for Japan that the US doesn't face.
(Ironically, in the 1980s, this history pushed Tokyo closer to Beijing than the US liked.) Beijing is quick to widen
perceived gaps in thinking between Washington and Tokyo, playing up the image of an irresponsible US or an

Some Japanese hawk a China threat because it supports their political

agenda, whether increasing military spending or loosening constitutional
restrictions on the Self-Defense Forces. Highlighting a China threat also
reinforces the message that Tokyo is a serious ally, ready to pull its weight on regional
security concerns. Unfortunately, while many in the US back these moves, Japanese messaging has
been ham fisted, arguing that Tokyo must change the interpretation of the right of
collective self-defense because in some cases Japan might not be able to defend its own territory, an
irresolute Japan.

argument that inadvertently plays up the image of an irresponsible ally. Some insist that problems in the US-Japan
relationship spring from Japanese insecurities. That is true - up to a point. But those insecurities, real or imagined,

while pursuing cooperation with

China, and urging Tokyo to do the same, Americans must push back against the notion that there is an
equilateral triangle among Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing . Our alliance
are a problem for the alliance and need to be deflated. As a start,

fundamentally distinguishes the US-Japan relationship from that of the US and China.

Engagement with China is perceived as decoupling damages

assurance.
Santoro and Warden 15 (David Santoro is a senior fellow at the Pacific
Forum CSIS. John K. Warden is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Pacific Forum CSIS,
Assuring Japan and South Korea in the Second Nuclear Age.
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring201
5_Santoro-Warden.pdf . Pub: Spring 2015.)
If a conflict arises between South Korea and North Korea, Japan and
North Korea, or Japan and China, U.S. allies want to be confident that the United States
will come to their defense. But just as important, allies want adversaries to have no
doubt that the United States will respond decisively, so that China and North Korea
deterredavoid using military means to challenge allied interests in the first
place. In an ideal world for allies, their protection would be the highest U.S. priority
and the cost of U.S. intervention would be low . But in reality, the United States has a
number of competing global interests and the cost of any major conventional, let
alone nuclear, war is extremely high. Japan and South Korea question U.S. extended
deterrence commitments when they perceive an increased risk of
decoupling: either they believe that the cost of U. S. intervention or escalation on
their behalf becomes significantly higher or that the United States is less concerned
with their interests. In this respect, both North Korea and China pose an assurance
challenge. North Koreas nuclear weapon and missile programs continue to advance, leading to the perception in allied capitals that Pyongyang
Dealing with the Fear of Decoupling

can hold targets at risk in South Korea, Japan, and potentially even Guam.42 Allies worry that, at some point, North Korea will be able to credibly threaten
the U.S. homeland. There is ongoing debate about North Koreas existing capability, including questions about the reliability of its medium- and long-range
missiles and its ability to miniaturize an effective nuclear delivery device.43 However, according to the Department of Defenses most recent public
assessment in February 2014, Advances in ballistic missile delivery systems, coupled with developments in nuclear technologyare in line with North
Koreas stated objective of being able to strike the U.S. homeland.44 General Curtis Scaparrotti echoed this sentiment in October 2014 when he said that
North Korea has the capability to have miniaturized a device at this point, and they have the technology to potentially actually deliver what they say they
have.45 Scaparrotti also noted that, regardless of the precise character of the DPRKs current capability, the United States already must account for an
increased risk when determining whether to intervene in or escalate during a conflict with North Korea.46 North Korea poses, using the formulation
presented above, an increasing redzone extended deterrence and assurance challenge. North Koreas strategy is nuclear brinksmanship, not nuclear warfighting.47 Rather than using nuclear weapons to achieve a favorable military outcomea fools errand given North Koreas small arsenalPyongyang is
likely to use nuclear threats to attempt to get the United States and its allies to back down during a crisis. It might, for example, use a single nuclear
weapon over open ocean, for a high-altitude explosion, or on a relatively remote military target, then threaten to launch additional weapons toward Seoul,
Tokyo, and/or Los Angeles if South Korea, Japan, or the United States retaliates. A key element of North Koreas strategy is to challenge cohesion of the
respective U.S. alliances, and even more so the U.S.JapanROK trilateral relationship. This strategy, along with North Koreas improved nuclear and
missile capability, has created the perception in South Korea of a security gap.48 Similarly, Japanese experts are worried that North Korea may now be
able to compel the United States to decouple from the region.49 To assure allies that North Koreas strategy is unlikely to succeed, the United States
should combine public statements, a commitment to offensive and defense systems, and an aggressive policy to slow North Koreas nuclear and missile
program. First, the United States should continue to demonstrate resolve, especially during times of high tension, by repeatedly reiterating that it will not
allow North Korea, or any adversary, to escalate [its] way out of failed conventional aggression.50 Washington should clearly state that any nuclear use
by North Korea would have serious consequences and discuss with allies the preemptive steps it might take to prevent a North Korean nuclear launch and
the retaliatory actions it might take should North Korea succeed in carrying out a nuclear strike. The United States should, in particular, ensure that allies
understand its thought process for deciding whether to use conventional or nuclear forces. Second, the United States should continue to invest in a
combination of strike capabilities and missile defense systems that, during a crisis or limited conflict, would allow Washington to limit and possibly negate
North Koreas nuclear and long-range missile threats.51 The United States should modernize its nuclear forces, while maintaining credible options for
limited nuclear strikes. It should also attempt to maintain a conventional preemptive posture by taking advantage of emerging non-kinetic technologies52
and continuing to pursue Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) systems,53 including reopening the proposal to convert a portion of its submarinelaunched Trident missiles to conventional payloads.54 It should also upgrade its ground-based mid-course defense system and continue to cooperatively
develop the Standard Missile (SM)-3 Block 2A interceptor with Japan. All the while, the United States should highlight the role of these capabilities in
dialogues with South Korea and Japan. Finally, the United States should redouble its efforts to disrupt North Koreas nuclear and missile programs by
targeting key trading companies that provide revenue and technology.55 Together these steps will demonstrate to allies that 1) the United States still has
various options to counter the North Korean nuclear and missile threat; and 2) even if that threat becomes more credible, the United States would remain

The decoupling challenge vis-a`-vis China is far more complex. To start,

the military cost of a U.S. China war continues to rise. China has long had the
capability to reliably strike the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons, and unlike with
North Korea, the United States cannot obviate this fact. Chinas technological
sophistication and vast resources ensure that the combined strategic capabilities
of the United States are not, and realistically cannot be, sufficiently numerous and
reliable to deny China the ability to deliver nuclear warheads to the continental
United States, no matter how much surprise the United States may achieve .56
Moreover, while the United States retains a large absolute conventional military
advantage over China, the relative advantage is narrowing .57 Of particular worry to U.S. allies
resolved to meet it.

is Chinas investment in anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that will limit the U.S. ability to project power in
Asia. According to a former Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the conventional superiority advantage is
critical, because it obviates the whole debate about whether or not Washington would sacrifice Los Angeles to save
Tokyo in a nuclear exchange.58 At the same time, the economic and political costs of a war between the United
States and China continue to grow. Unlike the Soviet Union, China is a competitor and potential adversary of the
United States, but also a critical partner. The U.S. and Chinese economies are more integrated than ever before,

China works with the United States to solve global challenges such as climate
change, infectious disease, and piracy. Together, Chinas growing military power
and political influence unnerve U.S. allies. They worry that because of the
narrowing conventional military balance between the United States and China, the
United States may prove unwilling to endure the costs of even a limited war with
China, instead opting to concede on their core interests to prevent escalation.
Tokyo in particular is concerned that the United States might begin to
think that the U.S.China relationship is more important than the U.S.
Japan alliance. As Ambassador Linton Brooks puts it, a closer U.S. relationship
with China will lead to a gap between U.S. and Japans security
perspectives, weakening the U.S. commitment.59 For the United States, there is no
easy solution to these assurance challenge s, but there are important steps that can help mitigate
and

allied anxiety. A large part of the allied perception that the United States is in decline relative to China comes from
weakness at home. The U.S. economy continues to recover from the 2008 financial crisis, but has still not reclaimed
its international reputation as the robust, resilient engine of global growth. Even worse, U.S. defense austerity
combined with renewed calls for U.S. military engagement in Europe and the Middle East have caused Japanese
officials and experts to doubt whether the United States has the will and capacity to maintain a long-term

commitment in East Asia.60 The 2013 defense sequester continues to shortchange military investment and cripple

allies question whether the dysfunctional U.S. political

system can right the ship.
effective long-term planning, and

Link Zero-Sum
US-China relations are zero-sum with Japan perception of
increased engagement causes Japanese militarism.
Govella 7 [Kristi Govella (Visiting Researcher @ University of Tokyo Institute of
Social Science, Research Fellow @ Waseda University Institute of Asia-Pacific
Studies, East Asia Project Director of the Berkeley Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
Study Center, M.A. in Political Science from UC Berkeley, Intern @ US Department of
State, Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs, Office of Regional & Security Policy),
Accommodating the Rise of China: Toward a Successful U.S.-Japan Alliance in
2017, CSIS Pacific Forum Issues & Insights, vol. 7, no. 16 (September 2007)]
The U.S.-Japan alliance has been the cornerstone of East Asian security for over five
decades and will continue to be an important part of regional affairs for years to come.
However, this alliance must be altered to account for the significant shifts in global, regional, and domestic
dynamics that have occurred since its establishment in 1951. Recent years have marked crucial initial steps in this
process, but much work still remains to be done. In 10 years, the U.S.-Japan alliance should be a source of stability
that works more inclusively to drive collaboration on the part of all regional actors; in order to accomplish this, it
must provide an atmosphere conducive to a peaceful Chinese ascension and a new conception of Japanese

I identify three
interrelated issues that have been exacerbated by the rise of China: the existence
of a zero-sum mentality with regard to regional leadership, the threat of a security
dilemma posed by mistrust between Japan and China, and the persistence of a
historical legacy that has fed nationalistic tendencies in both countries. I outline steps
leadership, while mediating the tensions between these two regional powers. In this essay,

that the U.S. can take to ameliorate these problems and to recraft the U.S.-Japan alliance in a way that better

Attitudes toward leadership in East

Asia are permeated by a zero-sum mentality; according to this line of thought,
either Japan or China can be the regional leader, and the U.S. will align
itself with only one of the two countries to best pursue its interests. In reality,
reflects and anticipates the changing realities of East Asia.

an exclusive alliance between the U.S. and either of these countries no longer makes sense in modern East Asia;
instead, the task must be to build good relations between the U.S. and both countries. Consequently, the U.S. must
strike a balance between supporting Japan through the U.S.-Japan alliance and facilitating Chinas peaceful rise. The
China portion of this equation is impossible to ignore, and indeed, giving China the incentives to progress down a

it is
also vital that the U.S. avoid giving the impression (real or perceived) that
Japan is being ignored or undermined by its long-time ally. In giving
increased emphasis to relations with China, there is a natural danger that
Japan might feel displaced. For example, in a 2007 report from the Japan Defense Research Center,
path of peaceful integration and benign competition is a key part of a successful strategy in Asia. However,

Takayama Masaji cites Chinese wish for a dissolution of U.S.-Japan relations as a potential threat and cites the
insult of President Bill Clintons failure to visit Japan after a 10-day visit to China in 1999. Takayama also mentions
changes in American referents for China; he notes Clintons use of the term strategic partner and Bushs

It is clear that
Japan is highly sensitive to changes in its relative status, and
consequently, the U.S. must tread carefully as it tries to accommodate the
growing power of China. Aside from proceeding with deliberate caution, the U.S. can also counter this
movement from labeling the PRC a strategic competitor to recognizing it as a stakeholder.

zero-sum mentality by solidifying its relationship with Japan under the current terms of the alliance as it
simultaneously builds relations with China. Concretely, this could involve further development of mechanisms for
joint planning and coordination in security situations, which would ensure that the partnership could function
quickly and effectively in the event of a contingency. Relocating U.S. military bases in Japan to better reflect future
challenges is a good first step, but further development of the alliance will require defining the roles, missions, and
capabilities each country should bring to a situation and then developing those abilities through bilateral training.
Moreover,

the U.S. should work with Japan to create a coordinated China policy so that ,

Japan does not find itself caught by surprise with regard to

developments in U.S.-China relationships. Strengthening of the alliance will require the initiation and
maintenance of long-standing personal relationships between policymakers in both countries. In addition to
ameliorating this problem of zero-sum attitudes, the U.S.-Japan alliance will also
have to avert the emergence of a security dilemma. The mistrust between China
and Japan means that Beijing fears both a strengthening and a weakening of the U.S.-Japan
alliance; while the former would grant a larger security role to Japan, the latter might result in a
hawkish return to militancy by a Japan unfettered by obligations to the U.S.
Japan, in turn, is wary of Chinese ambitions to undermine its relationship with the U.S.
and cognizant of investment in Chinese military capabilities. Thus, while it is important that
at the very least,

Japan take on greater security responsibility, it is important that this be done in a way that does not alarm China;
even defensive roles for Japan can seem threatening in this atmosphere of suspicion. One solution is for the U.S. to
draw the focus of Japanese military activity away from the region, folding the Japanese security role into a larger
mission of international peacekeeping; relatedly, any participation of the Self-Defense Forces in peacekeeping
missions should be not performed under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan alliance but instead within a framework of
international or regional cooperation. By helping other nations in this manner, Japan can claim moral high ground
and assuage fears about a return to its imperialist past, increasing its soft power and international credibility. This
approach would allow Japans military development and participation to be framed as a public good instead of as a
threat to regional security, shifting attention away from contentious areas such as the Taiwan Strait.

Link Perception
Japan is hyper-sensitive to U.S.-China policy and the plan
incentivizes them to pursue an independent security role.
Koizumi 7 [Shinjiro Koizumi (Research Associate for the Office of the Japan Chair
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies), Requirements for the JapanU.S. Alliance and the Rise of China, CSIS Pacific Forum Issues & Insights, vol. 7, no.
16 (September 2007)]
It is impossible to ignore the China factor when considering the future of the U.S.Japan alliance. Although the reinterpretation of the right of collective-self defense is necessary for Japan to
feel more confident about its role in the region, Japan must not regard that as part of an effort to contain or hedge
against China with the U.S. It is often said that there are two scenarios for Chinas rise, one optimistic and one
pessimistic. The optimistic scenario features China as a responsible stakeholder that contributes to regional
prosperity by becoming more democratic and working actively with other regional powers to resolve common
problems in East Asia. The pessimistic scenario presents a China that would remain nationalistic, mercantilistic, and
undemocratic, and faces serious social problems that could bring chaos, and requires an extremely strong and well-

an optimistic case does

not mean that the Japan-U.S. alliance does not face challenges regarding the rise of
China. On the contrary, China as a responsible stakeholder could pose other difficult
questions for the alliance. Chinas positive role in the region and the world can create more areas of
coordinated U.S.-Japan leadership to maintain regional stability. On the other hand,

cooperation for Japan and the U.S. If Japan and China can find a way to manage their history and the East China Sea
resource development issues, Japan-China relations could become hot politics, hot economics (the current situation
is hot economics, cold politics). The U.S. would also strengthen its political, economic, and military ties with China.
If China becomes a responsible stakeholder and plays a constructive role not only on the issue of denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula (as it has done so far), but also for other issues such as Irans nuclear program, stabilization
of the Middle East, or a positive contribution to poverty reduction and economic growth in Africa, it would be natural
for the U.S. to work more closely with China. It also seems reasonable for Japan to cooperate more with China.

Chinas rise as a responsible stakeholder would require very careful alliance

management by both Japan and the U.S. Historically, closer U.S.-China
relations tend to create a perception in Japan of Japan passing, and
Japan has tended to judge U.S. presidents on whether they are pro-Japan
or pro-China. Hence the question is whether Japan can regard closer U.S.-China
relations as a good stability in Asia. It is very difficult for Japan to welcome Chinas
bigger role if Chinas rise means the advent of a new regional power balance: China as
However,

a regional leader and Japan as a country in decline. In order to prevent this, Japan needs to play a greater security
role in the region by exercising the right of collective self-defense. This does not mean a hedging strategy against
China. On the contrary, it gives Japan more responsibility and confidence to build stable Japan-U.S.-China relations.

Japan is always looking at how the U.S. treats China and how it is treated
by the U.S. vis- -vis China. The U.S. must be sensitive to this Japanese
psychology. Japan has been proud of its status as the worlds second largest
economy and considers that part of its national identity, but it will lose the status
sooner or later and face the painful reality that China and India are catching up at a
frightening pace. Japan has a dilemma. On the one hand, it acknowledges that a China that follows a
stakeholder scenario is in Japans interest. On the other hand, it worries that the stakeholder scenario
would lead the U.S. to pay less attention to Japan. Japan would continue
suffering from the dilemma as long as it maintains a limited security role
under the current interpretation of the right of collective self-defense. Conclusion Facing
limitations of its security role, the post-9/11 world situation, and a new generation of leaders, Japan seems to be
headed for a consensus on the reinterpretation of the right of collective self-defense in order to play a greater
security role. In addition, it is important to recognize the important role of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the context of a
rising China. No one expects stability in Northeast Asia without the alliance. Japan and the U.S. have every reason

to keep enhancing the alliance to accommodate the peaceful rise of China and address new and emerging threats.
However, Japan will never become fully confident of its relations with the U.S. without assuming a greater role as an
ally. Confidence is the foundation of the alliance, and a more confident Japan will reinforce
the basis of the Japan-U.S. alliance and deepen mutual trust. For building a healthy U.S.-Japan-China triangle, a
Japan that can exercise the right of collective self-defense is a necessary component, and it will be a public good in
Asia.

U.S.-China relations scare Japan towards remilitarization

engagement is a strategic opportunity cost to the Japanese
alliance.
Silver 2000 [Neil E. Silver (Cyrus R. Vance Fellowship in Diplomatic Studies @
Council on Foreign Relations, Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs at U.S. Embassy
to Japan) The United States, Japan, and China: Setting the Course, Council on
Foreign Relations, 3/24/2000]
Japan was also greatly concerned about Americas alliance fidelity during President
Bill Clintons first administration because of the lack of a U.S. strategic focus and,
especially, the emphasis on trade-deficit reduction. From 1995, the Japanese were gradually reassured with the Nye
Initiative and the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines review.1 However, since the United States and Japan acted to

China has warned that Japans expanded role could be the first
step toward Japanese remilitarization, and it has expressed concerns about an
increasingly independent Japan. 2 China has made clear that it now prefers a
hollowed out U.S.-Japan security alliance to the stronger, more effective alliance envisioned in
strengthen their alliance,

the 1997 U.S.-Japan Joint Defense Guidelines. China has pressured Japan on the guidelines but has gone relatively

this
unpleasant experience has enhanced the strong Japanese trend toward a more
hard-nosed and wary approach to China. The Japanese have concluded that
China is now the most important and unpredictable geopolitical variable in
Asias future. American policymakers and others need to consider the policy implications of new
trends in China-Japan relations for the United States. Conversely, they need to consider the impact
of changes in U.S.-China relations on Japan. In reaction to the twists and turns
in U.S.-China relations, Japanese opinion leaders have traditionally worried that
America will either ignore Japan in its rush toward China or antagonize China without considering
Japans vital interests.3 Though the United States can hedge and constantly adjust its strategy
and tactics vis-a-vis China and Japan, choices entail costsAmericas influence may
dissipate if it endlessly changes its course. The other conclusions of this study follow:
easy on the United States. Japan, as the weaker alliance partner, has sidestepped Chinas pressure tactics. But

Link Empirics
Empirics go negative relations with China historically trade
off with Japan.
Silver 2000 [Neil E. Silver (Cyrus R. Vance Fellowship in Diplomatic Studies @
Council on Foreign Relations, Minister-Counselor for Political Affairs at U.S. Embassy
to Japan) The United States, Japan, and China: Setting the Course, Council on
Foreign Relations, 3/24/2000]
The United States has struggled for a century to define and redefine its strategic
relationship with China and Japan. From the beginning of the twentieth century until
the latter part of the Cold War in the 1970s, the United States never simultaneously had
good relations with China and Japan. As an emerging Asia-Pacific power in the
early 1900s, the United States fashioned its policies in reaction to the Qing
dynastys decline and the Russo-Japanese contest for Northeast Asian hegemony. Given Russias ambitions
elsewhere in Eurasia, British lobbying, and the American disgust with Russias pogroms and other abuses,

America leaned toward Japan. There were dissenters, some asking why America needed to take sides
and others concerned about Koreas fate. Nevertheless, the United States stepped in to end the 19045 RussoJapanese War on terms favorable to Japan, and it later acquiesced to Japans annexation of Korea in 1910.

