Poli Law Digests Compiled 2012-2015 by Dean Candelaria PDF

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS
BAR OPS PILIPINAS

2016
POLITICAL
LAW
Prepared by: Dean Sedfrey Candelaria and
students of Ateneo de Manila University
Political Law Digests

May 2012- May 2015
Navia v. Pardico ............................................................................................................................. .............. 2
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation v. Senate Of The Republic Of The Philippines ..................................... 3
Pimentel, Jr. v. Ochoa ............................................................................................................................. ..... 4
Jaloslos v. Comelec ............................................................................................................................. ......... 5
Gonzales v. Ochoa ....................................................................................................................................... 6
Funa v. Agra............................................................................................................................. .................... 7
Atong Paglaum v. Comelec ........................................................................................................................ . 8
Alliance For Nationalism And Democracy v. Commission On Elections................................................. 10
Abang Lingkod Party-List (Abang Lingkod) v. Commission On Elections.............................................. 12
Belgica v. Ochoa ....................................................................................................... ................................. 13
Disini v. Secretary Of Justice.................................................................................................................... . 16
Imbong v. Ochoa ............................................................................................................................. ........... 18
Go v. Republic ........................................................................................................................................... 20
Jardeleza v. Sereno............................................................................................................................. ........ 22
Gma Network v. Comelec......................................................................................................................... . 24
Vivares v. St. Theresas College et al. ....................................................................................................... 25
Ejercito v. Comelec ............................................................................................................................. ....... 27
Goh v. Bayron ............................................................................................................................. ............... 29
Cerafica v. Comelec ................................................................................................................................... 30
The Diocese Of Bacolod v. Comelec ......................................................................................................... 31
Risos-Vidal v. Comelec ............................................................................................................................ . 33
Araullo v. Aquino ...................................................................................................................................... 35
Cudia v. PMA ............................................................................................................................. ............... 37
Bishop Broderick Pabillo v. Comelec ........................................................................................................ 39
Resident Marine Mammals Of The Protected Seascape Taon Strait v. Reyes (DOE) ............................ 41
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PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016
NAVIA V. PARDICO
[GR. No. 184467; June 19, 2012]
Facts:
A vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the house of Lolita M.
Lapore (Lolita)
The arrival of the vehicle awakened Lolitas son, Enrique Lapore (Bong), and Benhur Pardico
(Ben), who were then both staying in her house.
When Lolita went out to investigate, she saw two uniformed guards disembarking from the
vehicle.
One of them immediately asked Lolita where they could find her son Bong.
Before Lolita could answer, the guard saw Bong and told him that he and Ben should go with them to
the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and
lamps in the subdivision.
Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian
Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision.
The Lapores and the side of Navia had different versions of what transpired after Bong and Ben were
taken to the security department.
o However, Ben disappeared and they did not know where he was.
o Thus, Virginia, Bens wife, filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of
Malolos City.
The amparo court issued an Order directing the issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of the
body of Ben before it.
Issue/s: WON the Court erred in ruling that the Pardicos are entitled to the privilege of the writ of
amparo?
Held: Virginia Pardicos Writ of Amparo is defective and must be dismissed. Bens disappreance does not
fall within the ambit of Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. It is clear that for the protective writ of amparo
to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are missing are not enough. It must be shown
and proved by substantial evidence that the disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the
same or give information on the fate or whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing
them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo
case has the burden of proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
In an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is essential to establish that
such disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization, support or acquiescence of the
government. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. Under
Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of amparo may lie against a private individual or entity. But even if
the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in an amparo petition is a private individual
or entity, still, government involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element. Here,
petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their
principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and
nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or
governmental operation.
PHILCOMSAT HOLDINGS CORPORATION V. SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
[GR. No. 180308; June 19, 2012]
Facts:
The Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT) is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), a government- sequestered
organization in which the Republic of the Philippines holds a 35% interest in shares of stocks.
For the period from 1986 to 1996, the government, through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), regularly received cash dividends from POTC.
Page | 2
o In 1998, however, POTC suffered its first loss.

