Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Introduction
In the organization sciences literature, many
issues remain unsolved empirically because
dierent studies report dierent results. In many
topical domains, some studies report signicantly negative relationships, others signicantly
positive ones, and yet others insignicant ones.
We gratefully thank Sang-Woo Nam for providing the
data collected when he worked as a Research Fellow at
the Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo, Japan, in
20002005. Arjen van Witteloostuijn gratefully acknowledges the nancial support through the Odysseus
Programme of the Flemish Science Foundation (FWO).
Yet others complicate matters by adding nonlinearities, by nding U-shaped or reversed Ushaped linkages with or without the reection
point being located within the observed range, or
by including all kinds of intermediating or
moderating eects. A well-known example of a
literature revealing such a state of the art is the
one on the corporate diversicationperformance link in strategic management. Of course,
many reasons may explain such a mixed bag of
ndings, obvious candidates being dierent
samples and dierent specications across studies. However, we believe that often such
empirical inconclusiveness may, in part, be
explained by the dominant estimation method
r 2010 British Academy of Management. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford
OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA.
608
applied, being classical linear regression1 or
osprings thereof.
In the board composition and board leadership
literature, the current state of the art is not very
dierent. These two corporate governance mechanisms and their links to rm performance are
hotly debated in the economics, nance and
organization sciences literatures, at both the
theoretical and empirical level, with the evidence
reecting a mixed bag of ndings. On the
theoretical level, two main theories, agency
theory and stewardship theory, have their own
arguments for explaining the link between board
features and rm performance. From an agency
theory perspective, on the one hand, a supervisory board should be dominated by independent non-executive members in order to generate
eective monitoring of executives. Moreover, the
CEO and board chairperson should be dierent
people in order to clearly separate operational
from control responsibilities. From a stewardship
theory perspective, on the other hand, the nonexecutive board should be dominated by inside
members in order to make eective decisions,
since insiders are better informed about the rm
than outside directors. Additionally, this perspective argues that the CEO and board chair
position should be in one hand (CEO duality),
rather than be separated into two positions (CEO
non-duality), because this facilitates clear and
strong leadership. The contradictory predictions
from dierent theories are mirrored in the
available evidence. Some studies found evidence
in line with agency theory, and some others
revealed empirical support for stewardship theory. So, no convincing conclusion can be drawn
from prior studies on the impact of board
composition and board leadership on rm
performance (see, for example, Dalton et al.
(1998) for a meta-analytic review).
In theoretical and empirical work, several
eorts have been carried out to consolidate the
609
ditionally, we oer fresh evidence for four understudied countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, South
Korea and Thailand. Finally, in the conclusion,
we will argue that quantile regression is widely
applicable in the organization sciences.
Below, we rst oer a brief overview of the
state of the art in corporate governance research
on board independence and CEO duality. Next,
we describe what quantile regression is, in theory,
and how the method works, in practice. Subsequently, we introduce our data. After that, we
demonstrate the application of this regression
method in the context of the relationship between
board characteristics and rm performance.
Finally, we conclude with a discussion. Note that
we decided to devote a larger than usual number
of pages to the introduction of our method as
quantile regression is new to the organization
sciences.
610
makes them better able to support eective
decision-making than independent directors.
Stewardship theory assumes that managers are
good stewards of corporations by acting in the
best interests of their principals. As a result, this
theory predicts that insider-dominated boards
will boost rm performance (Davis, Schoorman
and Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991, 1994).
This state of the art in the theoretical arena is
mirrored in empirical work on the board
independencerm performance link. The metaanalytic study of Dalton et al. (1998) clearly
reveals the mixed ndings on the relationship
between board independence (and CEO duality)
and rm performance. They conclude that
neither board composition [proportion of independent directors] nor board leadership structure [CEO duality] has been consistently linked to
rm performance (1998, p. 269). Table 1 presents
a summary of the studies on the relationship
between board independence and rm performance.