Following World War II, during which it allied with China and the Soviet Union, the United
States pushed Japan back to its home islands. As a delayed consequence of Japans rollback and
the civil war in China, from 1950 to 1953 the United States and South Korea fought North Korea and the new
communist Chinese regime to a stalemate. Japan was a logistical key to Americas and South Koreas efforts.
Although the Sino-Soviet split later changed the strategic calculus in East Asia, it took two decades for the United
States and China to move beyond their strong mutual antagonism. Finally, in 197172 they formed a strategic
partnershipout of a mutual needaimed at containing Soviet influence in East Asia. In the context of that
partnership, the United States convinced China that the U.S.-Japan security alliance was of strategic value to both
China and the United States. In the 1980s, Chinas reform successes, the arrival of a new Soviet leadership, the
rotting of the Soviet domestic economy, and the bitter fruits of the Soviet regional and global overreach impelled
the Soviet Union toward rapprochement with China on terms favorable to the latter. Rapprochement was achieved
ceremonially in Tiananmen Square only days before the June 1989 crackdown there and only months before the
Soviet Union started to come apart at the seams. The Tiananmen incident and the Soviet collapse fundamentally

As
the 21st century begins, America again faces strategic choices in Asia. Now China
is the rising power. This historic moment recalls for many Germanys rise at the turn of the previous
century. Despite attempts by American and Chinese political leaders to stabilize
relations and revive their strategic cooperation, bilateral diplomatic relations since
1989 have been far rockier than in the 197189 period. Yet while diplomatic relations are
bedeviled by a host of issueshuman rights, the trade imbalance, proliferation,
Taiwan, and moretrade and people-to-people exchanges continue to flourish. In contrast, despite trade
frictions the U.S.-Japan alliance remains as strong as ever , indeed perhaps even stronger. Russia
altered the dynamics of U.S.-China relations, raising still-unanswered questions in both Washington and Beijing.

cannot be counted out, but it is now a weakened regional player, despite its continuing arms sales to North Korea
and China. Another important change compared with the early 1900s is that the Korean and ASEAN statesall of
which, except Thailand, have been independent since the end of World War II, figure into East Asian political,
security, and economic calculations, as does Taiwan. Nevertheless, most eyes are on China. Many, including
thoughtful Chinese, wonder what the country will do with its growing power, assuming that its economic growth and
political stability continue. Despite the Tiananmen crackdown, Chinese politics have been relatively stable since
1978, although unresolved domestic political tensions remain close to the surface. Internationally, however, the
1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Chinas missile and nuclear proliferation activities, its military activity in the South
China Sea, and its threat to use force against Taiwan (including its 199596 missile tests near Taiwan) have
undermined many peoples fragile acceptance of Chinas benign role. The Taiwan missile tests in particular recall
other post-1949 Chinese political decisions and military actions that contributed to messyand sometimes long and
costlyconflicts on and beyond its borders: with the United States and other U.N. forces in Korea, and with Taiwan,
India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Chinas steady military modernization efforts have generally not been

exaggerated abroad, but they have drawn continued foreign scrutiny. There are good reasons for other countries to
be wary of China and to study its potential, motives, and intentions. PUTTING RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND CHINA
ON PARALLEL TRACKS Unquestionably, China has the potential to alleviate or exacerbate an array of regional

China has been, and can continue to be, an ad hoc strategic partner of the United
States, but barring another decisive turn in regional or global affairs, there is no
prospect of the two countries becoming strategic allies. In sobering terms, American officials in
problems.

early 1999 reiterated that the constructive strategic partnership with China envisioned during Clinton and
President Jiang Zemins meetings at the October 1997 Washington summit and the June 1998 Beijing summit was a
goal worth building toward, not a statement of present fact.8

In contrast, Japan is a key American

security and political ally. About 47,000 of Americas 100,000 military personnel deployed in the AsiaPacific region are based or home-ported in Japan. Japan contributes about $5 billion annually to underwrite the cost
of maintaining U.S. forces there. Moreover, despite Japans decade-long economic stagnation, it remains Asias
largest and the worlds second-largest economy. In quantifiable money terms, Japans $4.2 trillion economy is more
than six times larger than Chinas economy and comprises more than 60 percent of total East Asian gross domestic
product (GDP).9 Finally, unlike China, Japan shares core democratic values and institutions with the United States,

For a
variety of political and historical reasons, American policymakers and analysts in
and outside government have typically framed relations with China and Japan
separately, not in parallel. True, American political leaders, strategists, and diplomats have paid
and over the past 50 years, the United States and Japan have invested enormously in their relationship.

attention to the competitive strategic and political components in China-Japan relations, but arguably this has not

With the Soviet Unions collapse, Chinas rise, and Japans economic
stagnation, Chinese and Japanese competitive impulses are looming again
as important factors in their relations and, more subtly, in Americas relations with both
East Asian giants.
been enough.

Past diplomatic crises prove the link.

Minamide 15 [Alyssa M. Minamide (Arthur R. Adams International Affairs Fellow
@ Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, B.A. in International Relations
from Claremont McKenna College), "Deterring Nuclear Attacks on Japan: An
Examination of the U.S.-Japan Relationship and Nuclear Modernization, 4/27/15,
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2162&context=cmc_theses]
the Japanese also had reason to worry about U.S. policy , specifically the Nixon Doctrine.
calling into question
once again the issue of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence in that area of the
world. From the Japanese perspective, the U.S. was not only slowly abandoning it as
an ally but was also reaching out to its political enemies, namely through dtente with
the Soviet Union over nuclear arsenals and rapprochement with China.100 This was not the intent of the
U.S.; if anything, the U.S. was trying to unite China and Japan into a trilateral
strategic alliance in order to band against the Soviet Union, and ensuring sufficient deterrent capabilities in
the region was an absolute priority in order to make the grand strategy happen. However, the Japanese
fear of entrapment in other international crises, combined with the
questions of U.S. credibility and Chinese nuclear blackmail that had been
lingering since the 1960s, made a reactionary response to Nixon policies more
and more likely. Yasuhiro Nakasone was one of the first Japanese officials to actively respond to the Nixon
Yet

They viewed it as a preview for a later U.S. withdrawal from the East Asian region,

Doctrine and subsequent statements. The nationalistic leader of the Liberal Democratic Party and the director

Nakasone determined that while Japan would not directly benefit

from developing its own nuclear weapons, it needed a more secure guarantee from the U.S. in
terms of maintaining proper defensive forces. Nakasone ruffled feathers in the diplomatic
general of the Japan Defense Agency,

communities of both parties, as he sought to obtain explicit reassurance from U.S. military officials of nuclear

protection and even suggested that Japan should allow the United States to bring nuclear weapons into Japan in
emergencies.101 Nothing too productive came from the Nakasone initiative, namely because of the difficulties of
getting such extreme measures through the U.S. and Japanese legislatures and the contradictory diplomacy of the

Nakasone laid the

groundwork for a few more Japanese nationalistic reactions to Nixon policies to
reignite a serious debate on nuclear weapons and how they should best
protect Japan in light of external threats. Just as the responses to the Nixon Doctrine were
dying down, Nixon added fuel to the fire of tensions in the U.S.-Japan security
relationship in July 1971, when he made an official visit to China without informing
Japanese Prime Minister Sato until three minutes beforehand.102 This diplomatic disaster,
known as the Nixon Shock, came especially hard to the Japanese. The last thing
Japan wanted to see was Japan Passing, in other words, the U.S. bypassing it on
the list of priorities to visit the Chinese, one of its more bitter political
enemies. Serious damage was done to the trust and confidence between
the two governments, as well as to the domestic and international reputation of Prime Minister Sato.
Anti-U.S. sentiments increased in Japan in response to Japanese officials perception of having been
Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi, who took a more moderate stance. In spite of this,

deceived by policymakers such as Nixon and Kissinger. This was not helped by the apparent double standard of
Nixon and Kissinger, who wanted at all costs to prevent Japan-China collusion against the U.S. At the January 1972
summit with Sato and the February 1972 summit with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Nixon and Kissinger used
tailored diplomatic arguments in an attempt to persuade the leaders of both countries that staying with the U.S.
and not normalizing Japan-China relations was the optimal path.

Empirically perceive Chinese engagement as abandonment.

Dittmer 14 [Lowell Dittmer (Professor of Political Science @ UC Berkeley, Visiting
Professor of the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, PhD from
UChicago), JAPAN, CHINA AND THE AMERICAN PIVOT: A TRIANGULAR ANALYSIS,
EAI Working Paper No. 163, 5/26/14,
http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/publications/files/EWP163.pdf]
The
post-Cold War period has been one in which Chinas economic development has
gone into overdrive while Japans economy has stalled. Chinas 2010 passing Japan
in GDP seems to have inspired more assertive Chinese claims regarding territorial
disputes, with India and several Southeast Asian countries as well as Japan. Thus the realpolitik
becomes one of power transition.21 This is probably more important than differing
So what do these parallel but diverging alliance experiences have to do with current Sino-Japanese relations?

conceptualizations of alliances. The relevance of different alliance conceptions is that while the JUSA has been
institutionalized and remains fully operational, China has divested itself of the Sino-Soviet Alliance and adopted a

This helps fuel Sino-Japanese

tension by fostering the sense in China that two of the strongest countries in the world are combining forces to
keep China down. And since China has no allies it can trust to protect the sea lanes of
communication (SLOCs) in case of hostilities (over, say, Taiwan), it faces a Malacca dilemma that it
is strengthening the PLA Navy, fostering a security dilemma among other Asian
countries dependent on the SLOCs. Meanwhile Japan, the US and other trade partners are rankled by trade
imbalances and the sheer momentum of Chinas growth. While these concerns bolster JUSA, Tokyo is not
immune to anxiety about possible American abandonment in favor of
Beijing. Thus, stunned in February 1972 by the Nixon shock visit to China, Tokyo
quickly reversed course, dropping Taipei to recognize Beijing the same year; the 1998 Clinton visit
to China occasioned similar anxiety because he did not (at Beijings specific insistence) make
a Tokyo stopover. While the relationship among the three has many points in its favorJapan and the US both
medley of interesting substitutes, none of which is entirely equivalent.

have huge trade flows with China, China and Japan are geographical neighbors and share a Confucian cultural

legacywhenever tensions arise for whatever reasons, these tensions tend to reinforce JUSA solidarity and this in

the role of
the US in this tense relationship, which has not been altogether helpful. The US , as
tertius gaudens, makes the Sino-Japanese relationship triangular , as it had done with the Sinoturn evokes Chinas nightmare of being encircled by hostile forces [baoweiquan]. This brings us to

Soviet alliance. The US has played a structurally analogous role in both alliances. We first turn to a brief discursus
on the abstract logic of the strategic triangle before applying the framework to the three principals.

Link Hawks
Hawks will gain power after the plan and cause nuclearization
Gerald Curtis 13, Burgess Professor of Political Science @ Columbia, Japans
Cautious Hawks, Foreign Affairs, March/April,
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136063/gerald-l-curtis/japans-cautious-hawks
the Japanese public and Japan's political leaders are keenly aware that the
country's security still hinges on the United States' dominant military position in East Asia. Some on
the far right would like to see Japan develop the full range of armaments, including
nuclear weapons, in a push to regain its autonomy and return the country to the ranks of the world's great
powers. But the conservative mainstream still believes that a strong alliance with the United
States is the best guarantor of Japan's security. ISLANDS IN THE SUN Given Japan's pragmatic
Furthermore,

approach to foreign policy, it should come as no surprise that the country has reacted cautiously to a changing
international environment defined by China's rise. Tokyo has doubled down on its strategy of deepening its alliance
with the United States; sought to strengthen its relations with countries on China's periphery; and pursued closer

The one development that could

unhinge this strategy would be a loss of confidence in the U.S.
commitment to Japan's defense. It is not difficult to imagine scenarios that
would test the U.S.-Japanese alliance ; what is difficult to imagine are realistic ones. The exception is
economic, political, and cultural ties with China itself.

the very real danger that the dispute between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands (known as the Diaoyu
Islands in China), in the East China Sea, might get out of hand, leading to nationalist outbursts in both countries.
Beijing and Tokyo would find this tension difficult to contain, and political leaders on both sides could seek to exploit
it to shore up their own popularity. Depending on how events unfolded, the United States could well become caught
in the middle, torn between its obligation to defend Japan and its opposition to actions, both Chinese and Japanese,
that could increase the dangers of a military clash. The Japanese government, which took control of the
uninhabited islands in 1895, maintains that its sovereignty over them is incontestable; as a matter of policy, it has
refused to acknowledge that there is even a dispute about the matter. The United States, for its part, recognizes the
islands to be under Japanese administrative control but regards the issue of sovereignty as a matter to be resolved
through bilateral negotiations between China and Japan. Article 5 of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty, however,
commits the United States to "act to meet the common danger" in the event of "an armed attack against either
Party in the territories under the administration of Japan." Washington, in other words, would be obligated to
support Tokyo in a conflict over the islands -- even though it does not recognize Japanese sovereignty there. The
distinction between sovereignty and administrative control would matter little so long as a conflict over the islands
were the result of aggression on the part of China. But the most recent flare-up was precipitated not by Chinese but
by Japanese actions. In April 2012, Tokyo's nationalist governor, Shintaro Ishihara (who resigned six months later to
form a new political party), announced plans to purchase three of the Senkaku Islands that were privately owned
and on lease to the central government. He promised to build a harbor and place personnel on the islands, moves
he knew would provoke China. Well known for his right-wing views and anti-China rhetoric, Ishihara hoped to shake
the Japanese out of what he saw as their dangerous lethargy regarding the threat from China and challenge their
lackadaisical attitude about developing the necessary military power to contain it. Ishihara never got the islands,
but the ploy did work to the extent that it triggered a crisis with China, at great cost to Japan's national interests.
Well aware of the dangers that Ishihara's purchase would have caused, then Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda
decided to have the central government buy the islands itself. Since the government already had full control over
the islands, ownership represented no substantive change in Tokyo's authority over their use. Purchasing them was
the way to sustain the status quo, or so Noda hoped to convince China. But Beijing responded furiously,
denouncing Japan's action as the "nationalization of sacred Chinese land." Across China, citizens called for the
boycott of Japanese goods and took to the streets in often-violent demonstrations. Chinese-Japanese relations hit
their lowest point since they were normalized 40 years ago. Noda, to his credit, looked for ways to defuse the crisis
and restore calm between the two countries, but the Chinese would have none of it. Instead, China has ratcheted
up its pressure on Japan, sending patrol ships into the waters around the islands almost every day since the crisis
erupted. The United States needs to do two things with regard to this controversy. First, it must stand firm with its

Any indication that Washington might hesitate to support Japan in a

conflict would cause enormous consternation in Tokyo. The Japanese right would
have a field day, exclaiming that the country's reliance on the United States for its
security had left it unable to defend its interests. The Obama administration has wisely reiterated
Japanese ally.

Washington's position that the islands fall within the territory administered by Tokyo and has reassured the
Japanese -- and warned the Chinese -- of its obligation to support Japan under the security treaty.

Link Surprises
Plan is a surprise that damages alliance cred causes
militarization.
Minamide 15 [Alyssa M. Minamide (Arthur R. Adams International Affairs Fellow
@ Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, B.A. in International Relations
from Claremont McKenna College), "Deterring Nuclear Attacks on Japan: An
Examination of the U.S.-Japan Relationship and Nuclear Modernization, 4/27/15,
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=2162&context=cmc_theses]
abrupt policy discrepancies or surprises between the two
countries on nuclear weapons issues have also been influential in shaping the current U.S.
nuclear posture for protecting Japan. Japan only considered nuclear weapons
development in the late 1960s because of its concern that the U.S. nuclear arsenal would
not deter a Chinese nuclear attack, especially with U.S. attention fixated on the Soviet Union. The
1970s Japanese policy of U.S. Passing, in response to the Nixon Doctrine, was made out of
fear that the U.S. nuclear posture was too engaged with China, which could have negated the
Additionally, the

extended deterrence protection for Japan. And Japans hesitation to give logistical aid to the U.S. against North
Korea in the 1990s was not only contingent on its pacifist constitution but also on its unease at the withdrawal of

these examples illustrate that

without aligned security attitudes and a mutual understanding of the priorities and
structure of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, Japan begins to question the credibility
of U.S. security commitments and looks into other avenues for national
defense. Fortunately, in the past few years there have been no major incidents of
surprises from the Japanese in terms of nuclear security, signaling a positive trend in the
development of the U.S.-Japan alliance, even with an evolving nuclear posture. Given these
U.S forward deployed nuclear forces from South Korea in 1991. All of

improvements in the alliance up to now, how can the U.S. maintain its progress and effectively deter attacks on
Japan, without making Japan feel that the security commitments are either too loose or too restrictive? Do we have

To deter attacks specifically

on Japan, the U.S. needs to focus on how it portrays the U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance
in its security negotiations with other states, especially countries like China and Russia. If,
in its haste to make friendlier relations with China, the U.S. gives too
much of an impression that the U.S.-Japan alliance is irrelevant, it
automatically detracts from the credibility and security of the relationship
itself. On the physical arsenal side, since deterrence is about threatening second-strike capability, as opposed to
any reason to be worried about the alliance as the nuclear posture changes?

defense, there is no need to surround Japan with nuclear weapons and hope for the best. However, as the
modernization process is slowly implemented throughout the branches of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, adequate
amounts of deployed forces need to be clearly displayed to any state who might think about sneaking in an attack.
The word adequate when referring to the number of U.S. nuclear weapons is one of the most disputed terms in
the business. Proponents of full triad revitalization argue that any other cuts to the nuclear deterrent is harmful to
the U.S. arsenal as a whole; in the words of Peter Huessy, president of the consulting firm GeoStrategic Analysts,
Cutting the very backbone of our nuclear security is not the way forward to a safer world or safer America.180
Others view the continuation of the triad as a detriment to international disarmament and the NPT, which will lead

No matter how the nuclear force ends up, as long as it gives the
impression of being comprehensive and daunting, and the U.S. shows strong diplomatic support of
the alliance when dealing with third parties, attacks toward Japan should be effectively
deterred.
to more instability.181

Link Nonproliferation
Cooperation on North Korean denuclearization scares Japan.
Funabashi 15 [Yoichi Funabashi (Chairman of the Rebuild Japan Initiative
Foundation think tank, Nieman Fellow at Harvard University, visiting Fellow at the
Institute for International Economics, visiting professor at the University of Tokyo
Public Policy Institute, first Japanese laureate of Stanford Universitys prestigious
Shorenstein Journalism Award, Ph.D. from Keio University), A Japanese Perspective
on Anti-Americanism, Routledge, 2015]
Since President Richard M. Nixon visited China in 1972 without notifying Japan until three minutes before the official

Japan has been preoccupied with the prospect of the United States and
China joining together to "gang up" against her. This has been evident on both the security and
economic fronts. Particularly in a society that values loyalty as the supreme virtue, the visit to China by
President Bill Clinton in 1998 served to encourage anti-Americanism and strain
Japan-U.S. relations. Without even calling in on his Japanese ally, he upgraded the U.S.-China
relationship to a "strategic partnership." This Japan passing" came hard on the heels of joint Chinaannouncement,

U.S. criticism of the weak yen, which both countries complain is harmful to their trading interests. China's and the

As Japan perceives
it, weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance is a strategic priority for China , while
the United States stands to gain leverage over Tokyo by playing on fears that it is
moving closer to China and conversely devaluing its alliance with Japan. Such
perceptions remain pervasive among Tokyo's policy makers. America and
China have also found common cause over nuclear issues. Japanese anti-American
sentiments were severely exacerbated by America's indication that China should
denounce North Korea for its nuclear activities by employing the rationale that there
could be a possible domino effect in terms of Japan's nonnuclear stance. Japanese
suspect that the United States wants to cap the bottle on Japan, limiting it
to a purely defensive role, and has found a mutual interest with China in
doing so. This perception could breed mistrust and lead to a more anti-American
bent in Japan, which could be dangerously detrimental to the U.S.--Japan
relationship and lead Japan into pursuing a more individual course.
United States' castigation of Japan's economic travails is a continuing embarrassment.

