Trustees of Dartmouth College vs.

Woodward
FACTS:
Eleazar Wheelock set up an Indian charity school, with the help
of several established Americans, clothed, maintained and
educated a number of children of the Indian natives, with a view
of carrying the Gospel and spreading the word of God. The
school became reputable among Indians in such a way that a
vast number of Indians would want their children to study in his
institution although his personal finances and estate could no
longer handle the same. Wheelock thought that the undertaking
should be accomplished by collecting funds from well-off
individuals from England. Wheelock requested Reverend
Nathaniel Whitacker for that purpose and gave him a special
power of attorney to solicit from the worthy and generous
contributors for the cause. Eventually, Whitacker appointed
several persons to be trustees for the funds collected through a
deed of trust ratified and executed by Whitacker. Through the
efforts of the trustees alongside Wheelock and Whitacker,
Dartmouth College has been instituted with the Trustees of
Dartmouth College. Any heirs of the Trustees, as granted by the
courts, will be part of the body politic for the furtherance of
Darthmouth College.
[I tried to make a digest but the case was too long, sorry]

Villegas v Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic and
consular missions of foreign countries, in technical assistance
programs of the government and another country, and members
of religious orders or congregations) to procure the requisite
mayors permit so as to be employed or engage in trade in the
City of Manila. Thus, a case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop

enforcement of the ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the

ordinance void. Thus, the present petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of uniformity of
taxation?
(2) Does it violate the principle against undue designation of
legislative power?
(3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution?
RULING:
(1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are required
to pay it. The same amount of P50 is being collected from every
employed alien whether he is casual or permanent, part time or
full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive.
(2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide
the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that
where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or
to set up any standard to guide or limit the action, thus
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power,
such ordinance is invalid.
(3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get
a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or
refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of
the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
The shelter of protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and
citizens.
Thus, the ordinance is invalid.

Buck v. Bell 274 U.S. 200

FACTS: Carrie Buck is a feeble minded white woman who was
committed to the State Colony Epileptics and Feeble Minded.
She is the daughter of a feeble minded mother in the same
institution, and the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child.
She was eighteen years old at the time of the trial of her case in
the latter part of 1924. An Act of Virginia, approved March 20,
1924, recites that the health of the patient and the welfare of
society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of
mental defectives, under careful safeguard, that the sterilization
may be effected in males by vasectomy and in females by
salpingectomy, without serious pain or substantial danger to life;
that the Commonwealth issue supporting in various institutions
many defective persons who, if now discharged, would become
a menace, but, if incapable of procreating, might be discharged
with safety and
become self-supporting with benefit to
themselves and to society, and that experience has shown that
heredity plays an important part in the transmission of insanity,
imbecility, etc. The statute then enacts that, whenever the
superintendent of certain institutions, including the abovenamed State Colony, shall be of opinion that it is for the best
interests of the patient sand of society that an inmate under his
care should be sexually sterilized, he may have the operation
performed upon any patient afflicted with hereditary forms of
insanity, imbecility, etc., on complying with the very careful
provisions by which the act protects the patients from possible
abuse.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said statute authorizing compulsory
sterilization of the mentally retarded denies the due process and
equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The procedure can be no doubt had the due process of
law. Carrie Buck is the probable potential parent of socially
inadequate offspring, likewise afflicted, the she may be sexually

sterilized without detriment to her general health, and that her

welfare and that of society will be promoted by her sterilization.
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call
upon the best citizens for their lives. It is better for all the world
if, instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for crime or
to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those
who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.

IMBONG vs. OCHOA

FACTS:
The Reproductive Health Law is a consolidation and
enhancement of existing reproductive laws. It seeks to enhance
the population control program of the government in order to
promote public welfare. However, when coercive measures are
found within the law, provisions must be removed or altered in
order to ensure that it does not defy the Constitution by
infringing on the rights of the people.

Petition: to declare provisions of Republic Act No. 10354

as unconstitutional
Factual Antecedents
December 21, 2012: Congress enacted RA No.
10354 also known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH LAW)
The presidents imprimatur and support for the said
law lead to a range of petitions against the law
leading to iuris controversy in court. Petitions for
certiorari and prohibition were placed by numerous
parties. All in all, 14 petitions and 2 petitions-inintervention were filed.

March 15, 2013: the RH-IRR or enforcement of the

law took place
March 19, 2013: After deliberating the issues and
arguments raised, the court issued Status Quo Ante
Order (SQAO) which lead to a 120 day halt on the
implementation of the legislation
Due to further arguments and debates from opposing
parties, the SQAO was extended until further orders
of the court last July 16, 2013
Statute Involved:
Republic Act 10354, The Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012
Position of Petitioner:
o Petitioners claim that the provisions of RA 10354
are unconstitutional as they violate the rights to
life, to health, to freedom of expression and
speech, to the privacy of families, to academic
freedom, to due process of law, to equal
protection, and against involuntary servitude. They
also intrude on the autonomy of local governments
and the ARMM, and violate natural law.
Furthermore, they claim that Congress delegation
of authority to the FDA in determining which
should be included in the EDL is invalid.
Position of Respondent
There is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination
Some petitioners lack standing to question the RH
Law
The petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether the provisions of RA 10354 infringe upon the

Right to Life, as in the Due Process, of every person?
HELD:
Right to Life NO
Constitution intended that 1.) conception to refer to the time
of fertilization and 2.) the protection of the unborn upon said
fertilization
Not all contraceptives are to be banned (only those that kill a
fertilized ovum)
Contraceptives that prevent union of sperm and egg are thus
permissible
It is the intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to
prevent the enacting of a law that legalizes abortion.
RH law prohibits abortion
RH law recognizes that abortion is a crime
RH law prohibits abortifacients.
Due Process - NO
The definitions of several terms pinpointed by the petitioners
in the RH Law are not vague.
Private health care institution = private health care service
provider.
service and methods are also broad enough to include
giving information and performing medical procedures, so
hospitals run by religious groups can be exempted.
incorrect information connotes a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead the public.

Nebbia vs. State of New York

Facts. The New York legislature established a Milk Control

Board that was vested with the power to fix minimum and
maximum retail prices for milk sold within the state. Appellant,
Mr. Nebbia, an owner of a New York grocery store, was
convicted of selling milk for prices in excess of the price set by
the Board.
Issue. Whether the Constitution prohibits a state from fixing the
selling price of milk?
Previous
Held. No. Judgment affirmed. The production and distribution of
milk is a paramount industry of the state and largely affects the
health and prosperity of its people. Property rights and contract
rights are not absolute in nature and may be subject to
limitations. Since the price controls were not arbitrary,
discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy adopted
by the legislature to promote the general welfare, it was
consistent with the Constitution.

Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila

Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese
laundrymen who has general and the same interest, filed a
complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also
questioned the validity of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the
city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be in
duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind
and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and
cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied
by the trial court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532
savors of class legislation; putting in mind that they are Chinese
nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar
circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement
of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement of the

legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In

view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an
act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class
legislation that infringes property rights.

Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such

purposes are permissible under the police power. The police
power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based
on Section 2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the municipal
board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the
city:
(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the
following: xxxx xxxxx laundries xxxx.
(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper
for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity,
and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience, and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532
was to avoid disputes between laundrymen and their patrons
and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to
decipher Chinese characters from being defrauded.
(Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are more
familiar with Spanish and maybe English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that
the ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no

personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an

attempt is not made to violate personal property rights. The
ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its
operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction,
whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any
other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one of
them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The
obvious objection for the implementation of the ordinance is
based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an
additional burden will be imposed on the business and
occupation affected by the ordinance such as that of the
appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English,
but mostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it
seems that the same burdens are cast uponthem. Yet, even if
private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint,
and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of
the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold
the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the
police power is the control of private interests for the public
welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the
petition for a preliminary injunction is denied, with costs against
the appellants.

Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad

Facts:

On 1921, Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law

was passed, regulating that the account books should not be in
any other language exc. English, Spanish or any dialect,
otherwise a penalty of fine of not more than 10K or
imprisonment for not more than 2 years will be imposed
fiscal measure intended to facilitate the work of the
government agents and to prevent fraud in the returns of
merchants, in conformity with the sales tax and the income tax

On March 1923, BIR inspected the books of account of

Yu Cong Eng where it was found out that it is not in accordance
with Act 2972

A criminal case was filed against Yu Cong Eng before the

CFI Manila for keeping his books of account in Chinese

Yus defense:

Yu Cong Eng et al are Chinese merchants, claiming that

they represent the other 12K filed a petition for prohibition and
injunction against the CIR, questioning the constitutionality of
Act No. 2972 or the Chinese Bookkeeping Law
Issue: W/N Act No. 2972 is constitutional?
Ruling:

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be

raised in the lower court and that court must be given an
opportunity to pass upon the question before it may be
presented to the appellate court for resolution

Power of taxation
strongest of all the powers of government, practically
absolute and unlimited
It is a legislative power. All its incidents are within the
control of the legislature. It is the Legislature which must
questions of state necessarily involved in ordering a tax, which
must make all the necessary rules and regulations which are to
be observed in order to produce the desired results, and which
must decide upon the agencies by means of which collections
shall be made

The power to tax is not judicial power and that a strong

case is required for the judiciary to declare a law relating to
taxation invalid. If, of course, so great an abuse is manifest as to
destroy natural and fundamental rights, it is the duty of the
judiciary to hold such an Act unconstitutional

The Chinese petitioners are accorded treaty rights of the

most favored nation

Their constitutional rights are those accorded all aliens,

which means that the life, liberty, or property of these persons

cannot be taken without due process of law, and that they are
entitled to the equal protection of the laws, without regard to
their race

Act No. 2972 is a fiscal measure which seeks to prohibit

not only the Chinese but all merchants of whatever nationality
from making entries in the books of account or forms subject to
inspection for taxation purposes in any other language than
either the English or Spanish language or a local dialect

the law only intended to require the keeping of such

books as were necessary in order to facilitate governmental
inspection for tax purposes

The Chinese will not be singled out as a special subject

for discriminating and hostile legislation since there are other
aliens doing business in the Phils. There will be no arbitrary
deprivation of liberty or arbitrary spoliation of property. There will
be no unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in
similar circumstances. The law will prove oppressive to the
extent that all tax laws are oppressive, but not oppressive to the
extent of confiscation

Act No. 2972 as meaning that any person, company,

partnership, or corporation, engaged in commerce, industry, or
any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine
Islands, shall keep its account books, consisting of sales books
and other records and returns required for taxation purposes by
regulations of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, in effect when
this action was begun, in English, Spanish, or a local dialect,
thus valid and constitutional

deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law

; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in
the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions
of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to
engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and
5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

Ichong vs. Hernandez

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of

legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there
public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is
the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislatures purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or
oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in
connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived

Facts: Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of

other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, An Act to
Regulate the Retail Business, filed to obtain a judicial
declaration that said Act is unconstitutional contending that: (1)
it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and

Issue: Whether RA 1180 denies to alien residents the equal

protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law
Held: No. The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended
to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those
who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified

interference with private interest? These are the questions that
we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the
essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that
would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for
that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive
persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and
groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the
law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police
power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and
welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes
and means. And if distinction and classification has been made,
there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
The law does not violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens
already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its
objectives appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of
fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial
department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this
suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or
the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be

said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations

because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject
and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by
any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

NO ESPINA VS ZAMORA DIGEST

SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. &

MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and
Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEAapproved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date
of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second
Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be
made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents
did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer.
Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months
or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of
his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2)
months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23)
days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against
respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his
money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal
and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to

the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner

also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred
in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated
Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in
case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for
the unexpired portion of their contracts.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner

contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the
NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a
total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire
nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract,
computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue

that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple
Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled
to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he
questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner
filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed
the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate;
however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by
petitioner.

Issue:
1.)
Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the
lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month
employment contract, and not just for a period of three months?
2.)
Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form part of
the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award,
because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into
his contract?

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of
overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the
full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed
the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the
unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire
unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine
months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per
month. The subject clause or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with
fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims:
they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of
R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause,
illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year
or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap,
whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with
fixed-term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect

classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits
of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes
a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion
of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of
other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him
of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing
valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being
unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire
unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include
overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard
Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay
and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for
all work performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and
holiday pay is compensation for any work performed on
designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the
automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is
evidence that he performed work during those periods.

CLAUDIO S. YAP,
Petitioner, vs.

THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE

MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,
Respondents.
Facts:
Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T
SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited.
for a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded
M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician.
However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold.
Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed by the
Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be
scrapped. Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus,
extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with
respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the
payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that he was
entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract
since he was illegally dismissed from employment. He alleged
that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.
The Labor Arbiter
Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal
Dismissal with Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Labor
Arbiter (LA). On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been constructively
and illegally dismissed by respondents.
LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioners
contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period of
nine months.
The NLRC
Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.
The NLRC affirmed the LAs findings that petitioner was
indeed constructively and illegally dismissed. However, the
NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries corresponding to

nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three

months as provided under Section 108 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 8042,9 as enunciated in our ruling in Marsaman Manning
Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission
.Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Finding
merit in petitioners arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier
Decision, holding that "there can be no choice to grant only
three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired term
because there is no full year of unexpired term which this can
be applied."
The Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the findings and ruling of the LA and the NLRC
that petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed.
However, the
CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining
the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this
regard, the CA relied on the clause "or for three months for
every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" provided in
the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that
it affords an illegally dismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit
of "salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his employment
contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional. - YES
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting
petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired
term of 9 months is far short of the "every year of the unexpired
term" threshold. YES
Held:
The said provision of law has long been a source of abuse by
callous employers against migrant workers; and that said
provision violates the equal protection clause under the

Constitution because, while illegally dismissed local workers are

guaranteed under the Labor Code of reinstatement with full
backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld
from them up to their actual reinstatement. It imposes a 3-month
cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year
or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs
or local workers with fixed-term employment. Respondents,
aware of our ruling in Serrano, aver that our pronouncement of
unconstitutionality should not apply in this case because Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042 is a substantive law that deals with the
rights and obligations of the parties incase of Illegal Dismissal of
a migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character.
Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no retroactive
application of the law in this case.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers
no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates
no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The
doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the
aforementioned general rule. The doctrine of operative fact, as
an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law.
Following Serrano, we hold that this case should not be
included in the aforementioned exception. To rule otherwise
would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in
effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security of
tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually

profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision

of law. Invoking Serrano, respondents claim that the tanker
allowance should be excluded from the definition of the term
"salary." Fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this
Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this
question. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. A close perusal of the contract reveals that
the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not categorized as a
bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause,
hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner.

invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels
and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to wash
up or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided
by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required
by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

White Light Corp. vs. City of Manila

FACTS:
On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7774
entitled An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in
hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar
establishments in the City of Manila. White Light Corp is an
operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the
Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the
private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It
ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the
individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains
that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police
power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses and other similar establishments, including tourist
guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ord 7774 is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as
it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due
process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection
against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance

Tanada v. Tuvera
GR L-63915, 29 December 1986 (146 SCRA 446)
Facts:
On 24 April 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication to the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Decision
was concurred only by 3 judges. Petitioners move for
reconsideration / clarification of the decision on various
questions. Solicitor General avers that the motion is a request
for advisory opinion. February Revolution took place, which
subsequently required the new Solicitor General to file a
rejoinder on the issue (under Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of
Court).
Issue:
Whether publication is still required in light of the clause unless
otherwise provided.
Held:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided, in Article 2 of the

Civil Code, refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication. The legislature may
in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. Publication requirements applies to (1)
all statutes, including those of local application and private laws;
(2) presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the
same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly
conferred by the Constitution; (3) Administrative rules and
regulations for the purpose of enforcing or implementing existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation; (4) Charter of a city
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national
territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place; (5)
Monetary Board circulars to fill in the details of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. Further,
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws.
Reasoning:
The Supreme Court declared that all laws as above defined
shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after 15 days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of
the Civil Code.

Ynot v IAC (1987) 148 SCRA 659

Facts:

Petitioner transported 6 caracbaos from Masbate to Iloilo in

1984 and these wer confiscated by the station commander in
Barotac, Iloilo for violating E.O. 626 A which prohibits
transportation of a carabao or carabeef from one province to
another. Confiscation will be a result of this.
The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits
of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the
confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner,
for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
The same result was decided in the trial court.
In the Supreme Court, he then petitioned against the
constitutionality of the E.O. due to the outright confiscation
without giving the owner the right to heard before an impartial
court as guaranteed by due process. He also challenged the
improper exercise of legislative power by the former president
under Amendment 6 of the 1973 constitution wherein Marcos
was given emergency powers to issue letters of instruction that
had the force of law.
Issue: Is the E.O. constitutional?
Holding: The EO is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Ratio:
The lower courts are not prevented from examining the
constitutionality of a law.
Constitutional grant to the supreme court to review.
Justice Laurel's said, courts should not follow the path of least
resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law
when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should probe the
issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the
wound or excise the affliction.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but

it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead
of merely implementing an existing law due to the grant of
legislative authority over the president under Amendment
number 6.
Provisions of the constitution should be cast in precise language
to avoid controversy. In the due process clause, however, the
wording was ambiguous so it would remain resilient. This was
due to the avoidance of an iron rule laying down a stiff
command for all circumstances. There was flexibility to allow it
to adapt to every situation with varying degrees at protection for
the changing conditions.
Courts have also refrained to adopt a standard definition for due
process lest they be confined to its interpretation like a
straitjacket.
There must be requirements of notice and hearing as a
safeguard against arbitrariness.
There are exceptions such as conclusive presumption which
bars omission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption
is based on human experience or rational connection between
facts proved and fact presumed. An examples is a passport of a
person with a criminal offense cancelled without hearing.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of
police power which both restrains and is restrained by due
process. This power was invoked in 626-A, in addition to 626
which prohibits slaughter of carabaos with an exception.
While 626-A has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, it cant be said that it complies with the
existence of a lawful method. The transport prohibition and the
purpose sought has a gap.
Summary action may be taken in valid admin proceedings as
procedural due process is not juridical only due to the urgency
needed to correct it.

There was no reason why the offense in the E.O. would not
have been proved in a court of justice with the accused acquired
the rights in the constitution.
The challenged measure was an invalid exercise of police
power because the method to confiscate carabaos was
oppressive.
Due process was violated because the owner was denied the
right to be heard or his defense and punished immediately.
This was a clear encroachment on judicial functions and against
the separation of powers.
The policeman wasnt liable for damages since the law during
that time was valid.

Evelio Javier vs COMELEC and Arturo Pacificador

Facts:
Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos,
were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in
Antique. During election, Javier complained of
massive
terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering
and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed
men of Pacificador. COMELEC just referred the complaints to
the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the
Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of
canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further
orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the
board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner
without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the
Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation
made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature,
having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of

appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed

out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved
before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the
Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law
partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only
the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed
by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency,
Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to
have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of
Javiers death.
ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the
proclamation of Pacificador.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the
Sol-Gens tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently
demanded the cold neutrality of an impartial judge as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added
assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The
litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure
that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who
shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise
they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without
such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action
for the justice they expect.
Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring
compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of
fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to
the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial)
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are

supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement

according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain
the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all
the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis
of the established facts and the pertinent law.

Criselda Gacad vs. Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr., RTC

Branch 3, Nabunturan, Compostela Valley
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Verified Complaint against Judge
Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave
Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and violations
of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3
(Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal
case.
Petitioner alleged that she met Judge Clapis at the
Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the case of her
brother. The prosecutor of the said case, Graciano Arafol,
informed the petitioner that the Judge will do everything for her
favor but on the pretext that in return she has to give
P50,000.00 to the Judge. During the meeting, the Judge, after
being satisfied of the promise of the petitioner for that amount,
told her "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay,
leave it all to me, we shall crush them.)
When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of
Hearings were mailed to the petitioner only after the date of
hearing. Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings
without an application for bail and granting the same without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt
of the accused is strong. He set a preliminary conference seven
months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his
declaration of speedy trial for the case. However, the judge
claimed that notices were made verbally because of time

constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides were

given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all
proceedings, petitioner was in court and the orders were done in
open court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently
scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the
charges.

HELD: YES.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection
with ones performance of official functions and duties. For
grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained
of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the
law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error
of judgment.
The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a
litigant in a case pending before his sala and telling those
words, constitute gross misconduct. Judge Clapis wrongful
intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the
circumstances on record. Judge Clapis cannot escape liability
by shifting the blame to his court personnel. He ought to know
that judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in
their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the
judges responsibility.
The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together,
give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts
amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and
2; Canon 3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.

We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the

law for conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail being
filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an
opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Here,
the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in prudence,
discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known
rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error
produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for
gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed to wantonly
misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not only
be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive
disregard of the basic requirements of due process.

Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927]

Taft (CJ):
Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought
before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College Hill, charged
with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his
dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try him
under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion,
proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully
possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as
charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned
until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of
exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common
pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and
reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor was
disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of
Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed
the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On
4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumeys
application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in
the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of
right, asking that the judgment of the mayors court and of the
appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11

May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be

dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional
question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then
brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed
by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was
rightly directed.
Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his
village, and the system of courts in prosecuting violations of the
Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the
case.
Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve
constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias,
state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be
matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates
the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal
case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to
the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct,
personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion
against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which
he exercised in the case, to order that the person sentenced to
pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid.
The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in
convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the
$12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have
received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not
exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the
law and the ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is
paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not
become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either
at common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due
process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small
that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de
minimis non curat lex. The Court cannot regard the prospect of
receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute,
remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to
each defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and

judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect

of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against
his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result
of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due
process of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes
were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country part
of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and
maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the
Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is
offered of dividing between the state and the village the large
fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had
before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and
with a review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of
exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set
aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it
should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to
indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial
court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the
defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He
seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial
because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both
because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and
because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine
to help the financial needs of the village. There were thus
presented at the outset both features of the disqualification. The
judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and the
cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with
the present opinion.