o
Similarly, in 2004, PHC sustained a P7-million loss attributable to its huge operating expenses. By
2005, PHCs operating expenses had ballooned tremendously.
o
Likewise, several PHC board members established Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), a
wholly-owned PHC subsidiary to which PHC funds had been allegedly advanced without the appropriate
accountability reports given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT.
In view of the losses that the government continued to incur and in order to protect its interests in
POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, during the Second Regular Session of
the Congress, introduced Proposed Senate Resolution (PSR) No. 455 directing the conduct of an inquiry,
in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC and the
mismanagement committed by their respective board of directors.
Respondents, Senate Committees, submitted the assailed Committee Report No. 312, where it
noted the need to examine the role of the PCGG in the management of POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC.
After due proceedings, the respondents Senate Committees found overwhelming mismanagement by
the PCGG and its nominees over POTC, PHILCOMSAT and PHC, and that PCGG was negligent in
performing its mandate to preserve the government's interests in the said corporations.
Committee Report No. 312 recommended the privatization and transfer of the jurisdiction over the
shares of the government in POTC and PHILCOMSAT to the Privatization Management Office (PMO)
under the Department of Finance (DOF) and the replacement of government nominees as directors of
POTC and PHILCOMSAT.
Issue/s:
WON Committee Resolution No. 312 should be nullified, having proposed no piece of legislation and
having been hastily approved by the respondent Senate?
Held: Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution provides the Senate or the House of Representatives power
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The respondents Senate Committees power of inquiry relative to
PSR No. 455 has been passed upon and upheld in the consolidated cases of In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Camilo L. Sabio, which cited Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution. The Court
explained that such conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of Congress, in
this case the respondents Senate Committees, must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its
effective discharge. The Senate Committees cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it submitted Committee Resolution No.
312, given its constitutional mandate to conduct legislative inquiries. Nor can the respondent Senate be
faulted for doing so on the very same day that the assailed resolution was submitted. The wide latitude given
to Congress with respect to these legislative inquiries has long been settled.
PIMENTEL, JR. V. OCHOA
[GR. No. 195770; July 17, 2012]
Facts:
In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of the poor as target
beneficiaries.
It was pre-pilot tested in various municipalities upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos
under a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget and Management.
After an assessment on the appropriate assistance package, a household beneficiary could receive
from the government an annual subsidy for its basic needs up to an amount of P15,000.00.
Under A.O. No. 16, s. 2008, the DSWD also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network
among the Department of Education (DepEd), Department of Health (DOH), Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG), the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and the local government
units (LGUs), identifying specific roles an d functions in order to ensure effective and efficient
implementation of the CCTP, the government intervention scheme.
Issue/s: WON the P21 billion CCTP budget allocation under the DSWD in the GAA violates Art. II, Sec.
25 and Art. X, Sec. 3 of the LGC by providing for the recentralization of the national government in the
delivery of basic services already devolved to the LGUs.
Page | 3
Held: LGUs are charged to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon
them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective
jurisdictions, the provision of the law also provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationallyfunded projects, facilities, programs and services. The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no
power over a program for which funding has ben provided by the national government under the annual
general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction
of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic
facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The
national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented
locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.
JALOSLOS V. COMELEC
[GR. No. 192474; June 26, 2012]
Facts:
In May 2007, Romeo Jalosjos, Jr. ran for Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won.
While serving as Tampilisan Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans
Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same.
o In September 2008 he began occupying the house.
After eight months or on May 6, 2009, Jalosjos applied with the Election Registration Board
(ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his voters registration record to Precinct
0051F of Barangay Veterans Village.
Dan Erasmo, Sr., respondent, opposed the application.
After due proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos application and denied Erasmos opposition.
Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of registered voters of Precinct 0051F
before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Ipil.
After hearing, the MCTC rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos from the list of registered voters.
The CA reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Villages voters list pending the resolution of the petition.
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections.
This prompted Erasmo to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the
COMELEC claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he indicated in
it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
While Erasmos motion for reconsideration was pending before the COMELEC En Banc, the
May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in Jalosjos winning the elections for Representative of the
Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
Issue/s:
WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of Jalosjos residency qualification for
running for the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he
has been proclaimed winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.
Held: While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting
elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests
the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC
of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its jurisdiction
in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second District of Zamboanga
Page | 4
Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case. The Court
cannot usurp the power vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.
GONZALES V. OCHOA
[GR. No. 196231/196232; September 4, 2012]
Facts:
The case is a consolidation of two cases involving the same issue.
The first case involves the dismissal of Gonzales as Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other
Law Enforcement Offices upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust.
o
On August 2010, former Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza attempted to secure his
reinstatement by taking hostage a bus filled with foreign nationals.
o
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct was filed against Mendoza et al. The Ombudsman ruled guilty
against Mendoza.
o
A motion for reconsideration was filed, which was held by Gonzales for 9 months (longer than the
allowable time to decide upon the MR of 5 days as per Ombudsman Act).
o
Gonzales was charged with Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct due to such inaction.
The second case involves the dismissal of Barreras-Sulit as Special Prosecutor upon a finding of guilt
for culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
o On December 2003, two brothers were caught in the US smuggling $100,000 from
Manila.
o
Upon investigation, it was found that the money was amassed wealth through military corruption by
the boys father, Retired Major General Carlos F. Garcia.
o
A formal charge for Plunder and Money Laundering was filed against Garcia and his family.
o
Barreras-Sulit initiated a backdoor plea-bargaining deal in favor of Garcia, such acts being
tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust
Issue: WON the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over
a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman?
Held: YES, Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove. As a
general rule, therefore, all officers appointed by the President are also removable by him. Such was expressly
stipulated by the Congress in the Ombudsman Act in order to fill a gap in the law.
In terms of the Ombudsman being an independent body, what is afforded to them is political independence
in terms of office, salary, and appointments among others thus the President may exercise its power of
removal on other aspects. The President may only exercise such authority provided it is within the two
restrictions: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the
grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due
process. Both of which were satisfied in the case.
FUNA V. AGRA
[GR. No. 191644; February 19, 2013]
Facts:
Funa alleges that on March 1, 2010, Pres. Arroyo appointed Agra as acting DOJ Secretary after
Secretary Devanadera resigned in order to run for Congress.
Funa also alleges that on March 5, 2010, Pres. Arroyo designated Agra as acting Solicitor General
Agra states that on January 12, 2010, when he was the Government Corporate Counsel, Pres.
Arroyo designated him as acting Solicitor General and on March 5, 2010, he was appointed as acting DOJ
Secretary
Page | 5

The Court, in appreciating the facts, stated that despite the conflicting statements of Funa and Agra,
Agra has already admitted holding two offices concurrently in acting capacities, and this is sufficient for the
Court to resolve the constitutional question raised in the case at bar
Issue: Whether or not Agras concurrent appointments or designations is unconstitutional for falling
under the prohibition under Section 1 3, Article VII of the 1 987 Constitution?
Held:
In ruling against the constitutionality of the assailed appointments, the Court primarily anchored
on the provisions of Section 13, Article VII of the 1 987 Constitution which expressly prohibits the
President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants from holding any other
office or employment during their tenure unless otherwise provided in the Constitution.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition
on the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to
holding multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this
prohibition must be read with equal severity.
It was of no moment that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. In the language of
Section 13, the Constitution makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The
prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary.
The Court ruled that being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General, Agra was undoubtedly covered by the prohibition laid in Section 13, Article VII of
the Constitution.
Neither does the concurrent appointments fall under the two exceptions against the holding of
multiple offices namely, express Constitutional provision allowing the holding of multiple offices and
occupying posts in ex-officio capacities.
The Court, however, clarified that notwithstanding the main ruling in this case, Agra is
considered a de facto officer. Therefore, all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting Secretary of
Justice were presumed valid, binding and effective as if he was the officer legally appointed and qualified for
the office. This clarification is deemed necessary in order to protect the sanctity of the dealings by the public
with persons whose ostensible authority emanates from the State.
ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC

[GR. No. 203766; April 2, 2013]
Facts:
These cases constitute 54 petitions filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the
Resolutions issued by the COMELEC disqualifying them from participating in the May 2013 party-list
elections.
The disqualification of the party-list groups was either due to denial of their new petitions for
registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as
party-list organizations
The party-list groups and organizations basically want the COMELEC to allow them to
participate in the party-list elections contending that they are qualified to be registered and recognized
as a party-list group/organization.
Issue/s:
1)
Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani
and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49
(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the May 2013 party-list elections?
2)
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying the party-list groups from participating in the May 2013 party-list elections?
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Held:
1) NO. The criteria laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT should not be applied by the COMELEC
anymore. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list
elections, abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1 987 Constitution
and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.
The Court, in its ruling, elaborated on the intent of the framers of the Constitution regarding party-list and
sectoral representation in the Congress. It was concluded that the framers of the
1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also
non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of
the party-list system. Therefore, the party-list system must not be strictly composed of sectors enumerated
under the Constitution, but rather, other groups, as long as not disqualified under the law, may be allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
2) NO. The Court said that it cannot fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in
disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed
grave abuse of discretion. However, for the May 2013 party-list elections, the Court imposes and mandates
the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 (Party-List System Act ).
The Court stated that in determining who may participate in the May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major
or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only
through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by
itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"welldefined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of
advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations
must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[G.R. No. 206987; September 10, 2013]
Facts:
The COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of ANADs Certificate of Registration and/or
Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the 2013 Elections.
Page | 7