Link Magnifier Low Threshold

The link threshold is low American behavior is the only
relevant factor and minor changes are sufficient
Easton 15 Ian Easton, research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, JAPANESE
STRATEGIC WEAPONS PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIES: FUTURE SCENARIOS AND
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES, p26-27, NPEC, 2015,
http://npolicy.org/books/East_Asia/Ch7_Easton.pdf
U.S. Naval War College professors Toshi
Yoshihara and James Holmes have previously argued that a strategy of calculated ambiguity
that at once played up Japanese capacity to go nuclear and remained noncommittal
on Japanese intentions of doing so would offer Tokyo its best diplomatic option should
security conditions continue to decay in East Asia .14 These scenarios agree with this assertion. Strategic
So what do these scenarios tell us about potential Japanese strategies?

ambiguity would probably have been pursued to varying degrees in at least two of the three scenarios. Especially in the second scenario this chapters
most daring Japan might have initially attempted to maintain some ambiguity. The first two scenarios both paint pictures of nuclear breakout events in

They emphasize the point made by Yoshihara and Holmes that even barely
perceptible signs of weakness in the U.S. nuclear posture (either perceived of
real) could trigger alarm and overreaction in Japan.15 Given Japans utter
dependency on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent for neutralizing strategic
threats to Japans security, it holds that the greater the crisis of confidence Tokyo
has in Washingtons commitments, the greater the Japanese push toward
proliferation is likely to be in the future. In the first scenario, Japan probably went nuclear as the result of a series of
Japan.

serious crises, but the situation did not ultimately reach the threshold where Tokyo felt the need to go it alone. Instead Japan wanted to quickly fold its
capabilities into the preexisting, U.S.-led strategic deterrence structure. In the second scenario, the situation was clearly far worse from Japans
perspective. Japan ultimately felt compelled to become a full-fledged, independent nuclear power even as it worked to maintain its alliance with
Washington. In the third scenario, which is arguably the chapters most optimistic, Japan did not lose faith in its American allys nuclear umbrella, and so
chose to invest in conventional capabilities to strengthen Japans indigenous defense capabilities while simultaneously bolstering the U.S.-Japan alliance. It
can be seen in the three scenarios that Japans security calculations can and almost certainly will change over the coming 15 to 20 years based upon the
actions of China and North Korea. Japans domestic political and economic situation will also impact its strategic policies. Bureaucratic and individual

it would appear that the single most

important factor impacting Japanese decisions regarding whether or not to go
nuclear will be the behavior of the United States during periods of regional crisis.
Strong displays of American leadership and commitment, not only to Japan, but
also to the defense of others in the region , are likely to have reassuring
effects. In contrast, any signs of weakness, either real or imagined, could have
outsized effects on long term Japanese decision making.
leader interests can be expected to influence outcomes as well. However,

Allied assurance is fragile Chinese threat perception means

Japan is uniquely afraid of abandonment.
Hooper 15 (Dr. Mira Rapp Hooper is a Fellow in the Asia Program at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies and the Director of CSISs Maritime
Transparency Initiative. Uncharted Waters: Extended Deterrence and Maritime
Disputes. Spring 2015.
https://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/sites/twq.elliott.gwu.edu/files/downloads/TWQ_Spring20
15_Hooper.pdf)
the United States and China are not locked in a zero-sum standoff
they compete in some areas
and cooperate in others. Washingtons desire to maintain a modus vivendi with
Beijing helps to explain why it takes a position of neutrality on most sovereignty
Finally, as already noted,

as the United States and Soviet Union were during the Cold War. Rather,

disputes, including those involving close allies. This balancing act makes good sense, but it
adds a third level of complication to U.S. extended deterrence . If Washington remains
officially neutral on its allies territorial disputes, it cannot easily signal an extended deterrence
commitment to those territories if it has made one. Strong public statements that the United States
intends to defend the disputed territory or clear shows of force in the vicinity hardly signal a neutral position on

the United States and China are not sworn adversaries, China
is rising rapidly, and this gives it the military capabilities and increasingly the will to
advance its sovereignty claims, including those that pit it against U.S. allies . It can
sovereignty. Moreover, while

therefore employ what Thomas Schelling called salami tacticslimited probes of U.S. commitments that aim to

When these
factors are combined, they may lead U.S. allies to be especially fearful that
their superpower patron will abandon them in conflicts arising from their
territorial disputes. States are generally said to abandon an alliance partner if they
formally abrogate the alliance treaty, fail to support the ally when the agreements
casus foederis (or case for the alliance) arises, or decline to back a partner in a
dispute with an adversary.10 Managing abandonment fears is a central
challenge in any alliance. The ambiguous role of allies territorial disputes in U.S.
treaties, the allies disparate stakes in these disputes, and the United States
need to maintain a relationship with China, however, each inject additional
uncertainty into already ambiguous U.S. extended deterrence
commitments, and may provoke fears from U.S. allies that they will not
have Washingtons support if a territorial dispute escalates and pits them against Beijing. Japans
alliance fears over the Senakus Islands in the East China Sea, and the Philippines
territorial claims in the South China Sea illustrate why these factors may elicit
unusually high abandonment anxieties from U.S. allies, and why they present a
management challenge for extended deterrence and allied assurance.
advance Chinese interests incrementally and opportunistically without triggering U.S. intervention.

Link Magnifier Regional Contest

Japan-China security contest magnifies the link they perceive
everything through the lens of competition.
Kim 10 [Shin Yon Kim (PhD in Social Science from Maxwell School of Public Affairs
@ Syracuse University, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies),
The U.S.-Japan-China Strategic Triangle: Difficult, but not Impossible, The United
States and Japan in Global Context, published by The Edwin O. Reischauer Center
for East Asian Studies @ The Johns Hopkins University, 2010,
http://www.reischauercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/The-US-and-Japan-inGlobal-Context-2010-FINAL-Ia.pdf]
this trilateral relationship could become the major
source of strategic conflict in the region if these countries fail to build mutual trust due
to their differing threat perceptions and conflicting national interests. Difficulties in
building trust largely stem from two factors: the shifting balance of power resulting
from Chinas rise, and the deep-seated rivalry and enmity between Japan and China.
Without a European-style collective security mechanism in place, Northeast Asia in
effect relies on the unstable balance of power for its stability, thereby resulting in an
incessant contest for regional leadership between Japan and China the two
On the other hand, it is equally true that

largest Asian powerswhich in turn increases strategic uncertainty in the region. East Asia in the early 21st century
has seen an accelerating shift in the balance of power due to Chinas rise, Japans economic stagnation and
Americas relative decline in its global and regional sway, especially since the outbreak of the financial crisis in
2007. Having successfully passed through the financial crisis, China has become more assertive in their dealings
with the outside world. Such a trend has affected the perception of threats in each of the three countries in a way
that has yielded an ominous scenario of two countries banding together against one. U.S. concerns over Chinas
rise seemingly reflect aspects of the power transition theory. That is, China, a rapidly growing, dissatisfied
challenger, will inevitably pose a threat to the United States, a satisfied, status quo hegemon. Another U.S. concern
may be the possibility that the two Asian powers will forge an East Asia bloc that excludes the U.S. as a cornerstone

Having experienced the fear of abandonment in history from the

Nixon shock to President Clintons Japan-passing, Japan continues to harbor
fears of being edged out as the closest U.S. ally as the U.S. proceeds to
engage China. On the other hand, Japan is also anxious about the reinvigorated U.S.-Japan alliance that may
of regional integration.

drag it into a conflict with its large continental neighbor in the case of a Taiwan contingency. Meanwhile,

concerns about Chinas ambiguous motivations have led to a more upgraded,

comprehensive U.S.-Japan security alliance , which in turn has exacerbated Chinese worries that the
two allies may collaborate to contain China. Moreover, seemingly intractable mutual
animosities existing in Japan-China relations that stem from disputes over a
range of issues such as history, territory, resources, and Taiwan, have the potential
to hamper the process of promoting effective trilateral cooperation.

Affirmative Answers

UQ/Link Answers

Alliance Resilient
The alliance is resilient
Piling 15 David Pilling, Asia editor of the Financial Times. 4-22-2015, "An
unsinkable Pacific alliance," Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e32282d8e8cf-11e4-87fe-00144feab7de.html#axzz3cPkFBAkt
closeness between America and Japan, forged in the ashes of war, goes beyond the
ideological If the Americans and Japanese went in for that kind of thing they might describe
themselves as being as close as lips and teeth . In actual fact, that it is how China and North Korea
have traditionally categorised their relationship. Washington and Tokyo prefer to talk soberly
about their shared values as fellow democracies and market economies. Yet,
despite the lack of colourful language, theirs has been one of the closest and
most enduring of postwar relationships. They stand shoulder to shoulder on most
issues from terrorism to intellectual property. That closeness, forged in the ashes of
the second world war, goes beyond the ideological. In tangible ways, the two lean
on each other heavily. The US regards Japan as its representative in Asia. It
depends on Japan to help fund its debt : Tokyo not Beijing is the biggest holder of US Treasuries, if
only just. Japan has supported Washingtons military interventions, with cash and,
increasingly, with logistical support. Tokyo relies on the US nuclear umbrella and on the
The

protection afforded by 35,000 US troops stationed on its territory. In a candid description of the relationship,

Yasuhiro Nakasone, prime minister in the mid-1980s, referred to Japan as

Washingtons unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Pacific. Next week Shinzo Abe,
perhaps Japans strongest leader since Mr Nakasone , will celebrate 70 years of that relationship
with a rare speech to a joint session of Congress . He will stress Japans concerted effort to revive
its economy. He will urge Congress to give Barack Obama, the US president, the fast-track authority he needs to
conclude the Trans Pacific Partnership. He will express some contrition for the war, though perhaps not enough for
the taste of some in congress. He will paint a future in which Japan, released from postwar constitutional handcuffs,
can play a more active role in helping the US to keep the world a safe and lawful place. He is unlikely to mention
China. But everyone will know what he means. Mr Abe will mostly be warmly received. Washington
hopes Abenomics will work and is prepared to tolerate a little Abenesia the downplaying of Japans war record
if that is the price of a strong leader. Indeed, many in Washington regard Mr Abe as the best Japanese prime
minister in a generation.

Assurance Fails Now

Assurance is failing now funding, distractions, China
Green et al. 16 (STUDY DIRECTORS: Michael Green, PhD @ SAIS, is senior vice
president for Asia and Japan Chair at CSIS, chair in Japanese foreign policy at
Georgetown, served on the staff of the NSC as the director of Asian Affairs, senior
fellow for East Asian security on the Council of Foreign Relations; Kathleen Hicks,
PhD in Political Science @ MIT, is senior vice president, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and
director of the International Security Program at CSIS, served as a senior civilian
official in the DoD; Mark Cancian, senior advisor to the International Security
Program, adjunct professor of strategic studies @ John Hopkins. TEAM LEADS: Zach
Cooper; John Schaus. A ton of different contributing authors. Asia-Pacific Rebalance
2025 Capabilities, Presence, and Partnerships January 2016, CSIS,
http://csis.org/files/publication/160119_Green_AsiaPacificRebalance2025_Web_0.pdf)
Nevertheless, the United States will need to continue and in some cases accelerate investments in regional
relationships, posture, operational concepts, and capabilities if it is to achieve the strategic goals of the rebalance.

The past 14 years of war have left the military services with significant
challenges in recapitalizing equipment used at a pace faster than programmed,
reestablishing full-spectrum force readiness, and confronting an expanding range of
challenges from state and nonstate actors globally . It is doing so while drawing down forces and
structure and, the recent two-year budget deal notwithstanding, with lower long-term defense spending projections

Chinas rapidly expanding military investments and

increasingly coercive actions in the region demonstrate both the long-term and
near-term challenges facing the United States and its allies and partners in
protecting vital regional and global interests . Although Washington seeks to cooperate with Beijing
than planned even a few years ago.

where it can, the United States must also ensure that its engagements, posture, concepts, and capabilities allow it
to shape, deter, and, if necessarily, decisively defeat threats to U.S. interests. The threat of invasion by North Korea
continues to decrease, but the Norths missile and nuclear programs continue unabated while scenarios for

the Asia-Pacific
region has witnessed significant developments that require a reappraisal of U.S.
strategy and force posture, as well as an assessment of the strategy and force posture of U.S. allies
and partners. Many of these trends have improved prospects for regional security, but some new
challenges are emerging, and some existing risks are worsening. These trends span
instability within North Korea appear less remote going forward. Over the last few years,

issue areas of geopolitics, diplomacy, economics, domestic politics, and military considerations. Geopolitically, most
states in the Asia-Pacific region are embracing closer security and economic ties with the United States. At the
same time, however, states across the region have become more sensitive to Chinas growing political, economic,
and military power, and are potentially vulnerable to Beijings increasingly coercive behavior. Polls in Asian
countries indicate strong support for the rebalance, with the notable exception of China.5 The United States is
working bilaterally, trilaterally, and multilaterally to reinforce critical rules and norms that underpin a secure and
prosperous regional and international order. Yet despite these efforts, there is more acrimony and tension in the
U.S.-China relationship, a general deterioration in relations with Russia, and increasing bellicosity from North Korea.

the authors heard a consistent refrain from U.S. allies and

partners that, despite their appreciation for the goals of the rebalance, many
regional observers worry that U.S. efforts to manage the Iran nuclear
negotiations, Russias invasion of Ukraine, and conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq
and the Levant (ISIL) have distracted it from fully implementing the rebalance . The
In preparing this study,

administration has taken important steps to reinforce the rebalance strategy, beginning with the 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance and recently, the August 2015 Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy prepared for Congress.6
The authors also found that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) is well aligned with the rest of DOD in its various
lines of effort, including theater campaign planning. Much progress has been made since 2012, when CSIS scholars
found significant disconnects across the U.S. government and with allies and partners. Nevertheless,

the

implementation of the rebalance may be insufficient to secure U.S. interests.

Actions by countries in the region routinely challenge the credibility of U.S.
security commitments, and U.S. capability development is not keeping pace with
challenges by potential competitors, resulting in the balance of military power in
the region shifting against the United States. First, the Obama administration still has not
articulated a clear, coherent, or consistent strategy for the region, particularly when
it comes to managing Chinas rise. The language used to explain the rebalance in administration
speeches and documents has varied substantially over the last four years.7 The 2012 CSIS independent

remains a problem in terms of reassuring

allies and partners and sustaining congressional support. Second, cuts to the defense
budget from 20092015 have limited the Defense Departments ability to pursue the
rebalance. The October 2015 budget agreement notwithstanding, long-term budget uncertainty
and the large cuts already implemented represent major changes from the
environment that existed when CSIS scholars conducted the 2012 review. Third, while the U.S. military has
instituted major posture changes and is developing new military capabilities to strengthen the rebalance, the antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) challenge is increasing and concerns are growing about the
ability of potential adversaries to hold at risk forward-deployed and forwardoperating forces throughout the region. Chinese military strategy places a premium on
assessment highlighted this shortcoming, but it

investments in A2/AD capabilities. Its A2/AD umbrella includes long-range cruise and ballistic missiles, advanced
integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) systems, and submarines. The goal of these systems is to restrict or
outright deny an attacker freedom of entry or maneuver. Chinese investments in cyber; electronic warfare (EW); a
blue-water navy; missiles; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities serve as powerful

These capabilities give

China the ability to hold at risk U.S. installations and naval assets in the
Western Pacific, U.S. allies and partners, and the freedom to use international air and waterways on which the
U.S. economy depends. Absent major operational or technology breakthroughs by
the United States and its allies and partners, substantial risk remains that Chinas strategy
could undermine the U.S. militarys ability to defend U.S. interests in the AsiaPacific. Fourth, Chinas tolerance for risk has exceeded most expectationsas
demonstrated by Beijings increased operational tempo and construction of military
airfields and facilities on seven features in the Spratly Islands . This risk tolerance requires
reminders of Chinas plans to push the United States out of the region in a conflict.

the United States to reassess its China policy, and may lead allies and partners to do the same.

No assurance credibility now

Chen 14 [Dingding Chen (assistant professor of Government and Public
Administration at the University of Macau, Non-Resident Fellow at the Global Public
Policy Institute), The Diplomat, 4-29-2014, "4 Reasons Why Japan (Still) Doubts US
Security Assurances," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/4-reasons-whyjapan-still-doubts-us-security-assurances/]
U.S. President Barack Obama just finished a state visit to Japan last week. In a delayed joint statement released on
Friday, the United States, for the first time, clearly said that Americas commitments under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security extend to all the territories under the administration of Japan, including the
Senkaku Islands. In that context, the United States opposes any unilateral action that seeks to undermine Japans
administration of the Senkaku Islands. This, perhaps, is the only achievement for Japan as a trade agreement was
not reached by the two sides. Since the U.S. has given Japan a clear assurance in writing to help Japan defend the

But from a Japanese perspective, Obamas

state visit just makes the U.S. commitment to Japans security less credible. Some
scholars contend that such worries are unfounded and irrational. That view is flawed. Actually there are four
good reasons why Japan still feels insecure. First, there is an inherent problem in any
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, shouldnt Japan feel reassured?

alliance relationship that makes credibility always imperfect. It is the moral hazard
problem. Basically, it means that a client state will tend to act recklessly because it
believes that the patron state will offer unconditional support, thus dragging the
patron state into an unnecessary conflict or war. Because of this entrapment
problem, the patron state will always be very careful not to give a blank check to
the client state when it comes to security assurances. The result is that the client state, in turn,
will always be suspicious of the patron states commitment to its security.
To maintain this alliance relationship, the patron state will need to constantly
reaffirm its commitment to the client state through actions or words . This is partly why
the U.S. has always emphasized that it is neutral on the sovereignty issue of the
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, thus disappointing Japan. Second, there is the problem of
divergent interests between Japan and the United States . While Japan might
highly value the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands for historical, economic, and strategic reasons, most
Americans simply view the islands as a bunch of rocks with very little value to the
U.S. interest in the region. There is no U.S. military base or U.S. military presence on the
islands, and thus a possible attack by China on the islands will not result in
American casualties. Moreover, the U.S. highly values a stable and peaceful
relationship with China as the two share a number of common interests. Under such
conditions, it is hard for the U.S. to decide to aid Japan militarily even though the U.S.-Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security theoretically covers the islands, as President Obama just confirmed

When two parties

of an alliance relationship have seriously divergent national interests, it is
unsurprising that the client state would doubt the patron states commitment to its
security. Third, there is the problem of power shifts in Asia. Although no one doubts that the
U.S. is still the only superpower in the world and will remain so for another 20 or so years, many countries
in Asia are still concerned about the future distribution of power between
China and the United States. Chinas military spending is increasing quickly whereas U.S. military
during his visit in Tokyo. Moreover, both Japan and the US understand this point perfectly.

spending is contracting. The controversial pivot to Asia will be seriously hindered if the U.S. is unable to finance it,

Finally, the past inaction toward

regional crises in Syria, Crimea, and the East China Sea have seriously
undermined U.S. credibility in the world, thus making Japanese officials
more nervous about the U.S. commitment to Japans security. While many U.S.
evidenced by recent remarks by U.S. defense officials.

scholars (here and here) are quick to point out the main differences between Syria and Crimea and Japan as Japan
is an ally of the U.S., what they have forgotten is that Japanese perceptions of U.S. credibility ultimately matter. In

Japanese are rightly worried that Obama is a weak president and cannot
act tough when a crisis comes. Furthermore, it is not just one event that undermines
the U.S. credibility; it is a series of events from Syria to the East China Sea (the U.S.
this case,

only verbally protested when China declared its East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in 2013) to Crimea

we cannot really blame the Japanese

for being irrational or paranoid when they question the US credibility . Three of the four
reasons for Japanese doubts are structural reasons and they do not
change quickly. That means U.S. credibility will continue to be questioned by U.S. allies around the world.
that together seriously undermine the U.S. credibility. In short,

Perhaps the United States can demonstrate its credibility by acting tough the next time a regional crisis emerges.
Until then, it is not surprising that Obamas weak assurance this past week to Tokyo only exacerbated Japans
doubts and fears.

Conventional Re-Arm Now

Japan is pursuing offensive strike now in the context of the
alliance disproves uniqueness and internal link
Gertz 15, Senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon (Bill, 3/16, Japan Rising,
freebeacon.com/national-security/japan-rising/
Japans military, known as the Japan Self-Defense Forces, is making modest force improvements.
They include purchases of 46 U.S. F-35 jet fighters, the addition of two Aegis-equipped destroyers, the
modernization and growth of the underwater force from 16 to 22 submarines, and the
upgrade of missile defenses. The Japanese military also will field the long-range
Global Hawk spy drones in the next two years . Japans government also created a high-level policy
unit called the National Security Secretariat made up of senior officials and a staff to better coordinate defense and
security policies. The government also is considering establishing a foreign intelligence service modeled after the

A recent change to civilian space rules for the first time will permit
Japan to increase the number and use of satellites and space assets for defense.
Behind the scenes, Japan is working on new surface-to-surface and cruise
missiles and shifting forces from northern bases to southern zones to be
ready to respond to any Chinese provocations or attacks. The Abe administration also is
CIA or Britains MI-6.

strengthening alliances with key states, including India, Australia, Southeast Asian states, South Korea, and notably

Key to Tokyos increased defense posture is bolstering the U.S.Japan defense alliance. The two nations are finishing up a major revision of the U.S.Japan defense guidelines that officials and analysts said is focused on the growing threat
posed by China.
with the United States.