Pedro Azul vs. Judge Jose Castro & Rosalinda Tecson

Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance it he
entered a loan agreement with Tecson in the amount of P391k.
Tecson was only able to collect P141k thus leaving about P250k
as a balance. She filed a petition for collection of sum of money
before the Rizal RTC and the case was given to J Sarmiento.

On 27 Mar 79, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10

Apr 79, Azul filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for
responsive pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento retired
and was temporarily substituted by J Aover who granted the
extension but only for 5 days starting the next day. But Azul only
received the notice granting such on the 23rd of the same
month way passed the 5 day period. On the 17th of April,
Tecson already filed a motion to dismiss averring that Azuls 5
day extension has already lapsed. On the 18th of the same
month, J Castro, the permanent judge to replace J Sarmiento
took office and he ordered Azul to be in default due to the lapse
of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with the reception of
evidence the next day and of course without Azuls evidence as
he was still unaware of him being in default. On April 27th, J
Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul, unaware that J
Castro already decided the case appealed to remove his default
status. On May 7th Azul received the decision rendered by the
court on Apr 27th (but on record the date of receipt was May
5th). Azul filed a motion for new trial on June 6th. The lower
court denied the same on the 20th of the same month. On Aug
1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was denied on the 3rd but
was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul filed his record on
appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it on the 27th but
surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the 30th, J Castro set
aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th. Finally, J Castro denied
the appeal on the 7th of September.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due
process. The constitutional provision on due process commands
all who wield public authority, but most peremptorily courts of
justice, to strictly maintain standards of fundamental fairness
and to insure that procedural safeguards essential to a fair trial
are observed at all stages of a proceeding. It may be argued
that when the Azuls counsel asked for a fifteen (15) day
extension from April 11, 1979 to file his answer, it was

imprudent and neglectful for him to assume that said first

extension would be granted. However, the records show that
Atty. Camaya personally went to the session hall of the court
with his motion for postponement only to be informed that J
Sarmiento had just retired but that his motion would be
considered submitted for resolution. Since the sala was vacant
and pairing judges in Quezon City are literally swamped with
their own heavy loads of cases, counsel may be excused for
assuming that, at the very least, he had the requested fifteen
(15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is likewise
inexplicable why J Aover, who had not permanently taken over
the sala vacated by the retired judge, should suddenly rule that
only a five-day extension would be allowed. And to compound
the Azuls problems, the order was sent by mail and received
only twelve (12) days later or after the five-day period. Before
the much publicized Project Mercury of the Bureau of Posts, a
court should have known that court orders requiring acts to be
done in a matter of days should not be sent by mail. Meanwhile,
the petitioner was declared in default. The motion to declare
defendant in default is dated April 17, 1979. No copy was
furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon on April 18, 1979, the
very first day in office of J Castro in Quezon City.

Mayor Miguel Paderanga vs. Judge Cesar Azura

Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental.
He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from deciding on
pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they
have lost confidence in him, that he entertained tax suits against
the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties when it
is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the remedy
to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias, oppressive and
is abusive in his power.
ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the
trial.

HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in the

Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), All the foregoing
notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw
attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation
where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously
comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the
parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might
be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the peoples faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired.
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the duty
of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a
manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of
the judge.

NO CONCIO VS. DOJ CASE

PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, et al. G.R.
No. 196425, 24 July 2012, EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
Executive Order No. 13 which abolishes the Presidential AntiGraft Commission and transfers its functions to the Investigative
and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs, is constitutional pursuant to the
Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency.

In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Executive Order

No. 13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission (PAGC) and transferring its functions to the
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on filed before the
IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against
Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay), Chairman of the Board of
Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) for
the purchase by the LWUA of shares of stock of Express
Savings Bank, Inc. In defense, Pichay filed a Motion to Dismiss
Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving
the same transaction is already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available, Pichay has resorted to the instant petition
for certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of
E.O. 13.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional
2. Whether or not there is usurpation of legislative power to
appropriate
public funds in view of such reorganization
3. Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA encroaches upon the
powers and
duties of the Ombudsman
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates Pichays right
to due
process and the equal protection of the laws
HELD:
E.O. 13 is constitutional
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the
President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices
under him to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.

The Office of the President must, in order to remain effective

and efficient, be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives
and policies.
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
functions to a division specially created within the ODESLA is
properly within the prerogative of the President under his
continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize his own
office. Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the
President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the
PAGC and transferring its functions to the IAD-ODESLA is
allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate
public funds.
There is an express recognition under Section 78 of Republic
Act No. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the
Presidents authority to direct changes in the organizational
units or key positions in any department or agency. This
recognizes the extent of the Presidents power to reorganize the
executive offices and agencies under him, which is, even to the
extent of modifying and realigning appropriations for that
purpose. Thus, while there may be no specific amount
earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of
the President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be
properly sourced from the Presidents own office budget without
committing any illegal appropriation. After all, the President
simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by
Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and
duties of the Ombudsman

The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and

prosecute cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at
any time, take over the investigation being conducted by
another investigatory agency. Since the case filed before the
IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave
misconduct, Pichay may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from proceeding
with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsmans authority
to investigate both elective and appointive officials in the
government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive.
It is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
Moreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into the
determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the
investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that of a
fact-finding
investigator
whose
determinations
and
recommendations remain so until acted upon by the President.
As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsmans
constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichays right to due
process and the equal protection of the laws.
Pichays right to due process was not violated when the IADODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint
against him. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges
and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process, which simply means having the
opportunity to explain ones side. Hence, as long as Pichay was
given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence,
the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with
because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity
to be heard.

Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level

position of Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes
under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well
within his right to order an investigation into matters that require
his informed decision. There are substantial distinctions that set
apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in
government from non-presidential appointees and those that
occupy the lower positions in government.
Erminita Muoz v. Atty. Victoriano Yabut
Petition for review on certiorari of the decisions and resolutions
of the CA. The subject is a house and lot sold Munoz which she
sold to her sister Emilia Ching, who in turn sold it to the Go
spouses. When the Go spouses defaulted on their loan to BPI
the property was foreclosed. BPI won as the highest bidder at
the auction and the property was sold to the Chan spouses.
Munoz registered her adverse claim and filed a complaint with
the RTC for annulment of a deed of absolute sale, cancellation
of TCT in the spouses Gos names and for revival of the TCT
under her name. She also caused the annotation of a lis
pendens.
The RTC granted Gos motion for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and Munoz was driven out of the property.
Munoz, meanwhile, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the CA assailing the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction granted by the RTC, but it was dismissed. The RTC
rendered its judgment against Emilia Ching and the Go
spouses. It
found that Munozs signature and the absolute deed of sale was
forged.
Munoz never sold the subject property to her sister and that the
Go spouses were not innocent purchasers for value. The sale
was null and void. Emilia Ching appealed the decision, but the
appellate court not only affirmed the decision of the RTC, it