The COMELEC held that while ANAD can be classified as a sectoral party lacking in welldefined political constituencies, it must be disqualified due to the following:
o
Violation of election laws and regulations, particularly for its failure to submit at least five nominees;
and
o
Failure to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 Elections as required
by Section 14 of RA No. 71661.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution without
a benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing mandated by the due process clause
2.) Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioner submitted only
three nominees and that it failed to submit its Statement of Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007
Elections
Held:
1.) NO. ABAD was already afforded a summary hearing on August 23, 2013, during which ANADs
president authenticated documents and answered questions from the members of the COMELEC pertinent to
ANADs qualifications. In re-evaluating ANADs qualifications in accordance with the parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC, the COMELEC need not have called another summary
hearing. It already readily resort to documents and other pieces of evidence previously submitted by
petitioners in re-appraising ANADs qualifications. After all, it can be presumed that the qualifications, or
lack thereof, which were established during the August
23, 2012 hearing continued until election day and even thereafter.
2.) NO. COMELEC is a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country,
its factual findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on matters falling within its competence
shall not be interfered with by the Court in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any
jurisdictional infirmity or error of law. Factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the
courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support of such
findings. Such rule should be applied with greater force when it concerns the COMELEC as the framers of
the Constitution intended to place it on a level higher than statutory administrative organs.
_____________________________________
1
An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing
Appropriations therefor, and for Other Purposes; November 26, 1991
Page | 8
a.
ANAD submitted only three nominees in violation of Sec. 8 of RA No. 79412. Such finding was
based on the Certificate of Nomination presented and marked by ANAD during the summary hearings.
Compliance of the said law is essential. A party-list organization does not have the prerogative to substitute
and replace its nominees, or even to switch the order of the nominees, after submission of the list to
COMELEC.
b. ANAD failed to comply with COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 which requires the submission of
a proper Statement of Contributions and Expenditures. The exhibits submitted by ANAD consisted
mainly of a list of total contributions from other persons, a list of official receipts and amounts without
corresponding receipts, and a list of expenditures based on order slips and donations without distinction
as to whether the amounts listed were advanced subject to reimbursement or donated.
___________________________
2
Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the Commission not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than
five (5), from
which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes.
Page | 9
ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD) V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

[G.R. No. 206952; October 22, 2013]
Facts:
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of peasant farmers and
fisher folks, and was registered under the party-list system on December 22, 2009.
o
It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the number of votes needed for a seat in
the House of Representatives.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc cancelled ABANG LINGKODs registration as a
party-list group.
The COMELEC pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD: failed to establish its track record in
uplifting the cause of marginalized and underrepresented and failed to show that its nominees are themselves
marginalized and underrepresented or that they have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight
of the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
Issues:
1.) Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of
ABANG LINGKODs registration sans a summary evidentiary hearing for that purpose
2.) Whether or not there was no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering
that it complied with the six-point parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in Atong
Paglaum
Held:
1) NO. Court finds that the COMELEC had afforded ABANG LINGKOD sufficient opportunity to
present evidence establishing its qualification as a party-list group. ABANG LINGKOD was able to file its
Manifestation of Intent and other pertinent documents to prove its continuing compliance with the
requirements under R.A. No. 7941, which the COMELEC set for summary hearing on three separate dates
belies its claim that it was denied due process. Atong Paglaum did not require the COMELEC to conduct a
hearing de novo in reassessing the qualifications of said party-list groups. The Court only gave the
COMELEC the option to conduct further summary evidentiary hearing should it deem appropriate to do so.
2) YES. The flaw in COMELECs disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups to
present evidence showing that they have a track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. As a requirement imposed by Ang Bagong Bayani for groups intending to participate in the
party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual activities undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of
the sector/s, which they represent. The track record requirement was only imposed where the Court held that
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations seeking registration under the party-list system
must prove through their track record that they truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
Sectoral parties or organizations are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track record. It is
enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. It is sufficient
that the ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the sector/s, which
they represent.
BELGICA V. OCHOA
[G.R. No. 208566; November 19, 2013]
Facts:
Several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) for being unconstitutional. Petition was dismissed for lack of pertinent evidence.
The NBI began its probe into allegations that the govt has been defrauded of some P10B over the past
10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various govt agencies.
COA released results of a 3-year audit investigation to determine the propriety of funds under
PDAF and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VLP). The pertinent findings are the ff:
o Amounts released to legislators significantly exceed their respective allocations
o Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members
Page | 10
o
Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots which have yet to be turned over to the govt
o
Implementation of projects was not undertaken by implementing agencies themselves, but by
NGOs endorsed by legislators
o Selection of NGOs were not compliant with law
As for the Presidential Pork Barrel, whistle blowers allege that P900M of the gas project from
Palawan went into a dummy NGO.
Several petitions declaring the PDAF unconstitutional were filed.
Issues:
1. W/N the 2013 PDAF Article violate the principles of:
a. Separation of powers
b. Non-delegability of legislative power c. Checks and balances
d. Accountability
e. Political Dynasties f. Local Autonomy
2. W/N the phrases (a) and for such other pruposes as may be hereafter directed by the President relating to
the Malampaya Funds, and (b) to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to
finance restoration of damanged facilities as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegation of legislative power
Held:
1. PDAF
a. Separation of Powers
Yes. Legislators are given project identification powers wherein they can identify PDAF projects for
as long as the project falls under a general program listed in the program menu. They are also given
powers of fund release and fund realignment. These post-enactment measures are not related to
functions of congressional oversight and hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the Executive branch. From the moment the law becomes
effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
Yes. The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to
individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since they are allowed to
individually exercise the power of appropriation which is lodged in Congress. The power to
appropriate must be exercised only through legislation (Sec. 29, Art. VI). They are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they
determine.
c. Checks and Balances
Yes. A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the Presidents veto power
(Sec. 27, Art. VI). For him to exercise his item-veto power, it is necessary that there exists a proper
item w/c may be object of the veto. It is concluded that an appropriation bill must contain
specific appropriations of money and not only general provisions w/c provide for parameters
of appropriation. Appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence
meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose (line-item).
d. Accountability
Yes. Insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and
other forms of Congressional Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional. Allowing
the legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation a matter before another
office of the government renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
However, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislators use thereof may be linked to this
area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based
on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Page | 11
e. Political Dynasties
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is not self-executing due to the qualifying phrase as
may be defined by law. It does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional
right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
f. Local Autonomy
Yes. The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office,
without taking into account the specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based on genuine
parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into
consideration. Moreover, it runs in conflict with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils which are already mandated to assist in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.
2. Presidential Pork Barrel
a. Approriation
No. An appropriation law may be detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be for as long as the
intent to appropriate may be gleaned from the same (Philconsa). The Court cannot sustain the
argument that the appropriation must be the primary and specific purpose of the law in order for a
valid appropriation law to exist. If a legal provision designates a determinate amount of money and
allocates the same for a particular purpose, then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent
and sufficient to satisfy the Constitutional requirement.
b. Undue Delegation
Yes. The appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law
delegates rule-making authority to the Executive either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details or
(b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation. The completeness test and the sufficient
standard test must be employed.
Sec. 8 of PD 910 constitutions an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down
a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the Presidents authority w/ respect to
the purpose for w/c the Malampaya Funds may be used. As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court
takes judicial notice that Sec. 12 of PD 1869 has already been amended by PD
1993 w/c thus moots the petitioners submissions.
DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