We can see that the evidence on this relationship is very mixed indeed. Some studies support
agency theory (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Cho
and Kim, 2007; Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008;
Daily and Dalton, 1992, 1993; Ezzamel and
Watson, 1993; Kesner, 1987; Klein, 1998; Pearce
and Zahra, 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990;
Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori, 1989), others
provide evidence for stewardship theory (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 2002;
Cornett, Marcus and Tehranian, 2008; Kesner,
1987; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Klein, 1998;
Yermack, 1996) and yet others go against both
theories (Al Farooque et al., 2007; Chaganti,
Mahajan and Sharma, 1985; Cheung, Raub and
Stouraitis, 2006; Ghosh, 2006; Kesner, Victor
and Lamont, 1986).
So, the literature review indicates that, both on
theoretical and empirical grounds, a clear and
unambiguous prediction as to the eect of the
proportion of independent board members on
rm performance is dicult to make. For that
reason, we derive two opposing hypotheses as
our benchmarks Hypothesis 1 on the basis of
agency theory, and Hypothesis 1Alt from stewardship theory.
H1: Board independence is positively associated with rm performance.
Conditional rm performance
Some possible explanations of the mixed evidence
as to the relationship between board characteristics, here board independence and CEO duality,
and rm performance might be related to samples
that come from dierent institutional environments (Aguilera et al., 2008) and dierent
industries (Elsayed, 2007), as well as the dierent
psychological attributes of the sampled managers
and/or the dierent characteristics of the sampled
organizations (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Additionally, Tables 1 and 2 reveal
that prior studies employed standard linear
regression methods such as OLS, weighted least
squares, two-stage least squares (2SLS) or panel
data regression, with the exception of Elsayed
(2007), who used least absolute value (median)
regression. These standard linear regression
methods implicitly estimate the conditional mean
of the relationship between the variables of
interest and the dependent variable. So, the
interpretation of the relationship between the
variables of interest in this prior work should be
limited to this relationship at the conditional
mean. This is not dierent for studies using
ANOVA or MANOVA techniques, which only
imply a comparison at the mean, too.
As prior studies estimate only relationships at
the conditional mean, these studies are silent
about the relationship for low- or high-performing rms. In the current study, we postulate that
the relationships between board characteristics
and rm performance may well vary conditional
on the level of rm performance. Finkelstein and
DAveni (1994) argue that, when rm performance is high, CEO entrenchment is likely to
occur. In such circumstances, CEO status and
r 2010 British Academy of Management.
611
Board size
On the one hand, larger board size provides,
potentially, more monitoring resources, which
may enhance rm performance (Alexander,
Fennell and Halpern, 1993; Goodstein, Gautam
and Boeker, 1994; Mintzberg, 1983; Pfeer, 1972,
1973; Pfeer and Salancik, 1978). On the other
hand, however, larger board size makes coordination, communication and decision-making
more troublesome, and larger board size may
trigger free-riding issues among the many board
members. All this may lower rm performance
(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Jensen, 1993;
Klein (1998)
of outside directors
of neutral outside
of corporate outside
of nancial outside
Proportion
directors
Proportion
directors
Proportion
directors
Proportion
ROA
ROA
Productivity
Market return
Productivity
Tobins Q
Tobins Q
ROA
ROE
EPS
Net prot margin
ROA
ROE
Priceearnings ratio (PER)
Prot margin
Return on equity (ROE)
Return on assets (ROA)
Earnings per share (EPS)
Stock market performance
Total return to investment
(ROI)
ROA
ROE
ROI
Abnornal market return
Illegal activities
Dependent variables
Independent variables
Author(s)
Data
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Signicantly negative
Not signicant
Signicantly positive
Signicantly negative
Signicantly negative
Signicantly positive
Signicantly positive
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Outside signicantly
higher
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Signicantly positive
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Not signicant
Signicantly positive
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Signicantly negative
Not signicant
Not signicant
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Results
MANOVA
OLS regression
MANOVA
Correlation analysis
Correlation analysis
Methods
612
D. Ramdani and A. van Witteloostuijn
Proportion of non-executive
directors
Ghosh (2006)
ROA
Market to book value equity
Tobins Q
Operating income to assets ratio
Sales to assets ratio
Stock price return
Assets growth
Operating income growth
Sales growth
Tobins Q
ROA
ROA
Adjusted Tobins Q
Average value of ROA, ROE
and ROS
Market-adjusted CAR
ROA
Productivity
Market return
Productivity
ROS, return on sales; CAR, cumulative abnormal returns; EBIT, earnings before interest and tax.