ordered the spouses Go and their successors in interest to

vacate the premises. After the RTC filed a writ of execution
implementing its judgment, the spouses Chan came forward
and filed an urgent motion to stop the execution against them.
They asserted ownership and possession on the basis of a
clean title registered in their names, also contending that the
final judgment cannot be executed against them as they were
not parties to the case and that they purchased the property
from BPI without any defects to the title.
Munoz discovered the cancellation of her adverse claim and
notice of lis pendens, plus the subsequent events that led to
transfer and registration from Go, to BPI then to the Chans.
It was denied by the RTC. The photocopy of BPIs TCT could
hardly be regarded as proof that Munozs adverse claim and
notice of lis pendens were missing from the original, also
pointing out that the registration in the day book is what serves
as sufficient notice to the world. There was no more need to
annotate the title. They were deemed to have taken the property
subject to the final outcome of the present dispute. The RTC
then issued an alias writ of execution and the subject property
was taken from the spouses and returned to Munoz. Their
motion for reconsideration was denied. Munoz then instituted a
complaint for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction alleging that with the aid of armed men,
Chan and Atty. Yabut forcibly ousted Munoz of possession.
They claim Chan to be the true owner that his possession was
never interrupted, and the men were there to attend services at
the Buddhist Temple on the fourth floor of the building on the
property. Munozs claim of
forcible entry should be dismissed for lack of merit and legal
basis. The MeTC granted Munozs petition and restored
possession to her.
Yabut and Chan questioned the MeTCs decision through a
petition for certiorari with a prayer for a TRO and writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC. They asserted that they

were not bound by the final judgment between Go and Munoz.

Munoz on the other hand argued that the MeTC order was an
interlocutory order, and is thus a prohibited pleading under the
rules of summary procedure. The RTC issued a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC
order. The RTC found that the MeTC had committed grave
abuse of discretion for not dismissing the complaint for forcible
entry on the ground of lis pendens as the issue to who had a
better right to possession between Chan and Munoz was the
subject of a pending proceeding. The RTC dismissed the
ejectment suit.

remanded to the CA in observance of the hierarchy. The CA

dismissed Munozs petition agreeing with the RTC that the Chan
spouses could not be covered by the writ of execution
considering they were not impleaded in the civil case. Munoz
claims that the decision in the civil case binds not only Ching,
the Go spouses and BPI, but their successors in interest,
assigns or persons acting on their behalf, hence they cannot be
considered as innocent purchasers for value.
Issue:
Held:

Munoz appealed to the CA, but the CA sustained the RTC

orders holding that the Chans right to due process was vitiated
by impleading them only at the execution stage of the civil case.
The order of the RTC in the civil case was null and void, and
considering they are strangers to the case and they are
innocent purchasers for value. Thereafter Munoz filed a motion
for contempt with the RTC against the Chan spouses and Atty.
Yabut. Munoz also filed a Motion for an alias writ of execution
and application for surrender of the owners duplicate TCT, in
which she prayed to direct the RD not only to cancel the TCT of
Go, but all documents declared null and void, and to restore her
TCT free from all liens and encumbrances.
In its order the RTC denied Munozs motion for contempt, but
ordering an alias writ of execution to deliver the property to
Munoz, ordering Go to vacate. It also ordered the RD to cancel
from the records all documents determined void and to restore
Munozs TCT.
Unrelenting Munoz filed a motion for clarificatory order, pointing
out that the spouses Chan are the present occupants and that
the property could not be delivered unless the spouses Chan
are evicted. The motion was denied reiterating the rule that
once a judgment has become final only clerical errors may be
corrected. Munoz elevated the complaint to the SC, but it was

The SC denies Munozs petition for contempt and motion for

clarificatory order seeking that the Chans be executed against
because the prior civil case against Go is an action for
reconveyance which is an action in personam. Since the Chans
and BPI were not impleaded as parties, the effect of the
judgment cannot bind or be extended to them by simply issuing
alias writs of execution. No man shall be affected by any
proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case
are not bound by any judgment rendered to the court. Although
the titles of Ching and Go were deemed void, there was no
similar determination as to the titles that BPI and Chan had.
Munoz cannot collateraly attack the title that the Chans have;
they must be given their day in court in a proceeding designated
for that purpose.

Filemon David vs. Judge Gregorio Aquilizan, et. al.

Facts:
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He let
Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake separate
portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to be yielding
60-70 cavans of corn cobs and the share agreed upon is 50-50.
In 1973, David withdrew the land from the brothers and has not

allowed them to go back there. The brothers prayed for

reinstatement but David refused to do so. David denied that the
brothers were his tenants. He said that Ricardo was his tractor
driver before but he resigned to take care of his dad and to work
for DOLE. Filemon on the other hand surrendered the portion of
the land he was tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan
handled the case filed by the brothers against David and after
three months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers
without any hearing. David averred he was denied due process.
J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no hearing
conducted but he said the decision has already become final
and executory as the period for appeal has already lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered
without a hearing is null and void and may be attacked directly
or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want of due
process. And it has been held that a final and executory
judgment may be set aside with a view to the renewal of the
litigation when the judgment is void for lack of due process of
law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no judgment has been
rendered at all.

forcibly eject her tenants but she included to eject Cayetanos

property. Cayetano was not a party to the ejectment cases so
she prayed for the lower court that her property be not touched.
The lower court denied Cayetanos petition. The CA, upon
appeal, favored Cayetano. Lorenzana averred that Cayetano is
now a party to the ejectment cases as she already brought
herself to the Courts jurisdiction by virtue of her appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cayetanos right to due process has been
violated.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the CA. It
must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12
ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition had been
issued; she did not make her appearance in and during the
pendency of these ejectment cases. Cayetano only went to
court to protect her property from demolition after the judgment
in the ejectment cases had become final and executory. Hence,
with respect to the judgment in said ejectment cases, Cayetano
remains a third person to such judgment, which does not bind
her; nor can its writ of execution be informed against her since
she was not afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases.

Anita Lorenzana vs. Polly Cayetano

FACTS:
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila Railroad
Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She later purchased
the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property be rented to
tenants occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of rents, she filed
12 ejectment cases against her tenant. On the other hand,
Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land adjacent to that
of Lorenzanas land. Cayetano was renting the same from the
Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted Lorenzanas
ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ of execution to

NO CAOILE VS. VIVO DIGEST

NO LOBETE VS. SUNDIAM DIGEST
NO MARVEL BLDG. CORP. VS OPLE DIGEST
NO VALLADOLID VS. INCIONG DIGEST

Anglo-Fil Trading Corp. v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA 494 (1983)

F:
The petitioners were among 23 stevedoring and
arrastre operators at the Manila South Harbor. Their licenses
had expired but they were allowed to continue to operate on the

strength of temporary permits. On May 4, 1976, the Phil Ports

Authority decided to allow only one org. to operate the arrastre
and stevedoring services. On April 28, 1980, based on the
report and recommendation of an evaluation committee, the
PPA awarded the exclusive contract for stevedoring services to
the Ocean Terminal Services Inc (OTSI). The petitioners
brought suit in the CFI to annul the contract for exclusive
service. On motion, Ct issued a TRO enjoining PPA and OTSI
from implementing the exclusive contract. Later, the ct lifted the
TRO prompting the petitioners to file an action for certiorari with
the SC contending that: (1) ex parte lifting of TRO constituted
grave abuse of discretion; (2) the award would impair the
petitioners' contracts with foreign customers.
HELD: (1) Considering that the previous grant of TRO in favor
of pets. was made ex parte and w/o bond, notice and hearing of
the lifting were not necessary, much less mandatory.
(2) Stevedoring services are subject to regulation and
control for the public good and in the interest of the general
welfare. A single contractor furnishing the stevedoring
requirements of a port has in its favor the economy of scale and
the maximum utilization of equipment and manpower. In return,
effective supervision and control as well as collection and
accounting of the govt share of revenues are rendered easier
than where there are 23 contractors to oversee. As found from
the evidence, the multiple contractor system has bred cut-throat
competitions in the port. Understandably, most contractors had
been unable to acquire sufficient modern facilities, observe
labor standards, maintain efficiency, and pay PPA dues.
The contention of pets that due process was violated
resulting in a confiscation of private property is likewise without
merit. In the first place, the pets were operating merely on "hold
over"permits. In the second place, the award of OTSI was the
result of a evaluation of performance of existing contractors
made by a special committee created by the PPA. VV.

Notes:
The policy adopted by the Philippine Ports Authority to
allow only one organization to operate the arrastre and
stevedoring services of each port was upheld by the SC as a
valid exercise of police power. For the "one port, one operator"
rule makes possible the better supervision, collection, efficiency
and improvement of services, and prevent cut-throat
competition and non-maximal utilization of equipment and
manpower. However, in the awarding of contracts, the
procedures must allow only the capable operator to get the
franchise.
In this case, a temporary restraining order (TRO) was
issued without notice to the other party. As the TRO was lifted
also without hearing, the person in whose favor it was
originally issued cannot complain of the lifting of the TRO
without prior hearing.

NO CRUZ VS. RCBC DIGEST

NO CORDERO VS. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DIGEST
NO DIONA VS. BALANGUE DIGEST
University of the Philippines vs. Hon. Agustin S. Dizon
FACTS:
University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General
Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders
Corporation (Stern Builders) for the construction of its buildings
in its Los Baos campus. UP was able to pay its first and
second billing. However, the third billing worth P273,729.47 was
not paid due to its disallowance by the Commission on Audit
(COA). Thus, Stern Builders sued the UP to collect the unpaid
balance.

On November 28, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision ordering

UP to pay Stern Builders. Then on January 16, 2002, the RTC
filed its motion for reconsideration. The RTC denied the motion.
The denial of the said motion was served upon Atty. Felimon
Nolasco (Atty. Nolasco) of the UPLB Legal Office on May 17,
2002. Notably, Atty. Nolasco was not the counsel of record of
the UP but the OLS in Diliman, Quezon City.
Thereafter, the UP filed a notice of appeal on June 3, 2002.
However, the RTC denied due course to the notice of appeal for
having been filed out of time. On October 4, 2002, upon motion
of Stern Builders, the RTC issued the writ of execution.
On appeal, both the CA and the High Court denied UPs
petition. The denial became final and executory. Hence, Stern
Builders filed in the RTC their motions for execution despite
their previous motion having already been granted and despite
the writ of execution having already issued. On June 11, 2003,
the RTC granted another motion for execution filed on May 9,
2003 (although the RTC had already issued the writ of
execution on October 4, 2002). Consequently, the sheriff served
notices of garnishment to the UPs depositary banks and the
RTC ordered the release of the funds.
Aggrieved, UP elevated the matter to the CA but the CA
sustained the RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether UPs appeal dated June 3, 2002 has been filed
out of time
At stake in the UPs plea for equity was the return of the amount
of P16,370,191.74 illegally garnished from its trust funds.
Obstructing the plea is the finality of the judgment based on the
supposed tardiness of UPs appeal, which the RTC declared on
September 26, 2002.

It is true that a decision that has attained finality becomes

immutable and unalterable, and cannot be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether the modification is
made by the court that rendered it or by this Court as the
highest court of the land. But the doctrine of immutability of a
final judgment has not been absolute, and has admitted several
exceptions, among them: (a) the correction of clerical errors; (b)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries that cause no prejudice to
any party; (c) void judgments; and (d) whenever circumstances
transpire after the finality of the decision that render its
execution unjust and inequitable.
We rule that the UPs plea for equity warrants the Courts
exercise of the exceptional power to disregard the declaration of
finality of the judgment of the RTC for being in clear violation of
the UPs right to due process.
Firstly, the service of the denial of the motion for reconsideration
upon Atty. Nolasco of the UPLB Legal Office was invalid and
ineffectual because he was admittedly not the counsel of record
of the UP. The rule is that it is on the counsel and not the client
that the service should be made. Verily, the service of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration could only be validly made
upon the OLS in Diliman, and no other. It is settled that where a
party has appeared by counsel, service must be made upon
such counsel. This is clear enough from Section 2, second
paragraph, of Rule 13, Rules of Court, which explicitly states
that: If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him
shall be made upon his counsel or one of them, unless service
upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Where one
counsel appears for several parties, he shall only be entitled to
one copy of any paper served upon him by the opposite side.
Secondly, even assuming that the service upon Atty. Nolasco
was valid and effective, such that the remaining period for the
UP to take a timely appeal would end by May 23, 2002, it would

still not be correct to find that the judgment of the RTC became
final and immutable thereafter due to the notice of appeal being
filed too late on June 3, 2002. In so declaring the judgment of
the RTC as final against the UP, the CA and the RTC applied
the rule contained in the second paragraph of Section 3, Rule
41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration interrupted the running of the period for filing
the appeal; and that the period resumed upon notice of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration. For that reason, the CA
and the RTC might not be taken to task for strictly adhering to
the rule then prevailing.
However, equity calls for the retroactive application in the UPs
favor of the fresh-period rule that the Court first announced in
mid-September of 2005 through its ruling in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals, viz: to standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15
days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional
Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.
The retroactive application of the fresh-period rule, a procedural
law that aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new
trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any
final order or resolution, is impervious to any serious challenge.
This is because there are no vested rights in rules of procedure.
Consequently, even if the reckoning started from May 17, 2002,
when Atty. Nolasco received the denial, the UPs filing on June
3, 2002 of the notice of appeal was not tardy within the context
of the fresh-period rule. For the UP, the fresh period of 15-days
counted from service of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration would end on June 1, 2002, which was a
Saturday. Hence, the UP had until the next working day, or June
3, 2002, a Monday, within which to appeal, conformably with

Section 1 of Rule 22, Rules of Court, which holds that: If the

last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the
time shall not run until the next working day.

