i:-:-RiQVED FOR RET.

RiSR
DOTE: JOUST 2 0 0 5

C E H T H 1

INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY

OF NAIIOEAL ESTIMATES
lu
POft THIS DIRECTOR
SUBJT^CTi

Use of Huclear Weapons in the Vietnam War

CONCLUSION

A.

Use of niueleax veapons Tjy the UB in the Vietnam var

be otie of the most Important events of modem h i s t o r y ,

1torl&

reactions vould T^o affectei t o flomfl ejetent t y tlue circumstances

In whlcft the \JG resorted t o t h e i r usa, grid tlus t a r g e t s attacked
But a^jnoet Independent of these factors v a u i i be a widespread
ftnd -fundjaineivtal revulfilon t h a t tVw US had fcroken the S0*year
taboo on the tise of nuclear
.

Aramg the cohsequ^Bces would, be Incten&e a g i t a t i o n in

Japanj probably leadlnc t o a r e s t r i c t i o n on US use of Japanese

f a c i l i t i e s and possibly t o deftuneiatian of the US-Japan defense
t r t a t y ; probably aotme accelerated raoioetituia toward
p r o l i f e r a t i o n ; ajecona&artied, hflfiraver, by lorterdational
for disanaamant In the nuclear f i e l d , with scant patience for the
t e c h n i c a l i t i e s of v e r i f i c a t i o n ; 4 prdbable resolution of condemnation
In the UN; and a tnarked diminution of such public support as US
in Vietnam now has*

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C.

It is possible that d&ee the UB had used nuclear weapons

the Chinese- Communist B might

IOVS

to disengage* but

VQ

thinft it

more likely that they would not do B?f but would hope that
accumulating US Lasses and mounting world pressures vould forte
the US to task dawn, The DKV would have l)n reduced to s.
secondary tole. The USSR *ould act vigorously against the US an
the political and propaganda ftontj ve do not believa that it
vould enter the war or auirpcxt the Chineae with nuclear

DISCUSSION
I,

SCENARIO
1,

It if i l l -be argued in this paper that foreien reactions

t o US use :>f nuclear yeapans ill the Vietnam war vouM be

fr more by the fact that the weapana vert nuclear than by the
circumstances in which they vere used or the provocations
might have led the US ta use them,

nevertheless, the

vould make sorae difference, at least In certain quarters.

Hue

following ehoTt l i s t of conceivable ecenarioa begins vith one

in vhich US ue* of nuclear weapons v^uld appear Uaflt justifiable
in the eyes of the world generally and least In accord with
Comawnist expectations, and proceeds t o the one vhich Is &t
other extreme in these respects,
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a.

(a)

'Sbfi military situation In South Vietnam remains

essentially as a t present; the US employs nuclear
weapons out of sheer frustration at i t s inability
to obtain any decision by conventional means .

(b)

The US invades North Vietnam* either overland or

by amphibious assault* or both; the Chinese
Copiimait^tg intervene in large combat force t either
overtly or v i t h "volunteers/ 1 and the US forces
in Ifortfi Vietnam find themselves -threatened with
destruction,

(c)

Hie US does not Invade Uarth Vietnam. But the

PAVW> pltis Chinese Conrnumiflt ground force &j launch
the largest scale ovort Invasion of S^itt Vietnam
&f whith they aj^e capable, across and around the
demilitarized stone- Th&y iaay al&o came into
northern Laos in strong force IB and South
Vietnamese forces iaay or may no* be seriously
endangoredj In any event a new pha3& of the
var 1& opened lay Chinese and DRV i n i t i a t i v e *

(d)

Hie area of conflict i s expanded by Chinese

COnmunist I n i t i a t i v e , involving Invasiope of
Laos, Kiailand, and perhaps Eurtna*

{a)

The Chinese Cosmunietg then.jelires f i r a t use &

veapon.

Neither the first nor the last of these scenarios

rorth eerious consideration; they aw both BO highly unlikely as

to lie virtually &ut of the quest ion, and they are included only
to illustrate the possibility of situations different frsm tn&&&
which tie shall discuss. Within each of the three middle scenarios
there are, no doubt, a large nu&iber of possible attendant circumstances
would have some bearing on the situation and night modify to
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some small degree t h e HludgmentG which t h e world made of t h e US

nuclear re3pan&eT and a l t e r the rejittions t^i i t .