Signicantly negative
Signicantly positive
Signicantly negative
Signicantly positive
Not signicant
Not signicant
Signicantly negative
Signicantly negative
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Signicantly negative
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Signicantly negative
3SLS regression
OLS regression
OLS and 2SLS regression
OLS regression
CEO duality
CEO duality
CEO duality
CEO duality
CEO non-duality
CEO duality
CEO duality
CEO duality
Lagged CEO duality
Elsayed (2007)
ROA
Tobins Q
Discretionary accruals
Adjusted EBIT/assets
ROA
Market-adjusted CAR
CEO duality
ROE
PER
Market value of the rm
Tobins Q
ROE
Priceearnings ratio
Cost eciency
ROA
ROA
ROE
Prot margin
ROE
ROA
Firm failure
Dependent variables
Illegal activities
ROI
Independent
variables
Author(s)
337 US corporations
100 US rms listed in Inc.
magazine
Data
Not signicant
Not signicant
Signicantly positive
Signicantly negative
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Signicantly negative
Not signicant
Not signicant
Signicantly negative
Not signicant
Not signicant
Not signicant
Duality signicantly lower
Not signicant
Results
OLS regression
OLS regression
OLS regression
MANOVA
OLS regression
ANOVA
ANOVA and
MANOVA
ANOVA
ANOVA and
MANOVA
ANOVA
Methods
614
D. Ramdani and A. van Witteloostuijn
615
with y 2 0; 1
min 4
b2RK
X
i2fi:yi x0i by g
yjyi
x0i by j
1 yjyi
x0i by j5
2
where R indicates the dimensions of the independent variables (K). The optimization problem
of this function is to search for the yth quantile
regression estimators (b(y)) that minimize the
absolute value of a weighted sum of the residuals
between observed values (yi) and tted values
(xi0b). We assign a weight of y to the points lying
below the quantile regression line (the rst term
3
Quantile regression has been widely applied in dierent
literatures outside the organization sciences, generally,
and corporate governance, particularly. Illustrative
examples are Goel and Ram (2004) and Manning,
Blumberg and Moulton (1995) in elasticity of demand
work, Arias, Hallock and Escudero (2001), Buchinsky
(2001) and Eide and Mark (1998) in education
economics, Barreto and Hughes (2004) in economic
growth studies, Buchinsky (1994), Garc a, Hernandez
and Nicolas (2001), Machado and Mata (2001) and
Nielsen and Rosholm (2001) in wage analysis, Ribeiro
(2001) in labour economics, Abrevaya (2001) in population economics, Bassett and Chen (2001) in portfolio
investment research, and Cade, Terrell and Schroeder
(1999) and Knight and Ackerly (2002) in ecology
science.
616
y1 y 1
X 0 X1
n
fey 02
Figure 1. (a) Normal distribution with homoscedasticity; (b) normal distribution with heteroscedasticity; (c) skewed distribution with
outliers
617
618
porations in these countries have similar characteristics, such as high concentration of family
ownership, often belonging to a business group
with a pyramidal structure and cross-ownership,
low corporate transparency, extensive and diversied business structures, and risky nancial
strategies (Claessens and Fan, 2002; Claessens
et al., 1999). As family ownership is very
common, with family members often sitting in
the top management team, the key agency
relationship in our sample involves the controlling owner and minority shareholders rather than
managers vis-a`-vis outside shareholders (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000).
These characteristics make the study of the
rm performance impact of board independence
and CEO duality important in this sample. We
could expect that both corporate governance
mechanisms work well, as suggested by agency
theory. The literature on corporate governance in
these countries, mostly viewed from a corporate
nance perspective, is heavily biased toward the
agency theory perspective. Then, the argument is
that board independence and CEO non-duality
are suited to minimize agency cost (Claessens
and Fan, 2002; Claessens, Djankov and Lang,
2000; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Mitton, 2002).
So, this empirical setting oers the opportunity to
test this logic by looking into the roles of board
independence and CEO duality as a governance
mechanism to enhance rm performance conditional on rm performance and in interaction
with board size.