No Zero-Sum Link
Relations arent zero-sum Japan welcomes cooperation.
Mifune 11 [Emi Mifune (Professor at Komazawa University, visiting professor at
China Foreign Affairs University), Japans Perspectives towards a Rising China, in
Herbert S. Yee, ed. China's Rise: Threat or Opportunity? London and New York:
Routledge, 2011, http://www.la.utexas.edu/dsena/courses/globexchina/readings/yeejapan.pdf]
On his first trip to Asian countries as the US president in November 2009, President Obama said the US would seek
to strengthen its tie with a rising China even as it maintains close ties with allies like Japan. There are questions
about how the US perceives China's emergence as a global power, how its seeking to build stronger ties with China
wields influence over the Japan-US relations and the Japan-US-China triangle relations, and how Japan should

Some Japanese worry that the deepening US-China

relations in a new era affects the Japan-US relations , causing Japan's position to retreat.
However, others believe that Japan welcomes the idea that the US and China
have an increasingly broad base of cooperation and share increasingly
important common responsibilities on many major issues concerning global stability
and prosperity. It is important for Japan to welcome a strong, prosperous, and
successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs by interacting with
the United States. According to lEA (lntemational Energy Agency), China exhausted 21 percent of the
engage the expanding US-China relations.

world's carbon dioxide in 2007, the US exhausted 20 percent, the EU exhausted 14 percent, Russia exhausted 6

Both China and the US must find

way to mitigate climate change and should combine efforts. Without dramatically significant
percent, India exhausted 5 percent, and Japan exhausted 4 percent.

actions by the US and China, the global climate crisis will leave human beings with no future. China's role in the SixParty Talks concerning North Korea is crucial to regional security in Asia. China's influence over North Korea is not
absolute, but there is no one that can affect North Korea as much as China can. Without China's cooperation with
the US on the North Korea issue, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot be expected. China has recently
increased its economic, military, and diplomatic influence in countries in South Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast
Asia. China's investments in these countries are large and will continue to increase. It is seeking to develop its
influence over those countries to ensure its energy import and to build its sea-lane. It has obstacles in these places
because there is historical antagonism among these countries even though the governments have now developed
better relations. The countries and sea around them are so important for Japan's sea-lane that

Japan needs to

build cooperative relationships

with them without causing a confrontation with China. The US has

decided to encourage more Americans to study in China by launching a new initiative to send 100,000 students to
China over the forthcoming four years. China has sent the United States a lot of students in the past. This new
project of sending American students to China is going to cultivate US experts on China. It will also develop
personal channels between China and the US. Japan also needs to develop personal exchanges. Recently, there
have been a lot of Chinese scholars and celebrities who have conveyed propaganda to Japan about the preferred
ideas and politics of China. However, there have been few Chinese specialists in Japanese affairs. The current

The Japan-US relation is not a zerosum game towards the US- China relation. While the Japan-US relation is one of
being allies, the US-China relation is a partnership to negotiate and resolve many issues
concerning global and regional stabilities and prosperity. These two bilateral relationships are
completely different. Seeking to build common ties to China and the US is necessary
for Japan, and now is the appropriate time to get into the act. However, the Hatoyama Administration forms
relation between US and China poses challenges for Japan.

abstract ideas of the Japan-US and the Japan- China relations, which might harm those relations in the near future.

Japan does not need to fear a rising China ; however, the Japanese government needs a grand
foreign strategy with mid-term and long- term views to cope with a rising China.

Internal Link Answers

No Prolif Nuclear Umbrella

Nuclear deterrence solves the impact
Rowberry 14 (Ariana Navarro, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Brookings,

Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-advancedconventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advancedconventional-weapons-deterrence-and-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry.pdf)
The U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is the supreme guarantor of Japans security
and a central component of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japans protection under the
U.S. extended nuclear deterrent has assured Tokyo when China and North Korea
have engaged in provocative actions that threatened Japans security . Moreover, the
U.S. extended nuclear deterrent has been a key factor in dissuading Japan from
developing its own nuclear weapons capability , which it has considered on several occasions since
the end of World War II. Moving forward, the importance of the U.S. extended nuclear
deterrent to Japan will be crucial in assuring Tokyo and deterring adversaries . While the
unique value of nuclear deterrence is irreplacable, the integration and expansion of advanced conventional

As the only state

to be the victim of nuclear weapons use, Japan adopted anti-nuclear policies at the
end of World War II. While the constitution does not explicitly mention nuclear
weapons, it is widely interpreted as prohibiting their development . Moreover, in 1967,
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced the Three Nos, renouncing the manufacture, possession, or
introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. Sato later changed the three nos to the four pillars of nuclear
policy: 1) promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy; 2) efforts toward global
nuclear disarmament; 3) reliance and dependence on U.S. extended
deterrence, based on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security; and 4) support for the
three non-nuclear principles under the circumstances where Japans national security is guaranteed by
weapons into the U.S.-Japan alliance can complement the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.

the other three policies. 8

Nuke umbrella checks

Panda 14 (Ankit Panda is a foreign affairs analyst, writer, and editor with

expertise in international relations, political economy, international security, and

crisis diplomacy. He has been an editor at The Diplomat since 2013, US-Japan
Alliance: Still 'Sword and Shield'?, 11/5/14, http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/usjapan-alliance-still-sword-and-shield/)
the new U.S.-Japan defense guidelines dont fundamentally alter the spear
and shield dynamics of the U.S.-Japan alliance. While many in the U nited States would
undoubtedly like to see Japan shoulder a greater part of the burden in a time when defense
budgets are growing tight and while the Abe government might reciprocate this desire, the
established rubric of bilateral military cooperation will resist fundamental
transformation. Despite the more granular changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance, the
ultimate guarantee of Japanese security the U.S. nuclear umbrella
persists. As long as the United States spear remains sharp and credible in the AsiaPacific, there is little reason for concern that Japan could behave unpredictably. True
Overall,

military normalization for Tokyo will only emerge after that assumption no longer
holds.

No Prolif Pacifism
Lack of political support makes the risk of nuclearization
remote pacifism is too entrenched.
Gady 15 (Franz-Stefan Gady, senior fellow at the EastWest Institute and associate
editor for The Diplomat, 9/18/2015, Japan's Improbable Military Resurgence,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-improbable-military-resurgence/)
In 2004, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a case for Japan to restore its military capabilities, writing in his book,
Determination to Protect This Country, that if Japanese dont shed blood, we cannot have an equal relationship with America.
Since then, Abe has sought to revive the countrys defensive capabilities , mostly toward fortifying
its claim over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, an island chain in the East China Sea that Beijing says belongs to China. He has
requested a record five trillion yen ($42 billion) defense budget for fiscal year 2016 (if approved, it will be Tokyos largest in 14

and reinterpreted the constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of

collective self-defense. The efforts have provoked growing alarm . A June 2015 survey found that
years)

57 percent of South Koreans believe that Japan is in a militaristic state, and 58 percent said that Tokyo poses a military threat. In
comparison, only 38 percent surveyed thought that China was the bigger threat. China, too, is worried. It has repeatedly warned

Whatever Abes intentions,

Japanese militarism was buried for good in August 1945 and will not likely rise again.
The reason: the Japanese people. Defeat Suits After the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Emperor
that Abe is leading the country down a more dangerous path toward militarization.
however,

Showa, popularly known as Hirohito, gave a radio address explaining to his people that continuing the fight against the Allies would
result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation. And so Japan surrendered. Unlike the Germans, though, the
Japanese people had no Adolf Hitler or Nazi Party to blame for a war that had killed at least 2.7 million Japanese servicemen and
civilians and destroyed 66 major cities. Although the Japanese emperor had been accused of overseeing war crimesmass rapes
and killings in China and Southeast AsiaU.S. General Douglas MacArthur thought it politically expedient to keep him in power and
successfully ran a campaign to exonerate Hirohito. The Japanese people came to regard Hirohito as innocent and subsequently
turned against the military, accusing the services of deceiving them and drawing the country into a perilous war. Japanese police
reports immediately after the surrender note the peoples grave distrust, frustration, and antipathy toward military and civilian

Civilian contempt for the military quickly spread to the

Imperial Japanese Army. And so, after the war, Japanese
soldiers were both defeated and despised . In a letter from an anonymous former soldier dated May 9, 1946,
leaders and general hatred of the military.
rank and file of the 3.5 million-strong

Not a single person gave me a kind word. Rather, they cast hostile glances my way. Military uniforms were nicknamed defeat
suits, and military boots were called defeat shoes. Even one of the most reverent expressions of gratitude during the war years
thanks to our fighting men (heitaisan no okage desu)turned into an expression of contempt. Thanks to our fighting men, lives
and property had been destroyed. Thanks to our fighting men, Japans overall economic and political situation was absymal. As the
historian John W. Dower outlines in Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, no one listened to the returning soldiers
who spoke out about the differences between the military leadership and common servicemen. The Tokyo War Crimes Trials, which
lasted from 1946 to 1948, revealed the extent of the atrocities committed by the Japanese military during World War II and also the
extreme antipathy that the Japanese people felt for the military. For example, during the 1945 Battle of Manila, the Japanese military
mutilated and massacred between 100,000 and 500,000 Filipino civilians. Shortly after the news reached Tokyo, a Japanese woman
wrote a letter to the Japanese national paper Asahi Shimbun expressing her revulsion. Even if such an atrocious soldier were my
son, she wrote, I could not accept him back home. Let him be shot to death there. The poet Saeki Jinzaburo also penned a few
lines expressing his disgust with the army after the war crimes revelations: Seizing married women, raping mothers in front of their
childrenthis is the Imperial Army. In 1947, a Japanese poetry magazine published the following verse after the end of the Tokyo
tribunal: The crimes of Japanese soldiers, who committed unspeakable atrocities in Nanking [China] and Manila, must be atoned
for. Former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, an army general, was openly ridiculed for a botched suicide attempt in September 1945. One
Japanese novelist and poet, Takami Yoshio (who went by the pen name Jun Takami), wrote at the time, Cowardly living on, and then
using a pistol like a foreigner, failing to die. Japanese cannot help but smile bitterly. . . . Why did General Tojo not use a Japanese

postwar sentiments against the military were so

strong that even textbooks during that period systematically skipped over
any references to past Japanese victories and military heroes. And they
remain absent from schoolbooks to this day. Ashes of Hiroshima Distrust and ridicule of all things
sword as Army Minister Anami did? These

military did not abate in the postwar years. After the war, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Japans de facto postwar army created at
the behest of the United States, were generally accepted. In the 1960s, though, new recruits were occasionally pelted with stones
while walking down the street, and when they appeared in public spaces, people would get up and leave. Throughout the Cold War,

Japans military was seen as serving no real purpose and offering little protection .
Then, as now, the public felt that the U.S.-Japanese security treaty offered
a better guarantee of security than the SDF. After all, since its founding, the SDF had neither
achieved a single military victory nor ever engaged in combat operations. Although the end of the Cold War brought a new raison

dtre to the SDFUN Peacekeeping operations the

Japanese still regard the force as useful

primarily for disaster relief rather than defense. According to a 2015 public opinion poll
conducted by Japans Cabinet Office, 82 percent of Japanese think that the SDFs primary role is
disaster relief, and 72.3 percent believe that this should remain its main duty in the
future. Perhaps that is why, to this day, the SDF refers to its weapons as equipment and artillery brigades as technical
brigades in order to downplay the military aspects of Japans armed forces. Tanks even used to be called special vehicles,
although they are now referred to as tanks again. In the same poll, 92 percent of those surveyed had a positive impression of the
SDF, but a positive impression does not mean support or approval. According to Thomas Berger, a professor of international
relations at Boston University, Japans best and brightest do not flock to join the armed forces, and the SDF is hardly celebrated in
Japanese society. Indeed, according to the same 2015 public opinion poll, less than half of people questioned thought that being a
soldier was a respectable occupation, and only 25.4 percent perceived the job to be a challenging one. As Berger explained to me,
Internal [SDF] surveys showed that the majority joined the forces because they hoped for material betterment. It is a safe, reliable
job, and the legal status is the same as being a post office clerk. The SDF also has the reputation of being a holding center for high
school and college dropouts. It recruits heavily from Japans backwaters, such as southern Kyushu and northern Honshuand
especially from Akita prefecture and Hokaido, where young people face limited job prospects. Most of those enlisted belong to the
lower and lower middle classes, although the officer corps is staffed primarily by those from the middle class. Once these young
men and women have joined, they tend to serve until quiet retirement in their early 50s. Japan doesnt have the sort of hero
worship of military things that can boost the career of a retired officer, according to Robert Dujarric, director of the Institute of

That is why the Japanese have resisted Abes

attempts to revive the military. In August 2015, in one of the largest demonstrations in Tokyo against Abe, tens of
Contemporary Asian Studies at Temple University in Japan.

thousands hit the street. One protester told the Financial Times, This is the last chance we have to preserve Japans worldwide

Japanese military radicalization could be

triggered only by a fundamental change in the security architecture of
East Asia, such as a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from Japan or a North
Korean nuclear missile attack. Both are far-fetched scenarios. But given the
current political climate, it was not surprising that an August 2015 public poll found only 11
percent of the Japanese were supportive of Abes policy to reinterpret the
power that the constitution gives its military. His personal ratings have also
slipped, with some analysts predicting his resignation . The moral and military
defeat of the Japanese army in World War II was so total that it echoes to
this day. Despite Abes historical revisionism and fearmongering, the
Japanese public appears unwilling to trust another military clique. Thats
why, for all the talk of Japanese militarism, a relatively pacifist country is
here to stay.
reputation as a country of peace. In reality, however,

No Prolif Politics
Japan wont nuclearizebureaucratic inertia
Windrem 14, writer at NBC Japan Has Nuclear Bomb in the Basement and
China Isnt Happy About It, http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/fukushimaanniversary/japan-has-nuclear-bomb-basement-china-isnt-happy-n48976
not everyone believes that Japan COULD go all the way. Jacques Hymans, a
professor of international relations at the University of Southern California, believes the
process would be thwarted by what he calls "veto players," that is, government officials
who would resist a secret program and reveal it before it reached fruition . He
wrote recently that Japan has more levels of nuclear bureaucracy than it once had ,
as well as more potential veto players inside that bureaucracy because of
Fukushima. He said that any attempt to make a bomb would be "swamped by the
intrusion of other powerful actors with very different motivations."
And, in fact,

Political and economic costs make prolif impossible even if

theres pressure
Yuki Tatsumi, senior associate of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center,
and Dr. Robert Weiner Naval Postgraduate School, February 2014, Political
Influence on Japanese Nuclear and Security Policy, Project on Advanced Systems
and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report Number 2014004,
http://www.nps.edu/Academics/Centers/CCC/PASCC/Publications/2014/2014%20004
%20Japan%20Politicization.pdf
An observer would be forgiven for observing this policy record and extrapolating it to expect Abe eventually, in the
later portions of his likely extended time in office, to push, slowly but surely, for expansion in Japans nuclear

because Abe
holds so many comparatively ambitious security policy goals that he is unlikely to
push for what would be extremely ambitious steps towards establishing greater nuclear autonomy.
The public-support threshold that a nuclear-expansion effort would need to clear is
extremely high. In isolation, when asked in opinion polls whether one is comfortable with the notion
weapons capabilities. But it seems more likely that the opposite pattern will hold. It is precisely

of considering a move toward autonomous nuclear-weapons capability, Japanese citizens might be more positive

in practice, public comfort with nuclear weapons would first

require the public to collectively achieve comfort with at least four inter-related
intermediate steps, each of which itself would constitute a major transformation: 1) Article 9 of the
Constitution, through which Japan now renounces the right to wage war, would need
to be amended; 2) the Three Non-Nuclear Principles (no possession or manufacture of nuclear
than before. But

weapons, nor permitting their introduction into Japanese territory), which are not law but have taken on the de facto

would need to be
abandoned; 3) the Self Defense Forces would need to be permitted to acquire
offensive capabilities, thus breaking from their history of possessing only (or at least
maintaining that they possess) exclusively defense-oriented capabilities; 4) and,
finally, more amorphously and perhaps most difficult the Self Defense Forces
would need to earn widespread trust as a professional military organization, something
weight of law (as have their counterpart Three Principles of Arms Exports noted above),

that even the SDFs widely-praised performance in the humanitarian assistance operation following the 3/11
disasters is still far from producing.66 Any one of these objectives would consume practically all of a Japanese
administrations political capital. Indeed, Abe has already begun to spend political capital on Constitutional revision,
which in most contexts other than nuclear weapons policy would represent any administrations crowning
achievement, not simply an intermediate step. In Japan, even firmly establishing that nuclear weapons are a

The political capital involved in making

significant steps toward nuclear weapons capability would simply be too great.
legitimate option would qualify as significant.

Besides this basic budgetary limit on political ambition, one can point to other conditions that will likely discourage
Abe from pursuing politically driven steps away from the nuclear status quo. Economics also plays a role. First, that
Abe has been able to pursue his securitypolicy goals without debilitating legislative and public pushback thus far is
largely due to the fact that his economic program was rolled out first, and, much more important, that this program
has actually proven successful. This is perhaps the first time in two decades that Japanese citizens have viewed an
economic upturn not as a temporary fluctuation or as artificially manufactured through government stimulus
unsustainable over the long term, but, rather, as the result of systematic and durable economic policy. That said,
Abes economic success over his first year or so of this second term is by no means guaranteed to last. If the
current comparatively high economic tide were to recede, and if Abe were thereby left stranded with only revisionist

At the same time, a

nuclear weapons program (as opposed to, say, the export of nuclear technology) is
itself a direct drain on the treasury, even in an economy as large as Japans, and, given the
security policy to his name, public patience with his priorities might quickly grow thin.67

existence of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is likely to be viewed by many as an extravagance.68 Finally, Abes recent
political history, for him more than for other LDP leaders, discourages costly moves away from the nuclear status
quo. More than any other LDP prime minister again, since at least his grandfather Kishi in the 1950s Abe has
hard personal experience with the dangers of over-reliance on security policy as a signature legislative
achievement. And Abes visit to Yasukuni Shrine and heavy-handed passage of state secrets legislation in
December 2013 has already dealt him his first acute drop in Cabinet support. At the same time, as a wellestablished security hard-liner (again, by Japanese standards, at least), Abe has no need to go out of his way to

Abe has a need to avoid confirming some of

the publics perception of him as an extreme hawk. If Japanese citizens were to trust
prove his bona fides in this regard. If anything,

any leader with taking steps away from the nuclear status quo, it would more likely be someone other than him. He
has retained the support of most citizens, but he has also conditioned them to be on guard for extremism.

No Prolif Abe
Abe wont nuclearize focused on diplomacy
Tatsumi 15 -- Senior associate of the East Asia program at the Stimson Center. Previously, Tatsumi worked
as a research associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and as the special assistant for political
affairs at the Embassy of Japan in Washington. In September 2006, Tatsumi testified before the House Committee
on International Relations. She is a recipient of the 2009 Yasuhiro Nakasone Incentive Award. In 2012, she was
awarded the Letter of Appreciation from the Ministry of National Policy of Japan for her contribution in advancing
mutual understanding between the United States and Japan (Yuki, Japans global diplomacy: views from the next
generation, Stimson center, March 2015)

Since first launching the diplomacy that takes a panoramic view of the world map
(chikyuugi wo fukan suru gaiko) initiative in his policy speech to the Diet in January 2013, Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe has demonstrated his strong personal commitment to translate this conceptual
framework into a greater Japanese diplomatic presence around the world. In this endeavor, he
has been playing the role of diplomat-in-chief, visiting more than 50 countries and meeting more than 200 foreign
leaders. Abe also made the decision to keep Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, whom he appointed at the beginning of
his administration, in place through the cabinet reshuffle in September 2014, illustrating his desire to maintain
consistency in his governments foreign policy approach. Indeed,

Abes approach

to the countries and regions

addressed in this volume has been remarkably consistent since he first served as prime minister in
2006 to 2007. As Tomohiko Satake illustrates, it was during Abes first term in office that the deepening of Japan-

Similarly, although there has always been a mutual sense of

it was Abes personal
commitment to Japan-India relations that set the relationship between the two
countries on todays path toward a strategic partnership. In Japans relationships
with Europe also, Abe has maintained the commitments and relationships he
established eight years ago. As Michito Tsuruoka describes, Abe attended the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
Australia security relations began to accelerate.

affinity and friendship between Japan and India as Takaaki Asano chronicles ,

meeting for the first time as Japanese prime minister in January 2007, and it was during this visit that he first
described Japan and NATO as partners that share such fundamental values as freedom, democracy, human rights

Driving Abes foreign policy, including the relationships with the

countries and regions identified in this volume, is his strong desire to re-establish
Japans position as a key player in the international community. In the report The U.S.-Japan
Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia (often referred to as the third Armitage-Nye Report) in 2012, a bipartisan
group of longtime US experts on the US-Japan alliance questioned whether Japan
seeks to remain as a tier-one nation, or [is] content to drift into tier-two status. 2
and the rule of law.