BecaU&e the

effect of such v a r i a t i o n s would almost certairjly be minor i t

flaea not seem useful to a t t e a p t t o esiplore any of thn ^.n d e t a i l *
The di#cu B gl,3n which follows applica p r i n c i p a l l y to s i t u a t i o n ( c ) *a Large-scale Cofflwunist inTasian of 3 o ^ h Vie?triaiB -* but WS
sotac references t o t h e differences in reaction vhieh
be expected, ir. s i t u a t i o n s (b) or (d)*

IH THE T3ON-C0(I*Emi3T WORLT1

3,

In t h e non-CiiaiiUAi&-t v a r l d there are a s ^ d Piaiiy

who n e i t h e r ^IOH nor care raucli about nuclear veftpass and would not
r e a c t one way or t h e o t h e r if thfc US used them i n Vietnam, p a r t i c u l a r l y
so leng n& the danger seomed: remote from themselves,

t!her& are

goirernmccits whichf whatever t h e i r pblJLc prsnounccmente on t h e

subject t would in the l i ^ h t of t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t *
be elad t o see thft Chtnege Conmuilist re^iJoe deEtroyed hy thlfl
means.

There are also in^ivicluals said governments vha would

consider the Unites S t a t e s veak i f i t allowed s u b s t a n t i a l r.utribers

Of i t g armed farces to be deatroyed without attemptiBg t o
them by t h e use of nucle&r weapons.

And t h e r e etre BSHK? who

consider t h e United State* foolieh t o accept defeat o r even

compromise i n thti Vietnam struggle without having rocaurse t o i t a
formidable L:lement of m i l i t a r y power*
- U -E-T

kw

Granting theat and perhaps same other exceptions, there

in the field o tirternational affairs probably no more universal

than t h a t which hsl4s the use of itucla&r vtja,pona to be
abhorrent.

Any use of unclear weapons by the US in "the Vietnain

var would "be viewed as canong the most fearful and fateful errente
of modern hickory*

Wor.li react tins vould be affected to

ertent Tiy th(f tonditlina under which the US resorted to

and. the Jttnde of weapons ami targets Involved.

But almost

indjeFende-nt &f theae factors would be a fundamental revulsion

t h a t the US had. broken t t e 30-year tebcw on the use of nuclear

5-

The use of atomic tombs, ag&inst Japan in 19^+5 i s t i l l

condemned by ciany-j not only Abroad but withi.ii the US, Hbet
informed opinion, hovever, recociii^eB t h a t i t was intended t a
hasten the end of a long and bloody world var*

Most important, i t

t s seen as a bad moment f histary that accursed nearly a

ago and mist never Tse6,

Over tiie ysaT^j world opinion had been generally surprised

and relieved to discover t h a t the UB^Soviet rmcl&ar raee^ ratlier

than precipitating ^ va.r between the- two powersj has tended to make
- 5 -

a ver "unthinkable*11 Nuelsar tombs and varhaads thus tend to

be locked upon *s veapone which v i l l never be ueed except in a.
world bent on self-destruction*

It has come to be f e l t t h a t the

of a nuclear holocaust hoys qi.gnificanrfily recsfied in

because the two sup^r-powers are 1&4 by responsible
which are prepared t o EO tr> gr^at lenfl-tue to see that nuclear
v i i l ncTrer aeain be employett.
T.

Tti^ir tise In Vietrjan, rogardleas af the

v a i l i eend a vavt of fear and. aE^er through w>et of tbfl

varli.

The (jowoi^l feeltns vould be t h a t , once the taboo bid been

broken, there would remain no effective barrier t& expanded use of

such tfo&pong. People vouia feeir t h a t the Communists vould respond
in kliad if they hadj or could ajcq.ulr5j a nuclear capability*
Behind a l l t h i s would l i e a ttaar that the use of nuclear weapons
might lead "to a general nuclear war endangering the vorld et large.
Most friends of the US vould condemn I t tot
the world into a nev and t e r r i b l e phase u history in
nuclear weaporiB hs4 betome the vsrl^tng w^apens of the times*
Resolutions of condemnation would be introduced in the UH with, the
likelihood of winning & majority vste,

MTO vould be T>adly shaken

Guch public support as UB policy in. Vietuani new receiTee from a

number of gavemmontsj especially in Europe, would be ended*
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9-

A Rritieh ^ovemment which failed to raaJ;e a public

of the intraductlon of nuclear i^epotis Into the
f l a t i n s Vtwld probably f a l l .

In Japan, Tnepaories of

Hiroshima and. Kdftasaki VOUld make the people especially

of a se-cotvi uee of TJfi ".cuclear weapons acaitist AsiBJifl*

At a

Prime Mir tsta? Sato woul'i feel conp&Hcd ta end his stipport 3f
US policy* azvXf in particular> t a r e s t r i c t tlw US use of Japanese
facilltifis.

M&re liltsly, the Llberel-Demoeratic Party would

replate Sato with siraeone lesg ldentlfiably prD*-UE3 In his views.

I t 1$ poa&ible that, under l e f t i s t praddingj the popular
reactim vould farce a move t a eloea US bases or even t a denounce
the US-Japan defense treaty*

J-bat opinion in India and the Indian

Government would stror^ly condemn the US action, though some

Indian Leatera vwiLd be relieved to eee t!r.j ChlUeee Ccwmupi-6ts
set bacUj and some vauld he secretly pleased if Chinese nuclear
fMS-Lities v>ere destroyed

Tne aeneral Iniian

"be eoweuhjt reduced i f the- nuclear weapons wore used to atop a

Chine ae invaEiian of

10,

A very limited use of t a c t i c a l veapons tn cmly the

immediate b a t t l e arts a vauld cauac a less violent reaction in

sophisticated circles than would the nuclear bombing of Chinese

a i r f i e l d s , r a i l centsrs t and nuclear praduction s i t e s .

Bat to

much of the -world the distinction vould not be significant;

the

Important thine would, be that "these ueapone had been used at all*
The circumstances under vhich the weapons were used TfisalC. also
have some effect on reactions,

Wifi moet severe reaction vould

Occil^ if the US had ittYcdod Ifertla Vtetruni {caee 'I*1); on the

other hand, the negative TCactionfl would be reduced if nuclear
weaPQUS wctc empljoycd as a l a s t resdrt to fltap the Cofflmuai3t
Chinese frtss overwhelmtnE the whale af Sauttea&t Aciat

Indeed,

in thia ftaee some positive support would be

IX.

Seymd thoae djjrect reae*ioniaj there v&tflti be other

effects havii^ a crawi^G iugiact n the futune*

Thtre wou!4 probably

he a wave- of international pressure for Immediate disaoiajDCitit in

the nuclear field*

>bst of this would "be aimed at tlie US &3 the

anly nation t o haire used such weaponsf and there would be l i t t l e

pationce v i t h continued US insifltDiice on the need for inspection.
I t Is pec Bible, howevert that some of t h i s praasure could: he diverted
to the BmrUtB In the fain of demands ^or

12.

ir

realM and "verified"

Yetj paradaxically^ there voiiLd probably also be ail

momentum tovarti nu^le^^ proliferation.

- G -

A US use which

-C-B-E-T

11

nuclear weapons and demonstrated t h e i r c r i t i c a l

ee and pnwtic a b i l i t y ia today's vars wmild l^ad *e

to feel they mist have such veapMM in t h e i r arsenals.
At the

SQHIE

U x e , the UE a?Guneat against prolifer&cim vould lose

tnocral credit ami encounter cynical reactions*

in.

HBACETOMS

13,

or *tHS iflsrr

Connnunlat_China>

CCHMINIST COUMKIEB

WK Ctiimefie Comnwuilflt leaders at*

quite conscious of the potent nuclear arsenal of the US,

In

atoptlng a. palicy invalvinc the probability of var with the USj

they vould Hav^ congidersd the possibility that puelsa* weapons
be used*

They misht haire coiiel*ad t h a t

totetflatlanal

and.

presBUros wcuia prevent the U3 ft-Jm ilBlng nuclear vg^po

under any conditions ehort of a direct t h r ^ t to i t s national
survival.

They coiM not De certain of t h i e , novever, and t h e i r

vould Imve inc3.uded

GOUITBOS

t o follow i f nuclear

used*
Ik,

I t i e passible that ante the US used nuclear weapons,

the Ctrfneae miGht povc to disetttia^, particularly i f they hid not

the 05 to do BO. We think i t more l i k e l y , however, that
once

ir the Chines* would a t t e n d t o continue Iti spite of

weapons.