Data and measures
We use a data set from a corporate governance
survey in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and
South Korea conducted by the Asian Development Bank Institute. The questionnaire was
mailed to respondents during JulyOctober
2003 (Nam and Nam, 2004). The survey took a
sample of stock-listed enterprises. The sample
involves about 19.82% (66 rms) of the total
population of rms listed on the stock exchange
in Indonesia, 6.48% (111 rms) in South Korea,
8.28% (75 rms) in Malaysia and 11.21% (61) in
Thailand. When needed, we collected data from
annual reports to add missing information.
Respondents of the survey are corporate secretaries, executives and non-executives. Questions
addressed to corporate secretaries asked about
619
Median
Std Dev.
ROA
Proportion of independent directors
CEO duality
Board size
Assets
Fixed assets per sales
Debt to equity ratio
Growth sales
Year listed
0.002
0.002
0.392
0.020
1.069
0.030
0.847
0.016
0.095
0.058
0.017
0.488
0.416
4.103
1.285
3.921
1.401
0.826
Min
Max
Skewness
Kurtosis
0.555
0.030
0.392
1.367
7.206
6.736
6.832
9.832
2.390
0.381
0.066
0.608
1.076
9.276
5.081
7.672
6.584
1.460
2.376
0.486
0.444
0.293
0.307
0.463
0.223
1.761
1.225
36.893
4.390
1.203
2.988
1.774
7.558
1.729
23.839
4.516
Note: The data are normalized such that the mean values are zero.
Evidence
The main results are presented in Table 4,
reporting the OLS regression and quantile
regression outcomes. We also performed a robust
regression7 in order to verify whether our OLS
ndings are aected by outlier observations. The
OLS regression is aimed to test the benchmark
hypotheses, which are Hypotheses 1 and 2. The
results show that in the OLS regression (using the
reg command in STATAs (version 9.2) statis7
620
Quantile regression
OLS
Robust OLS
Q0.10
0.267
0.015
0.098
0.014**
0.243
0.006
0.046
0.009
0.008
0.007***
0.001
0.008***
0.002
0.000
0.040*
0.014
0.006
0.018
0.009*
0.001
0.013
0.010
0.010**
0.006***
0.003
0.001
0.011*** 0.007***
0.004*
0.002*
0.001
0.001
0.011
0.012
0.005
0.001
0.005
0.002
0.007** 0.005
0.001
0.002
0.001
0.006
0.007
0.004
0.000
0.016
0.000
0.022
0.005
0.013
0.014
0.003
0.003
0.005
0.009
0.010
0.009
0.003
0.003
0.006
0.079
0.013
0.001
0.021
0.003
0.006
0.006
0.012
0.012
0.038
0.068
0.015
0.015
0.026
0.004
0.007
0.008
0.028
0.012
0.053
0.112
0.023**
0.012***
0.007**
0.015***
0.005**
0.002
Q0.25
0.013
0.001
0.015
0.000
0.006
0.003
0.053
0.003
0.009
0.015
0.001
0.003
0.003
0.019
0.016
0.017
0.006
0.009
0.012
0.010
0.005
0.139
0.005
0.005
0.003
0.012*
0.013*
0.011
0.002
0.006
0.006
0.136
0.007
0.004
0.005
0.033
0.001
0.004
0.033
0.028
0.072
0.160
0.013
0.014
0.005
0.023**
0.024**
0.012
0.022
0.024**
0.037
0.083
Q0.5 (median)
0.283**
0.010*
Q0.75
Q0.90
0.078
0.191
0.028**
0.029
621
(b)
0.10
0.05
0.00
CEO Duality
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.05
2.00
0
.2
.4
.6
Quantile
.8
.2
.4
.6
Quantile
.8
Figure 2. Estimates for (a) independent directors and (b) CEO duality
Note: The 90% condence intervals are superimposed over the shaded areas.
regression, using the BreuschPagan test, indicates that we have to reject the null hypothesis
that the variance of the residuals is homogeneous
(w2(1) 5 62.42 and po0.01). The dierent results
for OLS vis-a`-vis quantile regression are therefore
not surprising. In our sample, estimating the eect
of corporate governance variables on rm performance at dierent points of the rm performance conditional distribution using quantile
regression is clearly warranted, since each quantile
may be associated with dierent eects. Note that
although the robust OLS regression (column 3 in
Table 4) gives better results than the OLS
regression (column 2 in Table 4) by showing that
CEO duality is signicantly and positively associated with ROA, the robust OLS estimates must
be interpreted as the relationship at the conditional mean.
