REPUBLIC V DAGDAG

FACTS:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan
Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The
birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the
wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear
for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During
the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends
and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from
him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he
escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the
RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons
was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general
circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her
counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only
witness.
The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2,
1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence,
and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and
found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.

Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court
declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating
prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was
prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether
he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the
same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court
denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The
CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and
obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.

ISSUE:

Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity,
as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive
from justice?

HELD:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment
of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the
case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in
the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code.

Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply
with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity
must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical
doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further,
the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven.
In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating
prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

TE v TE
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized
by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted
to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter already had a boyfriend, the young
man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was
Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was
young and jobless. Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left
Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel money of
P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her

uncles house and Edward to his parents home. Eventually they got married
but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited from getting out of
the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle.

After a month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents.
Edwards parents wanted them to stay at their house but Rowena refused and
demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she said that it
was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of
his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological

incapacity.

HELD:
The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met
in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted
ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both
parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls
under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically

incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth

assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot

assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love,
respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make
everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make
most of his important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in
this case, petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons
around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as
a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear
direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder
makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations on account for
her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of
others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no
qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of
committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological
incapacity, the precipitous marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is
thus, declared null and void.

TING V TING
FACTS:
Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates
in medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City
when respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993,
after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu
City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the
following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his
profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary
to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to
pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to
give regular financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained
that he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that
it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played
mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both presented expert witnesses
(psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTCs decision. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied
to this case

ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of
psychological incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on
Article 36 of the Family Code has been liberalized,
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

HELD:
1. No. respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and
Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that
petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a
husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity
as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago.

SUAZO V SUAZO
FACTS:
Angelito Suazo and Jocelyn Suazo were married when they were 16 years old only.
Without any means to support themselves, they lived with Angelitos parents while
Jocelyn took odd jobs and Angelito refused to work and was most of the time drunk.
Petitioner urged him to find work but this often resulted to violent quarrels. A year
after their marriage, Jocelyn left Angelito. Angelito thereafter found another woman
with whom he has since lived. 10 years later, she filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Art. 36 Psychological incapacity. Jocelyn testified on the
alleged physical beating she received. The expert witness corroborated parts of
Jocelyns testimony. Both her psychological report and testimony concluded that
Angelito was psychologically incapacitated. However, B was not personally
examined by the expert witness. The RTC annulled the marriage on the ground that
Angelito is unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as immaturity, i.e., lack
of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility, otherwise peculiar to
infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or excessive dependence
on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the condition by
which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks but the CA reversed it

and held that the respondent may have failed to provide material support to the
family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they
were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or
medically identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was
suffering from an anti-social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was
not the product of any adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that
she got from the petitioner, anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior
of the respondent was due simply to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which
are not equivalent to psychological incapacity, or the failure or refusal to work could
have been the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been
forced into a loveless marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a basis to nullify Jocelyns marriage with Angelito under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:
The Court find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error of
law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns
marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
Jocelyns evidence is insufficient to establish Angelitos psychological incapacity. The
psychologist evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner
she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias
for her cause cannot of course be doubted. The psychlologist, using meager
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this
is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. Both the psychologists report
and testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported antisocial personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as
chronic, grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however,
on the bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the
characterization she gave. Jurisprudence holds that there must be evidence showing
a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
and the psychological disorder itself. As testimony regarding the habitual
drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of psychological
incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital obligations.
It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated,
had difficulty in complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform
these obligations. Proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse

integral element in the respondents personality structure that effectively

incapacitated him from complying with his essential marital obligations must be
shown. Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations
or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from incapacity rooted in some
debilitating psychological condition or illness; irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as
the same may only be due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.

CAMACHO-REYES V CAMACHO
FACTS:

Marital difficulties, which mostly is due to the respondents actions, caused the
petitioner to file a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with the
respondent alleging psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Traversing the petition, respondent denied petitioners allegations that he was

psychologically incapacitated. Respondent maintained that he was not remiss in
performing his obligations to his familyboth as a spouse to petitioner and father to
their children.

[Petitioner] presented several expert witnesses to show that [respondent] is

psychologically incapacitated. Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed [respondent]
as purportedly suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid Narcissistic and
Anti-Social Personality Disorder). Further, clinical psychologist Magno found
[respondent] to be suffering from an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic
and dependent features, while Dr. Villegas diagnosed [respondent] to be suffering
from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage between the parties null
and void on the ground of their psychological incapacity.