In the belief that they c3*Od- eventually

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-B-E-T

they vould probably press on, accepting the military consequences

while tryins to minimize them by dispersal t doce-embrace b a t t l e f i e l d
t a c t i c s , and am intensification of g u e r i l l a warfare behind the U3
linea. ttiey would hope thus to prolong the Btrusele IQ the point
where accumulating US leases and mounting world pressures would
force the U t o back
.

Ifoscov would l?e? alarrafid at the prospect of

continued escalation -which might force i t iftto a nuclear

confrontation wltb tlK U3, I t rould ta3:e ctepe on a l l fronts to
reduce the livelihood of such a development.

I t would act v

on the propaganda and p o l i t i c a l front 7 s t r i v e s to generate eufflcient

iriternatioTial preBsttTG tn and out of the UM t o foro^ the IS t o pull
hack from i t s eBcalatlau.

[Due Soviets would pnohatl^ feel

t o warn the U5 t h a t the UGi3R would Binppcrt China with

.

At the same time, however, they would BL^:e i t clear to

not to count on Soviet nuclear weapons.

Iftey -ttould almost

certainly not provide any nuel&ar weapons t o the Chinese.

6.

The_DIW. With the war having expamacd to thfc point

th& Chinese were directly involved end nuclear weapons

heen introduced, the DFV would have been reduced to a secondary
PAVK/VC vould retain a alenificant capability In the
- JO

sE-C-R-E-T

South, b u t In t h e bl;; p i c t u r e they Tfoulti have TJCCOUE an adjunct O

t h e Chinese forces*

In th<3 event t h a t t h e use of nuclear weapons

SO aJa-rmcd t h e DEW Ji t o l e a i i t t a wish t o q u i t the war, the

Chine EG itivolvyyraent aud presence would probably have foreclosed
t h i s option.

IV.

They c^iil^ sjcid the vsr only i f Peking concurKd,

LGHOBR TESM IMFLICATIOM9

17+

I f t h e t a c t i c a l uao of nuclear weapons BUcCS^&ctl in

tumiJiE liaclt the? Chine ee and helped lead t o a. quick and

settlement in Vietnam, t h e r e wouM "be many Cfttns for the V&
set dftfilnffb the loeaes racntianed above.

"Kothin^ succ*ed lllte

success j 1 1 gnd nosy wauld fargivE the IB oaoce the dancer

Asian alllfiE of the US would feel much more secure a g a i n s t
Chinese encroachments,

Bailing, badly s e t tack> would Lise

and t h i s micht leaA t o a r e a p p r a i s a l of the leadership by the massep

and the youa^er party l e a d e r s .

Ihc Soviets irauld Qftln new f e a r

and r e s p e c t for the US bard l l n e r e j t h e i r conviction o the

danser of 'Srars of n a t i o n a l l i b e r a t i o n 1 ' would be confirmed.

At

t h e aarae t i m e , those i n the USSH who advocate G r e a t e r s t r e s s on

railitary

develojtTkent and are mnenrthu^iastic abaut detente would

have: t h e i r hands s t r e n ^ h e n e d *
- 11 -

ifl.

If the US used nuclear weapons vith sort* peraietetice

ond s t i l l failed to turn bock th CMnefie or bring & quick end

to the war, the results vould be aerloua indeed*

The cceaparatlv

ln^&tence of the IE end of ita moat vaunted veapcofl in coping

with &. "revolutiBftary struggle" vould have been damoofltrrsted to
Peking's n a t i f a c t i o n and fidya&tage* At the soffle tme} the US
would poy the -whole p o l i t i c a l coat of having used these
In the f i r s t pl.
19-

n'heire riSflfliiiaj of course, t h e qiiestiun of t h e consequences

of n r t uDing tiuclcer veapens, &nd of accepting a m i l i t d i y d i s a s t e r ,

perhRpe ttendne t o l o s s of t h e war, whicb t h e s e weapons might
hsve averted *

Such a development vould have profound

ijiiplicationfl

f o r t h e standing of t h e US in. t h e world end for tfre balance of

power m Asia.
Involve

EKflteination of these implies t i o n s , however, vould

CODE i t e r a t i o n

of t h e whole s u b j e c t of US oTsjecti^efi and

p o l i c i e s i n Sootheset Aflia^ and does a o t ecme within t h e scope of

this
POH THE BOARD OF WA^OHAL

Acting

^ IE -

T-