[GR. No. 203335; February 18, 2014]
Facts:
Consolidated petition questioning the constitutionality of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012
Petitioners argue that 21 sections of the Act violate their constitutional rights
o Particularly, freedom of expression and access to information
Issue/s:
WON the sections of the Cybercime Prevention Act of 2012 is constitutional
Held: The court held that Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 are unconstitutional.
Section 4(c)(3) prohibits transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications (or SPAM).
Though spam is commercial speech (not afforded the same protection as other forms of expression), it is
Page | 12
nonetheless entitled to protection. Prohibition of unsolicited communication would deny a person the
right to read his emails, even unsolicited ones adressed to him.
Section 12 authorizes law enforcement without a court warrant to collect or record traffic data in real- time
associated with specified communications transmitted by means of a computer system. Traffic data
includes origin, destination, route, size, date, and duration of the communication, but not its content nor the
identity of users. As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized that the
right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion. In determining whether a
communication is entitled to the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person
claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the communication, and (2) whether his
expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society.
Internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of privacy over their communications transmitted
online. However, it did not find the expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent
through internet does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or office) of the sender and the
recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.
Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective
reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of enough data may reveal the personal information of its
sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court viewed the law
as virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in fishing expedition,
choosing whatever specified communication they want.
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect
for the right to privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data found to be in
violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued that this section also violated the right to freedom of
expression, as well as the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the Philippines Constitution requires the government to
secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a form of
expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it unconstitutional.
IMBONG V. OCHOA
[GR. No. 203335; February 18, 2014]
Facts:
Various rights groups brought actions before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of
the Reproductive Health Law
Their claim is based on the following grounds (among others):
o RH law violates the right to life of the unborn
o Violates the right to health and right to protection against hazardous products
o Violates right to religious freedom
o Violates equal protection claus
Issue/s:
WON the RH Law is constitutional
Held: The court held that Sections 7, 23-A-1, 23-A-2-I, 23-A-3, 23-B, 17, 23-A-2-ii, and Section 3.01-A
and J of the IRR are unconstitutional.
Page | 13

Section 7 was declared unconstitutional only insofar as it: (a) requires private health facilities, nonmaternity specialty hospitals, and hospitals owned by religious groups to refer patients not in an emergency
or life-threatening situation to another health facility which is conveniently accessible (b) provides
access to family planning and RH services to minors who have been pregnant or had a miscarriage
without a parental consent
Section 23-A-1, punishes RH providers, regardless of their religious belief, who fail or refuse to
dissiminate information regarding RH services and programs.
Section 23-A-2-i, allows a married individual not in a life-threatening case to access RH
procedures without the consent of the spouse.
Section 23-A-3, insofar as it punishes an RH provider who fails to refer any non-life-threatening case
to another RH provider.
Section 23-B, insofar as it punishes any public officer who refuses to support RH programs
Section 17, which mandates a 40-hour pro bono service by private and nongovernment RH
service providers, including gynecologists and obstetricians, as a prerequisite for PhilHealth accreditation.
Section 3.01-A and J of the RH law Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), which defines
abortifacients as "primarily" inducing abortion instead of simply inducing abortion
Section 23-A-2-ii, which prohibits RH service providers from refusing to perform legal and
medically-safe reproductive health procedures on minors in non-life-threatening situations without
parental consent
Right to Life - Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception (life begins at fertilization).
The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives from being unconstitutional. The
clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to
prevent the Legislature from enacting measures that legalized abortion.
Right to Health Unless provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory.
Religious Freedom Constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Under the Free Exercise Clause, the State is
prohibited from unduly interfering wit the outside manifestation of ones belief and faith. The obligation to
refer under the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.
Family Planning Seminars -- The requirement of attendance to a family planning seminar as a condition for
the issuance of a marriage license is a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. The religious
freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. Those who receive any information during their attendance in
the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely free
to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life
without the intervention of the State.
Right to Marital Privacy -- Reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy, by their
very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife. The RH Law
cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision making by giving absolute authority to the spouse
who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision.
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. The right to chart their own
destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach
into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. At any rate, in case of conflict between the
couple, the courts will decide.
Parental Consent - The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the
care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning
services, on one hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning
methods themselves, on the other. By way of exception, insofar as access to information is concerned, the
Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor even without parental
consent. Moreover, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of
Page | 14
emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of
the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents
their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the
two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child, the parents should not be deprived of
their constitutional right of parental authority.
GO V. REPUBLIC
[GR. No. 202809; July 2, 2014]
Facts:
Dennis L. Go filed a petition for naturalization under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 473, the
Revised Naturalization Law.
In the said petition, Go alleged the following:
1) That he was born on May 7, 1982 in Manila to spouses Felix and Emma Go, both
Chinese nationals;
2) that he was of legal age, Chinese national, single, with residence address at No. 13081310 Oroquieta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where he had been residing since birth;
3) that he spoke English and Tagalog and has spent his elementary, secondary and tertiary education
in Philippine schools where subjects on Philippine history, government and civics were
taught as part of the school curriculum;
4) that he believed in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, was of good moral
character and had conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
period of his residence in the Philippines in his relations with the constituted government as well
as with the community;
5) that he is not opposed to organized government or is affiliated with any association or
group of persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;
6) that he did not defend or teach the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of mens ideas;
7) that he was neither a polygamist nor a believer in polygamy;
8) that he had never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude and was not suffering
from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;
9) that he was not a citizen or subject of a nation at war with the Philippines;
10) that it was his intention in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to
renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign state or
sovereignty, particularly to China of which he was a citizen;
11) that he would reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up
to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship; and
12) that he was exempt from the filing of the Declaration of Intention with the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG)under C.A. No. 473, Section 5, as he was born in the Philippines and
received his primary, secondary and tertiary education in the country.
During the hearings, Go testified to prove his compliance with all the requirements and presented, as
witnesses i.e. Dr. Joseph Anlacan, Dr. Edward C. Tordesillas, Silvino J. Ong, Teresita M. Go,and Juan C.
Go. Dr. Anlacan testified that Go had no psychiatric abnormality. Dr. Tordesillas testified
that Gos medical examination results were normal. Ong, being a friend and neighbor of Gos family, said
that he had known Go since childhood through family celebration. Teresita claimed that since birth, she had
personally known Go because he was the son of her brother-in-law and described Go as a peace-loving
Page | 15
person who participated in activities sponsored by his school and the barangay. Juan, testified that he
personally knew Go and that he had executed an Affidavit of Support in his favor.
Issue: WON Gos petition for naturalization should be granted?
Held:
NO. The court held that the joint affidavits executed by petitioners witnesses did not establish their own
qualification to stand as such in a naturalization proceeding. Also Go did not present evidence to prove that
these witnesses were credible. No evidence was presented to prove the witnesses good standing in the
community, honesty, moral uprightness, and most importantly, reliability. Thus, the witnesses
statements about Go do not possess the measure of "credibility" demanded by naturalization cases. Also,
Gos witnesses only averred general statements failing to specify acts or events that would exhibit Gos traits
worthy of the grant of Philippine citizenship.
Gos witnesses only proved that he mingled socially with Filipinos. Even though almost all of the
witnesses testified that they knew Go since birth and that they had interacted with his family in some events,
these did not satisfy the requirement of genuine desire to learn and embrace the Filipino ideals and traditions
as set by law. Moreover, the NBI and BOI reports cast doubt on Gos alleged social interaction with Filipinos
as shown during the background checks wherein the members of his household were uncooperative.
Go himself disobliged when asked for an interview by BOI agents.
Page | 16
JARDELEZA V. SERENO
[GR. No. 213181; August 19, 2014]
Facts:
Due to compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad, the Judicial and Bar
Council announced the opening for the vacated position. Francis H. Jardeleza, incumbent Solicitor General of
the Republic was nominated for the said position.
On June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone calls informing him that during the meetings
held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes
P.A.Sereno manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0093 against him.
Jardeleza was directed to "make himself available" on June 30, 2014 as he would be informed of the
objections as to his integrity.
In a letter-petition, Jardeleza prayed that the Court issue an order:
1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the
JBC to which he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the
charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and
copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of
the public record of the JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting
witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions that
attend the public interviews held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing
scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno
from participating in the voting on June 30, 2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote
would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
On June 30, 2014, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Courts ante-rooms. Department of Justice
Secretary Leila M. De Lima informed him that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and
disclosed confidential information to which Sereno characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing,
Jardeleza was summoned by the JBC.
Jardeleza alleged that Sereno asked him if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues
raised against him. He replied in the affirmative provided that due process would be observed.
Jardeleza demanded that Sereno executes a sworn statement specifying her objections and that in a public
hearing, he be afforded the right to cross-examine her. He requested that the same be imposed on Carpio.
Jardeleza in a written statement expressed his views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its
meeting since the Court en banc would meet the next day to act on a pending letter-petition submitted
by him. Jardeleza was then excused.
_________________________
Section 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. In every case when the
integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the
affirmative vote of all the
members of the Council must be obtained for the favourable consideration of his nomination.
3
Page | 17