The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court reversed the
RTC decision and declared the parties marriage valid and subsisting. It held that the
petitioner failed to sufficiently establish the alleged psychological incapacity of her
husband, as well as of herself. It held:

In the case at bar, we hold that the court a quos findings regarding the
[respondents] alleged mixed personality disorder, his come and go attitude,
failed business ventures, inadequate/delayed financial support to his family, sexual
infidelity, insensitivity to [petitioners] feelings, irresponsibility, failure to consult
[petitioner] on his business pursuits, unfulfilled promises, failure to pay debts in
connection with his failed business activities, taking of drugs, etc. are not rooted on
some
debilitating
psychological
condition
but
on
serious
marital
difficulties/differences and mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. [Respondents] defects were not present at the inception
of marriage. They were even able to live in harmony in the first few years of their
marriage, which bore them two children xxx. In fact, [petitioner] admitted in her
Amended Petition that initially they lived comfortably and [respondent] would give
his salary in keeping with the tradition in most Filipino households, but the situation
changed when [respondent] resigned from the family-owned Aristocrat Restaurant
and thereafter, [respondent] failed in his business ventures. It appears, however,
that [respondent] has been gainfully employed with Marigold Corporation, Inc. since
1998, which fact was stipulated upon by the [petitioner].

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct when it rejected the
testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas.

RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court held:
Notwithstanding these telling assessments, the CA rejected, wholesale, the
testimonies of Doctors Magno and Villegas for being hearsay since they never
personally examined and interviewed the respondent.

We do not agree with the CA.

The lack of personal examination and interview of the respondent, or any other
person diagnosed with personality disorder, does not per se invalidate the
testimonies of the doctors. Neither do their findings automatically constitute
hearsay that would result in their exclusion as evidence.

For one, marriage, by its very definition, necessarily involves only two persons. The
totality of the behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage is
generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other. In this case, the experts
testified on their individual assessment of the present state of the parties marriage
from the perception of one of the parties, herein petitioner. Certainly, petitioner,
during their marriage, had occasion to interact with, and experience, respondents

pattern of behavior which she could then validly relay to the clinical psychologists
and the psychiatrist.

For another, the clinical psychologists and psychiatrists assessment were not
based solely on the narration or personal interview of the petitioner. Other
informants such as respondents own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law
(sister of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondents behavior
and interactions with them, spanning the period of time they knew him. These were
also used as the basis of the doctors assessments.

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, doctors can diagnose the psychological
make up of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A
person afflicted with a personality disorder will not necessarily have personal
knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that a personality disorder is
manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting only
in his bare denial of the doctors separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke
credence and cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

In sum, we find points of convergence & consistency in all three reports and the
respective testimonies of Doctors Magno, Dayan and Villegas, i.e.: (1) respondent
does have problems; and (2) these problems include chronic irresponsibility;
inability to recognize and work towards providing the needs of his family; several
failed business attempts; substance abuse; and a trail of unpaid money obligations.

It is true that a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists diagnoses that a person has

personality disorder is not automatically believed by the courts in cases of
declaration of nullity of marriages. Indeed, a clinical psychologists or psychiatrists
finding of a personality disorder does not exclude a finding that a marriage is valid
and subsisting, and not beset by one of the parties or both parties psychological
incapacity.

In the case at bar, however, even without the experts conclusions, the factual
antecedents (narrative of events) alleged in the petition and established during
trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

The respondents pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological

incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic
financial support; (2) extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business
attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6) inability to keep a job that is not
connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of estafa.

MALLILIN V JAMESOLAMIN
FACTS:
Robert and Luz were married in 1972. They begot three children. On 16 March 1994,
Robert filed a case for annulment of their marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Roberts petition was tried by the
family court (RTC) of CDO. Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their
marriage, Luz was suffering from psychological and mental incapacity and
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life and to comply with its essential
obligations and responsibilities. He alleged that such incapacity became even more
apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear manifestation of
immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and
inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
(In the meantime, Roberts petition with Metropolitan Tribunal and the National
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church was granted and their marriage
declared void) After the hearing, the family court granted the petition but the Court
of Appeals reversed family court and declared that there is no psychological
incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that there is no
psychological incapacity to warrant annulment of marriage.

DECISION: Court of Appeals is correct.

What is psychological incapacity within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family

Code of the Philippines?
Psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental not merely physical incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their
mutual obligations to live together; observe love, respect and fidelity; and render
help and support. There is hardly a doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.