The quantile regression results show, indeed,
that the eects of corporate governance variables
dier across the quantiles in the conditional
distribution of rm performance. To reveal this,
the eects for all quantiles are visualized in Figures
2(a) and 2(b) for the proportion of independent
directors and CEO duality, respectively. These
gures are produced in STATA using the grqreg
command after running the qreg command. We
are particularly interested in how the eect of a
corporate governance mechanism varies with the
quantiles. Note that we only report the ndings for
r 2010 British Academy of Management.
622
mechanism in mediocre performing rms, but not
for under-performing and top-performing rms.
The results partly support Hypothesis 3, arguing
that board independence is not an eective way to
advance rm performance for low-performance
rms. However, we failed to nd evidence that
board independence is eective for high-performance enterprises.
Figure 2(b) shows that CEO duality is signicantly and positively associated with rm performance in the range from quantiles 0.30 to 0.75
with the eect being larger in the higher quantiles.
The results also show that CEO duality is not
signicant in the quantiles lower than 0.30 and in
the quantiles larger than 0.75, which is indicated
by the very broad band of the interval of
condence. This implies that CEO duality as a
corporate governance mechanism is not functioning well for under-performing and top-performing
rms. In this case, these ndings show that the
relationship between CEO duality and rm
performance is dierent across quantiles, which is
again something that cannot be captured by
applying the classical linear regression. The ndings on the relationship between CEO duality and
rm performance using quantile regression partly
support Hypothesis 4, indicating that CEO duality
is not an eective way to promote rm performance for high-performance corporations. However, we nd no evidence to support the argument
that CEO duality is an eective way to promote
rm performance of low-performance enterprises.
The other additional results are provided in
Table 5, reporting the estimates of the interaction
eects as to board characteristics and board size.
In Model 1, the interaction of the proportion of
independent directors and board size is not
signicant. This goes against Hypotheses 5 and
5Alt: evidence for a moderating eect of board
size on the relationship between the proportion of
independent directors and rm performance is
missing. In contrast, in Model 2, the interaction
of CEO duality and board size is negatively
signicant ( 0.036, with po0.05). In Model 3,
with all interaction eects included, similar
results are found for the CEO dualityboard size
interaction variable ( 0.036, with po0.05), with
the interaction eect of the proportion of
independent directors with board size being
insignicant. Based on this regression analysis,
we reject Hypothesis 6. However, we cannot
reject Hypothesis 6Alt, as we found evidence that
Model 2
Model 3
0.397
0.298
0.018
0.018
0.026**
0.027**
0.013*** 0.014***
0.007**
0.008**
0.016*** 0.016***
0.005**
0.005**
0.002
0.002
0.004
0.007
0.022
0.006
0.005
0.022
0.004
0.020
0.019
0.014
0.004
0.011
0.010
0.009
0.004
0.020
0.018
0.013
0.004
0.011
0.013
0.010
0.499
0.036** 0.036**
0.000
0.151
0.002
0.155
623
contribute so little, if anything, in very lowperforming enterprises may be that these rms do
not need good surveillance, but rather a mediator
to obtain external resources. Well-informed inside directors, being well aware of the internal
conditions of the rm, are better positioned to
help to make the right decisions as to the
appropriate business strategy (Baysinger and
Hoskisson, 1990). As rm performance increases,
though, the likelihood of CEO entrenchment
goes up: then, board independence is required to
discipline the CEO (Finkelstein and DAveni,
1994). Our result that board independence is
signicant in the 0.30.7 quantiles range supports
this entrenchment argument, so being in line with
agency theory (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen,
1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Conversely, as
the rm moves into the top rank, board
independence will turn ineective, again. This
may be caused by the fact that the adoption of
these practices by excellent rms operates as a
signal that they behave well, which is in line with
the expectations of the outside world anyway
(Black, Jang and Kim, 2006).
On the other hand, the result that CEO duality
is not signicant to enforce the performance of
under-performing corporations may be because
such rms are so engaged with all kinds of serious
challenges that the marginal contribution of the
CEO duality governance mechanism is close to
zero. The nding that CEO duality does enhance
rm performance in mediocre enterprises oers
support for stewardship theory, which argues
that duality creates unambiguous leadership and
unity of command (Fayol, 1949; Massie, 1965).
The nding goes against popular beliefs in East
Asia that the role of the chair of the board should
be separated from the position of the CEO
(Claessens and Fan, 2002; Claessens, Djankov
and Lang, 2000). Perhaps, average-performing
rms face complicated operational and managerial issues that demand strong and solid leadership. For the top-performing enterprises,
insignicance of CEO duality may be due to the
fact that the likelihood of entrenchment is larger
in such rms (Finkelstein and DAveni, 1994).
Conversely, these rms need good surveillance
mechanisms by implementing CEO non-duality,
an argument in line with agency theory. Additionally, we found a negative moderating eect of
board size on the positive relationship between
CEO duality and rm performance. This implies
624
that the positive eect of CEO duality does
diminish as the number of board members
increases. The reason is that, as the number of
board members increases, decision-making processes, coordination and communication become
more problematic (Lin, 1996; Yermack, 1996),
which reduces the benets of CEO duality.
The ndings in this study have implications for
both theoretical understanding and corporate
governance practices. The result that the eectiveness of board characteristics depends on the
level of rm performance underscores the contingency theory of management. Contingency
theory proposes that the optimal structure of
any organization is dependent upon a wide
variety of contingencies (Donaldson, 2001; Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Pugh et al., 1969). Our
ndings suggest that the optimal design of board
independence and CEO duality is conditional on
the level of initial rm performance. This is a
result that is highly relevant from a regulatory
perspective as well. A single one size ts all
design of corporate governance, as reected in
many corporate governance codes, that is applied
to a wide variety of enterprises is likely to be
inappropriate, as a specic characteristic of a rm
may t with a dierent best practice than
suggested. This implies that regulators should be
careful not to design strict one size ts all
corporate governance rules, but should rather
specify conditional best practices. As an alternative, the often introduced comply or explain
clause may oer a second-best option.
Our study, as any, features a number of
limitations. A key one is the cross-section nature
of our data. This means that we cannot explore
causality and time lag issues. For instance, it may
be that the eects of an independent board
membership and CEO duality take several years
to materialize. Apart from collecting panel data,
this issue can perhaps be resolved by weighting
board independence and CEO duality by the
tenure of the (non)executive ocers involved.
Another important research opportunity is to
apply quantile regression widely in the corporate
governance research domain and organization
sciences at large, for that matter. This study
demonstrates that quantile regression can provide
additional insights in the understanding of the
relationship between board characteristics and
rm performance. We believe that the method can
be extensively utilized to evaluate corporate
References
Abrevaya, J. (2001). The eects of demographics and maternal
behavior on the distribution of birth outcomes, Empirical
Economics, 26, pp. 247257.
Agrawal, A. and C. R. Knoeber (1996). Firm performance and
mechanisms to control agency problems between managers
and shareholders, Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis, 31, pp. 377397.
Aguilera, R. V., I. Filatotchev, H. Gospel and G. Jackson
(2008). An organizational approach to comparative corporate governance: costs, contingencies, and complementarities, Organization Science, 19, pp. 475492.
Alexander, J. A., M. L. Fennell and M. T. Halpern (1993).
Leadership instability in hospitals: the inuence of board
CEO relations and organization growth and decline,
Administrative Science Quarterly, 38, pp. 7499.
Al Farooque, O., T. van Zijl, K. Dunstan and A. K. M. W.
Karim (2007). Corporate governance in Bangladesh: link
between ownership and nancial performance, Corporate
Governance: An International Review, 15, pp. 14531468.
Arias, O., K. F. Hallock and W. S. Escudero (2001). Individual
heterogeneity in the returns to schooling: instrumental
variables quantile regression using twins data, Empirical
Economics, 26, pp. 740.
