Statutory Construction 1

Cases 2

LIDASAN v. COMELEC
G.R. No. L-28089

Ruling: The baneful effect of the defective title here

presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not
inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the
law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that
part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur;
it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces
were actually affected by the bill. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic
Act 4790. Republic Act 4790 was declared null and void, and
prohibited respondent Commission from implementing the
same for electoral purposes.

October 25, 1967

ARROYO v. DE VENECIA
BARA
LIDASAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS, respondent in relation to Art VI Section 12 (1) of
the Philippine Constitution No bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.

Facts: On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law
House Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, which is entitled
"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province
of Lanao del Sur", It came to light later that barrios Togaig and
Madalum just mentioned are within the municipality
of Buldon,Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,
Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province
of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.

Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its

resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which
are for purposes of establishment of precincts, registration of
voters and for other election purposes, the Commission
RESOLVED pursuant to RA 4790.

This triggered the present original action for certiorari and

prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter
for the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be
declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of
August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the
same for electoral purposes, be nullified.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 4790, which is entitled

"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province
of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in
another province, Cotabato, be considered null and void for a
violation of The Constitution.

G.R. No. 127255

August 14, 1997

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R.

OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B.
ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents in relation to Article VI
Section 16 (3) Each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend
or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition

challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which
amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific
taxes) on the manufacture and sale of beer and cigarettes.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No.

7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September
12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the
Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third
reading on November 17, 1996. The bicameral conference
committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., Rep. Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to
the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the
Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his
motion was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of
the sponsor thereafter proceeded. What happened thereafter
is shown in the following transcript of the session on
November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as
published by Congress in the newspaper issues of December 5
and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now

approved and ratify the conference committee
report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to
the motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none,
approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I
stood up. I want to know what is the question that
the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President of the Senate and
certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress as having been finally passed by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996.
The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V.
Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the

conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question.
Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and
void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the
House; that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate"
in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of
its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the
House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They
contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the
law was properly passed is false and spurious.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House.

Ruling: The Court has jurisdiction over the petition at bar

and that issues posed by petitioner are justiciable.
Nonetheless, there is no grave abuse of discretion committed
by the public respondents to justify granting said petition. The
petition merely involves the complaint that petitioner was
prevented from raising the question of quorum. The petition
does not concern violation of any rule mandated by the
Constitution. Nor does it involve the right of a non-member of
the House which requires constitutional protection. The rules
on how to question the existence of a quorum are procedural
in character. They are malleable by nature for they were
drafted to help the House enact laws. As well stated, these
rules are servants, not masters of the House. Their
observance or non-observance is a matter of judgment call on
the part of our legislators and it is not the business of the
Court to reverse this judgment when untainted by grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view
is that they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with
their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but
only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the
House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no
more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House
than members of that House have to look over our shoulders,
as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

TOLENTINO v. THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of
Rule VIII, Sec. 35 and Rule XVII, Sec. 103 of the rules of the
House, the Chair, in submitting the conference committee
report to the House, did not call for the yeas or nays, but
simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum;
(2) in violation of Rule XIX, Sec. 112, the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr.
Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve
or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, Sec. 97, the Chair refused
to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep.
Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved;
and (4) in violation of Rule XX, Sec. 121-122, Rule XXI, Sec.
123, and Rule XVIII, Sec. 109, the Chair suspended the session
without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is
alleged, is a point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued
that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the
resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because
the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment
remained upon the resumption of the session.

G.R. No. 115455

October 30, 1995

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF

FINANCE
and
THE
COMMISSIONER
OF
INTERNAL
REVENUE, respondents in relation to Article VI Section 24 of
the Constitution, All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.

Facts: Some of the petitioners (Tolentino, Kilosbayan, Inc.,

Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims
made by them that R.A. No. 7716 entitled AN ACT
RESTRUCTING THE VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,

WIDENING
ITS
TAX
BASE
AND
ENHANCING
ITS
ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING AND
REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" did not "originate exclusively" in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed
in the House of Representatives where it passed three
readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where
after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and
Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass
it on second and third readings. Instead what the Senate did
was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it approved on
May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate
committee should have done was to amend H. No. 11197 by
striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text
of S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House
bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the
text) of the House bill."

Issue: Whether or not R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional by

virtue of its origin.

Ruling: S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197.

Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that S. No. 1630 is
an independent and distinct bill. R.A. No. 7716 originated both
in the House and in the Senate and that it is the product of
two "half-baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No.
1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."

While Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or

tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively
in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate
may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of
this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a
substitute measure.

MANABAG v. LOPEZ VITO

also binds the judges under the 'enrolled bill rule' out of
respect to the political departments."

Facts: This is a petition for prohibition to prevent the

enforcement of a congressional resolution designated
"Resolution of both houses proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
ordinance thereto."

For this purpose it suffices to say that three of the plaintiff

senators and eight of the plaintiff representatives had been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Commission on Elections
as having been elected senators and representatives in the
elections held on April 23, 1946. The three senators were
suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first
session of Congress following the elections, on account of
alleged
irregularities
in
their
election.
The
eight
representatives since their election had not been allowed to
sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of
the Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been
formally suspended. A resolution for their suspension had
been introduced in the House of Representatives, but that
resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House
when the present petition was filed.