What characterizes psychological incapacity to constitute grounds for annulment

of marriage?
a) gravity

c) incurability

b) juridical antecedence and

The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
only emerge after the marriage. It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

Guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to

71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by
evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given

great respect by our courts. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.

When can the evidence of psychological incapacity be considered as medically and

clinically indentified?
Based on the records, Robert failed to prove that Luzs disposition of not cleaning
the room, preparing their meal, washing the clothes, and propensity for dating and
receiving different male visitors, was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the
parameters of jurisprudence on psychological incapacity.The alleged failure of Luz to
assume her duties as a wife and as a mother, as well as her emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility and infidelity, cannot rise to the level of psychological incapacity
that justifies the nullification of the parties marriage. The Court has repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations, not
merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse.Indeed, to be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse
or be reluctant to perform ones duties is another. Psychological incapacity refers
only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Is sexual perversion or promiscuity of an errant spouse alone enough to constitute

psychological incapacity? When can sexual promiscuity be considered psychological
incapacity?
No. As correctly found by the CA, sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment
do not, by themselves, constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on
psychological incapacity. Robert argues that the series of sexual indiscretion of Luz
were external manifestations of the psychological defect that she was suffering
within her person, which could be considered as nymphomania or excessive sex
hunger. Other than his allegations, however, no other convincing evidence was
adduced to prove that these sexual indiscretions were considered as nymphomania,
and that it was grave, deeply rooted, and incurable within the term of psychological
incapacity embodied in Article 36. To stress, Roberts testimony alone is insufficient
to prove the existence of psychological incapacity. . respondents act of living an
adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder,
especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait already
existing at the inception of marriage. The petitioner must be able to establish that
the respondents unfaithfulness was a manifestation of a disordered personality,
which made her completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state.

(Please observed however the tenor of the underscored portion of the decision.
Roberts argument that nymphomania constitutes psychological incapacity might
have been considered had it been backed up with proper evidence.

What is the probative value of the decision of the National Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church?
the decision of the Metropolitan Tribunal is insufficient to prove the psychological
incapacity of Luz. Although it is true that in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina, the Court stated that interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts, still it is subject to the law on evidence. Thus: Since the
purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws
with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such
appellate tribunal. Ideally subject to our law on evidence what is decreed as
[canonically] invalid should be decreed civilly void x x x. Pertinently, Rule 132,
Section 34 of the Rules of Evidence provides: The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose of which the evidence is offered
must be specified. In this regard, the belated presentation of the decision of the
NAMT cannot be given value since it was not offered during the trial, and the Court
has in no way of ascertaining the evidence considered by the same tribunal.

ABLAZA V REPUBLIC
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC Cataingan, Masbate a petition for
the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26,
1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on
January 9, 1950. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who
had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired
by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and
that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage
between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano,
due to the marriage being void ab initio.

The RTC dismissed the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of
time (action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage.

The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the
beginning does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action
must be filed by the proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the
parties to the marriage. xxxx

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party
to file the subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be
prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said case.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest in the action to seek the
declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the
regime of the old Civil Code

HELD: YES
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and
to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation.
The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a
marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot
be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. Thus, a Civil Code
marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by
the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein
of Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on
March 15, 2003.

Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between
marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of
the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered
by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced
after March 15, 2003.

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity
of a marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-1110-SC; and

2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15,
2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at
the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the
parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of
nullity of the marriage under AM 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the
petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog, the
children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the
declaration of the nullity of their fathers marriage to their stepmother contracted
on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court
distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and
when each might be impugned, thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage. Under ordinary circumstances, the
effect of a void marriage.......is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And
therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any
proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or
collateral. xxx
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of
either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article
40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a
second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of
either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then
the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes......the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the
same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

However, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the
absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still
be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the

avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Thus, only the
party who can demonstrate a proper interest can file the action. Interest within
the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be
affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresencianos brother and
surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then
he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not
a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article
1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers
and sisters or their children to the other half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a

surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.

Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a
prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or
children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late
Cresencianos surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial
court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late
Cresencianos surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification
of her own marriage. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined
herein. We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in Heirs of
Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses
Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the
legal owners of the property involved therein. As a defendant in that action, the
petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs,
Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano.
As such, Leila was another indispensable party whose substantial right any
judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should likewise implead
Leila.

WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its records are returned to RTC Masbate, for
further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his
initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza
Jasul as parties-defendants.