People vs. Beriales

Facts: A case of three men who were charged for the murder of
Saturnina on Sept. 13, 1974. During the hearing on Nov. 26,
1974, upon motion of the defense the Court ordered the reinvestigation of the case pending submission of the Fiscal of its
reports. Couple of postponements was made until Dec. 13,
1974 hearing when the Court proceeded with the arraignment
and trial in the absence of the Fiscal and its report on reinvestigation, and over the disagreement of the defense. The
CFI of Leyte relied on the private prosecutor being authorized
by the Fiscal to present evidence and the defense presumed to
have waived its right over its disagreement. Trial then
proceeded and the 3 found guilty of he offense. Thus, this
appeal on the constitutional requirement of due process.
Issue: Whether or not due process of law had been observed.
Held: Constitutional due process was violated, thus, case
remanded to CFI for arraignment and trial. Court should have
held in abeyance the trial while the report on e-investigation was
still pending. Consistent disregard of the defense objection on
the arraignment, trial, presentation of private prosecutors
evidence, and rendition of judgment violates due process.
Prosecutor or Fiscal entrusted with the investigation is duty
bound to take charge until final termination. They shall have
direction and control of the criminal prosecution over private
prosecutors.

Marcos v. Garchitorena
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside as arbitrary and
in grave abuse of discretion resolutions of the Sandiganbayan's
First Divisiondenying petitioner's motion for leave to travel
abroad for medicaltreatment.
The former first lady Imelda Marcos was found guilty by the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan of violating 3 of the Anti Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. After conviction she filed a "Motion
for Leave to Travel Abroad" to seekdiagnostic tests and
treatment by practitioners of oriental medicine in China allegedly
because of "a serious and life threatening medical condition"
requiring facilities not available in the Philippines that was
denied. Then she again filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Permission to Travel Abroad" to undergo diagnosis and
treatment in China. This was supported by several medical
reports that were prepared by her doctor Roberto Anastacio.
Again another Motion to leave was filed by Mrs. Marcos to US
and Europe for treatment of several Heart diseases alleging that
the tests were not available here.
The presiding justice, Garchitorena, contacted Dr. Gregorio B.
Patacsil, Officer-in-Charge of the Philippine Heart Center, and
later wrote him a letter, asking for "expert opinion on coronary
medicine". The court still found no merit to allow the petitioners
motion to leave and denied all of the motions.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and a "Motion to
Admit Clinical Summary and to Resolve Motion for
Reconsideration." Attached was a recent medical report and
letters of Vice President Joseph E. Estrada offering to be
guarantor for the return of petitioner and those of twenty four
members of the House of Representatives requesting the court
to allow petitioner to travel abroad. This was also denied by the

Court also stating their express disapproval of the involvement

of the VP and the Cabinet members so as to influence the
resolutions, decisions or orders or any judicial action of
respondent court.
Issue: Whether or Not the Sandiganbayan erred in disallowing
the Motion for Leave to Travel Abroad because it (1)
disregarded the medical findings (2) it motu propio contacted a
third party asking the latter to give an opinion on petitioner's
motion and medical findings (3) said that there was no necessity
to get medical treatment abroad.
Held: No. The contention of the petitioner that was invalid to
contact a third party asking the latter to give an opinion on
petitioner's motion and medical findings was erroneous.
Respondent court had to seek expert opinion because
petitioner's motion was based on the advice of her physician.
The court could not be expected to just accept the opinion of
petitioner's physician in resolving her request for permission to
travel. What would be objectionable would be if respondent
court obtained information without disclosing its source to the
parties and used it in deciding a case against them.
In disregarding the medical reports, the petitioner failed to prove
the necessity for a trip abroad. It should be emphasized that
considering the fact that she is facing charges before the courts
in several cases, in two of which she was convicted although
the decision is still pending reconsideration, petitioner did not
have an absolute right to leave the country and the burden was
on her to prove that because of danger to health if not to her life
there was necessity to seek medical treatment in foreign
countries.
On the third issue, the Court ordered petitioner to undergo
several tests which summarily states that the required medical
treatment was available here in the Philippines and that the
expertise and facilities here were more than adequate to cater

to her medical treatment. The heart ailments of the petitioner

were not as severe as that was reported by Dr. Anastacio.
Wherefore, the petitioner is Dismissed without prejudice to the
filling of another motion for leave to travel abroad, should
petitioner still desire, based on her heart condition. In such an
event the determination of her medical condition should be
made by joint panel of medical specialists recommended by
both the accused and the prosecution.

NO REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

DIGEST
NO PLDT VS. HPS SOFTWARE COMMUNICATIONS
CORPORATION DIGEST

printouts of the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued

an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount
necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing
of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order for
Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.
The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared
Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.
Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had
been denied his right to due process because he had not been
notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort
to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary
evidence, had been unwarranted because there was no proof
that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.
The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN
FACTS:
During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as
winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes,
brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging
that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209
clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of
the votes, and, based on the results of the revision, declared
Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding
Saquilayan to cease and desist from performing the functions of
said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion for execution
pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.
The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the
parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the

Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari,

reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and
to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount
proceedings conducted by the First Division.
The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the
same. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not
abuse its discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead
of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot
images were not secondary images, but considered original
documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots
under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First
Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been
tampered had been fully established by the large number of
cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.
ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the
instant petition despite a clear violation of petitioner's

constitutional right to due process of law considering that

decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the
ballots were done inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of
the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner
and for the first time on appeal.
HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted.
Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns
(ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC
to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its
cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties
the opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The
parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is
never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly
because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be
thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the
COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Divisions
deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily
resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the
parties with notice of its proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard, the most basic requirements of due process.
The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that
are regarded as the equivalents of the original official ballots
themselves. In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013the Court
held that "the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and
recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully
capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined
by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof
are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the
voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes
in an electoral protest."
That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image
are considered "original documents" simply means that both of

them are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is

presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than
the other.
But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the
COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and
unilaterally resort to the printouts of the picture images of the
ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the
parties. Despite the equal probative weight accorded to the
official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules
for the revision of ballots adopted for their respective
proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or
best evidence of the voters will. In that regard, the picture
images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown
that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.

NO CALANO VS. CRUZ DIGEST

Lawton vs. Steele

Summary: Plaintiffs sued defendant fish and game protectors to
recover damages for the loss of their seized fishing nets. At
issue was the New York statute that prohibited fishing in the
area where plaintiffs were fishing and proscribed seizure of
fishing gear used in violation of the statute. The U.S. Supreme
Court held that such a statute is a constitutional exercise of
state police power, as the protection of fish and game has
always been within the proper domain of police power. Further,
the court found the legislature acted properly in providing a
seizure component to the statute to control what it termed a
"public nuisance."

Facts: The nets were the property of the plaintiffs, and were
taken away by the defendant Steele, and destroyed. At the time
of the taking, most of the nets were in the waters of the Black
River bay, being used for fishing purposes, and the residue
were upon the shore of that bay, having recently been used for
the same purpose. The plaintiffs were fishermen, and the
defendant Steele was a state game and fish protector. The
taking and destruction of the nets were claimed to have been
justifiable under the statutes of the state relating to the
protection of game and fish. Plaintiffs claimed there was no
justification under the statutes, and, if they constituted such
justification upon their face, they were unconstitutional.
Defendant Sherman was a state fish commissioner. Defendant
Sargent was president of the Jefferson County Fish & Game
Association. Plaintiffs claimed these defendants to be liable
upon the ground that they instigated, incited, or directed the
taking and destruction of the nets.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed sections of Chapter 591 of,
Laws New York 1880 is valid and constitutional.

so used to be destroyed, it would seem like belittling the dignity

of the judiciary to require such destruction to be preceded by a
solemn condemnation in a court of justice. The same remark
might be made of the cards, chips, and dice of a gambling room.
The value of the nets in question was but $15 apiece. The cost
of condemning one (and the use of one is as illegal as the use
of a dozen) by judicial proceedings would largely exceed the
value of the net, and doubtless the state would, in many cases,
be deterred from executing the law by the expense. They could
only be removed from the water with difficulty, and were liable to
injury in the process of removal. The object of the law is
undoubtedly a beneficent one, and the state ought not to be
hampered in its enforcement by the application of constitutional
provisions which are intended for the protection of substantial
rights of property. It is evident that the efficacy of this statute
would be very seriously impaired by requiring every net illegally
used to be carefully taken from the water, carried before a court
or magistrate, notice of the seizure to be given by publication,
and regular judicial proceedings to be instituted for its
condemnation.