Abe responded to this question in his speech Japan Is Back at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, DC, in February 2013. Abe declared that Japan is not, and never will be, a tier-two country. I am

Abe articulated his vision of Japan as a

rules-promoter, a commons guardian and an effective ally and partner to the US
and other democracies in front of a foreign audience for the first time since taking office in December
back and so Japan shall be.3 It is in this speech that

2012.4 In Japans National Security Strategy, released ten months later in December 2013, these key concepts

This vision of Japan that Abe promotes is admirable. It has allowed Japan
to justify diplomatic outreach beyond the Asia-Pacific region and to provide key
organizing principles for Japans foreign policy. As can be seen in Japans relations with Australia
and India, Japans aspirations to play a key role in promoting and enforcing the existing
international norms has revitalized Japans efforts to enhance its relations with key
US allies and strategic partners such as Australia, Europe and India.
remain clear

No Prolif Public Support

No prolif public opinion, international commitments, security
calculations
Lenn 14 William Lenn, studying a Master of International Relations at the
University of Melbourne, THE FUTURE OF JAPANS NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
STATUS, Aug 1, 2014, http://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/the-future-of-japansnon-nuclear-weapons-status/
It appears likely that Japan will maintain its non-nuclear weapon status into the near
future. Although conflict on the Korean Peninsula keeps Japan on edge, it is evident that through the
combination of Japans national identity as a non-nuclear weapons state, its
international and domestic commitments to the non-proliferation regime , and the
continuing strength of the US-Japan alliance, Japan will maintain its non-nuclear weapons
status in the near-future. Polling conducted in Japan since the inception of its
non-nuclear policy indicates that there has been a decline in support for
nuclearisation, though with periodic increases at times of regional insecurity. Though there remains
overwhelming support to maintain Japans non-nuclear weapons status, Japans
citizens feel the need to debate acquiring nuclear weapons. Japan has remained committed to
promoting the non-proliferation regime through its membership of the NPT, CTBT
and the IAEA, and makes considerable efforts to further the non-proliferation
regime through its annual resolutions to the UNGA and working papers to the NPT . In
order for Japan to remain a non-nuclear weapons state the nuclear umbrella has been a necessary condition for
Tokyos non-nuclear policy.31 Japan has relied on the strength of the US-Japan alliance to guarantee its security in

Japans national identity as a peaceful and non-nuclear weapons

state, its commitment to the global non-proliferation regime and its security
calculations suggest that through these three factors, Japan will maintain its nonnuclear weapon status in the near-future.
the Asia-Pacific region.

Consensus goes aff no support for prolif

Kulacki 15 (Gregory, China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program,
Japan Calls for United States to End Hair-Trigger Alert, April 2015, Union of
Concerned Scientists)
During 12 trips to Japan over the past six years, the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) conducted
extensive interviews with elected and unelected members of the Japanese
government. Those inter-views leave little doubt that U.S. concerns about the
possibility of a nuclear-armed Japan are unwarranted. Except for a few outliers, Japanese
officials do not see possessing nuclear weapons as a solution to their
national security problems (Lewis 2014). This reportthe third in a series on Japan and the U.S.
nuclear postureexplores the findings from our interviews, as well as the history of the U.S.Japanese security commitment. Contrary to what many people believe, this history shows
that the United States does not provide a nuclear umbrella for Japan .
More-over, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security policyincluding taking
U.S. nu-clear weapons off hair-trigger alertis supported by an overwhelming majority of
the Japanese public and their elected officials. The Politics of Nuclear Weapons in Japan
Japan has a complicated relationship with nuclear weapons. The Japanese are the only people ever to suffer a
nuclear attack. The survivors still testify to the world about the horrifying humanitarian conse-quences, and an
overwhelming majority of Japanese remain determined to sustain their nations commit-ment to ensure that nuclear

nearly half of Japans people

consider nuclear weapons the worlds greatest dangera far higher percentage than in any
of the other 43 nations polled (Pew 2014). Another recent survey shows that 82 percent of the
Japanese public and most of Japans elected officials support their nations role as
an international advocate for nuclear disarmament (Asahi Shimbun 2014)
weapons are never used again. According to a recent Pew survey,

No Prolif Security
Japan prolif will never happen national security interest,
consensus of studies and Japanese opinion.
Kulacki 15 (Gregory, China Project Manager in the UCS Global Security Program,
Japan Calls for United States to End Hair-Trigger Alert, April, Union of Concerned
Scientists)
But our interviews with U.S. and Japanese participants in the EDD confirmed that that did not happen.

The EDD

does not focus on nuclear deterrence but on deterrence in general. A senior U.S.
Department of Defense official involved in the talks told us that the United States tries to downplay the role of
nuclear issues in the EDD. That means that todays U.S.-Japanese dialogue on extended deterrence follows in the

as then, the U.S.

government continues to affirm that the credibility of the U.S. defense
commitment to Japan does not depend on U.S. nuclear weapons. Why Japan Is
Not a Proliferation Risk The most difficult question confronting outside observers today is whether
the contradiction between Japanese government support for nuclear disarmament and the
pro-nuclear preferences of some Japanese officials reflects U.S. pressure on Japan,
Japanese pressure on the United States, or mutual consent. U.S. officials who argue that the United States
footsteps of the one led by Wolfowitz on the INF Treaty 30 years earlier. Now,

cannot reduce the role of nuclear weapons in the alliance because Japan might develop nuclear weapons obviously

all the Japanese officials we

recently interviewedincluding the lead political officer who testified in 2009 in
support of redeploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Asiaargue that Japan has no
leverage on the U.S. nuclear posture. The opinions expressed in these interviews are
consistent with those in a confidential Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) study of Japans
nuclear options conducted by some of the countrys most conservative defense
analysts. The study was commissioned by Japanese elected leaders to inform their decision
on whether to back a permanent extension of the NPT in 1995. At the time, North Korea had
believe Japanese officials are exerting pressure on the United States. Yet

embarked on a program to develop nuclear weapons, and the Chinese Communist Party, which had recently
crushed student-led protests with lethal military force, was threatening Taiwan with missile launches. The study also
considered the possibility that China might use nuclear intimidation to reinforce its claims to the Senkaku (Diaoyu)

The study found no imaginable

scenario where a decision to develop nuclear weapons would be in Japans
national security interests. Even in a worst-case scenario positing a
break-up of the U.S.- Japan alliance, a collapse of the nonproliferation
regime, and an inclination of various countries to go nuclear, the study concludes:
Even in such a case, it is questionable whether there is any value for a trading
nation that de-pends on the stability of international society to try to secure its
survival and protect its interests with its own nuclear weapons. It would more likely
undermine the basis of its own survival. Only in a case where destitution reaches a stage
Islands, a focus of tensions be-tween Japan and China.

where the exchange of damage with an opponent is not a concern anymore, would the geopolitical vulnerability of

This, however, is a case where a condition

becomes its own goal, and is not worthy of consideration (JDA 1995). If Japans
most conservative defense analysts believe that a collapse of both the NPT and the
U.S.-Japan alliance are not cause to develop nuclear weapons , modest changes to
U.S. nuclear weapons policy such as taking all U.S. land-based ICBMs off hair-trigger alert should
not raise fears that Japan might respond by withdrawing from the NPT and
starting a nuclear weapons program.
Japan make the nuclear option a possibility.

No Prolif Materials
Cant prolif Japan gave up their nuclear materials
Baetz 14 [Juergen Baetz, 3-24-2014, "Japan will give up weapons-grade
plutonium to U.S. ," Seattle Times, http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/japanwill-give-up-weapons-grade-plutonium-to-us/]
A major international summit to rein in the threat of nuclear terrorism opened Monday with Japan
pledging to return to the United States more than 315 kilograms (700 pounds) of
weapons-grade plutonium and a supply of highly enriched uranium. The Nuclear Security
Summit is the third in a series of meetings established after a landmark 2009 speech by President Barack Obama in
which he said non-secure nuclear material presents the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.

American and Japanese officials announced the deal the meetings first important
breakthrough at the two-day summit in The Hague, Netherlands. This is a very significant nuclear
security pledge and activity, U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz told reporters. The material will
be transferred to the United States for transformation into proliferation-resistant
forms. Japan originally received the material from the U.S. and Britain in the 1960s for use in research. The
summit focuses not on nuclear weapons but on efforts to reduce and secure nuclear material stockpiles to prevent
them falling into the hands of terrorists who could potentially use them to fashion a weapon. All our discussions
today and tomorrow will focus on one question: How to prevent nuclear terrorism, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte
said as he opened the meeting. The number of countries possessing such stockpiles has fallen from 39 in 2009 to
25 at the start of the Hague summit. The summit, which hosts leaders and senior officials from 53 countries, is
expected to wrap up Tuesday with a commitment to enact further reforms to boost nuclear security before a final
summit in Washington in 2016. Obama flew into the Netherlands on Monday morning and was attending a hastily
arranged G-7 summit later in the day to discuss the Wests response to Russias annexation of Crimea. The White
House also said, in addition to the Japan deal, the United States had reached agreements with Belgium and Italy to
remove highly enriched uranium and plutonium from those European allies. The White House said it had removed a
significant amount of nuclear material from Belgium and about 20 kilograms (44 pounds) from Italy. It did not
elaborate. Italy and the United States plan to continue to work together to eliminate additional stocks of special
nuclear material to make sure they do not fall into the hands of terrorists, the Obama administration said in a

Yosuke Isozaki, a senior national security adviser to Japanese Prime Minister

Shinzo Abe, said handing over the highly enriched uranium and plutonium was part
of Japans efforts to prevent proliferation. Japan shares a vision of a world without
nuclear weapons, he said through a translator. As part of the deal, the U.S. will continue to
receive spent reactor fuel from Japanese nuclear plants for an additional 10 years.
statement.

AT: Timeframe
Takes yearstheir short figures are for crude devices, not
battlefield nukes
Holmes 12, co-author of Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best
Foreign Affairs Book for 2010 and a former US Navy surface warfare officer, Japan:
Joining the Nuclear Weapons Club? It Could, http://thediplomat.com/2012/10/japanjoining-the-nuclear-weapons-club-it-could/
Conventional wisdom holds that Japan is what nonproliferation specialists call a "threshold" nuclear weapon state
a country that could stage a nuclear breakout virtually overnight should its electorate and leadership resolve to do

Estimates commonly bandied about run from six months to a year. Toshi Yoshihara and
Japanese bombmakers might
manage a crude device within that timeframe, but that's a far cry from a weapon
ready for battlefield use. Despite Japan's renown for high-tech wizardry and long
experience operating nuclear power plants, it would take Tokyo far longer than a
year to deploy a working nuclear arsenal. We're talking many years.
so.

I take aim at such assumptions in Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age.

Impact Answers

AT: Arms Race

No arms race from Japan.
White 8 (Hugh, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National
University, A nuclear Japan: The least bad option?
http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2008/07/17/A-nuclear-Japan-The-least-badoption.aspx)
in a world with nuclear weapons, a key aim of strategic policy is to stop them being
used. We therefore have to put very high priority on reducing the risks of conflict between nuclear powers, and to
But

reduce the risks of escalation to a nuclear exchange if they do go to war. And this leads to some very tough choices.

the imperative for fewer nuclear weapons in fewer hands must be weighed
against the imperative to build an international order and a military balance which stabilises the
international order and makes the use of these weapons less likely. We might find that the risks of
nuclear war in Asia would be lower if Japan had nuclear weapons than if it
did not. Second, more specifically, I am not sure that a Japanese nuclear capability
would automatically ignite a new wave of proliferation. Developing nuclear
weapons is a big step for anyone. Who among the non-nuclear states would find their
strategic situation so profoundly altered by a Japanese nuclear capability that they would feel
impelled to take this step? The most likely, of course, is South Korea. But if, like me, you
are a inclined to doubt that North Korea will surrender its weapons , and that an eventual
unified Korea is therefore like to be a nuclear power anyway, then this horse may already be out
of the stable. Beyond Northeast Asia, I think flow-on proliferation effects are much
less likely: would Australia, or Indonesia, be more likely to seek nuclear weapons
because Japan had them? Thirdly, we might ask whether the non-proliferation regime
could survive by adapting to accommodate a nuclear-armed Japan. Is this unthinkable?
At times,

Surely not, when serious thought is being given to accommodating India as a nuclear-armed country.

No widespread proliferation structural barriers

Hymans 12 (Jacques, Associate Professor of International Relations USC, North
Korea's Lessons for (Not) Building an Atomic Bomb, Foreign Affairs, 4-16,
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137408/jacques-e-c-hymans/north-koreas-lessonsfor-not-building-an-atomic-bomb?page=show)
Washington's miscalculation is not just a product of the difficulties of seeing inside the Hermit Kingdom. It is also a

the broader tendency to overestimate the pace of global proliferation . For

decades, Very Serious People have predicted that strategic weapons are about to spread
to every corner of the earth. Such warnings have routinely proved wrong - for
instance, the intelligence assessments that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq - but they continue
to be issued. In reality, despite the diffusion of the relevant technology and the knowledge for
building nuclear weapons, the world has been experiencing a great proliferation slowdown .
Nuclear weapons programs around the world are taking much longer to get off the
ground - and their failure rate is much higher - than they did during the first 25 years
of the nuclear age. As I explain in my article "Botching the Bomb" in the upcoming issue of Foreign Affairs,
the key reason for the great proliferation slowdown is the absence of strong cultures
of scientific professionalism in most of the recent crop of would-be nuclear states, which in turn is a
consequence of their poorly built political institution s. In such dysfunctional states,
the quality of technical workmanship is low, there is little coordination across
result of

different technical teams, and technical mistakes lead not to productive learning but instead to
finger-pointing and recrimination. These problems are debilitating, and they
cannot be fixed simply by bringing in more imported parts through illicit supply networks. In short, as a
struggling proliferator, North Korea has a lot of company.

AT: Domino Theory

Domino theory is wrong for Asia
Weiner 12 (Sarah Weiner, Research Assistant and Program Coordinator for the
Defense and National Security Group and the Project on Nuclear Issues @ Center for
Strategic and International Studies, The Dominos Wont Fall, November 9,
http://csis.org/blog/dominos-wont-fall)
The narrative is compelling. Fortunately for us, however, it makes much more sense in
theory than it is likely to play out in practice. The first glaring problem with the nuclear
domino theory is that it has been wrong for almost 70 years. Since the United
States successfully detonated its first nuclear bomb in 1945, eight additional nuclear powers have
emerged: Russia (1949), the United Kingdom (1952), France (1960), China (1964), (presumably) Israel (late
1960s), India (1974), Pakistan (1998), and North Korea (2006). That averages out to about one new nuclear state

If this
is domino proliferation, then it is the slowest domino chain in history.
every 7.5 years (and just one every 14 years since the Nonproliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970).

Some may look at this list and see the domino theory confirmed: the Soviet Union pursued a nuclear weapon
because its adversary the United States was doing so; Maoist China went nuclear in response to U.S. and Soviet
nuclear build up; and India nuclearized in response to China, sparking subsequent proliferation in Pakistan.

The

trouble with this chronicle is that it walks right into a classic stats 101 trap:
choosing based on the dependent variable. If we are interested in
understanding why states proliferate, analyzing a sample of nuclear states is
bound to skew our examination because, by our own definition, only nuclear
states made it into the dataset. Its like interviewing a sample of Republican voters,
discovering that the state of the economy determined their votes, and concluding
that anyone worried about the economy would vote for the GOP. In this scenario, we
would need to sample all voters. So to understand proliferation, we need to
understand all states. The decision not to proliferate is just as significant as the
opposite, and the list of non-proliferating states tells quite a different story. After
Chinas first successful nuclear test, for example, the U.S. administration predicted India, Indonesia, and Japan
could nuclearize, followed by a menacing crew including Sweden, Italy, Canada, and several nations in Eastern

Viewed from this lens, Indias nuclearization hardly confirms the domino
theory. Look at all the dominos that didnt fall! The same dog-that-didnt-bark
problem holds true in more modern cases. A long list of Asian countries should feel
threatened by North Koreas nuclear program, especially Japan and South Korea .
Yet, in contrast to dire predictions, the rest of the East and Southeast Asia
dominos remain upright.
Europe.

AT: NPT
The NPT is useless now anti-proliferation is losing political
momentum
Wilson 15 (Ward Wilson, Senior Fellow and director of the Rethinking Nuclear
Weapons project at the British American Security Information Council, 5/7/2015,
How nuclear realists falsely frame the nuclear weapons debate,
http://thebulletin.org/how-nuclear-realists-falsely-frame-nuclear-weaponsdebate8306)
There has never been as much dissatisfaction with the international framework
governing nuclear weapons (the Non-Proliferation Treaty) as there is today. The treaty
is being reviewed and debated at the United Nations in New York this month, and for the first time in
35 years there are serious concerns that it might tear apart at the seams.
Increasingly, there are those who feel strongly that the world would be safer without nuclear weapons, and that the
nuclear-armed states (whose promise to work seriously toward disarmament in Article VI of the treaty is one of the

The potential
unraveling of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is causing a careful reexamination of the
assumptions that underlie the entire nuclear weapons debate . And like a captain who waits
too long to put his boat into dry dock to look for rot under the waterline, the results have been shocking. Much
of the intellectual structure supporting the rationale for nuclear weapons
is made up of anachronistic ideas from the Cold War. Much of what we
thought we knew has turned out to be wrong or inadequate. This has led to some sharp,
tender spots creating anger and resentment) are not fulfilling their obligations.

interesting exchanges. Rather than being a stale debate that occasions stifled yawns, the debate about nuclear

the most interesting new thinking

involves the familiar framing of the debate as a contest between realists and
idealists. It turns out this division was not really a distinction created for
intellectual clarity but a sort of gerrymandering that aimed to fix the
outcome of the debate. This gerrymandering has been so successful , with one side in
the debate losing so consistently, that most people now hesitate to be associated with the
losers. In the United States, where this framing is most prevalent and shapes the
debate most strongly, enthusiastic support for disarmament (except in the most far-off,
one-day, maybe-someday terms) is tantamount to professional suicide. Politicians, for
example, rightly see that in the current environment taking an anti-nuclear
position is a quick way to be branded as starry-eyed, inexperienced, and
unrealistic. Carl Bildt famously said in the summer of 2013, when he was Foreign Minister of Sweden, that
weapons is suddenly full of surprising new developments. Perhaps

states questioning the importance of nuclear weapons are not serious. Opinion shapers and thought leaders draw
back as well. Journalists, particularly, like to think of themselves as hard-boiled, worldly cynics. Because opposition
to nuclear weapons has been cast as idealism, journalists who take disarmament arguments seriously risk their
credibility with colleagues. Even anti-nuclear activists are likely to see themselves as Don Quixotes, tilting valiantly

Yet the
emerging arguments paint this presumed dichotomy between the hard-headed and the
hopeful-heartedas no more than clever salesmanship on the part of nuclear weapons
believers. It works for them to claim that they are realists and to cast the
debate as realists v. idealists. But the position carved out by most nuclear weapons realists is
at targets they know they cannot dislodge, but bound by honor to keep on with the hopeless fight.

so unrealistic it would be laughable ... if the matter were not so serious.

AT: Miscalculation
No miscalc empirics
Stashwick 15 [Steven Stashwick (Lieutenant Commander in the U.S. Navy
Reserve, pent 10 years on active duty as a U.S. naval officer, made several
deployments to the Western Pacific, and completed graduate studies in international
relations at the University of Chicago), The Diplomat, 9-25-2015, "South China Sea:
Conflict Escalation and Miscalculation Myths," Diplomat,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-andmiscalculation-myths/]
The threat of miscalculation is again in vogue. What was once a preoccupation of accidental war
theorists has resurfaced in discussions about maritime disputes in Southeast Asia and Sino-U.S. relations. During
the Cold War, policymakers and scholars worried about nuclear annihilation sparked by misinterpreted warnings,
rogue officers, technical glitches in command and control systems, or a lower-level confrontation spiraling out of
control. Absent the Cold Wars looming nuclear threat, todays oft-repeated concerns focus on miscalculation
causing a local or tactical-level incident between individual ships or aircraft (harassment, collision, interdiction, and
so on) to lead to broader military confrontation. Some variation of this theme has been featured in public remarks
by former U.S. Defense Secretaries Gates, Panetta, Hagel, and current Defense Secretary Carter, as well as
Commanders of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Command, and was a topic of policymaker discussion
going back at least to the 1996 Taiwan Strait incident. These concerns are likewise found in too many op-eds,

while
history shows that strategic miscalculations can lead states to war , or dangerously close to
it, evidence does not support the worry that miscalculation may cause a local or
tactical-level incident to spiral out of control. To understand the risks associated with
miscalculation, we must distinguish between miscalculation at the strategic level and
miscalculation stemming from a localized incident between naval or air forces. At
the strategic level that is, a nations a priori willingness to escalate a conflict and use military force to
achieve its objectives no country starts a war expecting to lose. Yet, most warsend in the defeat
reports, interviews, commentaries, and articles to count (see also here, here, here, and here, etc.) However,

of at least one nation which had expected victory, implying all wars result from some degree of strategic

much of the
discourse about localized maritime incidents in the South China Sea conflates strategic
and local miscalculation risks, focusing on the latters potential to lead to a wider conflict. This concern
miscalculation. That may be a plausible danger in Southeast Asia, but a distinct one. Instead,

over local miscalculation nonetheless reflects a longstanding view of the danger incidents at sea poses to peace
stretching back to the Cold War. Both U.S. and Soviet leaderships were concerned that an incident between
peppery young ship captains could lead people to shoot at each other with results that mightbe impossible to
control, in the words of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s. Back then, the U.S.
and Soviets were openly adversarial and serious incidents between their ships and aircraft were almost

despite explicit mutual, strategic, and existential antagonism between

the U.S. and U.S.SR, none of the hundreds of maritime incidents that occurred over
the four decades of the Cold War escalated into anything beyond a short diplomatic
crisis. It is possible that they avoided a nuclear spiral in these incidents through diligent diplomacy and luck. But
more likely, it suggests that this type of maritime incident is insufficient on its own to
lead to the worst-case scenarios envisioned. Mitigating the miscalculation concerns
of officials and the extreme scenarios of some commentators is that these maritime incidents do not
occur in a vacuum, de-coupled from explicit national interests. In a famous 1988
Cold War incident, Soviet vessels in the Black Sea shouldered the U.S. warships
Yorktown and Caron (a controlled collision meant to push a ship off-course) while the latter were deliberately
commonplace. Yet

contesting what the U.S. deemed excessive Soviet legal claims over maritime rights. The Soviets knew the U.S.
vessels were there to intentionally flout their claims, and the U.S. knew the Soviets would likely try to enforce them.
Even if the firmness of the Soviet response was unanticipated (or deemed unlikely), there was no mystery to either
sides objectives. Thus,

neither side was going to start shooting in confusion ; the Soviet vessels

even radioed their intention to strike the U.S. ships. While not safe in the strictest sense (ships do not like to
swap paint with each other), footage from the Yorktown and Caron being pushed shows the actions to be intense
but deliberate, professionally executed, and clearly of an enforcement nature, rather than a prelude to combat.

While a serious diplomatic incident, both sides understood the situation, which
served to moderate concern over escalation. Similarly, a shouldering incident between
the U.S. cruiser Cowpens and a Chinese warship in 2013, while concerning to the U.S. from a
safety-at-sea perspective, was understood to be motivated by Chinese sensitivities around
testing their new aircraft carrier, not a precursor to hostilities. Nonetheless, concerns over
maritime incidents, miscalculation, and spiraling conflict contain enough intuitive logic to have endured. A
shared Cold War concern over miscalculations led to accords that are still in effect,
such as the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas
(INCSEA) and Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (DMA) agreement, and may be
credited with helping keep incidents between the U.S. and U.S.SR under control. However, the fact that
agreements were reached at all is likely more significant than their content. Such
agreements indicated a shared belief between U.S. and Soviet military leaderships that despite their feverish
preparations for war against one another, neither wanted war to come as the result of a tactical-level incident

neither would let an incident, however

serious, become an independent casus belli. The substance of these accords (and
those reached in the South China Sea) further strengthens this thesis. While INCSEA and
between individual ships and aircraft. This suggests

DMA contained rules of behavior, these were, again in Zumwalts words, little more than a reaffirmation of the
[maritime] Rules of the Road (international rules that direct how ships stay safe around each other at sea). What
was groundbreaking was that in concluding the accords, the U.S. and U.S.SR implicitly recognized their intentions to

The accords
created new parallel rules by which each could do so safely, as well as new
communications protocols to inform one another of their intentions. Together, this
affirms that both sides were playing a (serious) game to establish positions and assert
rights more than they were interested in war. Of course, incidents intended to reinforce maritime
violate those rules and practices when advantageous (consider the Yorktown and Caron).

claims and hostile actions can look the same right up until ordnance is exchanged, but now both sides could be

In Asia, there
is recent and dramatic precedent for restraint, even after an unambiguously hostile
local event, which belies theoretical arguments about the risk of miscalculation and
unintended escalation. When the South Korean warship Cheonan was sunk in 2010,
South Korea determined that North Korea was responsible. Far from a mere incident of the
sort worried over in the South China Sea, this was a belligerent act against South Koreas
armed forces. And yet, there was no miscalculation-fueled conflict spiral, and instead a
more confident that if shooting did start, it was an intentional act of war. Precedent for Restraint

strategically calibrated response. It remains unknown whether the sinking of the Cheonan was ordered by the North
Koreans (they continue to deny any responsibility), the act of a renegade, or, perhaps least plausibly, an accident.
What is clear is that

despite a sunken ship and 46 sailors killed, the incident did not spiral

out of control.

This suggests that South Koreas political calculus did not view militarily punishing North Korea
worth the risk of a renewed and potentially nuclear war, which is to say that an extraordinary but tactical-level

some take the miscalculation-escalation

dynamic so far as to suggest that incidents between fishing vessels and coast
guards in the South China Sea might lead to war. In view of the Cold War record and the recent
Cheonan example, such propositions are drastically overstated. It is conceivable that a state
event did not trump strategic preferences. Even so,

already resolved to escalate a dispute militarily might view a local maritime incident as a convenient casus belli.
But in that emphatically calculated case, no institutional impediments to such incidents would prevent the hostility.

the prevalence of coast guards and fishing vessels is actually a sign of

restraint. For a front so often considered a flashpoint, it is notable how few incidents in the
South China Sea are between naval assets. This is not accident or luck, but instead
suggests that regional players deliberately use lightly armed coast guard and other
On the contrary,

para-military white hull vessels to enforce their claims. Because these units do not
have the ability to escalate force the way warships do, it in fact signals their desire
to avoid escalation. And while gray hull naval vessels may be just over the horizon
providing an implicit threat of force, they can also provide a further constraint on potential
incidents; their very presence compels parties to consider how far to escalate
without inviting more serious responses. As in the Cold War, parties in the South China
Sea have sought diplomatic mitigation of maritime incidents, principally through the
perennially-stalled Code of Conduct, the year-old Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES), and
the bilateral Military Maritime Consultative Agreement between the U.S. and China. But underpinning concerns
about miscalculation and escalation, and mitigation efforts like CUES, is the idea that by avoiding incidents the
region will avoid war. This belief is dangerous insofar as it conflates the symptoms of the disputes (incidents at sea)
with the terms of the dispute itself (maritime rights and sovereignty). Incidents and the activities that precipitate
them help establish new and accepted regional norms and facts on the ground (bloodlessly, if inelegantly). In that
sense, avoiding incidents sets back the de facto resolution of the disputes. Since the balance of these evolving
norms and facts on the ground appears to favor Chinas efforts (e.g., using its coast guard to eject fishing vessels
from disputed waters and island reclamation projects), it is neither surprising that Chinas regional rivals propose
institutional remedies like CUES and the Code of Conduct, nor that China only agrees to them after negotiating

The record suggests that miscalculation concerns over

incidents in the maritime realm are exaggerated and can artificially increase tensions, raise
threat perceptions, and justify arms build-ups. Whether an incident is deliberate, or a true
organic accident, if it occurs within a dispute context where neither side desires
armed conflict, it will not escalate at the strategic level. However, because of the very
seriousness of that perceived escalation threat, the miscalculation narrative can also motivate
positive diplomatic efforts like INCSEA, DMA, and now CUES (not to overstate their realistic contribution to
away any legally binding provisions.

resolving disputes). Further, for all its conceptual and historical problems, and not least its potential to feed
narratives of aggression, another possible advantage of focusing on miscalculation in the South China Sea is that
it allows countries to maintain ambiguity about the real terms of dispute. Avoiding war is a distinct objective from

But if peace is the priority,

ambiguity may be preferable if all that clarity reveals is just how intractable those
disputes may be. Clarity can rob governments of the flexibility to equivocate to their domestic audiences
solving disputes; war is a dispute resolution mechanism after all.

(and competitors) and force a choice between escalating a conflict and backing down from their claims. Then open

if all parties are more or less content to live

with ambiguity in the regions maritime claims, then a somewhat mutually
dissatisfying peace prevails, but peace nonetheless. Everyone wants to win, but as
long as everyone also wants to avoid losing even more, occasional incidents do not
have to fuel strategic tension.
conflict might become more realistic. Conversely,

Prolif Defense
Empirics prove that weapons dont increase the risk of war
Tepperman 9 (Jonathan Tepperman a journalist based in New York City. Why
Obama should learn to love the bomb Newsweek Nov 9, 2009
http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome_files/nukes_Final.pdf)
A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear weapons may not, in
fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most people assume. The bomb may actually make
us safer. In this era of rogue states and trans-national terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that
few politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But thats a mistake. Knowing the truth about nukes would
have a profound impact on government policy. Obamas idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic
administration, may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But its not even clear he should
make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S. government can and should take to make the real
world safer, and these mustnt be ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke free planet) thats both unrealistic
and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of peace as well as destruction rests

theres
never been a nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that
possess them. Just stop for a second and think about that: its hard to overstate how remarkable it is,
on two deceptively simple observations. First, nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second,

especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz, the leading nuclear optimist and a
professor emeritus of political science at UC Berkeley puts it, We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima.
Its striking and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not been any war among
nuclear states. To understand whyand why the next 64 years are likely to play out the same wayyou need to
start by recognizing that all states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid,
petty, venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when theyre pretty sure they can get away with them. Take

a country will start a fight only when its almost certain it can get what
it wants at an acceptable price. Not even Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didnt think they could
win. The problem historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble
and underestimate the other sideand millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear
weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable,
and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to ashes with the push of
war:

a button and everybody knows itthe basic math shifts. Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that
war with a nuclear state is unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, Why fight if you cant win

The iron logic of deterrence and mutually assured

is so compelling, its led to whats known as the nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented
stretch since the end of World War II in which all the worlds major powers have avoided coming to blows. They
did fight proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these never
matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World War II alone was
and might lose everything? Why indeed?
destruction

responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has
declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and theres very
good reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close look at these cases is
fundamentally reassuringbecause

in each instance, very different leaders all came to the

same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in
October 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both
countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would have meant curtains for
everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchevs aide Fyodor
Burlatsky said later on, It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the first time.
The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear armed enemies slide toward war, then pull back,

The best recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought

Getting their hands on
weapons of mass destruction didnt do anything to lessen their animosity. But it did
dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic weapons, the two sides
have never fought another war.
always for the same reasons.

three bloody wars after independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998.

Statistics prove that prolif isnt destabilizing

Asal and Beardsley 7 (Victor Asal Department of Political Science, State
University of New York, Albany and Kyle Beardsley Department of Political Science,
Emory University Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior Journal of Peace
Research 2007; 44; 139)
As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict

the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a

negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary
support to the argument that nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior , as
variable. Our primary independent variable,

stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors Suez Nationalization War
(1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992) and five nuclear actors
Gulf War (1990) only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear
actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there
is actually a pacifying effect.

The positive and statistically significant coefficient

on the variable

that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts
the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with
higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors by

the results can only suggest that,

increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a

extension, many general actors as well experienced war. Therefore,

keeping the number of crisis actors fixed,

pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels
violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV,
Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a
sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than
other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in

All actors should tend to be more

cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own
capabilities. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a balance of terror as a source of
order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence.

stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), it supports the logic in this

nuclear weapons can serve as a deterrent of aggression from both nuclear

and non-nuclear opponents.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and
article that

demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most
crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors
does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant,
which lends credence to the optimists view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave
less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly
illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity
appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint
toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is
when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of
nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the
exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five
nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see,
the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any
nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage
points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability
of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear
actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of
nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. Overall, the analysis lends
significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when
nuclear actors are involved. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war,

reduces the probability of full-scale war,

powers involved in the conflict increases.

it significantly

with more reduction as the number of nuclear

Prolif Good General

Systemic level analysis proves prolif is stabilizing
Suzuki 15 Akisato, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Is

more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict
by Random Forests, Research and Politics April-June 2015: 17
Does nuclear proliferation decrease or increase interstate conflict? The existing theories provide different, and often
conflicting, explanations.

Quantitative research has assessed the empirical validity of various

explanations, but has only utilized a dyadic-level or crisis-level of analysis (Asal and Beardsley,
2007; Bell and Miller, 2015; Gartzke and Jo, 2009; Geller, 1990; Narang, 2013; Rauchhaus, 2009; Sobek et al.,
2012). This is surprising, because nuclear proliferation is principally a systemic phenomenon ,
since it increases the number of nuclear states in the inter- state system. Thus, it remains unclear how nuclear

A
systemic propensity for conflict may not be understood simply as an aggregate of
lower levels of phenomena. For example, even if nuclear weapons had a significant
effect on conflict at the dyadic level, this effect might be negligible as an aggregate
at the systemic level.
prolif- eration is empirically associated with a propensity for interstate conflict at the interstatesystemic level.

This is a reasonable con- cern, because the majority of states in the system are non- nuclear states. Given these issues, this paper contributes to the existing literature by

empirically examining how a change in the number of nuclear states influences a propensity for con- flict at the interstatesystemic level. Because the literature lacks a rigorous empirical answer to the theoretical debate, like
Rauchhaus (2009) this paper tests existing theories rather than proposing a new theory. To this end, it utilizes the machine learning method Random Forests (Breiman, 2001; for an R package, see Liaw and Wiener, 2002), one of the
best-performing supervised learning models currently available (Caruana and Niculescu- Mizil, 2006). Random Forests can address theoretical and methodological problems to analyze the relationship between nuclear proliferation
and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, as this paper discusses in greater detail. The paper first reviews the scholarly debate on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict. Second, it empirically examines the relationship
between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, using a Random Forests model to analyze interstatesystemic year data from 1950 to2009. Finally, it presents implications for the literature and policy
making. Theories Nuclear-proliferation optimists argue that nuclear weapons reduce conflict because of the intolerable cost of nuclear war (Mearsheimer, 1984/1985: 21; Waltz, 2003: 69). Therefore, more may be better (Waltz,
2003: 3). Nuclear symmetry (a dyad of nuclear states) should deter states from resorting to war, because war could result in the use of nuclear weapons (Powell, 1985). Rauchhaus (2009: 263) notes that the nuclear deterrence
literature is virtually silent on the effect of nuclear asymmetry (a nuclear state versus a non-nuclear state), but Waltz (2003: 17) argues, Far from lowering the expected cost of aggression, a nuclear offense, even against a nonnuclear state, raises the possible costs of aggression to incalculable heights because the aggressor cannot be sure of the reaction of other states. Non-nuclear states should also be deterred from engaging in war with nuclear states,
because non-nuclear states fear nuclear retaliation. If nuclear weapons prevent war, they should also decrease conflict short of war, because states would hesitate to initiate conflict which could escalate to war. Optimists admit that
nuclear weapons do not necessar- ily prevent all types of interstate conflict (see Hagerty, 2009: 109110; Waltz, 2003: 17), but they do not argue that nuclear weapons increase conflict either. Waltz (2003: 926) also suggests that
new nuclear states are not more prone to conflict than old nuclear states, because the logic and assumptions of nuclear deterrence can be applied not only to old nuclear major powers but to any kind of states (minor powers,
domestically unstable states, autocratic states, or states engaged in rivalry). In short, optimist logic expects that nuclear proliferation reduces a systemic propensity for interstate conflict through deterrent effects. Nuclearproliferation pessimists suggest that nuclear proliferation sometimes increases conflict; in discussions of nuclear symmetry, pessimists point out the problem of the stabilityinstability paradox, whereby nuclear deter- rence at the
strategic level allows for greater flexibility and aggression at lower levels (Saideman, 2005: 219; see also Snyder, 1965). Analyzing why Pakistan resorted to unconventional warfare against India even after both states became
nuclear-armed, Bajpai (2009: 170) argues that the existence [of nuclear weapons] created the con- ditions under which one side, Pakistan, felt that the fear of nuclear war allowed it to prosecute an insurgency/terror war against
India. Thus, nuclear symmetry can provoke limited war and conflict, if not full-scale war. As for nuclear asymmetry, Geller (1990: 307) points out that the possession of nuclear weapons has no evident inhibitory effect on the
escalation propensities of the non-nuclear opponent for the following two reasons: first, the non- nuclear state may doubt that the nuclear opponent will actually use nuclear weapons due to its lack of military significance or
political and ethical inhibitions; and second, the non-nuclear state may have greater interests in the conflict than the nuclear opponent. Hence, Geller con- cludes that, in nuclear asymmetry, war is a distinct pos- sibility, with
aggressive escalation by the non-nuclear power probable (Geller 1990: 307). As for the age of nuclear states, Sagan (2003: 5372) suggests that new nuclear states are more prone to conflict than old ones, because the
assumptions of nuclear deter- rence cannot be applied to the former. Other states may be motivated to initiate preventive war to destroy new nuclear states nuclear programs in their early stages, while new nuclear states may lack
second-strike capabilities for effec- tive deterrence. The implication of this argument is two- fold: first, if new nuclear states do not have as much deterrence credibility as do old nuclear states, they are likely to motivate other states
to initiate conflict. Other states are faced with a closing window of opportunities to secure their interest vis--vis new nuclear states. With time, their nuclear capabilities will develop, making it more dif- ficult for other states to
change the status quo by military means. Second, because they fear that other states will initi- ate conflict earlier rather than later, new nuclear states may initiate conflict as a costly signal to increase their deter- rence credibility.
Therefore, according to pessimist logic, new nuclear states are more likely to experience conflict (either as a target or an initiator) than old nuclear states or non-nuclear states. In summary, pessimist logic says that nuclear
proliferation occasionally increases a systemic pro- pensity for interstate conflict, particularly after a new nuclear state appears in the system. Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator andBrito(1981)suggestmiddlegroundviews.Whiletheir model primarily focuses on the relationship between nuclear proliferation and the probability of nuclear war, it can be inferred that if the number of nuclear states changes the probability of nuclear war, it
should also change the probability of interstate conflict which could escalate to such war. Bueno de Mesquita and Rikers (1982) formal model shows that nuclear proliferation increases the prob- ability of conflict until the number of
nuclear states reaches five, and then the probability keeps decreasing along with further proliferation. Intriligator and Britos (1981) model indicates that nuclear proliferation causes the probability of conflict to increase until the
second nuclear state obtains sufficient nuclear capabilities, and then further prolifera- tion either decreases or increases the probability depending on the potentiality of accidental or irrational war. In short, these two models expect a
non-linear relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for inter- state conflict. Finally, nuclear proliferation could mitigate conflict through two indirect mechanisms: first, extended nuclear deterrence
decreases the likelihood of a non-nuclear pro- tg being a target of conflict (Fuhrmann and Sechser, 2014; see also Huth, 1990 and Weede, 1983), and ceteris paribus, nuclear proliferation should result in a larger num- ber of
extended nuclear deterrence measures, thereby reducing a systemic propensity for conflict; and second, since nuclear weapons expand states foreign interests (Bell and Miller, 2015), the emergence of nuclear states might
discourage non-nuclear dyads, particularly those in the same region, from engaging in conflict for fear of interven- tion by these nuclear states. Given these conflict-reducing/provoking effects of nuclear proliferation, what overall
effect would nuclear proliferation have on a systemic propensity for conflict? This is difficult to answer, not only due to the controversy over whether nuclear states are more or less prone to con- flict, but also because the existing
theories do not explain whether those conflict-reducing/provoking effects are large enough to influence a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, given the ratio of nuclear states to non-nuclear states in the system. This challenge

The interstate
systemic year data are used here to investigate the relationship between nuclear
proliferation and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict .
motivates the empirical examination of the relationship between nuclear prolifera- tion and a systemic propensity for conflict. Empirical investigation by Random Forests

The dependent variable is the number of militarized interstate

dispute onsets (Palmer et al., 2015; version 4.01 is used) per sys- temic-year, standardized as the ratio to the number of states in the interstate system (Correlates of War Project, 2011) hereafter, the disputestate ratio.
Observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to make sure that causal effects pre- cede a variation in the disputestate ratio.2 Two regressors are used to examine the effect of nuclear proliferation: the number of nuclear states in
the interstate system; and a count of the years since the number of nuclear states changes (hereafter nuclear year counter), measur- ing the effect of new nuclear states (Horowitz, 2009). The data about nuclear states are from
Gartzke and Kroenig (2009); additionally, the current paper codes North Korea as a nuclear state since 2009 (Table 1).3 The model also includes the number of democratic states (Polity2 score 6 in Marshall, 2013) in the interstate
sys- tem, the gross world product (Earth Policy Institute, 2012), and the binary variable of unipolarity (coded zero until 1989 and one from 1990; see Monteiro, 2011/2012); these Table 1. Information on nuclear states in the
interstate system. three variables control for democratic peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001), capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007), and polarity (Monteiro, 2011/2012) respectively. The number of nuclear states and these control variables
suffer from multicolline- arity (see Table A-9 in the online appendix), and this paer later explains how to resolve this problem. A lagged dependent variable is also included to address the temporal dependence of time-series data. The
temporal scope is 19502009 (i.e. N=59) due to the data availability and the use of the dependent variable at t+1. The descriptive statis- tics of all variables are displayed in Table 2.4 As mentioned in the introduction, this paper
uses the machine learning, non-parametric method Random Forests for the empirical investigation.5 Although it is unfamiliar to most political science and international relations analysts, Random Forests has been widely used in
numerous scien- tific studies (Strobl et al., 2009: 324; Strobl et al., 2008). The popularity of the method is also apparent from the fact that Breimans (2001) original paper has been cited 12,721 times in the literature.6 Random
Forests generates two useful analytics: first, conditional variable importance measures how impor- tant each regressor is, conditional on the remaining regres- sors (Hothorn et al., 2006; Strobl et al., 2007, 2008). This is analogous
to statistical significance in conventional regression models. The significance threshold proposed by Strobl et al. (2009: 343) is whether the importance score of a regressor is negative, zero, or lower than the absolute value of the
lowest negative score. If none applies, the regressor is considered as important; and the second rele- vant analytic is a partial dependence plot (Friedman, 2001). This estimates the marginal effect of each regressor on the dependent
variable while taking the remaining regressors into consideration. Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the esti- mation of conditional variable importance and partial
dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339341), which is desirable because, as
already noted, some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for con- flict; and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009:
339341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausi- ble to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world
prod- uct). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are there- fore essential. The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative impor- tance score.7 Thus, the nuclear year
counter is not important in explaining the disputestate ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the
nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate
conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower disputestate ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and
from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is
supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the disputestate ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the sys- tem (as there were in 2009), the
number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approx- imately from 44 to 35. This is a substantively significant decline. Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave rela- tionship with the dispute
state ratio, suggesting that new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot.
Finally, as for the control variables, the number of dem- ocratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the disputestate ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest
values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from
40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37. Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the disputestate ratio, suggest- ing that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict;
however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states
and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with

caution. Discussion and

The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the

relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically
concluding remarks

supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the

systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear
evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic
propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons
themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state
is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to
keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the
analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear
proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear
states are associated with fewer disputes in the system . This conclusion, however, raises
questions about how to reconcile this studys findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell
and Miller, 2015). The cur- rent paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for
interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic
conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that

nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating

effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states
intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking
effect of nuclearasymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely
be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity
for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

Prolif Good Asia

Asian proliferation is stabilizingit de-escalates territorial
conflict
Sapolsky & Leah 14, Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor Emeritus and the Former
Director of The MIT Security Studies Program. Christine M. Leah is a Stanton Fellow
at the MIT Security Studies Program, Let Asia Go Nuclear,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/let-asia-go-nuclear-10259
Americas policy of opposing the proliferation of nuclear weapons needs to be more nuanced. What works for the
United States in the Middle East may not in Asia. We do not want Iran or Saudi Arabia to get the bomb, but why not
Australia, Japan, and South Korea? We are opposed to nuclear weapons because they are the great military
equalizer, because some countries may let them slip into the hands of terrorists, and because we have significant

our opposition to nuclear weapons in Asia

means we are committed to a costly and risky conventional arms race with
China over our ability to protect allies and partners lying nearer to China
than to us and spread over a vast maritime theater. None of our allies in Asia possess
advantage in precision conventional weapons. But

nuclear weapons. Instead, they are protected by what is called extended deterrence, our vaguely stated promise to
use nuclear weapons in their defense if they are threatened by regional nuclear powers, China, North Korea and
Russia. We promise, in essence, to trade Los Angeles for Tokyo, Washington for Canberra, and Seattle for Seoul, as

to avoid such a test of our will, the United States

attempts to contain China in particular, but others as well, via a conventional force buildup
preposterous as that might seem. In order

the so-called pivot to Asia. We station tens of thousands of troops in Japan and South Korea, and are expanding our
presence in Guam, Australia, Singapore, and the Philippines. The conventional challenge is Chinas ability to deny
access for US forces in or near the island chains that are our Asian allies and that at the same time guard China. As
Chinas military grows the access issue becomes more problematic because of Chinas ability to saturate the zone
with missiles and aircraft that can threaten our military presence. The Air-Sea Battle operational concept, a costly
networking of missile defenses, long-range-strike capabilities and naval forces has been the US militarys response.
Billions are being spent by the United States to assure our Asian allies of our will to protect them conventionally as

there is a better, cheaper way to provide

security in Asia. We should encourage our allies to acquire their own nuclear
weapons. With nuclear weapons Australia, Japan and the others would have the capability
to protect themselves from bullying. Nearly all of the allies are rich enough and
technologically advanced enough to acquire and maintain nuclear force s. And those
well with extended nuclear deterrence. But

who are notthe Philippines, for examplelose much of their vulnerability once the focus shifts away from

Nuclear weapons helped prevent the Cold War

from turning hot. In Asia they can stop a conventional arms race that is forcing the
conventional defenses of the island chains.

United States to invest in weapons that can block the Chinese military on its doorstep, thousands of miles from our

Tailored
proliferation would not likely be destabilizing. Asia is not the Middle East.
Japan, South Korea, Australia, and even Taiwan are strong democracies.
They have stable political regimes. Government leaders are accountable to
democratic institutions. Civilian control of the military is strong. And they dont
have a history of lobbing missiles at each otherthey are much more riskaverse than Egypt, Syria or Iran. Americas allies would be responsible nuclear
weapon states. A number of Asian nations have at one time or another considered
going nuclear, Australia for example, with tacit U.S. Defense Department encouragement in the 1960s. They
own. Let our Asian allies defend themselves with the weapon that is the great equalizer.

chose what for them was the cheaper alternative of living under the US nuclear umbrella. Free nuclear guarantees
provided by the United States, coupled with the US Navy patrolling offshore, have allowed our allies to grow

Confident that the United States

protects them, our allies have even begun to squabble with China over strings of
uninhabited islands in the hope that there is oil out there. It is time to give them a
prosperous without having to invest much in their own defense.

dose of fiscal and military reality. And the way to do that is to stop standing between them and their
nuclear-armed neighbors. It will not be long before they realize the value of having their own nuclear weapons. The
waters of the Pacific under those arrangements will stay calm, and we will save a fortune.

AT: Japan-China War

Doesnt escalate threats are rhetoric, conflict would be
resolved quickly
Chiaramonte 14 (Perry Chiaramonte, FoxNews, China preps military for 'short,
sharp war' with Japan, US Navy analyst says, 2/19/14,
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/02/19/china-preps-military-for-short-sharp-warwith-japan-says-us-navy/)
China is practicing for a "short, sharp war" with Japan. That is the assessment of
a top U.S. Navy intelligence analyst, who told colleagues that Chinas Peoples Liberation Army
(PLA) is currently conducting training exercises in a practice scenario in which the
military takes the Senkaku Islands, near Taiwan. We witnessed the massive
amphibious and cross-military region enterprise , Capt. James Fannell, deputy chief of
staff intelligence and information operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLEET)
said at the West 2014 conference on Feb. 13 in San Diego. [We] concluded that the PLA has been given
the new task to be able to conduct a short, sharp war to destroy Japanese forces in
the East China Sea following with what can only be expected a seizure of the
Senkakus or even a southern Ryukyu [islands] as some of their academics say. Its alleged that
in the past year, China has increased its military activity, including high-profile actions in the South China Sea as
well as combat drills in the south Philippine Sea. Fannell's comments were reported by the U.S. Naval Institute, an
independent professional association founded in 1873 which closely follows navy matters. There is growing
concern that Chinas pattern of behavior in the South China Sea reflects an incremental effort by China to assert
control of the area contained in the so-called 9-dash line despite the objections of its neighbors, and despite the
lack of any explanation or apparent basis under international law, Fannell also said. Japan has in recent months
accused a Chinese warship of locking its missile-targeting radar onto one of its warships, Fannell noted. China first
denied the claim, but later admitted it while downplaying any danger the incident posed. Retired U.S. Army Lt. Col.

China has a habit of bullying its neighbors with intimidating military

drills, though exercises aimed at Japan are a new and worrisome wrinkle. The Chinese have
conducted training exercises aimed at Taiwan for decades--but haven't
invaded, Peters, also a Fox News military analyst, told FoxNews.com. The latest Chinese exercises
that appear to rehearse an invasion of the Senkaku Islands are probably in that
vein: Military exercises as a show of strength, a closed-fist tool of
diplomacy, and, yes, a threat, but not one on which Beijing really desires to
act. Peters adds that the exercises are likely Chinas attempt at posturing . At
present, China would have a great deal to lose by attacking or otherwise provoking
a confrontation with Japan, he said. At the same time, the Chinese feel they're the regional (and global)
rising power and they rather enjoy flexing their muscles. You might say they're proud of
their physique, but don't really want a fight. In that sense, these exercises are a
strategic selfie.
Ralph Peters said

China-Japan trade dependence prevents conflict.

McCurry 14 (Justin McCurry, Econ & Japanese Studies from London University,
CSM, Why will Japan and China avoid conflict? They need each other., 2/5/14,
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2014/0205/Why-will-Japan-and-Chinaavoid-conflict-They-need-each-other)
Despite dark allusions to Germany and Britain in 1914, the two powers' economies are
deeply intertwined, and Japanese doing business in China are guardedly optimistic.
One of the most striking warnings that Sino-Japanese tensions could descend into conflict came from none other

than Japans prime minister, Shinzo Abe. Speaking at the recent World Economic Forum in Davos, Abe suggested
that Japans relationship with China was in a similar situation to that between Britain and Germany before the
outbreak of World War I in 1914. The most common interpretation: that close economic ties between nations are not
always enough to prevent them from going to war with each other. Japanese officials insisted that Mr. Abes
comments, as reported by some foreign media, had been taken out of context. But his analogy raises an important

strong bilateral trade

will be enough to pull them back from the brink or, at the very least, help
them weather the current diplomatic storm. The answer at least for now is yes, according to the
question about the ongoing territorial dispute between Japan and China: whether

consensus emerging among the myriad Japanese companies with business interests in China. That guarded
optimism contrasts with the autumn of 2012, when Japans decision effectively to nationalize the Senkaku islands
East China Sea territories also claimed by China, where they are known as the Diaoyu sparked riots in several
Chinese cities and forced Japanese businesses in the country to temporarily close amid calls for boycotts of
Japanese products. We suffered a downturn, just like every Japanese company that has business interests in
China, says a spokesman for the automaker Nissan. But 2013 ended up being our best-ever year for sales, he
adds. Between January and December last year, Nissan's new vehicle sales in China, which accounts for a quarter of
the firm's global sales, totaled 1.27 million units, up 17 percent from a year earlier. We fully expect that sales there

The broader picture tells a similar story.

Exactly a year after the riots in China, sales were returning to near pre-crisis levels,
with Japans exports to China rising more than 11 percent in September 2013 from a
year earlier; Japan's imports from China, its biggest trading partner, increased by more
than 30 percent over the same period. Interdependent economies Economically, Japan
and China need each other. Trade between the two countries has tripled
over the past decade to more than $340 billion in 2012. China offers Japanese
firms an affordable manufacturing base and a vast export market. Between 1995 and
2011, for example, shipments to China accounted for 45 percent of the overall
growth in Japanese exports. China, in turn, depends on Japanese investment
and the jobs that come with it, while its own export industry would struggle without
Japanese technology. About 60-70 percent of the goods China imports from Japan
comprises the machinery and parts it needs to make its own products. And for every 1
will continue to grow in 2014, the spokesman adds.

percent of growth China sees in global exports, imports from Japan rise by 1.2 percent, according to 2012

Given that backdrop, any military confrontation

in the East China Sea would have profound implications for the global economy. It
could also suck in the US, which is treaty-bound to come to Japans aid if it is attacked. Japanese firms can
take some comfort from the absence of violent protests in China or boycotts of
Japanese goods since Abe visited a controversial war shrine in Tokyo at the end of last year. Richard Bush,
calculations by the International Monetary Fund.

director of the Center for East Asia Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution in Washington, says China has come to
realize that a repeat of the officially sanctioned mass protests of 2012 would only strengthen the hand of Japanese

the benefits China accrues from strong economic

ties with Japan will trump any desire to raise the stakes over territorial
and historical disputes. But Beijings motivation is probably more strategic than
economic, he adds. It doesnt want to have the US get drawn into whatever
might happen in the security realm with Japan. What I think they are doing is lowrisk, and may work, whereas a more aggressive approach carries greater risks.
right-wingers. Mr. Bush suggests that

Turns Case Answers

AT: Nuclear Winter

Nuclear winter doesnt cause extinction or climate change.
Robock 10 [Alan Robock, Distinguished Professor in the Department of
Environmental Sciences @ Rutgers University, PhD in Meteorology from MIT,
Nuclear Winter, WIREs Climate Change Journal Volume 1, May/June 2010,
http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/WiresClimateChangeNW.pdf]
to point out the consequences of nuclear winter , it is also important to point
extinction of our species was not ruled out in initial
studies by biologists, it now seems that this would not take place. Especially in Australia and
New Zealand, humans would have a better chance to survive. Also, Earth will not be
plunged into an ice age. Ice sheets, which covered North America and Europe only
18,000 years ago and were more than 3-km thick, take many thousands of years to build up
from annual snow layers, and the climatic disruptions would not last long enough to
produce them. The oxygen consumption by the fires would be inconsequential, as
would the effect on the atmospheric greenhouse by carbon dioxide production. The
While it is important

out what will not be the consequences. Although

consequences of nuclear winter are extreme enough without these additional effects, however.

Nuclear war does not cause extinction consensus of scientists

and empirics prove.
Nyquist 99 [J.R. Nyquist, WorldNetDaily contributing editor and a renowned
expert in geopolitics and international relations, May 20, Antipas, Is Nuclear War
Survivable? http://www.antipas.org/news/world/nuclear_war.html]
prominent physicists have condemned the nuclear winter hypothesis.
Nobel laureate Freeman Dyson once said of nuclear winter research, Its an absolutely atrocious piece of
science, but I quite despair of setting the public record straight. Professor Michael McElroy, a Harvard physics professor, also
criticized the nuclear winter hypothesis. McElroy said that nuclear winter researchers stacked the deck
in their study, which was titled Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Multiple Nuclear Explosions (Science, December
The truth is, many

1983). Nuclear winter is the theory that the mass use of nuclear weapons would create enough smoke and dust to blot out the sun,
causing a catastrophic drop in global temperatures. According to Carl Sagan, in this situation the earth would freeze. No crops could

In truth, natural disasters have frequently

produced smoke and dust far greater than those expected from a nuclear war. In
1883 Krakatoa exploded with a blast equivalent to 10,000 one-megaton bombs, a
detonation greater than the combined nuclear arsenals of planet earth. The
Krakatoa explosion had negligible weather effects. Even more disastrous, going
back many thousands of years, a meteor struck Quebec with the force of 17.5
million one-megaton bombs, creating a crater 63 kilometers in diameter. But the
world did not freeze. Life on earth was not extinguished. Consider the views of
Professor George Rathjens of MIT, a known antinuclear activist, who said, Nuclear
winter is the worst example of misrepresentation of science to the public in my
memory. Also consider Professor Russell Seitz, at Harvard Universitys Center for
International Affairs, who says that the nuclear winter hypothesis has been
discredited. Two researchers, Starley Thompson and Stephen Schneider, debunked the nuclear winter hypothesis in the
summer 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. Thompson and Schneider stated: the global apocalyptic conclusions of
the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishingly low level
of probability. OK, so nuclear winter isnt going to happen. What about nuclear fallout? Wouldnt the radiation from a nuclear
be grown. Humanity would die of cold and starvation.

war contaminate the whole earth, killing everyone? The short answer is: absolutely not. Nuclear fallout is a problem, but we should

not exaggerate its effects. As it happens, there are two types of fallout produced by nuclear detonations. These are: 1) delayed
fallout; and 2) short-term fallout. According to researcher Peter V. Pry, Delayed fallout will not, contrary to popular belief, gradually
kill billions of people everywhere in the world. Of course, delayed fallout would increase the number of people dying of lymphatic
cancer, leukemia, and cancer of the thyroid. However, says Pry, these deaths would probably be far fewer than deaths now
resulting from ... smoking, or from automobile accidents. The real hazard in a nuclear war is the short-term fallout. This is a type of
fallout created when a nuclear weapon is detonated at ground level. This type of fallout could kill millions of people, depending on

But short-term fallout rapidly subsides to safe levels

in 13 to 18 days. It is not permanent. People who live outside of the affected areas
will be fine. Those in affected areas can survive if they have access to underground
shelters. In some areas, staying indoors may even suffice. Contrary to popular misconception,
the targeting strategy of the attacking country.

there were no documented deaths from short-term or delayed fallout at either Hiroshima or Nagasaki. These blasts were low
airbursts, which produced minimal fallout effects. Todays thermonuclear
If used in airburst mode, these weapons would produce few (if any) fallout casualties.

weapons are even cleaner.

AT: Nuclear Power Generic

Cant solve warming take too long to build, only reduces a
fraction of emissions, and diverts resources from solar power
Madsen et al 9 Travis Madsen and Tony Dutzik (Frontier Group), Bernadette Del
Chiaro and Rob Sargent (Environment America Research & Policy Center) November 2009, GENERATING FAILURE: How Building Nuclear Power Plants Would
Set America Back in the Race Against Global Warming,
http://www.environmentiowa.org/sites/environment/files/reports/GeneratingFailure---Environment-Iowa---Web.pdf
Far from being a solution to global warming, nuclear power will actually set America back in the
race to reduce pollution. Nuclear power is too slow and too expensive to make enough of a
difference in the next two decades. Moreover, nuclear power is not necessary to provide clean, carbonfree electricity for the long haul. The up-front capital investment required to build 100 new nuclear reactors could
prevent twice as much pollution over the next 20 years if invested in energy efficiency and clean, renewable energy
instead. Taking into account the ongoing costs of running the nuclear plants, a clean energy path would deliver as
much as five times more progress for the money. Early action matters in the fight against global warming. The
more total carbon dioxide pollution that humanity emits into the atmosphere, the greater the warming and
consequent damage. Earlier action allows us more flexibility to respond to an evolving understanding of humanitys
role in shaping the climate. According to current science, humanity as a whole can emit no more than 1 trillion
metric tons of carbon dioxide from 2000 through 2050 in order to have a 75 percent chance of limiting the global
temperature increase to 3.6 F above the pre-industrial era a target the international community has set to limit
the severity of global warming impacts. This 1 trillion metric tons is our carbon budget. To facilitate keeping
total emissions within this budget, a panel of distinguished Nobel Prizewinning scientists have called on developed
nations to reduce their emissions of global warming pollution by 25 to 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020.
Reducing emissions from power plants holds large potential for early progress. The share of the U.S. emissions
budget available to electric power plants could be as little as 34 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide (CO2) from
2010 cumulatively through 2050. New nuclear reactors would be built too slowly to reduce global warming pollution
in the near term, and would actually increase the scale of action required in the future. No new reactors are now

The nuclear industry will not complete the first new

reactor until at least 2016, optimistically assuming construction will take four years
after regulatory approval. However, it is likely that no new nuclear reactors could be online until 2018 or
later. During the last wave of nuclear construction in the United States, the average
reactor took nine years to build. New reactors are likely to experience similar
delays. For example, a new reactor now under construction in Finland is at least three years behind schedule
after a series of quality control failures. The American nuclear industry is not ready to move
quickly. No American power company has ordered a new nuclear power plant since 1978, and all reactors
ordered after the fall of 1973 ended up cancelled. As a result, domestic manufacturing capability
for nuclear reactor parts has withered and trained personnel are scarce. Even if
the nuclear industry managed to complete 100 new reactors in the United States by
2030 the level of construction advocated by supporters of nuclear power new
nuclear power plants could still only reduce cumulative power plant emissions by 12
percent over the next two decades, leading to a higher and later peak in pollution . As
under construction in the United States.

a result, America would burn through its 40- year electric sector carbon budget in just 15 years. (See Figure ES-1.)
In contrast, energy efficiency and renewable energy sources can make an immediate contribution toward reducing
global warming pollution. Clean energy can begin cutting emissions immediately. Energy efficiency programs are
already reducing electricity consumption by 1-2 percent below forecast levels annually in leading states, and the
U.S. wind industry is already building the equivalent of three nuclear reactors per year in wind farms, and growing
rapidly. With the up-front capital investment required to build 100 new nuclear reactors, America could prevent
twice as much pollution in the next 20 years by investing in clean energy instead. (Midpoint estimate, see Figure
ES-1 and page 21 for more details.) However, even this level of investment in clean energy would not be enough
to keep U.S. power plant emissions within budget. (See Figure ES-1.) America should cut power plant emissions on
the order of 50 percent within the next decade to limit the worst consequences of global warming. Nuclear power is

Building 100 new

nuclear reactors would require an up-front capital investment on the order of $600
billion (with a possible range of $250 billion to $1 trillion), diverting money away from cleaner and cheaper
solutions. Any up-front investment in nuclear power would lock in additional
expenditures over time. Over the life of a new reactor, the electricity it produces could cost in the range of
expensive and will divert resources from more cost-effective energy strategies.

12 to 20 cents per kilowatt-hour, or more. In contrast, a capital investment in energy efficiency actually pays us
back several times over with ongoing savings on electricity bills, and an investment in renewable power can deliver
electricity for much less cost. Per dollar spent over the lifetime of the technology, energy efficiency and biomass
co-firing are five times more effective at preventing carbon dioxide pollution, and combined heat and power (in
which a power plant generates both electricity and heat for a building or industrial application) is greater than three
times more effective. In 2018, biomass and land-based wind energy will be more than twice as effective, and
offshore wind power will be on the order of 30 percent more effective per dollar of investment, even without the

By 2018, and possibly sooner,

solar photovoltaic power should be comparable to a new nuclear reactor in terms of
its per-dollar ability to prevent global warming pollution. Some analyses imply that
thin film solar photovoltaic power is already more cost-effective than a new reactor.
And solar power is rapidly growing cheaper, while nuclear costs are not likely to
decline. Nuclear power is not needed to provide reliable, low-carbon electricity for
the future. Nuclear power proponents argue that nuclear plants are needed to produce low-carbon baseload power. However, the need for base-load power is exaggerated and small-scale clean
energy solutions can actually enhance the reliability of the electric grid. Many clean
benefit of the renewable energy production tax credit. (See Figure ES-2.)

power sources including energy efficiency improvements, combined heat-and-power technologies and renewable
energy sources such as biomass, geothermal energy and solar thermal power with heat storage are available at

wind and solar photovoltaic power, are

predictable with about 80-90 percent accuracy a day in advance . With proper planning and
any time, just like nuclear power. Others, including

investments in a smart grid to facilitate wise use of resources, clean energy solutions could supply the vast bulk
of Americas electricity needs.