Later in the afternoon of the same day, denying Jardelezas request for deferment of the proceedings,
the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist.
Thereafter, the JBC released the shortlist to which Jardeleza was not included.
Issues:
1. WON the court has power of supervision over the JBC.
2. WON the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an objection or
opposition to an application is raised.
Held:
1. YES. The court has power of supervision over the JBC as stated in Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
Section 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member
of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.
Based on previous rulings, the court held that supervising officials task is to see to it that rules are followed.
They do not have the power to prescribe rules or the power to modify or replace them. If they find that the
rules are not observed, they may order that the work be done or redone but only inorder to conform to the
rules. They have no power to prescribe their own manner of execution of the act.
Thus, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules.
In the present case, Jardelezas principal allegations in his petition merit the exercise of a supervisory
authority.
2. YES. Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. There is no complainant or prosecutor to speak of. Thus,
JBC proceedings are unique and special in nature. However, notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the
right to be heard and to explain ones self is availing. Thus the court ruled that, where an objection to
an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory
the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend.
In the present case, Jardelezas right to due process was violated when he was neither formally
informed of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a reasonable chance to muster a defense. He was
asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. Jardeleza was
not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior.
GMA NETWORK V. COMELEC
[GR. No. 205357; September 2, 2014]
Facts:
Consolidated petitions brought by various radio and television networks against Comelec during the
May 2013 elections.
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to
candidates and political parties, as well as the requirements incident thereto, such as the need to report the
same, and the sanctions imposed for violations.
They raise the constitutionality of Sec. 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 limiting the
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national election positions to
an aggregate total of 120 and 180 minutes, respectively.
They contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the
press, impairs the peoples right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of
their right to choose who to elect during the forthcoming elections.
Page | 18

Prior to the May 2013 elections, candidates and political parties airtime limitation for political
campaigns or advertisements were on a per station basis.
Comelec argued that the per candidate rule or total aggregate airtime limit was in accordance with RA
9006 (Fair Elections Act) as to give life to the constitutional objective to equalize access to media during
elections.
Issue/s: WON Sec. 9(a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes, it is unconstitutional.
Comelec Resolution 9615 effected a drastic reduction of the allowable minutes within which
candidates and political parties would be able to campaign through the air, which was not within the power of
the Comelec to do so. The authority of the Comelec to impose airtime limits directly flows from the Fair
Election Act 120 minutes of tv ads and 180 minutes for radio ads.
For the 2004 elections, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 6520 implementing the airtime
limits by applying the said limitation on a per station basis.
There was no basis for Comelec to come up with a new manner of determining allowable time limits
except its own idea as to what should be the maximum number of minutes based on its exercise of discretion
as to how to level the playing field.
Comelec cannot exercise its powers without limitation or reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt
measures or regulations just because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be concerned.
Comelec is not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal
provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change the rules, the same must be properly
explained with sufficient basis.
Congress intended to provide a more expansive and liberal means by which the candidates,
political parties, citizens and other stake holders in the periodic electoral exercise may be given a
chance to fully explain and expound on their candidacies and platforms of governance, and for the electorate
to be given a chance to know better the personalities behind the candidates.
VIVARES V. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE ET AL.

[GR. No. 202666; September 29, 2014]
Facts:
Minors who were senior students of St. Theresas College (STC) in Cebu posted pictures of
themselves clad only in their garments, drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes on Facebook.
The matter was brought to the attention of STCs Discipline in Charge, who found the students to
have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the schools Student Handbook.
The students were called to the principals office where they claim to have been castigated and
verbally abused by the STC officials.
o They were also told that as penalty, they were barred from joining the commencement
exercises.
The parents of the students filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC against
STC et al.
The RTC issued a TRO allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony.
STC filed an MR.
Despite the issuance of the TRO, STC still barred the sanctioned students from participating in the
graduation rites since the MR to the RTO remained unresolved.
Petitioners then filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Habeas Data,
contending that the privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only and
thus they had a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
The RTC denied the petition for habeas data, finding that the petitioners failed to prove the
existence of an actual or threated violation of the minors right to privacy, one of the preconditions
for the issuance of the writ of habeas data.
It also held that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
view them, lost their privacy in some way.
Page | 19
Issue/s: WON there was an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty or security
of the minors involved which would entitle petitioners to the issuance of a writ of habeas data
Held:
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor,
information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the
truth and to informational privacy.
It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in

instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.
The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to
information about a person.
Without an actionable entitlement to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not
prosper.
The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
It was designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.
Nothing in the rule suggests that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a
person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
To engage in something is different from undertaking a business endeavor.
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not
to mention each systems inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every
individuals right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual should have
at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Network (OSN)
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to
keep certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.
A Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her post or
profile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said
choice.
Not one of petitioners disputed a STC teachers sworn account that her students, who are the
minors Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to
show that no special means to be able to view the allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by the
students, and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1)
their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is "Public," it can be surmised that the
photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners
children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph.
If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational
privacy.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students
Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was
the minors Facebook friends who showed the pictures to the Discipline In Charge.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
access to the said posts.
Page | 20
EJERCITO V. COMELEC
[GR. No. 212398; November 25, 2014]
Facts:
Three days prior to the May 2013 Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by
respondent San Luis before the Comelec against E.R. Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and,
at the time, the incumbent Governor of Laguna.
Ejercito allegedly distributed so-called Orange Cards which could be used in any public
hospital in Laguna for medical needs, with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his
favor, an act which is prohibited under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
He also allegedly exceeded the allowable expenditures in relation to his campaign.
San Luis subsequently filed a Petition to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Ejercito.
However, Comelec did not act upon the petition and the next day, Ejercito was proclaimed by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Governor.
Ejercito then filed his Answer and prayed for the dismissal of the petition due to procedural ad
substantive irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as Governor.
He claimed that the petition questioning his qualifications was rendered moot and academic by his
proclamation as the duly-elected Governor.
The Comelec First Division promulgated a resolution granting the petition for disqualification
against ER Ejercito pursuant to Sec. 68 of the OEC.
Ejercito alleged that his constitutional right to due process was violated as he was deprived of his right
to notice and hearing and was not informed of the true nature of the case filed against him when San Luis was
allegedly allowed in his memorandum to make as substantial amendment in the reliefs prayed for in his
petition.
San Luis was allegedly allowed to seek for Ejercitos disqualification instead of the filing of an
election offense against him.
Issue/s:
1) WON the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito was for the latters disqualification and
prosecution for election offense
2) WON the conduct of preliminary investigation is required in the resolution of the electoral aspect
of a disqualification case
3) WON Ejercito should be disqualified for overspending in his election campaign
Held:
1) YES. The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running, or if elected,
from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the election laws.
A petition to disqualify a candidate may be filed pursuant to Sec. 68 of the OEC, which states:
o SEC. 68. Disqualifications.-- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared
by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having:
a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or
e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person
who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, not to violations of
other penal laws. Thus, offenses that are punished in laws other than in the OEC cannot be ground for a
Section 68 petition. The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those
enumerated in Section 68 of the OEC.
Page | 21

All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and
not administrative in nature.
2) NO. Comelec Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary investigation because it
merely amended, among others, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, which deals with
disqualification of candidates.
In DQ cases, the Comelec may designate any of its officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar,
to hear the case and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay officials
o Under Resolution 9386, all lawyers in the COMELEC who are Election Officers
in the National Capital Region (NCR), Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys,
Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and lawyers of the Law Department
are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the
election laws which may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the COMELEC.
An election offense has its criminal and electoral aspects.
o While its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject
of summary hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from
office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character.
3) YES. R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not
be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising
contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall be
signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly- authorized representative of the political
party.
GOH V. BAYRON
[GR. No. 212584; November 25, 2014]
Facts:
Alroben Goh filed before the Comelec a recall petition against Mayor Bayron of Puerto Princesa
City due to loss of trust and confidence.
Comelec found the recall petition sufficient in form and substance but suspended the funding of any
and all recall elections until the resolution of the funding issue.
Comelec contended that while there is a law authorizing the Chairman to augment a deficient
appropriation, there was no existing line item in the Commissions budget for the actual conduct of a recall
elections.
o
The Commission also posited that granting arguendo that the line item for the conduct and
supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes and plebiscites under the Program category of the
Commissions 2014 budget is also a line item for the conduct of recall elections, still augmentation cannot be
made within the bounds of the law. Under Sec. 69 of the General Provisions of the 2014 GAA, there are
priorities in the use of savings, and the conduct of recall elections is not one of them.
Goh submits that, notwithstanding its finding that the recall petition was sufficient in form and
substance, Comelecs decision to nevertheless suspend the holding of a recall election supposedly through
lack of funding constituted grave abdication and wanton betrayal of the Constitutional mandate and a
grievous violation of the sovereign power of the people.
Issue/s: WON the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the funding of recall
elections
Held: YES.
The 2014 GAA provides the line item appropriation to allow the Comelec to perform its
constitutional mandate of conducting recall elections.
There is no need for supplemental legislation to authorize the Comelec to conduct recall elections for
2014.
The 1987 Constitution expressly provides the Comelec with the power to enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
Page | 22

The Constitution not only guaranteed the Comelecs fiscal autonomy, but also granted its head, as
authorized by law, to augment items in its appropriations from its savings.
The 2014 GAA provided such authorization to the Comelec Chairman.
When the COMELEC receives a budgetary appropriation for its "Current Operating
Expenditures," such appropriation includes expenditures to carry out its constitutional functions, including the
conduct of recall elections.
CERAFICA V. COMELEC
[GR. No. 205136; December 2, 2014]
Facts:
Kimberly Cerafica filed her COC for Counciler of Taguig for the 2013 Elections.
Her COC stated that she was born on October 29, 1992, or that she will be 20 years of age on the day
of the elections, in contravention of the requirements that one must be at least 23 years old on the day of the
elections as set out in Sec. 9(c) of RA 8487 (Charter of Taguig City).
Instead of attending the clarificatory hearing, Kimberly filed a sworn Statement of Withdrawal of
COC on December 17, 2012.
Simultaneously, Olivia Cerafica filed her own COC as a substitute of Kimberly.
Director Amora-Ladra of the Comelec Law Dept. recommended the cancellation of Kimberlys
COC and consequently, the denial of the substitution of Kimberly by Olivia, and such recommendation was
adopted by Comelec.
o
Dir. Amora Ladra opined that it was as if no COC was filed by Kimberly; thus, she cannot be
substituted.
Olivia filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO.
Issue/s: WON there was a valid substitution
Held: YES.
Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course to or cancel COCs
under Sec. 77 of BP 881, the Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of COCs.
Under the express provision of Sec. 77, not just any person, but only an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party may be substituted.
Kimberly was an official nominee of the Liberal Part; thus, she can be validly substituted.
There was a valid withdrawal of Kimberlys COC after the last day for the filing of COCs and Olivia
belongs to and is certified to by the same political party to which Kimberly belongs. Olivia filed her COC not
later than mid-day of election day.
In simply relying on the Memorandum of Dir. Amora-Ladra in cancelling Kimberlys COC and
denying the latters substitution by Olivia, and absent any petition to deny due course to or cancel said COC,
the Comelec gravely abused its discretion.
The Comelec, in the exercise of its adjudicatory and quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution
mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon motion for reconsideration, by the En Banc.
As cancellation proceedings involve the exercise of quasi-judicial functions of the Comelec, the
Comelec in Division should have first decided the case.
The determination of whether a candidate is eligible for the position he is seeking involves a
determination of fact where parties must be allowed to adduce evidence in support of their contentions.
Page | 23
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC

[GR. No. 205758; January 21, 2015]
Facts:
The Diocese of Bacolod posted two tarpaulins (6x10 feet each) on the front wall of the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod (private property).
o The first tarpaulin contains the message IBASURA ANG RH Law.
o
The second tarpaulin contains the heading Conscience Vote, and provides for a list of those who are
either Anti-RH (TEAM BUHAY), or Pro-RH (TEAM PATAY).
In this case, the Diocese of Bacolod is seeking to nullify the following orders for being
unconstitutional:
o The order of Election Officer Atty. Majarucon, directing them to remove the supposed
over-sized tarpaulins; and
o
The order issued by COMELEC, directing them to immediately remove such tarpaulins, and
threatening them with the filing of an election offense
The Supreme Court En Banc issued a TRO, enjoining the COMELEC from removing the
tarpaulins.
Issue/s:
1) WON COMELEC the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violated the Dioceses
fundamental right to freedom of expression.
2) WON the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-based or content-neutral regulation.
3) WON there was violation of petitioners right to property.
4) WON the tarpaulin and its message are considered religious speech.
Held:
1) YES. These orders of COMELEC infringe on the right to freedom of expression of the petitioners.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of
expression exercised by a non-candidate. Every citizens expression with political consequences enjoys a
high degree of protection. Moreover, the COMELECs argument that the tarpaulin is election
propaganda, being the Dioceses way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting
those who voted for it, holds no water.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and
political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted in return for consideration by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
2) The restriction imposed by the COMELEC is a content-based regulation. Content-based restraint or
censorship refers to restrictions based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech. In contrast, contentneutral regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of
the speech. Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and the clear and present
danger test must be applied. In this case, COMELEC failed to justify the regulation. There is no
compelling and substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin as to justify
curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the
state to minimize the right of non-candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size
of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone elses constitutional rights.
3) YES. The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin
remains the private property of the Diocese. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by the
Constitution.
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or
constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.
Page | 24
4) NO. The position of the Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to
qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such basis. The
enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its nature as speech with
political consequences and not religious speech.
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation
of religion under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government policies that take religion
specifically into account not to promote the governments favored form of religion, but to allow individuals
and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a persons or institutions religion.
The lemon test is applied to determine if a regulation is constitutional. Thus, a regulation is
constitutional when:
1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
Page | 25
RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC
[GR. No. 206666; January 21, 2015]
Facts:
In 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction
during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.
o
In the same year, PGMA extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to Estrada, which
explicitly states that he is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President for the 2010 elections. There
were three petitions seeking for his disqualification but none of these cases prospered and MRs were denied
by Comelec En Banc. Estrada managed to garner the second highest number of votes for the 2010 elections.
For the 2013 elections, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of the City of Manila.
Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the COMELEC because of
Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification.
o Risos-Vidal relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code4 in relation to Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code. 5
o
The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that Estradas
right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by PGMA.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in the 2013 elections.
Issue: WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in ruling that Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President Arroyo.
_________________________
4
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; (d) Those
with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad
and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
5
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by
competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period
of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.
Page | 26
Held: NO. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal
bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by
law or were so patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights,
which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office. The wording of the pardon extended to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. The disqualification of former President
Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of
the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other
words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national position.
ARAULLO V. AQUINO
[GR. No. 209287; February 3, 2015]
Facts:
The 2015 case is a motion for reconsideration regarding the SC ruling on the Disbursement
Acceleration Program.
In that case, it was held that:
o
The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under
the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being
transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
o
Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there
is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all
for the transfers.
In this motion for reconsideration, the respondents have the following arguments:
o
The Executive has not violated the GAA because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of
interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial, determination.
o
There is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item. What is
required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President.
o
The Court should extend the presumption of good faith in favor of the President and his officials who
co-authored, proposed or implemented the DAP.
Issue/s:
1) WON the interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a legislative function.
2) WON there is a constitiutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item.
3) WON the presumption of good faith should be applied.
Held:
1) NO. The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a foremost judicial function. This is
because the power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive. The interpretation and application of
said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws
extends to the Constitution.
Page | 27
The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the
general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose.
Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against
expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the
Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget
execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress power of the purse.
2) NO. The term item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution6 is the last and indivisible
purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class.
There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of
augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class.
It was clarified in previous cases that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of
expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of
augmentation. However, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a
specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes.
3) YES. A public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance of his duties.
Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that they were
motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. "Bad faith" does not simply connote bad
moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of
the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive
of self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes.
Relevantly, the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, being public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. This presumption is necessary because
they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of the State, and because they act in the interest of
the public as required by law. However, the presumption may be disputed.
___________________________
Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution states that:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
6
Page | 28
CUDIA V. PMA
[GR. No. 211362; February 24, 2015]
Facts:
Cadet 1CL Cudia was a member of the class of 2014 in the PMA and was supposed to graduate as the
class salutatorian.
o In November of 2013, he was 2 minutes late for his English class.
o
He told the professor that the previous professor dismissed the class early. The previous professor
denied this and claimed he dismissed the class 10-15 minutes before the bell (as was standard).
o
He was found to be lying and after which, he claimed instead he was waiting for a report from the
professor for his grades.
The Honor Committee conducted a preliminary investigation for violation of the honor code.
Cudia plead not guilty. A vote occurred wherein 8 voted guilty and 1 voted not guilty (one vote of not guilty
is enough to find the accused not guilty), but after this vote, the committee met in a closed door session
wherein they clarified the reasons for the not guilty vote, after which the member changed his vote to guilty.
o
He was dismissed from the PMA, but his sister had posted on social media the situation which went
viral. He appealed his case to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board (CRAB) with PAO preparing his appeal
memorandum.
o On consultation with CHR, CHR declared that he was denied due process.
He filed this petition for mandamus with the SC after the president, Noynoy Aquino accepted the
ruling of the CRAB denying his appeal.
Issue/s:
1.) WON the Cudia relinquished certain civil liberties upon entering the PMA.
2.) WON the honor code can cause the termination of a cadet.
3.) WON procedural due process was violated.
4.) WON findings of the CHR are binding.
Held: Cudia is not entitled to reinstatement and cannot graduate.
1.) Cudia did not relinquish civil liberties upon entering the PMA. It has been held that a cadet facing
dismissal has constitutionally protected private interests, hence procedural due process is
required. The PMA is not immune from the structure of due process.
2.) The school-student relationship is contractual in nature. Academic freedom is enshrined in our
constitution, providing for the right to decide on academic freedoms the following:
Who may teach
What may be taught
How it shall be taught
Who may be admitted to study
Academic freedom subsumes the schools right to discipline students. The honor code is a primary means
of achieving the cadets character development and as ways by which the academy has chosen to identify
those who are deficient in conduct.
3.) NO. Procedural due process was followed. Based on jurisprudence, the minimum requirements are:
Student must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them.
They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired.
They shall be informed of the evidence against them.
They shall have the right to adduce evidence.
The evidence must be duly considered.
Page | 29
All the above were followed by the honor code committee. Changing the vote from 8-1 to 9-0, causing his
dismissal was not a deviation of the standard procedure, as it has been done in the past to clarify the reasons
behind a not guilty vote in case of 8-1 or 7-2 votes, so no bad faith can be attributed.
Cudia was allowed to have counsel assist him in preparing the appeal memoranda, even if he was not
allowed to be represented by counsel (PAO in a non-intervening role), counsel assisted in preparing his
defense, and that satisfies due process. The court in this case also held that due to the stature of Cudia, he was
aware of the possible ramifications of his actions and need not be represented by counsel since he was
assisted by one.
4.) The CHR is merely a recommendatory body and binds no one.
Page | 30
BISHOP BRODERICK PABILLO V. COMELEC