Held: YES
It is not easy to draw the line between cases where property
illegally used may be destroyed summarily and where judicial
proceedings are necessary for its condemnation. If the property
were of great value, as, for instance, if it were a vessel
employed for smuggling or other illegal purposes, it would be
putting a dangerous power in the hands of a custom officer to
permit him to sell or destroy it as a public nuisance, and the
owner would have good reason to complain of such act as
depriving him of his property without due process of law. But
where the property is of trifling value, and its destruction is
necessary to effect the object of a certain statute, we think it is
within the power of the legislature to order its summary
abatement. For instance, if the legislature should prohibit the
killing of fish by explosive shells, and should order the cartridges

It is said, however, that the nets are not in themselves a

nuisance, but are perfectly lawful acts of manufacture, and are
ordinarily used for a lawful purpose. This is, however, by no
means a conclusive answer. Many articles-- such, for instance,
as cards, dice, and other articles used for gambling purposes-are perfectly harmless in themselves, but may become
nuisances by being put to an illegal use, and in such cases fall
within the ban of the law, and may be summarily destroyed. It is
true that this rule does not always follow from the illegal use of a
harmless article.

Emilio Gancayco vs City Government of Quezon City and

MMDA

Facts:
In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of
land located in EDSA. Then on March 1956, Quezon City
Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of
arcades for commercial buildings to be constructed. At the
outset, it bears emphasis that at the time Ordinance No. 2904
was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code
passed by the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the
construction of buildings was left to the discretion of local
government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city
council required that the arcade is to be created by constructing
the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters
away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not
allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line,
thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor. In effect,
property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an
arcade for pedestrians, instead of using it for their own
purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco.
Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice Gancayco sought the
exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his
property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be
exempted from constructing an arcade on his property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice
Gancaycos request and issued Resolution No. 7161, S-66,
subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer,
the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure
of said arcade at his own expense when public interest so
demands.
Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to
clear obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they sent a
notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion
of his building violated the National Building Code.

Gancayco did not comply with the notice and filed a petition for
TRO with the RTC Quezon City to prohibit the MMDA from
demolishing his property. The RTC rendered its Decision on 30
September 2003 in favor of Justice Gancayco. It held that the
questioned ordinance was unconstitutional, ruling that it allowed
the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. The RTC said that because 67.5 square meters
out of Justice Gancaycos 375 square meters of property were
being taken without compensation for the publics benefit, the
ordinance was confiscatory and oppressive. It likewise held that
the ordinance violated owners right to equal protection of laws.
MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went
beyond its powers when it demolished the subject property. It
further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to sidewalks,
streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places
in Metro Manila, thus excluding Justice Gancaycos private
property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed
with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
Issues: (1) WHETHER OR NOT JUSTICE GANCAYCO WAS
ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE VALIDITY OF
ORDINANCE NO. 2904. (2) WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE
NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.(3) WHETHER OR NOT THE
WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCOS BUILDING IS A
PUBLIC NUISANCE. (4) WHETHER OR NOT THE MMDA
LEGALLY DEMOLISHED THE PROPERTY OF JUSTICE
GANCAYCO.
Ruling:
(1) We find that petitioner was not guilty of estoppel. When it
made the undertaking to comply with all issuances of the BIR,
which at that time it considered as valid, petitioner did not
commit any false misrepresentation or misleading act.

(2) Justice Gancayco may not question the ordinance on the

ground of equal protection when he also benefited from the
exemption. It bears emphasis that Justice Gancayco himself
requested for an exemption from the application of the
ordinance in 1965 and was eventually granted one. Moreover,
he was still enjoying the exemption at the time of the demolition
as there was yet no valid notice from the city engineer. Thus,
while the ordinance may be attacked with regard to its different
treatment of properties that appears to be similarly situated,
Justice Gancayco is not the proper person to do so.
(3) The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice
Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an
indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances
per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and adversely
affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an
ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily
make that structure a nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco
was given a permit to construct the building, the city council or
the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished
portion, to be a threat to the safety of persons and property.
This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against
summarily demolishing the structure.
Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a
nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have
the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance
when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize
the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those
things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts
of law.

FACTS:
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines
Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior locators
and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz, Zambales.
They are asserting their claim against the group of Martinez and
Pabiloa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et al. ZCM
appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned as
the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit
himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed his
earlier decision when he was still the director of mines. ZCM
then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI affirmed
the decision of Gozon. It held that the disqualification of a judge
to review his own decision or ruling (Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of
Court) does not apply to administrative bodies; that there is no
provision in the Mining Law, disqualifying the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from deciding an appeal
from a case which he had decided as Director of Mines; that
delicadeza is not a ground for disqualification; that the ZCM did
not seasonably seek to disqualify Gozon from deciding their
appeal, and that there was no evidence that Gozon acted
arbitrarily and with bias, prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM.
ZCM appealed the case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozons
finding and declared that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to
Martinez et al by Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that
the factual basis found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given
due weight. The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon
cannot affirm his own decision and the CA remanded the case
to the Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CAs earlier
decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that
Gozons finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.

MMDA illegally demolished Gancayco's property.

Zambales Chromite Mining, et. al., vs. CA

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier decision w/o
disturbing due process.

HELD:
The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a mockery
of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of discretion. In
order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer
might not turn out to be a farce, the reviewing officer must
perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under
review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there
would be no real review of the case. The decision of the
reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be
the same view since being human, he would not admit that he
was mistaken in his first view of the case. The SC affirmed the
2nd decision of the CA.

Dr. Felicidad Anzaldo vs. Jacobo Clave

FACTS: Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National
Institute of Science and Technology for 28 years. She was
holding the position Scientist Research Associate IV when she
was appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her
appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position
was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr
Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr
Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that Anzaldos
appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation Committee
which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points to Venzon. The
issue was elevated to the Office of the president by Venzon.
Clave was then the Presidential Executive Assistant. Pursuant
to PD 807 or the Civil Service Decree, Clave referred the issue
to the CSC. Clave was also holding the chairmanship of the
CSC. Clave issued Res 1178 appointing Venzon to the
contested position. After the denial of her motion for the
reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980,
Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. Since Clave was holding the office of PEA he just
affirmed his decision as the CSC chairman.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said
in his decision that he was inclined to concur in the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission, what he
meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Claves
recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is evident
that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential
Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the recommendation
of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission.
Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to
Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide whether his own
recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as to who between
Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed Science Research
Supervisor II, should be adopted by the President of the
Philippines.

NO NASECO GUARDS ASSOCIATION VS NATIONAL

SERVICE CORPORATION DIGEST