AT: Nuclear Power Investment

No one will invest in new nuke power
Mecklin 13 [John Mecklin deputy editor of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists March/April 2013, Introduction: US nuclear exit?, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/2/9.full]
In a 2012 progress report on federal energy initiatives, the Obama administration enthusiastically asserted that it
was jumpstarting the nuclear industry. It noted that the Department of Energy issued a conditional commitment
for a loan guarantee to support the first US nuclear reactors in more than three decades. The projectwill bring
two new Westinghouse AP1000 reactors online, supporting 3,500 construction jobs and 800 permanent jobs (White

two new units at its Vogtle nuclear power plant

in Georgia, but the administrations rosy energy report omitted some key context: Those reactors, which likely
wouldnt be financed without a federal loan guarantee , are rare sunbeams in a
dismal nuclear power landscape. Because of the nuclear industrys long history of
permitting problems, cost overruns, and construction delays, financial markets have
been wary of backing new nuclear construction for decades . The supposed nuclear
renaissance ballyhooed in the first decade of this century never really materialized.
And then came Fukushima, a disaster that pushed countries around the world to confront the same basic
House, 2012: 12). The Southern Company is indeed building

question: Should nuclear power be part of the energy future? In Japan and many European countries, that question
has been the focus of significant public debate and policy making, but in the United States, it has scarcely been
broached. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has respondedand doubtless will continue to respondto
safety issues raised by the Fukushima accident. The overall US approach to nuclear power, however, remains
roughly what it has been for decades. And that business-as-usual approach is exactly what could produce a US
nuclear phase-out, former NRC Commissioner Peter A. Bradford writes in his engaging and somewhat

Even though the NRC

granted a 20-year life extension to the Kewaunee Power Station in Wisconsin, its owner
decided to shutter the plant anyway. This is just one of several recent industry moves
that show nuclear power has entered a new phase in the United Statesone in
which market forces challenge the economic viability even of existing nuclear
plants, while making new reactors hopelessly unattractive as investments, Bradford
counterintuitive essay, How to close the US nuclear industry: Do nothing.

writes. In this new phase, some operating nuclear plants will be unable to compete with the cheaper power
produced by coal, gas, and renewable sources.

Financial markets will continue to shy away from

funding new nuclear plants. And, Bradford writes, as existing reactors run out their licensed lifetimes,
nuclear power will, likely, simplydisappear. Absent an extremely large injection of government funding or further
life extensions, the reactors currently operating are going to end their licensed lifetimes between now and the late
2050s, he concludes. They will become part of an economics-driven US nuclear phase-out a couple of decades
behind the government-led nuclear exit in Germany.

AT: Nuclear Power Slow

Nuclear energy is a catastrophe no funding, no
infrastructure, takes forever, and our authors indict your
studies
Romm 16 (Joe, Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics
from MIT, 1/7, Why James Hansen Is Wrong About Nuclear Power,
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2016/01/07/3736243/nuclear-power-climatechange/, NKF)
Hansen and a handful of other climate scientists I also greatly respect Ken Caldeira, Tom
Wigley, and Kerry Emanuel present a mostly handwaving argument in which new nuclear
power achieves and sustains an unprecedented growth rate for decades. The one
quantitative illustrative scenario they propose a total requirement of 115 reactors per year to
2050 to entirely decarbonise the global electricity system is far beyond what the world ever
sustained during the nuclear heyday of the 1970s, and far beyond what the
overwhelming majority of energy experts , including those sympathetic to the industry, think is
plausible. They ignore the core issues: The nuclear power industry has essentially priced
itself out of the market for new power plants because of its 1) negative learning
curve and 2) inability to avoid massive delays and cost overruns in market economies. This
is doubly problematic because the competition renewable power, electricity storage, and
energy efficiency have seen steady, stunning price drops for a long time. Hansen et al also
continue the myth that somehow nuclear power is being held back by environmental opposition, rather than its own
marketplace failures, a point I will return to later. Those interested in what new nuclear power can and cannot

the most objective, independent, and

comprehensive analysis done in recent years the 2015 Technology Roadmap
from the IEA and NEA. Those agencies bottom is line is that, if the industry gets its act
together a big IF, given recent history new nuclear power can play an important but limited
role. This just happens to be what Ive been arguing consistently on Climate Progress for a long, long time. The
IEA is the international body responsible for energy analysis, and one of the few
independent agencies in the world with a sophisticated enough energy and
economic model to credibly examine in detail the role of various low carbon technologies in a
plausibly contribute to stopping global warming should start with

2C scenario (2DS) aimed at averting catastrophic climate change. The NEA was established by the OECD countries
To assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, the
scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. Here is what the IEA and NEA project is a plausible though challenging pathway for
the nuclear energy industry in a 2DS world if it can solve its cost and logistics problems:The core problem is that

the price of new nuclear reactors has been rising for decades, and they are now
extremely expensive, costing up to $10 billion apiece. Nuclear power appears to have
a negative learning curve: In the past several years, utilities have told state
regulators that the cost of new nuclear plants is in the $5,500 to $8,100 per kilowatt
range (see here and here). A key reason new reactors are inherently so expensive is that
they must be designed to survive almost any imaginable risk, including major disasters and
human error. Even the most unlikely threats must be planned for and eliminated when the
possible result of a disaster is the poisoning of thousands of people, the long-term contamination of large areas of
land, and $100 billion in damages. No wonder very few new plants have been ordered and built in the past two
decades in countries with market economies, such as the United States. And that was before the 2011 Fukushima
nuclear disaster. Japans embattled utility Tokyo Electric Power Co now expects the compensation costs after the
Fukushima nuclear disaster to be more than $57 billion, Agence France-Presse wrote last year. That doesnt even
include the cost of decommissioning the reactors or cleaning up the mess from the disaster.

In 2014 there

were only three new plants put under construction and just 5 gigawatts of
capacity were added. In their Nuclear Roadmap, the IEA and NEA explain what level of
capacity additions would be required in the 2 degrees Celsius scenario: In order for
nuclear to reach its deployment targets under the 2D scenario, annual connection
rates should increase from 5 GW in 2014 to well over 20 GW during the coming
decade. That means returning to a nuclear build rate previously achieved for only
one decade 20 gigawatts per year during the 1980s. That target has many challenges in a post-Fukushima
world. The IEA and NEA themselves note that such rapid growth will only be possible if several actions take place
including vendors demonstrating the ability to build on time and to budget, and to reduce the costs of new
designs. Also, both governments and the industry need to maintain and improve safety. If such advances do occur,
then new nuclear plants could provide a moderate amount of the needed new carbon-free power for the 2C
scenario. But, to repeat, in the only quantitative scenario Hansen and colleagues offer, the world builds 115

Rather than seriously

discussing any of the multiple marketplace barriers to such an unprecedented
sustained explosion in plant construction, they simply assert, We know that this is
technically achievable because France and Sweden were able to ramp up nuclear
power to high levels in just 15-20 years. Seriously. Apparently they dont think it relevant to let
you know that Sweden has precisely wait for it 10 operational nuclear reactors!
Yes, the fact that Sweden connected 10 reactors to the grid over a period of 15
years is somehow evidence the world could build 115 reactors per year to 2050 .
reactors per year to 2050 to entirely decarbonise the global electricity system.

And what about the nation best known for its reliance on nuclear power? According to the online database of the

France has 58 operational reactors, which took the

country more than two decades to connect to the grid! That would be a rate of under three per
International Atomic Energy Agency,

year. How do France or Sweden provide any evidence that 115 reactors per year for 35 years is technically
achievable? Answer: They dont. So why do such smart people advance such an indefensibly absurd scenario?
Because when you drop the numbers to more plausible (but still highly optimistic) levels, such as imagined by the

nuclear power isnt going to be the major player in

the fight to avoid catastrophic warming. Indeed if we actually moved into the realm of sober realism,
it becomes clear that new nuclear power is most likely to be a bit player. While Hansen et al tout
IEA and NEA, you immediately realize that

France as a big success story, youd never know from reading their article that, as the IEA and NEA note, France,
which today generates 75% of all its electricity from nuclear, still plans to reduce this share to 50% by 2025 while

the Financial Times, not exactly a

detailed the Tale of woe in French nuclear sector marked by
multibillion-euro delays and a key national champion rescued from the brink of
failure. Here is what happened when the two major French nuclear suppliers attempted to build thirdgeneration reactor technology, called the European Pressurised Reactor (EPR) in market economies: In Finland, the
proposing to maintain nuclear capacity at its present level. In October,
liberal enviro publication,

Areva-built Olkiluoto 3 reactor, the first EPR to be commissioned, is 10 years behind schedule and 5bn [$5.4
billion] over budget. It is expected to start up in 2018. In September EDF announced delays for the EPR reactor in
Flamanville, Normandy: initially expected to cost 3bn and start operations in 2012, it will not start until 2018 at a

The French couldnt even build an affordable, on-schedule

next generation nuke in their own nuclear-friendly country! To be clear, I dont think we
should take nuclear power off the table or even prematurely shut down safe, working reactors. But it is time for
rosy-eyed nuclear enthusiasts like Hansen to stop implying that somehow U.S. activists
or progressive politicians are thwarting the Renaissance of an otherwise affordable
and easy-to-scale major climate solution. Nuclear power remains a highly subsidized
energy source that benefits from a myriad of favorable policies in this country, including
cost of 10.5bn [$11.3 billion].

taxpayer-backed disaster insurance and loan guarantees.

AT: Nuclear Power Cost/Tech

Nuclear power cant solve no incentive, too expensive,
dangerous, and lacking in technology
Barrett 14 (Brendan, research coordinator at the UN Global Compact Cities
Programme and hosted by Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT), 2/13, Is
Nuclear Power the Answer to Climate Change? http://ourworld.unu.edu/en/isnuclear-power-the-answer-to-climate-change, NKF)
Reaction from scientists in Japan The climate scientists letter caused quite a stir including a critique from the Union
of Concerned Scientists arguing that new

reactors are not currently economical

compared to electricity generation from natural gas or from other low-carbon energy
sources such as wind and solar. They continued by stating that we do not believe nuclear reactors are yet
sufficiently safe and secure. Perhaps the most engaging response was a rebuttal letter posted online in January
2014 by three researchers from Japan Jusen Asuka, Seung-Joon Park and Toru Morotomi and the former lead
climate-treaty negotiator, Mutsuyoshi Nishimura. It is compelling because the authors response was influenced by
Japans experience of the Fukushima nuclear accident, leading them to have certain reservations about the
prospects of nuclear power as a way forward in responding to climate change. Their basic argument is that

Caldeira et al. have underestimated the risks of nuclear power generation,

while also underestimating the possible role of other climate change
measures, such as fuel switching, renewable energies and energy saving .
They outline seven reasons why nuclear should not be considered as an option, which I will distill here. Probability of
major nuclear accidents Following the Fukushima accident, the Japanese Government reexamined the costs and

the probability of an
accident is once in 500 reactor years (one reactor year is one year of operation of one nuclear
reactor), which compares with earlier projections that placed the risk at one in a million
reactor years. Their conclusion is based on the fact there have been three major
accidents in 1,500 reactors years in Japan. This means that if 50 reactors were in
operation, as was the case in Japan before the Fukushima accident, there would be one
major accident every 10 years. While this point is very powerful, the basis of this calculation is not
risks of nuclear accidents. The Committee tasked with this assessment concluded that

completely clear. For instance, a reader would likely assume that the three major accidents are Three Mile Island,
Chernobyl and Fukushima. If that is the case, then arent we talking about the number of reactor years at the global
level, not just in Japan? This may be splitting hairs, because the main concern is not whether the accidents happen
every 10 years, every 30 years or every 100 years, but that they happen at all and that the scale of damage caused

There is a tendency to compare the

number of fatalities resulting from nuclear accidents with those caused by air
pollution, particularly from coal-based power generation. This is too simplistic. While some
by such accidents is huge. Comparison of the number of fatalities

commentators rightly point out that there were no direct fatalities from exposure to radioactive materials from the
Fukushima accident, it is essential to look at the indirect fatalities . These include those who died as
a result of the evacuation, and those who committed suicide lamenting the loss of their homes, their livelihoods and

a total of 1,459 people fell within this

category as of September 2013. The most recent data also indicates that the number of
evacuees resulting from the accident stands at 159,000 persons . They have to deal with the
their community. According to the Fukushima Prefectural Office,

psychological impacts of the nuclear accident and the loss of almost everything livelihoods, homes and
community. One consequence has been population decline in the locality, as people move out, and a decreasing
number of births (by as much as 34 percent in some locations), often due to fears of fetal exposure to radiation.

The costs of nuclear energy have long been contentious

and viewed as too low, mainly because they exclude many significant external costs
such as research and development or equipment failure liability . Prior to the Fukushima
Cost of nuclear power generation

accident, in 2004 the Japanese government had calculated the cost of nuclear power at 5.9 yen/kWh. A
recalculation was made after the accident to include social costs, such as accident settlement, compensation and
area decontamination. This new estimate was 8.9 yen per kWh, but it excludes the costs of nuclear waste storage,

decommissioning of nuclear reactors and indemnification insurance. Estimates have shown that if these are
included, then nuclear

power costs would exceed 100 yen/kWh. This compares with 9.9 to
for wind and 33.4 to 38.4 yen/kWh for solar. Worst-case scenarios Through a
combination of factors it was possible for Japan to avoid the worst-case scenario
(barely) with regard to the Fukushima accident. This would have involved a complete meltdown
of the reactors, releasing a massive amount of radioactive materials into the
atmosphere and causing the evacuation of people in a 250 km radius including the
30 million people in the Tokyo metropolitan area (myself included). While the rebuttal letter does not
17.3 yen/kWh

explore this issue in depth, a look at the findings from the post-disaster investigations reveals the major problems
encountered by the staff of the nuclear power plants immediately after the quake and tsunami. For instance, the
report from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission described the situation as
follows: In the chaos following the destruction wrought by the tsunami, workers were hindered greatly in their
response efforts. The problems from the loss of control room functions, lighting and communications, and the
struggle to deliver equipment and materials through the debris-strewn and damaged roads in the plant and
continuous aftershocks were, all in all, far beyond what the workers had foreseen. The response manuals, with
detailed measures against severe accidents, were not up to date, and manuals including that of the isolation
condenser (IC) were not sufficiently prepared in advance to cover circumstances such as this accident. Emergency
drills and the training of operators and workers had not been sufficiently prioritized. Documents outlining the
venting procedures were incomplete. It is clear that in such chaotic circumstances the prospect of total reactor
meltdown was not beyond the realms of possibility. The consequence would have been a killer-blow to the Japanese

Nuclear power is not a

replacement for coal The reality in the Japanese case is that coal has always been
seen as an essential counterpart to the development of nuclear power. Many of the coal
thermal plants that have been constructed in Japan are intended to act as a back-up system
in the case of reduced operations of nuclear plants . Moreover, the stakeholders
promoting nuclear power are identical to those promoting the use of coal
economic bureaucrats, power generation companies, heavy equipment manufacturers and energy
intensive industries. These groups tend to be far less enthusiastic about energy saving
measures and renewables, since they undermine their business model.
economy, and one from which it would have been very difficult to recover.

AT: Nuclear Power Environment

Nuclear power destroys the environment leakage and
disposal destroys the climate and makes environmental
calamity worse
Cohen 16 (Jay, Executive Director, Columbia Universitys Earth Institute, 3/14,
The Technological World and the Risk of Nuclear Power,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-cohen/the-technological-worlda_b_9457878.html, NKF)
my colleagues focused on climate change see nuclear power as an inevitable
solution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Perhaps it will be, but it certainly shouldnt
be. It would be wise to avoid using current nuclear technology and it would be foolish to rely on the
current system regulating the use of atomic power. In theory, nuclear power can be a low risk
Many of

part of the

technology; in reality it is not. The problem is that humans manage nuclear energy facilities and are responsible for
the operation and maintenance of complex and aging power plants. Some may argue that nuclear technology is

people make mistakes. And the price of a nuclear

mistake is too high to risk. While only technology will save us from the impact of our technology,
nuclear power is the wrong technology to save us from global warming. Its
tempting. The scale is large, the power is immense, and its something we know how to
build. But the toxicity of nuclear fuel and waste is simply too great to permit. The
probability of failure may be low, but the catastrophic impact of failure is too great
to tolerate. That is the lesson of Fukushima. The lesson of a failure at Indian Point would be even more
profound. Imagine radioactive debris floating down the Hudson River. Imagine the panic in
nearly free of errors, but everyone knows that

the New York metropolitan region. In the United States we seem to have trouble regulating safe drinking water; why
should anyone think we could safely manage the far more toxic technology of nuclear power? Reductionist science

environmental issues are nearly always

interconnected. Climate change is not our only environmental challenge. The first of
focuses us on solving one problem at a time, but

Barry Commoners classic laws of ecology is that everything is connected to everything else. The second law from
his path-breaking book, The Closing Circle is that everything must go somewhere. When something as toxic as
nuclear material is used anywhere on the planet, its toxicity must be contained for over 100,000 years. If it is not

It is beyond arrogant and long past hubris to believe

that we can keep those poisons from contaminating the planet at some point in the
future. Solving climate change by exponentially increasing the presence of highly
toxic nuclear fuel and waste on the planet is a short-sighted act of desperation. This is
contained, it inevitably goes somewhere.

far from the first time Ive argued against nuclear power. I am not anti-technology or unaware of the difficulty of
addressing climate change without nuclear energy. But any student of politics, regulation and organizational
management knows that human systems fail and when they do, failure can appear in unpredictable forms. As we
develop new technologies we need to consider the toxicity of those technologies to people and other elements of
the living world. We also need to consider the irreversibility of the impacts of these technologies. If we look closely
at the evolution of the modern organization we see greater specialization and networks of organizations replacing
vertically integrated and hierarchical organizations. Energy still remains an exception to that trend, and the modern
electric utility is typical of the highly centralized bureaucratic structures that dominated the 20th century. But low
priced communication and information technologies make it possible for decentralized supply chains to replace
massive, centralized hierarchies. The effort by some state governments and their utility regulators to separate
power generation from distribution is in part an effort to break up these centralized energy dinosaurs. Distributed
generation of energy linked by microgrids and smart grid computerized controls reduces the vulnerability of the
energy system and makes it possible to reduce the need for capital intensive, centralized energy generation
facilities. They are the future of our energy system and in my view nuclear power represents the past. So wit hout

a strong push by government, nuclear power will fade because it requires massive,
centralized, capital-intensive facilities whose financial risk must be added to their
environmental risk. Taken together, it leads to a search for other forms of carbon-free

energy. While this years U.S. presidential election proves how difficult it is to predict
politics, the politics of nuclear power and waste makes plant siting very difficult . Even
Japan, which must import nearly all of its fossil fuels, is finding it impossible to reopen the nuclear facilities that
closed after Fukushima. Jonathan Soble notes that Fukushimas political impact is far from over and reports that: A
smooth [Fukushima] cleanup is a top priority for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who wants to rebuild Japans tattered
nuclear power industry. He has had little success so far. This week, a court ordered one of only two atomic power
stations operating in the country to shut down, saying new safety measures it put in place after the Fukushima

the United States, the contentious

politics of facility siting makes it difficult to build large developments in populated
areas. A new development need not be dangerous for it to be opposed. Inconvenience will do. The not in my
backyard (NIMBY) syndrome prevents Walmarts, homeless shelters, and even schools
from being built. New nuclear power plants would be a far tougher sell. People
disaster were inadequate. More than 40 reactors are sitting idle. In

instinctively resist new development because they suspect that the people proposing the new project will be gone
when the negative impacts start to hit. And because the American political system is partially based on geography
and represents places as well as people, local political forces can stop risky technologies in the form of facilities. But

The
modern economy and our way of life depend on new and advancing technology. It
especially depends on energy technology. I do not expect or even want that to change. Like most
new technologies that are not associated with places or particular facilities are much more difficult to delay.

people who have access to modern conveniences, I like them and want to maintain them. I also like the new stuff
too. I enjoy and use streaming video, e-books and blue tooth devices in my car. But we need to adopt an attitude
toward the development and governance of technology that permits a greater appreciation of potential risk and
allows careful consideration of costs and benefits before new technology is used. Fukushima is a painful lesson in

Hopefully, New Yorks Indian

Point power plant does not provide yet another painful lesson in the need to
effectively regulate potentially toxic technologies. I realize that the benefits of
modern life come with risks. I simply want us to do a better job of understanding and
managing those risks.
the price we pay for ignoring the potential negative impacts of technology.