[GR. No. 216098; April 21, 2015]
Facts:
Pabillo filed a case for certiorari and prohibition against COMELEC resolution (No. 9222)
approving a direct contract with Smartmatic for the PCOS machines and extended warranty program
dated January 30, 2015.
o Pabillo contends that it is violative of the GPRA (Procurement Law)
Under R.A. No. 9369, the COMELEC is authorized to use an Automated Election System.
o
May 10, 2010 beginning of 10 year warranty for parts, labor, technical support and
maintenance.
o
Nov. 11, 2013 Smartmatic proposed to extend the warranty of PCOS machines for 3 years (for
2014-2016 elections) including diagnostics of all existing PCOS machines and preparations for the elections.
On Dec. 23, 2014, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9222 which approved the extended
warranty for P300M via direct contract.
o After negotiations, it was reduced to P240M.
Issue:
WON the resolution adopting the extended warranty is valid.
Held: NO. Resolution No. 9222 is void for being violative of the GPRA. Alternative methods of procurement
are allowed when (GPRA IRR):
1.) There is prior approval of the head of the procuring entity on the use of alternative methods of
procurement.
2.) The conditions required by law for the use of alternative methods are present.
3.) Procuring entity must ensure that the method chosen promotes economy and efficiency.
4.) The most advantageous price is obtained.
The conditions required by law are not present (requisite 2). The parameters for valid direct contracting are
found in Section 50, Article XVI of the GPRA. 7 Here, the 10 year warranty by Smartmatic only provides
for a warranty on availability and access to purchase of parts and services (Smartmatic only
______________________________
7
SEC. 50. Direct Contracting. - Direct Contracting may be resorted to only in any of the following
conditions:
1.) Procurement of Goods of proprietary nature, which can be obtained only from the proprietary
source in this case, the goods sought are refurbishment, maintenance and repair of PCOS
machines, this repair is not covered by Smartmatics intellectual property rights.
2.) When the Procurement of critical components from a specific manufacturer, supplier or
distributor is a condition precedent to hold a contractor to guarantee its project performance, in
accordance with the provisions of this contract in this case, the repair is not a critical component
Those sold by an exclusive dealer or manufacturer, which does not have sub-dealers selling at lower prices
and for which no suitable substitute can be obtained at more advantageous terms to the Government in this
case, there was no showing that a pre-procurement conference was held, nor was there an initial industry
service that would have determined the exclusivity of the goods and could have justified direct contracting as
per the GPRB manual.
Page | 31
warranted a 1 year replacement). Part of the AES procurement project is that Smartmatic must train
COMELEC personnel to service the machines. This, coupled with the availability of parts (10 years)
should mean that COMELEC already has the means to service the machines. The extended warranty
is premature. Lastly, it is not a continuing contract (extension), it is a new contract, with a new offer and
consideration with a new payment.
Page | 32
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT V. REYES

(DOE)
[GR. No. 180771; April 21, 2015]
Facts:
On June 13, 2002, the GRP, acting through the DOE, entered into a Geophysical Survey and
Exploration Contract 102 (GSEC-102) with Japan Petroleum Exploration Co. (JAPEX).
o JAPEX (100% Japanese owned) was allowed to drill one exploration well along the
Taon straight.
The petitioners in this case filed a petition for injunction, certiorari and prohibition to prevent the
implementation of Service Contract-46 (drilling) for being violative of the Constitution due to JAPEX being
100% Japanese-owned.
o Petitioners claim that the fish catch in the area was reduced by 50-70% (as per a study)
due to the destruction of the artificial reef by the seismic survey.
o Petitioners also claim no public consultation and non-compliance with the Environmental
Imapct Assessment system, the Fisheries Code and their IRRs.
Issue:
WON the service contract (SC-46) with JAPEX is valid.
Held: NO. The contract is null and void. The prohibition in the constitution as to service contract have
safeguards as established in the La Bugal case, to wit,
Service contracts shall be crafted in accordance with a general law not disadvantageous to the
country.
The president shall be the signatory for the government.
Within 30 days, the President shall report it to Congress to give opportunity for objections.
SC-46 meets the first requirement. According to the transitory provision in the 1987 Constitution, all
existing laws are deemed valid until repealed. This includes PD 87 (Oil Exploration and Development Act of
1972), which has not been repealed expressly.
However, SC-46 fails the second and third requirements. The president was not signatory to SC-46 and the
same was not submitted to Congress. Thus, it violates not only PD 87, but also the 1987 Constitution for
being contrary to law.
SC-46 was entered into and signed only by the DOE (not the president). The alter ego doctrince cannot apply
since this doctrine has the exception that says except in cases where the Chief executive is required
by the constitution or law to act in person. Neither was the DOE expressly authorized by the president to
enter into such a contract.
SC-46 likewise violates laws like Proclamation 1234, declaring the Taon straight a protected area.
Without a new law changing this, no energy exploration may be done in said protected seascape.
Page | 33

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PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS

BAR OPS PILIPINAS

Political Law Digests

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

o In 1998, however, POTC suffered its first loss.

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST (ABANG LINGKOD) V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

Held: Yes, it is unconstitutional.

VIVARES V. ST. THERESAS COLLEGE ET AL.

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

Issue/s: WON there was a valid substitution

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD V. COMELEC

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

Held: Cudia is not entitled to reinstatement and cannot graduate.

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

BISHOP BRODERICK PABILLO V. COMELEC

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAON STRAIT V. REYES

PALS BAR OPS PILIPINAS 2016

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