Baliga, B. R., R. C. Moyer and R. S. Rao (1996). CEO duality
and rm performance: whats the fuss?, Strategic Management Journal, 17, pp. 4153.
Barreto, R. A. and A. W. Hughes (2004). Under performers
and over achievers: a quantile regression analysis of growth,
Economic Record, 80, pp. 1735.
Bassett Jr, G. W. and H. L. Chen (2001). Portfolio style:
return-based attribution using quantile regression, Empirical
Economics, 26, pp. 293305.
Baysinger, B. D. and H. N. Butler (1985). Corporate
governance and the board of directors: performance eects
of changes in board composition, Journal of Law, Economics
and Organization, 1, pp. 101124.
Baysinger, B. D. and R. E. Hoskisson (1990). The composition of
boards of directors and strategic control: eects on corporate
strategy, Academy of Management Review, 15, pp. 7187.
Bhagat, S. and B. Black (2002). The non-correlation between
board independence and long-term rm performance,
Journal of Corporation Law, 27, pp. 231273.
Black, B. S., H. Jang and W. Kim (2006). Does corporate
governance predict rms market values? Evidence from
Korea, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 22,
pp. 366413.
Boyd, B. K. (1995). CEO duality and rm performance: a
contingency model, Strategic Management Journal, 16, pp.
301312.
625
626
contrasting theories of corporate governance, Corporate
Governance: An International Review, 11, pp. 189205.
Klein, A. (1998). Firm performance and board committee structure, Journal of Law and Economics, 41, pp.
275303.
Knight, C. A. and D. D. Ackerly (2002). Variation in nuclear
DNA content across environmental gradients: a quantile
regression analysis, Ecology Letters, 5, pp. 6676.
Koenker, R. and G. S. Bassett (1978). Regression quantiles,
Econometrica, 46, pp. 3350.
Koenker, R. and K. F. Hallock (2001). Quantile regression,
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, pp. 143156.
Lemmon, M. L. and K. V. Lins (2003). Ownership structure,
corporate governance and rm value: evidence from the
East Asian nancial crisis, Journal of Finance, 58, pp. 1445
1468.
Lin, L. (1996). The eectiveness of outside directors as a
corporate governance mechanism: theories and evidence,
Northwestern University Law Review, 90, pp. 898976.
Lipton, M. and J. W. Lorsch (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance, Business Lawyer, 1, pp. 5977.
Machado, J. A. F. and J. Mata (2001). Earning functions in
Portugal 19821994: evidence from quantile regressions,
Empirical Economics, 26, pp. 115134.
Manning, W. G., L. Blumberg and L. H. Moulton (1995). The
demand for alcohol: the dierential response to price,
Journal of Health Economics, 14, pp. 123148.
Massie, J. L. (1965). Management theory. In J. G. March
(ed.), Handbook of Organizations, pp. 387422. Chicago, IL:
Rand-McNally.
Mintzberg, H. (1983). Power In and Around Organizations.
Englewood Clis, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Mitton, T. (2002). A cross-rm analysis of the impact of
corporate governance on the East Asian nancial crisis,
Journal of Financial Economics, 64, pp. 215241.
Mukherjee, C., H. White and M. Wuyts (1998). Econometrics and
Data Analysis for Developing Countries. New York: Routledge.
Nam, S. W. and I. C. Nam (2004). Corporate Governance in Asia:
Recent Evidence from Indonesia, Republic Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute.
Dendi Ramdani is a PhD student at the University of Antwerp, Belgium. He obtained his MPhil
(Research Master) in economics and econometrics from the University of Groningen, the
Netherlands, and his MSc in economics from the University of Indonesia, Indonesia. His PhD
research project focuses on the impact of corporate governance on rm performance in dierent
institutional contexts.
Arjen van Witteloostuijn is a Research Professor of economics and management at the University of
Antwerp, Belgium, and Professor of Institutional Economics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands.
He has published widely in such international journals as the Academy of Management Journal,
Academy of Management Review, American Sociological Review, Economica, Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, Journal of Economic Psychology, Journal of International Business
Studies, Journal of Management Studies, Management Science, Organization Studies, Organization
Science and Strategic Management Journal. His current research interests cross-border
macroeconomics, industrial organization, organizational ecology and social psychology.