As a consequence these three senators and eight

representatives did not take part in the passage of the
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned
within the computation of the necessary three-fourths vote
which is required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If these members of Congress had been counted,
the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment
would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in
either branch of Congress. The respondents deny that this
Court has jurisdiction, relying on the conclusiveness on the
courts of an enrolled bill or resolution. There is some merit in
the petitioners' contention that this is confusing jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not the Courts have jurisdiction over this

question or are they bound under the enrolled bill rule.

G.R. No. L-1123

March 5, 1947

ALEJO MABANAG, ET AL., petitioners, vs JOSE LOPEZ VITO, ET

AL., respondents in relation to Art XVII Section 1 of the
Philippine Constitution Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its
Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.;
And,
the majority enunciates the proposition that "political
questions are not within the province of the judiciary," except
"by express constitutional or statutory provision" to the
contrary. Then argues that "a duly certified law or resolution

Ruling: This petition is dismissed without costs. It will be seen

upon examination of section 313 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, that, roughly, it
provides two methods of proving legislative proceedings: (1)
by the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by
copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their
order; and (2) in case of acts of the Legislature, by a copy
signed by the presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of
the due enactment thereof.

The Court holds the copy conclusive proof of the due

enactment of the law. The Court expressly stated that it
"passed over the question" of whether the enrolled bill was
conclusive as to its contents and the mode of its passage.

Even if both the journals and an authenticated copy of the Act

had been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on
the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment
of a law may be proved in either of the two ways specified in
section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. This Court found in
the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law
and did not bother itself with considering the effects of an
authenticated copy if one had been introduced. It did not do
what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in
order to determine the correctness of the latter, and rule such
copy out if the two, the journals and the copy, be found in
conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been
noted between the two documents and the court did not say
or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy existed it
would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding the
explicit provision that duly certified copies "shall be conclusive
proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment
thereof."

therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating

P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase
of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin
fee therefor.

Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum
of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last
importation of these products, petitioner made a similar
request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee
therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding
margin fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the
Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said
vouchers, upon the ground that the exemption granted by the
Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of urea
and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of
section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal
taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently
affirmed said action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this
petition for review.

CASCO v. GIMENEZ
G.R. No. L-17931
February 28, 1963

CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, vs.HON.

PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the
Philippines, and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as
Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents in relation to
Republic Act No. 2609 Section 2, par. XVIII. The margin
established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision
of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of
foreign exchange for the importation of the following:Urea
formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard
when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users.

Facts: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor

General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco
Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.

The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of

Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines
issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To
supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a
memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said
Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and
December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and
hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main
raw materials in the production of said glues and paid

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner, Casco Philippine

Chemical Co. Incs separate importations of urea and
formaldehyde still is in accord with the provisions of Section to
par XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609 and are still entitled to the
25% marginal fee refund sum of P6,345.72.

Ruling: The decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with

costs against the petitioner. It should be noted that, whereas
"urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in
the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, "urea formaldehyde"
is a finished product, which is patently distinct and different
from urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in
the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea
formaldehyde".

Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in

Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between
the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members
of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde"
separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the
synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the
latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the
statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members
thereof. Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill
which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of
the bill on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing
the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of
the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

MORALES v. SUBIDO
G.R. No. L-29658
November 29, 1968

ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner, vs. ABELARDO SUBIDO, as

Commissioner of Civil Service, respondent in relation to the
provisions of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act
4864): Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency. No person may be appointed chief of a city
police agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning and has served either in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau of
Investigation, or has served as chief of police with exemplary
record, or has served in the police department of any city with
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years; or any high school graduate who has served as officer
in the Armed Forces for at least eight years with the rank of
captain and/or higher.

Facts: The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the

detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds
the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as
patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968,
the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of Manila
and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the
same position by the mayor of Manila.

On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil

Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the
petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet
the minimum educational and civil service eligibility
requirements for the said position."

He contended that his service alone as captain for more than

three years in the Manila Police Department qualified him for
appointment. The demand was contained in a letter which he
wrote to the respondent on October 8, 1968. The mayor
endorsed the letter favorably, but the respondent refused to
reconsider his stand. Hence this petition for mandamus to
compel the respondent to include the petitioner in a list of
"five next ranking eligible and qualified persons."

Issue: Whether or not, within the meaning and intendment of

the law, in addition to service qualification, one should have
educational qualification as shown by the possession of a
bachelor's degree.

Ruling: The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to

(the meaning of which is not in issue in this case), section 10
of the Act needs no interpretation because its meaning is
clear. That the purpose is to require both educational and
service qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of
police is evidence from a reading of the original provision of
House Bill 6951 and the successive revision it underwent.
Thus, section 12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the
Police Act of 1966) read:

Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a Police

Agency. No chief of a police agency of a province or
chartered city shall be appointed unless he is a member of the
Philippine Bar, or a holder of a bachelor's degree in police
administration. Any holder of a bachelor's degree who served
either in the Philippine Constabulary or the police department
of any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second class,
or its equivalent for at least three years shall be eligible for
appointment to the position of chief of the police agency.
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as
requiring both educational and service qualifications.

In conclusion, under the present state of the law, the

petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as
chief of police of the city of Manila. Consequently, the
respondent has no corresponding legal duty and therefore
may not be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner
as qualified and eligible.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No
pronouncements as to costs.

ASTROGA v. VILLEGAS
G.R. No. L-23475
April 30, 1974

Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view

still we do not see how the requirement of a college degree as
additional qualification can run counter to the avowed policy
of the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the
requirement of such additional qualification will best carry out
that policy. The fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its
assumption that the choice is between one who has served
long and loyally in a city police agency and another who, not
having so served, has only a bachelor's degree. But that is not
the issue in this case.

HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of

Manila, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as
Mayor of Manila respondent in relation to the passage of
House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An Act
Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of
the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Sections
Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Nine,
as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila."

Facts: On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local
application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was
there passed on third reading without amendments on April
21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas.

When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on

second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to
Section 1 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas, that instead of
the City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the
Municipal Board who should succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of
the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor, does not appear in the
journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted upon.

On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to

the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had
been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with
amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the
amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator
Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones
actually approved by the Senate. The House of
Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill
No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to
be printed. The printed copies were then certified and
attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the
Senate and the Senate President.

On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four

printed copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines,
who affixed his signatures thereto by way of approval on June
18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.

The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public
denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew
immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5,
1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of
House Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the
Philippines was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by
the Senate because it did not embody the amendments
introduced by him and approved on the Senate floor. As a
consequence the Senate President, through the Secretary of
the Senate, addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the
President of the Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy
of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the secretaries of both
Houses as well as by the presiding officers thereof was not the
bill duly approved by Congress and that he considered his
signature on the enrolled bill as invalid and of no effect. A
subsequent letter dated July 21, 1964 made the further
clarification that the invalidation by the Senate President of
his signature meant that the bill on which his signature
appeared had never been approved by the Senate and
therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary had
signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.

On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a

message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress
informing them that in view of the circumstances he was
officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266
(which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3),
adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy
to convert into law what was not actually approved by the two
Houses of Congress."

Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio

Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs
of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to
the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of Republic Act
4065.

Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then

Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this
Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the
Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the
Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the
members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions
of Republic Act 4065.

Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not

mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the
Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but
would not affect the validity of the statute. Hence, it is pointed
out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and binding.

It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of

the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the
validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther.
Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and
consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what
evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had
been duly enacted? In such a case the entries in the journal
should be consulted.

Issue: Whether or not Vice Mayor Astrogas petition for

Mandamus to compel respondents to comply to the provisions
of Republic Act 4065, valid on the grounds that Republic Act
4065 is still in force.

Ruling: This Court is not asked to incorporate such

amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky

undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both
the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the
manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the
President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become
law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about
mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making
body.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied

and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 is declared not to
have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is
hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

TANADA v. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915
April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and

MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN
C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the
President in relation to SEC. 6. Article IV of the Philippine
Constitution The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the
citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
And Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines Laws shall
take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of

public concern, as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have

this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant
petition. Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since
the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they

need not show any specific interest for their petition to be

given due course.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official

Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of
laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the
presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the
Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The
point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code.

Issue: Whether or not the clause unless otherwise provided

in Article 2 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, refers to the
publication or to the date in which the laws shall be published.

Ruling: The Court therefore declares that presidential

issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect.
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this
Court's construction of said article. In a long line of
decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself
does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity,
which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into
effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only
insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of
publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily
reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object here is to give the general public adequate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
"ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.

US v. PONS
G.R. No. L-11530
August 12, 1916

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN

PONS, defendant-appellant in relation to

Facts: That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, Juan Pons,
Gabino Beliso, Jacinto lasarte, conspiring together and plotting
among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to
wit, that of Spain, on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez, and
import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing
125 kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine
currency; and that, then and there, the said accused, also
conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did
receive and conceal the said quantity of opium and aided
each other in the transportation, receipt and concealment of
the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing
that said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and
illegally introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign
country; an act committed in violation of law."

On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried

separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each
were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced
accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the
period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same
penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was
sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later
withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become
final.

In Pons motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered

to prove that the last day of the special session of the
Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February;
that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if
found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of
February but on March 1 of that year; and that, therefore, the
same is null and void.

The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is

admitted that the last day of the special session was, under
the Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that
the appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of
Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of
the Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely,
(1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative
journals or extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can
take judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be
considered in the reversed order.

Issue: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of

the Journals to determine if Act No. 2381 was indeed made a
law in February 28, 1914.

Ruling: While there are no adjudicated cases in this

jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts may
take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled
in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the
courts in determining the question whether a particular bill
became a law or not. These journals are not ambiguous or
contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They
show, with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned
sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February 28, 1914.

Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381),
published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the
date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts
may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are
clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this
investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science
which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the
one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we
have indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but
on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be
established by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand,
it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are
conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment.